

III

BAVLI ZEBAHIM CHAPTER THREE

FOLIOS 31B-36B

3:1-2

3:1

- A. All unfit people [e.g., the ten listed at M. 2:1A] who [in behalf of the Temple cult] slaughtered [an animal designated for a sacrifice] — their act of slaughter is valid.
- B. For an act of slaughter [in general, not in the cult] is valid [when done] by non-priests, women, slaves, and unclean men —
- C. even in the case of [their slaughtering] Most Holy Things.
- D. And [this is so] on condition that the unclean people do not touch the meat.
- E. Therefore they [who are listed above also have the power to] invalidate [the offering they have slaughtered] by improper intention [in the act of slaughtering].
- F. But all of them [who are unfit] who received the blood [intending to eat the meat] outside its proper time or outside its proper place,
- G. if the lifeblood [suitable for tossing] still remained [in the beast, that is, the blood which gushes at the moment of death] —
- H. a fit person should go and [with proper intention] receive [it].

3:2

- A. [If] a fit person received [the blood] and handed it over to an unfit person, [without conveying it] he [the unfit one] should return it to the fit person.
- B. [If] he received the blood in his right hand and put it into his left, he should return it to his right hand.
- C. [If] he received it in a sacred utensil and put it into an unconsecrated utensil, he should put it back into a sacred utensil.
- D. [If after the blood was received in a utensil], it poured from the utensil onto the pavement and one gathered it up, it is valid.
- E. [If he [who was unfit] tossed it on the ramp, not against the foundation [of the altar],

- F. [if] he tossed those which are to be tossed below, above,
- G. or those which are to be tossed above, below,
- H. those which are to be tossed inside, outside,
- I. or those which are to be tossed outside, inside,
- J. if the lifeblood still remained in the beast,
- K. a suitable person should go and receive it [and repeat the sprinklings] [= M. 3:1G-H].

- I.1** A. [We commence by formulating a thesis on what is implicit in the Mishnah's formulation of the rule.] *If such a person slaughtered a beast, after the fact it is a valid action, but to begin with, such a person should not do so.*
- B. *An objection was raised on the basis of the following:*
- C. "And he shall slaughter" (Lev. 1: 5) — slaughtering by a non-priest is valid.
- D. **For an act of slaughter [in general, not in the cult] is valid [when done] by non-priests, women, slaves, and unclean men — even in the case of [their slaughtering] Most Holy Things.**
- E. But perhaps it may be done only by priests?
- F. Do you say so now? But whence your reason? That it is said, "And you and your sons with you shall keep the priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar" (Num. 18: 7)? So you maintain that this applies to the act of slaughter as well? But Scripture further states, "and he shall kill the bullock before the Lord, and Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the blood" (Lev. 1: 5), which bears the sense that the priesthood's participation is required for receiving the blood and from that point on, while slaughtering by a non-priest is valid.
- G. *Now, it is clear, that is the rule even to begin with [and not only after the fact]. But the reason that matters are formulated as they are [in language which suggests that the rule applies only after the fact] is that the framer of the passage wishes to include the classification of unclean persons, and these to begin with may not commit the act of slaughter since they may not touch the meat, so the passage is formulated in the language, **All unfit people who [in behalf of the Temple cult] slaughtered** [that is, after the fact].*
- I.2.** A. *But is it the fact that, after the fact, an unclean person may indeed carry out a valid act of slaughter? In contradiction of that allegation is the following;*
- B. "And he shall lay his hands upon the head of the burned offering...and he shall kill the bullock before the Lord" (Lev. 1: 4-5) — just as the laying on of hands may be done only by cultically-clean persons, so the act of slaughter may be done only by cultically-clean persons.
- C. *True enough, but that is only by the authority of the rabbis [and not a law of the Torah, so that after the fact, it is still valid].*
- D. *And what distinguishes the act of laying on of hands? It is the use of the language, "...before the Lord" (Lev. 1: 4).*
- E. *But the same language, "...before the Lord" (Lev. 1: 4) is used with regard to the act of slaughter!*

- F. *It is possible to make a very long knife and perform the act of slaughter with it [with the animal inside the court, the priest outside, so the unclean priest can come “before the Lord” for the purpose of slaughtering the animal].*
- G. *It is also possible to do the same with the laying on of hands, since the person can poke his hands into the Temple court and lay them on the beast [even though the person is unclean].*
- H. *Partial entry into the courtyard on the part of a person is classified as entry into the courtyard [and forbidden].*
- I. *R. Hisda formulated matters as a Tannaite tradition in just the opposite manner:*
- J. *“And he shall lay his hands upon the head of the burned offering...and he shall kill the bullock before the Lord” (Lev. 1: 4-5) — just as the act of slaughtering the sacrificial animal must be done by cultically-clean persons, so the act of laying on of hands must be done only by cultically-clean persons.”*
- K. *And what distinguishes the act of slaughter? It is the use of the language, “...before the Lord” (Lev. 1: 4).*
- L. **[32B]** *But “before the Lord” is used also with reference to laying on of hands.*
- M. *It is possible to poke his hands into the Temple court and lay them on the beast [even though the person is unclean].*
- N. *For the purposes of slaughtering the beast too, it is possible to make a very long knife and perform the act of slaughter with it [with the animal inside the court, the priest outside.*
- O. *Who is the authority behind this formulation? It is R. Simeon the Temanite.*
- P. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- Q. *“And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord” (Lev. 1: 4) — the bullock must be located before the Lord [in the Temple courtyard], but the one who slaughters it does not have to be located before the Lord.*
- R. *Simeon the Temanite says, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the hands of the one who does the slaughtering must be located on the inner side of the beast that is slaughtered [so that he stands between the beast and the altar]? As it is said, ‘And he shall slaughter the bullock before the Lord,’ meaning, the one who slaughters the bullock must be located before the Lord.”*

I.3. A. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “An unclean person who poked his hands inside the Temple court is flogged, for it is said, ‘She shall not touch any Holy Things nor come into the sanctuary’ (Lev. 12: 4) — Scripture thereby treats as analogous entering the sanctuary and touching the Holy Things. Just as partially touching something is classified as wholly doing so [even though one does not touch the thing with the whole of his body], so partially entering the sanctuary is treated as equivalent to wholly entering it.”

B. *R. Hoshaia objected to Ulla, “If the eighth day of the purification period of a person afflicted with the skin ailment [of Leviticus 13-14] coincided with the eve of the Passover, and who had an*

emission on that day [before offering his sacrifices in completion of the purification rite], and who immersed himself [although he had immersed on the previous day on account of his leprosy, doing so again by reason of his emission] — sages said, ‘Even though any other person in the status of one who has immersed but awaits sunset for the completion of his purification may not enter the Temple, this one may enter the Temple [for his purification rite]. It is better that fulfilling an affirmative religious duty that bears the penalty of extirpation [the Passover offering, and completing the purification rite allows the man to eat the Passover offering that night, and that is an affirmative religious duty] should come along and set aside an affirmative religious duty that does not carry with it the penalty of extirpation [that is, the one who has immersed and awaits sunset is not to come into the Levitical camp, but if he does so, he does not incur the penalty of extirpation].’

