

IV.

BAVLI TRACTATE NAZIR CHAPTER FOUR

FOLIOS 20B-30B

4:1-2

4:1

- A. He who said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his friends heard and said, “Me too,” “Me too,” “Me too” —
- B. all of them are Nazirites.
- C. If the vow of the first was declared not binding, the vows of all of them are deemed not binding.
- D. [If the vow of the] last of them was declared not binding, the last of them is not bound, but all the rest of them remain bound.
- E. If he said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his friend heard and said, “Let my mouth be like his mouth, and my hair like his hair,” lo, this one is a Nazirite [= M. 1:1A].
- F. [If he said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his wife heard and said, “Me too” —
- G. he [has the power to] release her vow, but his stands.
- H. [If the wife said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and her husband heard and said, “Me too,” he cannot release [her vow].

4:2

- A. “Lo, I am a Nazirite, — and you?”
- B. and she said, “Amen” —
- C. If he releases hers, his is null.
- D. [If she said] “Lo, I am a Nazirite, and you?”
- E. and he said, “Amen” —
- F. he has not got the power to release her vow.

I.1 A. *R. Simeon b. Laqish went into session before R. Judah the Patriarch, and in session stated, “[The Nazirite vow takes effect when one says, ‘Me too,’] only when they make their vow within the brief span of time sufficient for continuing a conversation. And how much is such ‘an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation’? Enough time to greet someone. And how long is that span of time? It is the time that a disciple takes to greet his master [‘Peace to you, my lord’].”*

- B. *He said to him, “Then you don’t leave space for a disciple [to greet the master and also to say, ‘me too’].”*
- C. **[21A]** *It has been taught on Tannaite authority along the same lines:*
- D. **He who said, “Lo, I am a Nazir,” and then hesitated for a time sufficient for a break in conversation, and his friend heard and said, “And me too” [M. Naz. 4:1A-B] — he is bound [by the oath], but his friend is not bound by it. And how long is a time sufficient for a break in conversation? Sufficient time to ask after someone’s welfare [T. 3:2A-E].**
- E. *May one say that the following supports his position: He who said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his friends heard and said, “Me too,” “Me too,” — and no more? [The fact that there can be no more shows only two can join the chain.]*
- F. *Is the Tannaite framer of the passage like a peddler, adding things up as he goes along?*
- G. *Then let him formulate the passage with only a single case, and we may infer the rest!*
- H. *Indeed, he could have done so, but it is because the later clause required the language, If the vow of the first was declared not binding, the vows of all of them are deemed not binding. [If the vow of the] last of them was declared not binding, the last of them is not bound, but all the rest of them remain bound, it yields the inference that there are cases in between, so he mentions “me too” twice in the opening clause.*

- I.2 A.** *The question was raised: [when we invoke the criterion, the statement has to be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation,] does that mean, one speaking immediately following upon the immediately preceding one, in such an interval of time, or all of them within an interval of time following the statement of the initial speaker?*
- B. *So what difference does it make?*
- C. *Whether the process can go on without limit. If you take the view that the statement has to be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation involving one speaking immediately upon the conclusion of the one before him, then the process can go on infinitely. But if you maintain that all of the statements have to be made within the interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation involving only the initial speaker, then the one who speaks first after the initial statement is subject to the vow, but the others are not subject to that initial vow. So what is the law?*
- D. **Come and take note: He who said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his friends heard and said, “Me too,” “Me too,” — and no more. That yields the implication, the statement must be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation involving the initial speaker. For if you should imagine that the statement of each must be made within the specified interval in conversation with**

*the immediately prior one, then the Tannaite framer of the passage should have included many more “**Me too**”-statements!*

- E. *Is the Tannaite framer of the passage like a peddler, adding things up as he goes along?*
- F. *Then let him formulate the passage with only a single case, and we may infer the rest?*
- G. *Since he planned to frame the Tannaite statement later in with the language, **If the vow of the first was declared not binding, the vows of all of them are deemed not binding. [If the vow of the] last of them was declared not binding, the last of them is not bound, but all the rest of them remain bound,** it yields the inference that there are cases in between, so he mentions “me too” twice in the opening clause. And on that account he refers twice in the opening clause to “**Me too**.”*
- H. *Come and take note: **If the vow of the first was declared not binding, the vows of all of them are deemed not binding.** The first is the one who is released, lo, the one in the middle is not released. That yields the implication, the statement must be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation involving the initial speaker.*
- I. *I may say to you: in point of fact the statement must be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation with the subsequent participants in succession, but since he wanted to use as the Tannaite formulation, **the vows of all of them are deemed not binding,** and if he made that statement in the context of the intermediate one, there would have remained the initial party who had not been released, he preferred to make the reference to the first of those in sequence.*
- J. *Come and take note: **[If the vow of the] last of them was declared not binding, the last of them is not bound, but all the rest of them remain bound.** [So the point is, because] there are no others following him, but the middle one, after whom there is another, is released. That yields the inference, the statement must be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation with the immediately preceding speaker in sequence.*
- K. *In point of fact, I may say to you: the rule is, the statement must be made within an interval of time sufficient for continuing a conversation only with the first speaker in the sequence, and what is the meaning of **the last of them**? It is, those in the intermediate positions in the sequence, but, because he uses the language of **the first**, he uses the language of **the last**.*
- L. *Come and take note of that which has been explicitly taught on Tannaite authority:*
- M. *If the vow of the first of them was declared not binding, the vows of all of them are deemed not binding. Of the vow of the last of them is deemed not binding, he is released, but all the rest of them are subject to a binding vow. If the vow of the one in the middle is released, from him and onward the vows are released, from him and upward, the vows are still binding.*
- N. *Now that formulation bears the clear implication that the statement of each must be made within a span of time sufficient for continuing a conversation with his fellow in sequence.*

O. *That leaves no doubt whatsoever.*

II.1 A. If he said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and his friend heard and said, “Let my mouth be like his mouth, and my hair like his hair,” lo, this one is a Nazirite:

B. *Merely because he says, “Let my mouth be like his mouth, and my hair like his hair,” should it be the fact that lo, this one is a Nazirite?!*

C. **[21B]** *And an objection was raised as follows: [If he said], “Let my hand be like his hand.” “My foot like his foot,” lo, this one is a Nazir. [If he said], “My hand is a Nazir,” “My foot is a Nazir,” he is not a Nazir. “My head is a Nazir,” “My liver is a Nazir,” — lo, this one is a Nazir. This is the general principle: [If he spoke of] something upon which life depends, he is a Nazir. [If he spoke of] something on which life does not depend, he is not a Nazir [T. 3:3C-F].*

D. Said R. Judah, “[*The rule of the Mishnah takes for granted that*] he has said this: ‘Let my mouth be as his mouth as to wine, and my hair as his hair as to shearing.’”

III.1 A. [If the wife said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and her husband heard and said, “Me too,” he cannot release [her vow]:

B. *The question was raised: does the husband utterly uproot the vow, as if it had never taken place, or does he merely terminate the vow [from that time forward]?*

C. *What difference does it make?*

D. *The difference it makes is to the case of a woman who took a vow as a Nazirite, whose friend heard and said, “Me too,” and whose husband [the husband of the first woman] heard and released her vow. Now, if you take the view that the husband completely uproots the vow as though it had never been, then the second party also is released from her vow. But if you say that he merely terminates the effect of the vow from that point forward, then while the wife is released, her friend is still bound by the Nazirite vow.*

E. *What, then, is the law?*

F. **Come and take note:** [If the wife said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and her husband heard and said, “Me too,” he cannot release [her vow]. *Now if you should imagine that the power of the husband is merely to terminate the vow from that point forward, then let him release her vow, while he remains bound. [He terminates the vow for her but cannot affect his own situation, since his power is only for the future.] Then it must be inferred [that he cannot do so] because the husband utterly uproots the wife’s vow as though it had never been [Klien: and he cannot declare his wife’s vow void, for by doing so, he would incidentally retract his own vow, which is forbidden].*

G. *No, in point of fact, he merely terminates the vow from that point forward. And in strict logic he should be able to release her vow, and here is the reason that he cannot release her vow: since he has said to her, “me too,” he is as one who has said to her, “It is confirmed for you.” If then he seeks to have his confirmation of the wife’s vow released by a sage, he can then declare the wife’s vow void, but otherwise he cannot do so.*

H. **Come and take note:** A woman who took a vow to be a Nazirite and set aside her beast [for the required sacrifice], but afterward her husband released her vow for her — now if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to him, it goes

forth and pastures in the corral. But if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to her, the animal designated as a sin offering is left to die. And the animal designated as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering. And the animal designated as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering. It is eaten for one day [like a Nazir's peace offering], but it does not require bread offering, [unlike a Nazir's offering] [M. 4:4A-D]. Now if you should imagine that the husband utterly uproots the vow as though it had never been, then why should the animal not go forth to the status of an unconsecrated beast! So is it not to be inferred that the husband merely terminates the effect of the vow of Naziriteship from that time forward?

