

XI.

BAVLI SHABBAT CHAPTER ELEVEN

FOLIOS 96B-102A

11:1

- A. He who throws [an object] from private domain to public domain, [or] from public domain to private domain, is liable.
- B. [He who throws an object] from private domain to private domain, and public domain intervenes —
- C. R. Aqiba declares [him] liable [to a sin-offering].
- D. And sages exempt [him].

11:2

- A. How so?
- B. Two balconies opposite one another [extending] into the public domain —
- C. he who stretches out or throws [an object] from this one to that one is exempt.
- D. [If] both of them were [different private domains on the same side of the street and] at the same story,
- E. he who stretches [an object over] is liable, and he who throws from one to the other is exempt.
- F. For thus was the mode of labor of the Levites:
- G. Two wagons, one after the other, in the public domain —
- H. they stretch beams from this one to that one, but they do not throw [them from one to the other] —

- I.1** A. **[96B] [He who throws:]** *Note: Throwing is a derivative of the generative classification of labor of carrying out. But as to carrying from private to public domain, how on the basis of Scripture do we know that that act is forbidden on the Sabbath?*
- B. *Said R. Yohanan, "Said Scripture, 'And Moses commanded, and they carried the proclamation throughout the camp' (Exo. 36: 6): Now where was Moses located? He was in the camp of the Levites, and the camp of the Levites was public domain, and yet he said to the Israelites, 'Don't carry out or get something from private domain to public domain. And how do we know that this was on the Sabbath? Maybe it took place during the week, and the operative consideration for not carrying materials about was that there was enough for the work already, since Scripture is explicit, 'For the stuff that they had was sufficient' (Exo. 36: 7)? The reason is that we form a verbal analogy between two passages on the basis of the appearance in them both of the word for 'passing through,' as occurs with reference to the Day of Atonement. Here it is written, 'and they carried the proclamation throughout the camp' (Exo. 36: 6), and with reference to the Day of Atonement, 'And you should carry the sound of a loud trumpet through the land' (Lev. 25: 9). Just as in the latter instance the verse refers to the day on which the prohibition is announced, so here, too, what is under discussion is the day on which the prohibition is announced."*

- I.2** A. *Thus we have found that it is forbidden on the Sabbath to carry objects out from private domain to public domain. How do we know that carrying objects in from public domain to private domain also is forbidden?*
- B. *It's a matter of reasoning. When it comes to taking something from one domain to another, what difference does it make if it is taking something out or bringing something in?*
- C. *Still, while carrying something out is [as just now shown] a generative classification of labor, carrying something in is a derivative classification of labor.*
- D. *But note: For this action one is liable, and for that action one is liable, so why should one be classified as a generative classification of labor and the other as a derivative classification of labor? [Why does it make any difference?]*
- E. *The concrete outcome would be a case in which one did simultaneously two acts of labor that are classified as generative, or two acts of labor done simultaneously that are classified as derivative. In such a case one is liable*

on two counts. But if at one and the same time one had done an act of labor classified as generative and another classified as derivative, one would be liable on only one count.

F. And from the perspective of R. Eliezer, who imposes liability for a derivative act of labor in a case in which one has simultaneously performed a generative act of labor, why classify one as a generative and the other as a derivative act of labor?

G. What is differentiated as having been done in setting up the tabernacle is classified as a generative act of labor, while what was not identified on account of its being done in setting up the tabernacle is classified as derivative.

H. Or, also, one that is written in Scripture is classified as a generative act of labor, while what was not written in Scripture is classified as derivative.

- I.3** A. *And as to that which we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who throws [something from a distance of] four cubits toward a wall — [if he throws it] above ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws it into the air [which is public domain]. [If it is] less than ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws an object onto the ground [which is private domain]. He who throws [an object to a distance of] four cubits on the ground, is liable [M. Shab. 11:3] — how do we know that he who throws an object for four cubits in public domain is liable?***
- B. Said R. Josiah, “It is in the model of curtain weavers [for the hangings of the tabernacle], who toss their needles to one another across public domain.”
- C. *What in the world do they need needles for?*
- D. Rather, “It is in the model of curtain sewers [working on the hangings of the tabernacle], who toss their needles to one another across public domain.”
- E. *Yeah, so maybe they sat close together?*
- F. *If they did, they would reach one another with their needles [bumping into each other, so they didn’t sit close together].*
- G. *So maybe they sat within four cubits of one another?*
- H. Rather, said R. Hisda, “It is in the model of curtain weavers [for the hangings of the tabernacle], who toss the clue into the curtain.”
- I. But doesn’t the other worker still have the distaff in his hand?

- J. *This makes reference to the last [Freedman:] manipulation [Freedman: when the weaver throws the clue through the web for the last time].*
- K. *But lo, it has gone through an area that is not subject to liability at all [portions of the curtain, and that is not public domain]!*
- L. *Rather, "It is in the model of curtain weavers [for the hangings of the tabernacle], who toss the clue to those who need to borrow it from them" [Freedman: people working on other curtains, so the clue had to traverse public ground].*
- M. *Yeah, so maybe they sat close together?*
- N. *If they did, they would reach one another when they made the borders.*
- O. *So maybe they sat close together crosswise [so they could work close together without touching each other (Freedman)]? Furthermore, is it the fact that they borrowed from one another? And didn't Luda [or: Levi] teach on Tannaite authority: "'Every man from his work that they wrought' (Exo. 36: 4) — each did the work on the basis of his own material but not his fellow's? And furthermore, how do we know that, if one carries an object for four cubits in public domain, he is liable?*
- P. *Rather: The entire rule concerning carrying an object for four cubits in public domain is a tradition.*

I.4

- A. Said R. Judah said Samuel, "[The sin] of the wood gatherer [at Num. 15:32ff.] was that he carried the wood for four cubits in public domain."
 - B. *In a Tannaite formulation it is taught: He was [guilty on the count of] cutting them off. [That is equivalent to harvesting, detaching produce from the ground.]*
- C. *R. Aha b. R. Jacob said, "He was tying them together [into sheaves, and that is the count of which he was guilty]."*
- D. *So what difference does all this make?*
- E. *It concerns what Rab said, for said Rab, "I found a suppressed scroll of the household of R. Hiyya in which was written: 'Issi b. Judah says, "The generative classifications of labor are forty less one, but one bears liability on only a single count [in any one action]."'"*
- F. *One, and no more than one? And haven't we learned in the Mishnah: **The generative categories of acts of labor prohibited on the Sabbath are forty less one [M. Shab. 7:2A], in connection with which we reflected: What need do we have for the specific number associated with that statement? And said***

R. Yohanan, “So that if someone did all of these actions in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable for each classification of labor.” *Rather, say it this way: He is liable on only a single count.*

- G. *R. Judah finds it obvious that one who carries something in public domain is liable, and the framer of the Tannaite formulation finds it obvious that he who cuts off is liable, while R. Aha b. Jacob finds it obvious that he who makes sheaves is liable. So one master holds, “This at least is not subject to doubt,” and the other maintains, “That, at least, is not subject to doubt” [in respect to Issi’s list].*