- C. “And R. Yohanan said, ‘Even an affirmative action is not connected with that matter, so far as the law of the Torah is concerned.’ For it is said, ‘And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah and Jerusalem in the house of the Lord before the new court’ (2Ch. 20: 5). *And what is the meaning of ‘the new court’?* Said R. Yohanan, ‘They innovated there and ruled, “A person who has immersed and awaits for sunset to complete his purification must not enter the Levitical camp.” *Now if you take the view that so partially entering the sanctuary is treated as equivalent to wholly entering it, how can the person afflicted with the skin ailment, who is undergoing a process of purification, poke in his hands for sprinkling of the thumbs, for in both cases we deal with an affirmative religious duty, the sanction of which is extirpation [that is, an unclean person may not enter the Temple court and the sanction is extirpation].*”
- D. *He said to him, “From your answer [I can refute you,]: the case of a person afflicted with the skin disease is different. Since he was permitted to enter the court partially on account of the purification rite for his skin ailment, he also will be permitted to do so for the purification rite in respect to his emission.”*
- E. *Said R. Joseph, “Ulla takes the position that if the majority of the people were unclean by reason of flux and they further contracted corpse uncleanness, since they are permitted by reason of their corpse-uncleanness, they are permitted by reason of their flux-uncleanness [to participate in the Passover, in line with the rule that if the majority of the community on the eve of Passover contracts corpse uncleanness, they can offer the Passover offering nonetheless, since this uncleanness is set aside; if they were unclean with flux uncleanness, they could not do so. If they were unclean in that way and then become unclean with corpse uncleanness too,*

they are permitted on account of the latter, since they are permitted on account of the former (Freedman)].”

F. *Said to him Abayye, “But are the cases really comparable? The corpse-uncleanness was remitted, while the flux-uncleanness was not remitted. [Freedman: though the uncleanness by reason of corpse uncleanness is remitted, yet since it came after the flux uncleanness, it cannot render that permitted too, for if it did, it would create the absurd position that while the flux uncleanness alone is not remitted, when corpse uncleanness is added to it, then it is remitted.] Perhaps this is what you meant to say: if the majority of the people were unclean by reason of corpse uncleanness and they further contracted flux uncleanness, since they are permitted by reason of their corpse-uncleanness, they are permitted by reason of their flux-uncleanness.”*

G. *He said to him, “Quite so.”*

H. *He said to him, “Still, are the cases really comparable? In the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment, it is permitted [for him to project his hands inside the Temple court, in the purification process], and, since there is a remission of the uncleanness in regard to the skin ailment, it also is a case in which there is a remission of the uncleanness in regard to his seminal emission. But in the case of the corpse-uncleanness, it is merely superseded; so in respect to the corpse uncleanness, it is superseded, while in respect to the flux uncleanness, it is not superseded.”*

I. *Said to him Raba, “To the contrary, the opposite view stands to reason, namely: in the case of a person afflicted with the skin ailment, the uncleanness is remitted, but it is remitted in respect to the one but not the other. But the uncleanness nonetheless is superseded. Now what difference does it make to me whether it is superseded in one matter or whether it is superseded in general?”*

J. **[33A]** *What follows is that both [Abayye and Raba] take the view that in the case of uncleanness affecting the community, the uncleanness is merely superseded.*

K. *May one maintain that the following supports the position of Ulla [that poking only part of one’s body into the Temple area is tantamount to poking the whole of one’s body there]:*

L. **All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter, except for this one, which was at the gate of Nicanor. And all the layings on of hands that are done in the sanctuary take place at the northern side of the altar, except for this one, which was at Nicanor’s gate. For he cannot enter the courtyard until some of the blood of his sin offering and his guilt offering is sprinkled on him [T. [Neg.8:10A-E](#)].**

- M. *Now if you take the position that poking only part of one's body into the Temple area is not tantamount to poking the whole of one's body there, then let the man poke his hand inside the Temple court and lay on hands [immediately prior to the slaughter, as in all other cases].*
- N. *Said R. Joseph, "In accord with whom is this rule formulated? It is in accord with R. Yosé b. R. Judah, who has said, 'The north was at some distance from the entrance of the Temple court [and that is where the purification offerings of the person afflicted with the skin ailment were offered].'"*
- O. *Then why not make a little gate [on the north wall of the Temple court near the altar, so the animal still could be slaughtered as soon as the healed person laid on hands]?*
- P. *Both Abayye and Raba said, "'All this do I give you in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by his hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern' (1Ch. 28:19) [so the Temple could not be changed in any way]."*
- Q. *Others say, "said R. Joseph, 'Whoever lays on hand must poke in to the Temple courtyard his head and the greater part of the body. Why is this the case? Because we require him to lay on his hands with all his strength, and there is no other way of doing it.'"*

I.4. *A. What does the Tannaite authority take as his premise [when he says, **All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter, except for this one, which was at the gate of Nicanor. And all the layings on of hands that are done in the sanctuary take place at the northern side of the altar, except for this one, which was at Nicanor's gate. For he cannot enter the courtyard until some of the blood of his sin offering and his guilt offering is sprinkled on him**]? If he takes as his premise that laying on of hands on the guilt offering of the person healed of the skin ailment is by the authority of the Torah, and the rule that **All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter** likewise is by the authority of the Torah, then let the healed person who was afflicted with the skin ailment go right on and lay hands, since the All-Merciful has prescribed doing just that!*

- B. *Said R. Ada bar Mattenah, "It is a precautionary measure, lest he take too many steps."*

- C. Others say, “Said R. Ada bar Mattenah, ‘*While the laying on of hands on the guilt offering of the person healed of the skin ailment is by the authority of the Torah, the rule that **All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter** is not by the authority of the Torah.*’”
- D. *An objection was raised:* “And he shall lay his hands...and he shall kill” (Lev. 1: 4) — just as the laying of hands must be done only by clean persons, so the act of slaughter must be done only by clean persons. *Now if you say that this is not a rule based on the authority of the Torah, then it should be permitted to have unclean persons do it too!* [Let the formerly-afflicted persons lay on hands outside the Temple court and then bring the sacrifice in and have it slaughtered (Freedman)].
- E. *Rather, reverse matters: laying on of hands by the formerly afflicted person on the guilt offering does not rest on the authority of the Torah, but the requirement that the act of slaughter must follow immediately upon the laying on of hands is based on the law of the Torah.*

I.5. A. [33B] *Rabina said, “[The position of Ulla, that poking only part of one’s body into the Temple area is tantamount to poking the whole of one’s body there] is stated only with reference to the penalty of flogging [but not in respect to extirpation].”* [Freedman: therefore you cannot raise an objection from the law of a leper who had a nocturnal issue, where the penalty is involved is extirpation.]