- I. *No, in point of fact, I may say to you: the husband truly does uproot the vow as though it had never been, and this is the operative consideration in the present case: since she no longer requires an atonement offering, the beast is classified as a beast designated as a sin-offering, the owner of which has died, and we have learned, An animal designated as a sin offering the owner of which has died is left to die.*
- J. *Come and take note: A woman who took a vow as a Nazirite but nonetheless went around drinking wine and contracting corpse uncleanness — lo, this one receives forty stripes [M. 4:3A-B]. Now how are we to imagine such a case? If it is a case in which the husband has not released her vow, then is it necessary to state such a law? [Obviously not, since it is an established fact.] Rather, it is self-evident, we deal with a case in which the husband has released the vow for her. Now, if you should imagine that the husband utterly uproots the vow of Naziriteship, as though it had never been, then why should she be flogged? So does the law not bear the implication that the power of the husband is merely to terminate the vow from that point onward?*
- K. *No, in point of fact, I may say to you: the husband truly does uproot the vow as though it had never been, but in this case, because of the language that follows, If] her husband released the vow for her, but she did not know that her husband had released it for her and nonetheless continued to go around drinking wine and contracting corpse uncleanness, she does not receive forty stripes, [22A] the framer of the passage also makes reference to the obvious fact in the opening clause, lo, this one receives forty stripes.*
- L. *Come and take note: A woman who took the vow of a Nazirite and contracted corpse uncleanness, and then her husband nullified her vow, has nonetheless to bring a sin-offering of a bird, but not the burnt-offering of a bird. Now if you take the view that the power of the husband is merely to terminate the vow from that point forward, she ought also to present a burnt offering of fowl.*
- M. *Then what?! Do you think that the husband has the power utterly to uproot the oath as a Nazirite as though it had never been? Then she also should not have to present a sin offering of fowl!*
- N. *Well, that's precisely the law. But what we have here is the schismatic view of R. Eleazar Haqqappar, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eleazar Haqqappar beRibbi says, "Why does Scripture say, 'And make atonement for him for he has sinned against the soul' (Num. 6:11) — against what soul has this one sinned? But he has caused himself distress by not drinking wine. And it yields an*

argument a fortiori: if this one, who has caused himself distress merely by not drinking wine, is called a sinner, he who causes himself distress by not benefiting from any [of this world's goods] — all the more so!"

- O. *Come and take note of that which has been explicitly taught on Tannaite authority: The woman who took a vow and her girl-friend heard and said, "And me too," and afterward the husband of this one [who originally took the vow] came and released it for her — she is not bound by her vow, but her girl-friend is bound by it [T. 3:10A-B]. That yields the inference: the husband terminates the effect of the vow but does not utterly uproot it as though it had never been.*
- P. **R. Simeon says, "If she [the girl-friend] has said, 'Also I intended only to be like her,' then both of them are not bound by the vow" [T. 3:10A-C].**
- Q. **[22B]** *Mar Zutra b. R. Mari said, "This question [of whether the vow of the second woman is binding depends not on the husband's declaration that the vow is void but on the alternatives set forth in the question] raised by R. Ami bar Hama, for . R. Ami bar Hama raised the question as follows: If he said, 'Lo, it is unto me like meat of a peace-offering' what is the rule? [The meat of the offering could not be eaten before the blood was sprinkled on the altar; it could be eaten afterwards.] When the man makes his statement, does he speak with reference to the original condition of that of which he speaks, or does he speak of the final condition of that of which he speaks? [Before the sprinkling, the meat is forbidden; afterward, it may be eaten. Similarly in the case of the second woman: did she contemplate the original state of the first woman, so she is a Nazirite, or did she consider the possibility of the husband's declaring the vow void, when her own would also become void? In R. Ami's case, the original state was meant and the food is forbidden (Klien).]*
- R. *But are the cases truly comparable? In that case, since the man has said, "Lo, that food is to me like the meat of peace offerings," then, even though once the blood is sprinkled, it may be eaten outside the Temple boundaries, still it remains sanctified. In our case, on the other hand, if we take the position that the woman has in mind the final state of affairs, then the husband of the first woman has declared the vow void [Klien: and the vow of the second will not operate. But she must have meant something by the vow. We therefore are forced to conclude that she had only the original state in mind. Thus the solution of this problem affords no clue to the solution of R. Ami's problem.]*
- S. *There are those who say, in point of fact, this is certainly the same as the problem of R. Ami bar Hama. [Klien: they do not consider the distinction drawn above decisive, for the woman may have considered it sufficient if she abstained from wine until the husband of the first one declared the vow void, and so once more we have two alternatives.]*

III.2 A. *If a woman said to her, "Lo, I am a Nazirite in your path" [and then the vow of the original woman who took the Nazirite vow was released], what is the law? Does "in your path" mean, the whole way, and so she is released from the vow as the original woman is? or does "in your path" mean, prior to your husband's releasing the vow, so she is still bound by the vow?*

- B. *Come and take note: [If the wife said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” and her husband heard and said, “Me too,” he cannot release [her vow]. Now, if it should enter your mind that when he said to her, “Lo, I am [a Nazirite] in your path,” it is the original situation that he has in mind, [and he himself is not affected by any change in her vow (Klien)], then let him release her from the vow in her regard and confirm the vow in his own regard? Does this not then bear the implication that he has in mind the entire matter, and therefore it is only in his own regard that he cannot release the vow. But where another woman says, “I am a Nazirite in your path,” she would also be freed from the vow [when the husband nullifies the wife’s vow, to which the second woman made reference]?*
- C. *Not at all. In fact he has in mind the situation that prevails to begin with, but here, when he says, “Me too,” it is as though he says, “I confirm the vow for you,” and if he turns to a sage to have his confirmation nullified, he will be able to release her vow, but not otherwise.*

- IV.1** A. **“Lo, I am a Nazirite, — and you?” and she said, “Amen” — if he releases hers, his is null. [If she said] “Lo, I am a Nazirite, and you?” and he said, “Amen” — he has not got the power to release her vow:**
- B. *By way of contradiction: He who says to his wife, “Lo, I am a Nazir, and if you are ?” If she said, “Yes,” both of them are bound by his oath. And if not, both of them are not bound, because he makes his vow contingent upon her vow [T. 3:4(5)F-H].*
- C. *Said R. Judah, “Repeat the Tannaite formulation as, He can release her vow, but his remains valid.”*
- D. *Abbaye said, “You may even preserve the formulation as it is initially presented in a Tannaite formulation. The external tradition [as set forth in the Tosefta] deals with a case in which he said to her, ‘Lo, I shall be a Nazirite with you,’ in which case he has made his Nazirite vow contingent upon her Nazirite vow. [23A] Our Mishnah’s version, by contrast, deals with a case in which he said to her, ‘Lo, I shall be a Nazirite, and how about you?’ On this account, he may release hers while his is confirmed [his vow being independent of hers].”*

4:3

- A. **A woman who took a vow as a Nazirite but nonetheless went around drinking wine and contracting corpse uncleanness —**
- B. **lo, this one receives forty stripes.**
- C. **If her husband released the vow for her, but she did not know that her husband had released it for her and nonetheless continued to go around drinking wine and contracting corpse uncleanness,**
- D. **she does not receive forty stripes.**
- E. **R. Judah says, “If she does not receive forty stripes, nonetheless, she should receive punishment for disobedience.”**

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. *“Her husband has made them void and the Lord shall forgive her” (Num. 30:13) —*
- C. *Of whom does Scripture speak? It speaks of a woman who took a vow to be a Nazirite, and. her husband annulled the vow for her, but she did not know*

that her husband had annulled it for her and nonetheless continued to go around drinking wine and contracting corpse uncleanness [M. Naz. 4:3C], for she requires atonement and forgiveness.”

