

## VII.

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### BAVLI SHABBAT CHAPTER SEVEN

### FOLIOS 67B-76B

#### 7:1

- A. A governing principle did they state concerning the Sabbath:
- B. Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering.
- C. He who knows the principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths is liable for the violation of each and every Sabbath.
- D. He who knows that it is the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths is liable for the violation of each and every [68A] generative category of labor.
- E. He who performs many acts of labor of a single type is liable only for a single sin-offering.

- I.1** A. *How come the Tannaite framer of the passage has used the phrase, A governing principle [did they state concerning the Sabbath]? Should I say that, since he wishes to use the language for his Tannaite statement, And a further governing rule did they state, he has used the language here, A governing principle? And so, too, in the context of the rules of the Seventh Year, since he wanted to use the language, And a further governing rule did they state, he used the formulation also, A governing principle [did they state concerning the Sabbath] [M. Sheb. 5:5, 7:1]? Then what about the matter of tithing, in which tractate we find the language, This is the*

**governing principle** [M. **Ma. 2:7L**], *but the language, “governing principle” is not used!*

- B. *Said R. Yosé bar Abin, “As to the Sabbath and the Seventh Year, in which the distinction between generative and derivative principles is drawn, the Tannaite formulation utilizes the language, a governing principle, but as to tithing, in which there is no distinction between generative and derivative principle, the language, a governing principle, is not used.”*
- C. *But from the perspective of Bar Qappara, who does repeat the Tannaite formulation in the language, governing principle in connection with tithing, what distinction there can be recognized between generative and derivative principles? But isn’t this the operative consideration: The penalty attaching to the Sabbath is more “governing” [greater] than that attaching to the Seventh Year? For with respect to the Sabbath the restriction pertains to both what is plucked from the ground and what is growing in the ground, while the prohibitions of the Seventh Year do not apply in regard to what is plucked up from the ground but only in regard to what is growing in the ground. And, further, the penalty attaching to the Seventh Year is more “governing” [greater] than that attaching to tithes. For with respect to the Seventh Year there is a distinction between what is eaten by human beings and what is eaten by domesticated animals, while with respect to tithes, there is a tithing requirement for human food but not for animal food.*
- D. *And with regard to the position of Bar Qappara, who does repeat the Tannaite formulation in the language, governing principle, in connection with tithing?*
- E. *The penalty attaching to the tithing is more “governing” [greater] than that attaching to the requirement to leave the corner of the field, for while the law of tithes applies to figs and vegetables, the law of the corner of the field doesn’t pertain to figs and vegetables. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **They stated a governing principle concerning [the designation of produce as] peah: Whatever is edible, privately owned, grown from the ground, harvested as a crop, and can be preserved in storage, is subject to [designation as] peah** [M. **Pe. 1:4A-B**] —*
- F. **edible** — *excluding the aftergrowth of woad and madder;*
- G. **privately owned** — *excluding what has been declared ownerless;*
- H. **grown from the ground** — *excluding mushrooms and truffles;*
- I. **harvested as a crop** — *excluding a fig tree;*
- J. **and can be preserved in storage** — *excluding vegetables.*

- K. *Now, by contrast, with respect to tithing, we have learned in the Mishnah: A governing principle they stated concerning tithes: Anything which is food, cultivated, and which grows from the earth is subject to [the law of] tithe [M. Ma. 1:1A-B]. But in that context, we learn nothing about its being harvested as a crop or preserved in storage.*

**II.1** A. [Supply: **Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering. He who knows the principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths is liable for the violation of each and every Sabbath;**] *Both Rab and Samuel say, “Our Mishnah paragraph speaks of a child who was kidnapped by gentiles or a proselyte who converted while living among gentiles, but if one originally knew about the Sabbath but in the end forgot about it, one is liable for violation of each and every Sabbath.”*

*B. We have learned in the Mishnah: **Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering.** Doesn't this bear the inference that, to begin with, he knew that principle?*

*C. Not at all. What is the sense of **Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering?** That the very existence of the Sabbath was forgotten by him. But if he knew and then forgot, what is the consequence? He would be liable for every Sabbath.*

*D. In that case, instead of formulating the Tannaite rule in the language, **He who knows the principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths is liable for the violation of each and every Sabbath,** it would have been more sensible to state matters as if he knew...but in the end forgot... — and all the more so here!*

*E. What is the meaning of **He who knows the principle of the Sabbath?** It means, one who did know the principle of the Sabbath and forgot it. [68B] But if he never knew it, what is the law? **He is liable for the violation of each and every Sabbath.***

F. *Well, then, instead of formulating the Tannaite rule in the language, **He who knows the principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths is liable for the violation of each and every Sabbath**, it would make more sense to formulate the Tannaite rule in this language: **He who knows the principle of the Sabbath** — and all the more so in this case.*

G. *Rather, our Mishnah paragraph deals with a case of one who knew but later on forgot, and Rab and Samuel's statement runs along these same lines: It involves someone who knew and then forgot, and this is how it was stated: Both Rab and Samuel say, "Even a child who was kidnapped by gentiles or a proselyte who converted while living among gentiles are in the status of one who knew the principle of the Sabbath but ultimately forgot, so he is liable."*

- H. *But R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish both say, "It is particularly in the case of one who knew and ultimately forgot [who would be liable], but in the case of a child who was kidnapped by gentiles or a proselyte who converted while living among gentiles, he would be exempt."*

I. *An objection was raised: **A governing principle did they state concerning the Sabbath: Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering.** How so?*

J. *A child who was kidnapped by gentiles or a proselyte who converted while living among gentiles who did many acts of labor on many Sabbaths is liable for only a single sin-offering; such a person would be liable for eating forbidden blood, forbidden fat, or idolatry, also on one count alone. But Munbaz declares such a one entirely exempt.*

K. *And so did Munbaz argue before R. Aqiba, "Since one who sins deliberately is called a sinner, and one who sins inadvertently also is classified as a sinner, just as in the case of one who acted deliberately, the implication is that he had knowledge of the fact that what he was doing was forbidden, so in the case of one who acted inadvertently, he must at some point have had knowledge of the prohibited character of what he was doing [thus exempting the one in hand, who never had such knowledge to begin with]."*

L. Said to him R. Aqiba, “So let me add to what you’ve said. Just as one who has acted deliberately, who knew what he was doing at the moment he was doing it, so is it the case for the one who acted inadvertently should be one who knew what he was doing while he was doing it?”

M. He said to him, “Yessiree! and all the more so have you added to the argument!”

N. He said to him, “But by your definition, such a person cannot be classified as inadvertent but as a deliberate violation of the law” [T. [Shab. 8:5-6](#)].

O. *Anyhow, the Tannaite formulation uses the language, How so? A child who was kidnapped by gentiles or a proselyte who converted! Now, from the perspective of Rab and Samuel, there is then no problem. But from the viewpoint of R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish, isn’t this a problem?*

P. R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish can say to you, “But isn’t Munbaz around, who declares him exempt from culpability? So we rule in line with Munbaz.”

**II.2** A. *So what’s the scriptural basis for the ruling of Munbaz?*

B. “You shall have one torah for him who acts unwittingly” (Num. 15:29) and alongside, “And the soul that does something deliberately” (Num. 15:29). The deed that is done inadvertently is treated as comparable to one that is done deliberately; just as a deliberate action is one in which he knew what he was doing, so an inadvertent action must be one in which he knew what he was doing. [Only then is one obligated to a sin-offering.]

C. *And rabbis — how do they interpret this reference to “one torah”?*

D. *They interpret it in the way in which R. Joshua b. Levi interpreted Scripture to his son:* ““You shall have one torah for him who does anything in error, but the soul that does anything deliberately...” (Num. 15:29-30); and it is written, [\[69A\]](#) “And when you shall err and not observe all these commandments” (Num. 15:22), and further, “and the soul that does anything deliberately — that soul shall be cut off.” So the entirety of the Torah in this way is treated as analogous to the prohibition of

idolatry. Just as, in respect to idolatry, [they are] not [liable] in the case of idolatry, except in the case in which they gave instruction in a matter the deliberate commission of which is punishable by extirpation, and the inadvertent commission of which is punishable by a sin-offering, so in the case of all other transgressions, the same rule applies, namely, it must be a matter the deliberate commission of which is punishable by extirpation, and the inadvertent commission of which is punishable by a sin-offering.”

E. *Well, then, from Munbaz's perspective, what can "inadvertence" possibly be?*

F. For instance, if someone didn't know the obligation to bring an offering.

G. *And rabbis?*

H. *Forgetting the obligation to bring an offering for a certain deed is not classified as inadvertence.*

I. *And from rabbis' perspective, what can "inadvertence" possibly be?*

J. R. Yohanan said, “So long as one's error concerns extirpation, even though he deliberately sinned in respect to a negative commandment [that would constitute inadvertence].” [Freedman: He knows that the deed is forbidden by a negative commandment, but he doesn't know that the penalty is extirpation; this constitutes sinning in ignorance and involves a sin-offering.]

K. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “To be subject to the category of inadvertence, one has to err both in respect to the negative commandment and in regard to the penalty of extirpation.”