- B. *When Rabin came, he said R. Abbahu [said], “It was stated in the context of an unclean person who touched consecrated meat [and had nothing to do with partial entry into the Temple courtyard, pace Ulla].”*
- C. *For it has been stated:*
- D. An unclean person who touched consecrated meat —
- E. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is flogged.”
- F. R. Yohanan said, “He is not flogged.”

- G. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is flogged: 'she shall touch no holy thing' (Lev. 12: 4). [A negative commandment that is violated bears the sanction of flogging.]"
- H. R. Yohanan said, "He is not flogged. *The cited verse speaks of food in the status of heave-offering.*"
- I. *But does R. Simeon b. Laqish take the position that the cited verse serves the purpose just now imputed to it? Surely it is required to serve as an admonition against her eating consecrated meat [while still unclean]. For it has been stated:*
- J. How on the basis of Scripture do we derive an admonition against eating consecrated meat [in a condition of uncleanness]? R. Simeon b. Laqish says, "From the verse, 'she shall touch no holy thing' (Lev. 12: 4)."
- K. *R. Yohanan said Bardela repeated as a Tannaite formulation, "It derives from the use of the word 'his uncleanness' in the present context and also in the context of an unclean person's going into the sanctuary. ['Lev. 7:20: 'but the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings...having his uncleanness upon him...shall be cut off from his people.' Num. 19:13: 'whoever touches the dead and does not purify himself — he has defiled the tabernacle of the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from Israel']. Just as in the latter case the sanction is prescribed and admonition is given [at Num. 5: 3], so here as well Scripture specifies the sanction and also implies an admonition" [so R. Simeon b. Laqish reads the cited verse for a purpose other than that adduced above].*
- L. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish:*
- M. "She shall touch no holy thing" (Lev. 12: 4) — that represents an admonition as to not eating holy things when unclean.
- N. You say that that represents an admonition as to not eating holy

things when unclean. But perhaps that is not the case, but rather it forms an admonition in regard to touching. So the same passage goes on to state, “She shall not touch any Holy Thing nor come into the sanctuary.” The Holy Thing is treated as comparable to the sanctuary. Just as an offense against the sanctuary involves [34A] the death penalty, so an offense in connection with Holy Things involves the death penalty. *If this treats merely touching the meat, can there be a death penalty? [Obviously not]. So it must deal with eating.*

- O. *Nonetheless, the verse may well be required in regard to an unclean person's eating holy meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar [at which point it is permitted to eat the holy meat that is set aside from the offering]. For it has been stated:*
- P. An unclean person who ate eating holy meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar —
- Q. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is flogged.”
- R. R. Yohanan said, “He is not flogged.
- S. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is flogged: ‘she shall touch no holy thing’ (Lev. 12: 4). [A negative commandment that is violated bears the sanction of flogging.] There is no distinction to be made whether this is before the sprinkling of the blood or afterward. “
- T. R. Yohanan said, “He is not flogged. *For that is in line with what Bardela repeated as a Tannaite formulation, ‘It derives from the use of the word “his uncleanness” in the present context and also in the context of an*

unclean person's going into the sanctuary. [Lev. 7:20: 'but the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings...having his uncleanness upon him...shall be cut off from his people.' Num. 19:13: 'whoever touches the dead and does not purify himself — he has defiled the tabernacle of the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from Israel']. And that is written with regard to the rule governing after the sprinkling of the blood." [Freedman: the penalty of extirpation is incurred only after the sprinkling].

- U. If so [that the verse is required solely for this purpose], let Scripture state, "She shall not touch a Holy Thing." Why say, "any Holy Thing"? It is so that two distinct rules may be derived from the passage.

I.6. A. *Reverting to the body of the prior discussion:*

- B. An unclean person who ate eating holy meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar —
- C. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is flogged."
- D. R. Yohanan said, "He is not flogged."
- E. Said Abayye, "The dispute concerns uncleanness affecting the person of the priest, but as to uncleanness affecting the meat of the sacrifice itself, all parties concur that such a person is flogged, for Scripture has said, 'And the meat that touches any unclean thing shall not be eaten' (Lev. 7:19) — inclusive of the wood used on the altar and the frankincense, *which are not even things that can be eaten*

at all. Now these are matters to which Scripture has extended the law. [So even though the holy meat cannot be eaten prior to the sprinkling of the blood, if one does so, he is flogged for having violating a negative commandment that validly applies.]”

F. And Raba said, “The dispute concerns uncleanness affecting the meat of the sacrifice itself, but as to uncleanness affecting the meat of the offering, all parties concur that he is not flogged. *What is the scriptural basis of that view? Since to him does not apply the verse, ‘Having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off’ (Lev. 7:20), to him also does not apply the verse, ‘And the meat that touches any unclean thing shall not be eaten.’”*

G. But has not a master stated, “‘And the meat that touches any unclean thing shall not be eaten’ (Lev. 7:19) — inclusive of the wood used on the altar and the frankincense”?

H. *In that context with what do we deal? A case in which the wood and the frankincense had been consecrated in a utensil of service, so they entered the condition that applies when all of the rites that permit the eating of the sacrifice, so far as they pertain to these things, have been performed. For we have learned in the Mishnah: [The handful, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offerings of priests, and the meal offering of the anointed priest, and the meal offering which accompanies drink offerings [M. **Zeb.4:3**]*—the laws of sacrilege apply to them once they have been sanctified. [When] they have been sanctified in a utensil, they are rendered fit to be made invalid by a tebul-yom and by one whose rites of atonement have not yet been completed and by being left overnight. And they are liable on their account because of violation of the laws of remnant and because of violation of the laws of**

uncleanness. But the prohibition of refuse does not apply to them. This is the general principle:] For whatever is subject to that which renders the offering permitted are they not liable on account of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness until what renders the offering permitted has been properly offered. And for whatever is not subject to that which renders the offering permitted, once it has been sanctified in a utensil are they liable on account of the violation of the laws of remnant, and on account of violation of the laws of uncleanness. But the law of refuse does not apply to it [at all] [M. **Me.2:9**].

I.7. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. He who brings up limbs of an unclean beast onto the altar —
- C. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is flogged.”
- D. R. Yohanan said, “He is not flogged.”
- E. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is flogged.” a clean beast may [be put on the altar], but an unclean beast may not, and on account of violating a negative commandment which is inferred from a positive one, one is flogged.
- F. R. Yohanan said, “He is not flogged.” it is a negative commandment which is inferred from a positive one, and on account of violating a negative commandment which is inferred from a positive one, one is not flogged.
- G. *R. Jeremiah objected:* “‘That is what you may eat’ (Lev. 1: 2) but not an unclean animal. Here we have a negative commandment inferred from a positive one, and such a commandment as a matter of fact is classified as a positive commandment.” [Freedman: and but for the special negative injunction that follows in the scriptural

text, it would involve no flogging.]

