

XV

THE SYSTEM OF BABYLONIAN TALMUD ZEBAHIM

Whether or not the Talmud of Babylonia is carefully organized in large-scale, recurrent structures and guided by a program that we may call systematic forms the principal question addressed by an academic commentary. The preceding chapters therefore have pointed toward the presentation set forth here.

By “structure” I mean, a clearly-articulated pattern that governs the location of fully-spelled out statements. By “system,” I mean, a well-crafted and coherent set of ideas that explain the social order of the community addressed by the writers of a document, a social philosophy, a theory of the way of life, world view, and character of the social entity formed by a given social group. I see a collective, anonymous, and political document, such as the one before us, as a statement to, and about, the way in which people should organize their lives and govern their actions. At issue then in any document such as the remarkable one before us is simple: does this piece of writing present information or a program, facts to whom it may concern, or a philosophically and aesthetically cogent statement about how things should be?

The connection between structure and system is plain to see. From the way in which people consistently frame their thoughts, we move to the world that, in saying things one way rather than in some other, they wish to imagine the world in which they wish to live, to which they address these thoughts. For if the document exhibits structure and sets forth a system, then it is accessible to questions of rationality. We may ask about the statement that its framers or compilers wished to make by putting the document together as they did. But if we discern no structure and perceive no systematic inquiry or governing points of analysis, then all we find here is inert and miscellaneous information, facts but no propositions, arguments, viewpoints.

Now the Talmud commonly finds itself represented as lacking organization and exhibiting a certain episodic and notional character. That view moreover characterizes the reading and representation of the document by learned and experienced scholars, who have devoted their entire lives to Talmud study and exegesis. It must follow that upon the advocate of the contrary view — the one implicit in the representation of the document for academic analysis — rests the burden of proof. I set forth the allegation that the Talmud exhibits a structure and follows a system and therefore exhibits a commonly-intelligible rationality. The claim to write an academic commentary explicitly states that proposition. For the tractate before us, I have therefore to adduce evidence and argument.

I maintain that through the normal procedures of reasoned analysis we may discern in the tractate a well-crafted structure. I hold that the structure made manifest, we may further identify the purpose and perspective, the governing system of thought and argument, of

those who collected and arranged the tractate's composites and put them together in the way in which we now have them. By "structure" I mean, how is a document organized? and by "system," what do the compilers of the document propose to accomplish in producing this complete, organized piece of writing? The answers to both questions derive from a simple outline of the tractate as a whole, underscoring the types of compositions and composites of which it is comprised. Such an outline tells us what is principal and what subordinate, and how each unit — composition formed into composites, composites formed into a complete statement — holds together and also fits with other units, fore and aft. The purpose of the outline then is to identify the character of each component of the whole, and to specify its purpose or statement. The former information permits us to describe the document's structure, the latter, its system.

While the idea of simply outlining a Talmud-tractate beginning to end may seem obvious, I have never made such an outline before, nor has anyone else.* Yet, as we shall now see, the character of the outline dictates all further analytical initiatives. Specifically, when we follow the layout of the whole, we readily see the principles of organization that govern. These same guidelines on organizing discourse point also to the character of what is organized: complete units of thought, with a beginning, middle, and end, often made up of smaller, equally complete units of thought. The former we know as composites, the latter as compositions.

*I have provided complete outlines for the Mishnah and for the Tosefta in relationship to the Mishnah, and, not always in outline form, for the Midrash-compilations of late antiquity as well.

Identifying and classifying the components of the tractate — the composites, the compositions of which they are made up — we see clearly how the document coheres: the plan and program worked out from beginning to end. When we define that plan and program, we identify the facts of a pattern that permit us to say in a specific and concrete way precisely what the compilers of the tractate intended to accomplish. The structure realizes the system, the program of analysis and thought that takes the form of the presentation we have before us. From what people do, meaning, the way in which they formulate their ideas and organized them into cogent statements, we discern what they proposed to do, meaning, the intellectual goals that they set for themselves.

These goals — the received document they wished to examine, the questions that they brought to that document — realized in the layout and construction of their writing, dictate the points of uniformity and persistence that throughout come to the surface. How people lay out their ideas guides us into what they wished to find out and set forth in their writing, and that constitutes the system that defined the work they set out to accomplish. We move from how people speak to the system that the mode of discourse means to express, in the theory that modes of speech or writing convey modes of thought and inquiry.

We move from the act of thought and its written result backward to the theory of thinking, which is, by definition, an act of social consequence. We therefore turn to the matter of intention that provokes reflection and produces a system of inquiry. That statement does not mean to imply I begin with the premise of order, which sustains the thesis of a prior system that defines the order. To the contrary, the possibility of forming a coherent outline out of the data we have examined defines the first test of whether or not the document exhibits a structure and realizes a system. So everything depends upon the

possibility of outlining the writing, from which all else flows. If we can see the order and demonstrate that the allegation of order rests on ample evidence, then we may proceed to describe the structure that gives expression to the order, and the system that the structure sustains.

The present work undertakes the exegesis of exegesis, for the Talmud of Babylonia, like its counterpart in the Land of Israel, is laid out as a commentary to the Mishnah. That obvious fact defined the character of my academic commentary, since we have already faced the reality that our Bavli-tractate is something other than a commentary, though it surely encompasses one. The problems that captured my attention derived from the deeper question of how people make connections and draw conclusions. To ask about how people make connections means that we identify a problem — otherwise we should not have to ask — and what precipitated the problem here has been how a composition or a composite fits into its context, when the context is defined by the tasks of Mishnah-commentary, and the composition or composite clearly does not comment on the Mishnah-passage that is subjected to comment.

The experience of analyzing the document with the question of cogency and coherence in mind therefore yields a simple recognition. Viewed whole, the tractate contains no gibberish but only completed units of thought, sentences formed into intelligible thought and self-contained in that we require no further information to understand those sentences, beginning to end. The tractate organizes these statements as commentary to the Mishnah. But large tracts of the writing do not comment on the Mishnah in the way in which other, still larger tracts do. Then how the former fit together with the latter frames the single most urgent question of structure and system that I can identify.

Since we have already examined enormous composites that find their cogency in an other than exegetical program, alongside composites that hold together by appeal to a common, prior, coherent statement — the Mishnah-sentences at hand — what justifies my insistence that an outline of the document, resting on the premise that we deal with a Mishnah-commentary, govern all further description? To begin with, the very possibility of outlining Babylonian Talmud tractate Sotah derives from the simple fact that the framers have given to their document the form of a commentary to the Mishnah. It is in the structure of the Mishnah-tractate that they locate everything together that they wished to compile. We know that is the fact because the Mishnah-tractate defines the order of topics and the sequence of problems.

Relationships to the Mishnah are readily discerned; a paragraph stands at the head of a unit of thought; even without the full citation of the paragraph, we should find our way back to the Mishnah because at the head of numerous compositions, laid out in sequence one to the next, clauses of the Mishnah-paragraph are cited in so many words or alluded to in an unmistakable way. So without printing the entire Mishnah-paragraph at the head, we should know that the received code formed the fundamental structure because so many compositions cite and gloss sentences of the Mishnah-paragraph and are set forth in sequence dictated by the order of sentences of said Mishnah-paragraph. Internal evidence alone suffices, then, to demonstrate that the structure of the tractate rests upon the Mishnah-tractate cited and discussed here. Not only so, but the sentences of the Mishnah-paragraphs of our tractate are discussed in no other place in the entire Talmud of Babylonia in the sequence and systematic exegetical framework in which they are set forth here; elsewhere we may find bits or pieces, but only here, the entirety of the tractate.

That statement requires one qualification, and that further leads us to the analytical task of our outline. While the entire Mishnah-tractate of Sotah is cited in the Talmud, the framers of the Talmud by no means find themselves required to say something about every word, every sentence, every paragraph. On the contrary, they discuss only what they choose to discuss, and glide without comment by large stretches of the tractate. A process of selectivity, which requires description and analysis, has told the compilers of the Talmud's composites and the authors of its compositions* what demands attention, and what does not. Our outline has therefore to signal not only what passage of the Mishnah-tractate is discussed, but also what is not discussed, and we require a general theory to explain the principles of selection ("making connections, drawing conclusions" meaning, to begin with, making selections). For that purpose, in the outline, I reproduce the entirety of a Mishnah-paragraph that stands at the head of a Talmudic composite, and I underscore those sentences that are addressed, so highlighting also those that are not.

*This statement requires refinement. I do not know that all available compositions have been reproduced, and that the work of authors of compositions of Mishnah-exegesis intended for a talmud is fully exposed in the document as we have it. That is not only something we cannot demonstrate — we do not have compositions that were not used, only the ones that were — but something that we must regard as unlikely on the face of matters. All we may say is positive: the character of the compositions that address Mishnah-exegesis tells us about the concerns of the writers of those compositions, but we cannot claim to outline all of their concerns, on the one side, or to explain why they chose not to work on other Mishnah-sentences besides the ones treated here. But as to the program of the compositors, that is another matter: from the choices that they made (out of a corpus we cannot begin to imagine or invent for ourselves) we may describe with great accuracy the kinds of materials they wished to include and the shape and structure they set forth out of those materials. We know what they did, and that permits us to investigate why they did what they did. What we cannot know is what they did not do, or why they chose not to do what they did not do. People familiar with the character of speculation and criticism in Talmudic studies will understand why I have to spell out these rather commonplace observations. I lay out an argument based on evidence, not on the silences of evidence, or on the absence of evidence — that alone.

It follows that the same evidence that justifies identifying the Mishnah-tractate as the structure (therefore also the foundation of the system) of the Talmud-tractate before us also presents puzzles for considerable reflection. The exegesis of Mishnah-exegesis is only one of these. Another concerns the purpose of introducing into the document enormous compositions and composites that clearly hold together around a shared topic or proposition, e.g., my appendix on one theme or another, my elaborate footnote providing information that is not required but merely useful, and the like. My earlier characterization of composites as appendices and footnotes signalled the fact that the framers of the document chose a not-entirely satisfactory way of setting out the materials they wished to include here, for large components of the tractate do not contribute to Mishnah-exegesis in any way at all. If these intrusions of other-than-exegetical compositions were proportionately modest, or of topical composites negligible in size, we might dismiss them as appendages, not structural components that bear much of the weight of the edifice as a whole. Indeed, the language that I chose for identifying and defining these composites — footnotes, appendices, and the like — bore the implication that what is not Mishnah-commentary also is extrinsic to the Talmud's structure and system.

But that language served only for the occasion. In fact, the outline before us will show that the compositions are large and ambitious, the composites formidable and defining.

Any description of the tractate's structure that dismisses as mere accretions or intrusions so large a proportion of the whole misleads. Any notion that "footnotes" and "appendices" impede exposition and disrupt thought, contribute extraneous information or form tacked-on appendages — any such notion begs the question: then why fill up so much space with such purposeless information? The right way is to ask whether the document's topical composites play a role in the re-presentation of the Mishnah-tractate by the compilers of the Talmud. We have therefore to test two hypotheses:

1. the topical composites ("appendices," "footnotes") do belong and serve the compilers' purpose,

or

2. the topical composites do not participate in the re-presentation of the Mishnah-tractate by the Talmud and do not belong because they add nothing and change nothing.

The two hypotheses may be tested against the evidence framed in response to a single question: is this topical composite necessary? The answer to that question lies in our asking, what happens to the reading of the Mishnah-tractate in light of the topical composites that would not happen were we to read the same tractate without them? The outline that follows systematically raises that question, with results specified in due course. It suffices here to state the simple result of our reading of the tractate, start to finish: the question of structure, therefore also that of system, rests upon the position we identify for that massive component of the tractate that comprises not Mishnah-commentary but free-standing compositions and composites of compositions formed for a purpose other than Mishnah-commentary.

The principal rubrics are given in small caps. The outline takes as its principal rubrics two large-scale organizing principles.

The first is the divisions of the Mishnah-tractate to which the Talmud-tractate serves as a commentary. That simple fact validates the claim that the tractate exhibits a fully-articulated structure. But the outline must also underscore that the Mishnah-tractate provides both more and less than the paramount outline of the Talmud-tractate. It is more because sentences in the Mishnah-tractate are not analyzed at all. These untreated Mishnah-sentences are given in bold face lower case caps, like the rest of the Mishnah, but then are specified by underlining and enclosure in square brackets.

Second, it is less because the structure of the tractate accommodates large composites that address topics not defined by the Mishnah-tractate. That brings us to the second of the two large-scale modes of holding together both sustained analytical exercises and also large sets of compositions formed into cogent composites. These are treated also as major units and are indicated by Roman numerals, alongside the Mishnah-paragraphs themselves; they are also signified in small caps. But the principal rubrics that do not focus on Mishnah-commentary but on free-standing topics or propositions or problems are not given in boldface type. Consequently, for the purposes of a coherent outline we have to identify as autonomous entries in our outline those important composites that treat themes or topics not contributed by the Mishnah-tractate.

I. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 1:1-2

A. ALL ANIMAL OFFERINGS THAT WERE SLAUGHTERED NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME ARE VALID SO THAT THE BLOOD IS TOSSED, THE ENTRAILS BURNED, BUT THEY DO NOT GO TO THE OWNER'S CREDIT IN FULFILLMENT OF AN OBLIGATION:

1. I:1: Why did the Tannaite authority repeat in the formulation of the Mishnah, but they do not go to the owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation? Let him state simply, "and they do not go to the owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation."

2. I:2: This further accords with the position of Raba, for Raba has said, "As to a burnt-offering that one slaughtered not under the proper designation, it is forbidden to toss its blood under some other than the proper designation but the blood can be tossed only within the rules governing the burnt offering."

3. Said Rabina to R. Pappa, "You were not with us toward dusk within the Sabbath boundary of Be Harmakh, when Raba contrasted two excellent statements of the law and worked out the contradiction between them. What are these excellent statements of the law? We have learned in the Mishnah: All animal offerings which were slaughtered not for their own name are valid so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned, but they do not go to the owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation. The operative consideration, then, is that the beasts were offered under some classification other than that for which they were originally designated. But if no such other purpose had been defined, then the offering of the beast may even fulfill the obligation of their owner. Then it follows that that which is not subjected to an articulated purpose falls into the same category as that which has been assigned its own designated purpose. In contradiction of that premise is the premise of the following: Any writ of divorce that is not written for the sake of that particular woman for whom it is intended is invalid (M. [Git. 3:1A](#)). And if the writ is prepared without specification as to the woman for whom it is intended therefore also is invalid."

4. R. Joseph bar Ammi contrasted the rules governing change of classification with respect to sanctification of the beast and change of classification with respect to the ownership of the beast the priest expressed an improper intention in regard to the classification of the sacrifice, or he expressed an improper intention with regard to the owner of the beast, thus offering the animal in the name of someone who was not in fact the owner of the beast, and he furthermore resolved the contradiction: "Has Rab not stated, 'A beast originally designated as a sin-offering that one slaughtered as a sin-offering but for some sin other than the one that the owner who had consecrated the beast had discovered that he had committed is validly offered; but if the priest slaughtered the beast designated as a sin-offering in the classification of a burnt-offering, it is invalid.' It therefore follows that if one has slaughtered it within the designation of its own genus a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering, the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus not as a consecrated beast at all, the beast is not rendered null."

5. R. Habiba contrasted the rules governing change of classification with respect to sanctification of the beast and change of classification with respect to the contained

inner space within the contained inner space of the clay utensil and he resolved the problem: “Has Rab not said, ‘A beast designated as a sin offering which one slaughtered in behalf of one who is liable to offer a sin-offering but not the one who consecrated the beast is invalid; if it was slaughtered in behalf of one who was obligated to present a burnt-offering, it is valid.’ It therefore follows that if one has slaughtered it within the designation of its own genus a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering, the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus not as a consecrated beast at all, the beast is not rendered null. But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “‘And every clay utensil into the inside of which any one of them falls, whatever is in it shall be unclean, and you shall break it” (Lev. 11:33) — but not if it falls into the contained space that is within the contained space, and even a utensil that may be retrieved from a condition of uncleanness through being immersed that is, other than a clay utensil may serve the purpose of affording protection to the clay utensil and its contents.””

B. ALL ANIMAL OFFERINGS THAT WERE SLAUGHTERED NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME ARE VALID SO THAT THE BLOOD IS TOSSED, THE ENTRAILS BURNED

1. II:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that we require that the act of slaughter of a beast designated as a sacrifice be done within the classification for which the beast was originally designated?

a. II:2: Thus we have found the rule governing the actual act of sacrifice the killing of the beast, indicating that the priest must perform that act with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind. How do we know that the same rule pertains to other forms of sacrificial service?

b. II:3: Thus we have found the rule governing the actual act of sacrifice and the receiving of the blood, indicating that the priest must perform that act with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind. How do we know that the same rule pertains to the tossing of the blood on the altar?

c. II:4: Thus we have found the rule governing all of these actions, indicating that the priest must perform them with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind. How do we know that the same rule pertains to the carrying of the limbs to the altar for burning on the altar-fires? II:4:

d. II:5: Thus we have demonstrated that a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast is null. How about a revision as to the ownership of the beast in which case the officiating priest declares that the beast serves to fulfil the obligation of a person other than the farmer who has consecrated the beast?

e. II:6: Thus we have found the rule governing the act of slaughter. How do we know that the same rule applies to all other components of the sacrificial rite?

f. II:7: So we have derived the rule for the matters of sacrificing the beast and tossing the blood. How do we know the rule in respect to receiving the blood?

g. II:8: We now have found that the proposition derives to the ram presented by the Nazirite which falls into the classification of peace-offerings. How do we know that the same rule applies to other peace-offerings?

h. II:9: So we have found a basis for maintaining that the besought proposition applies to all classifications of peace-offerings. How do we know that it applies also to all Holy Things in general?

i. II:10: Gloss on the foregoing.

2. II:11: R. Simeon b. Laqish lay down on his belly in the house of study and raised the following problem: “If the offerings are valid, then let them be accepted for atonement so that the owner has fulfilled his obligation, and if they do not effect atonement, then why are they offered at all and why are they valid?”

a. II:12: R. Zira and R. Isaac bar Abba went into session, and Abbaye was in session with them, and in session they were stating, “R. Simeon b. Laqish found a difficulty with the guilt-offering, which is not presented after death, and so he derived the rule from the exegesis, ‘That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering’ (Deu. 23:24). Yet why not say, ‘what may be offered as a vow or as a freewill-offering must be presented but under the stated circumstances will not propitiate, while a guilt offering is not to be presented at all’?”

b. II:13: R. Huna and R. Nahman were in session, and R. Sheshet was in session with them, and in session they stated, “R. Simeon b. Laqish found a difficulty in the matter of the guilt-offering, which is not presented after the person who has designated the beast for that purpose has died. But R. Eleazar might well have said to him, ‘The guilt offering too may be presented after the death of the person who has designated it.’ For it is left to graze until blemished, is then sold, with the proceeds spent on a beast designated as a burnt-offering.”

c. II:14: R. Nahman and R. Sheshet were in session, and R. Adda b. Mattenah was in session with them. They were in session and stated, “As to what R. Eleazar stated, namely, ‘We find a counterpart in the case of offerings that are presented after the owner has died, that they are valid but are not accepted in propitiation for the deceased, for we have learned on Tannaite authority: A woman who after child birth presented the required sin-offering but then died prior to offering the burnt offering that also is required — her estate is liable to present her burnt-offering. If she had presented the required burnt offering that was incumbent on her and then died, her estate should not present the required sin-offering that is incumbent upon her,’ why should R. Simeon b. Laqish not reply to him, ‘These too may be presented and effect propitiation’ for the heirs?’”

3. II:15: As to a beast that has been offered for some purpose other than that for which the beast was originally consecrated (“not for its own name,” that is, not within the originally-defined classification of sanctification, but within some other classification altogether, or not in behalf of the owner who did the classifying as to sanctification, but some other owner, the question was raised: has the owner effected atonement for that for which he has presented the offering, or has he not?

4. II:16: The question was raised: does a burnt-offering effect atonement for a violation of a religious duty involving an affirmative action that is committed after the beast has been designated for the purpose of a burnt offering, or does it not atone for that purpose? Do we maintain that the burnt offering falls into the analogy of the sin offering, and just as a beast that is designated as a sin offering serves to achieve atonement for what was done prior to the designation of the beast for a sin offering but not for what was done afterward, so here too, for that which was done prior to the designation of the beast the offering atones, but for what was done afterward it does not atone? Or perhaps there is no analogy to be drawn to a sin-offering, for a sin-offering is presented on account of each and every individual sin, while in the present case, since a man may be owing an offering on account of any number of violations of religious duties of affirmative actions, it may well atone for all those violations of religious duties of affirmative action that have been done even after the designation of the beast for its present purpose?

5. II:17: It has been stated: As to a thanksgiving offering that the priest has slaughtered in the classification of a thanksgiving offering presented by some other party than the person who originally designated the beast for this purpose — Rabbah said, “It is valid so the one who originally designated the beast does not now have to present another thanksgiving offering.” R. Hisda said, “It is invalid.”

6. II:18: Said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered under the classification of a sin offering is valid. If one slaughtered it in the classification of a burnt offering, it is invalid.”

7. II:19: And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered in behalf of one who owed a sin offering is invalid. If he slaughtered it in behalf of one who owed a burnt offering, it is valid.”

8. II:20: And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered in behalf of one who owed nothing at all is invalid. For you have no Israelite anywhere who is not subject to an obligation in regard to neglect of a positive religious duty.”

9. II:21: And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering effects atonement for those who are obligated to an offering by reason of neglecting positive religious duties of affirmative action. That fact derives from the following argument a fortiori: if the beast effects atonement for those who are otherwise liable to extirpation, should it not all the more so effect atonement for those who are obligated to an offering by reason of neglecting positive religious duties of affirmative action?”

10. II:22: And said Raba, “As to a burnt-offering that one slaughtered not under the proper designation, it is forbidden to toss its blood under some other than the

proper designation but the blood can be tossed only within the rules governing the burnt offering.”

11. II:23: And said Raba, “An animal designated as a burnt offering that is presented after the death of the person who has designated the beast as a burnt offering and that is slaughtered under a different classification of sanctification from that which the owner has designated is invalid. If it is slaughtered in a different classification in regard to ownership, it is valid, for ownership does not pertain after one has died.”

12. II:24: And said Raba, “A burnt offering falls into the classification of a gift. For how can it actually effect atonement? If the donor has not repented of his sin, then it falls into the class of ‘the sacrifice of the wicked if an abomination’ (Pro. 21:27). If the donor has repented, then surely it has been taught on Tannaite authority, ‘If one has neglected to carry out an affirmative religious duty but has repented, he does not move from the spot until he has been forgiven even without making a sacrifice.’ It follows that a burnt offering falls into the classification of a gift.”

C. ...EXCEPT FOR THE PASSOVER AND THE SIN OFFERING — THE PASSOVER AT ITS APPOINTED TIME THE AFTERNOON OF THE FOURTEENTH OF NISAN:

1. III:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that rule in connection with the Passover-offering? How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a revision in the classification of the beast set aside for the Passover as to the ownership of said beast likewise invalidates the offering? Now we have found evidence that these rules pertain in the correct fulfillment of the religious duty. But how do we know that they are indispensable so that the offering is ruined if these rules are not observed?

2. III:2: Now that we have found the rule as it pertains to slaughtering the animal designated as the Passover offering, how do we know that the same rule pertains to the other acts of sacrificial service?

D. AND THE SIN OFFERING AT ANY TIME:

1. IV:1: How do we know the same for the sin-offering? So we have found the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast for purposes of sanctification. How do we know the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast in respect to ownership? So we have found the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast for purposes of sanctification. How do we know the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast in respect to ownership? So we have found that the rule applies for the proper fulfillment of the religious duty. But how do we know that obedience to the rule is indispensable so that the offering is spoiled if the rule is not obeyed?

2. IV:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: As to a beast designated for the Passover offering, at the time at which it is supposed to be offered midday on the fourteenth of Nisan until nightfall, if the beast is slaughtered for the purpose for which it was originally designated, it is valid, and if not slaughtered for the purpose for which it was originally designated, it is invalid. As to the rest of the year a beast that is designated as a Passover offering that is offered for the purpose for

which it has been designated is invalid, but if it is not offered for the purpose for which it has been designated, it is valid. Now what is the scriptural source for this ruling?

a. IV:3: Gloss of a detail of the foregoing.

3. IV:4: Said Rab in the name of Mabug, "If one has slaughtered an animal designated for use as a sin offering in the classification of the sin offering presented by Nahshon at Num. 7:12, that is, for the dedication of the altar, it is valid, for Scripture says, 'This is the law of the sin offering' (Lev. 6:18) — a single rule governs all classifications of sin offering."

4. IV:5: Said Raba, "A sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat which one slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating blood or in the classification of a sin offering presented on account of inadvertent acts of idolatry is valid. If it were slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering presented by a Nazirite or a sin offering presented by a person healed of the skin disease, it is invalid, for the latter are in fact classified as burnt offerings."

5. IV:6: It was stated: If one slaughtered the beast in accord with its original designation, but then he sprinkled the blood on the altar for a purpose not in accord with its original designation — R. Yohanan said, "It is invalid." R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is valid."

a. IV:7: It has been stated: If one has slaughtered the beast under its originally designated classification intending to sprinkle the blood under some other than the originally designated classification — R. Nahman said, "The offering is invalid." Rabbah said, "The offering is valid."

E. R. ELIEZER SAYS, "ALSO: THE GUILT OFFERING. THE PASSOVER AT ITS APPOINTED TIME, AND THE SIN OFFERING AND THE GUILT OFFERING AT ANY TIME." SAID R. ELIEZER, "THE SIN OFFERING COMES ON ACCOUNT OF SIN, AND THE GUILT OFFERING COMES ON ACCOUNT OF SIN. JUST AS THE SIN OFFERING IS UNFIT IF IT IS OFFERED UNDER SOME CLASSIFICATION OTHER THAN THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED, SO THE GUILT OFFERING IS UNFIT IF OFFERED UNDER SOME CLASSIFICATION OTHER THAN THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED:"

1. V:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Eliezer, "The sin offering comes on account of sin, and the guilt offering comes on account of sin. Just as the sin offering is unfit if it is offered) under some classification other than that originally designated not for its own name = "under some other name", so the guilt offering is unfit if offered under some classification other than that originally designated not for its own name = "under some other name". Said to him R. Joshua, "No, if you have said so concerning the sin offering, the blood of which is tossed above the red line that is drawn around the altar base, will you say so of a guilt offering, the blood of which is placed below the red line around the altar base, on which account, if one slaughtered the animal for some other than the originally designated classification, it still will be valid?"

a. V:2: Development and gloss of foregoing.

b. V:3: As above.

c. V:4: As above.

2. V:5: There we have learned in the Mishnah: Blood which is to be placed on the altar inside (M. 5:1-2) which is mixed up with blood which is to be placed on the altar outside — let it be poured out into the gutter. If the priest without paying mind placed the blood outside and then went and placed it inside, it is valid. If he placed it inside and then went and placed it outside — R. Aqiba declares invalid the sacrifice on the outer altar. And sages declare valid. For R. Aqiba did say, “All drops of blood which should have been sprinkled outside which are brought inside the sanctuary to effect atonement are invalid.” And sages say, “This applies to the sin offering alone which is invalidated by being brought inside, before the blood is tossed on the outer altar.” R. Eliezer says, “It also applies to the guilt offering, since it says, ‘As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering’ (Lev. 7: 7)” (M. Zebahim 8:11A-I). As for R. Eliezer, there are no problems, because he has stated the operative consideration, deriving from Scripture. But as to rabbis, what is the basis for their position?

F. YOSÉ B. HONI SAYS, “THOSE OTHER OFFERINGS WHICH ARE SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF THE PASSOVER AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SIN OFFERING ARE INVALID:”

1. VI:1: Said R. Yohanan, “Joseph b. Honi and R. Eliezer have said exactly the same thing!” Rabbah said, “The point of difference between them is in regard to animals set aside for other purposes that were slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering.”

G. SIMEON, BROTHER OF AZARIAH, SAYS, “IF ONE SLAUGHTERED THEM FOR THE SAKE OF THAT WHICH IS HIGHER THAN THEY, THEY ARE VALID. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED THEM FOR THE SAKE OF THAT WHICH IS LOWER THAN THEY “BUT IF UNDER THE NAME OF A LOWER GRADE”, THEY ARE INVALID. HOW SO? MOST HOLY THINGS WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF LESSER HOLY THINGS ARE INVALID. LESSER HOLY THINGS WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF MOST HOLY THINGS ARE VALID. THE FIRSTLING AND TITHE WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE OFFERINGS ARE VALID, AND PEACE OFFERINGS WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF A FIRSTLING, OR FOR THE SAKE OF TITHE, ARE INVALID.”

1. VII:1: R. Ashi repeated in the name of R. Yohanan, and R. Aha b. Raba repeated in the name of R. Yannai, “What is the scriptural foundation for the position of Simeon the brother of Azariah? It is that Scripture has said, ‘And they shall not profane the Holy Things of the children of Israel, which they raise up to the Lord’ (Lev. 22:15) — through what is at a higher classification than that originally given to an animal they are not profaned, but by a classification lower than that originally assigned to the beast they are indeed profaned.”

2. VII:2: R. Zira raised the question, “Does he take the view that they are valid but do not in any event do not propitiate, in which case he differs in only one respect, or perhaps he takes the view that they are both valid offerings and also propitiate, in which case he differs on two distinct points?”

II. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 1:3

A. THE BEAST THAT WAS DESIGNATED AS A SACRIFICE FOR THE PASSOVER WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED ON THE MORNING OF THE FOURTEENTH OF NISAN UNDER SOME CLASSIFICATION OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED — R. JOSHUA DECLARES VALID, AS IF IT WERE SLAUGHTERED ON THE THIRTEENTH OF NISAN. BEN BETERAH DECLARES INVALID, AS IF IT WERE SLAUGHTERED AT TWILIGHT OF THE FOURTEENTH.

1. I:1: Said R. Eleazar said R. Oshaia, “Ben Betera would declare the case valid when an animal that had been designated as a Passover offering was slaughtered at dawn on the fourteen of Nisan for the purpose for which it had originally been designated, because he takes the view that ‘the proper time’ for killing the Passover sacrifice is the entire day and not only the twilight of the fourteenth. And what is the sense of as if? Since R. Joshua made use of the expression, as if, he too also made use of the expression, as if.” Rejecting Oshaia’s thesis, said R. Yohanan, “Ben Batera declared unfit the sacrifice of an animal designated as a Passover offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth, whether it was sacrificed within the classification into which the owner had originally designated it, as a Passover offering, or whether he did so within any other classification, since part of that day is suitable for the sacrifice of the Passover offering.” If slaughtered in its own name, it is invalid, because the proper time is the afternoon; if not, it is invalid, because part of the day is the proper time.

a. I:2: Gloss to a secondary argument in the foregoing.

2. I:3: Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, “If one inadvertently ate forbidden fat, and, in penance, set aside an animal for an offering, but before actually sacrificing the beast apostatized, and then repented, once the sacrifice has been put off, it has been put off it is invalidated since apostates cannot offer sacrifices, and remains so. It cannot now be used for the original, inadvertent sin.”

3. I:4: R. Jeremiah raised this question: “If one has inadvertently eaten forbidden fat and designated an animal as an offering and then a court instructed that forbidden fat is permitted but then the court retracted, what is the law? Does this constitute a case in which the animal has been rejected or does this not constitute a case in which the animal has been rejected?”

B. SAID SIMEON BEN AZZAI, “I HAVE RECEIVED A TRADITION FROM THE SEVENTY-TWO ELDERS, ON THE DAY ON WHICH THEY SEATED R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH IN SESSION, THAT: ALL ANIMAL OFFERINGS WHICH ARE EATEN, WHICH WERE SLAUGHTERED NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED ARE FIT, BUT THEY DO NOT GO TO THE OWNER’S CREDIT IN FULFILLMENT OF AN OBLIGATION, EXCEPT FOR THE PASSOVER AND THE SIN OFFERING.”

1. II:1: Why does the Tannaite formulation refer specifically to seventy-two?

C. AND BEN AZZAI THEREBY ADDED ONLY THE BURNT OFFERING. BUT SAGES DID NOT AGREE WITH HIM.

1. III:1: Said R. Huna, “What is the scriptural basis for Ben Azzai’s position? ‘It is a burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor to the Lord’ (Lev. 1:17) — ‘It is’ means, when it is slaughtered in the classification for which the animal was originally designated, it is valid, when it is slaughtered not in the classification for which the animal was originally designated, it is invalid.”

III. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 1:4

A. THE ANIMAL DESIGNATED AS A PASSOVER AND THE SIN OFFERING WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED — THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE RECEIVED, CONVEYED, OR TOSSED NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED — OR FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AND ALSO NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED — OR NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AND ALSO FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED — ARE UNFIT. HOW DOES ONE DO IT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AND ALSO NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED? FOR THE SAKE OF THE PASSOVER AT ITS TIME AND FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE OFFERINGS....NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AND ALSO FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED? FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE OFFERINGS AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE PASSOVER.

FOR AN ANIMAL OFFERING IS MADE UNFIT BY IMPROPER INTENTION OR DEED IN FOUR RESPECTS: IN SLAUGHTERING, AND IN RECEIVING THE BLOOD, AND IN CONVEYING THE BLOOD, AND IN TOSSING THE BLOOD.

1. I:1: With reference to For an animal offering is made unfit by improper intention or deed in four respects: in slaughtering, and in receiving the blood, and in conveying the blood, and in tossing the blood: But can an inappropriate intention or deed with respect to receive the blood disqualify the offering? Said Raba, “There is no contradiction between what Tarfon has as a tradition and our rule, for the one refers to making the meat an abomination through an intention expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time, while our Mishnah-paragraph refers to an intentionality of some other sort.

2. I:2: But does an intention expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time only render the meat abominable but not render the act of sacrifice invalid?

3. I:3: Said a certain one of the rabbis to Raba, “But does improper intentionality not invalidate pouring out of the residue of the blood and burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: might one suppose that improper intentionality is affective only in connection with eating the meat of the offering? How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the law encompasses pouring out of the residue of the blood and burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires?

4. I:4: Said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, "I have heard that improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering 'And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood and sprinkle of the blood' (Lev. 4: 6) has the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering that is prepared on the inner altar."

5. I:5: Said R. Joshua b. Levi, "In this upper chamber I have heard that that improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering 'And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood and sprinkle of the blood' (Lev. 4: 6) has the power to impart the status of an abomination."

a. I:6: May we say that the issue of whether improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has the power to impart the status of an abomination also was disputed among Tannaite authorities?

B. R. SIMEON DECLARES FIT IN THE CASE OF IMPROPERLY CONVEYING THE BLOOD. FOR R. SIMEON DID SAY, "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREPARE AN ANIMAL OFFERING WITHOUT SLAUGHTERING, AND WITHOUT RECEIVING THE BLOOD AND WITHOUT TOSSEING THE BLOOD. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN ANIMAL OFFERING WITHOUT CONVEYING THE BLOOD. ONE SLAUGHTERS THE ANIMAL AT THE SIDE OF THE ALTAR AND FORTHWITH, WITHOUT CONVEYING THE BLOOD AT ALL TOSSES THE BLOOD ONTO THE ALTAR."

R. ELEAZAR SAYS, "HE WHO CONVEYS THE BLOOD — IF HE DOES SO IN A SITUATION IN WHICH HE HAS TO CONVEY THE BLOOD, THE WRONG INTENTION RENDERS INVALID THE ACT OF SACRIFICE. IF HE DOES SO IN A SITUATION IN WHICH HE DOES NOT HAVE TO CONVEY THE BLOOD, THE WRONG INTENTION DOES NOT RENDER THE ACT OF SACRIFICE INVALID."

1. II:1: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "R. Simeon concedes in the case of conveying the blood for a sin offerings prepared at the inner altar that improper intentionality in connection with conveying the blood does invalidate the offering, since it is an act of service that one cannot omit."

2. II:2: Said Raba, "If you should want to maintain that R. Simeon concurs with his son Eleazar b. R. Simeon, who has said, 'The area between the porch and the altar falls into the classification of "north of the altar,"' then improper intentionality expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughtering the animal concerning eating the meat at the wrong time will produce effect when it is expressed in connection with conveying the blood of sin offerings offered on the inner altar only concerning the movement from the entrance of the porch and inward. And if you should want to maintain that R. Simeon concurs with R. Judah, who has said, 'The whole inner part of the Temple court is classified as sanctified, then he will maintain that improper intentionality expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughtering the animal concerning eating the meat at the wrong time will produce effect when it is expressed in connection with removing the incense dishes only from the entrance of the hall containing the golden altar and outwards.

3. II:3: Said Abbaye to the precept of R. Hisda, "Ask R. Hisda, what is the rule if the blood is conveyed by a non-priest?" He said to him, "It is valid, and a verse of Scripture supports my view: 'And they killed the Passover lamb, and the priests

dashed the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them' (2Ch. 35:11)."

4. II:4: Both Rabbah and R. Joseph stated, "Whether or not conveying a blood by a non-priest invalidates the offering is subject to debate between R. Simeon and rabbis. For R. Simeon said, 'An act of service that can be omitted is not a part of the liturgy,' so conveying of the blood by a non-priest is valid. And from the viewpoint of rabbis who differ with his principle, it is invalid."

5. II:5: The question was raised: is carrying that does not involve moving a foot classified as carrying, or is it not classified as carrying?

6. II:6: It has been stated: Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, "Carrying that does not involve moving a foot is not classified as carrying. But is it possible, should such a thing take place, to straighten matters out, or is it not possible to straighten matters out?" Do we regard the carriage as simply having been omitted, in which case the blood can be taken back and the carriage performed, or do we regard the carriage as having been performed improperly, thus disqualifying the blood permanent, so that it cannot be repaired, and the sacrifice is consequently invalid?

7. II:7: It has been stated: Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, "Carrying that does not involve moving a foot is invalid. Therefore it is not possible to straighten matters out."

8. II:8: It has been stated: Whether or not carrying that does not involve moving a foot is valid or invalid represents a dispute between R. Simeon and rabbis. But as to carrying a substantial distance, all parties concur that it is invalid. Where there is a dispute, it concerns carrying only a small distance.

9. II:9: If a non-priest conveyed the blood, and a priest brought it back, and then he went and conveyed it himself — in that matter there was a disagreement between the sons of R. Hiyya and R. Yannai. One party said, "It is valid." And the other party said, "It is invalid."

