

BAVLI ZEBAHIM

CHAPTER FIVE

FOLIOS 47A-57B

5:1-2

5:1

- A. What is the place [in which the act of sacrifice] of animal offerings [takes place]?
- B. Most Holy Things [the whole offering, sin offering, and guilt offering] — the act of slaughtering them is carried out at the north [side of the altar].
- C. The bullock and the he-goat of the Day of Atonement — the act slaughtering them is at the north.
- D. And the receiving of their blood is carried out in a utensil of service, at the north [side of the altar].
- E. And their blood requires sprinkling over the space between the bars [of the ark], and on the veil, and on the golden altar.
- F. One act of placing of their [blood] [if improperly done] impairs [atonement].
- G. And the remnants of the blood did one pour out at the western base of the outer altar.
- H. [But] if he did not place [the remnants of their blood at the stated location], he did not impair [atonement].

5:2

- A. Bulls which are to be burned and he-goats which are to be burned —
- B. the act of slaughtering them is at the north [side of the altar].
- C. And the receiving of their blood is in a utensil of service at the north.
- D. And their blood requires sprinkling on the veil and on the golden altar.
- E. [47B] [The improper sprinkling of] one act of placing of their [blood] impairs [atonement].
- F. The remnants of their blood did one pour out on the western base of the outer altar.
- G. If he did not place [the remnants of the blood at the stated location], he did not impair [atonement].

H. These and those are burned in the ash pit.

- I.1 A.** *But why should the Tannaite author of the passage not state in the opening clause [A-B] as he does later on [Cff.]: **And the receiving of their blood is carried out in a utensil of service, at the north [side of the altar]!***
- B. *Since there is the matter of the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment [which is classified also as Most Holy Things], the blood of which is received in the hand [not in a utensil of service], he leaves out that item.*
- C. *But is the blood not received in a utensil of service? And lo, it is taught later on, **The peace offerings of the congregation and the guilt offerings — What are the guilt offerings? (1) The guilt offering for false dealing, and (2) the guilt offering for acts of sacrilege, and (3) the guilt offering [because of intercourse with] a betrothed bondwoman, and (4) the guilt offering of a Nazir, and the (5) guilt offering of the person healed of the skin ailment , and (6) the suspensive guilt offering — the act of slaughtering them is at the north [side of the altar]. And the receiving of their blood is with a utensil of service at the north [M. 5:5]!***
- D. *To begin with he took the position that the receiving of the blood was to be done by hand. So he omitted reference to the item here [just as has been explained]. But when he realized that the collection of the blood cannot be done unless a utensil is used, he included it later on. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. *“And the priest shall take of the blood of the guilt offering” — might one think that this is done with a utensil?*
- F. *Scripture states, “and the priest shall put it” (Lev. 14:14) — just as the putting on of the blood is to be done by the priest’s hand itself, so the taking of the blood also should be done by the priest’s hand itself.*
- G. *Might one suppose that that is the same for the altar [so that blood to be sprinkled on the altar is received not in a utensil but in the hand]?*
- H. *Scripture states, “For as the sin offering so is the guilt offering” (Lev. 14:13) — just as the sin offering requires a utensil for receiving the blood, so the guilt offering requires a utensil for receiving the blood.*
- I. *You must then draw the conclusion that two priests received the blood of the guilt offering of the one healed of the skin ailment, one in his hand, the other in a utensil. The one who received the blood in a utensil went to the altar and put the blood there, and the one who received it in his hand went to the person who had been healed of the skin ailment and put it on the specified parts of his body.*

II.1 A. [48A] Bullocks which are to be burned and he-goats which are to be burned — the act of slaughtering them is carried out at the north side of the altar. And the receiving of their blood is in a utensil of service at the north. And their blood requires sprinkling on the veil and on the golden altar:

- B. *Now take note that the requirement that the rite be carried out at the north side of the altar is written in regard to the burnt offering, so let the framer of the passage formulate the rule by making reference first of all to the burnt offering.*

- C. *[The reason that he treats the sin offering first is that] since the rule covering the sin offering derives from exegesis of Scripture [rather than being stated explicitly therein], it is regarded by him as of greater value.*
- D. *But then let him present the rules governing the sin offerings that are offered on the outer altar!*
- E. *Since the blood of those listed first is taken into the inner sanctum, it is regarded by him as of greater value.*

II.2. A. *Where in Scripture is reference made to the rule governing the burnt offering?*

- B. *“And he shall kill it on the side of the altar at the north” (Lev. 1:11).*
- C. *So we have found the explicit rule that treats a beast deriving from the flock. How do we know that the same rule governs what comes of the herd?*
- D. *Scripture states, ““And if his offering be of the flock,” and the word “and” continues the preceding statement, with the result that the subject that is prior may be deduced from the one given following. [Freedman: when a passage commences with ‘and’ the conjunction links it with the previous portion, and a law stated in one applies to the other too. Here the subject above is the burnt offering of the herd and the subject below is the flock.]*
- E. *That answer is satisfactory for him who takes the view that one may indeed derive a rule governing a prior subject from one that is given later on, but from the perspective of him who denies that fact, what is to be said?*
- F. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- G. *““And if any one [commits a breach of faith and sins unwittingly in any of the holy things of the Lord]’ (Lev. 5:15) — this [“and if”] serves to impose liability for a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of an act of sacrilege that is subject to doubt,” the words of R. Aqiba.*
- H. *And sages declare him exempt.*
- I. *May not one say that this is what is subject to dispute: R. Aqiba takes the view that we derive the rule for a prior matter from one that is mentioned later on, and rabbis maintain that we do not derive the rule governing a prior matter from a matter that is mentioned later on. [The prior matter is the one regarding sacrilege, the one that follows deals with the suspensive guilt offering, so Lev. 5:17: If any one sins, doing any of the things that the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he does not know it, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity.” Aqiba then derives the rule governing the case of an act of sacrilege that is subject to doubt from the rule governing unwitting sins that are subject to doubt, and consequently requires a suspensive guilt offering, and that explains his position: **R. Aqiba declares [a person] liable to a suspensive guilt offering in the case of a matter of doubt regarding acts of sacrilege.** Sages do not read the rule of the latter passage into the definition of the former.]*
- J. *Said R. Pappa, “All parties concur that we derive the rule for a prior topic from one that comes later on, [B. Ker. 22B adds:] for otherwise we should have no basis for the law that the bullock has to be slaughtered on the north side of the altar [for that rule derives from the fact that while the rule*

on the bullock offerings, Lev. 1: 3-4, comes prior to the rule on offering small cattle, Lev. 1:10f., and only the latter requires the slaughter to take place on the north side of the altar, we do indeed slaughter the bullock offerings on the north side of the altar as well]. *But this is the reason for the position of rabbis, who declare one exempt [from having to present a suspensive guilt offering in the case of a matter of doubt regarding acts of sacrilege]: they derive an verbal analogy to a sin offering based on the appearance of the word 'commandments' with reference to both matters.* There [at Lev. 4:27, with reference to a sin offering] there is an offense for which one is liable to extirpation in the case of a deliberate violation of the law, and to a sin offering in the case of an inadvertent violation of the law, and to a suspensive guilt offering in the case of doubt. So in every case, for which one is liable to extirpation in the case of a deliberate violation of the law, and to a sin offering in the case of an inadvertent violation of the law, and to a suspensive guilt offering in the case of doubt, the same rule applies; *but this excludes sacrilege, for in that case, a deliberate violation of the law does not bring on the penalty of extirpation.*" [B. Ker. 22B adds: *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority, He who deliberately committed an act of sacrilege — Rabbi says, "He is subject to the death penalty." And sages say, "He is subject to an admonition."*]

- K. And how about the position of R. Aqiba?
- L. *He maintains that when we draw an a verbal analogy between the reference here to "commandments" and the reference to "commandments" with regard to the sin offering [thus yielding the position outlined at E], it serves for the eating of prohibited fat, and accomplishes the following purpose: just as in that matter, reference is made to a sacrifice of fixed value, so all of the sacrifices must be of fixed value, thus excluding sacrifices of variable value [such as those listed at Lev. 5: 1-13], e.g., a sin offering brought on account of imparting uncleanness to the sanctuary and its Holy Things, which is expiated by an offering of variable value.*
- M. *And rabbis?*
- N. They take the view that one may not derive from an argument by analogy established through the use of a word in common only a limited repertoire of conclusions [but once the analogy is drawn, then all of the traits of one case apply to the other].
- O. *Then does it follow that R. Aqiba holds that one may derive from an argument by analogy established through the use of a word in common only a limited repertoire of conclusions? [Not at all.] All parties concur that one may not derive from an argument by analogy established through the use of a word in common only a limited repertoire of conclusions [but once the analogy is drawn, then all of the traits of one case apply to the other].*
- P. *And this is the operative consideration for the position of R. Aqiba: Scripture has said, "And if any one," with the result that the use of the "if" serves to complement the matter that is treated first and to impose upon*

that matter a rule that is presented only later on. [thus: “And if any one [commits a breach of faith and sins unwittingly in any of the holy things of the Lord]’ (Lev. 5:15) — this ‘and if’ serves to impose liability for a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of an act of sacrilege that is subject to doubt,” the words of R. Aqiba.]

- Q. *Now surely rabbis have to take account of the fact that Scripture has said, “And if any one,” [with the result that the use of the “if” serves to complement the matter that is treated first and to impose upon that matter a rule that is presented only later on].*
- R. *May one propose that it is in the following point that they differ:*
- S. *One authority maintains that proof supplied by analogy [here: the analogy sustained by the use of “and” to join the two subjects] takes priority, and the other party maintains that the proof supplied by the demonstration of a totality of congruence among salient traits takes precedence. Rabbis prefer the latter, Aqiba the former position.]*
- T. *Not at all! All parties concur that proof supplied by analogy [here: the analogy sustained by the use of “and” to join the two subjects] takes priority. But rabbis in this context will say to you that the rule governing the subject treated below derives from the rule governing the subject treated above, so that the guilt offering must be worth a least two silver sheqels. This is established so that you should not argue that the doubt cannot be more stringent than the matter of certainty, and just as where there is certainty of having committed a sin, one has to present a sin offering that may be worth even so little as a sixth of a zuz in value, so if there is a matter of doubt, the guilt offering worth only a sixth of a zuz would suffice.*
- U. *And how does R. Aqiba derive that same theory?*
- V. *He derives it from the verse, “And this is the Torah of the guilt offering” (Lev. 7: 1), meaning, there is a single Torah that covers all guilt offerings.*
- W. *You may then leave off considering the issue from the view of him who maintains that “Torah” is to be interpreted in that way, but on the view of him who maintains that “Torah” is not to be interpreted in that way, what is to be said?*
- Y. *Such a one derives the matter from the use of “according to your valuation” at Lev. 5:15 and Lev. 5:18 [and that yields a verbal analogy based on congruence of shared traits].*
- Z. *That poses no problems in the context in which “according to your valuation” occurs, but what about the guilt offering that is presented in the case of the violation of a maidservant who has been promised in marriage [Lev. 19:20-22], in which no reference is made to “according to your valuation”?*
- AA. *There we find the repetition of “with the lamb” (Lev. 5:16 and 19:22) [which yields the same rule on the minimum value of the beast offered for this purpose].*

III.1 A. [Supply: Most Holy Things (...sin offering...) — the act of slaughtering them is carried out at the north side of the altar:]

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the sin offering has to be prepared at the north side of the altar?*
- C. *As it is written, “And he shall kill the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Lev. 4:24).*
- D. *So we have found that the act of slaughter must take place in the designated place, but how on the basis of Scripture do we know that the same rule applies to the act of receiving the blood?*
- E. *As it is written, “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering” (Lev. 4:25). [“...take” means to receive the blood, and the “and” joins this to the immediately-preceding verse (Freedman)].*
- F. *What about the rule governing the location of the priest himself who receives the blood? How on the basis of Scripture do we know that rule?*
- G. *Said Scripture, “And he shall take to himself” [in the place where the blood is received, that is, at the north of the altar].*
- H. *So we have found the manner in which the religious duty is optimally carried out. But how do we know that these rules are absolutely indispensable to the rite [so that if they are not observed, the offering is ruined]?*
- I. *A further verse of Scripture states, “And he shall kill it for a sin offering in the place where they kill the burnt offering” (Lev. 4:33), and it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. *Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? It is in the north. This too [the sin offering] also is slaughtered in the north.*
- K. **[48B]** *Now is it from this verse that the rule is to be derived? Is it not in point of fact stated, “In the place where the burnt offering is killed shall the sin offering be killed” (Lev. 6:18) [referring to all sin offerings]? So why is this [sin offering presented by a ruler] singled out? It is to establish the place in which it is to be killed, so to prove that if one did not slaughter it in the north, it is invalid [and that repetition teaches the rule just now stated, yielding the fact that the keeping these rules is indispensable to the valid performance of the rite].*
- L. *You maintain that that is the reason that the matter has been singled out. But perhaps it is not the case, but rather to indicate that this offering alone [the ruler’s sin offering] is the only one that requires the north, but no other sin offering has to be killed at the north side of the altar? Therefore Scripture states, “And he shall kill the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” so stating an encompassing rule in regard to all sin offerings: all have to be slaughtered in the north.*
- M. *So we have found the rule governing the sin offering presented by the ruler: it is both described as properly carried out in this way and also prescribed as indispensably carried out in this way. And we also know that other sin offerings are properly carried out in this way. But how do we know that it is necessary to carry out other sin offerings in this way [so that if they are not slaughtered at the north, they are invalid]?*
- N. *Because the same requirement is specified in Scripture in regard to both the lamb (Lev. 4:33) and the she-goat (Lev. 4:29).*