- H. *Said R. Jacob to R. Jeremiah bar Tahalipa, "Let me explain it for you: in connection with the limbs of an unclean domesticated beast, there is no dispute whatsoever. Where there is a dispute, it concerns a wild beast, and this is how the matter has been stated:*
- I. *"[He who brings up limbs of an unclean wild beast onto the altar —] R. Yohanan said, "He violates a negative commandment." And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He does not in any way violate any commandment at all."*
- J. *"R. Yohanan said, 'He violates a negative commandment:' 'you shall bring your offering of domesticate cattle' means, only of domesticated cattle but not of wild beasts.*
- K. *"And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, 'He does not in any way violate any commandment at all:' the cited passage serves merely to describe the proper way of carrying out the religious duty at hand [but it is not an indispensable way of keeping the law]."*
- L. *Objected Raba, "If Scripture had said, 'When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, cattle...' (Lev. 1: 2), I should concur that the wild beast is encompassed by the word, 'cattle,' as in the verse, 'These are the animals that you may eat: ox, sheep, goat, hart, gazelle, roebuck'*

(Deu. 14: 4-5) [and the last three are wild and not domesticated]. But Scripture does indeed state, 'even of the herd or of the flock' (Lev. 1: 2), meaning, of the herd or of the flock are the beasts of which I have spoken to you, and not a wild beast. Might one take the view that one should not bring a wild beast to begin with, but if after the fact one has presented a wild beast, it is valid? To what should such an action be compared? To a disciple whom the master ordered, 'Bring me wheat,' and he brought him wheat and barley, in which case the disciple has not disobeyed but only added to the master's instructions, in which case it is a valid action. But Scripture states, 'even of the herd or of the flock,' so the sense is exclusionary: of the herd or the flock is what I have instructed you to bring, but not a wild beast. For to what may the matter be compared? To the case of a disciple whom the master ordered, 'Bring me only wheat,' and he brought him wheat and barley, in which case the disciple has not merely added to, but actually disobeyed, the master's instructions. **[34B]** So the action is invalid."

M. *The proposed refutation of the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish indeed is a valid one.*

II.1 A. But all of them [who are unfit] who received the blood [intending to eat the meat] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, if the lifeblood [suitable for tossing] still remained [in the beast, that is, the blood which issues at the moment of death] — a fit person should go and [with proper intention] receive [it]:

- B. *R. Simeon b. Laqish raised the following question: of R. Yohanan, “Can an unfit person place in the status of a residue the blood that is in the throat of the beast?” [Freedman: If an unfit person sprinkles the blood, can a fit person make the sacrifice valid by catching more blood from the animal’s throat and sprinkling it? Or do we say, once this unfit person has sprinkled the blood, what still remains in the throat is regarded as merely the residue of the blood, which cannot be used for sprinkling, and therefore the sacrifice is invalid].*
- C. He said to him, “There is no case in which an action of sprinkling renders the remaining blood a residue, except for a case in which the sprinkling is done with improper intention to eat the meat later on at the wrong time or in the wrong place, since the improper attitude imparts the status of refuse to the offering, the blood of which has been sprinkled subject to that improper attitude.”

II.2. A. *R. Zebid repeated as a Tannaite statement the issue in the following formulation: “R. Simeon b. Laqish raised the following question: of R. Yohanan, ‘Can the use of an unfit cup of blood render blood in the throat of the beast a residue?’*

- B. *“He said to him, ‘But what’s your opinion about the affect of such an action on the part of an unfit person himself? If an unfit person has the power to render blood in the throat of a beast into residue, then the use of an unfit cup also will render the blood into residue, and if an unfit person does not produce that affect, the use of an unfit cup also will not do so.”*

II.3. A. *R. Jeremiah of Difti repeated as a Tannaite statement the issue in the following formulation: “Abayye asked Rabbah, ‘Does one cup of blood have the power to render what is in another cup into residue?’ [Freedman: if the blood of a sin offering was received in two cups, and all the sprinklings were performed out of one, is the blood in the other regarded as residue, to be poured out at the foot of the altar in Line with Lev. 4: 7? Or do we say that by not using it he intentionally rejected it, and therefore it is simply poured out into the sewer in the Temple court?]*

- B. He said to him, “It is a dispute between R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon and rabbis.”
- C. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- D. Earlier it is stated, “And the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar” (Lev. 4:25), while later on, “And all the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar” (Lev. 4:30). In the case of a sin offering the blood of which one has received in four cups, how do we know that if the priest applied the blood from each one time on the altar [on the four horns thereof], all of the rest of the blood is poured out at the base of the altar? Scripture states, “And all the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar” (Lev. 4:30). Then might you suppose that if one made the four applications from a single cup, all the rest of the blood is to be poured out at the base? Scripture

states, "And the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar" (Lev. 4:25). How so? The remaining blood of that cup is poured out at the base, but the blood in the other cups is poured out into the sewer.

- E. R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that if the priest received the blood of the sin offering in four cups and made all four applications of blood onto the horns of the altar from one of them, all of the rest is poured out at the base? Scripture states, 'And all the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar' (Lev. 4:30)."
- F. But it also is written, "And the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar" (Lev. 4:25)!
- G. *Said R. Ashi, "That is to exclude the residue of blood left in the throat of the animal."*

III.1 A. [If] a fit person received [the blood] and handed it over to an unfit person, [without conveying it] he [the unfit one] should return it to the fit person. [If] he received the blood in his right hand and put it into his left, he should return it to his right hand. [If] he received it in a sacred utensil and put it into an unconsecrated utensil, he should put it back into a sacred utensil. [If after the blood was received in a utensil], it poured from the utensil onto the pavement and one gathered it up, it is valid:

- B. *All of these cases had to be articulated. For if we were informed only about the rule governing the unfit person, I might have supposed that the indicative trait of the unfit person is that it is a priest who is unclean but otherwise eligible for the rite, but a left-handed priest would not then fall into that classification, since he is not eligible to begin with.*
- C. *And had we been given the rule concerning the left hand, [I would have supposed that the indicative trait is that the left hand] is fit for use on the Day of Atonement [when the high priest took the spoon in his left hand, with the censor in his right], while an unconsecrated utensil is never fit [and so is not subject to the rule at hand].*
- D. *And had we been told the rule for the unconsecrated utensil, that would apply because they are eligible for sanctification, while the others, not in that classification, would not be subject to the rule.*
- E. *So it was necessary to articulate the several cases.*

III.2. A. [But if the blood was fit in the first place but rejected on any of the specified counts,] why not treat the blood as rejected?