Topical Appendix on the Theme of Intentionality

- D. When R. Aqiba would come to this verse, he wept, saying, “If someone intended to eat ham and really had in hand veal, yet the Torah has said that he requires atonement and forgiveness, one who intends to eat ham and really had in hand ham — all the more so!”
- E. Along these same lines: “Though he knew it not, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity” (Lev. 5:17) —
- F. [when R. Aqiba would come to this verse of Scripture, he would weep:] “If someone intended to eat veal and really had in hand pork, for example, a piece of permitted fat and forbidden fat, yet the Torah has said, ‘Though he knew it not, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity,’ one who really did intend to eat pork and actually had in hand pork [b. Qid. 81a: forbidden fat and had in hand forbidden fat] — all the more so [is he guilty]!”
- G. Issi b. Judah says, “‘Though he knew it not, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity’ (Lev. 5:17) — now if someone who intended to bring up in his hand lamb meat but brought up in his hand pig meat, for example, two pieces of fat, one of forbidden fat and the other of permitted fat, ‘he shall bear his iniquity,’ then one who intended to bring up in hand pork and brought up pork, all the more so for such a thing as this [that we are sinful even not by intent] let all those who are mournful mourn.”
- H. *What need to I have for all these cases?*
- I. *Had the Tannaite authority stated the matter with reference to the woman, I might have supposed that in that case in particular, she requires atonement and forgiveness, for to begin with, she intended to violate a prohibition. But where we have a piece of fat that is possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat, in which case there is no intention of violating a prohibition, there should be no requirement of atonement and forgiveness.*
- J. *And had the matter been stated with reference to one of the cases in which there is a clear prohibition present, but not with reference to the case of the woman whose husband had released her from her vow, in which case she was dealing with what was in any event permitted, I might have wrongly supposed that she ought not to have required atonement and forgiveness.*
- K. *And had the matter been stated with reference to these two matters, I might have supposed that it is in these two cases in particular that it suffices with atonement and forgiveness, since there is no confirmed prohibition in play, but in the matter of the two pieces of fat, one forbidden and one permitted, where there is certainly something forbidden in play, atonement and forgiveness would not suffice. So, in all, we are informed that there is no difference among any of these situations.*

- I.2 A.** *Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan, “What is the meaning of the verse of Scripture, ‘For the paths of the Lord are straight, that the righteous shall pass along them, but the transgressors will stumble in them’ (Hos. 14:10)? The matter may be compared to the case of two men who roasted their Passover offerings. One of them ate it for the sake of performing the religious duty, and the other one ate it to stuff himself with a big meal. The one who ate it for the sake of performing a religious duty — ‘the righteous shall pass along them.’ And as to the one who ate it to stuff himself with a big meal — ‘but the transgressors will stumble in them’”*
- B. *Said to him R. Simeon b. Laqish, “But do you really call him a wicked person? Granted that he did not carry out a religious duty in the best possible way, still, has he not eaten his Passover offering as he is supposed to? Rather, the matter may be compared to the case of two men. This one has his wife and sister with him in the house, and that one has his wife and his sister with him in the house [in the darkness of the night]. One of them had a sexual encounter with his wife, while the other had a sexual encounter with his sister. The one who had the sexual encounter with his wife — ‘the righteous shall pass along them.’ And as to the one who had a sexual encounter with his sister.— ‘but the transgressors will stumble in them’”*
- C. *But are the cases comparable to the verse of Scripture? Scripture speaks of a single path in which righteous and wicked walk, but here there are two paths [one being legal the other not]. Rather, the matter may be compared to the case of Lot and his two daughters. Those who had sexual relations to carry out a religious duty [to be fruitful and multiply] — “the righteous shall pass along them.” And as to the one who had sexual relations in order to perform a transgression — “but the transgressors will stumble in them”*
- D. *But maybe he too had in mind to fulfill the commandment?*

Subset on Lot and Abraham

- I.3 A.** *Said R. Yohanan, “The entire verse of Scripture is formulated to express the intention of committing a transgression, as it is said, ‘And Lot lifted his eyes and saw the entire plain of the Jordan that it was well watered’ (Gen. 13:10).*
- F. *“[The sense of ‘lifted’ derives from, ‘And his master’s wife lifted her eyes toward Joseph and said, Lay with me’ (Gen. 39: 7).*
- G. *“‘...his eyes...’ ‘And Samson said, Take her for me, as she is beautiful in my eyes’ (Jud. 14: 3).*
- H. *“‘And saw...’ ‘And Shekhem, son of Hamor...saw her and took her and lay with her and abused her’ (Gen. 34: 2).*
- I. *“‘the entire plain of the Jordan...’ ‘For a whore can be had for the price of a loaf of bread’ (Pro. 6: 3-26). [The Hebrew words for plain and loaf being the same.]*
- J. *“‘that it was well watered...’ ‘I will go after my lovers, who provide my bread and water, my wool and flax, my oil and my drink’ (Hos. 2: 7).”*

- K. *But wasn't he drunk anyhow, so he really was forced into the act!*
- L. *A Tannaite statement in the name of R. Yosé b. R. Honi, "Why are there dots about the word 'and' in the verse, 'and when the elder daughter arose' (Gen. 19:33)? It tells you that when she lay down with him, he didn't know what was going on, but when she got up, he knew."*
- M. *So what was he supposed to do? What was was.*
- N. *The point is that the next night, he shouldn't have gotten drunk [so as to get involved with the younger daughter].*

I.4 A. Raba expounded, "What is the meaning of the verse of Scripture: 'A brother offended the mighty city, [23B] and contention is like the bars of a castle' (Pro. 18:19)?"

- B. "'A brother offended the mighty city:' this refers to Lot, who took his leave from Abraham in order to sin with his daughters.
- C. "'and contention is like the bars of a castle:' by siring Moab and Ben Ammi with his daughters, Lot made contention between Israel and Amon, 'Neither an Amonite [driving from Ben Ammi] nor a Moabite shall come into the community of the Lord' (Deu. 23: 4)."

I.5 A. *Raba, or some say, R. Isaac, expounded, "What is the meaning of the verse of Scripture: 'To lust is a separatist drawn, and of any wisdom will he be contemptuous' (Pro. 18: 1)?"*

- B. "'To lust is a separatist drawn:' this refers to Lot, who took his leave from Abraham.
- C. "'and of any wisdom will be contemptuous:' for his shame was revealed in synagogues and in houses of study, *as we have learned in the Mishnah: The male Ammonite and Moabite are prohibited [from entering the congregation of the Lord (Deu. 23: 4)], and the prohibition concerning them is forever [M. Yeb. 8:3].*"

I.6 A. Said Ulla, "Tamar committed an act of prostitution, and Zimri committed an act of prostitution.

- B. "Tamar committed an act of prostitution, and there went forth from her kings and prophets.
- C. "Zimri committed an act of prostitution, and how many myriads of Israel fell in consequence."

Reverting to the Topic of Intentionality

I.7 A. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, "A transgression committed for its own sake, in a sincere spirit, is greater in value than a religious duty carried out not for its own sake, but in a spirit of insincerity.