L. *Said Raba, “What is the scriptural basis behind the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish? Said Scripture, ‘And if any one of the common people sins unwittingly, in doing any of the things that the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty’ (Lev. 4:27) — the error must involve both the negative commandment and the penalty of extirpation that accompanies it.”*

M. *And as to R. Yohanan, how does he interpret this verse that is presented by R. Simeon b. Laqish?*

N. *He requires it in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: “[And if any one] of the common people [sin unwittingly, in doing any of the things that the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Lev. 4:27)] — excluding an apostate.*

**II.3** A. R. Simeon b. Eleazar says in the name of R. Simeon, “[And if any one of the common people sin unwittingly, in doing any of the things that the Lord has commanded] not to be done, and be guilty’ (Lev. 4:27) — he who would retract if he knew [and would not deliberately violate the law] presents an offering for his unintentional transgression; he who would not retract if he knew does not bring an offering for his unintentional transgression.”

**II.4** A. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited on the Sabbath] are forty less one [M. 7:2A].** And we reflected on that statement: What need do I have for the enumeration? And said R. Yohanan, “If someone did all of them in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on each and every count.” Now how are we going to find such a case? Well, if it involves a deliberate violation of the Sabbath, but inadvertence as to the various classifications of labor, then, from the perspective of R. Yohanan, who has said, “So long as one’s error concerns extirpation, even though he deliberately sinned in respect to a negative commandment [that would constitute inadvertence],” you would find such a case, for instance, if he knew that it was Sabbath, which is subject to a negative commandment. But from the perspective of R. Simeon b. Laqish, who has said, “To be subject to the category of inadvertence, one has to err both in respect to the negative commandment and in regard to the penalty of extirpation,” how did he know that it was the Sabbath?*

B. *He knew about the rule of not carrying things across the boundaries of private and public domain, in accord with the*

*position of R. Aqiba [who maintains that that rule derives from the Torah].*

**II.5** A. *Who is the Tannaite authority behind what our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:* If one was unaware of both this and that [that there is such a thing as the Sabbath and that this act of labor is forbidden on the Sabbath], that is a definition of an inadvertent sin of which the Torah speaks. If one was fully aware of this and of that, that is the definition of a deliberate action of which the Torah speaks. If one was unaware of the principle of the Sabbath but was fully informed as to the classifications of forbidden labor, or if he was uninformed of the classifications of forbidden labor but was fully informed about the Sabbath, or if he said, “I know that this act of labor is forbidden, but I don’t know that on its account one is liable to an offering,” or, “not liable” — he is liable?

B. *In accord with whom? It is in accord with Munbaz.*

**II.6** A. Said Abbaye, “All concur in regard to an oath of utterance that one is not liable for an offering unless he is unaware that such an oath is forbidden.” [Freedman: The offender must have forgotten his oath at the time of breaking it, so he is unaware that his action is forbidden by an oath.]

B. All concur? *Who could that be?*

C. It’s R. Yohanan.

D. *But that’s self-evident! For when did R. Yohanan say otherwise? It is in a case in which the penalty of extirpation is invoked. But in the case of an oath of utterance, the penalty of extirpation doesn’t pertain, so he did not take that view!*

E. *Not at all, not at all! For it might have entered your mind that, since liability to an offering is an innovation here, for we don’t find in the entire Torah that for violating a negative commandment one has to bring an offering, but here one does, then, even if he is unaware*



*of the liability to an offering, he would have to bring an offering nonetheless. [69B] So we are informed that that is not the case.*

*F. An objection was raised: [With reference to the formulation, “whatever a man may utter in an oath”: This excludes one who is subject to constraint and not one who is forced to take the oath. He is not liable if he violates the imposed oath,] for what sort of inadvertent transgression of a rash oath framed concerning the past would someone be liable? [If the man knew at the time of taking the oath that he was swearing falsely, it is deliberate violation of the oath; if he did not, then, concerning the past, this is an inadvertent violation of the law of taking oaths!] It would involve one who says, “I know that this oath is binding, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to present an offering on that account.” [Silverstone: Although it is a willful transgression, it is counted as unwitting, because he did not know about liability to the offering.]*

*G. In accord with what authority is that formulation of matters?*

*H. It is in accord with Munbaz [Monobases], [who has said, “Action taken in inadvertent ignorance of liability to an offering is classified as inadvertence.”]*

## **II.7**

*A. And said Abbayye, “All agree in the matter of heave-offering, that one is liable to the penalty of the added fifth in making restoration only if he is aware of the prohibition [that a nonpriest may not eat food in that category; he must be unaware that it is heave-offering but must suppose it is common food].”*

*B. All concur? Who could that be?*

*C. It’s R. Yohanan.*

*D. But that’s self-evident! For when did R. Yohanan say otherwise? It is in a case in which the penalty of extirpation is invoked. But in the case of an oath of*

*utterance, the penalty of extirpation doesn't pertain, so he did not take that view!*

*E. Not at all, not at all! For it might have entered your mind that, death stands in stead of extirpation, so if one is ignorant of the death penalty, he is culpable; so we are informed to the contrary.*

*F. Raba said, "The death penalty stands in the place of extirpation, and the added fifth stands in the place of an offering."*

**II.8** A. Said R. Huna, "If someone was going along the way or in the wilderness and doesn't know which day is the Sabbath, he counts six days and then observes one day."

B. Hiyya bar Rab says "He observes one day and then counts six days."

*C. So what can possibly be at issue between them?*

*D. One authority enumerates in accord with the creation of the world, the other counts in accord with the creation of the first man [his first complete day was the Sabbath (Freedman)].*

*E. An objection was raised: If someone was going along the road and doesn't know when is the Sabbath, he keeps one day for six. Now doesn't this mean, he counts six days and observes one?*

*F. No, he observes one day and counts six.*

*G. If so, rather than framing matters as, he keeps one day for six, the passage should say, he keeps one day and counts six. And furthermore, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If someone was going along the way or in the wilderness and doesn't know which day is the Sabbath, he counts six days and then observes one day. That refutes Hiyya bar Rab.*

*H. Sure does.*

**II.9** A. Said Raba, "Every day he prepares enough food for that day, *except on that day [which is the Sabbath by his reckoning].*"

B. *So on that day is he supposed to drop dead?*

C. *He prepares double the prior day.*

D. *But maybe the preceding day was the Sabbath!*

E. Rather: "Every day he prepares enough food for that day, *even on that day [which is the Sabbath by his reckoning].*"

- F. *Then as to that day that is the Sabbath by his reckoning, how does he accord it recognition?*
- G. *By reciting the Sanctification of the Day and the Prayer of Separation [of that day from the rest of the week].*

**II.10 A.** Said Raba, “If [on the day that he discovered he has forgotten when it is the Sabbath, he nonetheless remembers how many days it is since he set out (Freedman)] he recognizes the temporal relationship to the day he departed, he may work the whole of that day [Freedman: on the seventh day after he set out, without any restrictions, since he certainly didn’t commence his journey on the Sabbath].”

B. *Big deal!*

C. *What might you have imagined? Since he didn’t depart on the Sabbath, he also didn’t leave on a Friday either, so even of this man started out on Thursday, he should be permitted to work on two whole days. So we are informed that sometimes someone may have a chance to travel in a caravan and so happen to start out even on a Friday.*

**III.1 A.** **Whoever forgets the basic principle of the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbath days is liable only for a single sin-offering:**

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this fact?*
- C. Said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha, “*There are two pertinent verses of Scripture, namely: ‘Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath’ (Exo. 31:16), and also, ‘and you shall keep my Sabbaths’ (Lev. 19: 3). How so? ‘Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath’ (Exo. 31:16) — one act of observance covers many Sabbaths. ‘And you shall keep my Sabbaths’ (Lev. 19: 3) — one act of observance is for each Sabbath.*”
- D. *Objected R. Nahman bar Isaac, “On the contrary! The opposite stands to reason. ‘Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath’ (Exo. 31:16) — this refers to one act of observance for each and every Sabbath. ‘And you shall keep my Sabbaths’ (Lev. 19: 3) — this speaks of a single act of observance for many Sabbaths.” [The distinctions that the Mishnah rule makes follow from these verses, but he reverses their significance (Freedman).]*

**IV.1 A.** **He who knows that it is the Sabbath and performs many acts of labor on many different Sabbaths....:**

- B. **[70A]** *How does the first clause differ from the second?*

- C. Said R. Safra, “In the one case he refrains because of the awareness that it is the Sabbath; in the other case he refrains because he knows that there are various classifications of forbidden labor.”
- D. Said to him R. Nahman, “Does someone refrain from action on the Sabbath for any reason except that the various classifications of labor are forbidden, and does one refrain from acts of forbidden labor for any reason other than that is the Sabbath?”
- E. *Rather, said R. Nahman, “The offering that the All-Merciful has declared obligatory is for what reason? It is on account of ignorance. In the one case, one is ignorant of a single fact, in the other, of many facts.”*

- V.1**
- A. **...is liable for the violation of each and every generative category of labor:**
  - B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that various types of labor are treated as distinct categories for the present purpose?*
  - C. Said Samuel, “Said Scripture, ‘Those who profane it shall surely be put to death’ (Exo. 35: 2) — the Torah has spoken of the death penalty on many counts for a single act of profanation of the holiness of the Sabbath.”
  - D. *But this is written with respect to a deliberate violation of the Sabbath! [We’re talking about offerings, which are on account of inadvertence.]*
  - E. If the matter is not pertinent to deliberate violation of the Sabbath, in which case it is written, “whoever does any work thereon shall be put to death” (Exo. 35: 2), then apply the language to one who offends inadvertently.
  - F. *Well and good, but what’s the point of “shall be put to death”?*
  - G. This speaks of a monetary penalty [such as an offering].