- B. *Said Rabina to R. Ashi, "This is what R. Jeremiah of Difti said in the name of Raba: 'Lo, who is the authority behind this rule? It is Hanan the Egyptian, who does not accept the rule that if blood is once rejected, it is permanently rejected. For so it has been taught on Tannaite authority.'"*
- C. Hanan the Egyptian says, "Even if the blood is in the cup, he brings its fellow and mixes it with it." [Freedman: two he goats were taken on the day of Atonement, one sacrificed as a sin offering, the other sent away into the wilderness, and the lot decided which was which. Blood of the former was received in a cup and sprinkled on the altar. If the scape goat died before the blood of the other was sprinkled, Hanan rules that we do not say the blood is rejected so two other goats

must be brought; only one more is brought and paired up with the one already slaughtered.]

- D. *R. Ashi said, "In any case in which one has the power to correct the situation, we do not say that rejection has taken place [e.g., as in this case by transferring the blood]."*
- E. *R. Shaya said, "Reason supports the view of R. Ashi. For whom do you know who has accepted the principle of rejection? It is R. Judah. For we have learned in the Mishnah: [The two goats of the Day of Atonement — the religious requirement concerning them is that the two of them be equivalent in appearance, height, and value, and that they be purchased simultaneously. But even though they are not equivalent [in these regards], they are valid. [If] one purchased one this day and the other the next, they are valid. [If] one of them died, if before the casting of the lots it died, let [the priest] purchase a mate for the survivor. But if after the casting of the lots it died, let one get another mate and cast lots for them as at the outset. And he says, "If the one belonging to the Lord died, then this one upon which the lot, 'For the Lord' has come up is to stand in its stead. And if the one which was for Azazel has died, this one upon which the lot, 'For Azazel,' has come up will stand in its stead." And the second one is to be put out to pasture until it is blemished, and then it is sold, and the money received for it is to fall to a freewill offering. For a sin offering of the community is not left to die. R. Judah says, "It is left to die." And further did R. Judah say, "[If] its blood is poured out, let the one who is to be sent forth be left to die. [If] the one which is to be sent forth died, let its [the other's] blood be poured out" [M. Yoma6:1]. Now we have in hand the knowledge concerning his view that in any case in which one has the power to correct the situation, we do not say that rejection has taken place. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, 'The priest would fill one cup with mingled blood and sprinkle it once against the base of the altar [for if the blood of one of them was mixed in, this will turn out to validate it' [T. Pes.4:12D-E] This proves that in any case in which one has the power to correct the situation, we do not say that rejection has taken place."*
- F. *That does indeed prove the point.*

III.3. *A. Reverting to the body of the prior discussion: It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **R. Judah says, "The priest would fill one cup with mingled blood and sprinkle it once against the base of the altar [for if the blood of one of them was mixed in, this will turn out to validate it]."**
- C. **They said to him, "And is it not so that it is not received in a utensil? [And blood which has not been received in a utensil is invalid for the altar. Another matter: this is blood that exudes at the end, and blood that merely exudes at the end, not life blood, is invalid for use on the altar.] He said to them, "If so, then why do they stop up the courtyard, so that the priests slipped around in blood up to their ankles?" They said to him, "It is a good thing for the priests to walk in blood up to their ankles" (T. Pes.4:12D-I)].**

- D. *How do they know [that it has not been caught in a utensil? Rather they said to him, “But perhaps it has not been caught in a utensil [but poured from the animal’s throat right onto the ground]?”*
- E. He said to them, “[35A] I too spoke only of blood that was received in a utensil.”
- F. *And how does he himself know that?*
- G. *The priests are meticulous, but while they do their work quickly, blood may spill.*
- H. But is it not the fact that the blood that exudes in the end is mixed up with the blood [and only life-blood can be used for sprinkling]!
- I. *R. Judah is consistent with principles expressed elsewhere, for he has said, “Blood that exudes at the end is classified as blood.”*
- J. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- K. Use of blood that has exuded is prohibited by an admonition to the contrary [and so flogging is inflicted, but not extirpation].
- L. R. Judah says, “It is subject to extirpation.”
- M. But has not R. Eleazar said, “R. Judah concedes as to the issue of atonement that the blood does not make atonement, since it is said, ‘For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life’ (Lev. 17:11) — it is the blood with the flow of which life expires, and blood with the flow of which life does not expire is not classified as blood”?
- N. *Rather, R. Judah is consistent with his view in that he has said, “Blood does not nullify blood of another classification.” [Freedman: there is certainly a little of life blood in the cup of mixed blood, and that suffices for atonement].*

III.4. A. Said to them R. Judah, “If so, then why do they stop up the courtyard, so that the priests slipped around in blood up to their ankles?”

- B. **They said to him, “It is a good thing for the sons of Aaron [the priests] to walk in blood up to their ankles” [T. Pes.4:12D-I].**
- C. *But lo, blood forms an interposition [between the feet of the priests and the pavement of the courtyard]!*
- D. *It is liquid and does not constitute an interposition, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If blood, ink, honey, and milk are coagulated, they interpose; but if in liquid form, they do not interpose.*
- E. *But lo, their garments become filthy, and it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If a priest’s garments were dirty and he performed an act of service, his act of service is unfit.*
- F. *And if you should reply that they would hold up their hems, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall put on his linen measure” (Lev. 6: 3) — meaning that it may not be too short or too long.*
- G. *They did so when they were bringing the limbs up the ramp, which is not in the category of an act of service.*
- H. *Now is it not? But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall offer it all and burn it on the altar” (Lev. 1:13)?*
- I. *Rather, they did so when putting the wood on the altar, which is not in the category of an act of service.*
- J. *So when they walked about for the purposes of acts of service, how did they do it?*

K. *They walked about on projections [along the walls].*

3:3-3:5

3:3

- A. He who slaughters the animal sacrifice [intending] to eat something which is not usually eaten,
- B. to burn something which is not usually burned —
- C. [the offering nonetheless] is valid.
- D. R. Eliezer declares invalid.
- E. [If he does so intending] to eat something which is usually eaten,
- E or to burn something which is usually burned,
- G. but the intentionally concerned [in volume] less than an olive's bulk of meat,
- H. [the offering] is valid.
- I. [If he does so] intending to eat a half-olive's bulk,
- J. and to burn a half-olive's bulk [in an improper manner],
- K. it is valid.
- L. For eating and burning do not join together.

3:4

- A. He who slaughters the animal offering [intending] to eat an olive's bulk of (1) the hide, (2) the grease, (3) the sediment [jelly], (4) the flayed-off meat [offal], (5) the bones, (6) the tendons, (7) the hooves, (8) the horns,
- B. outside of the proper time or outside of the proper place —
- C. it is valid.
- D. And they are not liable on their account for violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, or uncleanness.

3:5

- A. He who slaughters [female] consecrated animals [intending] to eat the foetus or the afterbirth
- B. outside [the proper place or time]
- C. has not rendered the sacrifice refuse [for these are not usually eaten].
- D. He who wrings the necks of turtledoves inside [intending] to eat their eggs outside [the proper place or time]
- E. has not rendered the sacrifice refuse.
- F. [As to] the milk of [female] consecrated beasts and the eggs of turtledoves [which are not integral to the body of the sacrifice] — they are not liable on their account in respect to the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness.