- B. *But is this really true that a transgression committed for its own sake, in a sincere spirit, is greater in value than a religious duty carried out not for its own sake, but in a spirit of insincerity. And did not R. Judah say Rab said, "A person should always be occupied in study of the Torah and in practice of the commandments, even if this is not for its own sake [but in a spirit of insincerity], for out of doing*

these things not for their own sake, a proper spirit of doing them for their own sake will emerge”?

- C. Say: it is equivalent to doing them not for their own sake.
- D. “For it is said, ‘May Yael, wife of Hever the Kenite, be blessed above women, above women in the tent may she be blessed’ (Jud. 5:24).
- E. “*Now who are these women in the tent?* They are none other than Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah.” [The murder she committed gained more merit than the matriarchs great deeds.]
- F. [As to Sisera, whom Yael killed,] said R. Yohanan, “That wicked man at that time had sexual relations with her seven times: ‘Between her legs he knelt, dropped and lay, between her legs he knelt, dropped, and as he knelt there, he fell exhausted’ (Jud. 5:27).”
- G. *Well, then, she must have had a great time from the sin!*
- H. Said R. Yohanan in the name of R. Simeon b. Yohai, “Even an act of pleasure deriving from a wicked man is disgusting to the righteous, as it is said, ‘Be careful in speaking with Jacob neither bad nor good’ (Gen. 31:29) — *now there is no problem understanding why he should not speak in a bad way, but why not in a good way? But does not the inference follow, whatever good he does is evil.*”
- I. *That proves the point.*

I.8 A. [Reverting to the body of the foregoing:] Said R. Judah said Rab, “A person should always be occupied in study of the Torah and in practice of the commandments, even if this is not for its own sake [but in a spirit of insincerity], for out of doing these things not for their own sake, a proper spirit of doing them for their own sake will emerge.”

- B. For as a reward for the forty-two offerings that were presented by the wicked Balak to force Balaam to curse Israel, he was deemed worthy that Ruth should descend from him.
- C. For said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “Ruth was the granddaughter of Eglon, the grandson of Balak, king of Moab.”
- D. [With regard to the name, Moab, meaning, “from father,”] said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, “How do we know that the Holy One, blessed be he, does not hold back the reward even for so minor a matter as fastidious speech? *From this point, for note that the first born called her son Moab, so the All-Merciful said to Moses, ‘Do not contend with Moab or engage them in battle’ (Deu. 2: 9). So they may not do battle with them, but they may harass them in other ways. But in the case of the younger daughter, who called her son, ‘Ben Ammi’ (son of my people), the All-Merciful said, ‘When you draw near the children of Amon, do not contend with them and do not engage them’ (Deu. 2:19) — in any way at all, even by harassing them.*”
- E. Said R. Hiyya bar Abin said R. Joshua b. Qorha, “A person should always get to carry out a religious duty first, for as a reward for the one night that the first born took over the younger daughter, **[24A]** she gained *zekhut* such that her descendants would precede those

of her sister to Israel's kingship by four generations" [Oved, Jesse, David, and Solomon; the first Amonite to ascend the throne was Rehoboam, Solomon's son by an Amonite woman].

4:4

- A. A woman who took a vow to be a Nazirite and set aside her beast [for the required sacrifice], but afterward her husband released her vow for her —
 - B. now if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to him,
 - C. it goes forth and pastures in the corral.
 - D. But if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to her,
 - E. the animal designated as a sin offering is left to die. And the animal designated as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering. And the animal designated as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering. It is eaten for one day [like a Nazir's peace offering], but it does not require bread offering, [unlike a Nazir's offering].
 - F. [Now if] she had coins that she had not designated for any specific purpose, they fall to a free-will offering.
 - G. [If the] coins [were] designated [for a specific purpose] —
 - H. those designated for a sin offering are to go off to the Dead Sea.
 - I. They are not available for benefit, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them.
 - J. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering.
 - K. And they are subject to the laws of sacrilege.
 - L. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used [for the bringing of a peace offering].
 - M. And [the animal] is eaten for one day and does not require a bread offering.
- I.1** A. *What Tannaite authority takes the position that the husband is not obligated for his wife's offerings [so that if she sets aside the husband's animals without his authorization, they are not sanctified, B-C]?*
- B. *Said R. Hisda, "It is rabbis [in dispute with Judah, and not Judah, as will be explained], for if it should enter your mind that it is R. Judah, then why should the beast go forth and pasture in the corral? Lo, he is obligated to her [for the required offerings]!"*
 - C. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah said, "A man [of means] brings in behalf of his wife the offering of a rich man [in accord with his means, not hers] and all the offerings that she owes, even if she ate prohibited fat, or even if she desecrated the Sabbath, for thus does he write for her in her marriage contract: 'And obligations that you owe will be mine from before up to now'" [T. Ket. 4:11A-D].*
 - D. *Raba said, "You may even say it is R. Judah. When he maintains that the husband is obligated to her, it is in respect to a matter that is essential to her, but as to a matter that is not essential to her, he does not take that view."*
 - E. *There are those who frame matters in the following way:*

- F. *What Tannaite authority takes the position that the husband is not obligated for his wife's offerings [so that if she sets aside the husband's animals without his authorization, they are not sanctified, B-C]?*
- B. *Said R. Hisda, "It is R. Judah. And where the husband is obligated to the wife, it is in connection with a matter that is essential to her, but as to a matter that is not essential to her, he is not so obligated. But as to the view of rabbis vis à vis Judah, the husband is not obligated to her in any way at all. [She therefore could not designate a beast as consecrated for her purposes.]"*
- G. *Then how are we to conceive a case [pertinent to the Mishnah, which has the animals sent to pasture only if the husband releases her vow, so if he does not release the vow, the animals are sanctified] is one in which the husband has assigned possession of the animals to her. And since he has assigned her title to the beast, it belongs to her [and the Mishnah's case is then clear].*
- H. **[24B]** *Raba said, "You may even say that the Mishnah represents the position of rabbis. For when he assigns title to her, it is title to something that is essential to her, but as to something not essential to her, he does not transfer title. [Klien: The transference is thus provisional, and this case is not the same as that of the second clause.]"*

II.1 A. But if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to her, the animal designated as a sin offering is left to die. And the animal designated as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering:

- B. *Well, how in the world has she gotten title to the beast that it should belong to her, since, after all, whatever a woman acquires becomes the property of her husband!*
- C. *Said R. Pappa, "It is a case of her saving the funds from her housekeeping budget."*
- D. *If you prefer, I shall say: a third party assigned title over the beast to her with the stipulation, "On condition that your husband has no domain in the beast."*

III.1 A. And the animal designated as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering:

Free-standing Analysis of a Problem, inserted because the Solution Intersects with our Mishnah-Paragraph

- B. *Said Samuel to Abbuha bar Ihi, "You are not to take your seat until you explain the following matter: These are the four ram-offerings that do not require loaves along with the offering: his, hers, those after death, and those after atonement [an animal was lost, replaced so atonement was accomplished with another, and then found]."*
- C. *[Here is the answer:] "Hers" is the one to which we have just now made reference [that is, our Mishnah-paragraph: **A woman who took a vow to be a Nazirite and set aside her beast [for the required sacrifice], but afterward her husband released her vow for her — now if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to him, it goes forth and pastures in the corral. But if the beast [set aside for her] belonged to her, the animal designated as a sin offering is left to die. And the animal designated as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering. And the animal designated as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering. It is eaten for one day [like a Nazir's peace offering], but it does not***

require bread offering, [unlike a Nazir's offering]. [Now if] she had coins that she had not designated for any specific purpose, they fall to a free-will offering. [If the] coins [were] designated [for a specific purpose] — those designated for a sin offering are to go off to the Dead Sea. They are not available for benefit, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering. And they are subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used [for the bringing of a peace offering]. And [the animal] is eaten for one day and does not require a bread offering].