**V.2** A. *But one can just as well derive the fact that various types of labor are treated as distinct categories for the present purpose from the passage from which R. Nathan derives it, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. R. Nathan says, “‘You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on the Sabbath day’ (Exo. 35: 3) — why does Scripture say this? Because Scripture states, ‘And Moses assembled all the congregation of the children of Israel and said to them, “These are the words that the Lord has commanded: Six days shall work be done”’ (Exo. 35:1-2). Now the references to ‘words’; ‘the words,’ ‘these are the words’ indicate that there were thirty-nine distinct classifications of labor that were taught to Moses at Sinai. [‘Words’ is plural, hence

two; ‘the’ makes it three, and the numerical value of the letters in the word ‘these’ is thirty-six, so thirty-nine.] Might one then suppose that if one did them all in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on only a single count? Scripture states, ‘from ploughing and from harvesting you shall rest’ (Exo. 34:21). So then I might still say that with reference to acts of ploughing and harvesting one is liable on two counts, but for all of the other actions, one would be liable on only a single count. But Scripture states, ‘You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on the Sabbath day’ (Exo. 35: 3). Kindling a flame was in the encompassing generalization of forbidden acts of labor. Why was it singled out? It was to provide an analogy from it to all others, indicating, just as kindling is a generative category of forbidden labor and people are liable on its account alone, so for every generative classification of labor people are liable for each count individually.”

C. *Samuel follows the reasoning of R. Yosé, who has said, “The specific reference to kindling a flame is made to indicate that that, too, is a negative commandment.” For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

D. “Specification of kindling a flame [as a prohibited act] serves to place such an act in the category of a negative commandment,” the words of R. Yosé.

E. R. Nathan says, “It serves to treat as a distinct act [punished by itself] that deed [or any other deed in violation of the Sabbath].”

**V.3** A. *But one can just as well derive the fact that various types of labor are treated as distinct categories for the present purpose from the passage from which R. Yosé derives it, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. R. Yosé says, “‘If any one sins unwittingly in any one of the things that the Lord has commanded not to be done and does any one of them’ (Lev. 4: 2) — there are occasions on which one is liable on only a single count for them all, and there are occasions on which one is liable on each and every count.”

C. *Said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “What is the reading of R. Yosé here? It is because it is written, ‘and shall do of one of them’ (Lev. 4: 2). [Freedman, Sanhedrin, p. 421, n. 3: “This is a*

peculiar construction. The Scripture should have written, ‘and shall do one (not “of one”) of them,’ or, ‘and do of them’ (‘one’ being understood), or, ‘and shall do one’ (‘of them’ being understood). Instead of which, a partitive preposition is used before each. Hence each part of the pronoun is to be interpreted separately, teaching that he is liable for the transgression of ‘one’ precept; and for part of one (i.e., for ‘of one’); for ‘them’ (explained as referring to the principal acts); and for the derivatives ‘of them’ (acts forbidden because they partake of the same nature as the fundamentally prohibited acts); also, each pronoun reacts upon the other, as explained in the discussion.” What follows, to the end of this paragraph, is Freedman’s translation, at Sanhedrin, to 62A, p. 423-425, reproduced with only minor changes:] This teaches that liability is incurred for one complete act of violation [i.e., ‘one’]; and for one which is but a part of one [i.e., ‘of one’]; and for transgressing actions forbidden in themselves [i.e., ‘them’], and for actions [the prohibited nature of which is derived] from others [i.e., ‘of them’]; further, that open transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices [i.e., ‘one’ = ‘them’], whilst many offenses may involve but one sacrifice [i.e., ‘them’ = ‘one’]. Thus: ‘one complete act of violation,’ — the writing [on the Sabbath] of Simeon; **[70B]** ‘one which is but a part of one,’ — the writing of Shem as part of Simeon, ‘actions forbidden in themselves’ [i.e., ‘them’] — the principal acts of labor forbidden on the Sabbath; ‘actions [the prohibited nature of which is derived] from others [i.e., “of them”]’ — the derivatives; ‘one transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices [i.e., “one” = “them”]’ — for example, if one knew that it was the Sabbath [and that some work is forbidden on the Sabbath], but was unaware that these particular acts are forbidden; ‘many offenses may involve but one sacrifice [i.e., “them” = “one”]’ — for example, if he was unaware that it was the Sabbath, but knew that his actions are forbidden on the Sabbath. But here [in idol worship], since separation of actions is not derived from elsewhere, may we not say that all agree [even R. Yosé] that prostration was singled

out to indicate ‘separation’? [But is this so?] May not ‘separation’ of acts in the case of idolatry, too, be deduced from ‘of one of them’? Thus, ‘one complete act of idolatry’ — sacrificing [to idols]; a part of one [i.e., ‘of one’] — the cutting of one organ. ‘Actions forbidden in themselves’ [i.e., ‘them’] — principal acts, i.e., sacrificing, burning, incense, making libations, and prostration; ‘actions derived from others’ [i.e., ‘of them’] the derivatives of these — for example, if he broke a stick before it; ‘one transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices,’ [i.e., ‘one’ = ‘them’], for example, when one knows that it is an idol [and that idolatry is forbidden], but is unaware that the particular acts in question constitute idol worship; many offenses may involve but one sacrifice, [i.e., ‘them’ = ‘one’]; if he is unaware that it is an idol, but knows that these acts are forbidden in idol worship.”

- V.4** A. *Asked Raba of R. Nahman*, “If one is responsible for forgetting the principle of both [the Sabbath as a day on which labor is prohibited, and also that the given act of labor is prohibited on the Sabbath], what is the law?”
- B. He said to him, “Lo, he is subject to a spell of inadvertence with respect to the Sabbath, so he is liable on only a single count.”
- C. “To the contrary! Lo, he is subject to inadvertence in respect to diverse generative acts of labor, so he is responsible on each count!”
- D. *Rather, said R. Ashi*, “*We examine the case to see*: If he stops the work because of the Sabbath, he was unaware of the fact of the Sabbath and is liable on only one count; if he stops work on account of the various acts of labor, he was inadvertent as to the acts of labor and is liable on each count.”
- E. *Said Rabina to R. Ashi*, “Well, would he desist from labor on the Sabbath for any reason other than the prohibition pertaining to the acts of labor that he is performing, but would he desist from the prohibited acts of labor for any reason other than the Sabbath? So it really makes no difference.”

**V.5** A. *We have learned in the Mishnah*: **The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited on the Sabbath] are forty less one [M. 7:2A].**

B. *And we reflected on that statement: What need do I have for the enumeration?*

C. And said R. Yohanan, “If someone did all of them in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on each and every count.”

D. *Now that poses no problem if you hold that one who is unaware of both is liable for each count on its own; then there is no problem.* [Freedman: If he is ignorant of all the forbidden labors of the Sabbath, the Sabbath is exactly the same as any other day to him, and he may be regarded as unaware of both.] *But if you hold that one who is subject to unawareness of the principle of the Sabbath is liable on only a single count, then how are you going to find such a case at all? If it involves a deliberate violation of the Sabbath, but inadvertence as to the various classifications of labor, then, from the perspective of R. Yohanan, who has said, “So long as one’s error concerns extirpation, even though he deliberately sinned in respect to a negative commandment [that would constitute inadvertence],” you would find such a case, for instance, if he knew that it was Sabbath, which is subject to a negative commandment. But from the perspective of R. Simeon b. Laqish, who has said, “To be subject to the category of inadvertence, one has to err both in respect to the negative commandment and in regard to the penalty of extirpation,” how did he know that it was the Sabbath?*

E. *He knew about the rule of not carrying things across the boundaries of private and public domain, in accord with the position of R. Aqiba [who maintains that that rule derives from the Torah].*

- V.6** A. Said Raba, “If one reaped and ground grain to the volume of a dried fig, in a spell of unawareness of the Sabbath but of awareness as to the forbidden acts of labor [and is liable on a single count], and he again reaped and ground grain to the volume of a dried fig knowing that it was the Sabbath but unaware of the prohibition as to the various acts of labor [Freedman: he was told it was the Sabbath but forgot these acts are forbidden thereon; in this case he is culpable on two counts], and then he was informed about the matter of the reaping and grinding in unawareness of the Sabbath but was aware of the acts of labor [Freedman: so he set aside a sin-offering on account of both acts of labor, before having learned of his second series of offenses], and then he was informed of the reaping and grinding performed when aware of the Sabbath but unaware in regard to the labors, the atonement for **[71A]** the first act of reaping involves atonement for the second, and atonement for the first act of grinding involves atonement for the second. [Freedman: This is in respect to expiation;



the sacrifice for his first two acts of reaping and grinding is an atonement for his second two acts, since all were performed in one state of unawareness, without any information in the interval, notwithstanding that his first unawareness differed in kind from his second unawareness.] But if he was first informed about the reaping performed when he was aware of the Sabbath but unaware of the forbidden labor, then atonement for this second reaping involves atonement for the first reaping and its accompanying grinding. [Freedman: When he makes atonement for his second reaping, he automatically makes atonement for the first as well, and since his first reaping and grinding only necessitate one sacrifice, his first grinding, too, is atoned for thereby.] But the corresponding grinding [the second one] stands as before. [Freedman: It is unatoned for until another sacrifice is brought.]”

- B. Abbaye said, “Atonement for the first act of grinding involves atonement for the second as well; the classification, grinding, remains one and the same.” [Freedman: All acts of grinding made in one state of unawareness are covered by this sacrifice, though it is not primarily offered on account of grinding at all.]