- III.2.** A. [As to the verse, “And he shall kill *it* for a sin offering in the place where they kill the burnt offering” (Lev. 4:33),] what is the purpose of the word “it”?
- B. *It is required in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. “...it...” is slaughtered at the north side of the altar, but the goat presented by Nahshon is not slaughtered at the north side of the altar [that is, the goats brought as a sin offering at the consecration of the altar, Num. 7:.. These are not really sin offerings at all.].
- D. *And it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. ““And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat’ (Lev. 4:24 [the goat brought by the ruler] — this encompasses the goat brought by Nahshon under the rule of the laying on of hands,” the words of R. Judah.
- F. R. Simeon says, “It serves to encompass under the rule of laying on of hands the goats brought on account of inadvertent idolatry.”
- G. [Reverting to the question of A,] *You might have supposed that since they are encompassed under the rule of laying on of hands, they also are encompassed under the rule of being slaughtered in the north. So we are informed to the contrary.*
- H. *To this proposition Rabina objected, “That conclusion serves full well for R. Judah, but from R. Simeon’s perspective, what is there to be said?”* [Freedman: he does not include it in respect of laying hands, so a text is not required to show that the north does not apply to it].
- I. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “And does that conclusion serve so well for R. Judah anyhow? Where it is included under the law, it is included under the law, where not, not [so no verse of Scripture is required]. And should you say that if Scripture had not included the matter, we should have reached the same conclusion by argument for analogy, then if that is the case, we can infer by analogy also the rule on laying on of hands. So you must answer that a temporary sacrifice [done once, as with Nahshon’s] cannot derive its law by inference from a permanent one, and so here too, a sacrifice brought only on a special occasion cannot find its rule by analogy to the rule governing a sacrifice that is permanent. [There is no reason to suppose that the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for an occasion, had to be done at the north, and therefore why is a text needed to exclude it? So we do not know the answer to our question, As to the verse, “And he shall kill it for a sin offering in the place where they kill the burnt offering” (Lev. 4:33), what is the purpose of the word “it”?]*
- J. “Rather: ‘it’ is slaughtered in the north, but the one who does the slaughtering does not have to stand in the north.”
- K. *But the law on the slaughterer derives from what R. Ahia said. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- L. R. Ahia says, ““And he shall kill it on the side of the altar at the north:’ why is this stated? It is because we find that the priest who receives the blood must stand in the north and also must receive the blood in the north. If he stood in the south and received the blood in the north, the offering is invalid. So you might have thought that the same rule governs slaughtering the animal. Scripture says, ‘And he shall kill it,’ meaning, ‘it’ must be in

the north, while the one who does the act of slaughter need not be in the north.”

- M. [Reverting again to the question of A,] “it” must be killed in the north, but a bird does not have to be killed in the north [when the neck of the bird is wrung to kill it as a sacrifice]. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- N. Might one suppose that killing a bird offering must be done in the north?
- O. That conclusion, after all, stands to reason, for if killing a lamb, which does not have to be done by a priest, must be done in the north, killing a bird, which does have to be done by a priest, surely should be done in the north!
- P. Accordingly, it is necessary to specify “it,” to bear the meaning, “it” must be killed in the north, but a bird does not have to be killed in the north.
- Q. No, what is particular to the lamb is that Scripture has required the use of a utensil in killing it [while no knife is required for a bird]!
- R. Rather, [reverting again to the question of A,] “it” must be killed in the north, but a Passover offering does not have to be slaughtered in the north. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- S. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “Might one suppose that slaughtering the Passover offering must take place in the north? For it stands to reason. If Scripture required that the burnt offering be slaughtered at the north, though it did not specify a fixed time for slaughtering the burnt offering, surely the Passover offering, for which Scripture did prescribed a fixed time for slaughter, surely should have to be slaughtered in the north.
- T. “Accordingly, it is necessary to specify ‘it,’ to bear the meaning, ‘it’ must be killed in the north, but a Passover offering does not have to be killed in the north.”
- U. Not at all. The distinctive trait of the burnt offering is that it is wholly burned up.
- V. Then derive the matter from the sin offering [which is not wholly burnt up but yields meat to the priest].
- W. What is distinctive about the sin offering is that it achieves atonement for those who are liable to the penalty of extirpation.
- X. Then derive the matter from the guilt offering.
- Y. What is distinctive about the guilt offering is that it falls into the classification of Most Holy Things, and, as a matter of fact, you cannot derive the rule from the cases of the burnt offering, guilt offering or sin offerings, for all of them are in the classification of Most Holy Things.
- Z. *So, in the end, it must be as we originally said:*
- AA. “it” is slaughtered in the north, but the one who does the slaughtering does not have to stand in the north.”
- BB. *And as to the question that you raised based on what R. Ahia said* [R. Ahia says, “‘And he shall kill it on the side of the altar at the north:’ why is this stated? It is because we find that the priest who receives the blood must stand in the north and also must receive the blood in the north. If he stood in the south and received the blood in the north, the offering is invalid. So you might have thought that the same rule governs slaughtering the animal. Scripture says, ‘And he shall kill it,’ meaning, ‘it’ must be in the north, while the one who does the act of slaughter need not be in the north.”] — *the answer is, the sense is not to exclude the*

slaughterer from the requirement that the rite be done in the north, but rather, “While the one who does the slaughtering need not be in the north, the one who receives the blood must be in the north.”

CC. *The receiver? But surely that is deduced from the language, “and he shall take,” meaning, “let him take himself to the north”!*

DD. *The authority at hand does not accept the sense, “and he shall take,” meaning, “let him take himself to the north.”*

III.3. A. *So we have found that, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, the act of slaughtering of the burnt offering must be done in the north, and the act of receiving, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, must be done in the north. How do we know that it is indispensable that the act of slaughtering and receiving the blood be done in the north [and if not, the offering is invalid]?*

B. *Said R. Adda b. Ahbah — others say, Rabbah b. Shila, “It is an argument a fortiori: if slaughtering and receiving the blood at the north form an indispensable part of the rite of offering the sin offering, the rule of which in any event is derived from the rule governing the burnt offering, then surely it is reasonable to suppose that these same procedures’ being done in the north are indispensable in the case of the burnt offering, from which the rules governing the sin offering derive!”*

C. *But the distinctive trait of the sin offering is that it effects atonement for those who are liable to extirpation.*

D. *Said Rabina, “[The reason that nonetheless Adda utilizes the argument a fortiori is as follows: this is what R. Adda bar Ahbah found troubling: do we ever find the rule governing a derivative matter more stringent than the rule governing the primary matter?” [The sin offering here is secondary to the burnt offering, since the requirement of offering the sacrifice at the northern side of the altar occurs primarily in connection with the burnt offering (Freedman)].*

E. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “Do we not find such a case? **[49A]** Lo, there is the matter of second tithe, which itself can be redeemed, while what is purchased with money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe cannot be redeemed. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **[Produce] purchased with coins [in the status] of second tithe, which becomes unclean [and therefore may not be eaten as second tithe] — let it be redeemed. R. Judah says, “Let it be buried.” They said to R. Judah, “If it is the case that when produce which is designated as second tithe itself becomes unclean, lo, it must be redeemed, is it not logical that produce purchased with coins in the status of second tithe which becomes unclean also should be redeemed?” He said to them, “No! If you say this in regard to [produce designated as] second tithe itself, which, if in a state of cleanness, may be redeemed when it is outside Jerusalem, can you say so as regards produce purchased with coins [in the status of second tithe which, when it is [in a state of] cleanness, may not be redeemed when outside Jerusalem?” [M. M.S. 3:10].***

F. *In that case the power of the sanctification is insufficient to govern its redemption. [Freedman: An object must possess a certain degree of sanctity before the sanctity can be transferred to something else, while the sanctity of this is too light to permit such a transfer. Hence Judah’s ruling arises out of the lesser, not the greater, sanctity of what has been purchased.]*

- G. *And lo, there is the case of a beast declared as a substitute for a consecrated beast, for while an act of consecration does not affect a beast that is permanently blemished, an act of substitution does affect a beast that is permanently blemished!*
- H. *The consecration of the beast declared as a substitute derives from the consecration of the consecrated beast itself, while the sanctification of a consecrated animal for its part derives from its originally-unconsecrated status. [Another animal already has been sanctified.]*
- I. *And lo, there is the case of the Passover, which itself does not require the laying on of hands, drink offerings, and the waving of the breast and shoulder, while a beast purchased with the remainder of funds set aside for the purchase of a Passover offering, when it is offered up on that occasion, does require the laying on of hands, drink offerings, and the waving of the breast and shoulder.*
- J. *But the animal purchased with the remainder of funds set aside for the purchase of a Passover offering during the rest of the year is classified simply as a peace offering [and it is not a Passover offering at all; it is a different sacrifice, subject to its own rules (Freedman)].*
- K. *If you prefer, I shall say, Scripture has said, “the burnt offerings,” meaning, “it must be in its appointed place.” [That means doing so in the northern area is essential to the rite, not merely recommended.]*

IV.1 A. [Supply: **Most Holy Things** (now: the guilt offering) — **the act of slaughtering them is carried out at the north side of the altar**]: *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the guilt offering has to be prepared at the north side of the altar?*

- C. *As it is written, “In the place in which they kill the burnt offering shall they kill the guilt offering” (Lev. 7: 1).*
- D. *So we have found that the act of slaughter of the guilt offering must take place at the northern side of the altar. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the collecting of the blood also must take place there?*
- E. *“And the blood thereof shall be dashed” (Lev. 7: 2).*
- F. *So the receiving of the blood must also be in the north. How about the location of the one who receives the blood?*
- G. *That is indicated by the use of the accusative particle et [which extends the law to the one who receives the blood] in the verse, “And the blood thereof shall be dashed” (Lev. 7: 2).*
- H. *So we have found that that is the recommended manner of carrying out the rite. But how do we know that it is indispensable to the proper performance of the rite that matters be done in this way?*
- I. *There is another verse that is written in this same connection: “And he shall kill the he lamb in the place where they kill the sin offering and the burnt offering” (Lev. 14:13) [repeating the rule in regard to another guilt offering shows that it is indispensable to the proper carrying out of the rite].*
- J. *But does the cited verse really serve the stated purpose in particular? Surely it serves another purpose altogether, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- K. If a matter was covered by an encompassing rule but then was singled out for some innovative purpose, you have not got the right to restore the matter to the rubric of the encompassing rule unless Scripture itself explicitly does so.
- L. How so?
- M. “And he shall kill the lamb in the place where they kill the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the holy place; for the guilt offering, like the sin offering, belongs to the priest; it is most holy” (Lev. 14:13) —
- N. Now what need does Scripture have to state, “for the guilt offering, like the sin offering”? [Freedman: for if it is to teach that it is slaughtered in the north, that follows from the first half of the verse; if it teaches that sprinkling of the blood and eating the meat follow the rules of the sin offering, that is superfluous, since it is covered by the general regulations on guilt offerings given at Lev. 7:1-10]. And why does Scripture state, “for the guilt offering, like the sin offering”?
- O. The reason is that the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment was singled out for the innovative purpose of indicating the following:
- P. in regard to the thumb of the hand, big toe of the foot, and right ear, you might have thought that the rite does not require the presentation of the blood of the offering and the parts to be burned up on the altar. Scripture therefore states, “for the guilt offering, like the sin offering,” to show that just as the sin offering’s blood and sacrificial parts have to be presented on the altar, so the blood and sacrificial parts of the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment have to be presented on the altar.
- Q. *If [you claim that the purpose of the verse is as stated and not to teach that doing the rite at the north is indispensable, as originally proposed,] then Scripture should have stated only the rule governing the rite for the one healed from the skin ailment but not the earlier version of the rule.*
- R. *Quite so — if we take the view that when something becomes the subject of a new law, it cannot then be covered by an encompassing rule that otherwise would apply, [49B] while the encompassing rule still can be derived from that special case. But if we take the view that when something becomes the subject of a new law, then it cannot be covered by an encompassing rule that otherwise would apply, and the encompassing rule also cannot be derived from that special place, then the law [Lev. 7: 1-10, indicating that the guilt offering must be killed in the north] is needed for its own purpose!*
- S. *Since Scripture has restored the matter to the rubric of the encompassing rule explicitly, that restoration has taken place.*
- T. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “But why not say, when Scripture restored the matter to the rubric of the encompassing rule, that was solely in regard to having to present the blood and the sacrificial parts on the altar, since the priest is necessary to perform that rite. But as to slaughtering the animal, which does not have to be done by a priest, that does not have to be done at the northern side of the altar?”*
- U. *[He said to him,] “If so, Scripture should say simply, ‘for it is like the sin offering.’ Why say, ‘or the guilt offering, like the sin offering’? It is to teach, let it*

be like other guilt offerings [that must be slaughtered at the northern side of the altar].”