Topical Appendix on the Wood-Gatherer of Num. 15:32

- I.5** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. **“The gatherer of wood was Zelophahad. Here the word ‘wilderness’ occurs, ‘and while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man gathering sticks’ (Num. 15:32), and elsewhere the word ‘wilderness’ occurs, ‘our father died in the wilderness’ (Num. 27: 3). Just as in the latter context reference is to Zelophahad, so here the same meaning pertains,” the words of R. Aqiba.**
- C. **Said to him R. Judah b. Beterah “[Aqiba!] One way or the other you are destined to stand in judgment. If you are right, the Torah protected him and you expose him, and if you are wrong, you slander that righteous man” [Sifré to Numbers CXIII:I.3].**
- D. **[97A]** *But what of the argument based on the verbal analogy?*
- E. *The other party doesn’t have in hand a tradition concerning that particular verbal analogy.*
- F. **“But whence did he come? He came from those who presumed to go up to the heights, as it is said, ‘But they presumed to go up to the heights of the hill country, [although neither the ark of the covenant of the Lord nor Moses departed out of the camp]’ (Num. 14:44)” [Sifré to Numbers CXIII:I.3].**

- I.6** A. Along these same lines:
- B. **““And the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he departed’ (Num. 12: 9) — this teaches that Aaron, too, was smitten with the skin ailment,” the words of R. Aqiba.**
- C. **Said to him R. Judah b. Beterah “[Aqiba!] One way or the other you are destined to stand in judgment. If you are right, the Torah**

protected him and you expose him, and if you are wrong, you slander that righteous man.”

D. *Well, isn't it written, “against them”?*

E. *That is written merely as a rebuke.*

F. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view that Aaron, too, was smitten with the skin ailment:*

G. “And Aaron turned to Miriam and behold she was afflicted with the skin ailment” (Num. 27:10) — *a Tannaite statement*: It means that he turned from his skin ailment [to hers].

I.7 A. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “He who casts suspicion on genuinely upright people is smitten in his body, for it is written, ‘And Moses said, but behold, they will not believe me’ (Exo. 4: 1). *But it was perfectly clear to the Holy One, blessed be He, that the Israelites were faithful.* He said to him, ‘They are faithful, children of the faithful, but you are the one who in the end will prove unfaithful. They are faithful: ‘And the people believed’ (Exo. 4:31); they are the children of the faithful: ‘And Abraham believed in the Lord’ (Gen. 15: 6). But you are the one who in the end will prove unfaithful: ‘And the Lord said to Moses and Aaron, because you didn’t believe in me’ (Num. 20:12).”

B. *And whence do we know that he was smitten?*

C. “And the Lord said moreover to him, ‘Now put your hand into your bosom’” (Exo. 4: 6).

I.8 A. Said Raba, and some say, R. Yosé bar Hanina, “A good reward comes more quickly than punishment. With reference to punishment: ‘And he took it out and behold it was afflicted with the skin ailment, as white as snow’ (Exo. 4: 6), while with reference to a good reward: ‘And he took it out of his bosom and behold it was turned again as his other skin’ (Exo. 4: 7) — from his very bosom it had already turned as his other skin.”

I.9 A. “But Aaron’s rod swallowed up their rods” (Exo. 7:12):

B. Said R. Eleazar, “It was a miracle inside of a miracle.”

II.1 A. **[He who throws an object] from private domain to private domain, and public domain intervenes — R. Aqiba declares [him] liable [to a sin-offering]. And sages exempt [him]:**

- B. *Rabbah raised this question: “Do they differ concerning space within ten handbreadths of the ground? Then this is what is subject to dispute: The one authority maintains, ‘An object caught in the air is equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest,’ and the other authority holds, ‘An object caught in the air is not equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest.’ But as to the passage of the object above ten handbreadths from the ground, all parties concur that one is exempt, and we do not treat as analogous throwing an object and reaching an object across such a space. Or perhaps they differ as to the space above ten handbreadths from the ground. And this is what is subject to dispute: One authority holds that we do treat as analogous throwing an object and reaching an object across such a space. And the other authority holds that we do not treat as analogous throwing an object and reaching an object across such a space. But as to the passage of an object within ten handbreadths of the ground, all parties concur that he is liable. How come? Because ‘an object caught in the air is equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest.’”*
- C. *Said R. Joseph, “This same question was raised by R. Hisda and R. Hamnuna solved it for him on the following basis: **He who throws an object from private domain to private domain, and public domain intervenes — R. Aqiba declares [him] liable to a sin-offering. And sages exempt [him].** Now, since the language at hand makes reference to passage through the public domain itself, it is obvious that at issue is passage of the object within ten handbreadths of the ground. Now how is this worked out? Should we say that one who carries the object across is liable only when the object is within ten handbreadths of the ground but not when the object is above that space? But didn’t R. Eleazar say, ‘He who carries out a burden at a distance of ten handbreadths above the ground is liable, for that was how the children of Kohath carried a burden’? So isn’t it a case in which it was moved by tossing, and it is in particular that if it passed within ten handbreadths of the ground he is liable, but if it passes above ten handbreadths, he is not liable. Then it must follow that what is at issue is whether or not an object caught in the air is equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest.”*
- D. *That does indeed settle the question.*

II.2 A. *And [Hamnuna] differs from R. Eleazar, for said R. Eleazar, “R. Aqiba imposed liability even if the object traveled more than ten handbreadths above the ground,” and the reason that they made*

reference in particular to the public domain itself was to tell you how far rabbis were willing to go in taking the opposite view.

B. And [Eleazar] differs from R. Hilqiah bar Tobi, for said R. Hilqiah bar Tobi, “If the object passes within three handbreadths of the ground, all parties concur that he is liable; if it passes more than ten handbreadths above the ground, all parties concur that he is exempt. If it passes from three to ten handbreadths above the ground, then we come to the dispute between R. Aqiba and rabbis.”

C. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

D. If the object passes within three handbreadths of the ground, the operative consideration is only the matter of Sabbath rest, so if both properties belong to him, to begin with it is permitted to carry.

E. If it passes more than ten handbreadths above the ground, all parties concur that he is exempt.

F. If it passes from three to ten handbreadths above the ground,

G. R. Aqiba declares him liable.

H. And rabbis declare him exempt.

II.3 A. The master has said, “If the object passes within three handbreadths of the ground, the operative consideration is only the matter of Sabbath rest, so if both properties belong to him, to begin with it is permitted to carry” —

B. *May we say that this refutes the position of Rab? For it has been stated:*

C. Two houses on either side of public domain —

D. Rabbah bar R. Huna said Rab [said], “It is forbidden to toss an object from one to the other.”

E. And [since both houses belong to the same party,] Samuel said, “It is permitted to toss an object from one to the other.”

F. *But haven't we established the fact that the issue concerns a case in which one is higher and the other lower, so that the object may fall into the street and the*

man may come and pick it up? [So this is not settled by the other matter at all.]

II.4 A. Said R. Hisda to R. Hamnuna, and some say, R. Hamnuna to R. Hisda, “What is the basis of that which rabbis have stated: ‘Any space that is within three handbreadths of the ground is equivalent to being joined to the ground’?”

B. He said to him, “It is because it’s not possible to trim the public domain with a plane and scissors.” [Freedman: The ground cannot be perfectly leveled and it must contain bumps of that height; therefore everything within three handbreadths of the ground is regarded as joined to the ground.]

C. “If so, space above three handbreadths from the ground should be subject to the same consideration. And, moreover, lo, we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who suspends the sides from above to below — if the [partitions] are three [or more] handbreadths above the ground, [the sukkah] is invalid [M. Suk. 1:9A-C]!** Lo, if the walls are less than three handbreadths above the ground, the sukkah is valid.” [Then the walls are regarded as touching the ground.]