IV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 2:1A-C

A. ALL ANIMAL OFFERINGS, THE BLOOD OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY A NON-PRIEST:

1. I:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know the rule covering the non-priest?

2. I:2: A member of the household of R. Ishmael presented the following as a Tannaite statement: "It derives by an argument a fortiori from the rule governing a priest who is blemished.

3. I:3: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a non-priest is admonished in this regard?

B. A PRIEST MOURNING HIS NEXT OF KIN:

1. II:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?

2. II:2: A member of the household of R. Ishmael repeated as a Tannaite formulation the following: "The rule derives by an argument from the rule that covers the blemished priest:

3. II:3: R. Mesharshayya said, “The rule may be derived from an argument a fortiori resting on the case of a priest who officiates while sitting down, namely:

4. II:4: All animal offerings, the blood of which a priest mourning his next of kin received — he has rendered it invalid: Said Raba, “This rule has been repeated only in connection with an offering in behalf of an individual, but in the case of a sacrifice performed in behalf of the community, it is accepted as a valid act of propitiation through the medium of the headplate worn by the high priest.

C. A PRIEST WHO WAS IN THE STATUS OF ONE WHO HAD IMMERSSED ON THAT SELFSAME DAY AND WAS AWAITING SUNSET TO COMPLETE THE RITES OF PURIFICATION TEBUL YOM:

1. III:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?

a. III:2: Said Rabbah, “How come Scripture has specified the rule item by item covering the unclean priest, the priest who has performed an act of purification and awaits sunset to complete the rite of purification, and the priest who has not yet fully carried out his required rite of atonement? These fall into the same classification, so a rule affecting the one applies to the other two. Why make them all explicit?

D. A PRIEST LACKING PROPER PRIESTLY GARMENTS:

1. IV:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we derive this rule?..So we have found the rule covering one who lacks priestly garments. How do we know it pertains to one who is drunk with wine?

2. IV:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: If the priestly garments trailed on the floor or did not reach the floor, if they were threadbare, and a priest officiated while wearing them, his act of service is valid. If he put on two pairs of pants, two girdles, if one garment was lacking, or if there was one too many, or if he had a bandage on a wound in his body, or if his garments were smeared or torn, and he performed an act of service, his act of service is invalid.

a. IV:3: Gloss of a detail of the analysis of the foregoing.

3. IV:4: Said R. Jeremiah of Difti, “The rule governing trailing garments that that were not lifted up is subject to a dispute among Tannaite authorities.”

E. TOPICAL APPENDIX ON THE RULES GOVERNING THE PRIESTLY GARMENTS

1. IV:5: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall put on his garment of linen:” this teaches that the garments are to be made of linen.

a. IV:6: And how do we know that the word translated linen actually bears the meaning that it must be flax linen?

I. IV:7: Gloss of proof-text in foregoing.

II. IV:8: Continuation of foregoing topical exposition.

A. IV:9: As above.

F. A PRIEST LACKING PROPER PRIESTLY GARMENTS: FURTHER EXPOSITION OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE PROPER PRIESTLY GARMENTS

1. IV:10: Raba raised the following question, “If wind blew through his garments, what is the rule? Is it that we require that the garment rest upon his flesh, and that

condition is not now met? Or perhaps this is quite routine as a way of wearing a garment so there is no disqualification?

2. IV:11: Mar b. R. Ashi asked the question, “If one’s hair entered beneath the garment, what is the rule? Is the hair deemed part of the body or not?”

3. IV:12: R. Zira raised the question: “As to one’s phylacteries, what is the rule on whether or not they interpose?”

G. A PRIEST WHOSE ATONEMENT IS NOT YET COMPLETE:

1. V:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this?

H. A PRIEST WHOSE HANDS AND FEET ARE NOT WASHED:

1. VI:1: “statute” derives its meaning from the use of the same word in connection with one who is not wearing the sufficient number of priestly garments and that is the source of the rule.

2. VI:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: A high priest who did not immerse and sanctify himself by washing the hands and the feet between putting on one garment and putting on another, or between one act of service and the next, but performed an act of service — his act of service remains valid. But all the same are a high priest and an ordinary priest who did not sanctify the hands and the feet through washing them prior to performing the act of service at dawn — the act of service is invalid (T. Kippurim 1:17).

I. TOPICAL APPENDIX ON THE RELIGIOUS DUTY OF SANCTIFYING HANDS AND FEET BY WASHING

1. VI:3 Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: How is the religious duty of sanctifying hands and feet by washing them carried out?

2. VI:4: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “If a priest has sanctified his hands and feet by day, he does not have to do so by night; if he did so by night, he has to do so by day,” the words of Rabbi. What is the scriptural basis for the position of Rabbi?

a. VI:5: When R. Dimi came, he said that R. Yohanan asked Ilfa, “From the viewpoint of him who maintains, ‘The passage of the night does not bear consequence for the sanctification of the hands and the feet in that, when the night passes, the previous act of sanctification is not null,’ what is the rule as to the water of the laver’s becoming unfit after the night has passed?”

b. VI:6: Said R. Yohanan, “If the priest has sanctified his hands and feet in connection with removing the ashes from the altar before dawn, he does not have to sanctify them again on the next day after dawn, because he has already done so at the beginning of his act of service.”

c. VI:7: The question was raised: What is the rule on whether or not the priest’s leaving the Temple court invalidates the prior sanctification of hands and feet? If you take the position that the passage of the night does not invalidate the washing of the hands and feet as Eleazar b. R. Simeon has now maintained, then that is so because the priest has not left the sacred precincts, but if he has gone out and left the Temple precincts, he no

longer concentrates on the rite. Or perhaps since he has the power to return and continue his service, he does not really interrupt his concentration on the rite.

I. VI:8: The question was raised: What is the status of uncleanness in regard to the sanctification of the hands and feet that is, if the priest's hands become unclean but not the rest of his body, does he have to sanctify the hands and feet once again? If you take the position that the reason that going out of the Temple court does not invalidate the sanctification, it is because the person overall remains valid for conducting the rite; but here the person is no longer fit for conducting the rite, so he no longer is concentrating on the rite. Or perhaps, since he is going to be fit again, he will still pay attention and so not cease to concentrate on the rite.

3. VI:9: The question was raised: What is the rule on the priest's sanctifying his hands and feet not by pouring water from the laver but by sticking them into the laver itself? Do we maintain that since the All-Merciful has said, "from it" (Exo. 30:19), the meaning is, with water poured from the laver, but not by sticking the hands and feet into the laver? Or perhaps the law would accept doing so even in the laver?

4. VI:10: Said R. Hiyya bar Joseph, "The water of the laver once the sun has set is invalid for use for purification the hands and feet in connection with the rite of sprinkling the blood of the sacrifice onto the alter or burning the residue of the meal offering, which rite, when carried out, will permit the parts of the beast available for eating by the priests to be eaten, just as the parts themselves are invalid if they are kept overnight."

a. VI:11: Gloss of a prior item.

5. VI:12: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "Whatever sort of liquid serves to complete the forty seahs of undrawn water required for an immersion pool serves likewise to make up the requisite volume of liquid for the laver enough water for four priests to sanctify hands and feet, though it may not make up the requisite volume of the quarter-log of water required for the washing of the hands prior to a meal."

6. VI:13: Said R. Jeremiah said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "The water of an immersion pool is fit for use for water in a laver" — though the former is not running water, it may be drawn into a laver.

J. AN UNCIRCUMCISED PRIEST:

1. VII:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this fact?

a. VII:2: Gloss of the foregoing proof-text.

K. AN UNCLEAN PRIEST:

1. VIII:1: Said the sages of the South, "This rule is repeated only in respect to one who has been made unclean by a dead creeping thing, but as to a priest who is unclean through corpse-uncleanness, since the priestly headplate propitiates despite uncleanness affecting the offering in the case of a sacrifice made in behalf

of the community, it also propitiates in this regard in the case of a sacrifice brought in behalf of an individual.”

a. VIII:2: Said Ulla, “R. Simeon b. Laqish criticized the position of the sages of the South in the following terms...”

L. A PRIEST WHO WAS SITTING DOWN:

1. IX:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?

a. IX:2: Gloss of the foregoing proof-text.

2. IX:3 Said Raba to R. Nahman, “Since one who performs the rite sitting down is comparable to a non-priest and profanes the service, then might we go on to maintain, just as a non-priest who performs the rite is subject to the death penalty, so one who performs the rite sitting down is subject to the death penalty? Then why has it been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘An uncircumcised priest, a priest in mourning for a close relative, and one who is sitting down, are not subject to the death penalty if they perform an act of service, but are merely admonished not to do so’?”

M. A PRIEST STANDING ON UTENSILS, ON A BEAST, ON THE FEET OF HIS FELLOW, — HE HAS RENDERED IT INVALID:

1. X:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?

a. X:2: Gloss of proofs.

2. X:3: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eliezer says, “If one foot was on a utensil and one on the pavement, one foot on a stone and one foot on the pavement, we consider the case: in any instance in which, if the utensil or the stone should be removed, the priest can yet stand on his other foot and perform the act of liturgy, then his act of liturgy is valid, but if not, his act of service is invalid” (T. **Zeb. 1:5H-L**).

a. X:4: Interstitial problem: R. Ammi raised this question: “If a paving stone was loose and he stood on it so shaking it, what is the law? In a case in which it is not his intention to fit the stone into the pavement, there is no question that the stone constitutes an interposition between him and the pavement. The question arises in connection with a case in which the priest fully intends to fit the stone back into the pavement. What then is the rule? Since he intends to fit the stone back into the pavement, it is as though it w

N. IF HE RECEIVED IT IN HIS LEFT HAND, HE HAS RENDERED THE SACRIFICE INVALID. R. SIMEON DECLARES VALID:

1. XI:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it on the horns of the altar” (Lev. 4:25) — “...shall take...” teaching that the receiving of the blood should be only with his right hand. “with his finger he shall take it,” teaching that the act of placing the blood should be performed only with the right hand.

a. XI:2: Secondary amplification of foregoing.

b. XI:3: Gloss of proof-text of XI.1.

V. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 2:1D

A. IF IT THE BLOOD WAS POURED ONTO THE FLOOR AND ONE THEN COLLECTED IT, IT IS INVALID.

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And the anointed priest shall take of the blood of the bullock” (Lev. 4: 5) — of the life-blood which spurts while the animal is dying, but not of the blood of the skin or of the residual blood that drains after death. “of the blood of the bullock” — he is to receive the blood directly from the bullock and not allow it to gush to the pavement and then gather it up, and if he does so, it is invalid for the rite.

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing.

B. TOPICAL APPENDIX: OTHER RULES ON THE COLLECTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE BLOOD OF SACRIFICIAL BEASTS

1. I:3: Said R. Judah said Samuel, “He who slaughters a beast must raise the knife upward, as it is said, ‘and he shall take of the blood of the bullock’ — but not of the blood of the bullock along with something else.”

2. I:4: Said R. Hisda said R. Jeremiah bar Abba, “He who slaughters an animal has to let the blood of the jugular veins run straight into the vessel.”

3. I:5: R. Assi asked R. Yohanan, “If one was receiving the blood and the sides of the bowl split before the blood reached the contained airspace of the blood, what is the law? Is an object that is in the air that will not eventually come to rest treated as though it has come to rest, or is that not the case?”

a. I:6: Continuing the problem of contained airspace: There we have learned in the Mishnah: If he placed under running water his hand or his foot or vegetable greens so that the water should flow into the barrel, it the water is unfit. If for this purpose he made use of leaves of reeds or nuts, it is fit. This is the principle: if one used something which is susceptible to uncleanness — it is unfit. And if one used something which is not susceptible to uncleanness — it is fit (M. **Par. 6:4A-C**). What is the scriptural basis for this rule?

4. I:7: R. Zira said Rab said, “He who slit the ear of a bull and afterward received the blood — it is invalid, as it is said, ‘And he shall take of the blood of the bullock’ (Lev. 16:14) — the bullock just as it had been prior to slaughter.”

5. I:8: Said R. Ammi said R. Eleazar, “If the beast is inside the Temple court and its foot outside, if someone cut off the legs and then slaughtered the animal, it is fit. If he slaughtered the beast and only then cut off the legs, it is fit.”

6. I:9: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Most Holy Things are to be slaughtered on the north side of the Temple court and their blood is to be received in utensils of service on the north side of the Temple court. If the priest stood in the southern part of the court and stretched out his hand into the north and slaughtered the beast, his act of slaughter is valid. If he received the blood in such a posture, it is invalid.

a. I:10: The father of Samuel asked Samuel, “What is the rule if the animal is inside the Temple court but the feet are outside?”

7. I:11: Said Abbaye, “In the case of offerings classified as Most Holy Things, all of the aforelisted actions are invalid, except for the one in which the priest suspended himself and performed the act of slaughter in airspace of the Temple courtyard. In the case of Lesser Holy Things, all of the aforelisted actions are valid, except for the one in which he suspended himself and received the blood” Here neither north nor on the side is mentioned; therefore the only invalid case is the exception in that that is not the way the rite is ordinarily carried on.

8. I:12: R. Jeremiah asked R. Zira, “If the priest is inside the Temple court but the locks of his hair are outside, what is the law?”

VI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 2:1E-K

A. IFA PRIEST WHO WAS FIT SPRINKLED IT THE BLOOD ON THE RAMP, NOT BY THE ALTAR BASE, IF ONE SPRINKLED THOSE DROPS OF BLOOD WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED BELOW THE RED LINE AROUND THE ALTAR, ABOVE THE RED LINE AROUND THE ALTAR, AND THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED ABOVE THE RED LINE AROUND THE ALTAR, BELOW THE RED LINE AROUND THE ALTAR, THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED INSIDE THAT IS, THE INNER ALTAR, OUTSIDE ON THE OUTER ALTAR, AND THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED OUTSIDE ON THE OUTER ALTAR, INSIDE THAT IS, THE INNER ALTAR — IT IS INVALID. AND PUNISHMENT BY EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT:

1. I:1: Said Samuel, “While the meat of the animal is unfit, the owners have attained atonement. What is the scriptural basis for this position? Scripture has said, ‘And I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement’ (Lev. 17:11) — once the blood of the sacrificial beast has reached the altar, the owners have attained atonement. Contrary to the view of Samuel, that the sense of the Mishnah’s statement that the offering is unfit is that while the meat of the animal is unfit, the owners have attained atonement, R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “In point of fact when the Mishnah says, ‘unfit,’ that is meant literally and the whole offering is invalid. R. Yohanan said, “Both cases the Mishnah-paragraph before us, which states that the upshot is an unfit offering, and the Mishnah-paragraph just now cited, which teaches that the blood has to be sprinkled again address a case in which the officiating priest has sprinkled the blood in silence, and still the operative principle is that doing so in the wrong place is not tantamount to doing so in the right place. But the one rule applies where the life-blood is still gushing, and the other deals with a case in which it is not still gushing.”

a. I:2: Secondary development of the foregoing dispute.

I. I:3: Tannaite counterpart to the foregoing dispute.

II. I:4: Continuation of foregoing.

VII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 2:2

A. HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THE ANIMAL OFFERING INTENDING TO TOSS ITS BLOOD OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE COURT, OR PART OF ITS BLOOD OUTSIDE, TO BURN ITS SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS OUTSIDE, OR PART OF ITS SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS OUTSIDE, TO EAT ITS MEAT OUTSIDE OR AN OLIVE'S BULK OF ITS MEAT OUTSIDE, OR TO EAT AN OLIVE'S BULK OF THE SKIN OF THE FAT TAIL OUTSIDE

1. I:1: It was assumed that the skin of the fat-tail is to be classified as the fat-tail, in which case there is the following difficulty: surely the priest has formed an intention concerning a human being's eating what is in point of fact consumed by the altar and such an intentionality should be null and produce no effects! Said Samuel, "Who is the authority of this rule? It is R. Eliezer, who takes the view that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat.

a. I:2: R. Huna said, "The skin of the fat-tail is not to be classified as the fat-tail." R. Hisda said, "In point of fact "The skin of the fat-tail is to be classified as the fat-tail, but here in our Mishnah's rule with what case do we deal? It is the fat-tail of a goat which is not burned on the altar." Now all of the cited scholars do not state matters in line with Samuel, for they did not wish to assign the opening clause of the rule to R. Eliezer and the closing clause to rabbis. And, further, they did not wish to state matters in line with the view of R. Huna, because they do maintain that the skin of the fat tail is classified as is the fat tail itself. But why do they not concur with R. Hisda?

B. ...IT IS INVALID. BUT PUNISHMENT BY EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT IN THE CASE OF THE PRIEST WHO EATS THEREOF:

HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THE ANIMAL OFFERING, INTENDING TO TOSS ITS BLOOD ON THE NEXT DAY, OR PART OF ITS BLOOD ON THE NEXT DAY, TO BURN ITS SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS ON THE NEXT DAY, OR PART OF ITS SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS ON THE NEXT DAY, TO EAT ITS MEAT ON THE NEXT DAY, OR PART OF ITS MEAT ON THE NEXT DAY, OR AN OLIVE'S BULK OF THE SKIN OF THE FAT TAIL ON THE NEXT DAY — IT IS REFUSE. AND THEY WHO EAT IT, EVEN AT THE PROPER TIME ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT TO PUNISHMENT BY EXTIRPATION.

1. II:1: What is the scriptural source for the rule at hand

2. II:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: And if any of the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day" (Lev. 7:18) — Said R. Eliezer, "Pay attention to listen to what this passage states. Scripture speaks of one who simply intends to eat the meat of his sacrifice on the third day. But perhaps that is not the case, but it speaks rather of one who actually does eat the meat of the sacrifice on the third day? You may reply as follows: after it has become fit, is it going then to become unfit later on?"

VIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 2:3-5

A. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: WHOEVER SLAUGHTERS, OR RECEIVES THE BLOOD, OR CONVEYS THE BLOOD, OR SPRINKLES THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY EATEN MEAT, OR TO BURN SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY BURNED ENTRAILS, OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE WHICH IS, THE TEMPLE COURT FOR MOST HOLY THINGS, THE WALLED CITY OF JERUSALEM FOR LESSER HOLY THINGS — IT IS INVALID AND THE MEAT MAY NOT BE EATEN. AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT. WHOEVER SLAUGHTERS, OR RECEIVES THE BLOOD, OR CONVEYS THE BLOOD, OR SPRINKLES (THE BLOOD), INTENDING TO EAT SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY EATEN, TO BURN SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME — IT IS REFUSE. AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT TO EXTIRPATION EVEN IF DESPITE THEIR DECLARED INTENTION, THEY ACTUALLY EAT THE MEAT WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT. AND THE FOREGOING RULE APPLIES ON CONDITION THAT WHAT RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE THE BLOOD, WHICH PERMITS THE SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS TO BE BURNED ON THE ALTAR AND THE MEAT TO BE EATEN BY THE PRIEST OR OWNER, THAT IS, THE PROPER SPRINKLING OR TOSsing OF THE BLOOD IS OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. HOW IS “WHAT RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT”? IF ONE SLAUGHTERED IN SILENCE LACKING IMPROPER INTENT, BUT RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND SPRINKLED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, OR IF ONE SLAUGHTERED INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF THE PROPER TIME, RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND SPRINKLED THE BLOOD IN SILENCE LACKING IMPROPER INTENT, OR IF HE SLAUGHTERED, RECEIVED THE BLOOD, AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND SPRINKLED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME — THIS IS A CASE IN WHICH WHAT RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE IS OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. HOW IS “WHAT RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE NOT OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT”? IF ONE SLAUGHTERED INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PLACE, RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND TOSSED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS TIME, OR IF ONE SLAUGHTERED INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME, RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND TOSSED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PLACE, OR IF ONE SLAUGHTERED, RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND CONVEYED THE BLOOD AND TOSSED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PLACE — THE PASSOVER AND THE SIN OFFERING WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME THAT IS, THE BEAST WAS DESIGNATED AS A PASSOVER OR A SIN OFFERING BUT WAS SLAUGHTERED FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT ORIGINALLY HAD BEEN DESIGNATED — THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE ALSO RECEIVED AND CONVEYED AND TOSSED INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF THEIR PROPER TIME, OR WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED INTENDING TO EAT OR BURN THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF THEIR PROPER TIME, AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE RECEIVED AND CONVEYED AND TOSSED NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME THAT IS, THE BEAST WAS DESIGNATED AS A PASSOVER OR A SIN OFFERING BUT WAS SLAUGHTERED FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT HAD BEEN

DESIGNATED — OR WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED, RECEIVED, AND CONVEYED AND TOSSED NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME THAT IS, THE BEAST WAS DESIGNATED AS A PASSOVER OR A SIN OFFERING BUT WAS SLAUGHTERED FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT HAD BEEN DESIGNATED — THIS IS A CASE IN WHICH WHAT RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE IS NOT OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED AN ANIMAL OFFERING AND RECEIVED, CONVEYED, AND TOSSED THE BLOOD INTENDING — TO EAT AN OLIVE’S BULK OUTSIDE THE PROPER PLACE AND AN OLIVE’S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY AT AN IMPROPER TIME, AN OLIVE’S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY AND AN OLIVE’S BULK OUTSIDE, HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK OUTSIDE AND HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY, HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY AND HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK OUTSIDE — IT IS UNFIT. BUT EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT.

SAID R. JUDAH, “THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING TIME CAME BEFORE THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING THE PLACE, IT IS REFUSE, AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT FOR EXTIRPATION. AND IF THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING THE PLACE CAME BEFORE THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING THE TIME, IT IS INVALID. AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO HIM.” AND SAGES SAY, “THIS AND THAT ARE INVALID. AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO HIM:”

1. I:1: Said Ilfa, “The dispute between Judah and sages, M. 2:5G-I concerns two acts of service, but in the case of a single act of service, all parties concur that what we have is a mingling of two aspects of intentionality.” Judah concurs that where both aspects of intentionality are expressed in connection with the same act of service, the sacrificial animal is not classified as refuse but only as unfit, and that is so even if the intentionality that will have imposed the status of refuse preceded the one that will have merely rendered the offering unfit.” And R. Yohanan said, “Even in a case of a single act of service Judah will maintain that same position.”

2. I:2: We have learned in the Mishnah: “He who with peace offerings and burnt offerings before him says, ‘Lo, this unconsecrated beast is the substitute of a burnt offering and the substitute of peace offerings,’ lo, this is classified solely as the substitute of a burnt offering,” the words of R. Meir. Said R. Yosé, “If to begin with he intended thus, his words are confirmed, since it is not possible to designate them by two names at once. But if after he said, ‘It is the substitute of a burnt offering,’ he changed his mind and said, ‘It is the substitute of peace offerings,’ lo, this is the substitute of a burnt offering” (M. Tem. 5:4A-C). The question was raised: If the man had said, “Lo, this is a substitute for a burnt offering and peace offering,” or, “Lo, this animal is a substitute for half of a burnt offering and half of a peace offering,” what is the law?

B. A TOPICAL APPENDIX: FORMING THE REQUISITE VOLUME TO INCUR A PENALTY: THE JOINING TOGETHER OF DISTINCT HALF-OLIVE’S BULKS SUBJECTED TO IMPROPER INTENTIONALITY

a. I:3: Gloss of a detail in the reading of the foregoing: Said Ulla, and some say, R. Oshaia, “Is it possible that our Babylonian colleagues know whether the formulation of our Mishnah-paragraph is ‘as much as an olive’s bulk...as much as an olive’s bulk...,’ or ‘about as much as an olive’s

bulk...and about as much as an olive's bulk.' At stake in the answer to the question is this: have we learned in the Mishnah, 'as much as an olive's bulk...as much as an olive's bulk...', but if the man said, 'about as much as an olive's bulk...and about as much as an olive's bulk,' all would concur that here we have a confusion of distinct aspects of intentionality in which case the offering is not deemed refuse. Or perhaps we have learned to formulate our Mishnah as, 'about as much as an olive's bulk...and about as much as an olive's bulk,' with the result that from R. Judah's perspective, this would then constitute an articulated enumeration in which case each forms a distinct statement and there is no confusion of aspects of intentionality, with the result that we are guided by the first of the two statements alone. And all the more so would that be his position if the man had said, 'as much as an olive's bulk...as much as an olive's bulk....'"

b. I:4: It has been stated: If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating a half olive's bulk outside of the proper time and a half olive's bulk outside of the proper place and a half olive's bulk after the proper time — Said Raba, "The question of refuse is then aroused as is one who has been asleep" And R. Hamnuna said, "This is a case of the confusion of distinct aspects of intentionality."

c. I:5 When R. Dimi came, he said, "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating half an olive's bulk of the offering outside of the proper place and half outside of the proper time, and then half an olive's bulk outside of the proper time, Bar Qappara repeated as the Tannaite formulation, 'The offering is classified as refuse, for a statement in regard to half an olive's bulk of meat has no effect in a case in which a statement has been made in regard to an entire olive's bulk of the meat.'"

d. I:6: Said R. Yannai, "If the officiating priest formed the intention that dogs eat the meat on the next day, the offering is forthwith rendered refuse, for it is written, 'And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel' (2Ki. 9:10) and the act of eating performed by dogs is classified as an effective act of eating imparting the status of food to what they eat, as much as if the priest had thought that he himself would eat the meat."

e. I:7: R. Ashi raised this question: "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of having the olive's bulk of meat eaten improperly by two distinct individuals, what is the rule? Are we guided by the intentionality, in which case the intention of the priest has affected a sufficient volume of meat, or are we guided by the ones who are supposed to eat the meat, and there is then not a sufficient volume of the meat?"

f. I:8: Raba raised this question: "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating an olive's bulk of the meat during a span of time greater than it takes to eat a half a loaf of bread, what is the rule? The eating of forbidden food in general is punishable only if as much as an olive's bulk of the forbidden food is eaten during the time of an ordinary meal, but not merely nibbled over a long period of time. Do we draw an analogy in the present case to the span of time required for eating the sacrificial parts that

are burned up on the altar by the Most High, or do we draw an analogy in the present case to the span of time required for eating an ordinary meal by human beings?”

C. IF ONE INTENDS TO EAT HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK AND TO BURN HALF AN OLIVE’S BULK, THE OFFERING IS VALID. FOR EATING AND BURNING ARE NOT JOINED TOGETHER.

1. II:1: The operative consideration here is that the intentionality concerns eating and burning. But if the officiating priest expressed the intentionality of eating what is fit for eating and of eating what is not fit for eating that is, he would burn the sacrificial parts, which are not fit for eating, then they would combine. But the first clause nonetheless teaches, Whoever slaughters, or receives the blood, or conveys the blood, or sprinkles the blood intending to eat something which is usually eaten meat, or to burn something which is usually burned entrails, outside of its proper place which is, the Temple court for Most Holy Things, the walled city of Jerusalem for Lesser Holy Things — it is invalid and the meat may not be eaten. And extirpation does not apply to it (M. 2:3B). So the rule applies to what is usually eaten, but not to what is not usually eaten! Said R. Jeremiah, “Who is the authority behind this rule? It is R. Eliezer, who takes the view that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat.

IX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 3:1-2

A. ALL UNFIT PEOPLE WHO IN BEHALF OF THE TEMPLE CULT SLAUGHTERED AN ANIMAL DESIGNATED FOR A SACRIFICE — THEIR ACT OF SLAUGHTER IS VALID. FOR AN ACT OF SLAUGHTER IN GENERAL, NOT IN THE CULT IS VALID WHEN DONE BY NON-PRIESTS, WOMEN, SLAVES, AND UNCLEAN MEN — EVEN IN THE CASE OF THEIR SLAUGHTERING MOST HOLY THINGS. AND THIS IS SO ON CONDITION THAT THE UNCLEAN PEOPLE DO NOT TOUCH THE MEAT. THEREFORE THEY WHO ARE LISTED ABOVE ALSO HAVE THE POWER TO INVALIDATE THE OFFERING THEY HAVE SLAUGHTERED BY IMPROPER INTENTION IN THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING.

1. I:1: If such a person slaughtered a beast, after the fact it is a valid action, but to begin with, such a person should not do so.

2. I:2: But is it the fact that, after the fact, an unclean person may indeed carry out an act of slaughter? In contradiction of that allegation is a cited passage.

a. I:3: Amplification on a secondary point in the foregoing: Said R. Simeon

b. Laqish, “An unclean person who poked his hands inside the Temple court is flogged, for it is said, ‘She shall not touch any Holy Things nor come into the sanctuary’ (Lev. 12:4) — Scripture thereby treats as analogous entering the sanctuary and touching the Holy Things. Just as partially touching something is classified as wholly doing so even though one does not touch the thing with the whole of his body, so partially entering the sanctuary is treated as equivalent to wholly entering it.”

I. I:4: Gloss of a text cited in the foregoing: What does the Tannaite authority take as his premise when he says, All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter, except for this one, which was at the gate of Nicanor. And all the layings on of hands that are done in the sanctuary take place at the northern side of the altar, except for this one, which was at Nicanor's gate. For he cannot enter the courtyard until some of the blood of his sin offering and his guilt offering is sprinkled on him? If he takes as his premise that laying on of hands on the guilt offering of the person healed of the skin ailment is by the authority of the Torah, and the rule that All layings on of hands that take place in the sanctuary require that forthwith after the laying on of hands come the act of slaughter likewise is by the authority of the Torah, then let the healed person who was afflicted with the skin ailment go right on and lay hands, since the All-Merciful has prescribed doing just that!

II. I:5: Secondary development of another aspect of I.3. Rabina said, "The position of Ulla, that poking only part of one's body into the Temple area is tantamount to poking the whole of one's body there is stated only with reference to the penalty of flogging but not in respect to extirpation."

A. I:6: Secondary gloss of a detail of the foregoing.

B. I:7: Extension of the foregoing: It has been stated: He who brings up limbs of an unclean beast onto the altar — R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is flogged." R. Yohanan said, "He is not flogged."

B. BUT ALL OF THEM WHO ARE UNFIT WHO RECEIVED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT THE MEAT OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME OR OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, IF THE LIFEBLOOD SUITABLE FOR TOSSING STILL REMAINED IN THE BEAST, THAT IS, THE BLOOD WHICH GUSHES AT THE MOMENT OF DEATH — A FIT PERSON SHOULD GO AND WITH PROPER INTENTION RECEIVE IT SINCE THE IMPROPER INTENTION OF UNFIT PEOPLE IS NULL IN RESPECT TO RECEIVING, CONVEYING, AND TOSSING THE BLOOD:

1. II:1: R. Simeon b. Laqish raised the following question: of R. Yohanan, "Can an unfit person place in the status of a residue the blood that is in the throat of the beast?" If an unfit person sprinkles the blood, can a fit person make the sacrifice valid by catching more blood from the animal's throat and sprinkling it? Or do we say, once this unfit person has sprinkled the blood, what still remains in the throat is regarded as merely the residue of the blood, which cannot be used for sprinkling, and therefore the sacrifice is invalid.

2. II:2: R. Zebid repeated as a Tannaite statement the issue in the following formulation: "R. Simeon b. Laqish raised the following question: of R. Yohanan, 'Can the use of an unfit cup of blood render blood in the throat of the beast a residue?'"

3. II:3: R. Jeremiah of Difti repeated as a Tannaite statement the issue in the following formulation: "Abbaye asked Rabbah, 'Does one cup of blood have the

power to render what is in another cup into residue?” If the blood of a sin offering was received in two cups, and all the sprinklings were performed out of one, is the blood in the other regarded as residue, to be poured out at the foot of the altar in line with Lev. 4:7? Or do we say that by not using it he intentionally rejected it, and therefore it is simply poured out into the sewer in the Temple court?

C. IF A FIT PERSON RECEIVED THE BLOOD AND HANDED IT OVER TO AN UNFIT PERSON, WITHOUT CONVEYING IT HE THE UNFIT ONE SHOULD RETURN IT TO THE FIT PERSON. IF HE RECEIVED THE BLOOD IN HIS RIGHT HAND AND PUT IT INTO HIS LEFT, HE SHOULD RETURN IT TO HIS RIGHT HAND. IF HE RECEIVED IT IN A SACRED UTENSIL AND PUT IT INTO AN UNCONSECRATED UTENSIL, HE SHOULD PUT IT BACK INTO A SACRED UTENSIL. IF AFTER THE BLOOD WAS RECEIVED IN A UTENSIL, IT POURED FROM THE UTENSIL ONTO THE PAVEMENT AND ONE GATHERED IT UP, IT IS VALID. IF HE WHO WAS UNFIT TOSSED IT ON THE RAMP, NOT AGAINST THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALTAR, IF HE TOSSED THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TOSSED BELOW, ABOVE, OR THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TOSSED ABOVE, BELOW, THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TOSSED INSIDE, OUTSIDE, OR THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TOSSED OUTSIDE, INSIDE, IF THE LIFELOOD STILL REMAINED IN THE BEAST, A SUITABLE PERSON SHOULD GO AND RECEIVE IT AND REPEAT THE SPRINKLINGS.

1. III:1: All of these cases had to be articulated. For if we were informed only about the rule governing the unfit person, I might have supposed that the indicative trait of the unfit person is that it is a priest who is unclean but otherwise eligible for the rite, but a left-handed priest would not then fall into that classification, since he is not eligible to begin with.

2. III:2: But if the blood was fit in the first place but rejected on any of the specified counts, why not treat the blood as rejected?

a. III:3: Gloss of a proof-text in the foregoing.

a. III:4: Continuing the foregoing.

X. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 3:3-5

A. HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE INTENDING TO EAT SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT USUALLY EATEN, TO BURN SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT USUALLY BURNED — THE OFFERING NONETHELESS IS VALID. R. ELIEZER DECLARES INVALID. IF HE DOES SO INTENDING TO EAT SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY EATEN, OR TO BURN SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY BURNED, BUT THE INTENTIONALLY CONCERNED IN VOLUME LESS THAN AN OLIVE’S BULK OF MEAT, THE OFFERING IS VALID. IF HE DOES SO INTENDING TO EAT A HALF-OLIVE’S BULK, AND TO BURN A HALF-OLIVE’S BULK IN AN IMPROPER MANNER, IT IS VALID. FOR EATING AND BURNING DO NOT JOIN TOGETHER.

HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THE ANIMAL OFFERING INTENDING TO EAT AN OLIVE’S BULK OF THE HIDE, THE GREASE, THE SEDIMENT JELLY, THE FLAYED-OFF MEAT OFFAL, THE BONES, THE TENDONS, THE HOOVES, THE HORNS, OUTSIDE OF THE PROPER TIME OR OUTSIDE OF THE PROPER PLACE — IT IS VALID. AND THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT FOR VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE, REMNANT, OR UNCLEANNES.

HE WHO SLAUGHTERS FEMALE CONSECRATED ANIMALS INTENDING TO EAT THE FOETUS OR THE AFTERBIRTH OUTSIDE THE PROPER PLACE OR TIME HAS NOT RENDERED THE SACRIFICE REFUSE FOR THESE ARE NOT USUALLY EATEN. HE WHO WRINGS THE NECKS OF TURTLEDOVES INSIDE INTENDING TO EAT THEIR EGGS OUTSIDE THE PROPER PLACE OR TIME HAS NOT RENDERED THE SACRIFICE REFUSE. AS TO THE MILK OF FEMALE CONSECRATED BEASTS AND THE EGGS OF TURTLEDOVES WHICH ARE NOT INTEGRAL TO THE BODY OF THE SACRIFICE — THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT IN RESPECT TO THE LAWS OF REFUSE, REMNANT, AND UNCLEANNES.

1. I:1: Said R. Eleazar, “If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the animal that is being sacrificed, then the status of the foetus is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the foetus inside the animal that is being sacrificed, then the status of the mother is not the same and it is not deemed refuse. If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the offal, then the status of the crop is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the crop, then the status of the offal is not the same and it is not deemed refuse. If the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the parts that are to be burned on the altar, then the status of the bullocks is the same and it is deemed refuse. But if the priest expressed an intentionality that would classify the offering as refuse in regard to the bullocks, then the status of the parts that are to be burned on the altar is not the same and it is not deemed refuse.”

2. I:2: There we have learned in the Mishnah: As to animals that are blemished — R. Aqiba declares valid in the case of animals which are blemished. Thus if they have gone up onto the altar, they should not go down. R. Hananiah, Prefect of the Priests, says, “Father did reject animals which had been blemished even from on top of the altar” (M. **Zeb. 9:3C-F**). Said R. Hiyya b. Abba said R. Yohanan, “R. Aqiba declares blemished animals to be valid only in the case of cataracts in the eye, since birds that have such cataracts are fit for the altar, and only if they were designated as Holy Things prior to the advent of the blemish. And he concedes that a female animal designated as a burnt offering is removed from the altar, because that is a blemish vis à vis that particular offering, which must be a male animal that took place prior to the consecration.”

XI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 3:6

A. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED IT AN ANIMAL SACRIFICE ON CONDITION OF LEAVING OVER ITS BLOOD AND NOT TO TOSS IT OR ITS SACRIFICIAL PARTS AND NOT TO OFFER THEM UP FOR THE NEXT DAY, OR TO TAKE THEM OUTSIDE — R. JUDAH DECLARES INVALID AS WOULD BE THE CASE IF THE OFFICIANT ACTUALLY DID SO. AND SAGES DECLARE VALID.

IF HE SLAUGHTERED IT ON CONDITION THAT HE INTENDED TO SPRINKLE IT ON THE RAMP, NOT AT THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALTAR, TO SPRINKLE THOSE WHICH ARE

TO BE SPRINKLED BELOW, ABOVE, OR THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED ABOVE, BELOW, THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED INSIDE, OUTSIDE OR THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE SPRINKLED OUTSIDE, INSIDE — THAT UNCLEAN PEOPLE EAT IT, THAT UNCLEAN PEOPLE OFFER IT UP, THAT UNCIRCUMCISED PRIESTS EAT IT, THAT UNCIRCUMCISED PRIESTS OFFER IT UP, TO BREAK THE BONES OF THE PASSOVER OR TO EAT OF IT WHILE IT IS RAW TO MIX ITS BLOOD WITH THE BLOOD OF UNFIT BEASTS — IT IS VALID. FOR IMPROPER INTENTION INVALIDATES ONLY IN RESPECT TO EATING THE MEAT OR BURNING THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE OR OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME AND, IN RESPECT TO THE PASSOVER AND THE SIN OFFERING, IMPROPER INTENTION INVALIDATES WHEN THIS INVOLVES SLAUGHTERING THEM NOT FOR THEIR OWN NAME NOT FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS A HOLY THING.