I.1 A. Said R. Eleazar, "If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the animal that is being sacrificed, then the status of the foetus is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the foetus inside the animal that is being sacrificed, then the status of the mother is not the same and it is not deemed refuse.

- B. “If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the offal, then the status of the crop is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the crop, then the status of the offal is not the same and it is not deemed refuse.
- C. “If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the parts that are to be burned on the altar, then the status of the bullocks is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the bullocks, then the status of the parts that are to be burned on the altar is not the same and it is not deemed refuse.”
- D. *May we say that the following supports this view [that part of an offering may be rendered refuse through an intentionality affecting another part of the same offering]?*
- E. And both concur that if the priest expressed an improper intentionality that can have yielded the classification of refuse in regard to the eating of the bullocks and burning them, he has done nothing. [Freedman: We speak of bullocks that were to be burned on the outer altar. All parties concur that if the priest expressed an intentionality during one of the blood rites to eat the bullocks the next day or to burn them on the next day, that is null, because the intentionality to eat does not count, since this is not an offering that is normally eaten, and the intentionality on burning is null, for only an intention that the altar should consume, not burn, would make a difference.]
- F. *Is it not then the case that if his intentionality had concerned the parts that are to be burned up, then the bullocks would have been rendered refuse?*
- G. No, [35B], the meaning is, “but if he had expressed an intentionality concerning the parts that were to be burned up, the parts that were to be burned up themselves are classified as refuse.”
- H. *Come and take note:* The bullocks that are to be burned and the he-goats that are to be burned are subject to the law of sacrilege from the time that they are sanctified for that purpose. When they are slaughtered, they may become unfit by one who has immersed but awaits sunset for the completion of his purification rite or by one whose atonement rites have not been completed, or by being kept overnight.
- I. *Now isn't it so that that must mean, “by keeping the meat overnight,” and you may then draw the conclusion that if being kept overnight renders the meat unfit, an improper intentionality concerning the meat likewise renders it unfit!*
- J. No, the point of reference is keeping overnight the parts of the animal that are to be burned up on the altar.
- K. *But lo, since the further clause says, “The law of sacrilege applies to them so long as they are in the house of ashes [where the meat is burned up] until the meat has dissolved,” it must follow that the opening clause also speaks of the meat, that is, of keeping the meat overnight?*
- L. *But what makes you think so? The one clause speaks of its particular case, the other of its, the former of the parts that are to be burned, the latter of the meat.*

- M. *Objected Rabbah*, “What are the things that do not impart the status of refuse [if subjected to an inappropriate intentionality] and themselves are not made refuse? The bones, tendons, horns, hooves, hair of the head of lambs, hair of the beard of he goats, eggs of turtle doves, crop of fowl, skin, limb, flayed off flesh, foetus and afterbirth. All of these do not impart the status of refuse to the animal sacrifice, either in respect to improper intention to eat the meat outside of the proper time or in respect to improper intention to burn the sacrificial parts outside of the proper place, nor does improper intention invalidate in their case on account of refuse [that is, they are not rendered refuse on their own account] and he who offers any of these things outside of the Temple is free of liability [T. **Zeb.3:9G-X**]. *Does this not mean that* they do not impart the status of refuse to the sacrifice and also are not classified as refuse through what happens to the sacrifice?”
- N. No, what it means is that they do not impart the status of refuse to the sacrifice and also are not classified as refuse through what happens to them.
- O. *If that is so, then that is just what the concluding portion states: All of these do not impart the status of refuse to the animal sacrifice, either in respect to improper intention to eat the meat outside of the proper time or in respect to improper intention to burn the sacrificial parts outside of the proper place, nor does improper intention invalidate in their case on account of refuse [that is, they are not rendered refuse on their own account], and why repeat that point?*
- P. *And within your position, when the passage states, and he who offers any of these things outside of the Temple is free of liability, why bother? It too is repeated. So you must response that the framer of the passage wishes to encompass the issues of left-over meat and unclean meat, and he also goes over the matter of refuse too, and here too, because he wants to go over the matter of one who takes them outside of the Temple, he goes over the rule, All of these do not impart the status of refuse to the animal sacrifice, either in respect to improper intention to eat the meat outside of the proper time or in respect to improper intention to burn the sacrificial parts outside of the proper place, nor does improper intention invalidate in their case on account of refuse [that is, they are not rendered refuse on their own account].*
- Q. *Raba said, “So too have we learned to repeat the matter: He who slaughters [female] consecrated animals [intending] to eat the foetus or the afterbirth outside [the proper place or time] has not rendered the sacrifice refuse [for these are not usually eaten]. He who wrings the necks of turtledoves inside [intending] to eat their eggs outside [the proper place or time] has not rendered the sacrifice refuse. [As to] the milk of [female] consecrated beasts and the eggs of turtledoves [which are not integral to the body of the sacrifice] — they are not liable on their account in respect to the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness. Does it then follows that one is culpable on account of the foetus and afterbirth? [Surely not!]. Rather, one must infer hat in the one case, it means through the sacrifice, in the other case, through what happens to the listed items themselves.”*
- R. *That is decisive proof.*

- I.2.** A. *There we have learned in the Mishnah: As to animals that are blemished — R. Aqiba declares valid in the case of animals which are blemished. [Thus if they have gone up onto the altar, they should not go down.] [R. Hananiah, Prefect of the Priests, says, “Father did reject animals which had been blemished [even] from on top of the altar” (M. Zeb.9:3C-F)].*
- B. Said R. Hiyya b. Abba said R. Yohanan, “R. Aqiba declares blemished animals to be valid only in the case of cataracts in the eye, since birds that have such cataracts are fit for the altar, and only if they were designated as Holy Things prior to the advent of the blemish. *And he concedes that a female animal designated as a burnt offering is removed from the altar, because that is a blemish [vis a vis that particular offering, which must be a male animal] that took place prior to the consecration.*”
- C. *To that thesis R. Zira objected, “...And he who offers any of these things outside of the Temple is free of liability. So if one had offered up the meat of the mother, he would have been liable. And how is that possible? It is possible only in the case of a female animal that was offered as a burnt offering. Now if you take the position that R. Aqiba holds that if a female animal is offered as a burnt offering, it may go up onto the altar but then is not removed, then there would be no problem, and that accords with R. Aqiba’s view [Freedman: since it is not removed from the altar within the Temple, there is liability for offering the animal outside of the Temple]. But if you say that even if it was put onto the altar it is removed, in accordance with what authority is such a view propounded?”*
- D. *Read it this way:* He who offers up the meat of such things outside of the Temple is exempt, but he who offers up the parts of the beast that are to be burned that derive from the mother, he is liable.
- E. *But he teaches “of them,” and the mother is comparable to them [that is, “of them” means, their meat, and the deduction in respect to the mother also refers to the meat, not the sacrificial parts, of the mother (Freedman)].*
- F. *Read it this way:* he who outside of the Temple offers up the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar is exempt, so he who offers up the parts of the mother that are to be burned on the altar will be liable.