D. In that case, this is the operative consideration: It is because what you have is a partition through which goats can squeeze [but they can’t squeeze through a gap of less than three handbreadths (Freedman)].

E. Well, that settles the issue of a space below, but as to a space above [if the gap is above the partition, we also invoke the principle of an imaginary extension], what is to be said?

F. *Rather, it is only by tradition that we know that what is less than three handbreadths away is regarded as joined together.*

II.5 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. If one tossed an object from public domain to public domain, with private domain intervening —

C. Rabbi declares the act liable.

D. And sages declare it exempt.

E. *Both Rab and Samuel say, “Rabbi imposed liability only in the case of a private domain that was roofed over, in which instance we invoke the principle, the house is as though it were full of objects [and so had no air space at all, thus as soon as the object enters the space, it is as though it has come to rest]. But that rule would not apply to a space that is not roofed over.*

F. Said Huna said R. Judah said Samuel, “Rabbi would impose liability on two counts, one on the count of removing the object from the one domain, the other on the count of bringing it in to the other domain.”

G. *In session, R. Hana found this difficulty [97B] “That bears the implication that Rabbi declares one liable for a derivative classification of labor in a case in which one has simultaneously carried out a generative classification of labor. But hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: Rabbi says, “‘And Moses assembled all the congregation of the children of Israel and said to them, ‘These are the words that the Lord has commanded: six days shall work be done’” (Exo. 35:1-2). Now the references to “words,” “the words,” “these are the words” indicate that there were thirty-nine distinct classifications of labor that were taught to Moses at Sinai’ [‘Words’ is plural, hence two; ‘the’ makes it three, and the numerical value of the letters in the word ‘these’ is thirty-six, so thirty-nine]?” [Hence there cannot be liability in a case in which there are both a derivative and a generative classification of forbidden labor.]*

H. *Said to him R. Joseph, “The master repeats this Tannaite formulation in this context with the result that he finds a problem in contradictions between two statements of Rabbi,*

but we repeat it in the context of a statement of R. Judah and we find no problems at all. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If one tossed an object from public domain to public domain, and it passed four cubits through public domain — R. Judah declares the act liable. And sages declare it exempt. And in this context said R. Judah said Samuel, ‘R. Judah would impose liability on two counts, one on the count of carrying the object out from private domain, the second on the count of carrying it over public domain.’ For if it should enter your mind that he imposes liability on only a single count, it would follow that rabbis would declare him entirely exempt! Yet he has carried out an object from private domain to public domain!”

I. *“But why is that the only possible solution to the problem? Maybe in point of fact, I may say to you, R. Judah declares him liable on only one count, and rabbis declare him entirely exempt from liability. And where would you find such a case? For example, if he said, ‘As soon as it goes out into public domain, let it come to rest.’ Then what is at issue between the contending authorities is this: R. Judah takes the view, ‘An object caught in the air is equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest,’ and the intentionality of the responsible party has been carried out, and the other authority holds, ‘An object caught in the air is not equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest,’ so the intentionality of the responsible party has not been carried out. But as to the matter of a derivative classification of labor performed in synch with a generative classification of labor, R. Judah would not have imposed liability!”*

J. *“Perish the thought! For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah adds [to the list of generative classes of action] one who closes up a web and beats on the woof [to even it out]. They said to him, ‘Closing up the web is covered in the classification of stretching the threads; and beating on the woof is covered in the classification of weaving.’ Doesn’t this mean that one does both acts simultaneously, which proves that as to the matter of a derivative classification of*

labor performed in synch with a generative classification of labor, R. Judah certainly does impose liability?”

K. *“But on what basis do you reach such a conclusion? Maybe what it means is that each action was done on its own, R. Judah doesn’t impose liability in the case of a derivative classification of labor performed in synch with a generative classification of labor, and what is at issue in consequence? R. Judah takes the view that these constitute generative classes of acts of forbidden labor, and rabbis maintain that they form derivative classes of acts of forbidden labor. You may know that that is the case, since the Tannaite formulation is, R. Judah adds.... Now if you take the view that at issue are generative classifications, then what is the sense of the language, R. Judah adds? It is, he adds generative classifications. But if you maintain that at issue are derivative classifications of forbidden acts of labor, what is the sense of R. Judah adds?”*

L. *So, too, it has been stated:*

M. *Rabbah and R. Joseph both say, “R. Judah imposed liability on only one count.”*

N. *Said Rabina to R. Ashi, “But on the basis of our original assumption, that R. Judah imposed liability on two counts, then if he wanted it to land here, he doesn’t want it to land there, and if he wants it to land there, he doesn’t want it to land here” [Freedman: but otherwise he is not liable; here, too, he should not be liable in either case unless he made such a declaration].*

O. *He said to him, “It is a case in which he says, ‘Wherever it wants to land, let it land there.’”*

[Freedman: This is regarded as though it rested at both places in accord with the stated intention.]

- II.6** A. *It is obvious that if he intended to toss the object eight cubits but threw it four, it is as though he wrote SIM as part of SIMEON [and he is liable, since that would form a word on its own]. But if one intended to throw an object four cubits and he threw it for eight, what is the law? Do we maintain the view,*

well, anyhow, he did what he planned in transporting the object? Or do we say well, anyhow, it didn't land where he wanted?

- B. *But isn't this what Rabina said to R. Ashi, who replied to him, "It is a case in which he says, 'Wherever it wants to land, let it land there'"? And as to your statement, he wrote SIM as part of SIMEON [and he is liable, since that would form a word on its own], are the cases really comparable? In that case, you can't write Simeon without writing Sim [Freedman: hence when one writes SIM, he does so intentionally, though he intends to add to it], but here, if you don't intend to throw it for four cubits, can't you throw it for eight cubits? [You certainly can, there need be no intention at all to throw it for exactly four cubits so as to throw the object for eight cubits. When one writes SIM he has performed an act of labor, while when one throws an object, his action is incomplete until the object comes to rest (Freedman).]*

II.7 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **He who tosses an object from public domain to public domain with private domain intervening —**
- C. **if it traveled four cubits over public domain [both segments of public domain being regarded as joined together] he is liable. [98A] If it traveled less than four cubits over public domain, he is exempt [cf. T. Shab. 10:1A-C].**

II.8 A. *So what's the point?*

B. *Here's the point:* Distinct portions of a given domain join together, so that we don't invoke the rule, An object caught in the air is equivalent [in respect to the Sabbath] to one that has come to rest.

II.9 A. Said R. Samuel bar Judah said R. Abba said R. Huna said Rab, "If someone transfers an object through four cubits of public domain that is roofed over, he is exempt from liability, since that area is not comparable to the case of the flags of the wilderness." [Freedman: The definition of what constitutes forbidden work on the Sabbath depends on the work that was done in connection with the tabernacle in the wilderness; carrying was necessary, so carrying an object four cubits is work. But there it was done under the open sky, hence Rab's statement; the same applies here. By "flags of the wilderness" is meant the whole disposition and encampment of the Israelites; they didn't have any cover in public ground.]

- B. *But is that true? Weren't the wagons covered? And said Rab in the name of R. Hiyya, "As for the wagons, the space that was underneath them, between*

them, and at their sides is classified as public domain.” [Freedman: The width of the wagons was five cubits, five cubits of space was allowed between them in breadth, and the boards were ten cubits in length; when placed crosswise on top of the wagons they projected two and a half cubits on both sides; so the space between them was completely covered over, and yet he calls it public domain.]