1. I:1: What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Judah?

a. I:2: And why should R. Judah not take issue in all of the other matters as well that are listed in the Mishnah-paragraph, reasoning as he does in the case at hand?

b. I:3 And does R. Judah really take the view that if the priest slaughtered a sin offering at the south side of the altar instead of the proper place at the north, he is liable on that account?

c. I:4: Said Raba, “But R. Judah concedes that the priest may then go and impart to the offering the status of refuse.” If the priest intended to leave the blood for the next day or carry it outside; although Judah holds that he thereby disqualifies the sacrifice, yet if he intended at a later service to eat the meat after the proper time, he makes it refuse. This is so in spite of the fact that generally speaking an intention that would result in making the offering refuse is operative only when there is no other disqualification, such as intending to eat it outside of the proper time.

2. I:5: Said R. Hisda said Rabina bar Sila, “If the officiating priest expressed the intention that unclean persons would eat the meat on the next day, he is liable on the count of having rendered the offering refuse.” We do not say that this is not an efficacious intention in respect to refuse, since the unclean may not eat the meat at any time.

XII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 4:1-2

A. THE HOUSE OF SHAMMAI SAY, “IN THE CASE OF ANY OFFERING, THE TOSSINGS OF THE BLOOD OF WHICH ARE TO BE PLACED ON THE OUTER ALTAR, IF ON THE OUTER ALTAR ONE PROPERLY TOSSED ONE TOSsing OF BLOOD, HAS EFFECTED ATONEMENT:

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that in the case of any offering, the tossings of the blood of which are to be placed on the outer altar, if on the outer altar one properly tossed one tossing of blood, has effected atonement? Scripture states, “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out” (Deu. 12:27) stated in the singular, hence one sprinkling of blood suffices.

a. I:2: But is that verse of Scripture required for that purpose? Surely it is needed in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:

b. I:3: But still, is that verse of Scripture required for that purpose? Surely it is needed in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:

c. I:4: But still, is that verse of Scripture required for that purpose? Surely it is needed in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:

I. I:5: Secondary development of the foregoing.

d. I:6: Now in respect to all of these Tannaite verses that utilize the cited verse, “the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out” for purposes other than that designated at the outset, how, for their part, do they derive from Scripture the rule: that in the case of any offering, the tossings of the blood of which are to be placed on the outer altar, if on the outer altar one properly tossed one tossing of blood, has effected atonement?

B. “BUT IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING, TWO TOSSINGS PROPERLY TOSSED ON THE OUTER ALTAR ARE REQUIRED TO EFFECT ATONEMENT.”

1. II:1: Said R. Huna, “What is the scriptural basis for the position of the House of Shammai? Scripture uses the plural form of the word for horns three times, meaning that six applications of blood are required so four are prescribed and two are essential. But the House of Hillel maintain that the written forms are given in the singular twice, in the plural once, thus four are required, three prescribed, but one essential.”

a. II:2: Further instance of the same exegetical principle.

b. II:3: As above.

2. II:4: Now the Tannaite authority whose version follows adduces the ruling of the House of Hillel as follows: The word, “He shall make atonement” occurs three times at Lev. 4:26, 31, 35 in connection with the sin-offering demonstrating that if the blood is properly tossed even one time only, that suffices to attain atonement in the case of a sin-offering. The reason for that repeated stress is on account of a possible logical argument to the contrary which, by formulating matters as it does, Scripture forestalls.

a. II:5: But must not Scripture say, “and he shall make atonement” to indicate that each sin is atoned for by its sin-offering, and hence the reference is required on its own? Said Raba bar Adda, “Mari explained it to me: ‘Scripture has said, “And he shall make atonement...and he shall be forgiven” — atonement and forgiveness fall into the same classification in which case the reference to “he shall atone” indeed is superfluous and available for the indicated purpose.’”

b. II:6: Continuation of the argument of the foregoing.

C. THE HOUSE OF SHAMMAI SAY, “IN THE CASE OF ANY OFFERING, THE TOSSINGS OF THE BLOOD OF WHICH ARE TO BE PLACED ON THE OUTER ALTAR, IF ON THE OUTER ALTAR ONE PROPERLY TOSSED ONE TOSSING OF BLOOD, HAS EFFECTED ATONEMENT. BUT IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING, TWO TOSSINGS PROPERLY TOSSED ON THE OUTER ALTAR ARE REQUIRED TO EFFECT ATONEMENT

1. III:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “The House of Shammai say, ‘Two proper acts of applying the blood in the case of the sin offering, and one in the case of all other offerings, permit the meat to be eaten and if accompanied by an articulated, inappropriate intention impart to the offering the status of refuse.’ Only if the intentionality that yields the status of refuse is expressed during both applications does the sin offering become refuse. Since both are essential, each act of sprinkling serves only to complete half of the disposition of the parts of the beast that render the remainder permitted for eating; each act on its own is insufficient then to sustain the intentionality of that would classify the offering as refuse. “And the House of Hillel say, ‘All the same are the sin offering, and all other offerings, — one proper act of applying the blood permits the meat to be eaten and if accompanied by an articulated, inappropriate intention impart to the offering the status of refuse” (T. [Zeb. 4:9A-D](#)).

2. III:2: Said R. Yohanan, “The three final applications of blood for sin offerings may not be done at night. They may be done after the death of the person who presented the offering. And he who carries them out outside of the Temple courtyard is liable.”

3. III:3: Said R. Pappa, “In some aspects the final three applications of blood for sin offerings are comparable to the initial application of blood, and in some aspects the final three applications of blood are comparable to the residue of the animal’s blood. In respect to sprinkling the blood outside of the Temple, court, at night, by non-priests, in a utensil that has been consecrated for service, sprinkling upon the horn of the altar, sprinkling with the finger, the washing off of the blood if it spurts onto the priest’s garment in the first application, which must be done if the blood used for the first application spurts; that must be washed off in the holy place itself, and the disposition of the residue.”

a. III:4: With reference to the cited passage, If the blood spurted from the horn or from the foundation of the altar, it does not require washing, Rabina said, “‘...from the horn...’ is meant literally, but ‘from the base’ refers to blood that is fit for the base.”

D. AND THE HOUSE OF HILLEL SAY, “EVEN IN THE CASE OF A SIN OFFERING, THE TOSSING OF THE BLOOD OF WHICH WAS PROPERLY PLACED IN THE CASE OF ONE PLACING, HAS EFFECTED ATONEMENT.” THEREFORE IF ONE PLACED THE FIRST TOSSING OF THE BLOOD IN THE PROPER MANNER IN SILENCE, BUT THE SECOND ARTICULATLY INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PORTION) OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, THE OFFERING IS VALID AND IT HAS EFFECTED ATONEMENT. THE FIRST PLACING OF THE BLOOD SUFFICED. IF ONE PLACED THE FIRST INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PORTION OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME, AND THE SECOND OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, THE OFFERING IS REFUSE THAT WHICH PERMITS THE OFFERING TO BE EATEN HAVING BEEN OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT, AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT FOR EXTIRPATION.

IN THE CASE OF ANY ANIMAL OFFERING, THE TOSSINGS OF THE BLOOD OF WHICH ARE TO BE PLACED ON THE INNER ALTAR, IF ONE OMITTED ONE OF THE ACTS OF TOSSING OF BLOOD, THE OFFERING HAS NOT EFFECTED ATONEMENT.

1. IV:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: With reference to the sin offering presented in behalf of the entire community, which is offered on the inner altar, “Then shall he do with the bullock as he did with the bullock of the sin offering, so shall he do with this” (Lev. 4:20) — how come Scripture duplicates the statement of the law of sprinkling? It is to teach that if the priest omitted one of the applications of the blood on the horn of the altar, he has done nothing at all. The sacrifice is null.

a. IV:2: Gloss of foregoing.

b. IV:3: Gloss of foregoing.

c. IV:4: Gloss of foregoing.

d. IV:5: Gloss of foregoing.

e. IV:6: Gloss of foregoing.

E. THEREFORE, IF ONE TOSSED ALL OF THEM IN THE PROPER MANNER, BUT ONE OF THEM NOT IN ITS PROPER MANNER, IT IS INVALID. BUT EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT:.

1. V:1: There we have learned in the Mishnah: If one formed and expressed an improper intention, such that he has made refuse the handful of meal for the meal offering but not the frankincense, the frankincense but not the handful — R. Meir says, “It is refuse, and they are liable on its account to extirpation.” And sages say, “Extirpation does not apply to it, until through improper intention to eat or offer up the whole outside the proper time he will render refuse the whole of that which renders the offering permissible.” And sages concur with R. Meir in the case of the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of a woman accused of adultery neither of which is accompanied by incense, that if one has imparted the status of refuse to the handful of the meal offering, it is refuse, and they are liable to extirpation on its account. For it is solely the handful of meal offering which renders the offering permissible (M. **Men. 2:5A-D**). Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “Do not draw the conclusion from the issue above, that if one formed and expressed an improper intention, such that he has made refuse the handful of meal for the meal offering but not the frankincense, the frankincense but not the handful that the operative consideration behind the ruling is that an improper intentionality yielding the classification of the offering as refuse that concerns only half of the disposition of the rites that permit the offering to be eaten actually does bear the consequence of rendering the offering refuse. Rather, with what sort of case do we deal here? It is one in which the priest presented the handful of the meal offering on the altar along with the articulated intention that would render the offering refuse, but then he put on the frankincense on the offering in commendable silence there being no improper intentionality connected with this other phase of the offering of the meal offering. Meir takes the position that whatever the priest does is treated as an expression of the initially attitude taken in the rite. And that improper intentionality, therefore, governed the entire matter, beginning to end.

a. V:2: Gloss of foregoing.

b. V:3: As above.

I. V:4: As above.

XIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 4:3-4

A. THESE ARE THINGS ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH THEY ARE NOT LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW OF REFUSE: THE HANDFUL, AND THE FRANKINCENSE, AND THE INCENSE OFFERING EXO. 30: 7-8, AND THE MEAL OFFERING OF THE PRIESTS, AND THE MEAL OFFERING OF THE ANOINTED PRIEST LEV. 6:15, AND THE MEAL OFFERING WHICH ACCOMPANIES THE DRINK OFFERINGS, AND THE BLOOD. “AND DRINK OFFERINGS WHICH COME BY THEMSELVES BUT NOT THOSE WHICH COME WITH A SACRIFICE, VS. NO. 6,” THE WORDS OF R. MEIR. AND SAGES SAY, “ALSO: THOSE WHICH COME ALONG WITH A BEAST. = NO. 6. MEIR’S VIEW IS THAT THE BLOOD OF THE SACRIFICES PERMITS THE DRINK OFFERING TO THE ALTAR. SAGES POINT OUT THAT THE DRINK OFFERING MAY COME LATER. AS TO THE LOG OF OIL OF THE MESORA, R. SIMEON SAYS, “THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW OF REFUSE IF THE GUILT OFFERING IS MADE REFUSE.” AND R. MEIR SAYS, “THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE IF THE GUILT OFFERING IS MADE REFUSE. FOR THE BLOOD OF THE GUILT OFFERING RENDERS IT PERMITTED FOR OFFERING OR EATING:

1. I:1: Said Ulla, “As to a handful of meal offering in the status of refuse that actually is put upon the altar, the status of refuse is removed from it. For if it can impart to other components of the rate the status of refuse, how much the more so it itself!”

2. I:2: Said R. Isaac said R. Yohanan, “As to an offering in the status of refuse, left-over meat, or unclean meat, that actually has been put upon the altar, the prohibited status is removed from it.”

a. I:3: Gloss of foregoing.

I. I:4: Gloss of foregoing.

A. I:5: Gloss of foregoing.

1. I:6: Gloss of foregoing.

B. AND ON ACCOUNT OF WHATEVER HAS THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE FOR OFFERING OR EATING, WHETHER FOR MAN OR FOR THE ALTAR ARE THEY LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW OF REFUSE.”

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: But perhaps the rule of accountability for refuse pertains only to that which bears analogous traits to peace offerings for it is peace offerings that generate the rule of refuse to begin with, for instance: Just as peace offerings are marked by the trait that they are to be eaten over the span of two days and the intervening night, so whatever is eaten over the span of two days and the intervening night is subject to the law of refuse. Then how on the basis of Scripture do we know that an offering the meat of which is eaten over the span of a single day and the following night is also subject to the law of refuse?

C. THE WHOLE OFFERING — ITS BLOOD RENDERS PERMISSIBLE ITS FLESH FOR THE ALTAR, AND ITS HIDE FOR THE PRIESTS. THE WHOLE OFFERING OF FOWL — ITS BLOOD RENDERS PERMISSIBLE ITS FLESH FOR THE ALTAR:

1. III:1: But I exclude from the rule of refuse the handful of meal offering, the frankincense, incense, meal offering of the priest, meal offering of the anointed priest, meal offering that accompanies drink offerings, and the blood. R. Simeon says, “What characterizes peace offerings in particular is that that classification of offering is presented on the outer altar where the blood is sprinkled, and people are liable for the offering; so any offering, the blood of which is not sprinkled on the outer altar, as in the case of peace offerings — they are not liable on its account because of transgression of the laws of refuse. Excluded then are bullocks which are to be burned and he-goats which are to be burned, since their blood, unlike that of peace offerings, is not sprinkled on the outer altar. Then they are not liable on its account because of transgression of the laws of refuse.

a. III:2: Gloss of foregoing.

i. III:3: As above.

D. THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL — ITS BLOOD RENDERS PERMISSIBLE ITS FLESH FOR THE PRIESTS:

BULLOCKS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED AND HE-GOATS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED — THEIR BLOOD RENDERS IT PERMISSIBLE TO OFFER THEIR SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS. R. SIMEON SAYS, “ANY OFFERING, THE BLOOD OF WHICH IS NOT SPRINKLED ON THE OUTER ALTAR, AS IN THE CASE OF PEACE OFFERINGS — THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE.”

1. IV:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?

2. IV:2: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eleazar says in the name of R. Yosé the Galilean, “If one had an intention that imposes the status of refuse concerning an action that is done in connection with a rite on the out altar, that indeed imposes the status of refuse upon the sacrifice. But if one had an intention that imposes the status of refuse concerning an action that is done in connection inner altar, he has not imposed upon an offering the status of refuse.

XIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 4:5A-C

A. AS TO HOLY THINGS PRESENTED BY GENTILES — THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE, REMNANT, AND UNCLEANNESS. “AND HE WHO SLAUGHTERS THEM OUTSIDE THE COURTYARD IS FREE OF LIABILITY,” THE WORDS OF R. MEIR. R. YOSÉ DECLARES ONE LIABLE FOR REFUSE, REMNANT, UNCLEANNESS, AND SLAUGHTER OUTSIDE THE COURTYARD.

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: As to Holy Things presented by a gentile, they are not liable on their account because of the transgression of the laws of remnant and uncleanness, and while people are not to derive benefit from those Holy Things, nonetheless the laws of sacrilege do not apply. And they do

not impart the status of substitute to animals designated in their stead. But while gentiles may not present drink offerings, still the animals that they offer do require drink offerings,” the words of R. Simeon.

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing: and while people are not to derive benefit from those Holy Things— by the law on the authority of rabbis; nonetheless the laws of sacrilege do not apply — for the law governing the offering for sacrilege is analogous to the law that pertains to priestly rations, in both of which cases the word “sin” occurs. Just as in the case of priestly rations, “the children of Israel” is written Lev. 22:15, meaning, Israelites’ but not gentiles’, the same pertains here.

b. I:3: as above. What is the scriptural basis for this provision?

c. I:4: As above. What is the scriptural basis for this provision?

d. I:5: As above. It has been taught on Tannaite authority:

e. I:6: As above.

2. I:7: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Blood that had become unclean which one tossed — if this was done inadvertently, the sacrifice is accepted. If this is done deliberately, the sacrifice is not accepted. Under what circumstances? In the case of an offering in behalf of a private party. But in behalf of an offering made in behalf of the community, whether the action is done inadvertently or deliberately, the offering is accepted. As to an offering presented by a gentile, if the action is done inadvertently or deliberately, the offering is not accepted.

XV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 4:5D-F

A. THINGS ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH THEY PRIESTS WHO EXPRESS AN INAPPROPRIATE INTENTIONALITY OR DO AN IMPROPER DEED ARE NOT LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE, ON THEIR ACCOUNT ARE THEY NONETHELESS LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REMNANT, BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF UNCLEANNESS,

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that people should be liable in connection with violating uncleanness only in respect to that which is subject to the valid completion of rites that render eating permissible, in regard to both man and the altar?

B. THINGS ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH PRIESTS WHO EXPRESS AN INAPPROPRIATE INTENTIONALITY OR DO AN IMPROPER DEED ARE NOT LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REFUSE, ON THEIR ACCOUNT ARE THEY NONETHELESS LIABLE BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF REMNANT:

1. II:1: Thus far we have proved the rule for the matter of uncleanness. How on the basis of Scripture do we prove that the rule pertains also to the matter of remnant? Where the law on uncleanness pertains, the law on remnant also applies, since the word “profanation” is written in connection with both considerations.

C. ...EXCEPT FOR THE BLOOD:

1. III:1: What is the scriptural basis for this rule?

2. III:2: Said R. Yohanan, “As to the three references, Lev. 7:20, 21, 22:3, to the penalty of extirpation that we find with reference to peace offerings, what purpose is served by each of them? One serves to state an encompassing rule concerning uncleanness, the next to particularize the foregoing, and the third to deal with things that are not eaten wood used on the altar and frankincense.”

D. R. SIMEON SAYS, “THIS IS THE RULE FOR SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY EATEN. BUT IN THE CASE OF SOMETHING NOT USUALLY EATEN, FOR EXAMPLE, WOOD, AND FRANKINCENSE, AND THE INCENSE OFFERING, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAWS OF UNCLEANNES:”

1. IV:1: It has been stated: R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish, R. Eleazar and R. Yosé b. R. Hanina — one of this pair, and one of that pair — One said, “The dispute concerns uncleanness of the meat, but in respect to uncleanness affecting the priest’s own body, all parties concur that one is not flogged on account of the wood and the incense, should one make them unclean.” And the other said, “As is the dispute in the one matter, so is the dispute in the other matter.”

XVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 4:6

A. FOR THE SAKE OF SIX THINGS IS THE ANIMAL OFFERING SACRIFICED: FOR THE SAKE OF THE ANIMAL OFFERING, FOR THE SAKE OF THE ONE WHO SACRIFICES IT, FOR THE SAKE OF THE LORD, FOR THE SAKE OF THE ALTAR FIRES, FOR THE SAKE OF THE ODOR, FOR THE SAKE OF THE PLEASING SMELL. AND AS TO THE SIN OFFERING AND THE GUILT OFFERING, FOR THE SAKE OF THE SIN EXPIATED THEREBY. SAID R. YOSÉ, “EVEN IF ONE WHO WAS NOT MINDFUL IN HIS HEART THAT HE PERFORMED THE VARIOUS RITES FOR THE SAKE OF ANY ONE OF ALL OF THESE CORRECT POINTS OF INTENTIONALITY, BUT SLAUGHTERED WITHOUT SPECIFYING THAT HE DID SO WITH THESE THINGS PROPERLY IN MIND — IT IS VALID.

1. I:1: Said R. Judah said Rab, “‘It is an burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing odor to the Lord’ (Lev. 1:13): ‘a burnt offering’ means that the designated beast must be slaughtered under the classification of a burnt offering, excluding the case in which it is slaughtered as a peace offering, in which instance the offering does not carry out the owner’s obligation. ‘made by fire:’ it must be under the classification of an offering made by fire, excluding the case in which the meat is merely charred, which is invalid. ‘of a pleasing odor:’ it must be done so as to produce a good aroma, excluding the case in which the limbs are roasted somewhere else and then put up on the altar, and that is invalid.”

a. I:2: Continuation of the foregoing set of special rulings by the named authorities: Said R. Judah said Rab, “An animal designated for use as a sin offering that one slaughtered under the classification of a burnt offering is invalid. If he did so under the classification of an entirely secular offering, the action is valid.”

I. I:3: Said R. Eleazar, “As to an animal designated as a sin offering, which knowing that the beast had been designated as a sin

offering one slaughtered as unconsecrated things is valid. If thinking that it was unconsecrated to begin with he slaughtered the beast as an unconsecrated beast, it is invalid. He did not have in mind a sacrificial action at all.”

B. FOR IT IS A CONDITION IMPOSED BY THE COURT, THAT INTENTIONALITY FOLLOWS ONLY THE MIND AND WILL AND ATTITUDE OF THE ONE WHO CARRIES OUT THE ACT NOT THE OWNER; AND THE OFFICIANT DOES NOT HAVE TO SPECIFY THE SIX CONSIDERATIONS AT ALL. IF HE ACTS IN COMMENDABLE SILENCE, THAT SUFFICES.”

1. II:1: The formulation of our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the position of the following Tannaite teaching, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Eleazar b. R. Yosé, “I have heard that the improper intentionality of the owner of the designated animal may serve to classify the beast as refuse.”

2. II:2: Said Abbaye, “R. Eleazar b. R. Yosé, R. Eliezer, and R. Simeon b. Eleazar all take the view that one party may validly express an affective intention while another party actually carries out the deed concerning which the intentionality is expressed.”

XVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:1

A. WHAT IS THE PLACE IN WHICH THE ACT OF SACRIFICE OF ANIMAL OFFERINGS TAKES PLACE? MOST HOLY THINGS THE WHOLE OFFERING, SIN OFFERING, AND GUILT OFFERING — THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS CARRIED OUT AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR. THE BULLOCK AND THE HE-GOAT OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT — THE ACT SLAUGHTERING THEM IS AT THE NORTH.

AND THE RECEIVING OF THEIR BLOOD IS CARRIED OUT IN A UTENSIL OF SERVICE, AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR.

AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES SPRINKLING OVER THE SPACE BETWEEN THE BARS OF THE ARK, AND ON THE VEIL, AND ON THE GOLDEN ALTAR. ONE ACT OF PLACING OF THEIR BLOOD IF IMPROPERLY DONE IMPAIRS ATONEMENT. AND THE REMNANTS OF THE BLOOD DID ONE POUR OUT AT THE WESTERN BASE OF THE OUTER ALTAR. BUT IF HE DID NOT PLACE THE REMNANTS OF THEIR BLOOD AT THE STATED LOCATION, HE DID NOT IMPAIR ATONEMENT.

1. I:1: But why should the Tannaite author of the passage not state in the opening clause as he does later on: And the receiving of their blood is carried out in a utensil of service, at the north side of the altar! Since there is the matter of the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment which is classified also as Most Holy Things, the blood of which is received in the hand not in a utensil of service, he leaves out that item.

B. BULLOCKS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED AND HE-GOATS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED — THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR. AND THE RECEIVING OF THEIR BLOOD IS IN A UTENSIL OF SERVICE AT THE NORTH. AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES SPRINKLING ON THE VEIL AND ON THE

GOLDEN ALTAR. THE IMPROPER SPRINKLING OF ONE ACT OF PLACING OF THEIR BLOOD IMPAIRS ATONEMENT:

1. II:1: Now take note that the requirement that the rite be carried out at the north side of the altar is written in regard to the burnt offering, so let the framer of the passage formulate the rule by making reference first of all to the burnt offering. The reason that he treats the sin offering first is that since the rule covering the sin offering derives from exegesis of Scripture rather than being stated explicitly therein, it is regarded by him as of greater value.

a. II:2: Where in Scripture is reference made to the rule governing the burnt offering?

b. II:3: So we have found that, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, the act of slaughtering of the burnt offering must be done in the north, and the act of receiving, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, must be done in the north. How do we know that it is indispensable that the act of slaughtering and receiving the blood be done in the north and if not, the offering is invalid?

C. MOST HOLY THINGS (...SIN OFFERING...) — THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS CARRIED OUT AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR:

1. III:1: With reference to the rule, Most Holy Things (...guilt offering) — the act of slaughtering them is carried out at the north side of the altar. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the guilt offering has to be prepared at the north side of the altar? So we have found that the act of slaughter must take place in the designated place, but how on the basis of Scripture do we know that the same rule applies to the act of receiving the blood? So we have found the rule governing the sin offering presented by the ruler: it is both described as properly carried out in this way and also prescribed as indispensably carried out in this way. And we also know that other sin offerings are properly carried out in this way. But how do we know that it is necessary to carry out other sin offerings in this way so that if they are not slaughtered at the north, they are invalid?

a. III:2: Further gloss of a proof-text of the foregoing: As to the verse, “And he shall kill it for a sin offering in the place where they kill the burnt offering” (Lev. 4:33), what is the purpose of the word “it”?

2. III:3: So we have found that, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, the act of slaughtering of the burnt offering must be done in the north, and the act of receiving, so far as fulfilling the religious duty, must be done in the north. How do we know that it is indispensable that the act of slaughtering and receiving the blood be done in the north and if not, the offering is invalid?

D. MOST HOLY THINGS — NOW: THE GUILT OFFERING— THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS CARRIED OUT AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR:

1. IV:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the guilt offering has to be prepared at the north side of the altar? So we have found that the act of slaughter of the guilt offering must take place at the northern side of the altar. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the collecting of the blood also must take place there? So we have found that that is the recommended manner of carrying out the

rite. But how do we know that it is indispensable to the proper performance of the rite that matters be done in this way. Why must a verbal analogy for the burnt offering be drawn to both a sin offering and also a guilt offering? The reason is that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy. That forms the bridge to the systematic composite that follows.

E. WHEN DO CASES FORM A SERIES: SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION THAT THAT WHICH IS DERIVED ON THE BASIS OF A VERBAL ANALOGY DOES NOT IN TURN GO AND IMPART A LESSON BY MEANS OF A VERBAL ANALOGY; AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SERIES

1. IV:2: Raba said, “The proposition that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy derives from the following proof:
2. IV:3: Now it is a fact that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy, demonstrated whether in the manner of Raba or in the manner of Rabina. Said R. Yohanan, “Throughout the Torah we infer one rule from another that has itself been derived by inference, except for the matter of consecration, in which we do not derive a rule from another that has itself been inferred.”
3. IV:4: That which is learned by a verbal analogy may in turn go and impart a rule by an argument a fortiori
4. IV:5: Can that which is learned by verbal analogy established may in turn go and impart a rule by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context? This mode of argument depends not on verbal analogy supplied by Scripture but an analogy drawn from similarity of the traits of two subjects.
5. IV:6: Can a rule that is derived by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on verbal analogy?
6. IV:7: Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits?
7. IV:8: Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context go and teach a lesson through an argument a fortiori?
8. IV:9: Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context go and teach a lesson through an argument constructed by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits among two or more classifications of things?
9. IV:10: Can a rule derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a rule established through analogy of verbal usage?

10. IV:11: Can a rule that is derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a lesson through an argument based on the congruence of other shared traits but not verbal ones in context?

11. IV:12: Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a lesson through an argument based on an argument a fortiori?

12. IV:13: Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a rule through an argument constructed on the basis of shared traits of an other-than-verbal character among two classifications of things?

13. IV:14: Can a rule derived by an argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things then turn around and teach a lesson by an argument based on an analogy of a verbal character, an analogy not of a verbal character, an argument a fortiori, or an argument based on shared traits?

F. THE REMNANTS OF THEIR BLOOD DID ONE POUR OUT ON THE WESTERN BASE OF THE OUTER ALTAR. IF HE DID NOT PLACE THE REMNANTS OF THE BLOOD AT THE STATED LOCATION, HE DID NOT IMPAIR ATONEMENT. THESE AND THOSE ARE BURNED IN THE ASH PIT:

1. V:1: What is the Scripture basis for this rule?

2. V:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority There are five passages that deal with the sin offering, Lev. 4: the sin offering of the anointed priest, Lev. 4: 1-12; the sin offering of the entire congregation, Lev. 4:13-22, the sin offering of a ruler, Lev. 4:22-26, the female goat of an ordinary person, Lev. 4:27-32, and the lamb of an ordinary person, Lev. 4:32-35. The first two were offered on the inner altar, the other three on the outer. In regard to the first three Scripture states that the residue of the blood is to be poured out "...at the base of the altar of the burnt offering..." (Lev. 4: 7, 18, 25), and in connection with the other two there is an allusion to the base of the altar without reference to "of the sin offering." Here rabbis explain why Scripture specifies the altar of the burnt offering in the first three cases. The first teaches that the residue is poured out at the base of the outer altar, the altar of the burnt offering, but not at the base of the inner altar, even though the blood was sprinkled on the horns of the inner altar. The second is superfluous, and it teaches that only the outer altar had such a base, not the inner altar. The third reference intimates that the residue of the blood of all sacrifices whose blood is sprinkled on the altar of burnt offering must be poured out at its base.

a. V:3: Gloss of foregoing.

b. V:4: As above.

c. V:5: As above.

i. V:6: As above.

A. V:7: As above.

1. V:8: As above.

3. V:9: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: "'And he shall make an end of atoning for the holy place and the tent of meeting and the altar' (Lev. 16:20) —

if he atoned by carrying out the rites required for atonement in other matters, e.g., the four sprinklings on the altar, the seven before the vil , he has completed the rite, but if he has not atoned, he has not completed the rite,” the words of R. Aqiba. Said to him R. Judah, “Why should we not say, ‘if he made an end to the rite, he has atoned, and if not, he did not atone’? So the rites, including the four applications, are necessary, and it is on that basis that that fact is to be demonstrated.”

XVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:3

A. AS TO SIN OFFERINGS OF THE COMMUNITY AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL — WHAT ARE THE SIN OFFERINGS OF THE COMMUNITY? HE-GOATS OFFERED FOR NEW MOONS AND FOR FESTIVALS — THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS TO BE CARRIED OUT AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR. AND RECEIVING THEIR BLOOD IS TO BE DONE IN A UTENSIL OF SERVICE AT THE NORTH.

AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES FOUR ACTS OF PLACING ON THE FOUR HORNS CORNERS OF THE OUTER ALTAR —

1. I:1: And their blood requires four acts of placing on the four horns of the outer altar: How was this done?

a. I:2: Amplification of the details of a dispute in the foregoing.

I. I:3: We have learned in the Mishnah: And a red line goes around it at the middle, to effect a separation between the drops of blood which are tossed on the top and the drops of blood which are tossed on the bottom (M. Mid. 3:1P). What is the scriptural basis for this rule?

B. HOW SO? THE OFFICIATING PRIEST WENT UP ON THE RAMP, AND WENT AROUND THE CIRCUIT, AND WENT AROUND TO THE SOUTHEASTERN CORNER, THE NORTHEASTERN CORNER, THE NORTHWESTERN CORNER, THE SOUTHWESTERN CORNER.

THE REMNANTS OF THE BLOOD DID HE POUR OUT ON THE SOUTHERN BASE.

AND THEY ARE EATEN INSIDE THE VEILS THAT IS, IN THE COURTYARD BY MALES OF THE PRIESTHOOD, AND COOKED FOR FOOD IN ANY MANNER OF COOKING FOOD ROASTING OR BOILING, FOR A DAY AND NIGHT, UP TO MIDNIGHT.

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “At the base of the altar” (Lev. 4:30) means, at the southern base of the altar. You say that it means at the southern base of the altar. But perhaps it means only at the western base of the altar, so that what is left undefined is derived from the rule that is spelled out. Thus: Lev. 4: 7 holds that the blood of the sin offering prepared at the inner altar is to be poured out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering which is at the door of meeting. As one entered from the door he came first to the western base; there is therefore regarded as defined, and the question is, why not learn the meaning of Lev. 4:30, where the matter is not defined, from Lev. 4: 7, where it is?

2. II:2: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Ishmael says, “Blood that is residue of offerings presented at the inner altar and also blood that is residue of

offerings presented at the outer altar are poured out at the western base of the outer altar.” R. Simeon b. Yohai says, “Both this and that are poured out at the southern base.”

XIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:4

A. THE BURNT OFFERING IS CLASSIFIED AS MOST HOLY THINGS.

1. I:1: As to the burnt offering, what is the reason that the Tannaite authority has specified, “is classified as Most Holy Things”?

B. THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING IT IS CARRIED OUT AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR. AND THE RECEIVING OF ITS BLOOD IS DONE IN A UTENSIL OF SERVICE AT THE NORTH.

AND ITS BLOOD REQUIRES TWO ACTS OF PLACING WHICH ARE DIVIDED AT THE CORNER INTO FOUR.

AND IT REQUIRES FLAYING, AND CUTTING INTO PIECES, AND BEING WHOLLY BURNED ON THE ALTAR FIRES.

1. II:1: How is this done? Said Rab, “He applied the blood and then went and applied it a second time on each horn, putting blood on each side of the horn.” Samuel said, “He made a single application of blood, in the form of a gamma.”

a. II:2: Tannaite complement to the foregoing.

b. II:3: Continuation of the foregoing.

l. II:4: Gloss of the foregoing.

A. II:5: Secondary expansion on a detail of the foregoing.

XX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:5

A. PEACE OFFERINGS OF THE CONGREGATION AND GUILT OFFERINGS — WHAT ARE GUILT OFFERINGS? THE GUILT OFFERING FOR FALSE DEALING, AND THE GUILT OFFERING FOR ACTS OF SACRILEGE, AND THE GUILT OFFERING BECAUSE OF INTERCOURSE WITH A BETROTHED BONDWOMAN, AND THE GUILT OFFERING OF A NAZIR, AND THE GUILT OFFERING OF THE MESORA, AND THE SUSPENSIVE GUILT OFFERING — THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS DONE AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR. AND THE RECEIVING OF THEIR BLOOD IS CARRIED OUT WITH A UTENSIL OF SERVICE AT THE NORTH.

AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES TWO ACTS OF PLACING, WHICH ARE FOUR. AND THEY ARE EATEN ONLY INSIDE THE VEILS, BY MALES OF THE PRIESTHOOD, AND COOKED FOR FOOD IN ANY MANNER OF COOKING FOOD, FOR A DAY AND A NIGHT, UP TO MIDNIGHT.

1. I:1: What is the scriptural source for this rule that these classifications of offerings require the north side of the altar?

XXI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:6

A. THE THANKSGIVING OFFERING AND THE RAM OF THE NAZIRITE ARE CLASSIFIED AS LESSER HOLY THINGS. THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM MAY BE PERFORMED IN ANY PLACE IN THE COURTYARD. AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES TWO ACTS OF PLACING WHICH ARE FOUR.

AND THEY ARE EATEN THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF JERUSALEM, BY ANY PERSON, COOKED FOR FOOD IN ANY MANNER OF COOKING FOOD, FOR A DAY AND A NIGHT, UP TO MIDNIGHT. THAT WHICH IS RAISED UP FROM THEM THE BREAST AND THIGH, AS HEAVE OFFERING FOLLOWS THEIR RULE, EXCEPT THAT THAT WHICH IS RAISED UP FROM THEM AS HEAVE OFFERING IS EATEN ONLY BY PRIESTS, BY THEIR WIVES, CHILDREN AND SLAVES.

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And the breast that is waved and the thigh that is waved shall you eat in a clean place” (Lev. 10:14) — Said R. Nehemiah, “But were they then going to eat the offerings listed earlier in context eaten in a condition of cultic uncleanness? Rather the sense of ‘clean’ is it was partly unclean, meaning, a place that was clean of the uncleanness of him afflicted with the skin ailment, but unclean of the uncleanness of one afflicted with flux uncleanness. What place is that? It is the camp of the Israelites” not the camp of the Divine Presence, the Tabernacle, nor the camp of the Levites around it, but the camp of the Israelites, corresponding to the Temple, the Temple Mount, and Jerusalem. A person afflicted with the skin ailment was expelled from all three, a person with flux, the first two but permitted in the third. So the meat may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem .

XXII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:7

A. PEACE OFFERINGS ARE CLASSIFIED AS LESSER HOLY THINGS. THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM MAY BE CARRIED OUT IN ANY PLACE IN THE COURTYARD.

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting...,” “and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting...” (Lev. 3: 2, 8, 13) — these three distinct formulations serve to validate all sides of the Temple court in the case of Lesser Holy Things. And the north side of the Temple court of course is valid by reason of an argument a fortiori: if Most Holy Things, which may be validly slaughtered not in all other directions of the Temple court but only in the north, Lesser Holy Things, which may be validly slaughtered in all other directions of the Temple court, surely should be validly slaughtered also in the northern area of the Temple court!

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing.

b. I:3: Further reading of the proof-texts of I:1.

I. I:4: It is self-evident that if the flap is shut, it is as though it were locked so the offering is invalid. But what if a curtain does it?

II. I:5: What if an elevation e.g. a beam or board, a raised construction that shuts off the door while it is actually open does it?

2. I:6: As to the space behind the mercy seat, what is the rule as to whether or not it was fit for Lesser Holy Things?

a. I:7: Said R. Judah said Samuel, “Liability on account of uncleanness for example, entering the Temple court when cultically unclean is incurred only on account of the area a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five cubits in breadth.”

I. I:8: Secondary development of the foregoing.

B. AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES TWO ACTS OF PLACING WHICH ARE FOUR. AND THEY ARE EATEN THROUGHOUT THE CITY, BY ANY PERSON, COOKED FOR FOOD IN ANY MANNER OF COOKING FOOD, FOR TWO DAYS AND ONE INTERVENING NIGHT. THAT WHICH IS RAISED UP FROM THEM THE BREAST AND THIGH, AS HEAVE OFFERING FOLLOWS THEIR RULE, EXCEPT THAT WHICH IS RAISED UP FROM THEM AS HEAVE OFFERING IS EATEN BY PRIESTS, BY THEIR WIVES, CHILDREN, AND SLAVES.

1. II:1: Said R. Isaac bar Abodimi, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the blood of an offering is rendered invalid at the moment of sunset on the day on which the beast was slaughtered? As it is written, ‘It shall be eaten on the day that he offers his slaughtering’ (Lev. 7:16). On the day on which you slaughter you may offer the blood, on the day on which you do not slaughter the animal, you also cannot offer the blood through sprinkling.”

2. II:2: It has been stated: If a priest expresses the intention, while slaughtering the beast, of eating the meat on the evening of the third day prior to the third day, which is to say, after the two days on which eating the meat of the offering is permitted, Hezekiah said, “The offering is valid.” R. Yohanan said, “The offering is invalid.”

3. II:3: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that peace offerings may be eaten on the evening of the third day? For that is a logical conclusion: the meat of some sacrifices is to be eaten on the same day as the killing of the animal, and the meat of others over a span of two days and the intervening night. Just as in the case of sacrifices that are to be eaten on the same day as the sacrifice, the night is associated with the prior day so that the meat may be eaten not only on the day that the beast was slaughtered but also the following night, so in the case of offerings the meat of which may be eaten over a span of two days and the intervening night are such that the night is associated with the prior day so that the meat may be eaten not only on the days but also the following night afterward.

XXIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 5:8

A. THE FIRSTLING AND TITHE OF CATTLE AND PASSOVER ARE CLASSIFIED AS LESSER HOLY THINGS. THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING THEM IS TO BE DONE IN ANY

PLACE IN THE COURTYARD. AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES A SINGLE ACT OF PLACING...

THE LAW IMPOSED A DIFFERENCE ON THEIR MANNER OF EATING THE FIRSTLING AND TITHE OF CATTLE, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO A RULE DIFFERENT FROM THAT GOVERNING THE EATING OF THE PASSOVER:

1. I:1: What Tannaite authority stands behind this rule that enumerates differences in the rules governing eating the offering alone, which means that the offerings are alike in regard to sprinkling and the burning up of the sacrificial parts. Whose view is this?

B. ...PROVIDED THAT ONE PLACES THE BLOOD AT THE BASE ON THE PART OF THE ALTAR THAT HAS A BASE UNDER IT:

1. II:1: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the blood must be sprinkled on a part of the altar that has a base?

C. THE FIRSTLING IS EATEN BY PRIESTS.

AND TITHE OF CATTLE BY ANY PERSON. AND THEY ARE EATEN THROUGHOUT THE CITY COOKED FOR FOOD IN ANY MANNER OF COOKING FOOD, FOR TWO DAYS AND ONE INTERVENING NIGHT:

1. III:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the meat of a firstling is to be eaten during the two days and one intervening night?
2. III:2: This question was addressed to sages at the vineyard at Yabneh, “Over how long a span of time may the firstling be eaten?”
 - a. III:3: Secondary expansion of what is at stake in the foregoing. On what point do the masters differ since it is established as fact that a rule that is derived by an argument based on a verbal analogy then cannot go and impart its lesson to yet another matter to which it is linked by another verbal analogy?

D. THE PASSOVER IS EATEN ONLY AT NIGHT. AND IT IS EATEN ONLY UP TO MIDNIGHT. AND IT IS EATEN ONLY BY THOSE THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO IT. AND IT IS EATEN ONLY ROASTED:

1. IV:1: Who is the Tannaite authority behind this rule?

XXIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 6:1A-C

A. MOST HOLY THINGS, SUPPOSED TO BE SLAUGHTERED AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR, THAT ONE SLAUGHTERED ON TOP OF THE ALTAR — R. YOSÉ SAYS, “THEY ARE AS IF THEY WERE SLAUGHTERED AT THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ALTAR.” R. YOSÉ B. R. JUDAH SAYS, “FROM THE MIDPOINT ABOVE THE ALTAR TO THE NORTH IS DEEMED EQUIVALENT TO THE NORTH, FROM THE MIDPOINT ABOVE THE ALTAR TO THE SOUTH IS DEEMED EQUIVALENT TO THE SOUTH.”

1. I:1: Said R. Assi said R. Yohanan, “R. Yosé would say, ‘The whole of the altar stands at the north.’”
2. I:2: Continuation of the foregoing analysis.

a. I:3: Gloss of the foregoing discussion.

b. I:4: As above.

3. I:5: Said Rab, “If the altar is damaged e.g., after the destruction of the Temple, all of the Holy Things that were sacrificed there are invalid. That is the lesson of a verse of Scripture that is in our possession, which we have forgotten.” But R. Yohanan said, “All the same are this and that: they are unfit.” If an animal is sanctified when the altar was unfit, then whether it was slaughtered or not makes no difference; it is unfit one way or the other.”

a. I:6: Clarification of a detail of the foregoing.

4. I:7: Said R. Eleazar, “On account of the altar’s being damaged after the destruction of the Temple, priests may not eat the residue of the meal offering, because it is said, ‘And eat it without leaven beside the altar’ (Lev. 10:12). Is it the fact then that they actually ate it beside the altar? It was eaten anywhere in the Temple court. The sense, then, can only be, when the altar is whole and not when it has been damaged.”

5. I:8: We therefore have found the rule that on account of the altar’s being damaged, after the destruction of the Temple, priests may not eat their share of the offerings with respect to Most Holy Things?”

6. I:9: We therefore have found the rule that after the destruction of the Temple, priests may not eat their share of the offerings with respect to Most Holy Things? How do we know the rule governing Lesser Holy Things?

a. I:10: Expansion of the foregoing.

B. COMPARING THE ALTARS AT SHILO, THE FIRST TEMPLE AND THE SECOND TEMPLE. THE CHARACTER OF THE SECOND TEMPLE AND ITS ALTAR.

1. I:11: Said R. Huna or: Hisda said Rab, “The altar at Shilo was made of stones.

2. I:12: The altar of the first Temple was twenty-eight cubits square overall, while that of the second Temple was thirty-two cubits, the addition would be a strip four cubits broad in triangular shape, like a Greek gamma. How come they made the altar larger?

3. I:13: When Rabin came, he said R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of Bar Qappara said, “They added pits to the structure.” In Solomon’s Temple there was a pit near the southwest of the altar, into which the altar libations were poured directly. In the second Temple the altar was extended on the south and the west, so that the place of the pit was incorporated in it, and over against this extension on top of the altar they made holes for the libations to flow into the pit below.

a. I:14: Now as to the site of the Temple itself, there is no problem for the outline of the building was easily discerned even in its ruin. But as to the site of the altar, how did they know where it should go?

4. I:15: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: The facts that the altar is to have a horn, an ascent, a base, and to be squared shape are indispensable. The prescribed measurements on the length, breadth, and height of the altar are not indispensable.

- a. I:16: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: What is the ledge? It is a place for the priests to walk between one horn and another.
5. I:17: The prescribed measurements on the length, breadth, and height of the altar are not indispensable.
- a. I:18: Complement to the proof-text cited in the foregoing.
6. I:19: Said R. Abin b. Huna said R. Hama bar Guria, “The logs of wood that Moses cut for the altar fire for the morning and evening whole offerings were a cubit long and a cubit wide and they were of the thickness of the instrument for levelling off the top of a seah.”
7. I:20: There we have learned in the Mishnah: And a ramp was at the south of the altar, thirty-two by a breadth of sixteen (M. **Mid. 3:3C**). How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the ramp had to be at the south side of the altar?
8. I:21: There is a Tannaite figure who derives the matter from the following, as has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, “‘And its steps shall face eastward’ (Eze. 43:17) — every time you turn, you must be to the right of the east” — the reference is to the altar and is interpreted to mean that the altar must be so constructed that when the priest, standing by the altar, has to turn round the side, he will turn right and go eastward; that is possible only if the ascent is at the south.
9. I:22: R. Simeon b. Yosé b. Laqonayya asked R. Yosé, “Did R. Simeon b. Yohai say, ‘There was an open space between the ascent and the altar with a gap between the one and the other?’”
10. I:23: There we have learned in the Mishnah: the ramp and the altar, sixty-two (M. Mid. 5:2B). But as a matter of fact they were sixty-four thirty-two each!
11. I:24: Said Rami bar Hama, “All of the ascents had a gradient of one cubit in three rising one cubit in every three except for the ascent of the altar, which was one and a half cubits and a finger and a third, counting the little fingers”

XXV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 6:1D-I

A. MEAL OFFERINGS WERE TAKEN IN HAND IN ANY PLACE IN THE COURTYARD, AND THE RESIDUE WAS EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, BY MALES OF THE PRIESTHOOD, COOKED IN ANY MANNER OF PREPARING FOOD, FOR THAT DAY AND THE FOLLOWING NIGHT DOWN TO MIDNIGHT:

1. I:1: Said R. Eleazar, “The handful of meal offering that was taken up in the inner sanctum is valid. For so we find the rite down in connection with the censers of frankincense.” When the censers of frankincense were removed from the tables on which the twelve loaves of the showbread were placed in the inner sanctum, the showbread was available for the priests to eat. So removing the censers of frankincense corresponded to taking the handful, in that this rendered the rest permitted. Since the former was done in the inner sanctum, if the latter was done there, it also is valid.

a. I:2: Said R. Yohanan, “Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the inner sanctum are valid, as it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of

meeting' (Lev. 3: 2), and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal." Since it must be killed at the door of the tent of meeting, the tent of meeting, corresponding to the inner sanctum, obviously is the principal place for it, while the Temple court is but an adjunct thereto.

XXVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 6:2-3

A. THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL WAS PREPARED ITS NECK WRUNG, ITS BLOOD TOSSED AT THE SOUTHWESTERN CORNER OF THE ALTAR:

1. I:1: What is the scriptural source for this rule?

B. IF IT WAS PREPARED IN ANY PLACE IN THE COURTYARD, HOWEVER, IT WAS VALID. BUT THIS WAS ITS USUAL PLACE.

1. II:1: What is the sense of this statement? If it was fit in any place, why insist on a particular spot?

C. AND THREE PURPOSES DID THE SPACE OF THAT SOUTHWESTERN CORNER SERVE BELOW THE RED LINE AROUND THE ALTAR, AND THREE ABOVE: BELOW THE RED LINE WAS SPRINKLED THE BLOOD OF THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL, AND THE BRINGING NEAR OF MEAL OFFERINGS, AND FOR POURING OUT THE REMNANTS OF THE BLOOD:

1. III:1: the sin offering of fowl: as we have just now said. the bringing near of meal offerings: as it is written, "And he shall bring it near unto the altar" (Lev. 2: 8) at the southwest corner. for pouring out the remnants of the blood: "And all the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar" (Lev. 4:30) meaning, the southern base.

D. ABOVE THE RED LINE AT THE SOUTHWESTERN HORN WERE POURED OUT FOR THE WATER OFFERING, AND FOR THE WINE OFFERING, AND FOR THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL, WHEN IT THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL WAS TOO ABUNDANT AT THE EAST.

1. IV:1: What is the operative consideration for this rule, which implies that the proper place for offering the burnt offering of a bird was the eastern side of the altar?

E. WHOEVER GOES UP TO THE ALTAR GOES UP ON THE RIGHT EAST SIDE AND MAKES A CIRCUIT AND GOES DOWN ON THE LEFT, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE WHO GOES UP FOR THESE THREE THINGS:

1. V:1: What is the operative consideration for the exceptions to the rule — except for the one who goes up for these three things rightward?

2. V:2: All who go up to the altar go up at the east and go down at the west, go up at the right and go down at the left, except for those who go up to the southwestern corner, in connection with the libations of water and wine and the burnt offering of fowl, who go up at the west and go down at the west, go up at the right and go down at the right (T. **Zeb. 7:7A-D**).

XXVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 6:4

A. THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL — HOW WAS IT PREPARED? THE PRIEST WOULD PINCHED OFF ITS HEAD CLOSE BY ITS NECK. BUT HE DOES NOT DIVIDE THE HEAD FROM THE BODY. AND HOLDING ONTO THE BIRD, HE SPRINKLES ITS BLOOD ON THE WALL OF THE ALTAR. THE REMNANTS OF ITS BLOOD WOULD HE DRAIN OUT ON THE BASE BELOW THE RED LINE. THE ALTAR OWNS ONLY ITS BLOOD, BUT THE WHOLE REST OF THE CARCASS BELONGS TO THE PRIESTS.

1. I:1: Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering” (Lev. 5: 9) — that means that the sprinkling must be done with the body of the sin offering itself. How is it done? He holds the head and body of the bird and sprinkles the blood on the wall of the altar, but not on the wall of the ramp or on the wall of the inner sanctum or on the wall of the entry way to the inner sanctum. And which area of the wall? It is the lower part of the wall of the altar.

2. I:2: Said R. Zutra bar Tobiah said Rab, “How is the bird that is a sin offering pinched off? He puts its two wings in his two fingers and its two legs in his two fingers, and he would stretch its neck out on his fingers. He would pinch the neck with his fingernail at its shoulder. And he does not divide the head from the neck (T. **Zeb. 7:4A-D**).

XXVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 6:5-7

A. THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL — HOW WAS IT PREPARED? THE PRIEST WENT UP ON THE RAMP AND WENT AROUND THE CIRCUIT. HE CAME TO THE SOUTHEASTERN CORNER HE WOULD WRING OFF ITS HEAD FROM ITS NECK AND DIVIDE THE HEAD FROM THE BODY. AND HE DRAINED OFF ITS BLOOD ONTO THE WALL OF THE ALTAR. HE TOOK THE HEAD AND PRESSED THE PLACE WHERE IT WAS SEVERED AGAINST THE ALTAR. AND HE DRIED IT WITH SALT AND TOSSED IT ON THE ALTAR FIRES:

1. I:1: Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall bring it to the altar” (Lev. 1:15) referring to the bird burnt offering and apparently superfluous, since the prior verse says, “Then he shall bring his offering”: What is the point of making this statement? Since it is said, “Then he shall bring his offering of turtle doves or of young pigeons” (Lev. 1:14), might one then suppose that one who volunteers to bring an offering of fowl must bring no fewer than two birds? Scripture says, “And the priest shall bring it to the altar” (Lev. 1:15). Why does Scripture specify that it must be the priest who does the rite? It is to assign the rite to a priest.

B. HE CAME TO THE BODY AND REMOVED THE CROP AND THE PLUMAGE AND THE INTESTINES WHICH COME OUT WITH IT. AND HE THREW THEM ON THE PLACE OF THE ASHES

1. II:1: Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: “And he shall take away its crop with the feathers thereof” (Lev. 1:16) — this refers to what we know by a different word for the crop. Might one suppose that he should cut through it with a knife

and take the crop alone, without the skin and feathers? Scripture states, “with the feathers thereof,” meaning, he takes the plumage together with the crop.

C. HE SLIT THE BODY OPEN AT THE WINGS BUT DID NOT DIVIDE IT. BUT IF HE DIVIDED IT, IT IS VALID. AND HE DRIED IT WITH SALT AND TOSSED IT ON THE ALTAR FIRES.

1. III:1: Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: “And he shall rend it” (Lev. 1:17) — this is done only by hand, in line with the usage as follows: “and he rent him by hand as one would have rent a kid” (Jud. 14: 6)

D. IF HE DID NOT REMOVE THE CROP OR THE PLUMAGE OR THE INTESTINES WHICH GO OUT WITH IT AND DID NOT SALT IT — ANYTHING WHICH HE DID IN A DIFFERENT WAY AFTER HE HAD DRAINED OUT ITS BLOOD — IT IS VALID. IF HE DIVIDED THE HEAD FROM THE BODY IN THE CASE OF A SIN OFFERING OF FOWL BUT DID NOT DIVIDE THEM IN THE CASE OF BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL SINCE THIS IS BEFORE THE RITE OF DRAINING OF THE BLOOD OF THE BODY, HE HAS RENDERED IT INVALID:

1. IV:1: Our Mishnah-paragraph is not in accord with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, “I have heard that the sin offering of the bird has to be split.” In the sense that if both organs of the throat are nipped, the bird is still fit; the Mishnah’s rule says that it is unfit.

E. IF HE DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD OF THE HEAD BUT DID NOT DRAIN OFF THE BLOOD OF THE BODY, IT IS INVALID. IF HE DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD OF THE BODY BUT DID NOT DRAIN OFF THE BLOOD OF THE HEAD, IT IS VALID:

THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL, THE NECK OF WHICH HE WRUNG NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME BUT RATHER UNDER SOME CLASSIFICATION OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH THE ANIMAL WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS HOLY, THE BLOOD OF WHICH HE DRAINED NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME, OR ONE OF WHICH HE DID FOR ITS NAME AND ONE NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME, OR ONE OF WHICH HE DID NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME AND ONE FOR ITS OWN NAME — IN THE CASE OF THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL, IT IS VALID, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT IT HAS NOT GONE TO THE CREDIT OF ITS OWNER ALL THE SAME IN THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS ARE THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL AND THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL, — THE HEADS OF WHICH HE WRUNG OFF, AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH HE DRAINED OUT — WITH THE INTENTION TO EAT SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY EATEN, TO BURN SOMETHING WHICH IS USUALLY BURNED, OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE — IT IS INVALID. AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT. IF HE WRUNG OFF THE HEAD OR DRAINED THE BLOOD WITH THE INTENTION OF EATING WHAT IS TO BE EATEN OR OF BURNING WHAT IS TO BE BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, IT IS REFUSE, AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT FOR EXTIRPATION, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE IS OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. HOW IS THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT? IF HE WRUNG THE NECK IN SILENCE, AND DRAINED THE BLOOD INTENDING TO INTENDING TO EAT WHAT IS TO BE EATEN OR TO BURN WHAT IS TO BE BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, OR IF HE WRUNG THE NECK INTENDING TO EAT WHAT IS TO BE EATEN OR TO BURN WHAT IS TO BE BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS

PROPER TIME, AND DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD IN SILENCE, OR IF HE WRUNG THE NECK AND DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD ARTICULATLY INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE — THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY A CASE IN WHICH THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE HAS BEEN OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. HOW IS THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE NOT OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT? IF HE WRUNG THE NECK WITH THE INTENTION OF EATING THE FLESH OR OFFERING THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE, AND HE THEN DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR OFFER THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, OR IF HE WRUNG THE NECK INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, AND DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR TO BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE INTENDING TO EAT WHAT IS TO BE EATEN OR TO BURN WHAT IS TO BE BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, OR IF HE WRUNG THE NECK AND DRAINED OFF THE BLOOD INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE — THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL, THE NECK OF WHICH ONE WRUNG NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME, AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE DRAINED OFF INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR TO OFFER UP THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME — OR THE NECK OF WHICH ONE WRUNG INTENDING TO EAT THE FLESH OR TO BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME, AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE DRAINED OFF NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME — OR THE NECK OF WHICH ONE WRUNG AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE DRAINED OFF NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME — THIS IS A CASE IN WHICH THAT WHICH RENDERS THE OFFERING PERMISSIBLE HAS NOT BEEN OFFERED IN ACCORD WITH ITS REQUIREMENT. IF ONE DID ANY OF THESE THINGS INTENDING TO EAT AN OLIVE'S BULK OUTSIDE AND AN OLIVE'S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY, AN OLIVE'S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY AND AN OLIVE'S BULK OUTSIDE, A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK OUTSIDE AND A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY, A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK ON THE NEXT DAY AND A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK OUTSIDE — IT IS UNFIT. AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT. SAID R. JUDAH, "THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING TIME CAME BEFORE THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING PLACE, IT IS REFUSE, AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT TO EXTIRPATION. BUT IF THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING PLACE CAME BEFORE THE IMPROPER INTENTION CONCERNING TIME, IT IS INVALID AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT." AND SAGES SAY, "THIS CASE AND THAT ARE INVALID, AND EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT." IF ONE INTENDED TO EAT A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK AND TO OFFER UP A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK, IT IS VALID. FOR EATING AND OFFERING UP DO NOT JOIN TOGETHER.

1. V:1: Our rabbis taught on Tannaite authority: "it is a burnt offering" (Lev. 1:17) — even if he drained the blood of the body but not the blood of the head it is still a burnt offering validly presented. Might one suppose that even if he drained the blood of the head but not the blood of the body, it is valid? Scripture says, "it is." It must be done with the correct rites.

XXIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 7:1-2

A. A BIRD THAT ONE DESIGNATED TO SERVE AS SIN OFFERING OF FOWL WHICH ONE PREPARED BELOW THE RED LINE, THAT IS TO SAY, PROPERLY, IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING, IN THE CLASSIFICATION “NAME” OF THE SIN OFFERING, IS VALID.

IF ONE PREPARED A BIRD DESIGNATED TO SERVE AS A SIN OFFERING OF FOWL IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING, BUT IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF A BURNT OFFERING OR IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE BURNT OFFERING BELOW THE LINE, BUT IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF A SIN OFFERING — OR IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE BURNT OFFERING, BUT IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF A BURNT OFFERING, IT IS INVALID. IF ONE PREPARED IT ABOVE THE RED LINE INSTEAD OF BELOW, BUT, OTHERWISE, IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF EITHER OF THEM, IT IN ALL EVENTS IS INVALID.

1. I:1: When the priest offered the bird designated as a sin offering with the rite of a burnt offering, in what way has he deviated from the standard rite? If I should say that he has deviated in performing the rite of pinching the neck nipping both organs and thus severing the neck, then shall we have to say that the rule does not accord with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, who has said, “I have heard that in the case of a sin offering made of a bird, one does sever the neck”?

B. THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL WHICH ONE PREPARED ABOVE THE RED LINE, IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE BURNT OFFERING, BUT IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF THE BURNT OFFERING, IS VALID. IF ONE PREPARED IT IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE BURNT OFFERING, IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF THE SIN OFFERING, IT IS VALID, EXCEPT THAT IT DOES NOT GO TO THE OWNER’S CREDIT IN FULFILLMENT OF AN OBLIGATION. IF HE DID SO IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING UNDER THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF A BURNT OFFERING, OR IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING, IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF THE BURNT OFFERING, IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING, IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF THE SIN OFFERING, IT IS INVALID. IF HE PREPARED IT BELOW THE RED LINE IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF EITHER OF THEM, IT IS INVALID.

1. II:1: When the priest offered the bird designated as a burnt offering of fowl in accord with the rite of the sin offering, in what way has he deviated from the standard rite? If I should say that he has deviated in performing the rite of pinching the neck nipping both organs and thus severing the neck, then when the Tannaite framer of the passage proceeds, And all of them which are invalid do not impart uncleanness in the gullet. And the laws of sacrilege apply to them, shall we have to conclude that this does not accord with the position of R. Joshua? For if it were in accord with the position of R. Joshua, he has maintained that the laws of sacrilege do not apply if the pinching of the neck is not done properly.

XXX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 7:3-4

A. AND ALL OF THEM WHICH ARE INVALID DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS IN THE GULLET. AND THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE APPLY TO THEM, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING OF THE FOWL WHICH ONE PREPARED BELOW IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING FOR THE NAME OF THE SIN OFFERING WHICH MAY BE EATEN BY THE PRIEST.

THE BIRD DESIGNATED AS BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL WHICH ONE PREPARED BELOW INSTEAD OF ABOVE, IN ACCORD WITH THE RITES OF THE SIN OFFERING, FOR THE SAKE OF THE SIN OFFERING — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE APPLY TO IT.” R. JOSHUA SAYS, “THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO NOT APPLY TO IT.” SAID R. ELIEZER, “NOW IF THE SIN OFFERING, TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO NOT APPLY WHEN ONE PREPARED IT IN THE CLASSIFICATION FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED “FOR ITS OWN NAME” IS SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE WHEN ONE DID IT NOT IN THE CLASSIFICATION FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED FOR THE SAKE OF SOME OTHER NAME (LIT. “WHEN HE CHANGED ITS NAME”), THE BURNT OFFERING, TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO APPLY WHEN ONE OFFERED IT IN THE CLASSIFICATION FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED FOR ITS OWN NAME, WHEN ONE DID IT NOT IN THE CLASSIFICATION FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED FOR THE SAKE OF SOME OTHER NAME “WHEN HE CHANGED ITS NAME” — IS IT NOT LOGICAL THAT THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE SHOULD CONTINUE TO APPLY TO IT?” SAID TO HIM R. JOSHUA, “NO. IF YOU HAVE SO STATED THE RULE IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING, IN WHICH CASE THE BEAST ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS A SIN OFFERING HAS BEEN OFFERED UP AS A BURNT OFFERING “THE NAME OF WHICH ONE HAS CHANGED TO THE NAME OF THE BURNT OFFERING”, THAT IS BECAUSE ONE INDEED HAS OFFERED THE BEAST IN THE CLASSIFICATION TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE APPLY IN ANY EVENT “CHANGED ITS NAME TO THAT OF SOMETHING TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE APPLY”. BUT WILL YOU SO STATE THE RULE IN THE CASE OF THE BURNT OFFERING, IN WHICH CASE AN ANIMAL ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS A BURNT OFFERING IS NOW OFFERED IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF SIN OFFERING THE NAME OF WHICH ONE CHANGED TO THE NAME OF THE SIN OFFERING? FOR INDEED HE HAS CLASSIFIED THE BEAST IN A CLASSIFICATION THAT DID NOT ORIGINALLY APPLY CHANGED ITS NAME TO THAT OF CLASSIFICATION OF OFFERING TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO NOT APPLY.” SAID TO HIM R. ELIEZER, “NOW, BEHOLD — MOST HOLY THINGS WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED AT THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE ALTAR, INSTEAD OF THE NORTHERN SIDE, AND SLAUGHTERED IN THE CLASSIFICATION “FOR THE NAME” OF LESSER HOLY THINGS E.G., PEACE OFFERINGS, WILL PROVE THE CASE. FOR ONE INDEED HAS OFFERED THE BEAST IN A CLASSIFICATION THAT DID NOT INITIALLY APPLY “CHANGED THEIR NAME” TO THAT CLASSIFICATION OF OFFERING TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO NOT APPLY, FOR SAID LAW APPLIES ONLY TO THE SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS, YET THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO APPLY TO THEM. SO YOU SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED CONCERNING THE BURNT OFFERING. FOR EVEN THOUGH ONE OFFERED A BEAST ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS A BURNT OFFERING “CHANGED ITS NAME” TO THE

CLASSIFICATION OF SOMETHING TO WHICH THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE DO NOT APPLY, THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE SHOULD MOST CERTAINLY APPLY TO IT.” SAID TO HIM R. JOSHUA, “NO. IF YOU HAVE SO STATED THE RULE IN CONNECTION WITH MOST HOLY THINGS WHICH ONE SLAUGHTERED AT THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE ALTAR AND SLAUGHTERED FOR THE SAKE OF LESSER HOLY THINGS, THAT IS BECAUSE HE INDEED HAS OFFERED THE BEAST IN A CLASSIFICATION OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED “CHANGED THEIR NAME”, SPECIFICALLY, A CLASSIFICATION IN WHICH THERE IS BOTH WHAT IS FORBIDDEN THE SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS OF LESSER HOLY THINGS ARE FORBIDDEN UNDER THE LAW OF SACRILEGE AND WHAT IS PERMITTED THEIR FLESH IS PERMITTED. BUT WILL YOU SAY SO CONCERNING THE BEAST ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED AS A BURNT OFFERING, THE CLASSIFICATION “NAME” OF WHICH ONE HAS CHANGED FOR THAT OF SOMETHING WHICH IS WHOLLY PERMITTED.

1. I:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Eliezer to R. Joshua, “An animal designated as a guilt offering, which one slaughtered at the north side of the altar for the in the classification of peace offerings will prove the point, for the priest has deviated from the originally designated classification, and the law of sacrilege applies to the offering. So do not be surprised concerning the burnt offering, in which instance even though the priest has changed the original classification of the beast to some other, the laws of sacrilege should continue to apply to it.” Said to him R. Joshua, “No, if you have stated that rule in the case of a guilt offering, in which instance while the priest has ignored the original classification of the beast, he still has observed the rule governing the proper location at the altar at which the guilt offering is to be prepared, will you say the same of a burnt offering, in which case the priest has not only classified the beast in some other classification than the one that originally applied but also has changed the location on the altar from to one that does not pertain?” Said to him R. Eliezer, “The animal designated as a guilt offering which the priest slaughtered at the south side of the altar in the classification of peace offerings will prove to the contrary. For here we have a case in which the officiating priest has classified the offering in a category other than that which originally applied and also has changed the correct place at the altar at which the rite is supposed to be carried out. And yet the law of sacrilege still pertains. So do not find it surprising that in the case of a burnt offering, even though the officiating priest has changed the classification of the beast from that which originally applied and also changed the location at the altar from that which should have applied, still the laws of sacrilege do apply.” Said to him R. Joshua, “No, if you have invoked the case of the guilt offering, in which case one has classified the animal as an offering other than that which it was originally designated to serve and also located the rite at a point on the altar other than the point at which the offering originally was contemplated to be prepared, still, the priest in no way has varied from the rites that would have applied to the original classification of offering. But will you say the same of a burnt offering, in which case one has not only deviated from the originally designated classification, and also has deviated from rites that should have applied in the original classification, and also deviated from the location that should originally have served for the performance of the rite?” (T. [Zeb. 7:16-20](#)).

a. I:2: Analysis of the foregoing. Said Raba, “But why not answer him with the case of ‘an animal originally designated as a guilt offering, which the priest slaughtered at the south side of the altar, under the classification of peace offerings, in the name of owners other than those who had originally consecrated the beast, in which case one has offered the beast in a classification other than originally designated, in a place on the altar other than should have applied to the originally designated classification of offering, and furthermore has deviated from the rites that would otherwise have applied to the original classification of offering’? Since he did not respond in this way, you may draw the conclusion that R. Eliezer saw R. Joshua’s operative consideration pertaining only to a bird offering.

I. I:3: Gloss of the analysis.

XXXI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 7:5

A. IF ONE PINCHED THE NECK WITH HIS LEFT HAND OR AT NIGHT:

IF HE SLAUGHTERED UNCONSECRATED BIRDS INSIDE THE TEMPLE COURTYARD OR HOLY THINGS CONSECRATED BIRDS OUTSIDE — THEY DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET. IF ONE PINCHED THE NECK WITH A KNIFE NOT WITH HIS FINGERNAIL, AS IS REQUIRED, IF HE PINCHED THE NECK OF UNCONSECRATED BIRDS INSIDE THE TEMPLE COURTYARD, OR OF HOLY THINGS OUTSIDE INSTEAD OF INSIDE THE COURTYARD, WHERE CONSECRATED FOWL ALONE ARE PROPERLY KILLED BY PINCHING THE NECK — IF HE PINCHED THE NECK OF TURTLEDOVES WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME TO SERVE AS SACRIFICES, AND YOUNG PIGEONS WHOSE TIME HAD PASSED FOR SERVING AS SACRIFICES, OR A BLEMISHED BIRD, E.G., WHOSE WING HAD DRIED UP, OR WHOSE EYE WAS BLINDED, OR WHOSE EYE WAS BLINDED, OR WHOSE LEG WAS CUT OFF WHICH ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR SACRIFICES — THE MEAT OF THE BIRD IS DEEMED CARRION AND THEREFORE IMPARTS UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET. THIS IS THE ENCOMPASSING PRINCIPLE: ANY BIRD WHICH BECAME INVALID WHILE IN THE SANCTUARY SUBJECT TO THE RITES OF SACRIFICE DOES NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET FOR THE PINCHING ITSELF IS VALID TO REMOVE THE CARCASS FROM THE CATEGORY OF CARRION. IF IT DID NOT BECOME INVALID WHILE IN THE SANCTUARY SUBJECT TO THE CULTIC PROCESSES, IT DOES IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET. AND ALL THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE INVALID LISTED AT M. 2: 1, WHO PINCHED THE NECK OF A BIRD — THEIR ACT OF PINCHING THE NECK IS INVALID SO FAR AS THE CULT IS CONCERNED. BUT THE CARCASSES OF THE BIRDS WHOSE NECKS THEY HAVE PINCHED DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET.

1. I:1: Said Rab, “If this was done by with the left hand or at night, the meat does not impart uncleanness when located in the gullet, but if it was done by a non-priest or a knife, the meat of the bird does impart uncleanness when located in the gullet. And R. Yohanan said, “If a non-priest performed the act of pinching, the meat does not defile in the gullet; if it was done with a knife, it does impart uncleanness in the gullet.”

a. I:2: Secondary analysis of positions taken in the foregoing.

I. I:3: As above.

2. I:4: Said R. Isaac, “I have heard two rules, one as to taking up the handful of meal offering by a non-priest, the other as to pinching the neck of the bird by a non-priest. In consequence, if the sacrificial parts are put up onto the altar, in the one case the offering is removed from the altar and in the other the meat is not removed from the altar. But I don’t know which is which.”

B. IF ONE PINCHED THE NECK WITH HIS LEFT HAND OR AT NIGHT:

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose to the contrary of the Mishnah’s rule that meat derived from the rite of pinching the neck of the bird when done within the Temple imparts uncleanness when located in the gullet of someone eating it? Scripture states, “And every soul that eats carrion...he shall wash his clothes” (Lev. 17:15).

2. II:2: A further Tannaite teaching is as follows: Might one suppose that meat deriving from an act of slaughter of unconsecrated birds inside the Temple court, or the act of slaughter of Holy Things whether inside or outside of the Temple court, defiles when located in the gullet? Scripture states, “And every soul that eats carrion...he shall wash his clothes” (Lev. 17:15).

XXXII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 7:6

A. IF ONE PINCHED OFF THE NECK AND THE BIRD TURNED OUT TO BE TEREFAH — R. MEIR SAYS, “IT DOES NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET SINCE SLAUGHTERING A BEAST IS WHOLLY EQUIVALENT TO PINCHING THE NECK OF A BIRD.” R. JUDAH SAYS, “IT DOES IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET.” BIRDS AND BEASTS IN NO WAY ARE COMPARABLE; NEITHER SLAUGHTERING AN UNCONSECRATED CLEAN BIRD NOR PINCHING THE NECK OF A CONSECRATED ONE WILL EXEMPT FROM UNCLEANNESS A BIRD WHICH TURNS OUT TO BE TEREFAH. SAID R. MEIR, “IT IS AN ARGUMENT A FORTIORI THAT IT DOES NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS OF THE GULLET. NOW IF IN THE CASE OF THE CARRION OF A BEAST, WHICH IMPARTS UNCLEANNESS THROUGH CONTACT AND THROUGH CARRYING, PROPER SLAUGHTER RENDERS CLEAN FROM ITS UNCLEANNESS THAT WHICH WAS TEREFAH, IN THE CASE OF THE CARRION OF FOWL, WHICH DOES NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS THROUGH CONTACT AND THROUGH CARRYING, IT SHOULD LOGICALLY FOLLOW THAT ITS PROPER SLAUGHTER SHOULD RENDER CLEAN FROM ITS UNCLEANNESS THAT WHICH WAS TEREFAH. JUST AS WE FIND THAT ITS PROPER SLAUGHTER IN THE CASE OF A BIRD OR BEAST RENDERS IT VALID FOR EATING AND RENDERS IT CLEAN FROM ITS UNCLEANNESS IN THE CASE OF TEREFAH, SO PROPER PINCHING OF THE NECK, WHICH RENDERS IT VALID FOR EATING, SHOULD RENDER IT CLEAN FROM ITS UNCLEANNESS IN THE CASE OF TEREFAH.” R. YOSÉ SAYS, “IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT IF THE SLAUGHTERING OF THE BIRD BE EQUIVALENT TO THE CARRION OF A BEAST: ITS A BEAST’S OR A BIRD’S SLAUGHTERING RENDERS CLEAN WHAT IS TEREFAH, BUT THE PINCHING OF THE NECK OF A BIRD DOES NOT RENDER CLEAN WHAT IS TEREFAH.”

1. I:1: But does not R. Meir accept the principle of sufficiency, It is sufficient that the slaughtering of the bird be equivalent to the carrion of a beast: a beast’s or a

bird's slaughtering renders clean what is terefah, but the pinching of the neck of a bird does not render clean what is terefah, in the principle that it suffices for what is inferred by an argument to conform to the traits of the premise of that same argument, seeing that that principle derives from the Torah?

2. I:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: "And the forbidden fat of carrion and the forbidden fat of a terefah-beast may be used for any other purpose, but you shall in no way eat of it" (Lev. 7:24) —Scripture speaks of the forbidden fat of a clean domesticated beast. You maintain that Scripture speaks of the forbidden fat of a clean domesticated beast, but perhaps Scripture speaks only of the forbidden fat of an unclean domesticated beast?

a. I:3: Gloss of foregoing.

b. I:4: As above.

3. I:5: R. Jeremiah raised the question, "If one broke a goat's neck as at Deu. 21:19, what is the law? The rule concerning ducks and chickens is because they are a species of bird, while a goat is not of the same species as a heifer, or perhaps the operative consideration is that it is of the species of cattle?" The act of slaughter by breaking the neck renders an animal carrion, so that it imparts uncleanness, but it is prescribed for the heifer at Deu. 21:1-9, it presumably does not impart uncleanness in such a case. What if one broke the neck of a goat instead of a heifer in that same context: is the goat carrion or not. The goat is not of the same species as a heifer, because a heifer is classified as large cattle, the goat small, and hence it will impart uncleanness. Or perhaps it is a species of cattle nonetheless, so it will not impart uncleanness.

XXXIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:1-2

A. ALL ANIMALS THAT HAD BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OFFERINGS THAT WERE MIXED UP WITH SIN OFFERINGS THAT HAD BEEN LEFT TO DIE...— EVEN ONE SIN OFFERING LEFT TO DIE IN TEN THOUSAND SUITABLE ANIMAL OFFERINGS — LET ALL OF THEM BE LEFT TO DIE:

1. I:1: ...even one sin offering left to die in ten thousand suitable animal offerings — let all of them be left to die: What is the meaning of "even"?

2. I:2: Continuing the foregoing: But have we not already got a Tannaite formulation of the same rule?

3. I:3: Continuing the foregoing.

B. ALL ANIMALS THAT HAD BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OFFERINGS THAT WERE MIXED UP WITH SIN OFFERINGS THAT HAD BEEN LEFT TO DIE OR AN OX SENTENCED TO BE STONED — EVEN ONE SIN OFFERING LEFT TO DIE IN TEN THOUSAND SUITABLE ANIMAL OFFERINGS — LET ALL OF THEM BE LEFT TO DIE:

1. II:1: But why not take them one by one and invoke the rule, "Whatever is separated from the mass is separated from the majority of the mass"? That is, when one thing is detached from many, we assume that was detached from what constituted the majority; here the majority of the animals are fit for sacrifice; as we

detached each one, we may assume that it was of the majority and therefore it can be sacrificed. Only the last two will then remain forbidden.

2. II:2: Said Raba, “Now that rabbis have established that the beasts may not be offered, should one offer the beasts, no animal among them achieves expiation atonement for sin through the blood rite.”

C. RESOLVING MATTERS OF DOUBT CONCERNING THE CONFUSION OF PERMITTED AND FORBIDDEN OBJECTS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO IDOLATRY AND PRIESTLY RATIONS

1. II:3: Said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha, “If a ring belonging to an idol was confused with a hundred other rings and one of the rings then fell into the Great Sea, all of the rest of them have been permitted for Israelite use, for we invoke the assumption that the ring that was lost is the one that had been prohibited by reason of belonging to an idol.” Raba objected to R. Nahman, “All animals that had been designated for the purpose of offerings that were mixed up with sin offerings that had been left to die or an ox sentenced to be stoned — even one sin offering left to die in ten thousand suitable animal offerings — let all of them be left to die. But why should that be the case? Should we not invoke the principle that the one that dies first is the one that was forbidden?”