3:6

- A. [If] one slaughtered it [an animal sacrifice] on condition of leaving over its blood [and not to toss it] or its sacrificial parts [and not to offer them up] for the next day,
- B. or to take them outside —
- C. R. Judah declares invalid [as would be the case if the officiant actually did so].
- D. And sages declare valid.
- E. [If] he slaughtered it on condition [that he intended]
- F. (1) to sprinkle it on the ramp, not at the foundation [of the altar] [M. 2:11],
- G. (2) to sprinkle those which are to be sprinkled below, above,
- H. (3) or those which are to be sprinkled above, below,
- I. (4) those which are to be sprinkled [36A] inside, outside

- J. (5) or those which are to be sprinkled outside, inside —
 - K. (1) that unclean people eat it,
 - L. (2) that unclean people offer it up,
 - M. (3) that uncircumcised priests eat it,
 - N. (4) that uncircumcised priests offer it up,
 - O. (1) to break the bones of the Passover [Exo. 12:9],
 - P. (2) or to eat of it while it is raw [Exo. 12:46],
 - Q. (3) to mix its blood with the blood of unfit beasts —
 - R. it is valid.
 - S. For improper intention invalidates only in respect to [eating the meat or burning the sacrificial parts] outside its proper place or outside its proper time [= A-B + D],
 - T. and, in respect to the Passover and the sin offering, [improper intention invalidates when this involves slaughtering them] not for their own name [not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated as a Holy Thing].
- I.1** A. [Supply: **If one slaughtered an animal sacrifice on condition of leaving over its blood [and not to toss it] or its sacrificial parts [and not to offer them up] for the next day, or to take them outside — R. Judah declares invalid [as would be the case if the officiant actually did so]. And sages declare valid:] *What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Judah?***
- B. *Said R. Eleazar, “There are two verses set forth with reference to leaving the meat over: ‘And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning’ (Exo. 12:10), and ‘He shall not leave any of it until the morning’ (Lev. 7:15). [Freedman: the one first refers to the Passover offering, the other to the thanksgiving offering; both were classified as peace offerings and therefore the rule had to be given for only one, and the other would follow]. Since, therefore, if one of the verses is not required to state the rule governing leaving over meat, apply its message to the matter of intentionality to leave over meat [so improper intentionality disqualifies, as much as the deed itself].”*
 - C. *Now does R. Judah take the view that the verse at hand serves the specified purpose? It is, rather, required for quite another purpose, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
 - D. *“And the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Lev. 7:15) — so we have learned in regard to the thanksgiving offering that it is to be eaten over a span of a day and a night.*
 - E. *How do we know that the same rule applies to a beast that is designated as an exchange for a beast in that category, for the offspring of a beast in that category, or for animals designated as substitutes for a beast in that category?*
 - F. *Scripture says, “And the meat” (Lev. 7:15).*
 - G. *How do we know the rule governing the sin offering and the guilt offering?*
 - H. *Scripture says, “and the meat of the sacrifice.”*

- I. How do we extend the rule even to peace offerings brought by a Nazirite and peace offerings that accompany the Passover offering?
- J. Scripture says, “his peace offerings.”
- K. How do we know the rule covering loaves of the thanksgiving offering and the loaves and wafers presented by the Nazirite?
- L. Scripture says, “his offering.”
- M. And to all of these classes of offerings I apply the rule, “he shall not leave any of it until the morning.
- N. *If that were the sole purpose of the verse under discussion, then Scripture should have just as well said, “You shall not leave over” [using the same verb that occurs at Exo. 12:10]. Why use “you shall not neglect to eat” [using a different verb for the same meaning]? It is superfluous in regard to actually leaving over the meat, so it serves to encompass within the law the mere intentionality to leave over the meat.*
- O. *Conceding that that proof suffices with regard to intentionality to leave over the blood or the sacrificial parts, what is to be said about intentionality to carry them out? And R. Judah’s position, moreover, rests on an argument from logic [and not on Scripture], for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- P. Said to them R. Judah, “Do you not concede that if the priest actually left the blood or parts to be burned on the altar for the next day, the sacrifice is [retrospectively] invalid? Even if he gave thought to leaving these things over for the next day, it is equally invalid.”
- Q. *So the operative consideration behind the position of R. Judah is a matter of logic.*
- I.2.** A. *And why should R. Judah not take issue in all of the other matters as well [that are listed in the Mishnah-paragraph, reasoning as he does in the case at hand]?*
- B. *In which aspect? Should he take up a dissenting position in regard to breaking the bones of the Passover offering or to eating the meat of the offering raw? [Should that be the priest’s intention,] is the body of the offering itself invalidated? Or should it be an action on the stipulation that unclean persons should eat the meat or offering it up? [Should that be the priest’s intention,] is the body of the offering itself invalidated? Or that uncircumcised persons should eat the meat or offer up the offering? [Should that be the priest’s intention,] is the body of the offering itself invalidated?*
- C. *Another formulation of the reason that R. Judah does not take issue in all of the other matters as well [that are listed in the Mishnah-paragraph, reasoning as he does in the case at hand]:*
- D. *Does the disposition of the offering wholly depend upon the intentionality of the priest [e.g., to have unclean or uncircumcised persons eat the meat or offer up the sacrificial parts? After all, he may not find people to do what he wants. So intentionality in these matters does not suffice.]*
- E. [To survey aspects of improper intentionality that fall under that argument:] if his intentionality is to mix the blood of the offering with the blood of invalid offerings, R. Judah is consistent [in denying that intentionality is an issue here], for he has said, “Invalid blood does not nullify blood.”