- V. *Why must a verbal analogy [for the burnt offering] be drawn to both a sin offering and also a guilt offering?*
- W. *Said Rabina, “Both are necessary. If a verbal analogy had been drawn to a sin offering but not to a burnt offering, I should have reached this conclusion: from what source did we derive the rule that a sin offering is slaughtered at the north side of the altar? It is on the basis of the analogy to the burnt offering. The consequence is that a rule that has been derived by analogy in turn generates another rule through analogy [so to avoid such a circularity, Scripture adds the matter of the burnt offering, to prove that that is not the case].”*
- X. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “Then draw the analogy to the burnt offering and omit reference to a verbal analogy to the sin offering altogether!”*
- Y. *[He said to him,] “Then I might reach the conclusion that [elsewhere] what is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy turns around and imparts a lesson by means of a verbal analogy [and there would be nothing in the text to show the contrary (Freedman)]. And if you should say, then draw the analogy to a sin offering, I would reply: Scripture prefers to draw the analogy to what is primary rather than to what is secondary [and the sin offering is the primary source of the law, since that is where the requirement that the rite take place at the north is specified, and the sin offering is derivative of the burnt offering]. That is why the analogy is drawn to the sin offering and also to the burnt offering, bearing the sense that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy.”*

When Do Cases Form a Series: Systematic Analysis of the proposition that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does [or does not] in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy; and other principles of the Construction of a Series

- IV.2. A. *Raba said, “[The proposition that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy] derives from the following proof:*
- B. *“It is written, ‘As is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Lev. 4:10) [namely, the sacrificial parts of the anointed priest’s bullock brought for a sin offering] — now for what purpose is this detail given? That the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys are to be burned on the altar [as is the case with those of the sin offering], that fact is specified in the body of the verse itself. But the purpose is to intimate that the burning of the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys of the he goats brought as sin offerings for idolatry are to be derived by analogy from the bullock of the community brought on account of an inadvertent sin. That law is not explicitly stated in the passage on the bullock that is brought for an inadvertent sin, but is derived from the rule governing the bullock of the anointed priest. ‘As is taken off’ is required so that it might be treated as something written in that very passage [on the bullock of inadvertence, being superfluous in its own context], not as something derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy.”*

- C. *Said R. Pappa to Raba, "Then let Scripture inscribe the rule in that very passage, and not trouble to draw a verbal analogy to the bullock of the anointed priest at all."*
- D. *"If the rule had been inscribed in its own context and not been presented by means of a verbal analogy to the bullock of the anointed priest, I might have said that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy. And if you should object, 'Then let Scripture present the rule by analogy without making it explicit,' I could answer that Scripture prefers to make an explicit statement in the proper context rather than to present a law through a verbal analogy. Scripture therefore inscribed the matter in the passage dealing with the anointed priest and established the analogy so as to demonstrate that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy."*

- IV.3.** A. Now it is a fact that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy, *demonstrated whether in the manner of Raba or in the manner of Rabina.*
- B. Is it the rule, however, that *that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy may in turn go and impart a lesson by means of an argument on the basis of congruence?* [Freedman: Thus the law stated in A is applied to B by analogy. Can that law then be applied to C because of congruence between B and C?]
 - C. [Indeed it can.] *Come and take note:* R. Nathan b. Abetolomos says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that when there is a spreading of disease-signs [of Lev. 13-14] in clothing, [if it covers the entire garment], it is ruled to be clean? The words 'baldness on the back of the head' and 'baldness on the front of the head' are stated in respect to man, and 'baldness on the back' and 'baldness on the front' are mentioned in connection with clothing. Just as is in the former case, if the baldness spread throughout the whole, the man is clean, so here too, if the baldness spread throughout the whole, the garment is clean."
 - D. And in that context how do we know the rule [that that which spreads and covers the whole head is clean, since Lev. 13:12-13 refers to what is on the skin, not the head? And furthermore, the symptoms differ (Freedman)]? Because it is written, "And if the skin ailment...cover all the skin...from his head even to his feet" (Lev. 13:12) — so the head is treated as analogous to the feet. Just as if the feet have all turned white, the ailment have spread over the whole of the body, the man is clean, so here too when it spreads over the whole of the head and beard, he is clean. [Thus we derive the rule by a verbal analogy that the specified marks covering the whole head are clean, and then the same rule is applied to the garments by the argument resting on congruence, as stated at C (Freedman)].
 - E. [To the contrary,] said R. Yohanan, "Throughout the Torah we infer one rule from another that has itself been derived by inference, except for the matter of consecration, in which we do not derive a rule from another that has itself been inferred."
 - F. *Now if it were the fact that we did so, then let the reference to "north" not be stated in the context of the guilt offering at all, and it could be inferred from the rule governing sin offerings, by means of the argument based on the congruence of the language, "It is most Holy" [which is stated in the setting of the sin*

offering at Lev. 7:18 and the built offering at Lev. 7:1]! Does that not bear the implication that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy may not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of an argument on the basis of congruence?

G. *But perhaps the reason that we do not learn the lesson at that passage is that there is an ample refutation: the reason that the sin offering has to be offered in the north is that it achieves atonement for those who are liable to the penalty of extirpation?*

H. *Still, in context, there is nonetheless a superfluous reference to “most Holy”[at Num. 18:9]. [Freedman: Since this is superfluous, an argument from congruence is plausible, even though the guilt offering is dissimilar to the sin offering; the that that we do not do so proves that in the case of sacrifices that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy may not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of an argument on the basis of congruence.]*

IV.4. A. *That which is learned by a verbal analogy may in turn go and impart a rule by an argument a fortiori .*

B. **[50A]** *That is in line with that which the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael set forth.*

IV.5. A. *Can that which is learned by verbal analogy established may in turn go and impart a rule by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]? [This mode of argument depends not on verbal analogy supplied by Scripture but an analogy drawn from similarity of the traits of two subjects.]*

B. *Said R. Jeremiah, “Let Scripture omit reference to slaughtering the guilt offering at the north of the altar, and that rule can have been inferred by appeal to an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] from the rule governing a sin offering. [Both offerings expiate sin. So the rule governing the one will pertain to the other.]*

C. *“So why has Scripture stated that law? Is it not to indicate that that which is learned by verbal analogy established may not in turn go and impart a rule by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]?”*

D. *But in accord with your reasoning, let the rule be inferred by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] from the one governing a burnt offering! [The rule is explicitly stated in that context, and the intermediate analogy based on verbal similarities is not required at all (Freedman).]*

E. *So why is it not inferred in that way?*

F. *It is because one may present the following challenge: the distinguishing trait of the burnt offering is indeed that it is turned to ashes on the altar! [That is not the case of the guilt offering.]*

G. *In reference to the sin offering, one may also present a challenge, namely: the distinguishing trait of the sin offering is that it expiates sins that bear the sanction of extirpation.*

H. *While, therefore, admittedly one cannot learn the rule on a one to one basis, why not derive the rule by imputing to the third classification the law governing two*

other classifications of sacrifice [so that Scripture can have intimated that slaughter at the north is required for two of the three classifications, and by an argument based on the congruence of other shared traits, we should derive the rule governing the third of the three]?

- I. *From which two of the three can the rule have been derived for the third? If Scripture had not written the rule in connection with the burnt offering, you might have derived the rule for that classification from the one covering the sin offering and the guilt offering.*
- J. *Not at all, for the distinguishing trait of these is that they effect atonement [which is not accomplished by the burnt offering].*
- K. *Then let Scripture not state the rule in connection with the sin offering, and derive it from the other two.*
- L. *Not at all, for the distinguishing trait of these is that they require male animals [which is not the case of the sin offering, which is a female].*
- M. *Then let Scripture not state the rule in connection with the guilt offering, and derive it from the other two.*
- N. *Not at all, for the distinguishing trait of these is that they may be brought as much in behalf of the community as in behalf of an individual. [A guilt offering is presented only by an individual.]*

IV.6. A. Can a rule that is derived by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on verbal analogy?

- B. *Said R. Pappa, “‘This is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings...if he offers it for a thanksgiving offering’ (Lev. 7:11ff.): in this verse we learn the rule that funds for the purchase of an animal offered for a thanksgiving offering may derive from money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe, since we find, in point of fact, that peace offerings themselves [into the class of which the cited verse assimilates thanksgiving offerings] may be purchased from money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe.”*
- C. *And how do we know, as a matter of fact, that that peace offerings themselves [into the class of which the cited verse assimilates thanksgiving offerings] may be purchased from money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe?*
- D. *The reason is that the word “there” is written in the context of both a beast purchased for use as a peace offering and also second tithe, [at Deu. 27:7 and Deu. 14:23, respectively]. [It follows that the rule governing the peace offering derives from an argument based on an analogy established through verbal congruence, and that rule is then applied to a thanksgiving offering by an analogy based on other than verbal congruence.]*
- E. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “But tithe of grain is in the status of unconsecrated food in general [but the issue at hand addresses tithe of the corral, which is in the status of Holy Things]!”*
- F. *He said to him, “Who has claimed that that to which a rule is transferred [by means of the exegetical principle at hand] must be in the class of Holy Things and that that from which a rule is transferred likewise must be in the class of Holy Things?”*

- IV.7.** A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on the congruence of [other] shared traits?
- B. *Said Rami bar Hama, "It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. *""Of fine flour soaked" (Lev. 7:12) — this teaches that the soaked cake [one that is made of boiled flour] must be made of fine flour.*
- D. *""How do we know the rule that applies to the ordinary unleavened cakes [hallot]?*
- E. *""Scripture in both contexts [speaking of the cakes that are soaked as well as the unleavened ones] speaks of hallot.*
- F. *""How do we know that the same rule applies to thin wafers?*
- G. *""Because Scripture in both contexts speaks of unleavened bread."" [Freedman: Thus we first learn by an analogy based on shared traits that the ordinary unleavened cakes must be made of fine flour, and then by a further such argument we learn from the ordinary unleavened cakes that the thin wafers likewise must be of fine flour.]*
- H. *Said to him Rabina, "How do you know that he derives the rule governing unleavened cakes from the one governing ordinary unleavened cakes? Perhaps he derives the rule from the law governing oven baked cakes [Lev. 2:4] [without appeal to the analogy that has been drawn here]?"*
- I. *Rather, said Raba, "It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. *""And its innards and its dung, even the whole bullock shall he carry forth outside of the camp" (Lev. 4:11) — this teaches that they carry it out whole.*
- K. *""Might one suppose that they burn it whole?*
- L. *""Here we find a reference to "its head and its legs," and elsewhere [Lev. 1: 8-9, 12-13] we find reference also to "its head and its legs." Just as in that other case, this is done only after cutting up the beast, so here too it means only after cutting up the beast.*
- M. *""If so, then just as there this is after flaying the hide, so here too is it to be after flaying the hide? Scripture states, "and its innards and its dung.""*
- N. *What conclusion is supposed to be drawn here?*
- O. *Said R. Pappa, "Just as its dung is kept within the innards, so the meat must be held within the hide."*
- P. *And so too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- Q. *Rabbi says, "Here [with reference to the bullock and he goat of the Day of Atonement] we find a reference to 'hide and meat and dung,' [50B] and elsewhere, we find a reference to hide and meat and dung [in connection with the bullock of the anointed priest]. Just as there, the beast was burned only after being cut up, but without flaying the hide, so here too the beast was burned only after being cut up, but without flaying the hide." [Thus the result of one such argument is transferred to another case by another such argument (Freedman)].*
- IV.8.** A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] go and teach a lesson through an argument a fortiori?
- B. *Indeed so, by reason of an argument a fortiori:*

- C. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by either Raba's or Rabina's demonstration* — nonetheless can go and by an argument a fortiori impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael* — then a rule that is derived by an argument based on analogy based on other than verbal congruence, which can for its part go and impart its lesson by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal congruity — *as has been shown by R. Pappa* — surely can in turn teach its lesson by an argument a fortiori to yet another case!
- D. *That position poses no problems to one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has been made. But for one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has not been made, what is to be said?*
- E. *Rather, this is an argument a fortiori in favor of the same point:*
- F. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by either Raba's or Rabina's demonstration* — nonetheless can go and by an argument a fortiori impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael* — then a rule that is derived by an argument based on analogy based on other than verbal congruence, which can for its part go and impart its lesson by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal congruity which is like itself— *as has been shown by Rami bar Hama* — surely can in turn teach its lesson by an argument a fortiori to yet another case!

IV.9. A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] go and teach a lesson through an argument constructed by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits among two or more classifications of things?

B. *That question must stand.*

IV.10. A. Can a rule derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a rule established through analogy of verbal usage?

B. The affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori:

C. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by either R. Pappa's demonstration,* — then a rule that is derived by an argument a fortiori, which can be derived by an argument based on the shared verbal traits of two things, — *as has been shown by the Tannaite authority of the house of R. Ishmael* — surely should be able to impart its rule to another classification of things by reason of an argument based on a verbal analogy!

D. *That position poses no problems to one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has been made. But for one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has not been made, what is to be said?*

E. *The question then must stand.*

IV.11. A. Can a rule that is derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a lesson through an argument based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]?

B. The affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori:

C. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot be derived from an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by R. Yohanan's demonstration*, — can go and teach a lesson by an argument based on an analogy established through other than verbal traits, *as has been shown by Rami bar Hama* — a rule based on an argument a fortiori, which can be derived by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal coincidence, surely should be able to impart its rule to another classification of things by reason of an argument based on an other than verbal analogy!

IV.12. A. Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a lesson through an argument based on an argument a fortiori?

B. Indeed so, and the affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori:

C. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot be derived from an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class — *as has been shown by R. Yohanan's demonstration*, — can go and teach a lesson by an argument a fortiori, as we have just pointed out, then an argument that can be derived from an analogy based on verbal congruence — *as has been shown by the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael* — surely should be able to impart its rule by an argument a fortiori!

D. But would this then would represent what we are talking about, namely, a rule deriving from an argument a fortiori that has been applied to another case by means of an argument a fortiori? Surely this is nothing more than a secondary derivation produced by an argument a fortiori!

E. Rather, argue in the following way:

F. Indeed so, and the affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori:

G. if an argument based on an analogy of a verbal character cannot be derived from another such argument based on an analogy between two classes of things that rests upon a verbal congruence — *in accordance with the proofs of either Raba or Rabina* — nonetheless can then go and impart its lesson by an argument a fortiori — *in accordance with the proof of the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael* — then an argument a fortiori, which can serve to transfer a lesson originally learned through an argument based upon verbal congruence, *in accordance with the proof of the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael* — surely should be able to impart its lesson to yet another classification of things through an argument a fortiori.

H. And this does represent what we are talking about, namely, a rule deriving from an argument a fortiori that has been applied to another case by means of an argument a fortiori.

IV.13. A. Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a rule through an argument constructed on the basis of shared traits of an other-than-verbal character among two classifications of things?