*C. But does Raba concur in the theory that atonement for one thing involves atonement for another as well? And lo, it has been stated:*

D. If one ate two olive’s bulks of forbidden fat in a single spell of inadvertence and he was informed concerning one of them, and then he went and ate an olive’s bulk of forbidden fat during the spell of inadvertence covering the second —

E. Said Raba, “If he brought an offering covering the first action, both the first and the second acts are atoned for, but the third is not atoned for. If he brought an offering for the third, the third and second are atoned for, but the first is not atoned for. If he brought an offering for the second act, all of them are atoned for.” [Freedman: Since both the first and the third were eaten in the state of unawareness of the second, all are covered; but the first two rulings show he rejects the theory that atonement for one thing involves atonement for another as well.]

F. Abbaye said, “Even if he brought one offering for all of them, all of them are atoned for.”

G. *After he heard what Abbayye said, it struck him as reasonable.*

H. *If so, then in the case of grinding as well, the same should apply to the grinding.*

I. *While he accepts the theory of direct involvement of atonement of one thing for something else, he doesn't accept the theory of indirect involvement.* [Freedman: Thus the first act of grinding is atoned for only because it is involved in the atonement for reaping; hence this in turn cannot involve the second act of grinding.]

**V.7** A. *A matter that was self-evident to Abbayye and Raba was found a problem by R. Zira. For R. Zira raised this question of R. Assi, and some say, R. Jeremiah asked R. Zira, "If one reaped or ground grain of the quantity of half a dried fig in unawareness of the Sabbath but full awareness of the prohibition of labor, and again reaped and ground grain of the same volume in awareness of the prohibition of the Sabbath but unaware of the prohibition of these particular acts of labor, can they be combined?" [The requisite volume is made up only if we combine the two quite distinct classes of action.]*

B. He said to him, "So far as sin-offerings are concerned, they form distinct categories and do not combine." [Freedman: Had each reaping been sufficient to entail a sin-offering, a sacrifice for one would not make atonement for the other; he differs from Abbayye and Raba.]

C. *Well, then, is it the fact that in any case in which actions are distinct as to sin-offerings to be presented in atonement, do these actions not combine so as to form the requisite volume to impose liability? And have we not learned in the Mishnah: [If] he ate [forbidden] fat and [again ate] fat in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable only for a single sin-offering. [If] he ate forbidden fat and blood and*

remnant and refuse [of an offering] in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable for each and every one of them. This rule is more strict in the case of many kinds [of forbidden food] than of one kind. And more strict is the rule in [the case of] one kind than in many kinds: For if he ate a half-olive's bulk and went and ate a half-olive's bulk of a single kind, he is liable. [But if he ate two half-olive's bulks] of two [different] kinds, he is exempt [M. Ker. 3:2A-F)?

*And we reflected on this matter: Was it necessary to specify the detail of ...of a single kind, he is liable? And said R. Simeon b. Laqish in the name of Bar Teutani, "Here with what sort of case do we deal? With a case in which one ate two portions of forbidden fat out of two distinct dishes, and the rule accords with R. Joshua, who maintains that if we deal with separate dishes, then there is a distinction to be drawn with regard to the offerings involved therein. What might you have said here? The statement of R. Joshua does not distinguish between a result that is lenient and one that is strict? So here we are informed that one is liable, and it follows, he has made his statement when it yields a more strict ruling, but he has not made his statement when it yields a more lenient ruling." Now here is a case in which they are distinct as to the requirement of bringing sin-offerings, and yet they do join together!*

*D. He said to him, "The master repeats that conception with respect to the opening clause, so it is difficult for you [since it has to be explained as dealing with two distinct tureens]. But we repeat it in the context of the second clause, and to us it poses no problem. Thus: Was it necessary to specify the detail of ...of a single kind, he is liable? And said R. Simeon b. Laqish in the name of Bar Teutani, "Here with what sort of case do we deal? With a case in which one ate two portions of forbidden fat out of two distinct dishes, and the rule*

*accords with R. Joshua, who maintains that if we deal with separate dishes, then there is a distinction to be drawn with regard to the offerings involved therein. What might you have said here? The statement of R. Joshua does not distinguish between a result that is lenient and one that is strict? Now, since the second clause speaks of one kind of commodity and two dishes, [71B] it follows that the first clause speaks of one kind of food and one dish. But if the first clause addresses one kind of food and one dish, then why bother to specify the rule, which is self-evident!"*

*E. Said R. Huna, "Here with what situation do we deal? A case in which there was awareness between the two acts of eating, and it represents the position of Rabban Gamaliel, who said, 'If one is aware of half of the requisite measure only, that is null.'" [Freedman: It does not separate two acts of eating, when in each case only half the standard quantity to create liability is consumed.]*

- V.8** A. *It has been stated:* If one ate two olive's bulks of forbidden fat in a single spell of inadvertence, and he became aware of the first and then again he became aware of the second —
- B. R. Yohanan said, "He is liable on two counts."
- C. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is liable on only one count."
- D. R. Yohanan said, "He is liable for the second, on the basis of the phrase, 'for his sin he shall bring a sacrifice' (Lev. 4:35)."
- E. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is not liable for the second: 'of his sin...and he shall be forgiven.'" [Freedman: Even if he offers a sacrifice for part of his sin only, he is forgiven for the whole].
- F. *But from R. Simeon b. Laqish's perspective, isn't it written, "for his sin he shall bring a sacrifice"?*
- G. *That pertains after atonement.* [Freedman: If he offends a second time after having atoned for the first, he must make atonement again.]
- H. *But from R. Yohanan's perspective, isn't it written, "of his sin...and he shall be forgiven"?*

I. *Here with what situation do we deal? A case in which he ate an olive and a half of forbidden fat, was informed about having eaten an olive's bulk of the same, then ate a half olive's bulk in the spell of inadvertence concerning the second half of the first volume. You might say that these two halves combine. So the verse cited by R. Simeon b. Laqish shows that that is not the case.*

**V.9** *A. Said Rabina to R. Ashi, "[Here are two possibilities of what is at issue. The first is,] they disagree in a case in which the eating of the second piece became known to the sinner before he had designated an animal for a sin-offering for the first. In that case, this is what is at issue: The one authority maintains, spells of inadvertence may be subdivided [Freedman: the knowledge first obtained concerning one piece divides this piece from the second, necessitating an offering for each], and the other holds, only the distinctions between the designations for particular purposes of animals for sin-offerings themselves are made [Freedman: and since a sacrifice was not designated until he learned of the second piece, it atones for both]. But as to the situation prevailing after the designation of an animal as a sin-offering for the first of the two actions in inadvertence, R. Simeon b. Laqish would concede to R. Yohanan that he is liable for two animal-offerings. Or perhaps, this is what is at issue: They differ where the facts of the matter became known to the sinner after the act of designating a beast as a sin-offering had taken place. This is then what is at issue between them: The one master holds, the designation of beasts for offerings is subject to division, while the other maintains, only the acts of atonement are subject to division. But if the sinner had learned about eating the second piece in what had been a spell of inadvertence before he had set apart an animal as a sacrifice on account of the first piece, R. Yohanan would concede to R. Simeon b.*

*Laqish that he is liable for only a single animal-offering. Or perhaps they differ in both cases?"*

*B. He said to him, "It stands to reason that they differ in both cases. For if it should enter your mind that they differ concerning the rule governing the designation of the offering, but as to the situation that prevails after the designation of the offering, R. Simeon b. Laqish concedes to R. Yohanan that the man under the specified conditions now would be liable for two animal-offerings, then, instead of reading the cited verse to refer to the period after atonement has been attained through the offering itself, let him interpret it to refer to the rule that pertains merely after the designation of the animal for the offering but prior to the actual offering up of the beast itself. And if they differ concerning the situation after the designation of the beast, though before the designation of the beast R. Yohanan agrees with R. Simeon b. Laqish, that he is liable for only one animal-offering, then, instead of reading the cited verse to refer to one who ate as much as an olive and a half's bulk of forbidden fat, let him relate it to the situation that would prevail if the man had become aware of eating the second bit of forbidden fat prior to designating the beast. And if you should want to propose that that itself is subject to doubt and is set forth merely as a hypothetical possibility, then how can R. Yohanan interpret the verse? He could read it as referring to one who ate the bulk of an olive and a half. And if you assume that they differ on the situation prevailing after the designation of the beast for the offering, how can R. Simeon b. Laqish interpret the verse? It would refer to the situation prevailing after atonement [the initial verse having been offered up]."*

**V.10** *A. Said Ulla, "From the perspective of him who has said, 'The obligation to present a guilt-offering for certainly having incurred guilt does*

*not require that one have known about the sin that he has committed at the outset of the action [but only at the end of the process of sinning],'* [72A] *it would follow that, if one had sexual relations five times with a betrothed handmaid, doing so unwittingly [not knowing her status] [in violation of Lev. 19:21, which imposes the requirement of a guilt-offering in such a situation, the woman being betrothed to someone else], [and between each action, he was informed of his prior offense, but he forgot and went and did it again], he would be obligated to present only a single guilt-offering."* [Freedman: Since knowledge of guilt is not required, the knowledge that he does possess is insufficient to separate his actions and necessitate a sacrifice for each. But on the view that previous knowledge is essential for a guilt-offering, the matter will be disputed by Yohanan and Simeon b. Laqish, as before.]