2. II:4: Said R. Judah said Rab, “In the case of a single ring belonging to an idol that was confused with a hundred other rings, and forty of the rings were taken away to another location and sixty some other location, if one of the rings was inadvertently separated from the forty and became confused with the others, it does not impose a prohibition on the others with which it is confused. If one of them was detached from the sixty and confused with the others, it does impose the prohibition attaching to it on all of the others with which it is confused.”

a. II:5: Gloss of foregoing.

3. II:6: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “In the case of a cask of food in the status of heave offering that was confused among a hundred casks of ordinary food, and one of the lot fell into the Salt Sea, all of the rest of them are permitted. For we say that the one that fell is the forbidden cask.”

a. II:7: The rulings of R. Nahman concerning a ring belonging to an idol and of R. Simeon b. Laqish are required.

b. II:8: Said Rabbah, “R. Simeon b. Laqish made his ruling, in which he permitted the mixture, only in the case of the cask of figs, for in that case the loss is entirely noticeable, but he would not rule in that way in the case of a single fig” which is small.

4. II:9: Said R. Eleazar, “A sealed cask of wine in the status of heave offering that fell among a hundred other casks — the farmer opens one of them and removes from it the correct proportion one one hundred and one part is to be removed, the rest permitted; an open cask can be neutralized. Then he may drink the contents of the keg.”

5. II:10: Said R. Oshaia, “A sealed cask of wine in the status of heave offering that was confused with one hundred and fifty casks, one of which was open — the farmer removes from it the correct proportion and drinks. But the rest of the

casks are forbidden until they too open by accident, for we do not invoke the principle, ‘The forbidden thing is part of the majority’” as was maintained earlier; if we do invoke that principle, we would assume that the cask of wine in the status of heave offering is among the hundred, and the other fifty can be opened right away

D. IF THEY ANIMALS DESIGNATED FOR USE AS OFFERINGS WERE MIXED UP WITH AN OX UPON WHICH A SIN WAS COMMITTED, OR AN OX WHICH HAD BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING A MAN ON THE EVIDENCE OF A SINGLE WITNESS OR ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE OWNER, WITH AN OX WHICH HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A HUMAN, OR WITH AN OX WITH WHICH A HUMAN HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS, OR WITH AN OX WHICH HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR IDOLATRY, OR WITH AN OX WHICH HAD BEEN WORSHIPPED, OR WITH AN OX WHICH HAD SERVED AS A HARLOT’S HIRE, OR WITH AN OX WHICH HAD SERVED AS THE PRICE OF A DOG, OR WITH AN OX WHICH WAS CROSSBRED, OR WITH AN OX WHICH WAS TEREFAH, OR WITH AN OX BORN FROM THE SIDE — LET THEM ANY OF THOSE BEASTS THAT HAD BEEN CONFUSED IN THIS WAY PASTURE UNTIL THEY SUFFER A BLEMISH SINCE ONE OF THEM IS A VALID CONSECRATED BEAST, AND THEN BE SOLD, AND LET THE OWNER BRING ANOTHER SACRIFICE, PURCHASED WITH THE PROCEEDS OF THE BEST OF THEM OF THAT KIND THAT HAD BEEN MIXED UP WITH THE INVALID BEASTS. IF THEY WERE MIXED UP WITH UNBLEMISHED UNCONSECRATED BEASTS, THE UNCONSECRATED BEASTS ARE TO BE SOLD TO THOSE WHO REQUIRE THAT PARTICULAR KIND OF SACRIFICE:

1. III:1: As to the other items on the list, there is no problem, for the basis on which they are disqualified is not readily discerned so they can be confused with others. But in the case of 8 a terefah-beast, how is this possible? If it is discernible, let a priest come and take it away from the mixture, and if he cannot discern it, then how does the priest know that a terefah-beast has been confused with the others if the beast’s infirmity is internal, until the beast has been slaughtered and dissected?

E. CONSECRATED BEASTS BELONGING TO SEVERAL OWNERS, WHICH WERE MIXED UP WITH OTHER CONSECRATED BEASTS OF THE SAME KIND OF OFFERING, SO THAT WHILE ALL THE BEASTS IN THE LOT HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE, WE STILL DO NOT KNOW TO WHOM IN PARTICULAR THE SEVERAL BEASTS BELONG — THIS ONE IS OFFERED FOR THE SAKE OF ONE AMONG THE OWNERS AND THAT ONE IS OFFERED FOR THE SAKE OF ONE AMONG THE OWNERS.

1. IV:1: But how can that solution work, since does a sacrifice not require the laying on of hands by the owner?

a. IV:2: Rabbi says, “We examine how the application was made: if it contains enough blood to be sufficient for each enough blood in one application for two such applications, it is fit, if not, it is unfit.”

F. CONSECRATED BEASTS WHICH WERE MIXED UP WITH OTHER CONSECRATED BEASTS E.G., BURNT OFFERINGS AND PEACE OFFERINGS, NOT OF THE SAME KIND OF OFFERINGS AND WHICH THEREFORE ARE OFFERED WITH DIFFERENT RITES, E.G., DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF ACTS OF SPRINKLING BLOOD, RULES OF CONSUMING THE FLESH, AND THE LIKE — LET THEM PASTURE UNTIL THEY SUFFER A BLEMISH, AND THEN BE SOLD SEPARATELY, AND LET THE OWNER BRING WITH THE PROCEEDS OF

THE BEST OF THEM A SACRIFICE E.G., PEACE OFFERINGS OF THAT KIND, AND LET HIM LOSE MAKE UP THE ADDED DIFFERENCE FROM HIS OWN PROPERTY.

IF THEY WERE MIXED UP WITH A FIRSTLING OR WITH TITHE OF CATTLE — LET THEM PASTURE UNTIL THEY SUFFER A BLEMISH, AND BE EATEN AS A FIRSTLING BY PRIESTS AND AS TITHE BY ORDINARY FOLK BUT NOT SLAUGHTERED IN THE PUBLIC MARKET OR SOLD BY WEIGHT.

1. V:1: Said Rami bar Hama, “As to the meat of a firstling — the House of Shammai say, “They do not feed it to menstruating women.” And the House of Hillel say, “They feed it to menstruating women” (T. **Bekh. 3:16 A-C**). Note M. **Bekh. 5:2A-C**: the House of Shammai say, “An Israelite is not numbered with a priest for eating a firstling.” And the House of Hillel permit, And even in the case of a gentile. The Shammaites see the firstling as a priestly possession. The Hillelites deem the blemished firstling to be unconsecrated. What about the substitute for such a beast?

2. V:2: Rami bar Hama, raised the question, “If one assigned a blemished firstling’s value to the upkeep of the Temple house, can the meat be weighed out by the pound or only by a general estimate? If weighed by the pound, a higher price will accrue, for the advantage of the Temple. Do we maintain that the profit to the sanctuary takes precedence, or perhaps the degradation of the meat of the firstling is the operative consideration?”

G. ALL CAN BE MIXED UP WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCERNING AN ANIMAL FOR ONE SACRIFICE FROM THAT FOR ANOTHER, EXCEPT A SIN OFFERING, WHICH IS FEMALE OR WHICH IS A MALE GOAT, WITH A GUILT OFFERING, WHICH IS A MALE SHEEP OR RAM.

1. VI:1: What differentiates the sin offering and guilt offering? It is presumably that the one is a male, the other a female? Then the same consideration pertains to the sin offering and guilt offering!

XXXIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:3

A. A GUILT OFFERING THAT WAS MIXED UP WITH PEACE OFFERINGS — LET THEM PASTURE UNTIL THEY SUFFER A BLEMISH . R. SIMEON SAYS, “BOTH OF THEM ARE SLAUGHTERED AT THE NORTH AND ARE EATEN IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES GOVERNING THE MORE STRINGENT OF THEM AS A GUILT OFFERING, INSIDE THE COURTYARD, BY MALE PRIESTS FOR A DAY AND A NIGHT.” THEY SAID TO HIM, “THEY DO NOT BRING HOLY THINGS TO THE STATUS OF INVALIDITY.”

IF PIECES OF MEAT OF ONE OFFERING WERE MIXED UP WITH PIECES OF MEAT OF OTHER OFFERINGS — MOST HOLY THINGS WITH LESSER HOLY THINGS E.G., PIECES OF A SIN OFFERING OR A GUILT OFFERING WITH PIECES OF A THANK OFFERING, THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE EATEN ON ONE DAY WITH THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE EATEN ON TWO DAYS — THEY ARE EATEN IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES GOVERNING THE MORE STRINGENT OF THEM.

1. I:1: A Tannaite authority repeated as a Tannaite formulation in the presence of Rab: They may not purchase produce in the status of heave offering with money received from the sale of produce of the seventh year, since that will limit the time

allowed for eating it (T. **Shebiit 6:29G-H**). When, in the seventh year, nothing is left for the beasts in the field, the food in the status of heave offering will have to be destroyed, while if it had not been purchased with money received for produce of the seventh year, it could be eaten without time limit. Rabbis said before Rabbah, “That is not in accord with the position of R. Simeon, for if it were to accord with R. Simeon, has he not said, ‘They do bring Holy Things to the status of invalidity’?”

2. I:2: Addressing the ruling of Simeon, that is all well and good for the guilt offering, but what is to be said about the log of oil? The guilt offering can be declared a voluntary peace offering to cover the case of the man’s not having been afflicted with the skin ailment, but what about the oil, to which, in that case, he was not liable ?

XXXV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:4

A. THE LIMBS OF A SIN OFFERING WHICH WERE MIXED UP WITH THE LIMBS OF A BURNT OFFERING — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “LET HIM PLACE THEM ALL ABOVE THE ALTAR FIRES. AND I REGARD THE MEAT OF THE SIN OFFERING WHICH IS ON TOP OF THE FIRES AS IF IT WERE WOOD.” AND SAGES SAY, “LET THEIR APPEARANCE BE SPOILED, AND LET THEM THEN GO OUT TO THE PLACE OF BURNING AS REMNANT, NOT AS MERE FUEL.”

1. I:1: What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Eliezer? Scripture has said, “But they shall not come up for a sweet savor upon the altar” (Lev. 2:12) — for a sweet savour you may not take it up on the altar, but you may take it up for fuel.

2. I:2: Our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the view of the Tannaite framer of the following, which has been taught on Tannaite authority....

a. I:3: If as Eliezer maintains, Scripture itself stands behind his position, then how can he use the language, I regard? Lo, Scripture itself has declared the mixture to be valid!

XXXVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:5

A. LIMBS OF BURNT OFFERINGS WHICH WERE MIXED WITH THE LIMBS OF BLEMISHED BEASTS WHICH ARE NOT OFFERED — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “IF THE HEAD OF ONE OF THEM WAS INADVERTENTLY OFFERED, LET ALL THE HEADS BE OFFERED IN THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ONE WHICH ALREADY HAS BEEN OFFERED IS THE ONE THAT WAS BLEMISHED. IF THE LEG OF ONE OF THEM HAD BEEN OFFERED, LET ALL THE LEGS BE OFFERED IN THE SAME ASSUMPTION.” AND SAGES SAY, “EVEN IF ALL OF THEM EXCEPT ONE HAD INADVERTENTLY BEEN OFFERED, LET IT GO FORTH TO THE PLACE OF BURNING SINCE THAT ONE MAY BE THE BLEMISHED ONE.”

1. I:1: Said R. Eleazar, “R. Eliezer has validated the procedure herein outlined only when they are two by two, but not one by one.”

XXXVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:6-7

A. BLOOD WHICH WAS MIXED WITH WATER, IF IT THE MIXTURE HAS THE APPEARANCE OF BLOOD, IS VALID. IF IT WAS MIXED IN WINE, THEY REGARD IT AS IF IT WERE WATER AND IF THE MIXTURE IS BLOOD-COLOR, IT IS VALID. IF IT BLOOD OF HOLY THINGS WAS MIXED WITH THE BLOOD OF A BEAST OR WITH THE BLOOD OF FOWL WHICH WERE UNCONSECRATED, THEY REGARD IT AS IF IT WERE WATER. R. JUDAH SAYS, “BLOOD UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT ANNUL BLOOD.”

1. I:1: With reference to the rule, they regard it as if it were water, and if the mixture is blood-color, it is valid: said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, “That rule applies only in a case in which water fell into blood. But if blood fell into water, then as each drop of blood fell into the water, it was nullified by the larger volume of water, and hence the mixture is unfit and poured out into the gutter.”

2. I:2: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “If meat that had been rendered refuse by the officiating priest’s improper intentionality, meat that was left over, or unclean meat, were mixed up together and one ate them, he is exempt. It is not possible that one classification of unfit meat has not formed the greater part or its fellow, with the result that the latter is nullified in the former.” The lesser part is nullified in the greater and is added thereto, while the kind that it is is diminished thereby. This will happen with each piece that he chooses, and as it is impossible to equalize them, one of the kinds has less than the standard bulk. Liability is incurred only when a formal warning or admonition is given to the offender, and this must be specific, e.g., with reference to the liability for refuse, left-over, or unclean meat in particular. But this is not possible, for if the warning covers refuse, then liability may be because of the other two classifications, and so throughout.

3. I:3: Said Raba, “Rabbis have stated that the operative criterion is which component of the mixture imparts its taste to the whole, and rabbis also have said that the operative criterion is which component of the mixture forms the larger part of the whole, and rabbis have also made the ruling that the operative criterion is which part of the mixture imposes its appearance on the whole.”

4. I:4: Now in maintaining that prohibitions e.g., prohibited classifications of meat, have the power to nullify one another, Simeon b. Laqish differs from R. Eleazar, for R. Eleazar has said, “Just as religious duties cannot nullify one another, so prohibitions do not have the power to nullify one another.”

5. I:5: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: The chamber pot of a man or woman afflicted with flux uncleanness — the water of the first and of the second washings of the pot conveys uncleanness. The water of the third rinsing is then clean. Under what circumstances? When someone put fresh water into it. But if one did not put water into the pot but washed it with urine, even up to the tenth rinsing, it is unclean. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, “The third rinsing, even though he did not put water into it, is clean” (T. **Toh. 5:3B-J**). Now of whom have you heard who takes the view that if you have a mixture of one kind and another of the same order, it is not nullified? It is R. Judah so he must be the anonymous authority contrary to Eliezer b. Jacob.

B. IF IT WAS MIXED WITH THE BLOOD OF UNFIT OFFERINGS, LET IT BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER. IF IT WAS MIXED WITH BLOOD WHICH EXUDED AFTER DEATH, LET IT BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER. R. ELIEZER DECLARES IT VALID. IF THE PRIEST DID NOT PAY MIND TO IT AND PLACED THE BLOOD ON THE ALTAR, THE OFFERING IN THE END IS VALID.

1. II:1: What is at issue between the two positions? Said R. Zebid, “At issue is whether or not a precautionary decree is issued in regard to matters affecting the sanctuary. One authority takes the view that we do make such precautionary decrees, the other that we do not.” R. Pappa said, “All parties concur that we do make such a decree. But here at issue is whether it is commonplace for blood that is drained out to form the greater part over blood that gushes out and is the blood to be tossed on the altar. One authority maintains that that is common, the other that it is not.”

XXXVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:8-10

A. BLOOD OF UNBLEMISHED ANIMALS WHICH WAS MIXED WITH THE BLOOD OF BLEMISHED ANIMALS — LET IT BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER. A CUP OF ONE KIND OF BLOOD WHICH WAS CONFUSED WITH CUPS CONTAINING ANOTHER KIND OF BLOOD — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “IF ONE CUP WAS OFFERED, LET ALL THE CUPS BE OFFERED.” AND SAGES SAY, “EVEN IF ALL OF THEM EXCEPT ONE HAD BEEN OFFERED, LET IT THE REMAINING ONE BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER.”

BLOOD WHICH WAS TO BE SPRINKLED BELOW E.G., OF A BURNT OFFERING WHICH WAS MIXED UP WITH BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE SPRINKLED ABOVE E.G., OF A SIN OFFERING, AS AT M. 5: 3 — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “LET HIM THE PRIEST SPRINKLE IT FIRST ABOVE THE RED LINE IN FOUR ACTS OF SPRINKLING. AND I REGARD THE BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE SPRINKLED BELOW THAT HAS BEEN SPRINKLED ABOVE AS IF IT WERE WATER. AND THEN LET HIM GO AND SPRINKLE BLOOD ONE TIME BELOW THE LINE AS WELL. THE REMNANTS OF BLOOD OF A SIN OFFERING IN ANY CASE ARE POURED OUT AT THE BASE.” AND SAGES SAY, “LET THEM BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER.” BUT IF THE PRIEST DID NOT PAY MIND TO IT INQUIRE ABOUT IT AND PLACED THE BLOOD ON THE ALTAR, THE OFFERING IS VALID.

BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN A SINGLE ACT OF TOSSING WHICH WAS MIXED UP WITH BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN A SINGLE ACT OF TOSSING — LET THEM BE TOSSED IN A SINGLE ACT OF TOSSING BELOW THE RED LINE. BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN FOUR ACTS OF TOSSING WHICH WAS MIXED UP WITH BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN FOUR ACTS OF TOSSING — LET THEM BE TOSSED IN FOUR ACTS OF TOSSING BELOW THE RED LINE. BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN FOUR ACTS OF TOSSING WHICH WAS MIXED UP WITH BLOOD WHICH IS TO BE TOSSED IN ONE ACT OF TOSSING — R. ELIEZER SAYS, “LET THEM BE TOSSED IN FOUR ACTS OF TOSSING.” R. JOSHUA SAYS, “LET THEM BE TOSSED IN A SINGLE ACT OF TOSSING.” SAID TO HIM R. ELIEZER, “AND LO, HE TRANSGRESSES THE RULE AGAINST DIMINISHING THE REQUIRED ACTS OF TOSSING, SO DEU. 4: 21.” SAID TO HIM R. JOSHUA, “AND LO, HE TRANSGRESSES THE RULE AGAINST ADDING TO THE REQUIRED ACTS OF TOSSING” SAID TO HIM R. ELIEZER, “THE PROHIBITION AGAINST ADDING IS STATED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT IN

ITSELF. SAID TO HIM R. JOSHUA, “THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DIMINISHING IS STATED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT IN ITSELF.” AND FURTHER DID R. JOSHUA SAY, “WHEN YOU PLACED THE BLOOD FOUR TIMES, YOU TRANSGRESSED THE PROHIBITION AGAINST ADDING, AND YOU DID THE DEED WITH YOUR OWN HAND, AND WHEN YOU DID NOT SPRINKLE FOUR TIMES, YOU TRANSGRESSED AGAINST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DIMINISHING, BUT AT LEAST YOU DID NOT DO THE DEED WITH YOUR OWN HAND.”

1. I:1: A cup of one kind of blood which was confused with cups containing another kind of blood — said R. Eleazar, “R. Eliezer permitted offering them only two by two, but not one by one.” One is definitely not forbidden, and we assume the same about the other.”

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing.

2. I:3: There we have learned in the Mishnah: A flask of purification water into which any amount of unmixed water fell — R. Eliezer says, “One sprinkles two sprinklings.” And sages declare unfit (M. **Par. 9:1A-C**). Now from the perspective of sages, there is no problem, since they take the view that we assume an even distribution of the components of a mixture, and the sprinkling of the purification water to be validly done requires a requisite volume of water, and sprinklings do not combine to make up the requisite volume for when the priest sprinkles the purification water on an unclean person, the minimum volume is lacking, since part of the water is unfit, and this cannot be remedied by sprinkling again, for sprinklings do not combine. But from the perspective of R. Eliezer, what can he possibly have in mind?

a. I:4: Gloss of a detail of the foregoing.

4. I:5: With reference to the dispute in the Mishnah, said Abbaye, “The dispute is set forth only with reference to the commencement of the process of offering a sin offering and a burnt offering that is, if the blood was mingled before sprinkling; only then do sages disqualify the mixture, holding that we may not sprinkle the blood of the burnt offering above the line in order to make the sin offering fit, but as to the conclusion of the process of offering a sin offering and the commencement of the process of offering a burnt offering: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, after it was sprinkled, was mixed with the blood of the burnt offering before it was sprinkled, all concur that the place at which the blood of the burnt offering is sprinkled is the place at which the residue is to be poured out that is, below the red line, from which it drains to the base.” This counts for both the initial sprinkling of the burnt offering and the final pouring out of the residue of the sin offering.

5. I:6: And so said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “The dispute is set forth only with reference to the commencement of the process of offering a sin offering and a burnt offering that is, if the blood was mingled before sprinkling; only then do sages disqualify the mixture, holding that we may not sprinkle the blood of the burnt offering above the line in order to make the sin offering fit, but as to the conclusion of the process of offering a sin offering and the commencement of the process of offering a burnt offering: if the residue of the blood of the sin offering, after it was sprinkled, was mixed with the blood of the burnt offering before it was

sprinkled, all concur that the place at which the blood of the burnt offering is sprinkled is the place at which the residue is to be poured out that is, below the red line, from which it drains to the base.” This counts for both the initial sprinkling of the burnt offering and the final pouring out of the residue of the sin offering.

XXXIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:11

A. BLOOD THAT IS TO BE PLACED ON THE INSIDE ALTAR THAT IS MIXED UP WITH BLOOD THAT IS TO BE PLACED ON THE OUTSIDE ALTAR — LET IT BE POURED OUT INTO THE GUTTER. IF THE PRIEST WITHOUT PAYING MIND PLACED THE BLOOD OUTSIDE AND THEN WENT AND PLACED IT INSIDE, IT IS VALID. IF HE PLACED IT INSIDE AND THEN WENT AND PLACED IT OUTSIDE — R. AQIBA DECLARES INVALID THE SACRIFICE ON THE OUTER ALTAR. AND SAGES DECLARE VALID.

1. I:1: Why should R. Eliezer not disagree here as well? What should the priest have done? Shall he first sprinkle the blood outside and then sprinkle it inside? That cannot be done, because just as the blood to be sprinkled above the red line around the altar must take precedence over the blood to be sprinkled below the red line, so the blood that must be sprinkled on the inner altar must take precedence over blood to be sprinkled around the outer altar.

B. FOR R. AQIBA DID SAY, “ALL DROPS OF BLOOD THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SPRINKLED OUTSIDE BUT ARE BROUGHT INSIDE THE SANCTUARY TO EFFECT ATONEMENT ARE INVALID.” AND SAGES SAY, “THIS APPLIES TO THE SIN OFFERING ALONE WHICH IS INVALIDATED BY BEING BROUGHT INSIDE, BEFORE THE BLOOD IS TOSSED ON THE OUTER ALTAR. R. ELIEZER SAYS, “IT ALSO APPLIES TO THE GUILT OFFERING, SINCE IT SAYS, ‘AS IS THE SIN OFFERING, SO IS THE GUILT OFFERING’ (LEV. 7: 7).”

1. II:1: Said R. Judah said Samuel, “In the matter of R. Aqiba’s reading, to what is the case comparable? It is to the case of a disciple who was mixing hot water and wine for his master, when the master said to him, ‘Mix me a drink.’ ‘With what,’ the disciple asked. ‘Are we not involved with how water anyhow?’ he said. ‘So I mean, either with hot or with cold.’”

XL. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 8:12

A. A SIN OFFERING SACRIFICED IN THE COURTYARD, THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE RECEIVED IN TWO CUPS — ONE OF THEM WENT FORTH OUTSIDE THE COURTYARD — THE ONE THAT REMAINED INSIDE IS VALID AND SO IS THE SIN OFFERING. IF ONE OF THEM WENT INSIDE INTO THE INNER SANCTUM, WHERE THE INNER ALTAR WAS LOCATED, AND SO WAS INVALIDATED, R. YOSÉ THE GALILEAN DECLARES THE ONE THAT REMAINED OUTSIDE IN THE COURTYARD TO BE VALID. AND SAGES DECLARE IT INVALID. SAID R. YOSÉ THE GALILEAN, “NOW IF IN A SITUATION IN WHICH IMPROPER INTENTION RENDERS THE RITE INVALID, NAMELY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTENTION TO SPRINKLE THE BLOOD OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE COURT, IN A SITUATION IN WHICH INTENTION DOES NOT RENDER THE RITE INVALID, NAMELY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTENTION TO SPRINKLE THE BLOOD, IS IT NOT

LOGICAL THAT WE SHOULD NOT TREAT THAT WHICH REMAINS AS EQUIVALENT TO THAT WHICH ENTERS IN?"

1. I:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Yosé the Galilean, "It is a matter of an argument a fortiori: if in a situation in which improper intention to carry the blood outside invalidates the rite, the blood that actually is taken outside does not invalidate the blood that remains inside, in a situation in which intention to take the blood inside into the inner altar does not invalidate the blood that remains inside the courtyard, is it not logical that the blood that is taken inside should not invalidate the blood that remains outside?" He said to him, "Lo, Scripture says, 'And every sin offering whereof any of the blood is brought into the tent of meeting shall be burned with fire — (Lev. 6:23) — even part of the blood.'" He said to them, "It is a matter of an argument a fortiori: if in a situation in which improper intention does not invalidate the rite, namely, the intention to bring the blood within, intentionality concerning blood that is at the inner altar disqualifies blood that is at the outer altar, in a case in which intentionality does disqualify, namely, with regard to the outer altar, is it not logical that the blood that is outside has the power to disqualify the blood that is inside?"

2. I:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: "Behold the blood of it was not brought into the sanctuary within" (Lev. 10:18) — I know the rule that the offering is disqualified only if the blood is taken into the innermost sanctuary. If it is taken into the inner altar that is before the innermost sanctuary, how do we know the same rule? Scripture says, "into the sanctuary within" (Lev. 10:18).

3. I:3: Raba raised this question: "If the blood of a bullock that is offered in behalf of the community on account of forgetfulness, or of a he goat that is brought by reason of inadvertent idolatry, which must be prepared at the inner altar but not be taken into the inner sanctum would be taken into the innermost sanctuary, what is the law? Do we rule that in regard to a passage in which Scripture states, 'into the sanctuary within,' wherever we read, 'into the sanctuary,' we read, 'within,' and wherever we do not read 'into the sanctuary,' we do not read 'within'? Only where the sacrifice is disqualified when the blood is taken 'into the sanctuary' it is likewise disqualified when it is taken 'within' the inner most shrine, but not otherwise. Or perhaps it is not in its place? When the blood is taken out of bounds the sacrifice is disqualified, and that principle applies here too.

B. "IF IT WAS TAKEN INSIDE TO MAKE ATONEMENT, EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT MAKE ATONEMENT, IT IS INVALID," THE WORDS OF R. ELIEZER. R. SIMEON SAYS, "IT DOES NOT BECOME INVALID UNTIL IT MAKES ATONEMENT."

1. II:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eliezer says, "Here it is said, 'to make atonement in the holy place' (Lev. 6:23), and elsewhere, 'and there shall be no man in the tent of meeting when he goes in to make atonement in the holy place' (Lev. 16:17). Just as in the latter case, reference is made to the time prior to his having made atonement that is, no one is to be present when he is going to make atonement, so here, the meaning is, the time prior to his having made atonement."

C. R. JUDAH SAYS, "IF HE BROUGHT IT IN INADVERTENTLY EVEN IF HE TOSSED THE BLOOD, IT IS VALID." AS TO ALL KINDS OF INVALID BLOOD WHICH WERE PLACED

ON THE ALTAR — THE FRONTLET DOES NOT EFFECT ACCEPTANCE EXCEPT FOR THE UNCLEAN BLOOD IN THE MIXTURE. FOR THE FRONTLET EFFECTS ACCEPTANCE FOR THAT WHICH IS UNCLEAN. BUT IT DOES NOT EFFECT ATONEMENT FOR THAT WHICH GOES FORTH.

1. III:1: But if he did so deliberately, it is disqualified. And when will this have taken place? Is it after he had made atonement, or even before he made atonement?

XLI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 9:1

A. THE ALTAR SANCTIFIES THAT WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO IT. IF SOMETHING IS PLACED ON THE ALTAR THAT IS SUITABLE FOR THE ALTAR, IT IS NOT TO BE REMOVED:

1. I:1: ...that which is appropriate to it remains on the altar, but that which is not appropriate to it does not: to exclude what?

B. R. JOSHUA SAYS, “WHATEVER IS APPROPRIATE TO NOT THE ALTAR BUT THE ALTAR FIRES, IF IT HAS GONE UP ONTO THE FIRES, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, SINCE IT IS SAID, ‘THIS IS THE BURNT OFFERING — THAT WHICH GOES UP ON THE HEARTH ON THE ALTAR’ (LEV. 6: 9): JUST AS THE BURNT OFFERING, WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR FIRES, IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, SO WHATEVER IS APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR FIRES, IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN.”

1. II:1: But does not Rabban Gamaliel also have to address the verse, “that which goes up on the hearth on the altar”?

C. RABBAN GAMALIEL SAYS, “WHATEVER IS APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR, IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, AS IT IS SAID, ‘THIS IS THE BURNT OFFERING ON THE HEARTH ON THE ALTAR’ (LEV. 6: 2): JUST AS THE BURNT OFFERING, WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR, IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, SO WHATEVER IS APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR, IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN.”

1. III:1: But does not R. Joshua also have to address the verse, “on the altar”?

D. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OPINION OF RABBAN GAMALIEL AND THE OPINION OF R. JOSHUA IS ONLY THE BLOOD AND THE DRINK OFFERINGS. FOR RABBAN GAMALIEL SAYS, “THEY SHOULD NOT HAVING BEEN PLACED ON THE ALTAR GO DOWN.” AND R. JOSHUA SAYS, “THEY SHOULD GO DOWN.”

R. SIMEON SAYS, “IF THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE IS VALID AND THE DRINK OFFERINGS INVALID, THE DRINK OFFERINGS VALID AND THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE INVALID, OR EVEN IF THIS AND THAT ARE INVALID — THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, BUT THE DRINK OFFERINGS SHOULD GO DOWN.”

1. IV:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon says, “The generative analogy is the burnt offering: just as a burnt offering is presented on its own account, so whatever is presented on its own account is encompassed under the law at hand that what is put on the altar is left there, excluding, then, drink offerings, which are presented not on their own account but as accompaniment for

another offering.” R. Yosé the Galilean says, “Since it is said, ‘Whatever touches the altar shall be holy’ (Exo. 29:37), I infer that that is so whether it is suitable for the altar or not suitable for the altar. So Scripture further says, ‘Now this is what you shall alter upon the altar: two lambs’ (Exo. 29:38) — just as lambs are suitable for the altar, so the law applies to whatever is suitable to the altar.” R. Aqiba says, “The generative analogy is the burnt offering: just as a burnt offering is appropriate for the altar, so whatever is appropriate for the altar is covered by the law.”

2. IV:2: What is at issue between the afore-cited Tannaite authorities and those of our Mishnah-paragraph?

XLII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 9:2-4

A. AND WHAT ARE THOSE THINGS WHICH, IF THEY HAVE GONE UP, SHOULD NOT GO DOWN? THAT WHICH REMAINS OVERNIGHT, AND THAT WHICH IS UNCLEAN, AND THAT WHICH GOES FORTH FROM ITS PROPER BOUNDS, AND THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED WITH THE INTENTION TO BURN THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OR TO EAT THE FLESH OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER TIME OR OUTSIDE OF ITS PROPER PLACE, AND THAT THE BLOOD OF WHICH UNFIT PEOPLE HAVE RECEIVED OR TOSSED. R. JUDAH SAYS, “THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY NIGHT, AND THAT, THE BLOOD OF WHICH HAS BEEN POURED OUT, AND THAT, THE BLOOD OF WHICH HAS GONE FORTH BEYOND THE VEILS — IF IT HAS GONE UP, SHOULD GO DOWN.” R. SIMEON SAYS, “IT SHOULD NOT GO DOWN. FOR THE CAUSE OF ITS INVALIDITY TOOK PLACE IN THE SANCTUARY.” FOR R. SIMEON DID SAY, “ANYTHING, THE CAUSE OF THE INVALIDITY OF WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE SANCTUARY — THE SANCTUARY ACCEPTS IT SO THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE ALTAR. IF ITS INVALIDITY DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN THE SANCTUARY, THE SANCTUARY DOES NOT ACCEPT IT AND IT SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE ALTAR:”

1. I:1: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, “‘This is the Torah of the burnt offering, it is that which goes up’ (Lev. 6:23) — lo, there are three exclusionary statements, thus meaning to exclude, first, a sacrifice that was slaughtered by night, second, one the blood of which has been spilled, and third, one the blood of which has been taken outside of the Temple veils vs. the Mishnah’s rule. These sacrifices are excluded from the law that holds that once a sacrifice has been placed on the altar, it may not be removed from the altar, so that, in these cases, if an offering has gone up on the altar, it is to be removed from it.” R. Simeon says, “From the word ‘burnt offering’ I know only that the law pertains to a valid offering. How do I know that the law encompasses the sacrifice that was slaughtered by night, one the blood of which has been spilled, and one the blood of which has been taken outside of the Temple veils, as well as the one that has been left overnight, and the one that has been taken outside, and the one that has become unclean, and the one that was left over, and the one that was slaughtered by the officiating priest after he had formed the intention to toss the blood outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, or one the blood of which has been received by unfit priests, or one the blood of which has been tossed in such a way that what was supposed to be tossed above the red line around the altar has been tossed below, and what was supposed to be tossed below the red

line around the altar has been tossed above, and one the blood of which was supposed to be tossed inside that was tossed outside, and one the blood of which was supposed to be tossed outside that was tossed inside, and the Passover and the sin offering that the officiating priest has slaughtered not for the sake of those designated purposes at all? Scripture states, 'This is the Torah of the burnt offering' (Lev. 6:23). This serves to extend the rule, so that a single Torah applies to all manner of burnt offerings, so that if they should go up on the altar, they are not to be brought down from there."

2. I:2: Said R. Yohanan, "He who slaughters a beast at night, within the Temple court, but offered up the sacrifice outside of the Temple court : he offers it up by laying it on a stone or on an altar like pile on account of laying limbs sacrificially outside of the Temple court, even according to Judah, who maintained that if it ascended the altar it must still descend; those which if laid on the altar do not descend certainly render the priest culpable if he lays them outside, since these can be received by the altar — let this not be treated as less of an offense than slaughtering the beast outside and offering up the limbs outside in which case one is liable on each count separately."

3. I:3: Said Ulla, "The limbs of Lesser Holy Things that one put up on the altar prior to the sprinkling of the blood are not to be removed, for they have become the 'bread' of the altar."

4. I:4: Said R. Hiyya bar Abba, "R. Yohanan raised this question: if the sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things were taken up to the altar before their blood was sprinkled, do they have to be taken down again or not?"

B. WHAT ARE THOSE THINGS, THE INVALIDITY OF WHICH DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN THE SANCTUARY? THE ANIMAL WHICH HAS HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A HUMAN, AND THE ANIMAL WITH WHICH A HUMAN HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS; AND THAT WHICH IS SET ASIDE FOR IDOLATROUS WORSHIP, AND THAT WHICH ACTUALLY IS WORSHIPPED; AND THE HIRE OF A HARLOT, AND THE PRICE OF A DOG; AND THE CROSSBRED ANIMAL; AND THE ANIMAL WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE TEREFAH, AND THAT WHICH GOES OUT BY THE SIDE. AND ANIMALS WHICH ARE BLEMISHED. R. AQIBA DECLARES VALID IN THE CASE OF ANIMALS WHICH ARE BLEMISHED. THUS IF THEY HAVE GONE UP, THEY SHOULD NOT GO DOWN:

1. II:1: Said R. Yohanan, "R. Aqiba declared fit only those that suffered eye cataracts, since animals in that condition are valid in the case of birds; but that is on condition that the animal was sanctified as a sacrifice prior to the advent of the blemish."

2. II:2: R. Jeremiah raised the question, "Does the consideration of having had sexual relations with a human being apply in the case of birds or does that consideration not apply?"

C. R. HANANIAH, PREFECT OF THE PRIESTS, SAYS, "FATHER DID REJECT ANIMALS WHICH HAD BEEN BLEMISHED EVEN FROM ON TOP OF THE ALTAR."

1. III:1: What point is he making here?

D. JUST AS, IF THEY HAVE GONE UP, THEY SHOULD NOT GO DOWN, SO IF THEY HAVE GONE DOWN, THEY SHOULD NOT ONCE MORE GO UP. BUT ALL OF THEM

WHICH HAVE GONE UP ALIVE TO THE TOP OF THE ALTAR SHOULD GO DOWN. A BURNT OFFERING WHICH WENT UP ALIVE TO THE TOP OF THE ALTAR SHOULD GO DOWN. IF ONE DID SLAUGHTER IT ON TOP OF THE ALTAR, HOWEVER HE SHOULD THEN FLAY AND DIVIDE IT IN ITS PLACE WHERE IT LIES, ON TOP OF THE ALTAR.

1. IV:1: Said Ulla, “This rule pertains only in a case in which the fire has not yet taken hold of the object, but in a case in which the fire has taken hold, it is to be put back onto the altar.”

XLIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 9:5

A. WHAT ARE THOSE THINGS WHICH, EVEN IF THEY HAVE GONE UP, SHOULD GO DOWN BEING REMOVED FROM THE ALTAR BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT OFFERED AT ALL AND THEREFORE ARE NOT APPROPRIATE TO THE ALTAR? THE MEAT THAT CONSTITUTES THE SHARE OF THE PRIESTS OF MOST HOLY THINGS SIN OFFERINGS AND GUILT OFFERINGS AND THE MEAT THAT CONSTITUTES THE SHARE OF THE PRIESTS OF LESSER HOLY THINGS, AND THE EXCESS OF THE SHEAF OF FIRST BARLEY THAT IS PRESENTED FROM PASSOVER THROUGH PENTECOST THE OMER , AND THE TWO LOAVES OF PENTECOST AND THE SHOW BREAD, AND THE RESIDUE OF MEAL OFFERINGS, AND THE INCENSE OFFERING THAT HAS BEEN ERRONEOUSLY PLACED ON THE OUTER, RATHER THAN THE INNER ALTAR TO WHICH IT IS APPROPRIATE — BUT THE WOOL ON THE HEADS OF LAMBS, THE HAIR OF THE BEARD OF GOATS, THE BONES, THE SINEWS, THE HORNS, AND THE HOOVES, WHEN THEY ARE ATTACHED TO THE FLESH, SHOULD GO UP ONTO THE ALTAR, AS IT IS SAID, “AND THE PRIEST SHALL BURN THE WHOLE UPON THE ALTAR” (LEV. 1: 9):

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar” (Lev. 1: 9) — this serves to encompass the bones, the sinews, the horns, and the hooves. Might one suppose that even if they separated from the corpus of the offering, they nonetheless should be left on the altar? Scripture states, “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the meat and the blood” (Deu. 12:27).