B. *Said R. Jeremiah, "Come and take note: [If] one pinched off the neck and [the bird] turned out to be terefah — R. Meir says, "It does not impart uncleanness of the gullet [since slaughtering a beast is wholly equivalent to pinching the neck of a bird]." R. Judah says, "It does impart uncleanness of the gullet." [Birds and beasts in no way are comparable; neither slaughtering an unconsecrated clean bird nor pinching the neck of a consecrated one will exempt from uncleanness a bird which turns out to be terefah.] Said R. Meir, "It is an argument a fortiori: now if in the case of the carrion of a beast, which imparts uncleanness through contact and through carrying, proper slaughter renders clean from its uncleanness that which was terefah, [in the case of] the carrion of fowl, which to begin with does not impart uncleanness through contact and through carrying, it should logically follow that its proper slaughter should render clean from its uncleanness that which was terefah. Just as we find that its proper slaughter [in the case of a bird or beast] renders it valid for eating [51A] and renders it clean from its uncleanness in the case of terefah, so proper pinching of the neck, which renders it valid for eating, should render it clean from its uncleanness in the case of terefah." R. Yosé says, "It is sufficient that it [the slaughtering of the bird] be equivalent to the carrion of a beast: its [a beast's or a bird's] slaughtering renders clean [what is terefah], but the pinching of the neck [of a bird does] not [render clean what is terefah]" [M. Zeb. 7:6]. [The language "Just as we find" then represents an argument based on shared traits of two distinct classifications of things, and so we see that a rule derived by an argument a fortiori then through such an argument based on shared traits is transferred to another class of things altogether.]"*

C. *But that is not so. For even if we concede that that is the case there, then still the rule derives from the act of slaughter of unconsecrated beasts [Freedman].*

IV.14. A. Can a rule derived by an argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things then turn around and teach a lesson by an argument based on an analogy of a verbal character, an analogy not of a verbal character, an argument a fortiori, or an argument based on shared traits?

B. *Solve at least one of those problems by appeal to the following:*

C. On what account have they said that if blood of an offering is left overnight on the altar, it is fit? Because if the sacrificial parts are kept overnight on the altar, they are fit. And why if the sacrificial parts are kept overnight on the altar are they fit? Because if the meat of the offering is kept overnight on the altar it is fit. [Freedman: thus the rule governing the sacrificial parts is derived by an appeal to an argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things, and that rule in turn is applied to the case of the blood by another such argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things].

D. What about the rule governing meat that is taken outside of the Temple court? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?]

- E. Because meat that has been taken out of the holy place is suitable for a high place.
- F. What about the rule governing unclean meat? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?]
- G. Since meat that is unclean is subject to a remission of the prohibition affecting it in the case of an offering made in behalf of the entire community.
- H. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering that the officiating priest subjected to the intention of being burned after the proper time? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?]
- I. Since the sprinkling of the blood is effective and propitiates in making such meat refuse by reason of the improper intentionality [we leave the sacrificial portions on the altar once they have been put there].
- J. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering that the officiating priest subjected to the intention of being eaten outside of the proper place? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?]
- K. Since sacrificial meat in that class is treated as analogous to sacrificial meat that has been subjected to an improper intentionality in respect to eating the meat outside of the proper time.
- L. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering the blood of which unfit priests have received and tossed, when such unfit persons are eligible for an act of service in behalf of the community...? [This question is not answered.]
- M. [Reverting to C-E:] Now can an analogy be drawn concerning something that has been disposed of in the proper manner for something that has not been disposed of in the proper manner? [If the sacrificial parts are kept over night, they are not taken off the altar, and therefore the meat kept overnight is fit; but the meat may be kept overnight, while the sacrificial parts may not. So too when the Temple stood, the flesh might not be taken outside, but where there was no Temple and only high places, the case is scarcely analogous!]
- N. *The Tannaite authority for this rule derives it from the augmentative sense, extending the rule, deriving from the formulation, "This is the Torah of the burnt offering" (Lev. 6: 2). [Freedman: the verse teaches that all burnt offerings, even with the defects catalogued here, are subject to the same rule and do not get removed from the altar once they have been put there; the arguments given cannot be sustained but still support that proposition.]*

V.1 A. The remnants of their blood did one pour out on the western base of the outer altar. If he did not place [the remnants of the blood at the stated location], he did not impair [atonement]:

- B. *What is the Scripture basis for this rule?*
- C. Scripture has said, "And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering which is at the door of the tent of meeting" (Lev. 4: 7).
- D. *That speaks of the first altar that one meets [as you enter from the door, and that is the western base].*

V.2. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority [Freedman: there are five passages that deal with the sin offering, Lev. 4: the sin offering of the anointed priest,

Lev. 4:1-12; the sin offering of the entire congregation, Lev. 4:13-22, the sin offering of a ruler, Lev. 4:22-26, the female goat of an ordinary person, Lev. 4:27-32, and the lamb of an ordinary person, Lev. 4:32-35. The first two were offered on the inner altar, the other three on the outer. In regard to the first three Scripture states that the residue of the blood is to be poured out "...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering..." (Lev. 4: 7, 18, 25), and in connection with the other two there is an allusion to the base of the altar without reference to "of the sin offering." Here rabbis explain why Scripture specifies the altar of the burnt offering in the first three cases. The first teaches that the residue is poured out at the base of the outer altar, the altar of the burnt offering, but not at the base of the inner altar, even though the blood was sprinkled on the horns of the inner altar. The second is superfluous, and it teaches that only the outer altar had such a base, not the inner altar. The third reference intimates that the residue of the blood of all sacrifices whose blood is sprinkled on the altar of burnt offering must be poured out at its base. thus:]:

- B. "...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering..." (Lev. 4: 7) — and not at the base of the inner altar.
- C. "...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering..." (Lev. 4:18) — the inner altar has no base anyhow.
- D. "...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering..." (Lev. 4:25) — apply the laws governing the base to the altar of the burnt offering.
- E. But perhaps that is not the sense, but rather, let there be a base around the altar of the burnt offering? [Freedman: perhaps the verse says nothing about the residue of the blood but indicates that the two sprinklings of the blood of the burnt offering must be made at that part of the altar that had a special base, excluding the southeastern horn, which did not have a special base.]
- F. Said R. Ishmael, "The proposition can be shown to derive from an argument a fortiori: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, which does not make atonement, has to be poured out at the base, then the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering itself, which does make atonement, surely would require the base [meaning, it must be a corner of the altar at which the horn has been provided with a base]." [Then a verse is not required to make that point, if the teaching is as proposed. Hence the proposed proof is null.]
- G. Said R. Aqiba, "[Along the same lines,] the proposition can be shown to derive from an argument a fortiori: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, which does not make atonement and which is not presented for the purposes of atonement in any way, has to be poured out at the base, then the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering itself, which does make atonement, and which is presented for the purposes of atonement, surely would require the base [meaning, it must be a corner of the altar at which the horn has been provided with a base]. So why does Scripture state, 'at the base of the altar of burnt offering'? It is to indicate that the laws of the base should pertain to the altar of the burnt offering."

V.3. A. A master has said, "'...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering...' (Lev. 4: 7) — and not at the base of the inner altar:"

- B. *Surely that clause is required to make its own point [and not to prove the derivative, "and not...", point]!*

- C. That point itself derives from the language, “which is at the door of the tent of meeting” [indicating that the outer altar is what is required, so the specification “of the burnt offering” is superfluous and serves the specified purpose].
- V.4.** A. [Supply: a master has said,] “‘...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering...’ (Lev. 4:25) — **[51B]** apply the laws governing the base to the altar of the burnt offering.”
- B. *For if it should enter your mind that the passage is to be read literally as written, then what need do I have for a verse of Scripture dealing with the residue, since pouring out the residue was an act done in the outer courtyard and not in the inner sanctum?*
- C. *And if you should say that without that verse, I might have concluded that it is indeed to be reversed, **[52A]** with the residue of the inner offering to be poured at the outer altar and the residue of the outer altar to be performed at the inner altar, in point of fact, the inner altar had no base [so the interpretation is possible only as given].*
- V.5.** A. [Supply: a master has said,] “But perhaps that is not the sense, but rather, let there be a base around the altar of the burnt offering.” [Freedman: perhaps the verse says nothing about the residue of the blood but indicates that the two sprinklings of the blood of the burnt offering must be made at that part of the altar that had a special base, excluding the southeastern horn, which did not have a special base.]
- B. But is it not written, “at the base of the altar of burnt offering”? [Freedman: if the verse intimated that the sprinkling itself must be performed on that part of the altar that has a base, it could not refer to sin offerings, the blood of which was sprinkled on all the horns of the altar, including the southeast. Hence it would have to refer to the burnt offering alone. But in that case, Scripture should write, “at the base of the burnt offering,” which would intimate that the blood of the burnt offering must be sprinkled over against the base. The word “altar” then becomes redundant.]
- C. *If the verse stated, “at the base of the burnt offering,” I might have supposed that the sense was, on the top of the base [right up by the altar itself]. But since it is written, “at the base of the altar of burnt offering,” the meaning is, “at the top of the base.”*
- D. Said R. Ishmael, “What need do I have for a verse to tell me that it is to be spilled out at the top of the base? It would follow through an argument a fortiori: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, which does not make atonement, has to be poured out at the top of the base, then the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering itself, which does make atonement, surely would require the top of the base.”
- E. Said R. Aqiba, “[Along the same lines,] the proposition can be shown to derive from an argument a fortiori: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, which does not make atonement and which is not presented for the purposes of atonement in any way, has to be poured out at the top of the base, then the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering itself, which does make atonement, and which is presented for the purposes of atonement, surely would require the top of the base. So why does

Scripture state, ‘at the base of the altar of burnt offering’? It is to indicate that the laws of the base should pertain to the altar of the burnt offering.”

V.6. A. *In what regard do the two authorities differ?*

- B. *Said R. Adda b. Ahbah, “At issue between them is whether or not the pouring out of the residue of the blood is indispensable to the rite. One authority maintains that pouring out of the residue of the blood is indispensable to the rite. The author takes the view that pouring out of the residue of the blood is not indispensable to the rite.”*
- C. *R. Pappa said, “All parties maintain that pouring out of the residue of the blood is not indispensable to the rite. But here what is at issue is whether or not the draining out of the blood of a bird that has been presented as a sin offering is indispensable to the rite. One authority takes the view that it is, the other, that it is not, indispensable to the rite.”*
- D. *There is a Tannaite formulation in accord with the theory of R. Pappa:*
- E. *“And all the remaining blood of the bullock [of the offering of the anointed priest] shall he pour out at the base of the altar:’ (Lev. 4: 7) — Why does Scripture make reference to ‘the bullock’ [since the context makes clear that that is what is at issue]? It teaches concerning the bullock that is offered on the Day of Atonement that the blood has to be poured out at the base of the altar,” the words of R. [Aqiba].*
- F. *Said R. Ishmael, “It is an argument a fortiori [that that is the case, and a proof-text is not required]. If the blood of an offering that is not obligatory [the bullock presented by a sin offering by the anointed priest, which is not an obligatory offering in that the man does not have to have said], presented on the inner altar, has to be poured out at the base, the blood of an offering that is obligatory, [the bullock presented on the Day of Atonement, which is required, whether or not the high priest has sinned], presented on the inner altar, surely should have to be poured out at the base!”*
- H. *Said R. Aqiba, “If an offering that is neither obligatory nor even a matter of a mere religious duty, the blood of which is not brought into the inner sanctum [the Holy of Holies], has to be poured out onto the base of the altar, an offering that is a statutory obligation, the blood of which is taken into the inner sanctum, surely should require a base!”*
- I. *“Now you might have supposed that the pouring out of the residue is indispensable for the rite [of the bullock on the Day of Atonement], and therefore Scripture states, ‘And he shall make an end of atoning’ (Lev. 16:20), meaning, all of the rites of atonement are now complete,” the words of R. Ishmael.*

- J. [Reverting to the claim of D:] Now it is an argument a fortiori in regard to the bullock of the anointed priest, namely, if the blood of an offering that is neither obligatory nor even a matter of religious duty which is not taken to the inner altar but still has to be poured out at the base of the altar, surely the blood of an offering whether obligatory or a matter of religious duty surely should have to be poured out at the base of the altar!
- K. Might one suppose that it is indispensable to the rite?
- L. Scripture states, “And all the remaining blood of the bullock he shall pour out,” and in this way Scripture turns the matter the residual aspect of a religious duty, indicating that pouring out the residue is not indispensable to the correct carrying out of the rite.

V.7. A. *But does R. Ishmael really take the position [as Pappa has claimed] that draining out of the blood of a bird that has been presented as a sin offering is indispensable to the rite? And has it not been set forth as a Tannaite rule by the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael, “‘And the rest of the blood shall be drained out:’ — what is left is to be drained out, [52B] but what is not left is not drained out “? [Freedman: all the blood may be used in sprinkling, so that nothing is left for draining, hence draining cannot be indispensable.]*

B. *There is a conflict among Tannaite versions of the opinions of R. Ishmael.*

V.8. A. *Said Rami bar Hama, “The following Tannaite authority takes the view that pouring out the residue of the blood is indispensable. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:”*

B. “This is the law of the sin offering...the priest who offers it for sin [having correctly carried out the rite in every detail] shall eat it” (Lev. 6:18-19) — “it” meaning, the one, the blood of which has been tossed above the red line around the altar, and not the one the blood of which was tossed below the red line around the altar.

C. Now explain [why might you have supposed that even though the blood was not properly sprinkled, the meat nonetheless still may be eaten, absent a proof-text to the contrary]!