B. *Objected R. Hamnuna:; "Then what about the following case: If he had sexual relations and then again went and had sexual relations, and designated an animal for an offering, and then said, 'Wait for me while I have sexual relations yet again,' [Freedman: so that the offering may atone for both actions?] in such a case would he still be liable for only a single offering, too? [Surely not!]"*

C. *He said to him "But do you speak of a deed that is done after the designation of an animal for an offering? For such a situation I did not present my ruling."* [Freedman: This certainly marks off the prior offenses from the later one and a sacrifice is required to cover each.]

D. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "From the perspective of him who has said, 'The*

*obligation to present a guilt-offering for certainly having incurred guilt does require that one have known about the sin that he has committed at the outset of the action [and not only at the end of the process of sinning],’ it would follow that, if one had sexual relations five times with a betrothed handmaid, doing so unwittingly [not knowing her status] [in violation of Lev. 19:21, which imposes the requirement of a guilt-offering in such a situation, the woman being betrothed to someone else], [and between each action, he was informed of his prior offense, but he forgot and went and did it again], he would be obligated to present an offering for each such action.”*

*E. Said to him Abbayye, “But lo, with reference to the sacrifice of a sin-offering, in which we require that the sinner have had knowledge of the prohibited character of the act prior to the sin [but have done the act itself in inadvertence], R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish differed on that very matter” [and the same principle applies here, so how make such a statement (Freedman)].*

*F. He shut up.*

*G. He said to him, “But perhaps you have made your statement with reference to a deed that took place after the designation of the animal for the sin-offering, and in line with the position of R. Hamnuna?” [Freedman: But Yohanan and Simeon b. Laqish differ about a case in which all the actions took place prior to the designation of the animal.]*

*H. He said to him, “Yup.”*

**V.11** *A. When Rabin came, he said, “All parties concur in the case of the*



betrothed bondmaid [in one matter], and all parties concur in the case of the betrothed bondmaid [in yet another matter]. But there is a dispute concerning the betrothed bondmaid [in yet a third matter].

B. "All parties concur in the case of the betrothed bondmaid [in one matter]: *One is liable on only one count, in accord with the position of Ulla.*

C. "And all parties concur in the case of the betrothed bondmaid [in yet another matter]: *That one is liable on each count, in accord with R. Hamnuna.*

D. "But there is a dispute concerning the betrothed bondmaid [in yet a third matter]: *Within the premise of him who says that the obligation to present a guilt-offering for certainly having incurred guilt does require that one have known about the sin that he has committed at the outset of the action [and not only at the end of the process of sinning], there is the dispute between R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish."*

**V.12** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. **[72B]** If one intended to raise up what was plucked from the ground but instead cut what was attached to the ground, he is exempt. [*What is the operative consideration? It is because lo, he did not have the intention of cutting anything at all.*]
- C. If, however, he intended to cut what was detached from the ground but instead cut what was attached to the ground,
- D. Abbaye said, "He is liable."
- E. Raba said, "He is exempt, *for lo, he had no intention of cutting that which was forbidden to be cut.*"

F. Abbayye said, “He is liable, *for lo, he had the intention in any event to cut something.*”

G. *Said Raba, “On what basis do I make that statement? For it has been stated on Tannaite authority:* There is a more strict rule that applies to the Sabbath than applies to other religious duties, and there is a more strict rule that applies to other religious duties that does not apply to the Sabbath. For in the case of the Sabbath, if one has done two forbidden actions in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable for each one separately, a rule that does not apply to other religious duties. The more strict rule applying to other religious duties is that if one has performed a forbidden action inadvertently, without prior intention, he is liable, which is not the rule for the Sabbath.”

**V.13** A. A master has said, “There is a more strict rule that applies to the Sabbath than applies to other religious duties, and there is a more strict rule that applies to other religious duties that does not apply to the Sabbath. For in the case of the Sabbath, if one has done two forbidden actions in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable for each one separately, a rule that does not apply to other religious duties” —

B. *How shall we illustrate that statement? If one should propose that a person did an act of reaping and one of grinding, then, in respect to other religious duties, it would be similar to eating both forbidden fat and blood. In such a case, one is liable on two counts, just as here he is liable on two counts.*

C. *Then with respect to other religious duties, what sort of case would yield the result that one is liable on only a single count?*

D. *If one ate forbidden fat and then more forbidden fat. In a parallel case involving the Sabbath it would be if one performed an act of reaping and then another act of reaping. In that case, however, in the one context [eating forbidden fat] he is liable on only one count, and in the other context, he also is liable on only one count.*

E. *The reference [to “other religious duties”] is specifically to idolatry, and it accords with what R. Ammi said. For R. Ammi said, “If one has sacrificed, offered incense, and poured out a*

libation, all in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on only a single count,” [while in the case of the Sabbath, as we see, one is liable on more than a single count].

F. *Then how have you interpreted the case? With respect only to idolatry? But you cannot assign the statement only to idolatry, for the end of the same sentence reads: “The more strict rule applying to other religious duties is that, if one has performed a forbidden action inadvertently, without prior intention, he is liable, which is not the rule for the Sabbath.” Now what, in reference to idolatry, can possibly fall into the category of an action that has been performed inadvertently, without intention? If one supposed that a temple of an idol was a synagogue and prostrated himself to it, lo, his heart was directed to heaven. Rather, he saw a statue of a man and bowed to it. If, then, he accepted it as a god, what he did was done deliberately. If he did not accept it as a god, then what he did was null. Rather, what he did was out of love and awe.*

G. *That poses no problems to Abbaye, who has said that, in such a case, he is liable. But as to the view of Raba, who has said that he is exempt, what is there to be said?*

H. Rather, it is one who has the view that such an action is permitted. [Freedman, Sanhedrin, p. 425, n. 3: And since he has never known of any prohibition, it is not regarded as unwitting, but as unintentional too.]

I. *Then this is what is not the case for the Sabbath, for, in a similar circumstance, one would not be liable at all.*

J. *[But surely that conclusion is not possible], for when Raba poses his question to R. Nahman as to the rule governing a single spell of inadvertence in each of the two contexts, it is only whether one is liable on one count or on two counts. But it never entered his mind that one would be entirely exempt from all liability.*

K. **[73A]** *What difficulty is at hand? Perhaps one may say to you indeed that the first clause speaks of idolatry and the remainder of other religious duties.*

L. *The case of inadvertence, without intention — what would be such a case? It would be one in which one had the view that [when he found there was forbidden fat in his mouth], he thought that it was permitted fat and swallowed it [rather than spitting it out], a rule which, in a parallel case on the Sabbath, would produce the ruling of non-liability. [How so?] If one had the intention of lifting up something that was already harvested but turned out to cut something yet attached to the ground, he is exempt.*

M. *And from Abbaye's viewpoint, what would be an unwitting and unintentional sin? If he thinks that the forbidden fat is spit and swallows it. The meaning of "which is not the case for the Sabbath," in which instance, he would be exempt, would involve, by analogy, one who intended to lift something detached but cut something attached to the soil; he is not liable. But if he intended to cut something detached and cut something attached to the soil, he is liable. [Freedman, Sanhedrin, p. 426, n. 2: Cutting or tearing out anything growing in the earth is a forbidden labor on the Sabbath. His offense was both unwitting and unintentional for (i) he had no intention of tearing out anything and (ii) he did not know that this was growing in the soil. Now, had he known that it was growing in the soil and deliberately uprooted it in ignorance of the forbidden nature of that action, his offense would have been unwitting but intentional. By analogy, had he intended to eat the melted fat, thinking that it was permitted, his offense would be regarded as unwitting but intentional. Since, however, he did not intend eating it at all, but accidentally swallowed it, thinking at the same time that it was spittle, his offense was both unwitting and unintentional.]*

**V.14** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. If the man intended to throw the stone two cubits and it fell four cubits away —
- C. Raba said, "He is exempt."
- D. Abbaye said, "He is liable."
- E. Raba said, "He is exempt, *for lo, he didn't intend to toss the object the four cubits [that would incur liability].*"

F. Abbayye said, “He is liable, *for lo, he had every intention of throwing the object in general.*”

**V.15** A. If he thought it was private domain but it turned out to be public domain,

B. Raba said, “He is exempt.”

C. Abbayye said, “He is liable.”

D. Raba said, “He is exempt, *for lo, he didn’t intend to toss the object in a forbidden manner.*”

E. Abbayye said, “He is liable, *for lo, he had every intention of throwing the object in general.*”

**V.16** A. *And it was necessary to give us the three disputes [these two plus the one we have just analyzed]. For had we been informed only of the initial one, we might have supposed that it was in that case in particular that Raba took the position that he did, since, after all, the man never intended to eat a piece of fat that was forbidden, but here, he did intend to throw the object for two cubits and he threw it for four, and it would not have been possible to throw it for four if he first didn’t throw it for the two, so I might have supposed that he concurs with Abbayye. And had we been informed of the present instance, I might have supposed that here alone Raba takes the position that he does, since the man didn’t intend to throw the object for four cubits, but if he thought it was private domain but it turned out to be public domain, since the man at any rate intended to throw it for four cubits, I might have supposed that he concurs with Abbayye. So the several examples of the dispute are required.*

**V.17** A. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited on the Sabbath] are forty less one [M. 7:2A].** And we reflected on that statement: What need do I have for the enumeration? And said R. Yohanan, “If someone did all of them in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on each and every count.”*

B. *Now there is no problem for Abbayye, who has held that in a case such as this, one is liable. You would find such a case, for instance, if the man knew about the prohibition of the Sabbath and he knew about the prohibition of such actions, but*