- C. *When Rab made his statement, he was referring to the interspaces* [Freedman: between the rows of boards that were not arranged close to each other]. *Take note: What was the length of the wagons? It was five cubits. What was the breadth of a board? A cubit and a half. And how many rows could be placed? Three. That leaves a half-cubit. When you divide it among the spaces, they are regarded as though they are joined* [Freedman: there being only a quarter cubit, one and a half handbreadths, between the rows of boards, and space of less than three cubits is disregarded].
- D. *But does the master think that the boards lay on their width? They were laid on their thickness.*
- E. *Nonetheless, what was the thickness of the board? A cubit. How many rows? Four — leaving a cubit, and when you divide it among the spaces, they are as though they formed a single board [with three spaces at two handbreadths each]. Now from the perspective of the opinion that the boards were a cubit thick at the bottom but tapered to a fingerbreadth, there is no problem* [Freedman: there would be more at the ends than three handbreadths’ of space between each]. *But from the view that they were equally thick at bottom and at top, a cubit, what is to be said?*
- F. Said R. Kahana, “[Freedman:] They were arranged in clasped formation.” [Freedman: The four rows were not equidistant, but in two rows, as though clasped at the head and at the tail of the wagon respectively, thus leaving a cubit between them. This was necessary because each row contained three boards, which would give a height of four and a half cubits and as the thickness was only one cubit, they might otherwise topple over.]
- G. *If they were clasped, where were they placed? On the top of the wagon. But the wagon itself was roofed over.*
- H. **[98B]** Said Samuel, “The bottom was made up of laths.”

The Boards of the Tabernacle in the wilderness

- II.10** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. “The boards were a cubit thick at the bottom and tapered to a fingerbreadth thick at the top: ‘They shall be entire to the top thereof’ (Exo. 26:24), and elsewhere, ‘the waters were entire and were cut off’ (Jos. 3:17),” the words of R. Judah.
- C. And R. Nehemiah says, “Just as at the bottom they were a cubit thick, so at the top they were a cubit thick: ‘And in like manner they shall be entire.’”
- D. But the word is written in the plural?
- E. *That teaches that they were to come whole.*
- F. *And the other also has to deal with the statement, “and in like manner they shall be entire”?*
- G. *That teaches that they were not to build them irregularly [but all were to stand in the same row (Freedman)].*
- H. *Well, there is no problem with the view that they were a cubit thick bottom and top, in line with the verse, “And from the back part of the tabernacle westward you shall make six boards, and two boards you shall make for the corners of the tabernacle” (Exo. 26:22-23), so that the breadth of these fills in the thickness of those. [Freedman: Since the tabernacle was ten cubits in breadth and these six boards accounted for nine only, the additional two boards, one at each side, made up the deficiency, while the extra cubit left in each fitted exactly over the thickness of the board ranged along the length of the tabernacle.] But from the view of him who holds that they were a cubit thick at the bottom but tapered at the top to a fingerbreadth, one receded and the other protruded. [Freedman: Obviously these two side boards protruded at the top beyond the attenuated thickness of the boards ranged lengthwise.]*
- I. *They were planed like a mountain [wider at the bottom, narrower at the top].*
- II.11** A. “And the middle bar in the midst of the boards shall pass through from end to end” (Exo. 26:28):
- B. *A Tannaite statement:* It stood there by a miracle [one long straight bar that passed along three walls, the necessary bending between the angles of the walls was miraculously done by itself (Freedman)].

- II.12** A. “Moreover you shall make the tabernacle with ten curtains; the length of each curtain shall be twenty-eight cubits” (Exo. 26:1-2):
- B. *Assign the length over the breadth of the tabernacle — how long was it? Twenty-eight cubits. Take off ten for the roof, thus leaving nine cubits on each side.*
- C. *From R. Judah’s perspective, the cubit of the sockets was left revealed, from the viewpoint of R. Nehemiah, a cubit of the boards also was left uncovered.*
- D. *Assign their breadth over the length of the tabernacle — how much was it? Forty cubits [ten curtains, each four cubits broad]. Take off thirty for the roof, leaving ten.*
- E. *From R. Judah’s perspective, the cubit of the sockets was left revealed, from the viewpoint of R. Nehemiah, a cubit of the sockets also was left uncovered.*
- II.13** A. “And you shall make curtains of goats’ hair for a tent over the tabernacle; eleven curtains you shall make them; the length of each curtain shall be thirty cubits and the breadth of each curtain four cubits” (Exo. 26:7-8);
- B. *Assign the length of the breadth of the tabernacle, how much was it? Thirty cubits. Take off ten for the roof, leaving ten on each side.*
- C. *From R. Judah’s perspective, the cubit of the sockets was left revealed, from the viewpoint of R. Nehemiah, a cubit of the sockets also was left uncovered.*
- II.14** A. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. ““And the cubit on one side and the cubit of the other side, of that which remains in the length of the curtains of the tent’ (Exo. 26:13) — this was to cover the cubit of the sockets,” the words of R. Judah.
- C. R. Nehemiah says, “It was to cover the cubit of the boards.”
- D. *Assign their breadth over the length of the tabernacle, so how much was it? Forty-four cubits. Take off thirty for the roof, leaving fourteen. Take off two for the doubling over, “and you shall double over the sixth curtain in the forefront of the tent” (Exo. 26: 9), leaving twelve. There is no problem from the perspective of R. Judah, since it is written, “the half curtain that remains shall hang.” But from R. Nehemiah’s, what’s the meaning of “the half curtain that remains shall hang”?*

- E. It shall hang over its companions [Freedman: the lower covering, beyond which the upper fell by two cubits].

II.15 A. *A Tannaite statement of the household of R. Ishmael:*

- B. To what was the tabernacle comparable? To a woman who goes out into the street with her skirts trailing behind her on the ground.

II.16 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. The boards of the tabernacle were cut out and the sockets were grooved [99A], and the claps in the loops looked like stars set in the sky.”

II.17 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. The lower curtains were made of blue wool, purple wool, crimson thread, and fine linen, and the upper ones were made of goats’ hair. It took more skill to make the upper ones than the lower ones. For in respect to the lower ones it is written, “And all the women who were smart did spin with their hands” (Exo. 35:25), and in reference to the upper ones, “And all the women whose heart stirred them up in wisdom spun the goats’ hair” (Exo. 35:26).

II.18 A. *And it has been taught on Tannaite authority in the name of R. Nehemiah:* “It was washed directly on the goats and spun on the goats.”

III.1 A. **Two balconies opposite one another [extending] into the public domain — he who stretches out or throws [an object] from this one to that one is exempt. [If] both of them were [different private domains on the same side of the street and] at the same story, he who stretches [an object over] is liable, and he who throws from one to the other is exempt:**

- B. Said Rab in the name of R. Hiyya, “As for the wagons, the space that was underneath them, between them, and at their sides is classified as public domain.” [Freedman: The width of the wagons was five cubits, five cubits of space was allowed between them in breadth, and the boards were ten cubits in length; when placed crosswise on top of the wagons they projected two and a half cubits on both sides; so the space between them was completely covered over, and yet he calls it public domain.]
- C. Said Abbaye, “Between one wagon and another at its side was the space of a full wagon length. And how much was that? Five cubits. *Why was this required, when four and a half would have been enough?* [Freedman: either for three rows of boards lying on their breadth, yielding four and a half cubits, or four rows lying on their thickness, leaving an additional half cubit to cover

the extra space needed for the bars.] *So that the boards wouldn't bump into each other*" [Freedman/Rashi: if laid on their breadth].