- D. It is a conclusion that can have been implied by the following verse, “and the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out...and you shall eat the meat” (Deu. 12:27) — thereby we have learned concerning a case in which it is required to toss the blood four times, that if one has tossed the blood in a single action, he has achieved atonement.
- E. Might one therefore suppose that if the blood that was supposed to be sprinkled above the red line was sprinkled below, the offering might also have achieved atonement for the donor?
- F. For it is a matter of logic: there is blood that is to be tossed above the red line [a sin offering made of a beast], and there is blood that is to be tossed below the red line [a sin offering of a bird], so, just as the blood that is supposed to be tossed below the red line does not atone if it is tossed above, so blood that is supposed to be tossed above the red line will not atone if it is sprinkled below it.
- G. Not at all. If you invoke that rule in the case of blood that is supposed to be sprinkled below the red line, it is because in the end it will not be above at all, but will you say the same of blood that is to be sprinkled above the red line, which ultimately will be located down below [in the form of the residue]. [Freedman: hence when he sprinkles the blood below the line, he is putting it where it will eventually be located and so effects atonement.]
- H. Let blood that is to be tossed on the inner altar prove the case, for it is going in the end to be brought outside [where the residue is poured out around the base of the outer altar], and yet if the blood that is to be tossed on the inner altar to begin with is tossed on the outer altar, the priest has not effected atonement.
- I. Not at all, for if you raise the issue of blood to be tossed on the inner altar, that is because the rite performed on the inner altar does not complete the ritual attached to the entire liturgy [since after the blood is sprinkled on

the inner altar, the residue has to be poured out at the base of the outer altar]. But can you say the same of the tossing of the blood on the upper part of the altar, in which case putting the blood on the horns complete the rite [and no further action is indispensable once the blood has been sprinkled on the horns of the altar]. Since sprinkling the blood on the horns of the altar complete the rite, if the priest sprinkled below the red line, the rite also is fit.

- J. [Because of the possibility of composing such an argument,] Scripture states, “This is the law of the sin offering...the priest who offers it for sin [having correctly carried out the rite in every detail] shall eat it” (Lev. 6:18-19) — “it” meaning, the one, the blood of which has been tossed above the red line around the altar, and not the one the blood of which was tossed below the red line around the altar.
- K. *What is the meaning of the phrase, the rite performed on the inner altar does not complete the ritual attached to the entire liturgy? Surely this refers to the residue of the blood [and that proves that pouring out the residue of the blood is an indispensable part of the rite].*
- L. *Said Raba to him, “If so, then you may prove the point through an argument a fortiori: if to begin with blood of an offering performed on the inner altar which is poured out on the outer altar does not make atonement, even though in the end it will be obligatory to pour out that blood on the outer altar, then as to blood that is to be sprinkled above the red line, which in the end is not subject to the obligation of being poured out below the line for the sacrifice to achieve its goal of atonement, if to begin with one sprinkled such blood below the red line, the offering should not secure atonement [Freedman: the sacrifice is invalid, and the meat may not be eaten. So why is a verse of Scripture required to prove the point? Hence the premise of this argument, that pouring out of the residue is essential, must be false.]*

M. Rather, this is the sense: it is not tossing the blood on the altar alone that completes the rite, but tossing the blood on the veil as well.

V.9. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “‘And he shall make an end of atoning for the holy place and the tent of meeting and the altar’ (Lev. 16:20) — if he atoned [by carrying out the rites required for atonement in other matters, e.g., the four sprinklings on the altar, the seven before the vil (Freedman)], he has completed the rite, but if he has not atoned, he has not completed the rite,” the words of R. Aqiba.
- C. Said to him R. Judah, “Why should we not say, ‘if he made an end to the rite, he has atoned, and if not, he did not atone’? [So the rites, including the four applications, are necessary, and it is on that basis that that fact is to be demonstrated].”
- D. *What is at issue between them?*
- E. R. Yohanan and R. Joshua b. Levi:
- F. *One said, “At issue is the correct interpretation of Scripture.”* [Freedman: but not in law. Both hold that all four applications of blood are indispensable, and that pouring out the residue is not. Aqiba holds that the conclusion, atoning, illumines the beginning, make an end, so completion depends on atonement, on the four applications. Judah maintains that ‘atoning’ might merely refer to a single application of blood, and therefore the interpretation must be revised, and the beginning of the verse illuminates the end; only when he completely finishes the rite, having done the four applications, is atonement done.]
- G. *The other said, “At issue is whether or not pouring out the residue of the blood at the base is indispensable to the rite.”*
- H. *Now you may draw the conclusion that it is R. Joshua b. Levi who took the position that at issue is whether or not pouring out the residue of the blood at the base is indispensable to the rite. For said R. Joshua b. Levi, “In the opinion of the one who said that the pouring out the residue of the blood is an indispensable part of the rite, one must bring another bullock and begin the rite on the inner altar.”* [Freedman: if the residue of the blood was spilled after the four applications, another bullock must be slaughtered and its blood first sprinkled at the inner altar, and then the residue poured out at the base of the outer altar. But the priest cannot simply pour out all the blood at the base, for then it is not a residue, and it is indispensable that a residue be poured out. Thus Joshua b. Levi holds that there is a view that pouring out of the residue is indispensable.]
- I. *But does R. Yohanan not maintain this same theory of matters? And has not R. Yohanan said, “R. Nehemiah taught as a Tannaite authority in accord with the opinion of one who maintains that the pouring out of the residue of the blood is indispensable to the rite”?*
- J. *Rather, you have to say, In accord with the words of him who says...,” but not, “in accords with those of these Tannaite authorities in particular [Aqiba and Judah], and so too here [in the matter of Joshua b. Levi,], In*

accord with the words of him who says...,” but not, “in accords with those of these Tannaite authorities in particular.

5:3

- A. As to sin offerings of the community and of the individual —
 - B. what are the sin offerings of the community? He-goats [offered for] new moons and for festivals —
 - C. the act of slaughtering them is to be carried out at the north side of the altar.
 - D. And receiving their blood is to be done in a utensil of service at the north.
 - E. And their blood requires four acts of placing on the four horns [corners of the outer altar] —
 - F. How so?
 - G. [53A] [The officiating priest] went up on the ramp, and went around the circuit, and went around to the southeastern corner, the northeastern corner, the northwestern corner, the southwestern corner.
 - H. The remnants of the blood did he pour out on the southern base.
 - I. And they are eaten inside the veils [that is, in the courtyard]]
 - J. by males of the priesthood,
 - K. and [cooked for food] in any [manner of cooking] food [roasting or boiling],
 - L. for a day and night, up to midnight.
- I.1.** A. [Supply: And their blood requires four acts of placing on the four horns (=corners of the outer altar)]: *how was this done?*
- B. *R. Yohanan and R. Eleazar —*
 - C. *One said, “[He stood] within a cubit of the actual corner at the southeast corner and] applied the blood in the direction of either the south or the east [Freedman].”*
 - D. *The other said, “[Freedman:] He applied it with a downward movement on the edge of the horn.”*
 - E. *From the perspective of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, who has said, “The blood itself is placed on the actual horn of the altar,” there is no dispute at all [for anywhere within a cubit of the angle of the altar is the horn, and the edge of the altar is not a consideration in sprinkling (Freedman)].*
 - F. *Where there is a dispute, it is within the perspective of Rabbi. [Freedman: Rabbi holds that the blood may be applied above the red line around the altar even not against the horn.] One authority takes the view that a cubit in either direction counts as space within the ambience of the horn of the altar, and the other master takes the view that the sprinkling must take place at the edge of the horn and no further [Freedman].*
 - G. *An objection was raised: As to sin offerings of the community and of the individual — ...How so? [The officiating priest] went up on the ramp, and went around the circuit, and went around to the southeastern corner, he dipped the index finger of his right hand, placing his larger finger on either side of the bowl to support it, and applies it with a downward movement against the edge of the horn of the altar, until the blood on his finger was used up, and thus he did at every horn [T. Zeb. 6:10A-C].*

H. *This is the sense of the statement: the correct religious duty is to put the blood on the edge, but if one has applied it within a cubit in either direction, there is no objection to such a procedure.*

I.2. A. *What is this reference to Rabbi's and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon's opinions?*

B. *It is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. *"The blood blood that is sprinkled above is to be sprinkled from the red line and above, and blood that is to be sprinkled below is sprinkled from the red line and below," the words of Rabbi.*

D. *Said R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, "Under what circumstances? In the case of the burnt offering made of a bird, but in the case of a sin offering made of a beast, its blood is applied on the very horn of the altar [and not merely anywhere above the line (Freedman)]."*

E. *Said R. Abbahu, "What is the scriptural basis for the position of Rabbi? It is written, 'And the altar shall be four cubits, and from the altar and upward there shall be four horns' (Eze. 43:15)."*

F. *But was the altar only four cubits in size? [It was much larger than that.]*

G. *Said R. Abba bar Ahba, "The meaning is, 'and the place of the horns was four cubits' [Freedman: the horns occupied four cubits of the altar, since each was a cubit in length and breadth.]*

H. *But did the horns fill up four cubits? [Freedman: since each was a cubit in length, actually only two cubits of the length of breadth of the altar were occupied by the horns.]*

I. *Rather say, the limits of the horns were four cubits. [Freedman: a distance of four cubits below the horns, that is, as far down as the scarlet line, still ranked as the horns. Therefore Rabbi says that blood to be sprinkled on the horn can be sprinkled anywhere above the red line.]*

I.3. A. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **And a red line goes around it at the middle, to effect a separation between the drops of blood which are tossed on the top and the drops of blood which are tossed on the bottom [M. Mid. 3:1P].***

B. *What is the scriptural basis for this rule?*

C. *Said R. Aha b. R. Qattina, "As it is said, 'That the net may reach halfway up to the altar' (Exo. 27: 5). So the Torah has assigned a partition to make a distinction between the blood that is to be tossed on the upper part of the altar and the blood that is to be tossed on the lower part of the alter."*

II.1 A. **The remnants of the blood did he pour out on the southern base:**

B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. *"At the base of the altar" (Lev. 4:30) means, at the southern base of the altar.*

D. *You say that it means at the southern base of the altar. But perhaps it means only at the western base of the altar, so that what is left undefined is derived from the*

rule that is spelled out [Freedman: Lev. 4:7 holds that the blood of the sin offering prepared at the inner altar is to be poured out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering which is at the door of meeting. As one entered from the door he came first to the western base; there is therefore regarded as defined, and the question is, why not learn the meaning of Lev. 4:30, where the matter is not defined, from Lev. 4: 7, where it is?]

- E. Do you say so? But we infer the rule governing his coming down from the ascent from the rule governing his exit from the inner sanctum. Just as when he left the inner sanctum, it was to the nearest side, so when he came down from the ascent, he turned to the nearest side. [Freedman: when the priest left the inner sanctum with the residue of the blood from the inner altar, he poured it out at the western base, this being nearest to him. So also when he came down the ascent with the residue of the blood of the outer altar, after having applied the blood on the southwest corner, he poured it out at the southern base, this being nearest to him.]

II.2. A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. R. Ishmael says, "Blood that is residue of offerings presented at the inner altar and also blood that is residue of offerings presented at the outer altar are poured out at the western base of the outer altar."
- C. R. Simeon b. Yohai says, "Both this and that are poured out at the southern base."
- D. *Now from the perspective of him who has said that it is at the western base, the operative principle is that what is left undefined is derived from the rule that is spelled out [Freedman: Lev. 4: 7 holds that the blood of the sin offering prepared at the inner altar is to be poured out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering which is at the door of meeting. As one entered from the door he came first to the western base; there is therefore regarded as defined, so the meaning of Lev. 4:30, where the matter is not defined, derives from Lev. 4: 7, where it is]. But from the perspective of him who has said that it is at the southern base, what is the operative consideration?*
- E. *Said R. Assi, "This Tannaite authority maintains that the whole of the altar stood at the north."* [Freedman: at the north of the door of the inner sanctum, and no part of the altar actually stood in front of the door; then the immediate side would be the southern. It may also mean that it stood in the north of the Temple court, five cubits of it facing the door, and one of these five cubits was the southern base, which one would face as he came out of the door.]
- F. *Another version: the whole of the gate stood at the south* [Freedman: of the altar].
- G. **[53B]** *The Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael formulated matters in reference to R. Simeon b. Yohai's statement, "Blood that is residue of offerings presented at the inner altar and also blood that is residue of offerings presented at the outer altar are poured out at the western base of the outer altar."*
- H. *Your mnemonic is, "Men pulled a man."* [Freedman: the household of R. Ishmael, representing many men, pulled the one man, Simeon, to the view of their master, Ishmael.]

5:4

- A. **The burnt offering is classified as Most Holy Things.**
- B. **The act of slaughtering it is carried out at the north side of the altar.**

- C. And the receiving of its blood is done in a utensil of service at the north.
- D. And its blood requires two acts of placing which are [divided at the corner into] four.
- E. And it requires flaying, and cutting into pieces, and [being] wholly [burned] on the altar fires.

- I.1.** A. As to the burnt offering, what is the reason that the Tannaite authority has specified, “**is classified as Most Holy Things**”?
- B. *It is because Scripture in reference to the burnt offering does not say that it is “most holy.”*

II.1 A. And its blood requires two acts of placing which are [divided at the corner into] four:

- B. *How is this done?*
- C. Said Rab, “He applied the blood and then went and applied it a second time [on each horn, putting blood on each side of the horn].”
- D. Samuel said, “He made a single application of blood, in the form of a gamma.”

II.2. A. *There is a conflict among Tannaite statements on the same matter:*

- B. [With reference to the verse, “And the priests shall dash the blood around about the altar” (Lev. 1: 5)], might one suppose that one should toss it in a single action?
- C. Scripture says, “round about.”
- D. Since Scripture says, “round about,” might one suppose that the blood must encompass the altar like a thread?
- E. Scripture says, “And the priests shall dash....”
- F. How was it done?
- G. It was to be sprinkled twice like a Greek Gamma, thus yielding two applications of the blood and therefrom, four sprinklings.
- H. R. Ishmael says, “Here we find a reference to ‘round about,’ and elsewhere [Lev. 8:15, when Aaron offers his sin offering of consecration] we find a similar reference. Just as in the latter action what is required is four separate applications of the blood, so here too we require four separate applications of the blood.”
- I. Then might one say, just as in that case the requirement is for four applications on the four horns of the altar, so here too we require four applications on the four horns of the altar?
- J. The blood of the burnt offering has to be sprinkled on the horns over against the base, but the southeast horn had no base.

II.3. A. Why not?