- F. And if the issue is improper intentionality to toss the blood below that should be tossed above the red line around the altar, or to toss the blood above that should be tossed below the red line around the altar, *R. Judah is consistent [in denying that intentionality is an issue here], for he has said, “Blood that has been tossed not in the correct place is classified as though it were tossed in the proper place.”*
- G. *But let him differ in connection with blood that was to be tossed on the inner altar which the priest intends to toss on the outer altar, or blood that was to be tossed on the outer altar which the priest intends to toss on the inner altar?*
- H. *R. Judah takes the position that we require a place that has a threefold purpose, in regard to the blood, the meat, and the parts to be burned on the altar. [The offering is disqualified only if the officiating priest announces that he intends to do what he plans to do with it in a place where the blood is sprinkled, the meat eaten, and the parts burned, that is, outside of the Temple court; if he plans to eat the meat in the court, where the meat is not eaten nor the sacrificial parts burned, it would not prove an effective intention].”*
- I. *But does R. Judah really hold that position? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. R. Judah says, “‘You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, in which is a blemish, even any bad thing’ (Deu. 17: 1): in this statement Scripture has extended the law to the case of a sin offering that one slaughtered on the south side of the Temple court [rather than on the north, where it belongs], or a sin offering the blood of which was taken into the inner altar [rather than tossed on the outer altar, where it belongs], indicating that such offerings are invalid.” [Freedman: this carrying outside of the proper location is not in respect of a place that has that threefold function.]
- K. *But does not R. Judah accept the interpretation of the sense of “third”? And surely we have learned in the Mishnah: [A sin offering sacrificed in the courtyard, the blood of which one received in two cups — one of them went forth [outside the courtyard] — the one which remained inside is valid [and so is the sin offering]. If one of them went inside [into the Hekhal and so was invalidated, M.8:11G-H] — R. Yosé the Galilean declares the one which remained outside [in the courtyard] to be valid. And sages declare it invalid. Said R. Yosé the Galilean, “Now if in a situation in which intention renders the rite invalid, namely, in connection with [the intention to sprinkle the blood] outside [the Temple court] [= M. 2:2], the law of M. 8:12A-C has not treated that which remains as equivalent to that which goes forth, in a situation in which intention does not render the rite invalid, [namely, in connection with the intention to sprinkle the blood (= M. 3:6)] inside the Temple court, is it not logical that we should not treat that which remains as equivalent to that which enters in?” If it was taken inside to make atonement, even though he did not make atonement, it is invalid,” the words of R. Eliezer. R. Simeon says, “[It does not become invalid] until it makes atonement.”] R. Judah says, “If he brought it in inadvertently [even if he tossed the blood], it is valid” [M. Zeb.8:12A-K]. Then if one did so deliberately, the offering would have been invalid. And we have already established that the ruling deals with a case in which the priest has made*

atonement. [Freedman: the mere carrying of the blood into the inner sanctum, even deliberately, does not invalidate the sacrifice, but only actually sprinkling the blood on the inner altar]. *Now, if in that case, where the priest has actually carried the blood inside to the inner altar, if he made atonement with the blood, the act does invalidate the sacrifice, but if he did not make atonement, then it does not, how much the more so here, where the priest has merely intended to do such a thing [should the intention alone not have the power to disqualify the offering].* [Freedman: the reason must be that Judah accepts the interpretation of “third” cited just now].

L. *What we are dealing with here is a conflict among Tannaite versions of the views of R. Judah.*

I.3. A. *And does R. Judah really take the view that if the priest slaughtered a sin offering at the south side of the altar instead of the proper place at the north, [36B] he is liable on that account? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. R. Judah says, “Might one suppose that if the priest slaughtered a sin offering at the south side of the altar instead of the proper place at the north, he is liable on that account? Scripture states, ‘You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, in which is a blemish, even any bad thing’ (Deu. 17: 1) — you may declare the priest liable for any evil thing, but you may not hold him liable for slaughtering a sin offering at the southern side of the altar”?

C. *What we are dealing with here is a conflict among Tannaite versions of the views of R. Judah.*

I.4. A. Said Raba, “But R. Judah concedes that the priest may then go and impart to the offering the status of refuse.” [Freedman: if the priest intended to leave the blood for the next day or carry it outside; although Judah holds that he thereby disqualifies the sacrifice, yet if he intended at a later service to eat the meat after the proper time, he makes it refuse. This is so in spite of the fact that generally speaking an intention that would result in making the offering refuse is operative only when there is no other disqualification, such as intending to eat it outside of the proper time.]

B. *Said R. Abba, “You may know that an intentionality that would result in turning the offering into refuse that was expressed prior to the sprinkling of the blood is null, but the act of sprinkling then comes along and imparts to the offering the status of refuse.”* [Freedman: Raba proves that the intention to leave the blood until the next day is not the same as the intention to eat the meat outside of the proper place, which makes imparting to the offering the status of refuse an impossibility. For if before sprinkling the priest declares his intention to sprinkle the blood on the next day, that intention does not render the offering refuse, since an offering is not refuse until the part of the beast that render it permissible to eat the meat have been properly offered. Still, if the priest later on sprinkles the blood properly, his previously declared intention is retrospectively valid and renders the offering valid. Now this intention was in effect an intention to leave the blood until the next day, which in Judah’s view disqualifies the sacrifice, though not rendering it refuse. This proves that we do not say, ‘since it did not become refuse at the outset, it is disqualified through the intention of leaving the blood, and it cannot subsequently become refuse.’]

- C. *But that is not the case; there we deal with only one aspect of intentionality [sprinkling the blood on the next day, which would impart the status of refuse to the offering] while here we deal with two aspects of intentionality [first to leave the blood until the next day, which disqualifies the offering but does not impart the status of refuse, then to eat the meat after the proper time].*
- D. *R. Huna objected to R. Abba, “If the priest intended to sprinkle the blood that was to be sprinkled above the red line below the line, or the blood that was to be sprinkled below the red line above it, if this was done forthwith, the rite is valid. If later on he planned to eat the meat outside of the proper place, the offering has been invalidated, but the penalty of extirpation does not follow. If the priest intended to eat the meat after a while, the offering is unfit, but one is liable to the penalty for extirpation on that account. If he intended to sprinkle the blood on the wrong place or doing so on the next day, the offering is unfit; if he subsequently intended to eat the meat outside of the proper place or after the proper time, the offering is unfit, but extirpation is not involved.” [The final clause refutes Abba.]*
- E. *This proposed refutation of R. Abba does the job.*
- I.5.** A. Said R. Hisda said Rabina bar Sila, “If the officiating priest expressed the intention that unclean persons would eat the meat on the next day, he is liable [on the count of having rendered the offering refuse].” [Freedman: we do not say that this is not an efficacious intention in respect to refuse, since the unclean may not eat the meat at any time].
- B. *Said Raba, “You may know, then, that prior to sprinkling the blood, the meat is not suitable for eaten, and yet when the officiating priest declares the intentionality that would classify the meat as refuse, it becomes unfit.”*
- C. *But the comparison is null, for in the one case the priest will sprinkle the blood with the consequence that the meat is valid, while here the unclean are not suitable to eat the meat at all.*
- D. *Said R. Hisda, “A valued saying that R. Dimi bar Hinnena would say: ‘On account of the meat of a Passover offering that was not roasted, the loaves of a thanksgiving offering none of which was separated for the use by the priest people are liable by reason of uncleanness.’ [And that is so even though, at this point, no one might eat the meat or the bread. Still, an unclean person who did so is liable on that account (Freedman)].*
- E. *Said Raba, “You may know that that is so. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “‘But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Lev. 7:20) — that encompasses under the aspect of uncleanness the parts of lesser sacrifices that are to be burned on the altar.’ This proves that even though these parts are not going to be eaten at all, people are liable on account of them by reason of uncleanness.”*
- F. *Here too the comparison is null, the parts of the animals that are to be burned on the altar that derive from Lesser Holy Things are suitable for the Most High — and that excludes the uncooked meat of a Passover offer and the loaves of the thanksgiving offering of which none has been separated for the priest, which are fit for the consumption of neither the Most High nor a human being.*