2. I:2: What Tannaite authority have you heard to hold the position, If they are separated, they should not go up? It is Rabbi, as has been taught on Tannaite authority....

B. IF THEY ARE SEPARATED FROM THE CORPUS OF THE OFFERING, HOWEVER, THEY SHOULD NOT GO UP, AS IT IS SAID, “AND YOU SHALL OFFER YOUR BURNT OFFERINGS, THE FLESH AND THE BLOOD” (DEU. 12:27).

1. II:1: Said R. Zira, “This rule has been repeated only for a case in which these parts have separated downward away from the center of the fire, but if they separated upwards toward the fire itself, then this means that they are presented nearer for consumption by the fire.”

XLIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 9:6-7B

A. AND ANY OF THEM WHICH BURST FROM OFF THE ALTAR —ONE SHOULD NOT PUT THEM BACK. AND SO IS THE RULE FOR A COAL WHICH BURST FROM OFF THE ALTAR.

1. I:1: How are we to understand the rule that what bursts off the altar is or is not to be restored? If there is some substance involved, then even after midnight, they should still be restored to the altar, and if there is no substance, then even prior to midnight they still should not be restored!

B. LIMBS WHICH BURST FROM OFF THE ALTAR, IF THIS WAS BEFORE MIDNIGHT — ONE SHOULD PUT THEM BACK, AND THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE APPLY TO THEM. IF THEY BURST AFTER MIDNIGHT, ONE SHOULD NOT PUT THEM BACK, BUT THE LAWS OF SACRILEGE STILL DO NOT APPLY TO THEM.

1. II:1: What is the source of this rule? Said Rab, “One verse of Scripture states, ‘This is the law of the burnt offering: it is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night...and he shall burn thereon...’ (Lev. 6: 2-5), and another verse of Scripture states, ‘all night...and he shall take up the ashes’ (Lev. 6: 3). How are these two verses to be harmonized? The assumption is that ‘and he shall take up the ashes’ also means during the night, since the whole verse reads, ‘and the priest shall put on his linen garment...and he shall take up the ashes.’ As it does not say that he must don his linen garment ‘in the morning,’ it is assumed that he did it at night and immediately took up the ashes; thus this contradicts the implications of the former of the two verses. Divide the night: half is for burning, the other half for taking the ashes.”

2. II:2: It has been stated: If the parts separated from the corpus of the offering prior to midnight, and the priest restored the parts to the altar after midnight — Rabbah said, “It is only by the second midnight the following midnight that they can be assumed to ‘have been consumed reaching the stage of hardness.” R. Hisda said, “By the morning star they can be assumed to ‘have been consumed reaching the stage of hardness.”

3. II:3: If the parts separated from the corpus of the offering prior to midnight, and the priest restored the parts to the altar after the rise of the morning star — Rabbah said, “The passage of the second midnight thereafter marks the point at which they have been consumed.” R. Hisda said, “They never reach the point at which they have been consumed.”

4. II:4: Raba asked Rabbah, “When the limbs are on top of the altar, does the consideration of being kept overnight take effect if the limbs are not consumed by midnight or does the consideration of being kept overnight not take effect? How are we to imagine the circumstances to which the question pertains? If they have not been removed from the altar, then if they had stayed overnight in the courtyard, they are not removed from the altar if they were put up on the altar after the night had passed, can there be a question that if they are already on top of the altar, they should stay there? Of course they stay there and are not removed! Rather, the question concerns a case in which they have been taken off the altar. Then do we

liken the altar to the table? Or perhaps we compare the altar to the pavement of the Temple court hence it becomes unfit?

B. JUST AS THE ALTAR SANCTIFIES THAT WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO IT, SO THE RAMP SANCTIFIES. JUST AS THE ALTAR AND THE RAMP SANCTIFY THAT WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO THEM, SO UTENSILS EXO. 30:28-29 SANCTIFY THAT WHICH IS APPROPRIATE TO THEM:

1. III:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “Whatever touches the altar shall be holy” (Exo. 29:37) — I know only that that is so for what touches the altar. How about the ramp? Scripture says, “...the altar,” using the accusative particle which serves to extend the law to other areas. How about utensils of service? Scripture states, “whatsoever touches them shall be holy” (Exo. 30:29) and utensils of service are covered by the “them,” since the preceding verse makes reference to them
2. III:2: R. Simeon b. Laqish asked R. Yohanan, “What is the law as to utensils’ of service sanctifying what is invalid to begin with?”
3. III:3: Is the airspace above the altar regards as equivalent to the altar or is that not so?

XLV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 9:7C-G

A. UTENSILS FOR LIQUIDS WATER SANCTIFY LIQUID; AND MEASURES FOR DRYSTUFFS SANCTIFY THAT WHICH IS DRY:

1. I:1: Utensils for liquids blood, wine, oil, water sanctify liquid: said Samuel, “This teaching is repeated as a Tannaite rule only in connection with measures. But basins which can be used for liquid or meal in any event sanctify, as it is said, ‘Both of them filled with fine flour’ (Num. 7:13): ‘both’ included a basin, normally used for liquids.”

B. HOLY UTENSILS WHICH ARE PERFORATED, IF THEY PERFORM THEIR FORMER FUNCTION AS THEY DID WHEN THEY WERE WHOLE, SANCTIFY. AND IF NOT, THEY DO NOT EFFECT SANCTIFICATION. AND ALL OF THEM EFFECT SANCTIFICATION OF WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THEM ONLY WHEN THEY ARE LOCATED IN THE SANCTUARY COURTYARD.

1. II:1: Said Samuel, “Utensils of service sanctify only if they are whole; utensils of service sanctify only if they are full; utensils of service sanctify only if they are filled on the inside, but if flour is heaped up on the outside of a utensil of service, it is not sanctified.”

C. UTENSILS FOR LIQUIDS DO NOT SANCTIFY THAT WHICH IS DRY, AND MEASURES FOR DRYSTUFFS DO NOT SANCTIFY THAT WHICH IS LIQUID:

1. III:1: Said Rab, and some say, R. Assi, “The effect of the sanctification described herein is not to permit the offering of what is in the utensil, but it is to sanctify what is in the utensil so that it is disqualified so that if it is removed from the Temple courtyard or made unclean in some way, it is disqualified and can no longer be used for a meal offering.”

2. III:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Utensils of service that were perforated — they do not melt them and they do not melt lead into them, and they do not grind away the blemish. A knife that broke off — they do not restore it. And they do not grind away its blemish. Abba Saul says, “A knife was causing terefah-blemishes, and they gave orders concerning it to hide it away” (T. **Men. 9:22A-B, 9:23A-C**).

3. III:3: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: As to priestly vestments, they are not to be sewn but are to be woven directly into garments, as it is said, “of woven work” (Exo. 28:32). If they were dirtied, they are not to be washed with natron or with harsh soap.

4. III:4: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: The whole of the priestly robe was blue, as it is said, “And he made the robe of the ephod of woven work, all of blue” (Exo. 39:22). How were the skirt made? It was blue wool, purple wool, and crimson thread, twisted together, that was brought and manufactured into the shape of pomegranates, the mouths of which had not yet opened; and in the shape of the cones of helmets for children’s heads. Seventy-two bells with seventy-two clappers were presented and hung on it, thirty-six on each side.

5. III:5: And said R. Inyani bar Sasson, “Why are the passages that concern the sacrificial offerings Lev. 7 and concerning the priestly vestments Lev. 8 set side by side? It is to tell you: just as the sacrifices effect atonement, so do the priestly vestments effect atonement.

XLVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 10:1

A. WHATEVER IS OFFERED MORE OFTEN THAN ITS FELLOW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ITS FELLOW: DAILY WHOLE OFFERINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ADDITIONAL OFFERINGS. THE ADDITIONAL OFFERINGS OF THE SABBATH TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE ADDITIONAL OFFERINGS OF THE NEW MOON. THE ADDITIONAL OFFERINGS OF THE NEW MOON TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE ADDITIONAL OFFERINGS OF THE NEW YEAR WHICH ALSO IS A NEW MOON, SINCE IT IS SAID, “IN ADDITION TO THE MORNING BURNT OFFERING WHICH IS FOR A DAILY WHOLE OFFERING YOU WILL PREPARE THESE” (NUM. 28:23).

1. I:1: How do we know this? It is in line with the scriptural proof that is explicitly stated: “In addition to the morning burnt offering which is for a daily whole offering you will prepare these” (Num. 28:23)!

XLVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 10:2-4

A. AND WHATEVER IS MORE HOLY THAN ITS FELLOW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ITS FELLOW: THE BLOOD OF THE SIN OFFERING TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE BLOOD OF THE BURNT OFFERING, BECAUSE IT MAKES ATONEMENT FOR A SIN:

1. I:1: What is the scriptural basis for these rulings?

B. THE LIMBS OF THE BURNT OFFERING TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OF A SIN OFFERING, BECAUSE THEY ARE WHOLLY GIVEN OVER TO THE FIRES TO BE BURNED UP.

1. II:1: But why should this be the rule? Let the initial tossing of the blood, which is the one that achieves atonement, take precedence, but not the rest of the preparation?

2. II:2: The question was raised: as between the blood of the sin offering and the limbs of the burnt offering, which of them takes precedence?

3. II:3: The question was raised: as between the blood of the burnt offering and the sacrificial parts of the sin offering, which of them takes precedence?

4. II:4: The question was raised: as between the blood of the sin offering and the blood of the guilt offering, which of them takes precedence?

C. THE SIN OFFERING TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE GUILT OFFERING, BECAUSE ITS BLOOD IS PLACED ON THE FOUR CORNERS OF AN ALTAR AND ON THE FOUNDATION

1. III:1: To the contrary, a guilt offering should take precedence, because of the consideration that unlike the sin offering, it has a fixed value Lev. 5:15!

D. THE GUILT OFFERING TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE THANK OFFERING AND THE RAM OF THE NAZIR, BECAUSE IT IS MOST HOLY THINGS.

1. IV:1: To the contrary, a thank offering and the ram presented by the Nazirite should take precedence, because of the consideration that those offerings must include loaves of bread!

E. THE THANK OFFERING AND THE RAM OF THE NAZIR TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER PEACE OFFERINGS, BECAUSE THEY ARE EATEN FOR ONE DAY UNLIKE PEACE OFFERINGS WHICH ARE EATEN FOR TWO DAYS AND REQUIRE BREAD:

1. V:1: To the contrary, the peace offering should take precedence, because of the consideration that it is offered in behalf of the community and not only in behalf of an individual traits of the thank offering and the Nazirite's ram!

2. V:2: The question was raised: as between the thank offering and the ram of the Nazir, which of the two takes precedence?

F. THE PEACE OFFERINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE FIRSTLING, BECAUSE THEY REQUIRE TWO PLACINGS WHICH ARE FOUR PLACINGS OF BLOOD, AND LAYING OF HANDS, AND DRINK OFFERINGS, AND WAVING OF THE BREAST AND THIGH.

1. VI:1: To the contrary, the firstling should take precedence, because it is sanctified from the womb, and it is eaten only by priests!

G. THE FIRSTLING TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER TITHE OF CATTLE, BECAUSE IT IS SANCTIFIED FROM THE WOMB, AND IT IS EATEN ONLY BY PRIESTS.

1. VII:1: To the contrary, the beast declared tithe should take precedence, because of the consideration that if there is a miscount, then the sanctity of the tenth beast extends to the ninth and the eleventh should they be called "tenth" erroneously!

H. THE TITHE OF CATTLE TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER FOWL EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER FALLS WITHIN MOST HOLY THINGS, BECAUSE IT IS AN ANIMAL SACRIFICE KILLED WITH A KNIFE, UNLIKE FOWL, AND THERE PERTAIN TO IT TRAITS THAT

CLASSIFY AN OFFERING AS MOST HOLY THINGS: ITS BLOOD AND ITS SACRIFICIAL PARTS WHICH ARE PLACED ON THE ALTAR.

1. VIII:1: To the contrary, fowl should take precedence, because of the consideration that they fall into the classification of Most Holy Things!
2. VIII:2: Said Rabina bar Shila, "If the sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things are taken out of the Temple courtyard prior to the sprinkling of the blood of the sacrificial beast from which they derive, they are invalidated.

I. FOWL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER MEAL OFFERINGS, BECAUSE THEY FALL WITHIN THE CLASS OF THAT WHICH PRODUCES BLOOD FOR ATONEMENT.

1. IX:1: To the contrary, meal offerings should take precedence, because of the consideration that they are offered for the community as much as for the individual.

J. THE MEAL OFFERING OF A SINNER TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE FREE WILL MEAL OFFERING, BECAUSE IT COMES ON ACCOUNT OF SIN.

1. X:1: To the contrary, the free will meal offering should take precedence, because of the consideration that it requires oil and frankincense and so is a more costly offering!
2. X:2: The question was raised: as between the meal offering presented by a woman accused of adultery and the meal offering presented as a free will offering, which takes precedence?

K. THE SIN OFFERING OF FOWL TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE BURNT OFFERING OF FOWL.

AND SO TOO IT TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE BURNT OFFERING WHEN THE TWO BIRDS ARE DEDICATED FOR AN OFFERING:

1. XI:1: What is the scriptural basis for this rule?
2. XI:2: The question was raised: where awaiting sacrifice are a burnt offering prepared of a bird, a burnt offering prepared of a beast, and tithe of the herd, which takes precedence? Should the burnt offering prepared of a bird take precedence? But there is the tithe of the herd, which takes precedence. Should the tithe of the herd come first? But the burnt offering prepared of a beast is there, and that takes precedence. Should the burnt offering prepared of a beast take precedence? But there is the sin offering prepared of a bird, which takes precedence!

XLVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 10:5-7

A. ALL SIN OFFERINGS WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN THE TORAH TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER GUILT OFFERINGS EXCEPT FOR THE GUILT OFFERING OF THE PERSON AFFLICTED BY THE SKIN AILMENT OF LEV. 13, BECAUSE IT COMES TO RENDER HIM FIT TO ENTER THE TEMPLE AND EAT HOLY THINGS.

ALL GUILT OFFERINGS WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN THE TORAH COME FROM ANIMALS IN THEIR SECOND YEAR AND MUST BE TWO SHEKELS IN VALUE, EXCEPT FOR THE GUILT OFFERING OF THE NAZIR AND THE GUILT OFFERING OF THE

PERSON AFFLICTED WITH THE SKIN AILMENT, WHICH ARE OFFERED IN THEIR FIRST YEAR AND DO NOT HAVE TO BE TWO SHEKELS IN VALUE. JUST AS THEY THE ABOVE-MENTIONED OFFERINGS, MORE HOLY THAN SOME OTHER, M. 10: 2-4 TAKE PRECEDENCE IN BEING OFFERED UP, SO THEY TAKE PRECEDENCE IN BEING EATEN. PEACE OFFERINGS OF YESTERDAY AND PEACE OFFERINGS OF TODAY — THOSE OF YESTERDAY TAKE PRECEDENCE, “PEACE OFFERINGS OF YESTERDAY AND A SIN OFFERING AND A GUILT OFFERING OF TODAY — THOSE OF YESTERDAY TAKE PRECEDENCE,” THE WORDS OF R. MEIR. AND SAGES SAY, “THE SIN OFFERING TAKES PRECEDENCE, BECAUSE IT IS MOST HOLY THINGS.”

1. I:1: The question was raised: as between that which is more frequent and that which is more holy, which takes precedence? Does that which is more frequent take precedence, because it is more frequent, or does that which is more holy take precedence, because it is more holy?

2. I:2: The question was raised: In the case of that which is the more routine and that which is the less, if the priest went ahead and slaughtered first of all the less routine, what is the law? Do we say that, since the priest has slaughtered the beast designated for the less routine classification, he should now go ahead and offer it? Or perhaps he should hand over the blood to another priest to stir the blood until he offers the more routine, and then he goes back and offers the less routine animal's blood?

B. AND IN THE CASE OF ALL OF THEM WHICH ARE EATEN, THE PRIESTS ARE PERMITTED TO VARY THE MANNER OF EATING THEM: TO EAT THEM ROASTED, SEETHED, OR COOKED.

“AND TO PUT IN THEM UNCONSECRATED SPICES OR SPICES OF HEAVE OFFERING,” THE WORDS OF R. SIMEON, R. MEIR SAYS, “HE SHOULD NOT PUT INTO THEM SPICES OF HEAVE OFFERING, SO THAT HE NOT BRING HEAVE OFFERING TO THE STATE OF INVALIDITY.”

1. I:1: What is the scriptural basis for this rule?

XLIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 10:8

A. SAID R. SIMEON, “IF YOU HAVE SEEN OIL SPREAD ABOUT IN THE TEMPLE COURT DIVIDED UP AMONG THE PRIESTS, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO ASK, ‘WHAT IS IT?’ FOR ONE MAY TAKE FOR GRANTED THAT IT IS THE RESIDUE OF THE MEAL OFFERING WAFERS OF ISRAELITES OR OF THE LOG OF OIL OF A PERSON HEALED OF THE SKIN AILMENT. IF YOU HAVE SEEN OIL PUT ON TOP OF THE ALTAR FIRES, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO ASK, ‘WHAT IS IT?’ BUT IT IS THE RESIDUE OF THE MEAL OFFERING WAFERS OF PRIESTS OR THE MEAL OFFERING OF THE ANOINTED PRIEST.” FOR: THEY DO NOT OFFER OIL AS A FREEWILL OFFERING.

R. TARFON SAYS, “THEY DO OFFER OIL AS A FREEWILL OFFERING.”

1. I:1: Said Samuel, “In the opinion of R. Tarfon, if a person makes a freewill offering of oil by itself, he removes a handful thereof and burns it on the altar, and the residue of the oil is eaten. What is the scriptural basis for this view? Scripture has said, ‘And when any one brings a meal offering’ (Lev. 2: 1) — this teaches that one can make a freewill offering of oil on its own, and that the offering of oil is

analogous to a meal offering. Just as in the case of a meal offering, he removes a handful thereof and burns it on the altar, and the residue of the meal offering is eaten, so in the case of a donation of oil, he removes a handful thereof and burns it on the altar, and the residue of the oil is eaten.”

2. I:2: Said Samuel, “One who makes a freewill offering of wine brings it and sprinkles it on the fires. What is the scriptural basis for this view? Scripture says, ‘And you shall present for a drink offering half a hin of wine, for an offering made by fire, of a sweet smell to the Lord’ (Num. 15:10).”

3. I:3: Said R. Huna, “Drink offerings of wine that were made unclean — one makes a wood pile for that wine by itself and then burns the wine, in line with this verse: ‘And every sin offering...in the holy place...shall be burned with fire’ (Lev. 6:23).”

L. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:1-2

A. THE BLOOD OF A SIN OFFERING WHICH SPLATTERED ON THE GARMENT — LO, THIS GARMENT REQUIRES WASHING. EVEN THOUGH SCRIPTURE SPEAKS ONLY ABOUT SIN OFFERINGS THAT ARE EATEN, AS IT IS SAID, “IN A HOLY PLACE WILL IT BE EATEN” NONETHELESS, ALL THE SAME IN REQUIRING WASHING ARE THAT WHICH IS EATEN AND THAT THE BLOOD OF WHICH MUST BE BROUGHT TO THE INNER AREA, AS IT IS SAID, “THE LAW OF THE SIN OFFERING” — ONE LAW FOR ALL SIN OFFERINGS:

1. I:1: Now if a single rule covers all sin offerings, then even the blood of a sin offering made of a bird also should have been included under the rule. then why has it been taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that the blood that spurted from a sin offering prepared of a bird should have to be washed off? Scripture says, “This is the rule covering the sin offering” (Lev. 6:18) and “this” is exclusive. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara, “Scripture has said, ‘...shall the sin offering be slaughtered...’ (Lev. 6:18) — Scripture speaks only of the sin offerings that are killed through an act of slaughter and not those killed through the pinching of the neck.”

2. I:2: R. Joseph said, “Said Scripture, “‘The priest shall eat it’ (Lev. 6:19) — this one he shall eat, but not another, and in so stating, Scripture has excluded some of those that are eaten.”

3. I:3: Rabbah said, “Said Scripture, ‘...and when there is sprinkled...’” which pertains only to sin offerings prepared at the inner altar, so it is the sin offerings prepared at the outer altar that are covered by the proof deriving from ‘This is the rule covering the sin offering’ (Lev. 6:18).

a. I:4: The Special Case of the Fowl Presented as a Sin-Offering: In light of the allegation that “...and when there is sprinkled...” which pertains only to sin offerings prepared at the inner altar, means that it is the sin offerings prepared at the outer altar that are covered by the proof deriving from ‘This is the rule covering the sin offering’ (Lev. 6:18), if so, then the sin offering prepared of a bird also should be encompassed by the rule since the key word is used in that regard as well

I. I:5: The Special Case of the Fowl Presented as a Sin-Offering: Rabin raised this question: “As to a sin offering prepared of a bird, the blood of which one carried into the inner altar using its neck for that purpose, what is the law? Is the sacrifice disqualified under the rule that forbids taking inside, into the inner altar, the blood of a sin offering prepared at the outer altar? Is the neck treated as the equivalent to a utensil of service, in which case the offering is invalidated, or perhaps it is treated as equivalent to the neck of a beast? And Scripture has said, ‘And every sin offering whereof any of the blood is brought into the tent of meeting shall be burned with fire’ (Lev. 6:23) — blood but not meat?”

II. I:6: The Special Case of the Fowl Presented as a Sin-Offering: Rabin raised this question: “As to a case in which the blood of a bird offering was poured out on to the pavement of the sanctuary and collected again, what is the law? The All-Merciful has merely not imposed the requirement of using a utensil of service in particular, so using the throat of the bird for that purpose is suitable, and therefore one can collect the blood and it is fit, or perhaps in this case the All-Merciful has in fact disqualified an offering in which a utensil of service is used, and therefore while one collects the blood, it is disqualified since the blood must be sprinkled directly from the throat?”

4. I:7: Levi raised the question to Rabbi: “If the blood of an animal offering spurted from one garment to another, what is the rule? Do we or do we not say that the blood has been ejected from the first garment and does not have to be washed from the second? When the blood fell on the first garment, it became unfit for sprinkling, since it has to be washed, and therefore the second garment does not have to be washed, the blood being unfit?”

5. I:8: Rami bar Hama asked R. Hisda, “If the blood of an animal offering spurted onto an unclean garment, what is the rule?”

B. AN INVALID SIN OFFERING — ITS BLOOD THAT HAD SPURTED ON A GARMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING, WHETHER IT HAD A MOMENT OF VALIDITY FOR TOSSING THE BLOOD OR IT DID NOT HAVE A MOMENT OF VALIDITY HAVING BEEN INVALIDATED BEFORE THE RECEIVING

WHAT IS THE SORT WHICH HAD A MOMENT OF VALIDITY? THAT WHICH REMAINED OVERNIGHT OR WHICH WAS MADE UNCLEAN OR WHICH WENT FORTH BEYOND THE VEILS SINCE PRIOR TO THESE EVENTS, THE OFFERING HAD BEEN ENTIRELY VALID. AND WHAT IS THE SORT WHICH DID NOT HAVE A MOMENT OF VALIDITY? THAT WHICH WAS SLAUGHTERED WITH THE INTENTION TO EAT THE MEAT OR TO TOSS THE BLOOD OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME OR OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, AND THAT THE BLOOD OF WHICH UNFIT PEOPLE RECEIVED, OR THE BLOOD OF WHICH UNFIT PEOPLE TOSSED.

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “And when there is sprinkled of the blood thereof” (Lev. 6:20) — of blood that is valid, not of blood that is invalid. R. Aqiba says, “If it had a moment of validity but was then invalidated, the

blood has to be washed off. If it did not have a moment of validity and was invalidated to begin with, the blood does not have to be washed off.” R. Simeon says, “All the same are both classifications: the blood does not have to be washed off.”

LI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:3A-D

A. IF THE BLOOD SPURTED DIRECTLY FROM THE NECK OF THE SLAUGHTERED BEAST ONTO THE GARMENT AND WAS NOT RECEIVED IN A POT, BEING INVALID FOR SPRINKLING ON THE ALTAR, IT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING. IF THE BLOOD SPURTED FROM THE HORN OR FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALTAR, IT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING:

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that if the blood spurted directly from the neck of the slaughtered beast onto the garment and was not received in a pot, being invalid for sprinkling on the altar, it might require washing? Scripture states, “and when there is sprinkled...” (Lev. 6:20) — I have spoken to you only concerning that which is suitable for sprinkling on the altar.

B. IF IT WAS POURED ONTO THE PAVEMENT AND ONE GATHERED IT UP AND THEN IT SPURTED ONTO A GARMENT, IT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING.

1. II:1: For what do I require this further statement?

C. THAT SORT OF BLOOD WHICH REQUIRES WASHING IS ONLY THE BLOOD WHICH HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN A UTENSIL AND IS SUITABLE FOR SPRINKLING ON THE ALTAR.

1. III:1: What then is excluded by this provision?

a. III:2: Said Raba, “It has been taught on Tannaite authority:” “And the priest shall dip + accusative particle et + his finger in the blood and sprinkle the blood seven times before the Lord” (Lev. 4: 6) — but not sponge it up by wiping around the sides of the utensil. The accusative particle is treated as an extension also in the phrases “he shall dip” and “in the blood.” That usage then yields a number of additional laws about sprinkling and dipping. In the blood” teaches that there must be sufficient blood in a single utensil to begin with to dip and we do not collect blood in two utensils and pour the blood together to form enough. “and sprinkle of the blood” — of the blood that is specified in this passage.

LII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:3E-G, 11:4

A. “IF BLOOD SPURTED ONTO THE HIDE BEFORE IT WAS FLAYED, IT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING. IF IT SPURTED ONTO THE HIDE AFTER IT WAS FLAYED, IT DOES REQUIRE WASHING,” THE WORDS OF R. JUDAH. R. ELEAZAR SAYS, “ALSO: IF IT SPURTED ONTO THE HIDE AFTER IT WAS FLAYED, IT DOES NOT REQUIRE WASHING.”

THE SAME ARE THE CLOTH AND THE SACKCLOTH AND THE HIDE: THEY REQUIRE WASHING. AND THE WASHING MUST BE IN A HOLY PLACE, AND THE BREAKING OF EARTHENWARE UTENSILS IN WHICH A SIN OFFERING IS COOKED IS TO BE IN A HOLY

PLACE. AND THE SCOURING AND RINSING IN THE CASE OF A COPPER UTENSIL ARE TO BE IN A HOLY PLACE. IN THIS MATTER THE RULE IS MORE STRICT IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING THAN IN THE CASE OF MOST HOLY THINGS.

1. I:1: The same are the cloth and the sackcloth and the hide: they require washing: What is the scriptural source for this rule?

B. ONLY THE PLACE ON WHICH THE BLOOD HAS FALLEN,

1. II:1: What is the scriptural source for this statement?

C. AND SOMETHING WHICH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO RECEIVE UNCLEANNES,

1. III:1: The unattributed rule of the Mishnah is in accord with the position of R. Judah.

D. AND SOMETHING SUITABLE FOR WASHING REQUIRE WASHING.

1. IV:1: excluding a utensil that has to be scarpd since washing does not good, e.g., one of wood.

E. THE SAME ARE THE CLOTH AND THE SACKCLOTH AND THE HIDE: THEY REQUIRE WASHING:

1. V:1: But can a hide be washed? And an objection may be introduced:

a. V:2: In accord with which of the foregoing authorities is this statement made by R. Hiyya bar Ashi, “Many times I would stand before Rab and dab his shoes with water”?

2. V:3: Said Raba, “And is there anybody who takes the position that hides cannot be washed? Has it not been written, ‘And the garment or warp or woof or whatever thing of skin it be, which you shall wash’ (Lev. 13:58)?”

F. AND THE WASHING MUST BE IN A HOLY PLACE, AND THE BREAKING OF EARTHENWARE UTENSILS IN WHICH A SIN OFFERING IS COOKED IS TO BE IN A HOLY PLACE. AND THE SCOURING AND RINSING IN THE CASE OF A COPPER UTENSIL ARE TO BE IN A HOLY PLACE.

1. VI:1: What is the scriptural source for this statement?

G. IN THIS MATTER THE RULE IS MORE STRICT IN THE CASE OF THE SIN OFFERING THAN IN THE CASE OF MOST HOLY THINGS

1. VII:1: In this matter and in no other? But lo, there is the fact that the blood of the sin offering is taken inside to the inner altar and that is not the case for other Most Holy Things!

LIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:5-6

A. A GARMENT WHICH WENT FORTH OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS IS BROUGHT BACK, AND ONE WASHES IT IN A HOLY PLACE. IF IT WAS MADE UNCLEAN WHILE OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS, ONE TEARS IT, AND IT IS BROUGHT BACK, AND ONE WASHES IT IN A HOLY PLACE.

1. I:1: To this rule Rabina objected, “If it was made unclean while outside of the veils, one tears it. But the All-Merciful has spoken of a ‘garment’ and this is not a garment once it is torn!”

B. AN EARTHENWARE UTENSIL WHICH WENT FORTH OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS IS BROUGHT BACK, AND ONE BREAKS IT IN A HOLY PLACE. IF IT WAS MADE UNCLEAN OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS, ONE MAKES A HOLE IN IT, AND IT IS BROUGHT BACK, AND ONE BREAKS IT IN A HOLY PLACE.

1. II:1: It is concerning a utensil that the All-Merciful spoke, and this is not a utensil! So how can it be brought back into the courtyard at all?

C. A COPPER UTENSIL WHICH WENT FORTH OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS IS BROUGHT BACK, AND ONE SCOURS IT AND RINSES IT IN A HOLY PLACE. IF IT WAS MADE UNCLEAN OUTSIDE OF THE VEILS, ONE BREAKS IT DOWN, AND IT IS BROUGHT BACK AND ONE SCOURS AND RINSES IT IN A HOLY PLACE.

1. III:1: But lo, this is not a utensil!

2. III:2: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “A priestly robe that became unclean outside of the Temple court — one brings it back into the Temple courtyard in segments of less than three fingerbreadths square which are insusceptible to uncleanness, and then one washes it, because it is said, ‘That the robe be not torn,’ hence it cannot be torn; therefore small patches are brought back into the courtyard, since then it is not an unclean garment.”

3. III:3: And lo, it is required that the seven substances used to test the character of a blotch on a piece of fabric be washed into the cloth, to make sure that it does not contain urine, which may not be brought into the Temple!

LIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:7A-D

A. ALL THE SAME ARE ONE IN WHICH ONE HAS COOKED AND ONE INTO WHICH ONE HAS POURED BOILING STEW:

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “But the clay utensil in which it is boiled” (Lev. 6:21) — I know that the law applies only to one in which one has cooked. How do I know that it applies also to one into which one has poured boiling stew? Scripture says, “...in which it is boiled shall be broken” even if it had not actually been boiled in it, for if boiling meat is put into the utensil, it will be absorbed therein

2. I:2: Rami bar Hama raised this question: “If one suspended the meat in the contained airspace of a clay oven boiling it in the steam, what is the law? Has the All-Merciful taken a particular interest only in the matters of boiling and absorbing, or perhaps the issue also is boiling even without absorbing?”

a. I:3: There was an oven that was greased in fat. Rabbah bar Ahilai prohibited forever eating bread that was baked in it even though the oven were refired and burned through to remove the fat, even eating the bread with salt, lest one end up eating it with a preserve that contained milk as well.

l. I:4: Said Rabina to R. Ashi, “Now since the position of Rabbah bar Ahilai has been refuted, why has Rab said, ‘Pots to remove leaven that will have inhered through the year shall be broken on Passover’ since one can just as well reheat them?”

3. I:5: If one has boiled meat of a sacrifice in only part of a utensil, does the part not used require scouring and rinsing, or does it not require scouring and rinsing?

B. AND ALL THE SAME ARE ONE USED FOR MOST HOLY THINGS E.G., A SIN OFFERING OR A GUILT OFFERING AND ONE FOR LESSER HOLY THINGS E.G., PEACE OFFERINGS: THEY REQUIRE SCOURING AND RINSING. R. SIMEON SAYS, “THOSE USED FOR LESSER HOLY THINGS DO NOT REQUIRE SCOURING AND RINSING.”

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “...a sin offering...’ (Lev. 6:18) — I know that the rule applies to a sin offering alone. How do I know that it applies to all other sacrifices? Because Scripture says, ‘It is most holy’ (Lev. 6:22). This includes not only Most Holy Things but also Lesser Holy Things. Might I then suppose that food in the status of heave offering is included as well? Scripture states, ‘Every male among the priests may eat thereof’ — excluding heave-offering,” the words of R. Judah.

a. II:2: And does a utensil used for cooking food in the status of heave offering not have to be scoured and rinsed? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority...

LV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:7E-J

A. R. TARFON SAYS, “IF ONE COOKED IN IT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FESTIVAL, HE COOKS THEREIN THROUGHOUT THE FESTIVAL:”

1. I:1: What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Tarfon?

B. AND SAGES SAY, “AT THE END OF THE TIME WHICH IS PERMISSIBLE FOR EATING THE OFFERING, THE POT IS SUBJECT TO SCOURING AND RINSING.”

1. II:1: What is the sense of this statement?

C. SCOURING IS DONE AS IS THE SCOURING OF A CUP. AND RINSING IS DONE AS IS THE RINSING OF A CUP ON THE OUTSIDE. SCOURING IS DONE WITH HOT WATER, AND RINSING IS DONE WITH COLD WATER. AND THE SPIT AND THE GRILL USED FOR A SIN OFFERING DOES ONE PUT INTO SCALDING WATER.

1. III:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “Scouring and rinsing are done with cold water,” the words of Rabbi. And sages say, “Scouring is done in hot water and rinsing in cold.”

LVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 11:8

A. IF ONE COOKED IN IT HOLY THINGS AND UNCONSECRATED FOOD, OR MOST HOLY THINGS AND LESSER HOLY THINGS, IF THEY WERE SUFFICIENT TO IMPART FLAVOR, LO, THAT THE RULE OF WHICH IS LESS STRINGENT IS EATEN IN ACCORD WITH THAT THE RULE OF WHICH IS THE MORE STRINGENT THUS APPLYING TO THE MORE HOLY THINGS.

AND IF THEY DO NOT IMPART FLAVOR THEY DO NOT REQUIRE SCOURING AND RINSING, AND IF THE INVALID PROPORTION OF THE MIXTURE DOES NOT IMPART FLAVOR, THEY DO NOT INVALIDATE MERELY BY HAVING MADE CONTACT.

1. I:1: What is the sense of this statement that it is not scoured and rinsed at the end of the period allowed for the more stringent?

a. I:2: Well, then, while in the latter case the pots do not require scouring and rinsing by reason of having been used for Most Holy Things, yet should they not require scouring and rinsing for having been used for Lesser Holy Things anyhow?

B. AN UNFIT WAFER WHICH TOUCHED ANOTHER WAFER, OR A PIECE OF MEAT WHICH TOUCHED ANOTHER PIECE OF MEAT — NOT THE WHOLE OF THE WAFER OR THE WHOLE OF THE PIECE(S) OF MEAT IS PROHIBITED. PROHIBITED IS ONLY THE PLACE WHICH ABSORBED THAT WHICH IS FORBIDDEN.

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “Whatever shall touch...shall be holy” (Lev. 6:20) — might one suppose that that is so even if the latter did not absorb anything from the former? Scripture says, “in the meat thereof” (Lev. 6:20) — only if it absorbs some of the meat. Might one suppose that if it touched part of a piece of meat, the whole of it should be invalidated? Scripture says, “shall touch...” — only that which touches is invalidated.

a. II:2: But why should this be the rule? Let the commandment that carries an affirmative action “and they shall eat those things wherewith atonement was made” (Exo. 29:33), meaning, the meat of the offerings come and take precedence over the negative commandment that prohibits eating what is unfit. there being a conflict between the two religious duties?

2. II:3: Thus we have found that the sin offering imparts the status of sanctification in the sense just now set forth to whatever touches it and absorbs from it. How do we know that that is the case for other Holy Things?

3. II:4: In a Tannaite formulation it was repeated in the name of R. Aqiba: “‘This is the Torah of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, of the sin offering, of the guilt offering, of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Lev. 7:37) all of which are covered by the same rule: ‘the meal offering:’ just as the burnt offering becomes holy if it absorbs that which is holy, so everything else becomes holy if it absorbs that which is holy.”

4. II:5: Said Raba, “It is obvious to me that if the blood of a sin offering below on the garment and then the blood of a burnt offering fell on top of that, the garment has to be washed.” But, asked Raba, “If the blood of a burnt offering is below, and then the blood of a sin offering splashes on top, what is the law? Is the operative consideration that the blood has made contact with the garment, and here there is contact? Or perhaps the operative consideration is that of absorption, and here there is no possibility of absorbing blood that has to be washed out?”

a. II:6: In consequence of the foregoing, said Raba, “It is obvious to me that in an immersion pool, the blood interposes as just now explained. But in the case of a slaughterer on whom blood spatters routinely, it does not interpose. Foreign matter may not interpose between what is immersed and the water of the immersion pool. Blood is a foreign matter, and so interposes, because a person will not want to have blood on the garment, and that is the operative consideration. But a slaughterer will not object to

blood on his garment, so it is not foreign matter in his case. Along these same lines, grease on a garment interposes, but if the owner is a grease seller, it does not interpose.” But, asked Raba, “If there is blood and grease on a garment, what is the rule?”

LVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 12:1

A. A PRIEST WHO HAS IMMERSED AND AWAITS SUNSET TO COMPLETE HIS PURIFICATION RITE DO NOT SHARE IN HOLY THINGS, EATING THEM IN THE EVENING:

1. I:1: What is the scriptural source of this ruling?

a. I:2: Secondary question flowing from the foregoing: R. Simeon b. Laqish raised this question: “In the case of a blemished priest who is also unclean, what is the law as to his taking a share in the meat? Since he is not suitable for making the offering but the All-Merciful nonetheless has extended the law to him permitting him to eat the food, there is no difference, since what difference does it make to me whether he is unclean or blemished? Or perhaps, if he is suitable to eat the food, he takes a share in it, and if he is not suitable to eat the food, he does not take a share in it?”

b. I:3: As above: R. Oshaia raised this question: “As to an unclean priest, does he have a share in the sacrifices presented by the community? Do we say that ‘it is the one who presents the sin offering’ of which Scripture spoke, and this one too can offer a sin offering in behalf of the community when in a state of uncleanness, if everybody is then unclean, or perhaps the principle is, if he is suitable to eat the food, he takes a share in it, and if he is not suitable to eat the food, he does not take a share in it?”