D. “His” *as we have learned in the Mishnah*: A man imposes a Nazirite vow upon his son, but a woman does not impose a Nazirite vow upon her son. How so? If he cut his hair, or his relatives cut his hair, he objected [and would not keep the vow] or his relatives objected — If he had a beast set apart [for his offering], the beast set aside as a sin offering is left to die. And the beast set aside as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering, and the one set aside as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering and eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering. If he had set aside coins [for the purchase of his offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, they fall to the purchase of a free-will offering. If the coins had been set aside and designated for particular purposes, the coins set aside for the purchase of a sin offering go off to the Salt Sea. They are not available for benefit, but they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering, and they are subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used for the bringing of a peace offering, which is eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering [M. 4:6A-L].

E. “those after death” — *how do we know that one?*

F. *As has been taught on Tannaite authority*: He who designated money for his Nazirite offerings [burnt offering, sin offering, and peace offering] — the money is not available for benefit, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them, since all the money may be used for the purchase of peace offerings [cf. M. Naz. 4:4H-I]. If he had set aside coins [for the purchase of his Nazirite offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, and he died, they fall to the purchase of a freewill offering. If the coins had been set aside and designated for particular purposes, the coins set aside for the purchase of a sin offering go off to the Salt Sea. They are not available for benefit, but they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering, and they are subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used for the bringing of a peace offering, which is eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering [M. Naz. 4:6H-L] [T. Meilah 1:9].

G. “and those after atonement [an animal was lost, replaced so atonement was accomplished with another, and then found]” — *that stands to reason. Specifically: how come “the one after death” does not require a bread offering?*

That is because it is not appropriate for atonement [since the owner is dead and has atoned through his death]. Then the “one after atonement” is not needed for that purpose [by definition, atonement having been attained].

- H. *Are there no more than these four cases?! And lo, there is the following: **And as to all of the other peace offerings of the Nazirite [which are obligatory], which one slaughtered not in accord with the religious duty that pertains to them, may be eaten within the same day and evening; they do not have to be accompanied by a bread offering, nor does the shoulder go to the priest’ [T. Naz. 4:9].***
- I. *The reckoning that Samuel has put forth encompasses animals offered in accord with the religious duty specified in their regard but it does not encompass those not offered in accord with the religious duty specified in their regard.*

Continuation of the Foregoing: A Protracted, Free-Standing Exposition of the Problem of Utilizing Funds Set Aside for the Purchase of Offerings; Thematically connected to the Mishnah’s Problem but Worked Out in its Own Terms

III.2 A. *If he had set aside coins [for the purchase of his Nazirite offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, and he died, they fall to the purchase of a freewill offering T. **Meilah 1:9**]:*

- B. **[25A]** *But are coins designated for a sin-offering not included in the cache [and these should go off to the Salt Sea]!*
- C. *Said R. Yohanan, “It is a traditional law [halakhah] in respect to the Nazirite offering.”*
- D. *R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Whether it be any of their vows of any of their freewill offerings’ (Lev. 22:18) — the Torah has said, the surplus of anything left over from money designated for the purchase of offerings pledged by vow is to be devoted to freewill-offerings.”*
- E. *Now from the perspective of R. Yohanan, who has said, “It is a traditional law in respect to the Nazirite offering,” then there is no problem understanding why the rule applies to undifferentiated funds and not to money that has been designated for a particular purpose. But from the perspective of R. Simeon b. Laqish, with reference to the verse, “Whether it be any of their vows of any of their freewill offerings,” why limit the reference-point to money that has not been designated for a particular purpose, why not extend it even to funds that have been designated for a particular purpose?!*
- F. *Said Raba, “You cannot maintain that the reference-point is to money designated for specific purposes, for a Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [has already set forth a different view]: “Only your holy things that you have and your vows” (Deu. 12:26) — Scripture speaks of the offspring of Holy Things and animals designated as substitutes for them. And what remedy*

is there for them? “You shall take them and go to the place that the Lord shall choose” (Deu. 12:26). Might one suppose that the meaning is, one is to take them up to the chosen house and hold back water and food from them so that they will die? Scripture says, “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deu. 12:27) — which is to say to you, “In the manner in which you dispose of the burnt offering, you shall dispose of the beast that is designated as its substitute. In the manner in which you dispose of peace-offerings, you shall dispose of their offspring. Might one suppose that that is so also with the offspring of a sin offering and the animal designated as a substitute for a guilt offering? Scripture states, “only,” the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, ‘That proof is not required. Lo, Scripture says, “It is a guilt offering” (Lev. 5:19) — it remains as is.” [Klien: hence if money is earmarked for a sin-offering etc., it cannot be used for voluntary offerings but must be used in the manner described in the Mishnah.]

- G. *It has been stated within the Tannaite formulation:* Might one suppose that the meaning is, one is to take them up to the chosen house and hold back water and food from them so that they will die? Scripture says, “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deu. 12:27). *But why should one have raised such a possibility to begin with, lo, it is the offspring of a sin-offering, concerning which we have a tradition that it is left to die in any event!*
- H. *Were it not for the declaration of the verse of Scripture, I might have supposed that the offspring of the sin-offering are left to die under all circumstances [anywhere] [25B] while the offspring of other animals designated for sacred purposes are left to perish only in the chosen house. So we are informed that that is not the case.*
 - I. *It has been stated within the Tannaite formulation:* Might one suppose that that is so also with the offspring of a sin offering and the animal designated as a substitute for a guilt offering? Scripture states, “only” — *what need to I have for a verse of Scripture to make that point? For there is a traditional law that the offspring of a sin-offering is left to die.*
 - J. *Quite true. The verse of Scripture is required to cover the case of the guilt-offering.*
 - K. *For the guilt-offering also there is a traditional law:* In any case in which an animal designated as a sin-offering would be left to die, an animal designated as a guilt-offering is left to pasture [until blemished].

- L. *If we had to rely upon the traditional law, one might have supposed that that indeed is a traditional law, but if one actually offered it up as a sacrifice, on that account he would incur no liability of any kind. So we are informed that that is not the case, namely, if one offered it up, he is guilty of violating a positive commandment.*
- M. R. Aqiba says, “That proof is not required. Lo, Scripture says, ‘It is a guilt offering’ (Lev. 5:19) — it remains as is.” — *what need to I have for a verse of Scripture to make that point? For there is a traditional law:* In any case in which an animal designated as a sin-offering would be left to die, an animal designated as a guilt-offering is left to pasture [until blemished].
- N. *Quite true. It is required for the purpose of dealing with the case of Rab, for* R. Huna has said Rab said, “In the case of a guilt offering [the animal was designated as a guilt offering and was lost, so a second guilt offering was set aside and offered up], that has been put out to pasture [until it dies], but the owner slaughtered it [the first beast designated as a guilt offering was found, and before it was blemished and unfit for the altar, the owner killed it] without further specification, — it is fit for a burnt offering [the proceeds go for a burnt offering].” Now the operative consideration is that it had been put out to pasture, but if not, that would not be the case, for the verse says, “It is a guilt offering,” meaning, it remains as is.
- O. The master has said, “[**With reference to the passage, If he had set aside coins for the purchase of his Nazirite offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, and he died, they fall to the purchase of a freewill offering (T. Meilah 1: 9).** But are coins designated for a sin-offering not included in the cache [and these go off to the Salt Sea], “It is a traditional law [halakhah] in respect to the Nazirite offering” — *are there no other areas to which this traditional ruling applies? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:* And all others listed in the Torah who are obligated to present bird-offerings [26A] who designated money for their bird offerings, if one wanted to present

with that money a sin offering of cattle, he may do so; if one wanted to present with that money a burnt offering of cattle, he may do so. If he died and had left money that was not designated for any specific purpose, the money goes for a freewill offering.

P. *The intent of the Tannaite authority is to say, “the Nazir and those who are obligated to present bird offerings who are comparable to him.”*

Q. *And that was meant to exclude the following, which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
If one was liable to offer a sin-offering of fowl and said, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a burnt-offering,” and he set aside coins and said, “Lo, these are for [purchasing an animal in fulfillment of] my obligation,” if he wanted to bring with them a sin-offering of fowl, he may not bring it. [If he wanted to bring with them] a burnt-offering of fowl, he may not bring it with them. And the laws of sacrilege apply to all of them [the coins], and the laws of sacrilege apply to only part of them. If he died, the coins go to the Salt Sea, because money set aside for a sin-offering is mixed up among them [T. Me. 1:11A-F].