*did not know the rules governing the requisite volume that would incur liability. But from Raba's perspective, who maintains that he would be exempt, how can you find such a case?*

*C. It would involve a case in which he knew about the Sabbath but didn't know about the fact that the acts of labor were forbidden.*

*D. Well, that would pose no problem if he concurred with R. Yohanan, who said, "Since one has made an action inadvertently in a deed the penalty of which is extirpation, even though he deliberately violated a negative commandment, he is liable. Then you would find such a case when he knew that the labors were forbidden on the Sabbath by reason of a negative commandment. But if he concurred with R. Simeon b. Laqish, who maintains that one is liable only if he is in error as to the negative commandment and also as to the penalty of extirpation, when how in the stated case did he know about the Sabbath at all?*

*E. What he knew concerned the law of boundaries not to be transgressed, in accord with the position of R. Aqiba.*

## **7:2**

- A. The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited on the Sabbath] are forty less one:**
- B. (1) he who sows, (2) ploughs, (3) reaps, (4) binds sheaves, (5) threshes, (6) winnows, (7) selects [fit from unfit produce or crops], (8) grinds, (9) sifts, (10) kneads, (11) bakes;**
- C. (12) he who shears wool, (13) washes it, (14) beats it, (15) dyes it;**
- D. (16) spins, (17) weaves,**
- E. (18) makes two loops, (19) weaves two threads, (20) separates two threads;**
- F. (21) ties, (22) unties,**
- G. (23) sews two stitches, (24) tears in order to sew two stitches;**
- H. (25) he who traps a deer, (26) slaughters it, (27) flays it, (28) salts it, (29) cures its hide, (30) scrapes it, and (31) cuts it up;**
- I. (32) he who writes two letters, (33) erases two letters in order to write two letters;**

- J. (34) he who builds, (35) tears down;
- K. (36) he who puts out a fire, (37) kindles a fire;
- L. (38) he who hits with a hammer; (39) he who transports an object from one domain to another —
- M. lo, these are the forty generative acts of labor less one.

- I.1 A. [73B] *What's the point of the enumeration?*
- B. Said R. Yohanan, "To teach that if someone does them all in a single spell of inadvertence, he still is liable on each count separately."

- II.1 A. **He who sows and ploughs:**
- B. *So let's examine the matter: Since ploughing is done before sowing, why shouldn't the Tannaite framer of the passage first make reference to ploughing, then to sowing?*
- C. *The Tannaite authority addresses the case of the Land of Israel, where they first sow and then plough.*

- II.2 A. *A Tannaite statement: Sowing, pruning, planting, bending a shoot, and drafting all form a single classification of labor.*
- B. *So of what does the statement inform us?*
- C. *Thus he informs us that one who does many acts of labor within a single classification of labor is liable on only a single count.*

- II.3 A. Said R. Abba said R. Hiyya bar Ashi said R. Ammi, "He who prunes is liable on the count of planting, and he who plants, bends the vine, or grafts is liable on the count of sowing."
- B. *On account of sowing but not planting?*
- C. *Say: also on the count of planting.*

- II.4 A. Said R. Kahana, "If one pruned his tree but requires the wood for fuel, he is liable on two counts, one on the count of planting, the other on the count of harvesting."

- II.5 A. *Said R. Joseph, "One who cuts hay is liable on two counts, one for reaping, the other for planting."*

- II.6 A. *Said Abbaye, "One who trims beets in the earth is liable on two counts: reaping and planting."*

- III.1 A. **Ploughs:**

- B. *A Tannaite statement:* Ploughing, digging, and trench-making form a single classification of work.

**III.2** A. Said R. Sheshet, “If someone had a mound of dirt and removes it, if he does this in the house, he is liable on the count of building; if he does this in the field, he is liable on the count of ploughing.”

- B. Said Raba, “If someone had a hole and filled it up, if he did so in the house, he is liable on the count of building; if he does this in the field, he is liable on the count of ploughing.”

**III.3** A. Said R. Abba, “He who digs a hole on the Sabbath and needs only the dirt is exempt on that account. *And even according to R. Judah, who said, ‘One is liable for doing an act of labor that is not needed for its own purpose,’ that is the case only if he brings about an improvement, but in this case, he is doing damage.*”

**IV.1** A. **Reaps:**

- B. *A Tannaite statement:* Reaping, vintaging, date gathering, olive collecting, fig gathering all form a single classification of labor.

**IV.2** A. *Said R. Pappa, “One who throws a piece of dirt at a palm tree to bring down dates is liable on two counts: detaching and stripping.”*

- B. R. Ashi said, “This is not an ordinary manner of detaching nor is it an ordinary manner of stripping” [so he is not liable on either count].

**V.1** A. **Binds sheaves:**

- B. *Said Raba, “One who collects salt from a salt pan is liable on the count of binding sheaves.”*
- C. Abbaye said, “Binding sheaves is a classification of labor that applies only to what grows from the ground.”

**VI.1** A. **Threshes:**

- B. *A Tannaite statement:* Threshing, beating flax in the stalks, beating cotton all form a single classification of labor.

**VII.1** A. **Winnows, selects [fit from unfit produce or crops], grinds, sifts:**

- B. *But the acts of winnowing, selecting, and sifting are all the same thing anyhow! [How can one be liable on each count?]*
- C. *Both Abbaye and Raba said, “Any type of labor that was performed in connection with setting up the tabernacle in the wilderness [74A], even though there may be acts of labor that bear likeness to one another, is regarded as a*



*single classification of labor [and one would be liable on each count for several such otherwise comparable acts of labor].”*

- D. *Well, then, why not enumerate pounding wheat as well [in a mortar, since pounding materials in a mortar was done to make dyes in the tabernacle’s construction]?*
- E. Said Abbayye, “It is because a poor man will eat his bread without pounding.” [Freedman: Hence it is omitted, for the Tannaite authority follows the general order of making bread, and bread for the poor is prepared with the husk of the wheat, but it is a primary labor forbidden on the Sabbath.]
- F. *Raba said, “Lo, who is the authority behind this passage? It is Rabbi, who has said, **The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited on the Sabbath] are forty less one.**”* [The actual number of classifications of labor derives from Scripture itself.]
- G. *Well, then, take away one of those and put in pounding?*
- H. *Rather, the answer of Abbayye clearly is correct.*

**VII.2** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. [With reference to the forms of labor, **winnows, selects fit from unfit produce or crops**]: If before a person were various kinds of foods, he selects and eats what he wants, selects and leaves what he wants, but he must not make a selection and if he does, he is liable to present a sin-offering.

**VII.3** A. *What in the world can that possibly mean?*

B. *Said Ulla, “This is the sense of the statement:* He selects and eats what he wants for that day in particular, selects and leaves what he wants for that day in particular, but as to what is for the next day, he must not make a selection and if he does, he is liable to present a sin-offering.”

C. *Objected R. Hisda, “So is it permitted to bake for use on that same day, is it permitted to cook for use on that same day?”* [Freedman: Since you say that selecting for use on the next day entails a sin-offering, it is a forbidden labor in the full sense of the term and hence prohibited even if required for the same day.]

D. *Rather, said R. Hisda, “[This is the sense of the statement:]...He selects and eats less than the requisite quantity to involve liability, selects and leaves what he wants less than the requisite quantity to involve liability. But he should not select so much as the requisite*

quantity to involve liability, and if he selected the requisite volume, he then would be liable to a sin-offering.”

E. *Objected R. Joseph*, “So is it permitted to bake for use on that same day less than the requisite volume, [or is it permitted to cook for use on that same day less than the requisite volume]?”

F. Rather, said R. Joseph, “[*This is the sense of the statement:*]...He selects and eats by hand, or selects and puts aside by hand; but he may not select with a basket or a dish, and if he does, he is not liable, though it is forbidden. He may not use a sieve or a basket sieve in making his selection, and, if he does so, he is liable to a sin-offering [being the usual mode of sifting and a primary form of labor].”

G. *Objected R. Hamnuna*, “*But then does the Tannaite formulation even mention a basket or a dish!?*”

H. Rather, said R. Hamnuna, “[*This is the sense of the statement:*]...He selects and eats: He eats what is edible from what is non-edible, selects and puts aside, taking the edible from the non-edible. But he may not select from the non-edible out of the edible, and if he does, he is liable to a sin-offering.” [Freedman: The former is not the ordinary mode of sifting, the latter is.]

I. *Objected Abbaye*, “*But then does the Tannaite formulation even mention he eats what is edible from what is non-edible?*”

J. Rather, said Abbaye, “[*This is the sense of the statement:*]...He selects and eats right on the spot, he selects and leaves right on the spot, but on the same day he may not select for later eating, and if he does, he is regarded as though he selected to store away food and is liable to a sin -offering.”