- B. Said R. Eleazar, “Because it was not in the portion of ‘the ravener’ [Benjamin, a wolf that ravens, so Gen. 49:27].”
- C. For said R. Samuel b. R. Isaac, “The altar consumed a cubit in the tribal land of Judah.” [Freedman: the width of one cubit along the eastern and southern sides of the altar, but not reaching right to the ends thereof; hence the southeast horn was in Judah’s portion and this was not provided with a base.]
- D. Said R. Levi bar Hama said R. Hama b. R. Hanina, “There was a strip of ground that went out from Judah’s portion and entered Benjamin’s [Freedman: and on this

strip was situated part of the Temple, including a portion of the altar]. On that account Benjamin, who was a righteous man, was distressed day by day, wanting to take it back [Freedman: to have the honor that the whole Temple and everything in it might be in his portion]. So it is said, [54A] ‘Yearning for him all day’ (Deu. 33:12). Therefore Benjamin gained the unearned advantage of serving as the host of the Holy One, blessed be he: ‘And he dwells between his shoulders’ (Deu. 33:12).”

- E. *An objection was raised: The burnt offering of fowl — how was it prepared? [The priest] went up on the ramp and went around the circuit. He came to the southeastern corner. He would wring off its head from its neck and divide [the head from the body]. And he drained off its blood onto the wall of the altar [M. Zeb. 6:5A-E].*
- F. *Now if you maintain that there was no base there, did he simply apply the blood in the air [with nothing to catch what fell to earth? That was not permitted! (Freedman)].*
- G. *Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, “I might say that they made the stipulation that the air space should be assigned to Benjamin and the dirt to Judah.” [Freedman: possibly there was a little ledge on that side, more than three handbreadths from the ground, where it would not count as belonging to Judah, and on this ledge the blood fell and was thus sacred. Nonetheless this ledge could not count as a base, where blood actually had to be poured out on the base.]*

II.4. A. [With reference to 2.J, “The blood of the burnt offering has to be sprinkled on the horns over against the base, but the southeast horn had no base,”] *what is the meaning of “...had no base”?*

- B. Rab said, “The sense is that as to the actual construction of the altar, it had no base.” [Freedman: the base, which was a separate structure, did not reach under the southeastern horn.]
- C. Levi said, “The sense is that as to the tossing of the blood, [there was no requirement to pour out the residue at the base].” [Freedman: the base ran along the whole length of the eastern side of the altar, but blood was not poured out nor applied in Judah’s portion.]
- D. *[As to the verse, “And he dwells between his shoulders” (Deu. 33:12),] Rab interpreted the statement to mean, “In [Benjamin’s] heritage the altar shall be built” [Freedman: hence the base, which was the under-structure and foundation of the altar, was omitted from that side that belonged to Judah].*
- E. *[As to the verse, “And he dwells between his shoulders” (Deu. 33:12),] Levi interpreted the statement to mean, “In his heritage shall the sanctuary be built,” meaning, a place sanctified for receiving blood. [Freedman: there was a base under the southeast horn, but it was not sanctified for the purpose, since it was not in Benjamin’s portion.]*

F. *Come and take note: And the foundation extended all the length of the north side and all the length of the west side, and projects one cubit to the south and one cubit to the east [M. Mid. 3:1R]. What is the*

meaning of the language, and projects one cubit to the south and one cubit to the east?

- G. *Here too the sense is, “in respect to the requirement of pouring out the residue of the blood” [which could be poured out there, even though there was no actual construction (Freedman)].*
- H. *Come and take note: The altar was thirty-two by thirty-two [cubits] [at the base] [M. Mid. 3:1A].* [Freedman: this implies that it was of equal length on all sides, while according to Rab it was a cubit short on the east and the south.]
- I. *With what sort of a case do we deal here? It was the length at the side.* [Freedman: only the north and west sides were of this length, the other two sides were each a cubit less.]
- J. *Come and take note:* Thus it turned out that it overhung a cubit over the base and a cubit over the balcony [referring to the ascent, which joined the altar from the south, implying that there was a base on the south as well (Freedman)].
- K. *Say:* a cubit corresponding to the base area and one of the balcony [Freedman: i.e. the cubit that would have been occupied by the base, had there been one on the south side].
- L. *Come and take note: for Levi formulated a Tannaite statement as follows, “How did they build the altar? They brought a frame which was thirty two cubits by thirty two cubits, and one cubit deep, and they brought round, smooth stones of various sizes. Then they produced plaster, molten lead and pitch. These they melted down and poured in. And this was the place of the base. Then they brought a frame that was thirty cubits by thirty three cubits, five cubits deep, and they brought round, smooth stones of various sizes. Then they produced plaster, molten lead and pitch. These they melted down and poured in. And this was the place of the balcony. Then they brought a frame twenty eight cubits square and three cubits deep, and they brought round, smooth stones of various sizes. Then they produced plaster, molten lead and pitch. These they melted down and poured in. And this was the place of the wood pile. Then they brought a frame one cubit square, and they brought round, smooth stones of various sizes. Then they produced plaster, molten lead and pitch. These they melted down and poured in. And this formed the horn. And so did they do for each horn.”* [Freedman: thus the base consisted of a complete square, which implies the inclusion of the south and east sides too.] *And should you maintain that [54B] then he cut it away [after the base was built, so that a cubit was removed on the south side,] surely what is required for the building of the altar was “unhewn stones” (Deu. 27: 6), [so cutting away is forbidden]!*
- M. *They put a plank there and then took it away.* [Freedman: in the first mould planks were placed on the south and east sides, a cubit from the edge, so that when the stones were poured in, these strips would be left empty; then the blanks were removed]. *For if you do not accept that view, then, when R. Kahana said, “The horns were hollow, for it is written, ‘And*

they shall be filled like the basins, like the horns of the altar' (Zec. 9:15)," *here too you should have to object, what is required for the building of the altar was "unhewn stones" (Deu. 27: 6)! So what must have happened is that first they put something there and then removed it, and, here too, they put a plank there and then took it away.*

- II.5.** A. *Expounded Raba, "[In search of the exact site of the Temple,] what is the meaning of the verse, 'And he asked and said, "Where are Samuel and David?"' And one said, "Behold, they are at Naioth in Ramah" (1Sa. 19:22) [and 'Naioth,' beautiful, applies to the Temple]? What connection is there between Naioth and Ramah? The sense of the verse is, they went into session in Ramah and took up the subject of the world's most beautiful place [which is the Temple].*
- B. *"They said, 'It is written, "Then you shall arise and ascend to the place which the Lord your God shall choose" (Deu. 17: 8) — this teaches that the house of the sanctuary is higher than the whole of the Land of Israel, and the land of Israel is higher than all other lands.' Not knowing where that place was, however, they produced the book of Joshua, in which, in reference to the territories of all the other tribes, it is written, 'And the border went down...and the border went up...and the border passed along...' (Joshua 15-18), while with regard to the land of the tribe of Benjamin, it is written, 'and it went up,' but not, 'and it went down.'*
- C. *"They said, it must follow that that is the place.*
- D. *"They considered building it at the well of Etam [Freedman: the border of other tribes ran in a southerly direction from the well of Etam, and the north as far as the well of Etam constituted Benjamin's boundary. Now the boundaries of other tribes as they proceeded south from the well of Etam are described as going down, while the boundary of Benjamin as it proceeded to the well of Etam is described as going up, hence the well of Etam must have been the highest spot of all], which is elevated, but then they said, 'Let us build it slightly lower,' as it is written, 'And he dwells between his shoulders' (Deu. 33:12) [Freedman: shoulders but not head implies that it should not be at the very highest point].*
- E. *"And if you prefer, I shall say: they had learned as a tradition that the Sanhedrin was to be located in the portion of Judah, and the Presence of God in the portion of Benjamin. [So they said,] 'If we build it in the highest place, there will be some distance between them, so it is better to build it somewhat lower.' So it is written, 'And he dwells between his shoulders' (Deu. 33:12).*
- F. *"And on that account Doeg the Edomite was jealous of David [who had chosen the site for the Temple], as it is written, 'Because envy on account of your house has eaten me up' (Psa. 69:10); 'Lord, remember for David all his affliction, how he swore to the Lord and vowed to the Mighty One of Jacob; Surely I will not come into the*

tent of my house nor go up into the bed that is spread for me; I will not give sleep to my eyes nor slumber to my eyelids, until I find out a place for the Lord, a dwelling place for the Mighty One of Jacob. Lo, we heard of it as being in Ephrath, we found it in the field of the forest' (Psa. 132:2-6).

- G. "'in Ephrath:' in the book of Joshua, who was descended from Ephraim.
- H. "'in the field of the forest:' in the territory of Benjamin: 'Benjamin is a wolf that ravens' (Gen. 49:27)."

5:5

- A. **Peace offerings of the congregation and guilt offerings —**
 - B. **What are guilt offerings? (1) The guilt offering for false dealing, and (2) the guilt offering for acts of sacrilege, and (3) the guilt offering [because of intercourse with] a betrothed bondwoman, and (4) the guilt offering of a Nazir, and the (5) guilt offering of the mesora [one afflicted with the skin ailment], and (6) the suspensive guilt offering —**
 - C. **the act of slaughtering them is done at the north [side of the altar].**
 - D. **And the receiving of their blood is carried out with a utensil of service at the north.**
 - E. **And their blood requires two acts of placing, which are four.**
 - F. **And they are eaten [only] inside the veils, by males of the priesthood, and [cooked for food] in any [manner of cooking] food, for a day and a night, up to midnight.**
- I.1. A. [55A] *What is the scriptural source for this rule that these classifications of offerings require the north side of the altar?***
- B. *It is in line with that which Rabbah bar R. Hanan repeated as a Tannaite formulation before Raba, "'And you shall offer one he goat for a sin offering and two he lambs a year old for a sacrifice of peace offerings' (Lev. 23:19): just as the sin offering is to be prepared at the north side of the altar, so peace offerings presented in behalf of the community are to be prepared at the north."*
 - C. *Said to him Raba, "But on the basis of what analogy is the rule governing the sin offering derived? It derives from the rule governing the burnt offering. Now can a rule that is derived through an analogy established through identity of language go and be applied in yet another case in which an analogy is established through identity of language [of another order altogether]?"*
 - D. *"Rather, it is in line with that which R. Mari b. R. Kahana taught as a Tannaite formulation: "'You shall blow with trumpets over your burnt offerings and over the sacrifices of your peace offerings" (Num. 10:10) [and these are public peace offerings, since individual peace offerings are not celebrated with the sound of the trumpet] — just as a burnt offering is in the class of Most Holy Things, so a peace offering is in the class of Most Holy Things. Just as a burnt offering is to be prepared at the north side of the altar, so a peace offering is to be prepared at the north side of the altar."*

- E. [Raba continues,] *“Then for what purpose does the initial analogy based on verbal parallels serve [in which the peace offerings are comparable to the sin offerings]? [It is to compare the peace offerings to] sin offerings, to make the point that just as a sin offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood, so sacrifices of peace offerings presented in behalf of the community are eaten only by males of the priesthood.”*
- F. *Said to him Abayye, “If so, then with regard to the ram presented by the Nazirite, of which it is written, ‘And he shall present his offering to the Lord, one he lamb of the first year without blemish for a burnt offering, and one ewe lamb of the first year without blemish for a sin offering, and one ram without blemish for a peace offering,’ (Num. 6:14), will you make the same statement, namely, that the analogy based on verbal parallels serves to make the point that just as a sin offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood, so the Nazirite’s ram may be eaten only by males of the priesthood?” [That is manifestly absurd.]*
- G. *But what sort of comparison is that! In that case, since it is written, “And the priest shall take the shoulder of the ram when it is boiled...this is holy, for the priest” (Num. 6:19-20), it follows that the remainder of the beast is wholly eaten by the owner.*
- H. *But then the boiled shoulder of the ram at the very least should be eaten only by males of the priesthood.*
- I. *That’s a problem.*
- J. *If you prefer, I shall say: “The boiled shoulder is called Holy Things, but it is not called Most Holy Things” [and therefore it cannot be comparable to the sin offering, which is classified as Most Holy Things].*
- K. *Then for what legal purpose does the initial analogy based on verbal parallels serve [in which the peace offerings are comparable to the sin offerings]?*
- L. *Said Raba, “If at the end of the vow the Nazirite shaves himself after offering only one of the three offerings that he must bring, burnt offering, sin offering, and peace offering, he has carried out his obligation.”*

5:6

- A. The thanksgiving offering and the ram of the Nazirite are classified as Lesser Holy Things.**
- B. The act of slaughtering them may be performed in any place in the courtyard.**
- C. And their blood requires two acts of placing which are four.**
- D. And they are eaten throughout the city [of Jerusalem],**
- E. by any person,**
- F. [cooked for food] in any [manner of cooking] food,**
- G. for a day and a night,**
- H. up to midnight.**
- I. That which is raised up from them [the breast and thigh, as heave offering] follows their rule,**
- J. except that that which is raised up from them [as heave offering] is eaten [only] by priests, by their wives, children and slaves.**

- I.1.** A. [Supply: **And they are eaten throughout the city [of Jerusalem]]** *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. “And the breast that is waved and the thigh that is waved shall you eat in a clean place” (Lev. 10:14) —
- C. Said R. Nehemiah, “But were they then going to eat the offerings listed earlier in context eaten in a condition of cultic uncleanness? Rather the sense of ‘clean’ is it was partly unclean, meaning, a place that was clean of the uncleanness of him afflicted with the skin ailment, but unclean of the uncleanness of one afflicted with flux uncleanness. What place is that? It is the camp of the Israelites” [not the camp of the Divine Presence, the Tabernacle, nor the camp of the Levites around it, but the camp of the Israelites, corresponding to the Temple, the Temple Mount, and Jerusalem. A person afflicted with the skin ailment was expelled from all three, a person with flux, the first two but permitted in the third. So the meat may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem (Freedman)].
- D. *But might I not say, “clean of the uncleanness affecting someone with flux uncleanness, but unclean with the uncleanness affecting someone who has contracted corpse uncleanness? And what are is that? It is the camp of the Levites”?*
- E. Said Abayye, “Said Scripture, ‘And you shall eat the meal offering in a holy place’ (Lev. 10:13). ‘It’ must be eaten in a holy place, but something else does not have to be eaten in a holy place, *thus taking it out of the camp of the Divine Presence into the camp of the Levites* [following Freedman’s version of the text]. Scripture further states, ‘in a clean place,’ *which withdraws it into the Israelite camp.*”
- F. Raba said, “‘...it...,’ in a holy place, and not anything else in a holy place. *Take it out of the holy place entirely. But then Scripture goes and says, ‘in a clean place,’ so bringing it back into the camp of the Israelites [within Jerusalem].*”
- G. *But might I not say, then bring it back into the Levitical camp [the Temple mount]?*
- H. *While we may bring it back by one step, we do not bring it back by two.*
- I. *Then say with regard to withdrawing, we take it out by one stop but not by two [thus excluding the camp of the divine Presence only]? Furthermore, Scripture states, “You may not eat within your gates” (Lev. 3: 2, 8, 13)!*
- J. *Rather, the proof of Abayye is better.*

5:7

- A. Peace offerings are classified as Lesser Holy Things.**
- B. The act of slaughtering them may be carried out in any place in the courtyard.**
- C. And their blood requires two acts of placing which are four.**
- D. And they are eaten throughout the city,**
- E. by any person,**
- F. [cooked for food] in any [manner of cooking] food,**
- G. for two days and one [intervening] night.**
- H. That which is raised up from them [the breast and thigh, as heave offering] follows their rule,**

I. except that which is raised up from them [as heave offering] is eaten by priests, by their wives, children, and slaves.