- D. Said Raba, "The sides of the wagons [the thickness of the sides, the wheels that reached up alongside them, and the space between the wheels and the sides, altogether (Freedman)] equalled the full inside breadth of the wagon. And how much was that? Two and a half cubits. [Freedman: The sides were one and a quarter each.] *And why was this required, when a cubit and a half would have been enough? It was so that the boards wouldn't move about* [Freedman: when placed on top, more than one and a quarter cubits would be necessary to support their length firmly]."

E. *And as to that which is an established fact for us, namely, the public domain must be sixteen cubits, since we derive the dimensions from the dimensions of the tabernacle, surely the public domain of the tabernacle was only fifteen cubits [two wagons side by side, each five cubits wide with five cubits between them, constituting a public pathway]!*

F. *There was an additional cubit where a Levite stood, so that if the boards slipped, he would support them.*

11:2I-K

- I. **The bank of a cistern and the rock ten handbreadths high and four broad**
—
- J. **he who takes [something] from that area or who puts something onto that area is liable.**
- K. **[If they were] less than the stated measurements, he is exempt [from any penalty for such an action].**

- I.1 A. *Why employ for the Tannaite formulation, **The bank of a cistern and the rock**, rather than simply saying, **a cistern and the rock**? That odd formulation supports the position of R. Yohanan, for R. Yohanan has said, "A cistern and its bank combine to reach the requisite height of ten handbreadths [such that the cistern forms private domain]."*

B. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. From a cistern in public ground, ten handbreadths deep and four broad they do not draw water on the Sabbath **[99B]** unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high; and they do not drink water from it on the Sabbath unless the person pokes in his head and the

greater part of his body within the partition. A cistern and its bank combine to reach the requisite height of ten handbreadths [such that the cistern forms private domain].

- I.2** A. *R. Mordecai addressed this question to Rabbah: “A pillar in public domain, ten handbreadths high and four broad, and one tossed something which came to rest on it — what is the law? Do we say, lo, removing the object violated a prohibition and bringing it to rest violated a prohibition, or, perhaps, since it comes from a place that is not subject to liability, it is not a culpable action?”*
- B. *He said to him, “It is covered in our Mishnah paragraph.”*
- C. *So he went and raised the same question to R. Joseph. He said to him, “It is covered in our Mishnah paragraph.”*
- D. *So he went and raised the same question to Abbayye. He said to him, “It is covered in our Mishnah paragraph.”*
- E. *He said to them, “You all spit the same spit.”*
- F. *They said to him, “And you — don’t you think the same? And didn’t we learn in the Mishnah, [The bank of a cistern and the rock ten handbreadths high and four broad] — he who takes [something] from that area or who puts something onto that area is liable?”* [Freedman: and in so doing, he must lift the object to a height above ten handbreadths].
- G. *He said to them, “But maybe our Mishnah speaks of a needle?”*
- H. *“A needle, too, it is not possible that he should not raise it at least a little.”*
- I. *“But the rock may project and the needle may lie on the projection, which is below ten handbreadths, [and even when the needle is picked up, it doesn’t go above ten handbreadths]! Or the needle may lie in a cleft [below ten handbreadths].”* [Freedman: Thus in Mordecai’s view the Mishnah statement does not solve his problem.]

- I.3** A. *Said R. Misha, “R. Yohanan raised this question: A wall in public domain, ten handbreadths high but not four broad, surrounding neglected public domain and thus turning it into private domain, and one throws something and it lands on top of the wall — what is the law? Do we say, since it is not four handbreadths broad, it is a place that is not subject to liability? Or maybe, since it turns the area into private domain, it is as though it were filled up [reaching the top of the wall so that the wall and the neglected public domain are one, the whole now forming private domain (Freedman)]?”*

- B. Said Ulla, “The solution derives from an argument a fortiori: If the wall serves as a partition for something else [namely, the neglected public domain, making it private domain], won’t it serve as a partition for itself [and constitute private domain, just like the neglected public domain that it serves]?”

C. *So, too, it has been stated:*

D. Said R. Hiyya bar Ashi said Rab, and so said R. Isaac said R. Yohanan, “A wall in public domain, ten handbreadths high but not four broad, surrounding neglected public domain and turning it into private domain — he who throws something which lands on top of it is liable; for if the wall serves as a partition for something else [namely, the neglected public domain, making it private domain], won’t it serve as a partition for itself [and constitute private domain, just like the neglected public domain that it serves]?”

- I.4** A. *R. Yohanan raised this question: “A pit nine handbreadths deep, from which one removed a piece [a handbreadth in thickness, bringing the pit to a depth of] ten handbreadths deep — what is the law? Does the taking up of the piece [thus deepening the pit] and the making of the partition take place simultaneously, in which case he is culpable? Or is he not culpable? And if you should propose that, since there was no partition ten handbreadths deep to begin with, he is not liable, then, if a pit was ten handbreadths deep and one put into it a piece of dirt and so diminished the depth, what is the law? Might we say that putting down the object and removing the partition thereby took place at one and the same time, in which case he is liable, or is he not liable?”*
- B. *You may solve the problem for him by his own statement, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who throws [something from a distance of] four cubits toward a wall — [if he throws it] above ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws it into the air [which is public domain]. [If it is] less than ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws an object onto the ground [which is private domain]. He who throws [an object to a distance of] four cubits on the ground, is liable [M. 11:3A-D]. Surely it doesn’t come to rest there [but bounces]!** And said R. Yohanan, “This rule was repeated in regard to a cake of juicy figs [which stick].” Now why should this be the case? Surely it diminishes the four cubits! [Freedman: for the thickness of the figs must be deducted; nonetheless, he is culpable, and the same reasoning applies to the second problem here].*

- C. *In that case he does not nullify the cake of figs [throwing it at the wall, he doesn't want the figs to become part of the wall], but here, he renders it nought [for it becomes part of the wall, so the cases are not like one another (Freedman)].*

I.5

- A. *Raba raised this question: "If one threw a board and it landed on poles [ten handbreadths high but not four square, and the board is four square], what is the law [as to the construction's constituting private domain, since it is now ten handbreadths high and four square]?"*
- B. *So what's the point of his question? Is it the law governing a case in which an article comes to rest and also forms a partition at one and the same moment? But that is precisely the question R. Yohanan raised!*
- C. *Raba raises his question in connection with a case in which one threw a board with an article on top of it and it landed on poles [ten handbreadths high but not four square, and the board is four square]. In such a case, what is the law? Since these come simultaneously, it is comparable to a case in which an article comes to rest and also forms a partition at one and the same moment? Or maybe, since it is not possible for the article to be slightly raised and then come to rest, it is more comparable to a case in which an article forms a partition and only afterward another comes to rest thereon?*
- D. *That question stands.*

I.6

- A. *Said Raba, "It is clear to me: Water that is lying on water — lo, that is a situation in which it has come to rest. A nut that is lying upon water — lo, that is [100A] not a situation in which it has come to rest."*
- B. *Raba raised this question: "A nut that is lying in a utensil, and a utensil is floating on water — do we invoke the criterion of the situation of the nut, in which case it has come to rest, or do we go by the criterion of the utensil, which, being unstable, has not come to rest?"*
- C. *The question stands.*