B. A PRIEST WHO HAS SUFFERED A BEREAVEMENT MAY TOUCH HOLY THINGS BUT DOES NOT MAKE OFFERINGS:

1. II:1: In contradiction, the following is to be considered: A priest who has suffered a bereavement and one who has not yet carried out his purification rites have to immerse in connection with Holy Things.

C. ... AND DOES NOT SHARE IN HOLY THINGS, EATING THEM IN THE EVENING:

1. III:1: Then it is a share that he does not take, but if he is invited to partake by others, he may eat the food anyhow. But in contradiction is the following rule: A bereaved priest immerses and eats the meat of his Passover offering in the evening, but in line with Lev. 10:19-20 he may not eat the meat deriving from any other offerings.” A bereaved priest may not eat the meat of sacrifices, so Lev. 10:19-20. By Scriptural law the status of bereavement pertains to the day on which the death occurred alone, but not to the night; rabbis extended the restrictions to the night as well. Since the Passover offering is scriptural, the prohibition is waived in regard to the night and the bereaved priest may eat the Passover meat. He is not unclean but has to immerse anyhow to show that, until evening the holy meat was forbidden to him, but now it is permitted. R. Assi said, “There is no contradiction. The one rule pertains to someone in which a man suffered a bereavement on the fourteenth of Nisan and was buried on the fourteenth; in the case of the Mishnah’s

rule, the man suffered the bereavement on the thirteenth of Nisan and buried the deceased on the fourteenth, for the operative premise here is that the day of burial does not then encompass the night that follows even by the rule of rabbis.” If the death was on the previous day and the burial on that day, then on the night following the status of bereavement does not apply. So the passage cited in contradiction treats of Passover but not of other days.

a. III:2: What Tannaite authority takes the view that the status of bereavement on the night following burial is only on the authority of rabbis?

l. III:3: And on what basis do you maintain that a distinction is to be drawn between the situation prevailing prior to midday and that pertaining thereafter? It is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:

b. III:4: Raba said, “Both statements refer to the period after midday, but there is no contradiction. The one rule speaks of the time that the bereavement took place after midday but before they had slaughtered the Passover offering and tossed the blood in his behalf, Then they must not do so, for he has become a bereaved person and is disqualified, the other rule speaks of the time that the bereavement took place after midday after they had slaughtered the Passover offering and tossed the blood in his behalf.” Then he eats the meat in the evening.

l. III:5: Gloss on a detail of the foregoing.

A. III:6: As above.

D. THE DISPOSITION OF THE PRIESTS’ FOOD IN A TIME OF BEREAVEMENT:.. WITH A TOPICAL APPENDIX ON THE PRIESTHOOD OF MOSES

1. III:7: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “For so I am commanded in connection with the meal offering,” “as I commanded in connection with the sin offering,” “as the Lord commanded in connection with the peace offering” (Lev. 10:13, 18, 15) — These were presented in connection with the consecration of the priesthood by Moses, and Moses instructed the priests to eat them, even though they were unclean, “for so I am commanded.” “For so I am commanded in connection with the meal offering” — in all instances, the commandment was that the priests eat the sacrificial meat assigned to them even though they had just been bereaved after the death of the sons of Aaron. “as I commanded in connection with the sin offering” — just at the time that the death took place. “as the Lord commanded in connection with the peace offering” (Lev. 10:13, 18, 15) — “It is not on my own authority that I say it.”

a. III:8: Gloss on proof-texts and their interpretation.

b. III:9: Gloss on a detail of III:7.

c. III:10: Gloss on a detail of the base-entry.

d. III:11: Gloss on a detail of the base-entry.

e. III:12: Gloss on a detail of the base-entry.

2. III:13: Said Rab, “Moses, our lord, was high priest and received a share in the Holy Things: ‘It was Moses’s portion of the ram of consecration’ (Lev. 8:29).”

3. III:14: Said Rab, “Moses, our lord, was high priest and received a share in the Holy Things: ‘It was Moses’s portion of the ram of consecration’ (Lev. 8:29),” and sages say, “Moses was made priest only for the occasion of the consecration alone.”

a. III:15: Gloss on the exegesis of the foregoing, III:13.

4. III:16: Said R. Yannai, “You should always show respect for the government, for it is written, ‘And all these your servants shall come down to me’ (Exo. 11: 8), but he did not make that statement with reference to Pharaoh.”

5. III:17: Said Ulla, “Moses wanted to be made king, but it was not given to him, for it is written, ‘Do not draw near hither’ (Exo. 32: 5), and the meaning of ‘hither’ is only the kingship, in line with the usage in the following verse, ‘Then David said, Who am I O Lord god...that you have brought me hither’ (2Sa. 7:18).”

E. BLEMISHED PRIESTS, WHETHER SUFFERING PERMANENT BLEMISHES OR TEMPORARY BLEMISHES, SHARE AND EAT IN HOLY THINGS IN THE EVENING, BUT THEY DO NOT OFFER UP SACRIFICES

1. IV:1: What is the scriptural source for this rule?

2. IV:2: It has further been taught on Tannaite authority: “Every male may eat of it” (Lev. 6:11, 22, 7: 6) Lev. 6:11: the meal offering; 6:22, the sin offering; 7:6, the guilt offering — that augmentative formulation serves to extend the rule to blemished priests.

3. IV:3: It has further been taught on Tannaite authority: “Every male may eat of it” (Lev. 6:11, 22, 7: 6) Lev. 6:11: the meal offering; 6:22, the sin offering; 7:6, the guilt offering — that augmentative formulation serves to extend the rule to blemished priests.

F. AND WHOEVER IS NOT FIT FOR THE SACRIFICIAL SERVICE DOES NOT SHARE IN THE MEAT. AND WHOEVER DOES NOT HAVE A PORTION OF THE MEAT HAS NO PORTION IN THE HIDES:

1. V:1: But does he not? Surely a priest who is blemished is not eligible for performing the service. and yet, as we just have said, he does have a share in the meat! And furthermore, the implication that every priest who is eligible to perform the service receives a share, and yet there is the case of the unclean priest, who is eligible to perform the service in behalf of community sacrifices under stated conditions, e.g., when the entire community is unclean, and yet he does not receive a share!

G. ...EVEN A PRIEST WHO IS UNCLEAN AT THE TIME OF THE TOSSING OF THE BLOOD BUT CLEAN AT THE TIME OF THE BURNING OF THE FAT DOES NOT SHARE IN THE MEAT, AS IT IS SAID, “HE AMONG THE SONS OF AARON WHO OFFERS THE BLOOD OF PEACE OFFERINGS AND FAT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT THIGH FOR A PORTION:”

1. VI:1: Lo, if he was clean at the time of the tossing of the blood, but unclean at the time of the burning of the fat, he does take a share in the meat.

2. VI:2: R. Ashi raised this question: “If the officiating priest was made unclean in the interim but was clean by the time the fats were burned — what is the law? We require cleanness at the time of the tossing of the blood and the burning of the fats, and lo, that condition has been met. Or perhaps, the condition is met only if the priest remains clean from the time of the tossing of the blood to the time of the burning of the fat?”

3. VI:3: Said Rab, “This argument have we learned from R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, which he stated in the toilet: ‘You may reason in the following manner: ‘If a priest who had immersed on the selfsame day and awaited sunset for the completion of his purification rite came and said, “Give me a share in the residue of the meal offering of an Israelite so I can eat it this evening,” then a clean priest may reply, “If in a place in which you have a valid claim, namely, in your share of the meat of a sin offering, I can dismiss your claim, namely, in your claim for the share of the meat of an Israelite’s sin offering, in a place in which your claim to begin with is weaker, namely, in your own meal offering for a priest who owes a sin offering may offer it up himself even when his particular priestly watch is not officiating and he retains the meat and the hide, but if he is in the status of one had immersed on the selfsame day and awaited sunset for the completion of his purification rite, he may not offer up his own meal offering, then I surely should be able to dismiss your claim for a share in the meal offering of an Israelite, since, after all, you have no valid claim to a share in your own meal offering!” But the other may reply, “If you have the power to dismiss my claim to a share in the sin offering of an Israelite, that is because, just as I have a strong claim, so you have a strong claim for just as I can present my own sin offering, so you can present your own, so I have no greater privilege in an Israelite’s sin offering than you do. But can you dismiss my claim for a share in the meal offering of an Israelite, where, while my claim is not so strong, your claim is not so strong!” The other may reply, “Lo, Scripture says, ‘and every meal offering shall be the priest’s who offers it’ (Lev. 7: 9) — come, offer, and eat. You cannot offer, since you are in the status of one had immersed on the selfsame day and awaited sunset for the completion of his purification rite.’

LVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 12:2-3

A. OF ANY BURNT OFFERING, THE MEAT OF WHICH THE ALTAR HAS NOT ACQUIRED E.G., WHICH WAS INVALIDATED BEFORE THE BLOOD WAS TOSSED — THE PRIESTS DO NOT ACQUIRE A RIGHT TO THE HIDE, AS IT IS SAID, “A MAN’S BURNT OFFERING” (LEV. 7: 8) — A BURNT OFFERING WHICH HAS BEEN BURNED TO THE CREDIT OF A MAN:

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “‘Any man’s burnt offering’ (Lev. 7: 8) — excluding the burnt offering deriving from what has been consecrated to the Temple,” the words of R. Judah. R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, “It serves to exclude the burnt offering presented by proselytes.”

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing. What is the meaning of, excluding the burnt offering deriving from what has been consecrated to the Temple?

b. I:3: Continuation of foregoing.

B. A BURNT OFFERING WHICH WAS SLAUGHTERED FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH THE BEAST WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED “NOT FOR ITS OWN NAME”, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS NOT GONE FOR THE CREDIT OF THE OWNER — ITS HIDE BELONGS TO THE PRIESTS BECAUSE THE ALTAR HAS ACQUIRED ITS MEAT.

ALL THE SAME ARE THE BURNT OFFERING OF A MAN AND THE BURNT OFFERING OF A WOMAN — THEIR HIDES BELONG TO THE PRIESTS.

THE HIDES OF LESSER HOLY THINGS BELONG TO THE OWNER, AND THE HIDES OF MOST HOLY THINGS BELONG TO THE PRIESTS. AND THIS PROPOSITION IS SUPPORTED BY AN ARGUMENT A FORTIORI: NOW IF THE BURNT OFFERING, THE MEAT OF WHICH DOES NOT BELONG TO THE PRIESTS, PRODUCES A HIDE THAT BELONGS TO THEM, MOST HOLY THINGS, THE MEAT OF WHICH DOES BELONG TO THE PRIESTS, ALL THE MORE SO SHOULD PRODUCE HIDES WHICH BELONG TO THEM. THE ALTAR ITSELF DOES NOT PROVE THE CONTRARY, BECAUSE IT HAS NO PORTION IN THE HIDE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: All the same are the burnt offering of a man and the burnt offering of a woman — their hides belong to the priests: “any man’s burnt offering.” I therefore know that the rule applies to the burnt offering presented by a man. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that the same rule applies to the burnt offering presented by proselytes, women, or slaves

a. II:2: Gloss of foregoing.

LIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 12:4

A. ALL HOLY THINGS BURNT OFFERING, SIN OFFERING, GUILT OFFERING WHICH SUFFERED AN INVALIDITY BEFORE THEY WERE FLAYED — THEIR HIDES DO NOT BELONG TO THE PRIESTS.

1. I:1: Of any burnt offering, the meat of which the altar has not acquired e.g., which was invalidated before the blood was tossed — the priests do not acquire a right to the hide — and that is the case even though the hide was flayed before the blood was sprinkled. Who stands behind that position?

a. I:2: Gloss of foregoing.

I. I:3: As above.

B. IF AN INVALIDITY WAS INCURRED AFTER THEY WERE FLAYED, THEIR HIDES BELONG TO THE PRIESTS

SAID R. HANANIAH, PREFECT OF THE PRIESTS, “IN ALL MY DAYS I NEVER SAW A HIDE TAKEN OUT TO THE PLACE OF BURNING.” SAID R. AQIBA, “FROM HIS STATEMENT WE LEARN: ‘HE WHO FLAYS THE FIRSTLING WHICH WAS BLEMISHED AND SLAUGHTERED THAT IS, IT WAS DISQUALIFIED EVEN BEFORE FLAYING AND IT TURNS OUT TO BE TEREFAH — THE PRIESTS MAKE USE OF ITS HIDE.’” AND SAGES SAY, “‘WE HAVE NOT SEEN’ IS NO PROOF. BUT: IT GOES FORTH TO THE PLACE OF BURNING.”

1. II:1: Did he never see such a thing? And lo, there are the cases of the bullocks that are to be burned and goats that are to be burned!

2. II:2: Said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, “The decided law accords with the position of R. Aqiba.

LX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 12:5-6

A. BULLOCKS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED AND GOATS WHICH ARE TO BE BURNED WHEN THEY ARE VALID AND THEREFORE TO BE BURNED IN ACCORD WITH THEIR REQUIREMENT AND HAVE NOT BEEN INVALIDATED, ARE BURNED IN THE PLACE OF ASHES. AND THEY WHO BURN THEM IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO THEIR CLOTHING. AND IF THEY ARE INVALID AND THEREFORE NOT BURNED IN ACCORD WITH THEIR REQUIREMENT, THEY ARE BURNED IN THE TEMPLE PRECINCTS.

AND THEY DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO THE CLOTHING OF THE ONE WHO HANDLES THEM AND BURNS THEM.

1. I:1: they are burned in the Temple precincts: And what is the definition of the Temple precincts?

2. I:2: Said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha said, “There are three ash pits. There was a large ash pit in the Temple court, where they burned Most Holy Things and the sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things that had been disqualified as well as bullocks that were burned and goats that were burned that had been disqualified before the sprinkling of the blood. There was another ash pit in Temple mount where they burned the bullocks that were burned and the goats that were burned that had been invalidated after the sprinkling of the blood. The ones that had been burned in accord with the religious duty pertaining to them were burned outside of the three camps.”

B. TOPICAL COMPOSITE: KEEPING OVERNIGHT BULLOCKS THAT ARE TO BE BURNED: SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

1. I:3: R. Jeremiah raised this question: “What is the law as to whether or not being kept overnight affects the bullocks that are to be burned and the goats that are to be burned? Does keeping them overnight invalidate them as it invalidates other offerings? Do we take the position that where being kept overnight takes effect concerns meat, that is, something that is eaten, but since these are not subject to being eaten, that is not the case. Or perhaps it makes no difference.”

2. I:4: R. Eleazar raised the question, “What is the law as to whether being taken out affects the bullocks that are to be burned and the goats that are to be burned? Does being carried out prior to the sprinkling of the blood invalidate those offerings?

3. I:5: R. Eleazar raised the question, “As to bullocks that are to be burned and goats that are to be burned, the greater part of which went out of the Temple court because the lesser part of a limb was taken out, though the greater part of that limb was left within the Temple courtyard, what is the law? Do we classify this lesser part of a limb along with the greater part, which of course has not gone forth from the Temple court and therefore the whole is deemed not to have been taken out? Or perhaps we classify the beast in accord with the status of the greater part of the animal itself?”

a. I:6: Rabbah b. R. Huna repeated this passage with reference to men who were involved in taking the beast out of the Temple, of which there were five: three had gone out and two left inside. What is the law? Do we follow the status of the majority of the men engaged in the project, or do we classify the status of the men by reference to the location of the animal?

4. I:7: R. Eleazar raised this question: “If the bullocks that were to be burned and the goats that were to be burned were carried out but then brought back, what is the law? Do we maintain that once they have gone forth, they have been made unclean, or perhaps, if they have come back, they have come back?”

5. I:8: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: He who burns the red cow, he who burns bullocks, and he who sends out the goat render clothing unclean. “A cow and bullocks and the goat that is sent forth themselves do not render clothing unclean, but they do render food and liquid unclean,” the words of R. Meir. And sages say, “A cow and bullocks to be burned render food and liquid unclean. A goat that is sent forth does not render even food and liquid unclean, because it is alive, and that which is alive does not render food and liquid unclean” (T. **Parah 7:8A-C**).

6. I:9: R. Eleazar raised this question: “As to the bullocks that are to be burned and the goats that are to be burned, what is the rule on their imparting uncleanness to food and drink inside the Temple court as they do outside? When the beast has not yet been taken out, it is as though it has not been subjected to a concrete action which makes it a source of uncleanness? Or perhaps the rule is that that is not the case?”

7. I:10: R. Abba bar R. Samuel raised the question of R. Hiyya bar Abba, “As to the carrion of a clean bird, in the perspective of R. Meir, what is the law on whether or not it imparts uncleanness when it is of the volume of an olive bulk?” There is no question on the view of rabbis, as they maintain that before anything can defile, it must conform to the general laws that govern, and as much as an olive’s of this particular carrion can defile only when it is in the gullet. Meir holds that whatever can eventually defile with a stringent defilement need not be fit for defilement, and hence this question arises. When it is lying on the ground, that is not a problem since it does not impart uncleanness, for it may never reach the stage of a most severe form of uncleanness, for someone may not eat it at all. And if someone has it in his mouth, there can be no question for it does impart uncleanness. Where the problem arises, it is when the man is holding it in hand. Do we say, since he has it in his hand, what has not yet been put into the mouth is as though it has not yet been acted upon to make it capable of imparting uncleanness? Or do we not take that position?”

a. I:11: Gloss of foregoing.

8. I:12: R. Zira asked R. Ammi bar Hiyya, and some say, R. Abin bar Kahana, “As to that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: when liquid forms a connector between foodstuffs, they regarded as connected in regard to a minor form of uncleanness but not in regard to a major form, do we then distinguish between first and second removes of uncleanness or do we not distinguish between first and second removes of uncleanness?”

C. THEY WOULD CARRY THEM ON POLES. IF THE FOREMOST BEARERS WENT OUTSIDE THE WALL, AND THE LATTER DID NOT YET GO OUTSIDE THE WALL, THE FORMER IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO CLOTHING, AND THE LATTER DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO CLOTHING-UNTIL THEY ACTUALLY GO FORTH. IF BOTH WENT FORTH, THESE AND THOSE IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO CLOTHING.

1. II:1: What is the scriptural source of this rule?

2. II:2: And how do we know that elsewhere the burning takes place outside all three camps?

D. R. SIMEON SAYS, “THESE AND THOSE WHO ARE TO BURN THE BULLOCKS OR GOATS DO NOT IMPART UNCLEANNESS TO CLOTHING UNTIL THEY ACTUALLY DO THE BURNING SO THAT THE FLAME WILL TAKE HOLD OF THEIR THE CARCASSES’ GREATER PART.” WHEN THE MEAT HAS BEEN WHOLLY BURNED TO ASHES, THE ONE WHO BURNS IT NO LONGER IMPARTS UNCLEANNESS TO CLOTHING WHICH HE WEARS.

1. III:1: Then how does R. Simeon deal with the language, “outside the camp”?

a. III:2: Now according to rabbis who have used the proof-text for another purpose, as we have just seen, where were they to be burned?

2. III:3: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: He who burns the bullocks imparts uncleanness to his clothing, but he who lights the fire does not impart uncleanness to his clothing, and he who arranges the wood pile does not impart uncleanness to his clothing. And who is the one who burns the bullocks imparts uncleanness to his clothing? It is any one who assists at the moment at which the burning takes place.

LXI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:1-2

A. HE WHO OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE COURTYARD BOTH SLAUGHTERS HOLY THINGS AND OFFERS UP HOLY THINGS IS LIABLE ON BOTH COUNTS, NAMELY: FOR THE ACT OF SLAUGHTERING AND IS LIABLE FOR THE ACT OF OFFERING UP:

1. I:1: With reference to the rule, he who outside the Temple courtyard both slaughters Holy Things and offers up Holy Things is liable on both counts, namely: for the act of slaughtering and is liable for the act of offering up: there assuredly is no problem with offering up, since both the penalty and the admonition against doing the act are explicitly contained in the Written Torah: But as for the act of slaughtering, while the penalty is explicitly presented in the Written Torah, “Whoever kills an ox and has not brought it to the door of the tent of meeting shall be cut off from his people” (Lev. 17:3-4), but as to the admonition against doing so, where do we find it in Scripture?

a. I:2: Continuation of the foregoing.

I. I:3: Secondary gloss of the foregoing.

II. I:4: As above.

2. I:5: Reverting to the original problem, He who outside the Temple courtyard both slaughters Holy Things and offers up Holy Things is liable on both counts,

namely: for the act of slaughtering and is liable for the act of offering up — there assuredly is no problem with offering up, since both the penalty and the admonition against doing the act are explicitly contained in the Written Torah:...But as for the act of slaughtering, while the penalty is explicitly presented in the Written Torah, “Whoever kills an ox and has not brought it to the door of the tent of meeting shall be cut off from his people” (Lev. 17: 3-4), but as to the admonition against doing so, where do we find it in Scripture, now that we have found the rule covering the case of the offerings that should be burned inside that were offered up outside of the Temple instead of inside the Temple courtyard, where they should have been burned, how do we know the rule covering the case of offerings that should be burned outside of the Temple courtyard and were offered up outside the Temple courtyard?

3. I:6: Now, with regard to what we have learned in the Mishnah, He who tosses part of the blood outside is liable (M. 13:6G), how on the basis of Scripture do we know that rule since the proofs up to now have spoken only of slaughtering the animal and offering it up outside of the Temple; but they have not referred to sprinkling?

4. I:7: As to that which we have learned: he who outside of the Temple takes a handful of meal offering and he who collects the blood of an offering are exempt from liability, how on the basis of Scripture do we know that fact?

a. I:8: Secondary analysis of the foregoing.

5. I:9: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “or who kills it outside of the camp” (Lev. 17: 3): Might one suppose that that means, outside of the three camps in which case he is culpable, but not if it is within one or another of them but in the improper one? Scripture states, “...or goat in the camp.” If “in the camp,” then might one suppose that even if one slaughters a burnt offering at the south side of the altar, he would be liable? Therefore Scripture states, “or who kills it outside of the camp.”

6. I:10: Said Ulla, “He who performs an act of sacrificial slaughter on the roof of the Temple is liable, since that area is not suitable for the slaughtering of any Holy Thing.”

7. I:11: It has been stated: He who at this time when the Temple of Jerusalem is in ruins makes an offering outside of the Temple — R. Yohanan said, “He is liable.” R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is exempt from liability.”

8. I:12: It has been stated: He who offers up a limb of less a volume than an olive’s bulk of meat — R. Yohanan said, “He is liable.” R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He is exempt from liability.”

9. I:13: Raba raised the question, “He who offers up the head of a pigeon that is not so much as the bulk of an olive, but that is increased to the bulk of an olive by salt — what is the law?”

B. R. YOSÉ THE GALILEAN SAYS, “IF INSIDE THE TEMPLE COURTYARD HE SLAUGHTERED THE ANIMAL, BUT OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE COURTYARD HE OFFERED IT UP, HE IS LIABLE. IF HE BOTH SLAUGHTERED OUTSIDE AND OFFERED UP OUTSIDE, HE IS FREE OF LIABILITY FOR THE OFFERING UP. FOR HE HAS OFFERED

UP OUTSIDE ONLY SOMETHING WHICH IN ANY EVENT IS INVALID. HAVING BEEN SLAUGHTERED OUTSIDE, IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OFFERED INSIDE ANYHOW.” THEY SAID TO HIM, “ALSO: HE WHO SLAUGHTERS INSIDE AND OFFERS UP OUTSIDE, SINCE HE TOOK IT OUTSIDE, HAS INVALIDATED IT AND SO TOO CONSISTENCY WOULD REQUIRE.”

1. II:1: Rabbi responded in behalf of R. Yosé the Galilean: “But what explains the rule covering the one who slaughters a sacrifice inside and offers it up outside is that for at least a moment, the procedure was valid. Can you say the same, by contrast, of one who both slaughtered outside and offered up outside? For in that case the procedure was never valid for a single moment!”

C. AN UNCLEAN PERSON WHO ATE EITHER UNCLEAN HOLY THINGS OR CLEAN HOLY THINGS, IS LIABLE. R. YOSÉ THE GALILEAN SAYS, “AN UNCLEAN PERSON WHO ATE CLEAN HOLY THINGS IS LIABLE. BUT AN UNCLEAN PERSON WHO ATE UNCLEAN HOLY THINGS IS FREE OF LIABILITY. FOR HE ATE ONLY SOMETHING OF HOLY THINGS WHICH IN ANY EVENT IS UNCLEAN.” THEY SAID TO HIM, “ALSO: THE UNCLEAN PERSON WHO ATE CLEAN HOLY THINGS, SINCE HE TOUCHED IT, HAS RENDERED IT UNCLEAN.” AND A CLEAN PERSON WHO ATE UNCLEAN HOLY THINGS IS FREE OF LIABILITY ON THAT COUNT, FOR HE IS LIABLE ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTAMINATION OF THE BODY.

1. III:1: Did the rabbis give a good answer to R. Yosé the Galilean?

LXII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:3

A. A MORE STRICT RULE APPLIES TO SLAUGHTERING ANIMALS DESIGNATED AS HOLY THINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE THAN TO OFFERING UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE, AND TO OFFERING UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE THAN TO SLAUGHTERING. MORE STRICT IS THE RULE WHICH APPLIES IN THE CASE OF SLAUGHTERING ANIMALS DESIGNATED AS HOLY THINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE: FOR ONE WHO SLAUGHTERS ANIMALS DESIGNATED AS HOLY THINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE IN BEHALF OF AN ORDINARY PERSON INSTEAD OF GOD! IS LIABLE. BUT ONE WHO OFFERS UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE FOR THE USE, E.G., THE EATING OF AN ORDINARY PERSON IS FREE.

1. I:1: What differentiates the act of offering up a sacrifice outside of the Temple in behalf of an ordinary man instead of God, that one is exempt from liability?

B. MORE STRICT IS THE RULE WHICH APPLIES IN THE CASE OF OFFERING UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE: TWO WHO TOOK HOLD OF A KNIFE AND SLAUGHTERED WITH IT ARE FREE OF LIABILITY. IF THEY TOOK HOLD OF A LIMB AND OFFERED IT UP, THEY ARE LIABLE.

1. II:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “‘Whosoever’ (Lev. 17: 8 “Whatsoever man,” repeating the word “man” twice) — What is the point of Scripture here? The repetition serves to extend the law to the case of two who took hold of a limb and offered it up, indicating that they are liable. For one might have argued that the contrary position is the more logical, namely, if it is the fact that two who took hold of a knife and slaughtered with it are free of liability, even though one who slaughters the beast for a man rather than God is liable, then, is it

not logical that if two took hold of a limb and offered it up, they should not be liable, since if one offered it up to a man, he would not be liable? Therefore it was necessary for Scripture to state, ‘whosoever,’” the words of R. Simeon.

C. “IF ONE OFFERED UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE AND WENT AND OFFERED UP AGAIN OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE AND WENT AND OFFERED UP AGAIN OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE, HE IS LIABLE TO BRING A SIN OFFERING FOR EACH AND EVERY ACT OF OFFERING UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE,” THE WORDS OF R. SIMEON. R. YOSÉ SAYS, “HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR ONE ACT OF OFFERING UP OFFERINGS OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE:”

1. III:1: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “The dispute concerns the case of offering up outside of the Temple four or five limbs. For one master takes the view that, when it is written, ‘to sacrifice it,’ the meaning is for the whole of an animal one is liable for making an offering outside of the Temple, but one is not liable for an animal that lacks some of the parts, since the statement refers to a whole animal. The other master takes the position that that statement is set forth in regard to each limb one is then liable only for offering up a whole limb but not for part of a limb, so each limb singly imposes liability. And in the case of offering up a single limb in several portions consecutively all parties concur that one is liable only only a single count.” R. Yohanan said, “The dispute concerns a single limb. One master takes the view that if one offers up outside of the Temple limbs that had first been burned inside and so were now incomplete, he is liable, and the other master takes the view that if one offers up outside of the Temple limbs that had first been burned inside and so were now incomplete, he is not liable, Because if such a limb popped off of the altar, it has to be put back, so it still has to be burned up, even after it has become incomplete, and therefore, if one offers it up outside of the Temple, he performs that act of offering up outside and is liable; consequently each successive offering up of a portion of the same limb entails liability on a single count by itself. But as to the case of offering up outside of the Temple four or five limbs, all parties concur that the one who does so bears liability on each count separately.”

D. AND HE IS LIABLE ONLY WHEN HE WILL OFFER UP ON THE TOP OF THE ALTAR WHICH HE HAS BUILT OUTSIDE. R. SIMEON SAYS, “EVEN IF HE OFFERED UP ON A ROCK OR ON A STONE, HE IS LIABLE.”

1. IV:1: Said R. Huna, “What is the scriptural foundation for the position of R. Yosé? It is written, ‘And Noah built an altar to the Lord’ (Gen. 8:20). Without having built an altar for that purpose, one does not conduct an at of sacrifice.” Said R. Yohanan “What is the scriptural foundation for the position of R. Simeon? It is written, ‘So Manoah took the kid with the meal offering and offered it upon the rock onto the Lord’ (Jud. 13:19).”

2. IV:2: R. Yosé b. R. Hanina raised the question, “Is the provision of a horn for the altar, a ramp upward, a base, and the square dimensions, indispensable for high places as they were for the altar in the tabernacle?”

LXIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:4A-C

A. ALL THE SAME ARE VALID HOLY THINGS AND INVALID HOLY THINGS, THE INVALIDATION OF WHICH TOOK PLACE INSIDE THE SANCTUARY, AND WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE — THE ONE WHO DOES SO IS LIABLE

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “Whosoever offers up a burnt offering” (Lev. 17: 8) — I know only that the law covers offering up outside of the Temple court a burnt offering. How on the basis of Scripture do I know that the law encompasses the sacrificial parts of a guilt offering, the sacrificial parts of a sin offering, the sacrificial parts of Most Holy Things, and the sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things? Scripture says, “...or sacrifice....”

B. HE WHO OFFERS UP AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE’S BULK OF FLESH OF A BURNT OFFERING AND OF THE SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE THE COURTYARD IS LIABLE:

1. II:1: The specification before us yields this fact: a burnt offering and its sacrificial parts is covered by the law, but peace-offerings and their sacrificial parts are not covered by the law.

LXIV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:4D-H, 13:5

A. THE HANDFUL, AND THE FRANKINCENSE, AND THE INCENSE, AND THE MEAL OFFERING OF PRIESTS, AND THE MEAL OFFERING OF THE ANOINTED PRIEST, AND THE MEAL OFFERING WHICH GOES ALONG WITH DRINK OFFERINGS, AN OLIVE’S BULK OF ONE OF WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE — HE IS LIABLE. R. ELEAZAR DECLARES HIM FREE OF LIABILITY, UNTIL HE OFFERS UP THE ENTIRE VOLUME OF THE MEAL OFFERING.

1. I:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: He who burns up an olive’s bulk of incense outside of the Temple is liable; if he burned half of what was actually the requisite volume of incense presented daily, morning and evening, he is not liable.

a. I:2: Analysis of the foregoing.

B. AND ALL OF THEM WHICH ONE OFFERED UP INSIDE, AND OF WHICH ONE LEFT AS RESIDUE AN OLIVE’S BULK, WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE — HE IS LIABLE.

AND ALL OF THEM WHICH LACKED ANY OF THE REQUISITE AMOUNT AT ALL, WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE OF LIABILITY, SINCE OFFERING THEM INSIDE IS INVALID IN ANY EVENT

1. II:1: The question was raised: if the lack of a requisite amount deemed consequential in an act performed outside of the Temple as it does in an act performed inside of the Temple? Do we say, since the thing was taken out of the Temple, it was disqualified, so what difference does it make where there is insufficient volume or excess volume? Or perhaps only when the thing is taken out but is wholly in hand is liability incurred, but if it is taken out but not wholly in hand, it does not matter? Said Abbayye, “Come and take note of the following: R. Eleazar declares him free of liability, until he offers up the entire volume of the

meal offering. So only when the thing is taken out but is wholly in hand is liability incurred.”

C. HE WHO OFFERS UP HOLY THINGS AND THEIR UNSEVERED SACRIFICIAL PARTS OUTSIDE IS LIABLE.

1. III:1: Why should that be the rule? Surely there is the consideration of interposition in that the meat interposes between the fire and the sacrificial parts, and that would mean we do not have a proper offering up of the meat inside the Temple, where the sacrificial parts must lie directly on the fire.

LXV. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:5B-C

A. A MEAL OFFERING FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN AND WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE. IF HE TOOK UP THE HANDFUL AND PUT BACK THE HANDFUL, AND HE OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE, HE IS LIABLE.

1. I:1: But why should that be the rule? Let the residue nullify the handful so there should be no liability.

LXVI. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:6A-F

A. THE HANDFUL AND THE FRANKINCENSE, ONE OF THE TWO OF WHICH ONE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE — HE IS LIABLE SINCE EITHER ONE ALONE IS SUITABLE FOR OFFERING INSIDE ON ITS OWN. R. ELEAZAR DECLARES FREE OF LIABILITY UNLESS HE OFFERS UP THE SECOND AS WELL, IF HE OFFERED UP ONE INSIDE FIRST AND ONE OUTSIDE AFTERWARD, HE IS LIABLE.

TWO DISHES OF FRANKINCENSE, ONE OF WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE-HE IS LIABLE. R. ELEAZAR DECLARES EXEMPT UNLESS HE OFFERS UP THE SECOND. IF HE OFFERED UP ONE INSIDE FIRST AND THEN ONE OUTSIDE AFTERWARD, HE IS LIABLE.

1. I:1: R. Isaac Nappaha raised the question: “As to the handful of meal offering, what is the law on its permitted part of the remainder that is proportionate to it? Does the handful actually effect the permission of the remainder, or does it merely weaken the prior prohibition?” Does the taking of the handful completely permit part, in which case this part is now permitted, or does it merely weaken the prohibition of the whole, while it is the frankincense that finally removes the prohibition? In that case the prohibition still pertains.

LXVII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:6G-I

A. HE WHO TOSSES EVEN ONLY PART OF THE BLOOD ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE IS LIABLE.

1. I:1: Said Raba, “But R. Eleazar concurs on the ruling with respect to blood, though he disagrees in regard to frankincense.

B. R. ELEAZAR SAYS, “ALSO: HE WHO OFFERS THE WATER LIBATION OF THE FESTIVAL OF SUKKOT ON THE FESTIVAL ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE IS LIABLE.”

1. II:1: Said R. Yohanan in the name of R. Menahem of Yudpaah, “R. Eleazar made his statement within the premise of R. Aqiba, his master, who has said, ‘The requirement of making a water offering on the Festival derives from the authority of the Torah.’”

2. II:2: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: He who pours out as a water libation three logs of water on the Festival of Tabernacles on an altar outside of the Temple is liable. R. Eleazar says, “If he drew the water for the purpose of the Festival, he is liable.”

3. II:3: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: He who pours out as a libation three logs of wine on an altar outside of the Temple is liable. R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, “But that is the case only if the wine has been consecrated by use of a holy utensil of service.”

C. R. NEHEMIAH SAYS, “THE RESIDUE OF THE BLOOD OF SIN OFFERINGS OF THE INNER ALTAR WHICH ONE OFFERED UP ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE — HE IS LIABLE.”

1. III:1: Said R. Yohanan, “The position of R. Nehemiah’s Tannaite formulation accords with the statement of him who says, ‘The disposition of the residue is an indispensable part of the rite which is why one who offers it outside is liable.’”

LXVIII. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:7

A. HE WHO PINCHES THE NECK OF FOWL INSIDE THE TEMPLE AND OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE IS LIABLE SINCE PINCHING THE NECK IS THE VALID MEANS OF SLAUGHTERING THE BIRD FOR SACRIFICIAL PURPOSES, AND THAT WAS CORRECTLY DONE. IF HE PINCHED THE NECK OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE AND OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE, HE IS FREE. PINCHING THE NECK IS DONE ONLY TO KILL THE BIRD AS A SACRIFICE; SINCE THIS WAS DONE OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE, IT IS NULL.

HE WHO SLAUGHTERS FOWL INSIDE THE TEMPLE AND OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE IS FREE. IF HE SLAUGHTERED IT OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE AND OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE, HE IS LIABLE. IT TURNS OUT THAT

THE WAY OF RENDERING IT SUITABLE, AND THE WAY OF RENDERING IT SUITABLE OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE FOR EATING UNCONSECRATED FOWL IS THAT WHICH FREES IT FROM PENALTY INSIDE THE TEMPLE.

1. I:1: The word-choice, rendering it suitable, really bears the meaning, “rendering it such as to impose liability upon the one who does it”!

B. R. SIMEON SAYS, “ANY ACT FOR WHICH THEY ARE LIABLE WHEN IT IS DONE OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE, FOR THE LIKE ACT ARE THEY LIABLE WHEN IT IS DONE INSIDE THE TEMPLE AND WHEN ONE OFFERED IT UP OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE, EXCEPT FOR HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS INSIDE THE TEMPLE AND OFFERS UP THE BIRD OFFERING OUTSIDE THE TEMPLE.”

1. II:1: To what does he make reference in this statement? If one should say that it is to the opening clause, namely, He who pinches the neck of fowl inside the Temple and offered it up outside the Temple is liable. If he pinched the neck

outside the Temple and offered it up outside the Temple, he is free, and in that connection R. Simeon made his statement, that is, just as he is liable when he pinches the neck inside, so he is liable when he does so outside, a better formulation would be not, “Any act for which they are liable when it is done outside the Temple,” but rather, “Any act for which they are liable when it is done inside the Temple.” If the intent is to say, “just as one is not liable when he pinches the neck outside, so he is not liable when he pinches the neck inside the Temple,” then the language he should use is, “Any act for which they are not liable when it is done outside of the Temple does not entail liability when it is done inside the Temple”

LXIX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 13:8

A. A SIN OFFERING, THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE RECEIVED IN A SINGLE CUP, AND THE BLOOD OF WHICH ONE FIRST PLACED ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, AND THEN PLACED ON AN ALTAR INSIDE, OR PLACED ON AN ALTAR INSIDE AND THEN PLACED ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE — HE IS LIABLE, FOR ALL OF IT IS SUITABLE TO COME TO BE PLACED ON THE ALTAR INSIDE.