I.1 A. [Supply **The act of slaughtering them may be carried out in any place in the courtyard:**] *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting...” (Lev. 3: 2, 8, 13) — these three distinct formulations serve to validate all sides of the Temple court in the case of Lesser Holy Things.
- C. And the north side of the Temple court of course is valid by reason of an argument a fortiori:
- D. if Most Holy Things, which may be validly slaughtered not in all other directions of the Temple court but only in the north, Lesser Holy Things, which may be validly slaughtered in all other directions of the Temple court, surely should be validly slaughtered also in the northern area of the Temple court!
- E. R. Eliezer says, “The purpose of Scripture is solely to validate use of the northern part of the Temple court [for otherwise we should not know that it is valid for Lesser Holy Things]. For one might have argued in this wise:
- F. “if the place in which are slaughtered Lesser Holy Things, which may be validly slaughtered on all sides of the Temple court, is not valid for use for offerings in the classification of Most Holy Things, then the place in which Most Holy Things are validly slaughtered, which is only in the north, should not be permitted for the slaughtering of offerings of Lesser Holy Things!
- G. “That is why it is necessary for Scripture to state, ‘the tent of meeting’ (Lev. 3: 2, 8, 13) [Freedman: implying any part of the area].”

I.2. A. [55B] *What is at issue between the two authorities?*

- B. *The former Tannaite authority takes the view that as to the three verses that are stated here, one serves its own purpose, to show that the door of the tent of meeting is necessary [and the animal may be slaughtered only when this door is open, as we shall see in a moment], the second is to permit use of the sides of the courtyard for this purpose, and the third is to forbid use of the sides of the sides [that is, the chambers that open into the Temple court, which may not be used for slaughtering Lesser Holy Things, even though they have been consecrated]. And in his view a particular verse of Scripture to validate use of the northern area is simply not required.*
- C. *R. Eliezer takes the view that as to the three verses that are stated here, one serves its own purpose, to show that the door of the tent of meeting is necessary [and the animal may be slaughtered only when this door is open, as we shall see in a moment], the second is to permit use of the northern part of the courtyard, and the third is to permit use of the sides, and, as to the sides of the sides, [that is, the chambers that open into the Temple court, which may not be used for slaughtering Lesser Holy Things, even though they have been consecrated], in his view a particular verse of Scripture to invalidate use of the northern area is simply not required.*

I.3. A. [With reference to the verses, “And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it

before the tent of meeting...” (Lev. 3: 2, 8, 13),] why is “at the door of the tent of meeting” stated in one instance, while “before the tent of meeting” is stated in the other cases?

- B. *So we are informed of the rule in accord with what R. Judah said Samuel said.*
- C. For R. Judah said Samuel said, “Peace offerings that one slaughtered as sacrifices prior to the opening of the doors of the sanctum are invalid, for it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting...,’ meaning, when it is open, but not when it is closed.”
- D. *So too it has been stated:*
- E. Said Mar Uqba bar Hama said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, ““Peace offerings that one slaughtered as sacrifices prior to the opening of the doors of the sanctum are invalid, for it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting...,’ meaning, when it is open, but not when it is closed.”
- F. *In the West this is how they repeat the item:*
- G. Said R. Jacob bar Aha said R. Ashi, “Peace offerings that one slaughtered as sacrifices prior to the opening of the doors of the sanctum are invalid; in the case of the Tabernacle in the wilderness [where there was no door but only an opening (Freedman)], if slaughtered before the Levites set up the tabernacle or after they took it down, it would have been invalid.”

I.4. A. *It is self-evident that if the flap is shut, it is as though it were locked [so the offering is invalid]. But what if a curtain does it?*

B. *Said R. Zira, “This itself is made only to serve as a door.”*

I.5. A. *What if an elevation [e.g. a beam or board, a raised construction that shuts off the door while it is actually open (Freedman)] does it?*

B. *Come and take note of what has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. **R. Yosé b. R. Judah said, “Two small doors were in the house of knives, open to the west, eight cubits above the ground, so that the entire courtyard should be valid for the eating of Most Holy Things and for the slaughtering of Lesser Holy Things, even the area behind the Mercy Seat, as it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting’ (Lev. 3: 2)” [T. Zeb. 7:1C].**

D. *Does this not mean that that an elevation eight cubits high stood before the doors?*

E. *No, the meaning is that they themselves were eight cubits high.*

F. *An objection was raised: All of the entrances and gates which were there were twenty cubits high and ten cubits wide, except for that of the porch. [M. Mid. 2:3I].*

- G. *The small doors were in a class by themselves.*
- H. *But lo, there were the sides [of the area on the north and south beyond the small doors. The area in front of these would not be made fit by the wickets (Freedman)]?*
- I. *They were built at the corners [Freedman: diagonally, so that the space opposite them, up to the north and the south walls of the Temple court, would still be technically “before the door”].*

I.6. A. *As to the space behind the mercy seat, what is the rule [as to whether or not it was fit for Lesser Holy Things]?*

B. *Come and take note, for Rami b. R. Judah said Rab said, “There was a small passage way behind the place of the Mercy Seat, which served to validate the whole of the Temple court for eating Most Holy Things and for slaughtering Lesser Holy Things. There were two such, and so it is written, ‘and two at the precinct’ (1Ch. 26:18).”*

C. *What is the meaning of “and two at the precinct”?*

D. *Said Rabbah b. R. Shila, “In line with the usage, ‘facing without.’”*

I.7. A. Said R. Judah said Samuel, “Liability on account of uncleanness [for example, entering the Temple court when cultically unclean] is incurred only on account of **[56A]** the area a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five cubits in breadth.”

B. *A Tannaite authority formulated as a Tannaite statement in the presence of R. Nahman: “The entire Temple court was an area a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five cubits in breadth.”*

C. He said to him, “This is what my father said to me: ‘In that area priests would come in and eat Most Holy Things and slaughter Lesser Holy Things, and on account of that area liability on account of uncleanness [for example, entering the Temple court when cultically unclean] is incurred.’”

D. *What areas then does this statement exclude? Shall we say it is to exclude the areas of the windows, doors, and thickness of the wall? But a Tannaite teaching states: The windows and thickness of the walls are classified as contained space of the courtyard itself.*

E. *Rather, it is to exclude the chambers [around the sides of the Temple court].*

F. But if they are built on secular soil but open into the holy soil, surely we have learned: **The contained space within is holy [M. M.S. 3:8].**

G. *That is so on the basis of the authority of our rabbis, but as to the law of the Torah, that is not the case.*

H. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*

I. As to the chambers that are built on secular soil but open into the holy soil, how on the basis of Scripture do we know that the priests may enter that area and eat therein their share of Most Holy Things and the residue of meal offerings?

- J. Scripture says, “In the court of the tent of meeting they shall eat it” (Lev. 6: 9). The Torah has encompassed a variety of courtyards within the area in which it was permitted for eating Holy Things. [This proves that that rule is not only on the basis of the authority of rabbis but of the Torah itself.]
- K. *Said Raba, “Eating is exceptional.”*
- L. *But is the specified area not holy in regard to protection from uncleanness? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- M. **Chambers that are built on secular soil and open up toward holy soil — priests go in there and eat Most Holy Things therein, and they do not slaughter Lesser Holy Things in it, and they are responsible on its account for violating the laws of uncleanness [T. M.S. 2:13].**
- N. *Have you not said that they do not slaughter Lesser Holy Things in it? Then along these same lines formulate the version as, they are not responsible on its account for violating the laws of uncleanness.*
- O. *Not at all. For as to ruling that they do not slaughter Lesser Holy Things in it, that is perfectly reasonable, since one must slaughter the beast opposite the door, which is not possible herein. But why in the world should the passage say, they are not responsible on its account for violating the laws of uncleanness?!*
- P. *But according to your reasoning, when you say, they do not slaughter Lesser Holy Things in it, are we not occupied with a case in which the act of slaughter is to take place opposite the door? For if not, then why say that rule at all? So you have to admit that, even though the act of slaughter would be opposite the entrance, the framer of the passage states, they do not slaughter Lesser Holy Things in it and that is because the area is not sanctified. Here too you should also read, they are not responsible on its account for violating the laws of uncleanness.*
- I.8.** A. *And is it the fact that we do not require eating the meat to be accomplished in an area facing the entrance? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. **R. Yosé b. R. Judah said, “Two small doors were in the house of knives, open to the west, eight cubits above the ground, so that the entire courtyard should be valid for the eating of Most Holy Things and for the slaughtering of Lesser Holy Things, even the area behind the Mercy Seat, as it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting’ (Lev. 3: 2)” [T. Zeb. 7:1C].**
- C. *Said Rabina, “Delete from this passage, for the eating of Most Holy Thing.”*
- D. But is it not written, “And boil the meat at the door of the tent of meeting and there eat it” (Lev. 8:31)?
- E. *The rule governing sacrifices that are offered other than on a regular basis is different.*

- II.1 A.** [Supply: **FOR TWO DAYS AND ONE INTERVENING NIGHT:**] Said R. Isaac bar Abodimi, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the blood of an offering is rendered invalid at the moment of sunset on the day on which the beast was slaughtered? As it is written, ‘It shall be eaten on the day that he offers his slaughtering’ (Lev. 7:16). On the day on which you slaughter you may offer [the blood], on the day on which you do not slaughter the animal, you also cannot offer [the blood through sprinkling].”
- B. *But that verse is required [56B] to make its own point [and is not available for the exegetical purpose that you have imputed to it]!*
- C. *If that were the case, then the verse could as well read, “it shall be eaten on the day of its slaughtering.” Why specify, “on the day on which the beast was slaughtered”? It is to bear the inference, on the day on which you slaughter you may offer [the blood], on the day on which you do not slaughter the animal, you also cannot offer [the blood through sprinkling].*
- D. *But perhaps this is what the Torah means to say: if the priest offers the blood that day, then the meat may be eaten that day and the next. If the priest offers the blood the next day, then the meat may be eaten only on the next day and the day after that?*
- E. *If that were the case, then the verse could as well read, “it shall be eaten on the day that he offers.” Why add, “of his slaughtering”? It is to bear the inference, on the day on which you slaughter you may offer [the blood], on the day on which you do not slaughter the animal, you also cannot offer [the blood through sprinkling].*

II.2. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. If a priest expresses the intention, while slaughtering the beast, of eating the meat on the evening of the third day [prior to the third day, which is to say, after the two days on which eating the meat of the offering is permitted],
- C. Hezekiah said, “The offering is valid.”
- D. R. Yohanan said, “The offering is invalid.”
- E. Hezekiah said, “The offering is valid:” *for lo, the meat has not yet been handed over for burning.*
- F. R. Yohanan said, “The offering is invalid:” *for lo, the meat is now rejected for eating.*
- G. He who eats the meat on the evening of the third day [prior to the third day, which is to say, after the two days on which eating the meat of the offering is permitted],
- H. Hezekiah said, “He is exempt of penalty, *for lo, the meat has not yet been handed over for burning.*”
- I. R. Yohanan said, “He is liable, *for lo, the meat is now rejected for eating.*”
- J. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of R. Yohanan:*
- K. As to Holy Things that are to be eaten only on the same day as the animal is slaughtered, if the priest has formed an intention to regard to tossing the blood from sunset on, or in regard to eating their

meat or burning their sacrificial portions from dawn on of the next day, [that improper intention invalidates the offering].

- L. But as to offerings the meat of which is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night, an intention to sprinkle the blood after sunset is valid so as to invalidate the offering; an intention in regard to burning the sacrificial parts is effective if it is to do so from dawn onward; and in respect to eating the meat, it is valid if the intention is to do so from sunset on the second day onward.