I.7

- A. *As to oil floating on wine there is a dispute between R. Yohanan b. Nuri and rabbis, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **Oil which is floating on the surface of wine, and one who has immersed on that day and awaits sunset for the completion of his rite of purification [a tebul-yom] touched the oil — he has rendered unfit only the oil.***

B. R. Yohanan b. Nuri says, “Both of them are deemed connected to one another” [M. T.Y. 2:5H-K].

- I.8** A. Said Abbayye, “In the case of a pit in public domain ten handbreadths deep and eight wide, into which one tossed a mat — he is liable; but if he divided it with a mat, [down the middle], he is not liable.” [Freedman: The thickness of the mat leaves less than four square handbreadths on either side, so that neither is now private domain.]
- B. *To Abbayye it is obvious that the mat annuls the partition; certainly a segment likewise would annul the partition. But so far as R. Yohanan is concerned, to whom a segment forms a problem, a mat certainly does not annul the partition* [Freedman: for the mat doesn’t become part of the pit].
- I.9** A. And said Abbayye, “A pit in public domain, ten handbreadths deep and four wide, filled with water, into which one tossed something — he is liable. If it is full of produce and one tossed something into it, he is not liable. *How come? The water does not have the effect of nullifying the partition, but the produce nullifies the partition.*”

B. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. He who throws something from the sea into a piazza, or from a piazza into the street, is exempt.

D. R. Simeon says, “If the place into which he throws the object is a distinct hole ten handbreadths deep and four wide, he is liable” [Freedman: since it stands apart from the rest of the sea; this hole is filled with water, and it follows that water does not annul the partition].

11:3A-D

- A. **He who throws [something from a distance of] four cubits toward a wall**
—
- B. **[if he throws it] above ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws it into the air [which is public domain].**
- C. **[If it is] less than ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws an object onto the ground [which is private domain].**
- D. **He who throws [an object to a distance of] four cubits on the ground, is liable.**

- I.1** A. [He who throws [something from a distance of] four cubits toward a wall:] *But lo, the object doesn't come to rest!*
- B. Said R. Yohanan, "We learn the Mishnah rule with reference to throwing ripe figs [which will stick]."
- I.2** A. Said R. Judah said Rab said R. Hiyya, "If one threw an object above ten handbreadths and it went and came to rest in a hole of any size at all, that brings us to the dispute of R. Meir and rabbis, *for R. Meir takes the view that in our imagination we hollow the hole to complete it to the requisite dimensions, so liability is incurred, and rabbis take the view that we do not do so.*"
- B. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. If one threw an object above ten handbreadths and it went and came to rest in a hole of any size at all —
- D. R. Meir declares liable.
- E. And sages exempt [the person from having to present a sin-offering].
- I.3** A. Said R. Judah said Rab, "A mound that reaches ten handbreadths within a space of four handbreadths [Freedman: which is too steep to be climbed in an ordinary stride, so the top is classified as private domain], onto the top of which one tossed an object, which came to rest — he is liable."
- B. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. An alleyway that is level inside but slopes downward toward public domain, or that is level in public domain but that slopes downward inside — that alleyway [to be marked off as private domain for purposes of carrying therein on the Sabbath] requires neither crossbeam nor sideboards [to make it into private domain; the slope itself is the partition (Freedman)].
- D. R. Hanina b. Gamaliel says, "A mound that reaches ten handbreadths within a space of four handbreadths, onto the top of which one tossed an object, which came to rest — he is liable."

11:3E-F

- E. [If he threw [an object] within the space of four cubits and it rolled beyond four cubits, he is exempt.
- F. [If he threw an object] beyond four cubits and it rolled back into four cubits, he is liable.

I.1 A. [If he threw an object beyond four cubits and it rolled back into four cubits, he is liable:] *But lo, the object doesn't come to rest!*

- B. Said R. Yohanan, "That is a case in which beyond the four cubits it comes to rest on something, whatever the dimensions thereof, [even for a moment]."

I.2 A. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. If someone threw an object beyond four cubits but the wind blew it and brought it back, and even if it carried it out again, he is not liable; if the wind held it for a moment, even if it carries the object in again, he is liable."

I.3 A. Said Raba, "For an article that is carried within three handbreadths of the ground to be regarded as having come to rest, in rabbis' opinion, it has to be put down on something of some small size at least."

B. *In session Maremar reported this tradition. Said Rabina to Maremar, [100B] "Isn't this what our Mishnah paragraph says, on which R. Yohanan commented, 'That is a case in which beyond the four cubits it comes to rest on something, whatever the dimensions thereof, [even for a moment]'?"*

C. *He said to him, "But you speak of a rolling object. Something that is rolling is not destined to come to rest, but since this is destined to come to rest, I might argue that even though it has not come to rest, it is as though it had; so he informs us by this statement that that supposition is not made."*

11:4

- A. He who throws [an object to a distance of] four cubits into the sea is exempt.
- B. If it was shallow water and a public path passed through it, he who throws [an object for a distance of] four cubits is liable.
- C. And what is the measure of shallow water?

D. Less than ten handbreadths in depth.

E. [If there was] shallow water, and a public path goes through it, he who throws into it to a distance of four cubits is liable.

I.1 A. *Said one of the rabbis to Raba, "There is no problem understanding why there are two references to 'passing through.' So we are informed that if it is possible to pass through, although with difficulty, that is classified as passing through; if it is possible to use with difficulty only, that is not classified as use. [Freedman: A public road that passes through a pool counts as public domain; a pit in the street nine handbreadths deep can be used but only inconveniently, so it is not the same as a pillar of that height on which one can put a burden, which is classified as public domain.] But how come there are two references to shallow water?"*

B. *One speaks of the dry season, the other of the rainy season, and both are required. For if we had only a single reference, I might conclude that it is only in summer, when people are glad to walk in water to cool off, the area is classified as public domain, but that is not the case in the winter. And if we had the rule only for the winter, I might have supposed that the rule applies only in winter, because people are dirty with mud and don't mind walking through water, but in summer that is not the case.*

C. *Abbaye said, "The two references are required, for otherwise I might have supposed that only if the pool is not four cubits across that is the case, but if it is four cubits across, people will walk around it, so it is not part of the public domain. So we are informed to the contrary."*

D. *R. Ashi said, "The two references are required, for otherwise I might have supposed that only if the pool is four across it is public domain but where it is not four across, people will step over it and avoid it."*

E. R. Ashi is consistent with positions stated elsewhere, for said R. Ashi, "One who throws an object and it lands on the point where a bridge hits the quay, he is culpable, since people pass across it."

[Freedman: Though many step over it, it does not on that account cease to be public domain, and the same is so above.]

11:5

A. He who throws [an object] (1) from the sea to dry land or (2) from dry land to the sea,

B. or (3) from the sea to a boat, or (4) from a boat to the sea,

- C. or (5) from one boat to another,
- D. is exempt.
- E. [If] boats are tied together, they move [objects] from one to the next.
- F. If they are not tied together, even though they lie close together, they do not carry [objects] from one to the other.

I.1 A. *It has been stated:*

- B. A boat —
- C. R. Huna said, “They may stick a projection, of whatever size, over the side of the ship, and from it water may be drawn from the sea.”
- D. *R. Hisda and Rabbah b. R. Huna say*, “One makes an enclosure of four cubits and draws water that way.” [Freedman: An enclosure above the water is made, which renders the water immediately below technically private domain, and through this, the water is drawn.]