K. *Rabbis stated this before Raba. He said to them, “Well said, Nahmani!”*

- VII.4** A. If before a person were two kinds of food, and he selects and eats or selects and leaves over —
- B. *R. Ashi repeated*, “He is exempt.”
- C. *R. Jeremiah of Difti repeated*, “He is liable.”
- D. *R. Ashi repeated*, “He is exempt.” *But lo, a Tannaite formulation has, he is liable!*

- E. *No problem, the one involves using a basket or a plate, the other, a sieve or a basket sieve.*

**VII.5** A. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "It was the Sabbath for an address by R. Bibi, and R. Ammi and R. Assi came by. He tossed a basket of fruit before them [by the force of his gesture causing the leaves to fall from the fruit], but I don't know whether he did that because he maintained that it is forbidden to pick out edible from non-edible food or whether he wanted to give a generous portion."*

- VII.6** A. *Hezekiah said, "He who picks lupines out of their husks is liable."*  
B. *May one propose that Hezekiah takes the view, it is forbidden to pick out edible from non-edible food?*  
C. *The case of lupines is exceptional, [74B] because they are boiled seven times, and if one doesn't remove the edible portion, it will turn rancid, so it is comparable to picking non-edible out of edible food."*

**VIII.1** A. **Grinds:**

- B. *Said R. Pappa, "One who cuts up beets very fine is liable on the count of grinding."*  
C. *Said R. Manasseh, "He who chops up chips for fuel is liable on the count of grinding."*  
D. *Said R. Ashi, "If someone cares about the size, he is liable on the count of cutting."*

**IX.1** A. **Kneads and bakes:**

- B. *Said R. Pappa, "The Tannaite before us has neglected the boiling of ingredients for dyeing [for example, for hangings and curtains], even though this took place in building the tabernacle, but treats nonetheless of baking [which didn't]!"*  
C. *Our Tannaite authority is following the order of baking bread.*

**IX.2** A. *Said R. Aha bar R. Avira, "Someone who throws a tent peg into a stove [for drying] is liable on the count of cooking."*

- B. *Obviously!*  
C. *What might you have supposed? His intention was to harden the wood, so we are informed that the wood at first softens and only then hardens.*

**IX.3** A. *Said Rabbah bar R. Huna, "One who boils pitch is liable on the count of cooking."*

- B. *Obviously!*
- C. *What might you have supposed? Since it hardens again, I might have imagined he isn't liable, so we are informed to the contrary.*

**IX.4** A. *Said Raba, "One who makes an earthenware barrel is liable on seven counts [to bring seven sin-offerings]. He who makes an oven is liable on eight counts."* [Freedman: The seven counts: The clods are crushed and powdered, which is grinding; the thick balls that don't powder well are removed, thus selecting; then it's sifted; the powder is mixed with water, thus kneading; the clay is smoothed, thus smoothing; the fire is lit in the kiln; the vessel is hardened, thus boiling. The eighth is that after the pot is hardened, a layer of loam is daubed on the inside to preserve the heat; this completes it and every special act needed to complete an article falls within "striking with a hammer." But a barrel doesn't need a special act of labor to complete it.]

- B. *Said Abbaye, "One who makes a wicker work is liable on eleven counts, and if he sews around the mouth, he is liable on thirteen counts."*

**X.1** A. **He who shears wool and washes [bleaches] it:**

- B. *Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said, R. Yohanan, "He who on the Sabbath spins wool from an animal's back is liable on three counts: One because of shearing, the second because of hackling, and the third because of spinning."* [Freedman: Spinning directly from the animal covers these three types of labor.]
- C. *R. Kahana said, "But this is not the ordinary manner of shearing, this is not the ordinary manner of hackling, and this is not the ordinary manner of spinning."*
- D. *So it isn't, is it? But hasn't it been taught on Tannaite authority in the name of R. Nehemiah, "It was washed directly on the goats and spun on the goats," which proves that spinning directly from the animal counts a spinning?*
- E. *An act that requires special skill is exceptional.*

**X.2** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **He who pulls a wing from a bird, trims it, and plucks the down, is liable for sin-offerings on three counts [T. [Shab. 9:20A](#)].**
- C. *And said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "The liability as to pulling the wing is on the count of shearing; the liability for cutting is on the count of severing; and the liability for smoothing is on the count of scraping" [so plucking or tearing are the same as shearing].*

**XI.1** A. **Ties, unties:**

- B. *So where was there the need for tying in the building of the tabernacle?*

- C. Said Raba, “They tied the tent pegs.”
- D. But that was tying with the intent of untying later on!
- E. Rather, said Abbaye, “When a thread broke, the weavers of the curtains tied it up.”
- F. *Said to him Raba, “Well, you’ve explained tying, but what is there to be said about untying? And should you say, when two knots of material came together, one untied one and left the other knotted, then one may wonder: If one wouldn’t do such a thing before a mortal king, how much the more so would one not do so before the King of kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He!”*
- G. Rather, said Raba — some say, R. Ilai, “Those who caught the purple fish [for dye for the tents of the tabernacle] had to tie and untie their nets.”

**XII.1 A. Sews two stitches:**

- B. *But these wouldn’t last [two stitches by themselves will come out of the cloth, and work that does not produce a permanent result isn’t punished].*
- C. Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan, “The rule of the Mishnah speaks of a case in which he knotted them [after sewing them, so they are permanent].”

**XIII.1 A. Tears in order to sew two stitches:**

- B. *So where was there the need for tearing in the building of the tabernacle?*
- C. *Both Rabbah and R. Zira say, [75A] “A curtain that suffered a moth hole was torn around the hole and re sewn.”*

**XIII.2 A. Said R. Zutra bar Tobiah said Rab, “He who pulls the thread of a seam on the Sabbath is liable to a sin-offering, and he who learns anything at all from a Magus is liable to the death penalty, and he who knows how to calculate the seasons and planets but doesn’t do so — it is forbidden to talk to him.”**

**XIII.3 A. As to the Magi —**

- B. *Rab and Samuel —*
- C. *One said, “It is pure sorcery.”*
- D. *The other said, “It is blasphemy.”*
  - E. *You may conclude that it is Rab who said that it is blasphemy, for said R. Zutra bar Tobiah said Rab, “He who learns anything at all from a Magus is liable to the death penalty.” Now if it should enter your mind that all it is is sorcery, then it is written, “You shall not learn to*

do after the abominations of those nations” (Deu. 18: 9) — but you may learn to understand and to make decisions.

F. *You may draw that conclusion.*

**XIII.4** A. Said R. Simeon b. Pazzi said R. Joshua b. Levi in the name of Bar Qappara, “Whoever knows how to calculate the seasons and planets but doesn’t do so — concerning him Scripture says, ‘But they regard not the work of the Lord, neither have they considered the works of his hands’ (Isa. 5:12).”

B. Said R. Samuel bar Nahmani said R. Yohanan, “How do we know that it is a religious duty for someone to calculate the seasons and planets? ‘For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the peoples’ (Deu. 4: 6) — what wisdom and understanding is something that the peoples see? It is the knowledge of the seasons and planets.”

**XIV.1** A. **He who traps a deer:**

B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. **He who hunts purple fish and splits it open is liable on only a single count.**

D. **R. Judah says, “He is liable on two counts” [cf. T. **Shab. 8:2C**].**

E. For R. Judah says, “Crushing is classified in the category of threshing.”

F. They said to him, “Crushing is not classified in the category of threshing.”

**XIV.2** A. *Said Raba, “What is the theory behind rabbis’ ruling? They take the view that threshing applies only to what grows from the earth.”*

**XIV.3** A. *Well, anyhow, let him be held liable on the count of taking a life?*

B. Said R. Yohanan, “This refers to a case in which he crushes it when it is dead.”

C. *Raba said, You may even say that it is crushed alive; as to the taking of life, it is merely incidental to his primary engagement.”*

D. *But lo, both Abbaye and Raba say, “R. Simeon concedes in a case of ‘cut off his head but let him not die’” [That a labor performed incidentally in the course of doing a permitted deed is itself permitted, unless that labor follows inevitably from the latter, in which case it is*

equivalent to a forbidden labor; here, too, it must inevitably die when crushed (Freedman)].

E. *This case is exceptional, since the maker would prefer that the thing remain alive, so that the dye will be clearer [so the death is not only unintentional but unwanted].*

**XV.1 A. Slaughters it:**

- B. *On what count is one who slaughters liable in respect to the Sabbath?*
- C. Rab said, "On the count of dyeing" [for the blood of the cut throat dyes the flesh (Freedman)].
- D. And Samuel said, "Because of the taking of life."
- E. **[75B]** [To Rab:] *On the count of dyeing but not on the score of taking life!?*
- F. Say: Also on the count of dyeing.
- G. *Said Rab, "As to this statement of mine, I will say something in that connection so that coming generations won't make fun of me: On what grounds is the dyeing process pleasing to the owner? The owner will be glad that the throat be stained with blood, so people will see the fact that [it is freshly killed] and come and buy the meat."*

**XVI.1 A. Salts it, cures its hide:**

- B. *Yeah, but salting and curing the hide are one and the same thing!*
- C. *Both R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish say, "Take out one of these and put in instead 'drawing a line' [before cutting]."*

**XVI.2 A. Said Rabbah bar R. Huna, "One who salts meat is liable on the count of tanning."**

- B. Raba said, "The considering of tanning doesn't apply to what is eaten."  
C. *Said R. Ashi, "Even Rabbah bar R. Huna made that statement only in a case in which he needs the meat for a journey, but if he needs it only for household use, someone doesn't change food into wood."*

**XVII.1 A. Scrapes it, and cuts it up:**

- B. Said R. Aha bar Hanina, "He who on the Sabbath smooths the ground between columns is liable on the count of scraping."

**XVII.2 A. Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, "Three things did R. Assi tell me in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: 'He who on the Sabbath planes the tops of beams is liable on the count of cutting [to measure]. He who puts a poultice evenly over a sore is**

liable on the count of scraping. He who chisels around a stone on the Sabbath is liable on the count of striking with a hammer.”

- B. Said R. Simeon b. Qisma said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “He who outlines a figure on a utensil and he who blows into glassware is liable on the count of striking with a hammer.”
- C. *Said R. Judah, “One who takes threads out of garments on the Sabbath is liable on the count of striking with a hammer, but that is so only if he doesn’t want the garments where they are.”* [These all are instances in which the process of manufacture is completed by said actions.]