II.3. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. Might one suppose that peace offerings may be eaten on the evening of the third day?
- C. For that is a logical conclusion: the meat of some sacrifices is to be eaten on the same day as the killing of the animal, and the meat of others over a span of two days and the intervening night. Just as in the case of sacrifices that are to be eaten on the same day as the sacrifice, the night is associated with the prior day [so that the meat may be eaten not only on the day that the beast was slaughtered but also the following night], so in the case of offerings the meat of which may be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night are such that the night is associated with the prior day [so that the meat may be eaten not only on the days but also the following night afterward].
- D. That is why Scripture is constrained to make explicit, “And if anything remain until the third day” (Lev. 19: 6) — while it is still day it may be eaten, but the meat may not be eaten on the evening of the third day.
- E. Then might one suppose that it must be burned forthwith [at sunset after the second day]?
- F. For that is a logical conclusion: the meat of some offerings must be eaten on the day of the sacrifice itself, and the meat of others is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night. Just as what is left over of sacrifices that are to be eaten on the same day must be burned immediately after the period in which eating is permitted has come to an end, so the same rule would apply to the meat of sacrifices that may be eaten during two days and the intervening night, so that burning the left over meat must immediately follow the end of the span of time that is allotted for eating the meat.
- G. That is why Scripture is constrained to make explicit, “And if anything remain until the third day, it shall be burned with fire” (Lev. 19: 6) — you must burn it by day, not by night.

5:8

- A. **The firstling and tithe [of cattle] and Passover are classified as Lesser Holy Things.**
- B. **The act of slaughtering them is to be done in any place in the courtyard.**
- C. **And their blood requires a single act of placing,**
- D. **provided that one places [the blood] at the base [on the part of the altar that has a base under it].**

- E. [The law] imposed a difference on their manner of eating [The firstling and tithe of cattle, which are subject to a rule different from that governing the eating of the Passover] :
 - (1) The firstling is eaten by priests.
 - (2) And tithe [of cattle] by any person.
- F. And they are eaten throughout the city [cooked for food] in any [manner of cooking] food, for two days and one [intervening] night.
- G. The Passover is eaten only at night.
- H. And it is eaten only up to midnight.
- I. And it is eaten only by those that were assigned to it.
- J. And it is eaten only roasted.

- I.1. A. *What Tannaite authority stands behind this rule* [E, which enumerates differences in the rules governing eating the offering alone, which means that the offerings are alike in regard to sprinkling and the burning up of the sacrificial parts. Whose view is this? (Freedman)]
- B. *Said R. Hisda, "It is R. Yosé the Galilean. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:"*
- C. R. Yosé the Galilean says, "[But the firstling of an ox or the firstling of a sheep or the firstling of a goat you shall not redeem; they are holy; you shall dash their blood against the altar and you shall make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire' (Num. 18:17)] — not 'its blood' but 'their blood,' not 'its fat' but 'their fat.' This teaches concerning the case of a beast designated as tithe of the herd and of a beast designated as a Passover offering that there must be a placing of blood on the altar and a burning up of the sacrificial parts on the altar." [So the rules governing the several classifications are the same, with the stated exception.]

- II.1 A. [Supply: **provided that one places [the blood] at the base [on the part of the altar that has a base under it:]** *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the blood must be sprinkled on a part of the altar that has a base?*
- B. *Said R. Eleazar, "The rule governing 'sprinkling' in regard to the blood of the firstling and the tithe derives from the definition of the law of sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering.*
- C. **[57A]** *And whence do we derive the rule of sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering itself?*
- D. As it is written, "At the base of the altar of the burnt offering" (Lev. 4: 7) — this teaches concerning the obligatory burnt offering that the blood has to be sprinkled at a part of the altar that has a base [Freedman: for in fact the altar was not used for the burnt offering exclusively, since the sentence that is quoted treats a sin offering, so the verse must mean, at the base of the altar as is done with a burnt offering].
- E. Then might one say too, just as in that other matter, the blood must be tossed in such a way that there are two applications of blood yielding four [by splitting the blood at the corner of the altar], so here too, there must be two applications of blood yielding four [by splitting the blood at the corner of the altar]?

- F. *Said Abayye, “Why must the words ‘round about’ be written in the context of both a burnt offering and a sin offering? It is so that we might have two verses that deal with the same subject, and in any case in which there are two verses of Scripture that deal with the same subject, they do not yield a law that would pertain to any other cases.” [Freedman: hence the number of applications required by a firstling and so forth cannot be deduced from the number required for the firstling.]*
- G. *That position poses no problems to him who has said that in any case in which there are two verses of Scripture that deal with the same subject, they do not yield a law that would pertain to any other cases. But from the perspective of him who has said that in any case in which there are two verses of Scripture that deal with the same subject, they do yield a law that would pertain to any other cases, what is to be said?*
- H. The guilt offering would form a third instance in which the same matter is made explicit, and where there are three verses of Scripture that deal with the same subject, they most certainly do not yield a law that would pertain to any other cases.

III.1 A. The firstling is eaten by priests:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the meat of a firstling is to be eaten during the two days and one intervening night?
- D. Because it is said, “And their meat shall be yours, as the breast that is waved and as the right thigh” (Num. 18:18) — in this language the Scripture has formed an analogy based on verbal correspondence between the meat of the firstling and the disposition of the breast that is waved and the right thigh of the peace offering [which belonged to the priest]. Just as the meat of peace offerings is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night, so the meat of the firstling is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night.

III.2. A. This question was addressed to sages at the vineyard at Yabneh, “Over how long a span of time may the firstling be eaten?”

- B. R. Tarfon responded, saying, “For a span of two days and the intervening night.”
- C. Now there was present a certain disciple who had just come to the house of study before sages, R. Yosé the Galilean by name. He said to him, “My lord, how do you know?”
- D. He said to him, “My son, a peace offering is classified as Lesser Holy Things, and a firstling is classified as Lesser Holy Things. Just as the meat of peace offerings is eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night, so the meat of firstlings is eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night.”
- E. He said to him, “My lord, the firstling is a gift to the priest, and a sin offering and guilt offering likewise fall into the category of gifts to the priest. Just as the sin offering and guilt offering yield meat that is to be eaten only for a single day and the night following, so the firstling should yield meat that is to be eaten only for a single day and the night following.”
- F. He said to him, “Let us compare one thing to the other and then deduce the law of the one from the law of the other [since that the breast and thigh belong to the

priest is not stated explicitly (Freedman)]. [The correct comparison is between peace offerings and the firstling,] for just as peace offerings are not presented by reason of having committed an inadvertent sin, so the firstling is not presented by reason of having committed an inadvertent sin. Therefore just as the meat of peace offerings is eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night, so the meat of firstlings is eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night.”

- G. He said to him, “My lord, let us compare one thing to the other and then deduce the law of the one from the law of the other. A sin offering and guilt offering are gifts to the priest, and so too the firstling is a gift to the priest. Just as the sin offering and guilt offering are not presented by reason of a vow or as a thanksgiving offering, so the firstling is not presented by reason of a vow or as a thanksgiving offering. Just as a sin offering and guilt offering yield meat that is to be eaten only for a single day and the night following, so the firstling should yield meat that is to be eaten only for a single day and the night following.”
- H. R. Aqiba jumped in and R. Tarfon pulled out. He said to him, “Lo, Scripture states, ‘And their meat shall be yours, as the breast that is waved and as the right thigh’ (Num. 18:18) — in this language the Scripture has formed an analogy based on verbal correspondence between the meat of the firstling and the disposition of the breast that is waved and the right thigh of the peace offering [which belonged to the priest]. Just as the meat of peace offerings is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night, so the meat of the firstling is to be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night.”
- I. He said to him, “You have drawn the verbal analogy to the breast and thigh of a peace offering, but I have proposed the analogy to the breast and the thigh of a thanksgiving offering. Just as the thanksgiving offering is eaten over a span of a single day and the night that follows, so a firstling should be eaten over a span of a single day and the night that follows.”
- J. He said to him, “Lo, Scripture states, ‘It shall be yours.’ Why does Scripture say [what does not have to be stated]? Scripture has thereby added to the existence of the firstling [Freedman: it is correct to liken it to a thanksgiving offering rather than to a peace offering, since we cannot permit a longer time for its consumption than the minimum of which we are certain. But the reiteration, ‘it is thine,’ implies that it is eaten for a longer time than you might otherwise think, and so it is permitted for two days, like a peace offering.]”
- K. Now when these matters were reported before R. Ishmael, he said to him, “Go tell R. Aqiba, ‘You have erred. For whence have you derived the rule governing the thanksgiving offering? You have derived it from the case of peace offerings. Now can a rule that is derived by an argument based on a verbal analogy then go and impart its lesson to yet another matter to which it is linked by another verbal analogy? [Freedman: hence the thanksgiving offering in this case cannot throw light on the firstling.]”
- L. *So how does R. Ishmael interpret the repetition of the language, “it shall be yours”?*
- M. He interprets it to teach that a blemished firstling too is to be handed over to the priest, for which rule we find no other verse in the entirety of the Torah.

- N. And R. Aqiba?
- O. *He derives that rule from the language "their meat," meaning, whether unblemished or blemished.*
- P. And R. Ishmael?
- Q. It means, "the meat of these firstlings."

III.3. A. *On what point do the masters differ [since it is established as fact that a rule that is derived by an argument based on a verbal analogy then cannot go and impart its lesson to yet another matter to which it is linked by another verbal analogy]?*

- B. *One authority maintains, "That which derives from the subject at hand and another is classified as an argument from analogy based on verbal correspondence," and the other takes the view, "That which derives from the subject at hand and another is not classified as an argument from analogy based on verbal correspondence." [Freedman: The rule that a thanksgiving offering is eaten over the span of a day and the following not is stated explicitly at Lev. 7:15 and does not derive from such an analogy, while the fact that the breast and thigh belong to the priest is inferred by an argument based on analogy established verbally. Ishmael holds that the fact that the priest may eat the breast and thigh during the specified period must be regarded as an inference drawn by such an argument by verbal analogy and therefore it cannot become the basis for another such argument by verbal analogy, that is, as to the time permitted for eating the meat of the firstling. Aqiba holds that since the time permitted for the thanksgiving offering is explicitly stated, we do not regard the issue of the time allowed for eating the breast and thigh to derive from such an argument by analogy based on verbal correspondence, and hence it cannot become the basis for another such argument.]*
- C. *Now from the perspective of him who maintains that that which derives from the subject at hand and another is not classified as an argument from analogy based on verbal correspondence, that is in line with what is written. "And so shall he do for the tent of meeting" (Lev. 16:16), meaning, just as he sprinkles the blood of the bullock in the inner sanctum once upward and seven times downward, so must he sprinkle it at the altar outside, and as he sprinkles the blood of the he goat in the inner sanctum once upward and seven times downward, so must he do at the altar outside.*
- D. *But from the perspective of him who maintains that that which derives from the subject at hand and another is classified as an argument from analogy based on verbal correspondence, what is to be said? [Freedman: if what is inferred partly from the subject itself and partly from another subject is not classified as such an argument, then the sprinklings in the altar outside can rightly be inferred by such an argument from those in the inner sanctum. But if it does, such an inference is disallowed, since what is learned from such an argument cannot then go and impart a rule to another subject by reason of an argument of the same classification.]*
- E. *The localities are deduced only from one another [so this is not a case in which what is learned from such an argument has gone and imparted a rule to another subject by reason of an argument of the same classification. [Freedman: The first refers to the animals, the second to the localities.]*

- F. **[57B]** *If you prefer, I shall say, “the sprinklings outside [at the altar outside of the inner sanctum] are directly inferred from those within the inner sanctum [and not through the commonality of the animals (Freedman)].*
- G. *From the perspective of him who maintains that this is not an argument based on analogy established through verbal correspondences, there is then no problem, and that is why it is written, “You shall bring out of your houses two loaves for waving, of two tenth parts of an ephah” (Lev. 23:17). If it is not necessary to use the language, “you shall bring,” [for the text can read, “and you shall present a new offering to the Lord out of your dwellings”] then what does the language, “you shall bring” serve to tell us?*
- H. It is that whatever you present in another context must resemble the present offering in these details: just as here a tenth of an ephah is used for the loaf, so there too, a tenth of an ephah is required for hallah.
- I. If so, then is it the fact that just as two tenths are required here, so elsewhere two tenths are required? [Not at all, and] that is why Scripture states, “They shall be of fine flour” (Lev. 23:17).
- J. And how do we know that ten tenths are required for the unleavened loaves?
- K. Because Scripture states, “With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Lev. 7:13), meaning, “bring an equal quantity of unleavened as of leavened.
- L. *But from the perspective of him who maintains that this is an argument based on analogy established through verbal correspondences, what is to be said?*
- M. “You shall bring” *is simply superfluous.* [Freedman: hence the fact that the loaves of the thanksgiving offering require a tenth of an ephah each is not regarded as an inference by an argument based on verbal analogy but as though it were explicitly stated.]

IV.1 A. The Passover is eaten only at night. And it is eaten only up to midnight. And it is eaten only by those that were assigned to it. And it is eaten only roasted:

- B. *Who is the Tannaite authority behind this rule?*
- C. *Said R. Joseph, “It is R. Eleazar b. Azariah. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:”*
- D. [“And they shall eat the meat in that night” (Exo. 12: 8):] R. Eleazar b. Azariah says, “Here it is stated, ‘In that night,’ and later on it is stated, ‘For I shall pass through the land of Egypt in that night’ (Exo. 12:12).
- E. “Just as, in the latter usage, the reference is to the period up to midnight, so here the reference is to the period up to midnight.”
- F. Said to him R. Aqiba, “And has it not already been stated, ‘You shall eat it in haste’ (Exo. 12:11)? The meaning is, ‘until the time of haste’ [which was dawn, at which point they scurried out of Egypt].

- G. “Why then does Scripture say, ‘By night’? One might suppose that the Passover sacrifice may be eaten by day, as is the case with Holy Things. Accordingly, Scripture says, ‘By night,’ meaning, ‘It is by night that the Passover sacrifice is eaten, and not by day.’”
- H. *Said to him Abayye, “How do you know that the author of our Mishnah-paragraph is R. Eleazar b. Azariah, and therefore the law derives from the authority of the Torah? Perhaps the law derives from the authority of rabbis, and at stake here is a rule that is meant to keep people far from transgression?”*
- I. *If so, why say, **And it is eaten only up to midnight?** Rather, the sense is, just as the other laws in context derive from the authority of the Torah, so this rule is stated in such wise as to derive from the authority of the Torah.*