E. R. Huna said, “They may stick a projection, of whatever size, over the side of the ship, and from it water may be drawn from the sea” — *he takes the view that territory in the status of neglected public domain is measured from the seabed, so that the airspace is not subject to liability in any way.* [Freedman: Only the space ten handbreadths above the ground count as neglected public domain; the space above that is not subject to liability at all; hence everything above the surface of the sea, including the sea, above ten handbreadths from the bed, falls in the category of neglected public domain.] *In strict law, even a projection shouldn't be required, but it is so as to make a clear indication of a differentiation* [Freedman: for one may certainly carry from a place in which liability does not pertain, but one may not carry from neglected public domain].

F. *R. Hisda and Rabbah b. R. Huna say*, “One makes an enclosure of four cubits and draws water that way” — *they take the view that territory in the status of neglected public domain is measured from the surface of the water, for the water is classified as though it were solid earth.* [Freedman: The seabed and sea count as one, as though the ground of neglected public domain rose very high.] *It follows that if someone doesn't make an enclosure of four cubits, he will turn out simply to transfer the water from neglected public domain to private domain [namely, the boat itself].*

G. Said R. Nahman to Rabbah bar Abbuha, *“From the perspective of R. Huna, who has said, ‘One makes an enclosure of four cubits and draws water that way,’ sometimes there won’t be ten handbreadths between the seabed and the surface, with the result that the area of the sea is neglected public domain, and one will turn out to be carrying from neglected public domain to private domain.”*

H. He said to him, *“We have it as a tradition that a ship won’t move in less than ten handbreadths of water.”*

I. *But the ship has a helm!* [Freedman: As that rises out of the water it is possible for it to sail into a draft of even less than ten handbreadths, and should water be drawn at that point, one will turn out to be moving something from neglected public domain to private domain.]

J. Said R. Safra, *“People sound the depth of the water with poles [and call out the marks, and they have to keep the ship out of shallow water].”*

K. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac to R. Hiyya bar Abin, *“From the perspective of R. Hisda and Rabbah b. R. Huna, who say, ‘One makes an enclosure of four cubits and draws water that way,’ how do they throw out the slops [since one can’t throw from private domain to neglected public domain, which is the classification of the sea so far as they are concerned]? And should you say that they toss the slops in that place, through the same enclosure, wouldn’t that be disgusting for the people on the ship?”*

L. *“They throw out the slops down the sides of the ship.”*

M. *“But the slops would have the force of the man behind them [even if they are just leaked over the sides, so the one who disposes of the slops indirectly is throwing them into the sea]?”*

N. *“Rabbis made no precautionary decree in respect to what indirectly happens on account of one’s force so far as neglected public domain is concerned.”*

O. *And how do you know that?*

P. *It is as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

Q. As to a ship — they do not carry something from it to the sea or from the sea to it.

R. [101A] R. Judah says, "If the ship on the inside [from the water's edge] is ten handbreadths deep but not ten high, they do carry something from it to the sea but not from the sea to it.

S. *Now what differentiates the matter of taking water from the sea to the boat? It is because people may not transport objects from neglected public domain to private domain.*

T. *Well, taking something from the ship to the sea also would be a case of transporting an object from private domain to neglected public domain! So doesn't it mean, pouring the water on the ship's edge, from which point it flows down into the sea? And that proves rabbis made no precautionary decree in respect to what indirectly happens on account of one's force so far as neglected public domain is concerned.*

U. *Yes, it proves that point.*

I.2 A. Said R. Huna, "As to the Mesenean canal boats [which are narrow and taper down at the bottom, being less than four handbreadths wide there and so not regarded as private domain], they may not carry in them more than four cubits [just as one may not do so in public domain for more than four cubits]. And we have made that statement only if they have a breadth of four handbreadths at less than three handbreadths from the bottom; but if they have a breadth of four handbreadths at less than that distance from the bottom, we have no objection; if they are filled with canes and bullrushes to the height at which they do have a breadth of four handbreadths, we also have no objection."

B. Objected R. Nahman, "But why not invoke the principle, 'stretch and in an imaginary way draw down the partitions' [so that the sides of the boat are seen to drop vertically down into the water, and that provides the breadth of four cubits that make the boat private domain]? Hasn't the following been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, 'If one stuck a reed in public domain, with a basket on the top

of it, and one tossed an object, which landed on it, he is liable [for the object is regarded as private domain]’? *Therefore we do invoke the principle, ‘stretch and in an imaginary way draw down the partitions.’* [Freedman: Only if we assume imaginary partitions descending from the sides of the basket, which is not ten handbreadths deep itself, have we the necessary conditions for culpability.] *Here, too, let’s invoke the principle, ‘stretch and in an imaginary way draw down the partitions.’”*

C. *Objected R. Joseph, “But didn’t they hear that which R. Judah said Rab said, and there are those who give it in the name of R. Hiyya, that it was taught as a Tannaite statement thereon: But sages declare him exempt?!”*

D. *Said to him Abbaye, “But don’t you think so? And hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: A pillar in public domain ten handbreadths high and four broad, but at the base there is not an area of four, and the narrow part is three in height, if one throws something and it lands on it, he is liable? So that proves beyond any doubt that we do invoke the principle, ‘stretch and in an imaginary way draw down the partitions.’ Here, too, let’s invoke the principle, ‘stretch and in an imaginary way draw down the partitions.’ Nonetheless, what makes you see them as parallel? In that case, there is a partition through which goats can pass [and the partition thus doesn’t meet this legal test, so rabbis exempt one from liability], but here, the partitions [imagined to exist in the water, by definition] keep goats out.”*

E. *Said R. Aha b. R. Aha to R. Ashi, “Well, in the case of ships, fish can get through the imaginary partition!”*

F. *He said to him, “Fish getting through isn’t classified as getting through!”*

G. *“And on what basis do you say so?”*

H. *“Because R. Tabela asked Rabin, ‘As to a partition that is suspended, what is the law on its making it permissible to carry around in a ruin?’ And he said to him, ‘A suspended partition does not make it permissible to carry around [101B] except in water, for that is a lenient ruling that sages extended in the case of water.’ Now why should this be the case? After all, fish can get through the imaginary partition! So that proves that fish getting through isn’t classified as getting through!”*

- II.1** A. **[If] boats are tied together, they move [objects] from one to the next. If they are not tied together, even though they lie close together, they do not carry [objects] from one to the other:**
- B. *That’s obvious!*
- C. *Said Raba, “Not at all. The rule is necessary to allow carrying by means of a small boat that is tethered between the ships, [which are fastened to the opposite sides of the tender].”*
- D. *Said R. Saфра, “By Moses! Can you possibly be right?! Haven’t we learned in the Mishnah, **they move [objects] from one to the next?**”*
- E. *Rather, said R. Saфра, “The rule is necessary to indicate that one may form a fictive union of the area of the boats by a Sabbath boundary and so carry from one boat to the other. And that is in accord with what has been taught on Tannaite authority: For ships tied to one another they erect a fictive Sabbath boundary and thereby carry from one ship to another. If they separate, it is forbidden to carry from one to another. If they are rejoined, whether this was done inadvertently or deliberately, under constraint or in error, they revert to the original status of an area in which it is permitted to carry things on the Sabbath. And the same is the case with mats that are hung up [and formed into tents, belonging to separate owners]; one may erect a fictive Sabbath boundary and thereby carry among them. If the mats are rolled up, it is prohibited to carry from one area to the other. If they were spread out again, whether this was done inadvertently or deliberately, under constraint or in error, they revert to the original status of an area in which it is permitted to carry things on the Sabbath. For any partition that is set up on the Sabbath, whether inadvertently or deliberately, is classified as a valid partition.”*