IF ONE RECEIVED ITS BLOOD IN TWO CUPS, AND PLACED THE BLOOD OF BOTH OF THEM ON AN ALTAR INSIDE, HE IS FREE. IF HE PLACED THE BLOOD OF BOTH OF THEM ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, HE IS LIABLE. IF HE PLACED THE BLOOD OF ONE OF THEM ON AN ALTAR INSIDE AND THEN PLACED THE BLOOD OF ONE OF THEM ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, HE IS FREE FOR THE LATTER NO LONGER IS SUITABLE TO COME INSIDE. IF HE PLACED THE BLOOD OF ONE OF THEM ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE AND THEN ONE OF THEM ON AN ALTAR INSIDE, HE IS LIABLE FOR THAT WHICH HE HAS PLACED ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, BUT THE ONE THE BLOOD OF WHICH HE THEN PLACED ON AN ALTAR INSIDE EFFECTS ATONEMENT.

1. I:1: Now as to sprinkling the blood on an altar outside and then going and sprinkling it on an altar inside, there is no problem, for all of the blood was suitable for being sprinkled on the blood inside. But as to a case in which he sprinkled the blood at an altar inside the Temple but offered it up outside, then what he has done outside is with nothing more than residue and why should he be liable? What authority stands behind this rule? It is R. Nehemiah, who has said, “For the residue of blood that one has offered up on an altar outside the Temple one is liable.”

B. TO WHAT IS THE MATTER TO BE LIKENED? TO HIM WHO SEPARATES HIS SIN OFFERING, AND IT WAS LOST, AND HE SEPARATED ANOTHER IN ITS PLACE, AND AFTERWARD THE FIRST ONE TURNED UP, SO THAT, LO, BOTH OF THEM ARE NOW AVAILABLE AND HE MAY SLAUGHTER EITHER OF THEM. IF HE SLAUGHTERED BOTH OF THEM ON AN ALTAR INSIDE, HE OBVIOUSLY IS FREE OF LIABILITY. IF HE SLAUGHTERED BOTH OF THEM ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, HE OBVIOUSLY IS LIABLE. IF HE SLAUGHTERED ONE ON AN ALTAR INSIDE AND ONE ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, HE IS FREE. IF HE SLAUGHTERED ONE ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE AND THE OTHER ON AN ALTAR INSIDE, HE IS LIABLE FOR THE ONE THE BLOOD OF WHICH HE PLACED HE HAS PLACED ON AN ALTAR OUTSIDE, BUT THE ONE WHICH HE SACRIFICES ON AN ALTAR INSIDE EFFECTS ATONEMENT. JUST AS THE SPRINKLING OF ITS BLOOD

RENDERS ITS MEAT FREE FROM THE LAW OF SACRILEGE, SO IT RENDERS THE MEAT OF ITS FELLOW FREE.

1. II:1: What need is there for adding, To what is the matter to be likened? Lo, who is the authority behind this formulation? It is Rabbi, who has said, “If the first beast was lost when the second had been designated, it must be left to die even if it was found by the time that the second beast had been sacrificed.” This is the sense of the statement at hand: that is the case only if the first was lost. But if one had set aside to animals for sin offerings to make sure that he would have one available should the other be lost, then one of them is a burnt offering to begin with.

LXX. Mishnah-Tractate Zebahim 14:1-10

A. ON ACCOUNT OF A RED COW FOR PURIFICATION ASHES THAT ONE BURNED OUTSIDE OF ITS PIT —

1. I:1: what is the meaning of, outside of its pit? Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “It means, outside of the place that has been inspected for that purpose to make certain there was no corpse matter buried beneath the spot.” Said to him R. Yohanan, “But is not the whole of the Land of Israel classified as a place that has been inspected for that purpose to make certain there was no corpse matter buried beneath the spot?”

a. I:2: Gloss of a detail of the foregoing. A master has said: Said to him R. Yohanan, “But is not the whole of the Land of Israel classified as a place that has been inspected for that purpose to make certain there was no corpse matter buried beneath the spot?” What is at stake in this dispute on whether or not the whole of the Land of Israel classified as a place that has been inspected to make certain there was no corpse matter buried beneath the spot?

B. AND SO: A GOAT TO BE SENT FORTH THAT ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE — HE IS FREE, AS IT IS SAID, “TO THE DOOR OF THE TENT OF MEETING HE DID NOT BRING IT” (LEV. 17: 4) — FOR WHATEVER IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO COME TO THE DOOR OF THE TENT OF MEETING THEY ARE NOT LIABLE IF SUCH A CLASSIFICATION OF OFFERING IS CARRIED OUT OUTSIDE OF THE TEMPLE.

1. II:1: But is the goat not appropriate to come to the door of the tent of meeting? And the following may be cited in contraction: “...or sacrifice” (Lev. 17: 8) — might I suppose that covered by the law are even Holy Things that have been designated for the upkeep of the house, which are classified as an offering in line with the following, “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” (Num. 31:50)? Scripture states, “And brings it not to the door of the tent of meeting,” so the law applies only to what is appropriate to come to the door of the tent of meeting, with the result that Holy Things that have been designated for the upkeep of the house are excluded.

C. THE ANIMAL WHICH HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A HUMAN, AND THE ANIMAL WITH WHICH A HUMAN HAD SEXUAL RELATIONS, AND THE ANIMAL SET ASIDE FOR IDOLATROUS WORSHIP, AND THE ANIMAL WHICH HAD BEEN WORSHIPPED, AND THE ANIMAL USED FOR THE HIRE OF A HARLOT, AND THE ANIMAL USED TO PAY

FOR A DOG, AND THE CROSSBRED ANIMAL, AND THE ANIMAL WHICH TURNS OUT TO BE TEREFAH, AND THE ANIMAL WHICH WENT FORTH FROM THE SIDE, WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE, AS IT IS SAID, “BEFORE THE ALTAR OF THE LORD” (LEV. 17: 4) — WHATEVER IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO COME BEFORE THE ALTAR OF THE LORD — THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT.

1. III:1: Now may I not infer this too from the statement, “to the door of the tent of meeting” so why present a different proof-text from the foregoing? With reference to the animal which had sexual relations with a human, and the animal with which a human had sexual relations there is no problem in explaining why two proof-texts are required, for here the other proof-text would be necessary, for example in a case in which one first consecrated the beast and then the act of bestiality was committed upon it so to begin with it was fit to come to the door of meeting but it may not now be offered upon the altar. But as to the categories of the animal set aside for idolatrous worship, and the animal which had been worshipped, a person cannot impose a prohibition on something that does not belong to him so how can such classifications of beasts be prohibited once they have been consecrated?

D. BLEMISHED ANIMALS, WHETHER PERMANENTLY BLEMISHED OR TEMPORARILY BLEMISHED, WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE. R. SIMEON SAYS, “PERMANENTLY BLEMISHED ANIMALS WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE. BUT TEMPORARILY BLEMISHED ANIMALS WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — THEY TRANSGRESS A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT. TURTLEDOVES WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME AND YOUNG PIGEONS WHOSE TIME HAD PASSED, WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE. R. SIMEON SAYS, “PIGEONS WHOSE TIME HAD PASSED WHICH HE OFFERED UP OUTSIDE) — HE IS FREE, TURTLEDOVES WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME WHICH HE OFFERED UP OUT-SIDE — THEY TRANSGRESS A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT.” IT AND ITS OFFSPRING LEV. 22:28: AND WHETHER THE MOTHER IS A COW OR A EWE, YOU SHALL NOT KILL BOTH HER AND HER YOUNG IN ONE DAY, AND THAT WITHIN SEVEN DAYS OF BIRTH, EXO. 22:29 WHOSE TIME TO BE OFFERED HAD NOT YET COME WHICH ONE OFFERED OUTSIDE — HE IS FREE. R. SIMEON SAYS, “LO, THIS ONE HAS TRANSGRESSED A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT.”

1. IV:1: The controversy involving Simeon and sages is required in all three cases blemished animals, turtledoves, and It and its offspring. For if the Tannaite statement had referred only to blemished animals, then the operative consideration would be that they are repulsive, but as to turtledoves, which are not repulsive, I might have thought that sages concede R. Simeon’s position. And if the Tannaite statement had referred only to turtledoves, then I might have supposed that the operative consideration is that they are not rejected once they have been eligible, but as to blemished animals, which were eligible but became rejected, I might have thought that R. Simeon concurs with the position of rabbis.

E. FOR R. SIMEON DID SAY, “WHATEVER IS APPROPRIATE TO COME AT A LATER TIME, LO, THIS ONE HAS TRANSGRESSED A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT, BUT EXTIRPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO IT.” AND SAGES SAY, “WHATEVER IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXTIRPATION IS NOT SUBJECT TO A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT.”

1. V:1: What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon?

a. V:2: Rabbah said, “The scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority.”

F. AN ANIMAL WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME — WHETHER IN ITSELF OR IN RESPECT TO ITS OWNER. WHAT IS AN OFFERING WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME IN RESPECT TO ITS OWNER? THE ZAB, AND THE ZABAH, AND THE WOMAN WHO HAS GIVEN BIRTH, AND THE PERSON AFFLICTED WITH THE SKIN AILMENT, WHO DURING THEIR TIME OF COUNTING CLEAN DAYS OFFERED THEIR SIN OFFERING AND SOLELY IN THE CASE OF THE PERSON AFFLICTED WITH THE SKIN AILMENT — THEIR GUILT OFFERING OUTSIDE ARE FREE SINCE THE OFFERINGS SERVE NEITHER TO FULFILL AN OBLIGATION NOR TO BE COUNTED AS A THANK OFFERING.

1. VI:1: Are these who are listed subject to bringing guilt offerings at all?

G. THE ZAB, AND THE ZABAH, AND THE WOMAN WHO HAS GIVEN BIRTH, AND THE PERSON AFFLICTED WITH THE SKIN AILMENT, WHO DURING THEIR TIME OF COUNTING CLEAN DAYS OFFERED THEIR SIN OFFERING AND SOLELY IN THE CASE OF THE PERSON AFFLICTED WITH THE SKIN AILMENT — THEIR GUILT OFFERING OUTSIDE ARE FREE SINCE THE OFFERINGS SERVE NEITHER TO FULFILL AN OBLIGATION NOR TO BE COUNTED AS A THANK OFFERING. IF THEY OFFERED THEIR BURNT OFFERINGS AND IN THE CASE OF THE NAZIRITE THEIR PEACE OFFERING OUTSIDE, THEY ARE LIABLE.

1. VII:1: Do those who are listed have to bring peace offerings?

2. VII:2: Said R. Hilqiah b. R. Tobi, “The rule that if a person afflicted by the skin ailment offers his guilt offering before the proper time, but outside of the Temple, he is not culpable speaks of a case in which he made the offering under the classification of a guilt offering. But if he made it under a different classification, he is liable, since under a different classification if it were offered inside of the Temple, it would be eligible for offering.”

a. VII:3: Said R. Hilqiah b. R. Tobi, “The rule that if a person afflicted by the skin ailment offers his guilt offering before the proper time, but outside of the Temple, he is not culpable speaks of a case in which he made the offering under the classification of a guilt offering. But if he made it under a different classification, he is liable, since under a different classification if it were offered inside of the Temple, it would be eligible for offering.” may we say that the following statement supports the position of R. Hilqiah: Might one suppose that I should also exclude from the requirement of bringing to the door of the tent of meeting a burnt offering, which can be premature in relationship to its owner that is, the owner might not be fit at the time it is presented, e.g., in the case of a person afflicted with the skin ailment or a woman after childbirth, the guilt offering of a Nazirite or the guilt offering of a person afflicted with the skin ailment? Scripture states, “an ox,” thus, under all circumstances, “or a lamb,” under all circumstances, “or a goat,” under all circumstances.” Thus he omits all reference to a sin offering. Now what case is under discussion here? If we say that when it is sacrificed at the proper time, then why make reference in particular to a guilt offering, when even if it were a sin offering too, there

would be liability. It must follow that in context under discussion is a case in which it is not sacrificed in the proper time. And under what circumstances? If we say, it is when he sacrifices it for the purpose for which the animal was originally designated, then why is he liable for a guilt offering? So the meaning must be, when he sacrifices it under a designation other than that for which it was originally consecrated. Freedman: thus what is not fit when offered within the Temple under its own designation is fit under a different designation.

H. HE WHO OFFERS UP PART OF THE FLESH OF A SIN OFFERING, PART OF THE FLESH OF A GUILT OFFERING, PART OF THE FLESH OF MOST HOLY THINGS, PART OF THE FLESH OF LESSER HOLY THINGS, THE RESIDUE OF THE OMER, AND THE TWO BREADS, AND THE SHOWBREAD, AND THE RESIDUE OF MEAL OFFERINGS ALL OF WHICH ARE EATEN BY THE PRIESTS, NOT OFFERED ON THE ALTAR — HE WHO POURS OUT OIL OVER THE MEAL OFFERING, HE WHO MIXES MEAL WITH THE OIL, HE WHO BREAKS MEAL OFFERING CAKES INTO PIECES, HE WHO SALTS MEAL OFFERING, HE WHO WAVES IT, HE WHO BRINGS IT NEAR OPPOSITE THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE ALTAR, HE WHO ARRANGES THE BREAD ON TABLE, HE WHO TRIMS THE LAMPS, HE WHO TAKES THE HANDFUL, HE WHO RECEIVES THE BLOOD NONE OF WHICH ACTIONS COMPLETES THE SACRIFICIAL RITE — OUTSIDE — IS FREE. THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON ITS ACCOUNT EITHER BECAUSE OF BEING ALIEN NOT BEING PRIEST, OR BECAUSE OF UNCLEANNESS, OR BECAUSE OF LACKING THE PROPER VESTMENTS, OR BECAUSE OF HAVING UNWASHED HANDS AND FEET.

1. VIII:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: How on the basis of Scripture do we know that He who offers up part of the flesh of a sin offering, part of the flesh of a guilt offering, part of the flesh of Most Holy Things, part of the flesh of Lesser Holy Things, the residue of the omer, and the two breads, and the showbread, and the residue of meal offerings all of which are eaten by the priests, not offered on the altar — outside — is free? Scripture says, “Whatsoever man..offers a burnt offering” — just as a burnt offering is eligible for offering up at the altar, so everything that is eligible for offering upon the altar involves liability if it is offered up outside and none of the items on this list falls into that category. How do we know that he who pours out oil over the meal offering, he who mixes meal with the oil, he who breaks meal offering cakes into pieces, he who salts meal offering, he who waves it, he who brings it near opposite the southwest corner of the altar, he who arranges the bread on table, he who trims the lamps, he who takes the handful, he who receives the blood none of which actions completes the sacrificial rite — outside — is free? Scripture says, “...who offers a burnt offering or sacrifice:” as offering up completes the act of service, so everything that completes the act of service involves liability and none of these falls into that category.

I. BEFORE THE TABERNACLE WAS SET UP, THE HIGH PLACES WERE PERMITTED, AND THE SACRIFICIAL SERVICE WAS DONE BY THE FIRST BORN. WHEN THE TABERNACLE WAS SET UP, THE HIGH PLACES WERE PROHIBITED, AND THE SACRIFICIAL SERVICE WAS DONE BY PRIESTS:

1. IX:1: R. Huna b. R. Qattina went into session before R. Hisda and recited the following verse of Scripture, “‘And he sent forth the young men of the children of Israel, who offered burnt offerings and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord’ (Exo. 24: 5). The young men were the firstborn, not priests, and the occasion was when Moses built an altar at the foot of Mount Sinai.” He said to him, “This is what R. Assi said, ‘But then that form of offering came to an end,’” And this was the last time that the firstborn performed the sacrificial service, though it was nearly a year before the tabernacle was set up. He gave thought to refuting this position on the basis of the Mishnah-paragraph before us before the tabernacle was set up...the sacrificial service was done by the first born, but, when he heard that which was stated in the name of R. Ada bar Ahbah, “The burnt offerings that the Israelites offered in the wilderness is not subject to flaying and cutting up,” he preferred to refute what he had said on the basis of the Tannaite formulation external to the Mishnah, which pertains to the entirety of the matter.

a. IX:2: Further exegeses supplementary to the foregoing.

2. IX:3: Continuation of IX:1.

a. IX:4: Further exegesis of the Tannaite formulation cited at IX.1.

b. IX:5: As above.

c. IX:6: As above.

d. IX:7: As above.

I. IX:8: Expansion on the foregoing.

A. IX:9: As above.

e. IX:10: As above.

f. IX:11: Secondary restatement of the same point as above.

I. IX:12: Illustrative story.

A. 13: Gloss of a detail of the foregoing.

II. IX:14: As above.

J. MOST HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, LESSER HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN THROUGHOUT THE CAMP OF ISRAEL.

1. X:1: Said R. Huna, “Wherever Israelites were located, but there was no camp so one could eat Lesser Holy Things even if he left the camp of the Israelites.”

2. X:2: It has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon b. Yohai says, “There was still another place there, which was the women’s court, and they would not impose a penalty on its account if one went in there while unclean. In Shilo there were only two camps alone.”

K. THEY CAME TO GILGAL. THE HIGH PLACES WERE PERMITTED. MOST HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, LESSER HOLY THINGS, ANYWHERE.

1. XI:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: “Whatever classification of offering is subject to a vow- or a freewill-offering is offered on the high place belonging to an individual. Whatever is not subject to a vow or a freewill-offering is not offered on the high place belonging to an individual; a meal offering and the

offerings of a Nazirite were offered at a high place,” the words of R. Meir. And sages say, “Offered on the high place of an individual are only a burnt offering and peace offerings alone.”

a. XI:2: What is the scriptural basis of the position of R. Meir?

b. XI:3: Said Samuel, “At issue between them are the sin offering and guilt offering presented by a Nazirite at the end of the spell of his vow, but all concur that as to burnt offerings and peace offerings of a Nazirite, these fall into the classification of votive offerings and they are presented on a high place.”

c. XI:4: Further gloss of Tannaite statement at XI:1. What is the scriptural basis for the ruling of rabbis?

d. XI:5: As above. In the cited passage, sages say the same thing as the initial, anonymous statement!

e. XI:6: As above. What is the scriptural basis of the position of R. Simeon?

2. XI:7: Recited a Tannaite authority before R. Adda bar Ahbah, “The only difference between a public high place and a private high place was in regard to the Passover offering alone and also obligatory offerings that had been assigned a fixed time (M. **Meg. 1:10**).” He said to him, “In accord with what authority has this statement been made to you? It accords with R. Simeon, who says, ‘The only difference between a great high place and a private high place was in regard to Passover offerings and obligatory offerings that had been assigned a fixed time,’ but then you have to make your formulation refer also to the statutory burnt offering, as there is also a votive burnt offering. The daily and additional burnt offerings are obligatory offerings subject to a fixed time, but the statutory sin offerings of festivals could not be offered there. But as to the sin offering, is there a votive sin offering?” Obviously not. Simeon includes only those obligatory offerings of which there are also votive offerings, for if he meant all obligatory offerings that have a fixed time, he should simply mention ‘them,’ and not the Passover offering at all, since that too is an obligatory offering with a fixed time. Hence this is what he means: the only difference between public and private high places was in respect to the Passover offerings, which were offered at the former but not at the latter, while as for other sacrifices that were offered at both, the difference is that at the private high place only votive votive offerings were offered, while at the public high place statutory offerings that have a fixed time also were offered.

L. THEY CAME TO SHILO. THE HIGH PLACES WERE PROHIBITED. THERE WAS NO ROOF BEAM THERE, BUT BELOW WAS A HOUSE OF STONE, AND HANGINGS ABOVE IT, AND IT WAS “THE RESTING PLACE” DEU. 12: 9.

1. XII:1: What is the scriptural source of this rule?

M. MOST HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, LESSER HOLY THINGS AND SECOND TITHE WERE EATEN IN ANY PLACE WITHIN SIGHT OF SHILO.

1. XIII:1: What is the scriptural source of this rule?

2. XIII:2: A Tannaite formulation: "...in any place within sight of Shilo of which they have spoken means from any place from which one could see the tabernacle without any intervening structure."

3. XIII:3: Said R. Pappa, "...in any place within sight of Shilo of which they have spoken does not mean one sees the whole of the tabernacle, but one must say part of it."

4. XIII:4: When R. Dimi came, he said, "The Indwelling Presence of God came to rest on Israel in three locations: Shilo, Nob-and-Gibeon, and the eternal house, and in all these instances it came to rest only within the portion of Benjamin: 'He covers him all day' (Deu. 33:12). All 'coverings' too will be only in the portion of Benjamin."

5. XIII:5: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: The time span of the tent of meeting in the wilderness was forty years less one; the time span of the tent of meeting at Gilgal was fourteen years, seven of them during the conquest, and seven during the division, of the land. The time span of the tent of meeting at Nob-and-Gibeon was fifty-seven years; leaving for Shilo three hundred and seventy less one.

a. XIII:6: Gloss of XIII:5. Basis for the sequence of factual allegations.

b. XIII:7: Gloss of XIII:5. Basis for the sequence of factual allegations.

c. XIII:8: Gloss of XIII:5. Basis for the sequence of factual allegations.

N. THEY CAME TO NOB AND GIBEON. THE HIGH PLACES WERE PERMITTED. MOST HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, LESSER HOLY THINGS, IN ALL THE TOWNS OF ISRAEL.

1. XIV:1: What is the scriptural basis for this allegation?

a. XIV:2: Said R. Simeon b. Laqish to R. Yohanan, "If so, then there should be an allusion to the consideration of second tithe as well since, if Shilo's sanctity was over, then it should be legislated that second tithe must be eaten at Nob and Gibeon alone."

b. XIV:3: Does it follow, then, that R. Judah takes the view that second tithe would be eaten only at Nob and Gibeon when they formed the cultic center of Israel?

O. THEY CAME TO JERUSALEM. THE HIGH PLACES WERE PROHIBITED. AND THEY NEVER AGAIN WERE PERMITTED. AND IT WAS "THE INHERITANCE" DEU. 12:9. MOST HOLY THINGS WERE EATEN WITHIN THE VEILS, LESSER HOLY THINGS AND SECOND TITHE WITHIN THE WALL.

1. XV:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: "For you have not yet come to the rest and the inheritance which the Lord your God gives you" (Deu. 12: 9) — What is 'the rest'? This refers to Shilo. What is 'and the inheritance'? This refers to Jerusalem. So Scripture says, 'For you have not come as yet to the rest and to the inheritance' (Deu. 12: 9): and further, 'My inheritance is to me a painted bird' (Jer. 12: 9); and further, 'My inheritance was to me as a lion in the forest,' (Jer. 12: 8)," the words of R. Judah. R. Simeon says, "'Inheritance refers to Shilo, 'rest' refers to Jerusalem, as it says, 'The Lord has

chosen Zion; this is my resting place forever; there I shall dwell, because I have desired it' (Psa. 132:13-14)" (T. **Zeb. 13:20A-I**).

a. XV:2: Gloss of foregoing. Now from the perspective of him who says, "What is 'the rest'? This refers to Shilo," there is no problem, and that is in line with "to the rest and to the inheritance" in the proper chronological order. But from the perspective of him who says, "'Inheritance refers to Shilo, 'rest' refers to Jerusalem," the cited verse should read, "to the inheritance and to the rest"!

b. XV:3: Gloss of foregoing. A Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael stated, "Both words speak of Shilo."

c. XV:4: Gloss of foregoing. Now from the perspective of him who says, "What is 'the rest'? This refers to Shilo," or even the reverse, there is no problem, and that is in line with "to the rest and to the inheritance" in the proper chronological order. But from the perspective of him who maintains that both words refer to Shilo or both words refer to Jerusalem, the verse should say, "to the rest and inheritance."

d. XV:5: Gloss of foregoing. From the perspective of him who says that both words refer to Shilo, there is no problem, for "rest" means, when they rested from the conquest of the land, and "inheritance" refers to dividing the inheritance, as it is said, "And Joshua cast lots for them in Shilo before the Lord, and there Joshua divided the land to the children of Israel according to their divisions" (Jud. 18:10). But from the perspective of the one who maintains that both words refer to Jerusalem, while there is no problem with regard to the word "inheritance," meaning, an eternal inheritance, what is the point of "rest"?

e. XV:6: Gloss of foregoing. From the perspective of him who maintains that both words speak, of Jerusalem, but during the period of Shilo, the high places were permitted, there is no problem in line with the following: "So Manoah took the kid with the meal offering and offered it upon the rock to the Lord" (Jud. 13:19). But from the perspective of him who says that both allude to Shilo, and the high places at that time were forbidden, how can it be that "Manoah took the kid with the meal offering and offered it upon the rock to the Lord" (Jud. 13:19)?

f. XV:7: Gloss of foregoing. The Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael is in accord with R. Simeon b. Yohai, who has said, "Both refer to Jerusalem.

P. ALL THE HOLY THINGS WHICH ONE SANCTIFIED AT THE TIME OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE HIGH PLACES AND OFFERED AT THE TIME OF THE PROHIBITION OF HIGH PLACES OUTSIDE — LO, THESE ARE SUBJECT TO THE TRANSGRESSION OF A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT AND A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT, AND THEY ARE LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT TO EXTIRPATION FOR SACRIFICING OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED PLACE.

IF ONE SANCTIFIED THEM AT THE TIME OF THE PERMISSION OF HIGH PLACES AND OFFERED THEM UP AT THE TIME OF THE PROHIBITION OF HIGH PLACES, LO, THESE

ARE SUBJECT TO TRANSGRESSION OF A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT AND TO A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT, BUT THEY ARE NOT LIABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT TO EXTIRPATION SINCE IF THE OFFERINGS HAD BEEN SACRIFICED WHEN THEY WERE SANCTIFIED, THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATION. IF ONE SANCTIFIED THEM AT THE TIME OF THE PROHIBITION OF HIGH PLACES AND OFFERED THEM UP AT THE TIME OF THE PERMISSION OF HIGH PLACES, LO, THESE ARE SUBJECT TO TRANSGRESSION OF A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT, BUT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A NEGATIVE COMMANDMENT AT ALL.

1. XVI:1: Said R. Kahana, "This statement has been made only with regard to slaughtering the animal as a sacrifice, but as to actually offering it up, one does indeed also incur the penalty of extirpation. What is the scriptural basis for that view? Scripture says, 'And you shall say to them' (Lev. 17: 8), meaning, 'those just now listed.'" Those who have consecrated the animal when the high places were permitted but sacrifice them when they were forbidden.

Q. THESE ARE THE HOLY THINGS OFFERED IN THE TABERNACLE OF GILGAL, NOB, AND GIBEON: HOLY THINGS WHICH WERE SANCTIFIED FOR THE TABERNACLE. OFFERINGS OF THE CONGREGATION ARE OFFERED IN THE TABERNACLE. OFFERINGS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARE OFFERED ON A HIGH PLACE. OFFERINGS OF THE INDIVIDUAL WHICH WERE SANCTIFIED FOR THE TABERNACLE ARE TO BE OFFERED IN THE TABERNACLE. AND IF ONE OFFERED THEM UP ON A HIGH PLACE, HE IS FREE.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HIGH PLACE OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE HIGH PLACE OF THE COMMUNITY? LAYING ON OF HANDS, AND SLAUGHTERING AT THE NORTH OF THE ALTAR, AND PLACING OF THE BLOOD ROUND ABOUT THE ALTAR, AND WAVING, AND BRINGING NEAR.

1. XVII:1: Laying on of hands is not done at a private high place in line with the following verse of Scripture: "before the Lord, and he shall lay his hand" (Lev. 1:3) meaning, a public place of sacrifice. slaughtering at the north of the altar: "And he shall kill at on the side of the altar northward before the Lord" (Lev. 1:11). placing of the blood round about the altar: "And he shall sprinkle the blood round about the altar that is at the door of the tent of meeting" (Lev. 1: 5). waving: "to wave it for a wave offering before the Lord" (Lev. 10:15). bringing near: "The sons of Aaron shall present it before the Lord in front of the altar" (Lev. 6: 7).

R. R. JUDAH SAYS, "THERE IS NO MEAL OFFERING ON A HIGH PLACE BUT THERE IS IN THE TABERNACLE:"

1. XVIII:1: R. Sheshet said, "In the view of him who says, 'A meal offering is presented at the high places,' then fowl also will be offered at the high places, and in the opinion of him who says, 'A meal offering is not presented at the high places,' fowl also are not presented there. Why not? '...and sacrifice them for sacrifices' (Lev. 17: 5) — 'sacrifices,' not meal offerings; 'sacrifices,' not bird offerings."

S. AND THE PRIESTLY SERVICE:

1. XIX:1: Because it is written, “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood on the altar of the Lord at the door of the tent of meeting” (Lev. 17: 6).

T. AND THE WEARING OF GARMENTS OF MINISTRY:

1. XX:1: Because it is written, ““And the priestly vestment shall be upon Aaron and upon his sons to minister in the holy place” (Exo. 28: 4).

U. AND THE USE OF UTENSILS OF MINISTRY:

1. XXI:1: Because it is written, ““The utensils of ministry wherewith they minister in the sanctuary” (Num. 4:12).

V. AND THE SWEET-SMELLING SAVOR:

1. XXII:1: Because it is written, “A sweet savor to the Lord” (Lev. 1: 9).

W. AND THE DIVIDING LINE FOR THE TOSSING OF VARIOUS KINDS OF BLOOD:

1. XXIII:1: Because it is written, ““That the net may reach half way up the altar” (Exo. 27: 5).

X. AND THE RULE CONCERNING THE WASHING OF HANDS AND FEET:

1. XXIV:1: Because it is written, “And when they came near to the altar, they should wash” (Exo. 40:32).

Y. THE DIVIDING LINE FOR THE TOSSING OF VARIOUS KINDS OF BLOOD:

1. XXV:1: Said Rami bar Hama, “The rule just now given pertains only to Holy Things of a public high place that were offered up at a public high place. But in the case of Holy Things of a private high places that were offered up at a public high place, no such line of demarcation was required.”

2. XXV:2: R. Zira raised the following question: “A burnt offering consecrated for a private high place which one brought within and then took out — what is the law? Does the law of the public high place apply, so that it must be brought back in and have its breast and thigh waved before the altar? Do we maintain, since it has entered within, the veils accept it in every respect? Or perhaps, since it has been taken back to the private high place, it has been taken out and the laws of the private high place apply?”

a. XXV:3: Gloss of foregoing.

3. XXV:4: It has been stated: As to slaughtering at a private high place by night — Rab and Samuel — One said, “It is valid.” And the other said, “It is invalid.”

4. XXV:5: It has been stated: A burnt offering prepared at a private high place — Rab said, “It does not require flaying and cutting up.” And R. Yohanan said, “It does require flaying and cutting up.”

Z. BUT THE MATTERS OF TIME, AND REMNANT, AND UNCLEANNES ARE APPLICABLE BOTH HERE AND THERE:

1. XXVI:1: Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: How on do we know that the consideration of time pertains to both a private and a public high place? For one might propose that the Torah has said that meat that is kept overnight is to be burned, and meat that is taken out of its permitted area is to be burned. Just as

meat that is taken outside in the case of a private high place is fit, so meat that is kept overnight at a private high place is fit.

Points of Structure

1. DOES BABYLONIAN TALMUD-TRACTATE ZEBAHIM FOLLOW A COHERENT OUTLINE GOVERNED BY A CONSISTENT RULES?

The remarkable consistencies of organization of the Talmud-tractate leave no doubt that the compilers intended to formulate a point-by-point commentary to the Mishnah, explaining, first, the scriptural foundations of the Mishnah's law, and, second, the meanings of words and phrases of the Mishnah; they further raised generalizing questions of inference and principle, yielding the demonstration of the fundamental coherence of the laws to a few, governing principles. The tractate also encompasses a handful of sizable composites that serve as inventories of data deemed relevant supplements to a given topic.

2. WHAT ARE THE SALIENT TRAITS OF ITS STRUCTURE?

Throughout the pattern is simple and uniform: Mishnah-commentary, secondary inquiry into broader, governing principles; tertiary amplification of detail. To underscore the uniformity of the document, we note that at not a single point is the given protocol reversed or even revised; we never find secondary generalization prior to Mishnah-commentary; we never find tertiary amplification of tangential detail prior to the inquiry into inference and coherence.

3. WHAT IS THE RATIONALITY OF THE STRUCTURE?

What dictates to the compilers that a given composition or composite must be located in one place and not in some other then is the requirements of a systematic Mishnah-commentary. And, we must also take note, the Mishnah's statements form the provocation for the analysis of inference and coherence; only if the Mishnah contains no pertinent materials, but the Tosefta does, or, the Tosefta does not, but some other (to us unavailable) compilation of Tannaite formulations does, will the analysis of inference and implicit principle proceed to some other than a Mishnaic or a Toseftan statement. So, it must follow, the generative hermeneutics of the Talmud, so far as that hermeneutics governs the rational organization of the whole, derives from the initial decision to accord to the Mishnah the privileged position. That is to say, the privileging of the Mishnah explains the coherence of the whole not only in a formal, but in a substantive sense. The character of the Mishnah accounts for the program of the Talmud, not only for its formal organization of its completed units of thought. The very character of the larger part of these completed units of thought derives from the initial problematic of the document as a whole: *if the Mishnah* — then why this? or: *if the Mishnah*, then what else? or: *if the Mishnah*, then what about..." This tractate requires us to recognize that the rationality of the structure of the document, which we have seen vividly portrayed by this outline of the whole, infuses the rationality of the thought-processes that generate the document's own compositions and the composites formed thereof.

4. WHERE ARE THE POINTS OF IRRATIONALITY IN THE STRUCTURE?

The stated definition of the document's principles of order and inner coherence must then define as irrational a large and consequential composite that entirely ignores the program and the proposition of the Mishnah. By that criterion I see these at IV.E; IV.I; V.B; VIII.B; XVIII.E; XXIV.B; XXXIII.C; LVII.D; LX.B.

Points of System

1. DOES THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD-TRACTATE ZEBAHIM SERVE ONLY AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE MISHNAH-TRACTATE OF THE SAME NAME?

This Talmud-tractate ignores a sizable sector of the Mishnah-tractate, the framers not having found themselves constrained to say something about everything. If we could identify traits common to all the ignored segments of the Mishnah, we might formulate an explanation for this somewhat odd fact. But I see no such shared traits, and, as a matter of fact, some of the ignored passages prove weighty and formidable in both size and intellectual substance. That the Talmud is much more, and also much less, than a Mishnah-commentary is therefore the established fact.

2. HOW DO THE TOPICAL COMPOSITES FIT INTO THE TALMUD-TRACTATE AND WHAT DO THEY CONTRIBUTE THAT THE MISHNAH-TRACTATE OF THE SAME NAME WOULD LACK WITHOUT THEM?

But it is a fact that the following data do not permit us to explain. For we shall now see that most of the composites of size and consequence that find their way into our Talmud form mere topical appendices. While themselves quite unrelated to the Mishnah in topic, all the more so proposition (if any), they provide a mass of information congruent with statements that are required for Mishnah-exegesis or amplification. I present at the right hand column those composites that present mere topical composites, relevant to the context in which they are located in the wholly formal way just now suggested. At the left I catalogue those composites that make substantive and original statements of their own.

IV.E: Topical Appendix on the
Rules Governing the Priestly Garments

IV.I: Topical Appendix
on the religious duty of
sanctifying hands and feet by washing

V.B: Topical Appendix:
Other Rules on the Collection and
Disposition of the Blood of Sacrificial Beasts

VIII.B: A Topical Appendix:
Forming the Requisite Volume to Incur a Penalty:
The Joining Together of Distinct Half-Olive's Bulks
Subjected to Improper Intentionality

XVII.E: When Do Cases Form a Series:
Systematic Analysis of the proposition that
that which is derived on the basis
of a verbal analogy does not in turn go
and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy;
and other principles of the Construction of a Series

XXIV.B: Comparing the Altars at Shilo,
the First Temple and the Second Temple.
The Character of the Second Temple and its Altar

XXXIII.C: Resolving Matters of Doubt
Concerning the Confusion of Permitted and
Forbidden Objects, with Special Attention
to Idolatry and Priestly Rations

LVII.D. The Disposition of the Priests' Food
in a Time of Bereavement:
With a Topical Appendix on the Priesthood of Moses

LX.B. Topical Composite: Keeping Overnight
Bullocks that Are to be Burned
Some Theoretical Problems

The picture is clear. XVII.E forms a powerful and original, sustained and compelling analysis of when cases form series, and how we are to derive from a sequence of cases a general rule. That problem of that composite is framed in terms of the exegetical requirements of a passage of our tractate's Mishnah-commentary, but the critical and generative issue concerns only the rules of sequential exegesis out of which all else flows. The details prove congruent to our tractate, but the fundamental issue vastly transcends it. The upshot is that our tractate is untouched by this magnificent exercise, even though the basic point, that rules derive from proper, that is, serial exegesis of Scripture, is underscored. But, it is clear, that truism (practically a platitude) does not provoke the inquiry, does not sustain it, and does not find important, fresh validation from it. And XXXIII.C need not detain us, since it is an inquiry common to any number of tractates and important here only because of the particular subject matter that serves as the example for analysis. These two free-standing composites in no way change our understanding of the topic and propositions of our Mishnah-tractate, nor do they vastly revise our grasp of the Talmud's Mishnah-exegesis either. So far as I can see, neither one materially changes the character of our tractate.

3. CAN WE STATE WHAT THE COMPILERS OF THIS DOCUMENT PROPOSE TO ACCOMPLISH IN PRODUCING THIS COMPLETE, ORGANIZED PIECE OF WRITING?

Some tractates say what the Mishnah says and clarify details, exemplified by Bavli-tractate Megillah. Other tractates so revise the topical program attached to the Mishnah-tractate subject to discussion as to impart to the Mishnah an entirely new meaning, to allow the Mishnah to make a quite fresh and profound statement, exemplified by Bavli-tractate Moed Qatan. But here we have a huge tractate that provides little more than a reprise of what the Mishnah says. And yet, the net effect of studying the tractate, beginning to end, defies the claim that all we have is a Mishnah-commentary.

For after all is said and done, our Mishnah-tractate does emerge vastly revised by the Talmud's re-presentation. The Mishnah-tractate has taken on entirely new layers of depth and meaning; it has been shown more profound and more complex in its substrate of thought, in its interior structure of logic and principle, in its interconnection with the written Torah. While the Mishnah-tractate speaks through the Talmud, so that the points that the Mishnah's authors wished to make register once more, the Talmud has so amplified the Mishnah's voice, so refined its timber, so redirected its lines of thought, as to

accomplish more than a process of clarification or even expansion. The privileging of the Mishnah, illustrated in a tractate that, as we have seen in this enormous outline, does little more than say again what the Mishnah said before, but say it in a fuller manner, has yielded a statement that, in the end, the Mishnah's own authors will have found jarring. These results open more questions than they settle.