R. *Said R. Ashi, “In regard to these references that you have made to coins that have been designated for a particular purpose, that these should not be used for a freewill offering, you should not suppose that he had said, ‘This money is for my sin offering and this is for my burnt offering and this is for my peace offering,’ but even if he had said, ‘All of this is*

for my sin offering, for my burnt offering, for my peace offering,' it is classified as designated money [not for use for freewill offerings].”

S. *And there are those who say, said R. Ashi, “Do not think that that is the case only if he says, ‘All of this is for my sin offering, for my burnt offering, for my peace offering,’ it is classified as designated money [not for use for freewill offerings]. But even if he had said, ‘This money is for my obligation,’ lo, the money falls into the classification of properly designated coins.”*

T. *Said Raba, “As to that which we have said, ‘Money not specifically designated for a given purpose goes for a freewill offering, nonetheless, if among those coins should fall money earmarked for the purchase of a sin offering, lo, the entire cache is deemed designated for a specific purchase.”*

U. **[26B]** *So too it has been taught on Tannaite authority: [If he said], “These are for my sin-offering, and the rest is for the other Nazirite-offerings,” and then died, the money set aside for a sin-offering goes to the Salt Sea. And with the rest the executor presents, with half of them a burnt offering, and with half of them peace offerings. And the laws of*

sacrilege apply to the whole of them but not to only part of it. If he said, “This is for my burnt offering and the rest is to fulfill my Nazirite obligations and then he died, the money for the burnt offering is to be used for a burnt offering and it is subject to the laws of sacrilege, and the rest is used for freewill offerings and it is subject to the laws of sacrilege [M. Me. 3:2F] [T. Me. 1:10K-L].

- V. Said R. Huna said Rab, “They have repeated the rule [concerning the disposition of a lump sum of money] only to coins, but animals would be regarded as designated for a given purpose [Klien: even if they were not the animals that a Nazirite must present].”
- W. Said R. Nahman, “As to that which we have said concerning beasts’ being regarded as designated, that concerns only unblemished beasts, but as to blemished ones, lo, they are treated as undesignated. But bars of silver would be regarded as designated.”
- X. And R. Nahman bar Isaac said, “Even bars of silver would be deemed undesignated, but not three piles of timber [not to be sold but to be bartered for animals].”

Y. *Said R. Shimi bar Ashi to R. Pappa, “What are the governing considerations in the mind of these rabbis [Rab, Nahman, and Nahman bar Isaac]? Do they take ‘money in a lump sum’ to mean, money and not animals, bars or silver, or piles of wood? Then how about this: they should say, ‘money but not birds.’ [Birds also should be regarded as designated.] And if you should claim that they concur on exactly that point, lo, said R. Hisda, ‘The status of the two birds presented for bird offerings [one for a sin offering,*

the other for a burnt offering] is articulated only either at the time that the owner purchases the fowl or at the time that the priest prepares the offering.’ *Now why should that be the case? Lo, we have a tradition that only money is deemed undesignated!*”

Z. **[27A]** *He said, “But lo, in accord with your own reasoning [there is a problem, for], lo, we have learned in the Mishnah: **Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel** says, ‘ If one brought three beasts and did not specify [their particular purposes, respectively], that which is suitable to serve as a sin offering [a ewe-lamb in its first year] is offered as a sin offering; [that which is suitable to serve as] a burnt offering [a he-lamb in its first year] is offered as a burnt offering, and [that which is suitable to serve as] a peace offering [a ram two years old] is offered as a peace offering’ [M. **Naz. 6:8A-B**]. *Now why should this be the case? Lo, you have said, “animals are not regarded as having been designated for a given purpose!”**

AA. He said to him, “In that case, ‘And she shall take two turtle doves, one for a burnt offering and the other for a sin offering’ (Lev. 12: 8), and also, ‘And the priest shall take the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering’ (Lev. 12: 8) is what the All-Merciful has said. *This shows that the designation may take place either when the owner takes them or when the priest offers them. Here too, **[27B]** would you [in Simeon b. Gamaliel’s instance] be able to say that the one that should be the sin offering is to be the burnt offering, since that one is female and the other male?” [Klien: and so*

formal earmarking is not necessary, but in all other cases it is necessary, and without it they are regarded as unspecified. So Shimi bar Ashi disagrees with the rabbis mentioned above.]

BB. [With regard to the statement, As to that which we have said concerning beasts' being regarded as designated, that concerns only unblemished beasts, but as to blemished ones, lo, they are treated as undesignated,] *objected R. Hamnuna, "Do we actually maintain that a blemished beast is equivalent to an undesignated one? Come and take note: And what is the case in which one brings a hair offering [with money set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father? When he along with his father was a Nazirite, and his father set aside coins that were not designated for the purchase of particular animals for the fulfillment of his Nazirite vow and his father then] died — and he said, "Lo, I shall be a Nazirite on condition that I may provide a hair offering with money belonging to father — if he had money that was not designated for a particular purpose, they fall to a freewill offering; if he had a beast designed as a sin offering, it is left to die; if there was one designated as a burnt offering, it is offered up as a burnt offering; if it was designated for peace*

offerings, it is offered as a peace offering [T. 3:9] — does this not mean, even if it was blemished?’

CC. No, it refers to an unblemished beast, but a blemished beast is equivalent to an undesignated one

DD. *But what makes you refer in particular to money, if a blemished one is concerned? Why not read, If he left a blemished animal, it is to be used to provide freewill-offerings [a finer distinction than the one between animals and money (Klien)]!*

EE. *Quite true.*

FF. *For why is a blemished animal sanctified to begin with? It is for its value, and the value is encompassed by reference to “money.”*

GG. *Objected Raba, “[It has been taught on Tannaite authority:] “...his offering...” (Lev. 4:23, 28, 32) — with one’s own offering one fulfills his obligation to bring a sin offering, and not with the offering designated for use by his father.*

HH. *“Might one suppose that, while one does not fulfill his obligation to present a sin offering through the offering of his father by means of a beast that his father has designated for a minor transgression of the father in regard to a major transgression of the son, or from one designated for a major transgression of the*

father for a minor transgression of the son [since here the class of sin does not match], but nonetheless one may fulfill one's obligation through an offering set aside by his father for a minor transgression of the father in regard to a minor transgression of the son or a major transgression of the father in regard to a major transgression of the son? Scripture says, "...his offering..." (Lev. 4:23, 28, 32) — with one's own offering one fulfills his obligation to bring a sin offering, and not with the offering designated for use by his father.

II. Might one suppose that, while one may not carry out one's obligation with an animal designated by one's father, even for a minor transgression of the father in regard to a minor transgression of the son or a major transgression of the father in regard to a major transgression of the son, for lo, one does not bring a hair offering for his Naziriteship with a beast that his father has set apart for his own use, but, still, one may carry out one's obligations with money that one's father has set apart, even in regard for a beast to be offered in connection with a minor sin for a major one, or with a major sin for a minor one, for lo, one does indeed bring a hair offering for his Naziriteship with coins that his father has set apart

for himself, [28A] if the coins have been left without explicit stipulation and not stipulated for the particular offering [e.g., for his sin offering or for his burnt offering]? Scripture says, “...his offering...” (Lev. 4:23, 28, 32) — with one’s own offering one fulfills his obligation to bring a sin offering, and not with the offering designated for use by his father.

JJ. “Might one suppose that, while one may not carry out one’s obligation with money that one’s father has set apart, even in regard for a beast to be offered in connection with a minor sin for a minor one, or with a major sin for a major one, still, one may fulfill one’s obligation through an offering that one has set apart for oneself, even if it is with a beast designated on account of a major sin for use in connection with a minor one, or for a minor sin in connection with a major sin? Scripture says, “His offering for his sin” (Lev. 4:28) — that his offering should be for the sake of his [particular] sin.