#### **XVIII.1 A. He who writes two letters:**

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. **If one wrote a very large letter and the space of the letter is sufficient to write two ordinary letters, he is exempt from penalty on this count. If he erased one large letter and there is room on the spot for writing two ordinary letters, he is liable.**
- D. **Said R. Menahem b. R. Yosé, “The rule covering erasing is more strict than the rule covering writing”** [T. Shab. 11:9-11].

#### **XIX.1 A. He who builds, tears down; he who puts out a fire, kindles a fire; he who hits with a hammer:**

- B. *Rabbah and R. Zira both say, “Any action that involves completing the process of manufacturing an object is liable on the count of hitting with a hammer.”*

#### **XX.1 A. Lo, these are the forty generative acts of labor less one:**

- B. **These...** *serves to exclude the position of R. Eleazar, who imposes liability for derivative classes of forbidden action when performed along with a generative class of action.*

#### **XXI.1 A. Less one:**

- B. **Less one...** *serves to exclude the position of R. Judah, as has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah adds [to the list of generative classes of action] one who closes up a web and beats on the woof [to even it out].*
- C. They said to him, “Closing up the web is covered in the classification of stretching the threads; and beating on the woof is covered in the classification of weaving.”



### 7:3

- A. And a further governing rule did they state:
- B. Whatever is suitable for storage, which people generally store in such quantity as one has taken out on the Sabbath —
- C. he is liable to a sin-offering on its account.
- D. And whatever is not suitable for storage, which people generally do not store in such quantity as one has taken out on the Sabbath —
- E. only he is liable on its account who stores it away [and who then takes it out].

- I.1**
- A. **Whatever is suitable for storage, which people generally store in such quantity as one has taken out on the Sabbath:**
  - B. *What class of things is excluded by the language, Whatever is suitable for storage?*
  - C. *R. Pappa said, "It excludes menstrual blood."*
  - D. *Mar Uqba said, "It excludes lumber from an asherah tree."*
  - E. *The authority who said that it excludes menstrual blood would all the more so maintain that it excludes lumber from an asherah tree. But he who says that it excludes the lumber of an asherah tree may hold that the blood of menstruation may be put away to feed the cat.*
  - F. *And the other party?*
  - G. *Since the cat would get sick on the blood, no one would put it away for such a purpose.*

- I.2**
- A. *Said R. Yosé bar Hanina, "This rule is not in accord with R. Simeon. For were it in accord with R. Simeon, hasn't he said, 'All of these rules have been stated only relative to the condition of those who are storing things'" [so that there is no fixed rule deriving from general practice, but we assess each situation in terms of the intent of him who is doing the storing; a rich person would store more, a poor person, less, each valuing things in his own terms (Freedman).]*

- II.1**
- A. **And whatever is not suitable for storage, which people generally do not store in such quantity as one has taken out on the Sabbath — only he is liable on its account who stores it away [and who then takes it out]:**
  - B. **[76A]** *Said R. Eleazar, "This does not accord with R. Simeon b. Eleazar, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: A governing principle did R. Simeon b. Eleazar state, 'In the case of anything that is not regarded as suitable for*

storage, the like of which in general people do not store away, but which a given individual has deemed fit for storage and has stored away, and which another party has come along and removed from storage and taken from one domain to another on the Sabbath — the party who moved the object across the line that separated the two domains has become liable by reason of the intentionality of the party who stored away this thing that is not ordinarily stored.”

### 7:4A-D

- A. **He who takes out a quantity of (1) straw sufficient for a cow's mouthful; (2) pea stalks sufficient for a camel's mouthful; (3) ears of grain sufficient for a lamb's mouthful; (4) grass sufficient for a kid's mouthful; (5) garlic or onion leaves, ([if] fresh, a dried fig's bulk), [and if] dry, sufficient for a kid's mouthful —**
- B. **[Supply: he is liable,]**
- C. **and they do not join together with one another [to form a quantity sufficient for culpability],**
- D. **because they are not subject to equivalent measures.**

#### I.1 A. **Pea stalks sufficient for a camel's mouthful:**

- B. *What is the definition of pea stalks?*
- C. Said R. Judah, “The stalks of various kinds of legumes.”

- #### I.2
- A. *When R. Dimi came, he said, “He who carries out a cow's mouthful of straw for a camel —*
  - B. *“R. Yohanan said, ‘He is liable.’*
  - C. *“R. Simeon b. Laqish said, ‘He is exempt.’*
  - D. *“In the evening that's what R. Yohanan said. In the morning, he retracted.”*
  - E. *Said R. Joseph, “He did well to retract, for lo, that quantity wouldn't be appropriate for a camel.”*
  - F. *Said to him Abbayye, “To the contrary! What he said to begin with stands to reason, for lo, it was, at any rate, suitable for a cow.”*
  - G. *Rather, when Rabin came, he said, “He who carries out a camel's mouthful of straw for a cow — all parties concur that he is liable. Where they differ, it is in the case of one who carries out for a cow pea stalks sufficient for a cow's mouthful [not a camel's mouthful, as in the Mishnah]. And the matter has been stated contrariwise, namely:*

- H. “R. Yohanan said, ‘He is exempt.’
- I. “R. Simeon b. Laqish said, ‘He is liable.’
- J. “R. Yohanan said, ‘He is exempt’: *Eating under difficult conditions is not classified as eating.*
- K. “R. Simeon b. Laqish said, ‘He is liable’: *Eating under difficult conditions is classified as eating.*”

**II.1 A. Ears of grain sufficient for a lamb’s mouthful:**

- B. *But hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: as much as a dried fig?*
- C. *Both represent exactly the same volume.*

**III.1 A. Garlic or onion leaves, ([if] fresh, a dried fig’s bulk), [and if] dry, sufficient for a kid’s mouthful — [Supply: he is liable,] and they do not join together with one another [to form a quantity sufficient for culpability], because they are not subject to equivalent measures:**

- B. Said R. Yosé bar Hanina, “**and they do not join together with one another [to form a quantity sufficient for culpability]** in the case of a strict result, but they do do so in the case of a lenient result.” [Freedman: The commodity whose standard is greater does not combine with that whose standard is lesser to make up that lesser quantity, but the latter does combine with the former to make up the greater quantity; that which requires a lesser quantity is naturally more stringent.]
- C. *But in the case of any mixture in which each component has its own minimal measure, is there any possibility of effecting a combination? And have we not learned in the Mishnah: Cloth [of wool or flax] is subject to uncleanness on account of being three-by-three [handbreadths square] — for midras uncleanness. And on account of being something three-by-three [fingerbreadths square] for corpse uncleanness. Sacking — four-by-four [handbreadths], leather [hide] — five-by-five [handbreadths], a mat — six-by-six [handbreadths] are equivalent for midras and for corpse uncleanness. [That is, we do not distinguish, as with cloth, between square handbreadths for midras uncleanness, and the much smaller square fingerbreadths for corpse uncleanness.] R. Meir says, “Sacking — its remnants are four [handbreadths], and its beginning [is] when it will have been completed” [M. Kel. 27:2]? And in that connection it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Cloth joins together with sacking, sacking with leather, leather with matting. [And yet, we see, each is subject to its own minimum dimensions.] And said R. Simeon, “What is the reason? Since all of them are*

subject to the same mode of uncleanness, namely, that imparted when a person subject to uncleanness as a person afflicted with flux [Lev. 15] sits on any of them. [Hence, the different sorts of materials join together because the same mode of transfer of uncleanness pertains to all of them.]” *So the operative consideration is that all of them are subject to the same mode of uncleanness, namely, that imparted when a person subject to uncleanness as a person afflicted with flux [Lev. 15] sits on any of them. So if they are not suitable to contract that form of uncleanness, that is not the rule!*

- D. *Said Raba, [76B] “Here, too, they are suitable to serve as a pattern.”* [Freedman: They can be pieced together to serve as a sample of one’s ware.]

### 7:4E-I

- E. **He who takes out foodstuffs [for a human being] in the volume of a dried fig is liable.**
- F. **And they do join together with one another [to form a quantity sufficient for culpability],**
- G. **because they are subject to equivalent measures,**
- H. **except for their (1) husks, (2) kernels, (3) stalks, (4) coarse bran, and (5) fine bran.**
- I. **R. Judah says, “Except for the husks of lentils, which are cooked with them.”**

- I.1** A. **[Except for their (1) husks, (2) kernels, (3) stalks, (4) coarse bran, and (5) fine bran:]** *But don’t the husks and coarse bran join together with grain or flour? Haven’t we learned in the Mishnah: Five-fourths [qab] of flour is subject to dough-offering [once made into dough]. [If] it [i.e., the flour] and its leaven, fine bran, and coarse bran [together comprise] five-fourths [qab, the whole] is subject [to dough-offering once made into dough] [M. Hal. 2:6A-B]?*

- B. *Said Abbaye, “The reason is that a poor person eats bread baked out of unsifted dough”* [Freedman: but with respect to the Sabbath, bread of better quality is required for liability to be incurred].

- II.1** A. **R. Judah says, “Except for the husks of lentils, which are cooked with them”:**
- B. *Lentils, not beans?! And hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, “Excluding the shells of beans and of lentils”?*

- C. *No problem, the one speaks of new beans [the husks combine], the other of old.*
- D. *Why not the old?*
- E. Said R. Abbahu, "Because in the dish they look just like flies."