- F. *Well, now, is that so? And didn't R. Nahman say, "They have learned this rule only with respect to throwing. [Freedman: The space enclosed by partitions erected on the Sabbath is private domain only insofar that throwing an object from public domain to that area is culpable.] But in fact it is forbidden to carry things in that area"?*
- G. *When that statement of R. Nahman's was made, it pertained to erecting the partitions deliberately.*

II.2

- A. Said Samuel, "And that is the rule even if they are tied together by a cloak ribbon."
- B. *So what's the point? If it can hold them together, that is obvious, and if it can't hold them together, why should that be so?*
- C. *In point of fact, it can hold them together, but Samuel's intent is to exclude a point he himself has made, for we have learned in the Mishnah: [If] one tied the ship with something which can hold it still, [or] held down a cloak with a stone, it brings the uncleanness; if it is with something that doesn't hold it still, it doesn't transmit to it uncleanness [M. Oh. 8:5I], on which Samuel made the statement, "and that is the case if it was fixed with an iron chain." That is so, in particular, when it pertains to uncleanness, in line with the verse "one that is slain with a sword" (Num. 19:16) — lo, metal that touches a corpse is unclean in the status of the corpse itself, [that is, as a generative source of uncleanness, so the chain will impart uncleanness to the ship], but so far as the Sabbath is concerned, since it can hold the ship still, even if it is a cloak ribbon, that would suffice.*

11:6

- A. [102A] He who throws [an object] and realizes [remembers what he has done] after it leaves his hand,
- B. [if] another person caught it,
- C. [if] a dog caught it,
- D. or [if] it burned up in a fire [intervening in its flight path] —
- E. he is exempt.
- F. [If] he threw it intending to inflict a wound,
- G. whether at a man or at a beast,
- H. and realizes [what he has done] before it inflicted the wound,
- I. he is exempt.

- J. This is the governing principle: All those who may be liable to sin-offerings in fact are not liable unless at the beginning and the end, their [sin] is done inadvertently.
- K. [But] if the beginning of their [sin] is inadvertent and the end is deliberate, [or] the beginning deliberate and the end inadvertent, they are exempt — unless at the beginning and at the end their [sin] is inadvertent.

- I.1**
- A. [He who throws an object and realizes what he has done after it leaves his hand, if another person caught it...he is exempt:] *Lo, if it should come to rest, he would be liable. But didn't he realize what happened? And we have learned in the Mishnah: All those who may be liable to sin-offerings in fact are not liable unless at the beginning and the end, their [sin] is done inadvertently.*
 - B. *Said R. Kahana, "The latter clause refers to a bolt and a cord [that are tied together, that is, someone threw a bolt while holding the cord in his hand; if he realizes before it reaches the ground, he can pull it back, if he doesn't, then the fact that it comes to rest is deliberate; but if the article has entirely left his control and he can't prevent its falling, the result is regarded as inadvertent, whether or not he remembers the matter (Freedman)]."*
 - C. *A bolt and a cord? But in that case, isn't the cord in the man's hand [so how is this an act of throwing]?*
 - D. It would be a case in which he intended to inflict a wound.
 - E. *But this, too, we have learned as a Mishnah statement: [If] he threw it intending to inflict a wound, whether at a man or at a beast, and realizes [what he has done] before it inflicted the wound, he is exempt.*
 - F. Rather, said Raba, "The Mishnah rule deals with a case of one who carries something [and can stop the action before it is completed, that is, before he has walked for four cubits]."
 - G. *But lo, the language that is used is, This is the governing principle!*
 - H. *That refers in particular to throwing the object, not carrying it.*
 - I. *Rather, said Raba, "There are two distinct Tannaite rules in hand: He who throws [an object] and realizes after it has left his hand, or, also, [if] another person caught it, [if] a dog caught it, or [if] it burned up in a fire [intervening in its flight path] — he is exempt."*

- J. *R. Ashi said, “The formulation of the passage is flawed, and this is how the Tannaite reading should be set forth: **He who throws [an object] and realizes [remembers what he has done] after it leaves his hand, [if] another person caught it, [if] a dog caught it, or [if] it burned up in a fire [intervening in its flight path] — he is exempt.** But if it comes to rest, he is liable. Under what circumstances? In a case if it happens that once again he forgot the situation [before the object came to rest]. But if he did not once again forget, he is exempt. **All those who may be liable to sin-offerings in fact are not liable unless at the beginning and the end, their [sin] is done inadvertently.**”*

II.1 A. This is the governing principle: All those who may be liable to sin-offerings in fact are not liable unless at the beginning and the end, their [sin] is done inadvertently. [But] if the beginning of their [sin] is inadvertent and the end is deliberate, unless at the beginning and at the end their [sin] is inadvertent:

B. *It has been stated:*

- C. If the object traveled for two cubits when the one who threw it did so inadvertently, but the next two cubits of the voyage were subject to his deliberate will, and then two more cubits unwittingly –

D. Rabbah said, “He is exempt.”

E. Raba said, “He is liable.”

F. Rabbah said, “He is exempt” — *even in the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel, who said, “If one is aware of half of the requisite measure only, that is null” [Freedman: it does not separate two acts of eating, when in each case only half the standard quantity to create liability is consumed], that is the case in that situation, because, when he completes meeting the requisite standard for culpability, he completes it entirely inadvertently, but here, he completes the requisite standard deliberately, so that would not apply.*

G. *Then to what case would this refer? If it is to one who throws, well, he acts inadvertently throughout [once the object has left his hand]!*

H. *Rather, it refers to one who is carrying an object [and can stop in the middle of his progress through public domain].*

I. Raba said, “He is liable” — *and even from the perspective of rabbis, who maintain, “If one is aware of half of the requisite measure*

only, that is effective,” in that case, he has the power to stop the action, but here he doesn’t have the power to stop the action, so that is here not the case.

J. Then to what case would this refer? It can’t be to one who is carrying an object in public domain, since he can stop the action.

K. Rather, it refers to one who throws the object.

- II.2** A. Said Raba, “If one threw an object and it fell into the mouth of a dog or into a furnace, he is liable.”
- B. *But we have learned in the Mishnah: [if] a dog caught it, or [if] it burned up in a fire [intervening in its flight path] — he is exempt!*
- C. *In that case, he didn’t intend for this to happen, but here he intended for this to happen.*
- D. *Said R. Bibi bar Abbayye, “So, too, we have learned the same in a Mishnah statement: There is he who carries out a single act of eating and is liable on its account for four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering: An unclean [lay] person who ate (1) forbidden fat, and it was (2) remnant, (3) of Holy Things, and (4) it was on the Day of Atonement. R. Meir says, “If it was the Sabbath and he took it out [from one domain to another] in his mouth, he is liable [for another sin-offering].” They said to him, “That is not of the same sort [of transgression of which we have spoken heretofore since it is not caused by eating]” [M. Ker. 3:4]. Now why should this be the case? Certainly this [he took it out from one domain to another in his mouth] is not the usual way of carrying out an object! But since this is how he wants things, his intention renders his mouth the right place to carry out the object. Here, too, since this is his intention, his intention renders the mouth of the dog or the furnace a perfectly acceptable place for having the object come to rest.”*