KK. “Might one suppose that, while one may not carry out his obligation with a beast that he has designated for an offering for his own use, even if it is a beast designated for use on account of a minor sin to be used for another minor sin, or a beast designated for use in connection with a

major sin for use in regard to another major sin, for lo, if he had designated a beast on account of eating forbidden fat, but presented it on account of eating blood, or set apart in connection with blood and presented it for eating forbidden fat, lo, he has not committed sacrilege and has not effected atonement, still, he may fulfill his obligation through the use of money that he has designated for use for purchase for himself in connection with a minor sin in regard to some other minor sin, or a major sin in regard to some other major sin, or in connection with a major sin in regard to some other, minor sin, or in connection with a minor sin in regard to some other, major sin, for lo, if he designated for use for himself money in connection with eating forbidden fat, but presented the beast purchased with them in connection with inadvertently having eaten blood, or in respect to blood and presented the beast in connection with forbidden fat, he has committed sacrilege and also has attained atonement? Scripture says, "His offering for his sin" (Lev. 4:28) — that his offering should be for the sake of his [particular] sin [etc.]. *In any event, the Tannaite formulation speaks of a beast, and does this not mean, even a blemished one?"*

LL. No, it speaks of an unblemished one.

MM. *Then what is the rule covering a blemished one?*

NN. *It is treated as undesignated.*

OO. *Then why speak of coins that his father has designated? Why not frame matters in terms of a blemished beast?*

PP. *You're quite right, for, in any event, what good is it? It is only good for sale in exchange for coins, and that is coins pure and simple.*

4:5

- A. **Once the blood of any one of the offerings has been tossed for her, he cannot any longer release the vow.**
 - B. **R. Aqiba says, "Even if any one of the beasts has been slaughtered in her behalf [but the blood not yet tossed], he cannot release her vow."**
 - C. **Under what circumstances?**
 - D. **In the case of the hair offering of a woman who has remained clean.**
 - E. **But it was the hair offering of a woman who has become unclean, he may release her vow.**
 - F. **For he has the power to say, "I don't want a disgraceful wife."**
 - G. **Rabbi says, "Even in the case of a hair offering brought by a woman who has remained clean, he may release the vow."**
 - H. **"For he has the power to say, 'I don't want a wife whose hair is shaved off.'"**
- I.1** A. *Our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the position of R. Eliezer, for has R. Eliezer not said, "The hair offering is indispensable [and must be completed] before it is permitted for the Nazirite to drink wine," and if she has not presented the hair offering, she is forbidden to drink wine, and since the consideration of her becoming disgraced still applies, the husband should be able to release her from the vow. [28B] The Tannaite authority at hand, by contrast, maintains that as soon as the blood is sprinkled on her behalf, she is permitted to drink wine, so she therefore is no longer subject to the consideration of her being disgraceful, while R. Aqiba takes the view that even though the animal has been slaughtered [but before the blood has been tossed], he may no longer release the vow, since the wanton use of Holy Things would result otherwise.*
- B. *Objected R. Zera [to Aqiba's concern for the waste of Holy Things], "Why should that be the case? Let the blood be tossed not for the purpose for which the offering at hand has been designated but for some other purpose, and that will permit the meat of the animal to be eaten [e.g., by the priests, which they may do*

once the blood has been properly tossed]. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:* [As for] lambs [prescribed by Lev. 23:19 as offerings] for the festival of Pentecost that one slaughtered under a different designation [e.g., as whole-offerings instead of peace-offerings] or that one slaughtered before or after their [fixed] time — their blood should be tossed and the meat should be eaten. But if it was a Sabbath, [the blood] should not be tossed. And if he tossed [it anyway], it is acceptable, on the condition that [he will] offer the sacrificial parts at eventide.”

- C. *Say: if it were a burnt offering or peace offerings that one had slaughtered for the Nazirite woman, that would have been a valid objection. But here with what situation do we deal? With a case in which he slaughtered an animal designated as a sin offering first of all, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **But if he cut his hair after any one of the three of them, he has carried out his obligation [M. 6:7F].*** [Klien: so if the husband is allowed to annul the vow, this sin offering would have to be destroyed, as is asserted by Aqiba, like all sin offerings the owners of which no longer stand in need of atonement.]

II.1 A. Under what circumstances? In the case of the hair offering of a woman who has remained clean. But it was the hair offering of a woman who has become unclean, he may release her vow. For he has the power to say, “I don’t want a disgraceful wife.” Rabbi [Bavli: Meir] says, “Even in the case of a hair offering brought by a woman who has remained clean, he may release the vow. For he has the power to say, ‘I don’t want a wife whose hair is shaved off:’”

- B. *And the initial Tannaite authority [who does not agree with the grounds for objection that Rabbi accepts]?*
 C. He will say to you, “It is possible for her to make use of a wig.”
 D. And Rabbi? [Bavli: Meir]?
 E. *He takes the view that, with the wig produced out of a gentile’s woman’s hair, because it is dirty, the husband will not accept it.*

4:6A-L

- A. **A man imposes a Nazirite vow upon his son, but a woman does not impose a Nazirite vow upon her son.**
 B. **How so?**
 C. **If he cut his hair, or his relatives cut his hair,**
 D. **he objected [and would not keep the vow] or his relatives objected —**
 E. **If he had a beast set apart [for his offering],**
 F. **the beast set aside as a sin offering is left to die.**
 G. **And the beast set aside as a burnt offering is offered as a burnt offering, and the one set aside as a peace offering is offered as a peace offering and eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering.**
 H. **If he had set aside coins [for the purchase of his offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, they fall to the purchase of a free-will offering.**
 I. **If the coins had been set aside and designated for particular purposes,**

- J. the coins set aside for the purchase of a sin offering go off to the Salt Sea. They are not available for benefit, but they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege.
 - K. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering, and they are subject to the laws of sacrilege.
 - L. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used for the bringing of a peace offering, which is eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering.
- I.1 A. [A man imposes a Nazirite vow upon his son, but a woman does not impose a Nazirite vow upon her son:]** *A man yes, but a woman no? How come?*
- B. R. Yohanan said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite."
 - C. And R. Yosé b. R. Hanina **[29A]** said R. Simeon b. Laqish [said], "It is so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties."
 - D. *If that is the operative consideration, then even a woman should be able to participate in her son's education!*
 - E. *He takes the view, A man is obligated to undertake the education of his son in carrying out religious duties, and a woman is not obligated to undertake the education of her son in carrying out religious duties.*
 - F. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why it is in particular on his son, but not on his daughter, that he can impose the vow of the Nazirite, but from the perspective of R. Simeon b. Laqish, he should be able to do so even for his daughter!*
 - G. *He takes the view that it is his son that he is obligated to educate, but his daughter he is not obligated to educate.*
 - H. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why it is in particular the Nazirite vow, but not other vows, that he can impose on his son. But from the perspective of R. Simeon b. Laqish, even other vows, besides the Nazirite vow, should the father be able to impose upon the son.*
 - I. *The argument unfolds progressively: not only is it the father's duty to educate the son by imposing ordinary vows on him, which involve no disfigurement, but even the Nazirite vow, which does involve disfigurement, even here he is obligated to educate the son.*
 - J. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why it is taught in the Tannaite formulation, **he objected [and would not keep the vow] or his relatives objected [the vow is null].** But as to R. Yosé bar Hanina's statement in behalf of R. Simeon b. Laqish, do the relatives have the power to tell the father not to teach the son how to carry out religious duties?*
 - K. *He takes the view that the son rejects any procedure that is not in accord with his dignity.*
 - L. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why the boy is permitted to cut off his hair for the hair offering [at the end of his*

Nazirite vow], even though this means rounding off the corners of the head [vs. Lev. 19:27). But as to R. Yosé bar Hanina's statement in behalf of R. Simeon b. Laqish, namely, "It is so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties," lo, he is going to round off the corners of the head [and how does this violation of the Torah contribute to his education in carrying out religious duties]?

- M. *He takes the view that the prohibition of rounding off the whole head [not merely the corners] such as is required in fulfillment of the Nazirite vow derives from the authority of the rabbis, and the obligation to educate the son derives from the authority of the rabbis, so the requirement to round off the head, which derives from the rabbis, overrides another obligation imposed by the rabbis on their own authority.*
- N. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why, on that account, the boy cuts his hair and presents an offering in the Temple. But from the perspective of what R. Yosé b. R. Hanina said R. Simeon b. Laqish said, namely, "It is so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties," lo, he is going to bring unconsecrated beasts to the Temple courtyard [since the boy is no Nazirite but just practicing for later on, the animals are not actually sanctified for a Temple purpose]!*
- O. *He takes the position that the prohibition against bringing unconsecrated beasts to the Temple court does not derive from the Torah.*
- P. *Now there is no problem understanding the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." We can understand why, on that account, if the boy contracts uncleanness, he presents the bird-offering, and the priest eats [his portion of the meat] after killing the pigeon by pinching off the head. But from the perspective of what R. Yosé b. R. Hanina said R. Simeon b. Laqish said, namely, "It is so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties," lo, he is eating carrion [since the bird is not a true offering, it should be killed through normal slaughter with a knife, and since that has not taken place, it is carrion.]*
- Q. *R. Yosé b. R. Hanina takes the position that the requirement of slaughtering fowl [in the normal manner] does not derive from the Torah, and he further maintains that the rule against bringing unconsecrated beasts in the Temple courtyard does not derive from the Torah.*
- R. *Well, now, does R. Yosé b. R. Hanina really maintain that view? And lo, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- S. *R. Yosé b. R. Hanina says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a sin offering of fowl that is presented in a situation of doubt [concerning childbirth, e.g., whether a miscarriage has taken place, or whether what has been excreted is not a true miscarriage] is not eaten [as it would have been had there been an actual childbirth or a true miscarriage]? Scripture states, 'And of them who have an issue, whether it be a man or a woman' (Lev. 15:33) — Scripture thereby establishes a generative analogy between a female and a male. Just as a male presents an offering in a situation of certainty [but not doubt], so a female presents an offering in a situation of certainty. Just as a male presents an offering in a situation of*

doubt, also a female presents an offering in a situation of doubt. And just as in the case of a male, it is from the species that he presents in a case of certainty that he presents in a case of doubt, so in the case of a female, it is from the species that she presents in a case of certainty that she presents in a case of doubt. Might one then proceed: just as in the case of a male, he presents an offering that is eaten [by the priests], so the female presents an offering that is eaten? Say: **[29B]** No, if you have made that statement in the case of the male, where there is only a single prohibition [namely, if he was not guilty in this case of doubt, an unconsecrated animal turns out to have been offered on his behalf, which the authority at hand deems prohibited], will you say the same in the case of a woman, where there are two prohibitions involved. *And what are these two prohibitions? Are they not the prohibition of carrion and of bringing unconsecrated animals into the courtyard of the Temple?*

- T. *Objected R. Aha b. R. Iqa [to the proposition that those acts are forbidden by the Torah], "Maybe the eating was forbidden because it would appear as if two rabbinic decrees are being transgressed [not by reason of the generative analogy to the offering brought by the man, but because two rabbinic ordinances of rabbis are involved, and that outweighs the analogy with the guilt offering (Klien)]."*
- U. *May one propose that the Tannaite formulation of [the dispute between Yohanan and Simeon b. Laqish] follows the lines of the following Tannaite formulation:*
- V. "Until what point may the father impose a Nazirite vow upon his son? Until he will produce two pubic hairs," the words of Rabbi.
- W. R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, "Until the son reaches the age at which he may take vows [which is at about nine years, well prior to puberty]."
- X. *Now is this not what is at issue in the Tannaite dispute: Rabbi takes the view: "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite," so that, even though the son has reached the age at which he may take vows, the father may continue to impose the Nazirite vow upon the son until he produces two pubic hairs, and as to R. Yosé b. R. Judah, who has said, "Until the son reaches the age at which he may take vows," takes the view, "It is so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties," and since the son has left the father's domain [and can make his own vows], the father is no longer obligated in this regard.*
- Y. *Say: no, all parties concur, "It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite." And here what is subject to dispute concerns the vows of one who can discriminate [and so understands what is at stake in a vow] but who has not yet reached puberty. Rabbi takes the view that one who can discriminate but has not yet reached puberty takes vows on the authority only of the rabbis, and the power deriving from the Torah and granted to the father to impose the Nazirite vow overrides the rabbinical right of the youth to make the vow on his own, while R. Yosé b. R. Judah takes the view that the boy who can discriminate but has not yet reached puberty has a right to make vows deriving from the Torah itself.*
- Z. *And if you prefer, I shall say, all parties concur that the father imposes the Nazirite vow so as to educate the son to carry out religious duties; and they further concur that the power of a boy who can discriminate but has not yet reached*

puberty to take vows derives from the authority of Rabbis. *Rabbi then takes the view that the father's duty to educate the son, which derives from the authority of the rabbis, comes and overrides the right of the boy near puberty to take vows, which also derives from the authority of the rabbis. And R. Yosé b. R. Judah, who has said, "Until the son reaches the age at which he may take vows [which is prior to puberty]," maintains that the father's duty to educate the son, which derives from the authority of the rabbis, does not come and override the right of the boy near puberty to take vows, which also derives from the authority of the rabbis. [When the boy can take vows, the father can no longer impose the Nazirite vow.]*

AA. *May we say that what is subject to dispute between the foregoing Tannaite authorities also is at issue in the following Tannaite dispute, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: **There is this precedent: the father of R. Hananiah b. Hananiah set upon him the vow of the Nazir, and then his father brought him before Rabban Gamaliel. And Rabban Gamaliel was examining him [to determine] whether he had come to the age of producing tokens of maturity. (And R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, "Whether he has come to the age of making vows.") He said to him, "My lord, why do to the trouble of examining me? If I am yet a child, then I shall be a Nazirite being subject to the authority of father, and lo, I am a Nazir. And if I am an adult, and subject to my own authority, lo, am a Nazir from this point forward on my own account."** He stood and kissed upon his head. He said, "I am certain concerning this one that he will not die before he has taught law in Israel." They said: Not many days passed before he taught law in Israel [T. Nid. 5:15B-F]. Now, from the perspective of R. Yosé b. Hanina, who has said, "Until the son reaches the age at which he may take vows [which is prior to puberty]," that explains why the boy said, **If I am yet a child, then I shall be a Nazirite being subject to the authority of father. But from the perspective of Rabbi, who has said, "Until he will produce two pubic hairs," And if I am an adult, and subject to my own authority, lo, am a Nazir from this point forward on my own account — [30A] lo, he is still within the domain of the father** [Klien: so that although he could make vows himself, his father could still impose a Nazirite vow on him].*

BB. *[Rabbi replies:] "Rather, it is a case in which he said, 'I shall be a Nazirite on account of father, I shall be a Nazirite on my own account.' Now if he produced two pubic hairs to begin with, his Nazirite vow on his own account takes effect, if this was after he kept the Nazirite vow, he will have observed the Nazirite vow imposed by his father."*

CC. *What if he produced the puberty-signs in the interval? What is the law? [The vow imposed by the father automatically lapses.] That poses no problem to the position of R. Yosé b. R. Judah, who has said, "Until the son reaches the age at which he may take vows [which is prior to puberty]," [Klien: for on his reaching the age of making vows, vows imposed by the father beforehand are unaffected, and puberty is a long way off], but from the perspective of Rabbi, who has said, "Until he will produce two pubic hairs," what is there to be said?*

DD. *Say: from Rabbi's perspective there is no remedy other than that he should observe Nazirite vows both on account of the father's and on account of his own statement.*

4:6M-V

- M. A man brings a hair offering [with offerings set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father, but a woman does not bring a hair offering [with offerings set aside] for the Naziriteship of her father.
- N. How so?
- O. He who had a father who was a Nazirite, who had set aside coins for the purchase of his sacrifices, which had not been designated for his particular Naziriteship offerings, and whose [father] died,
- P. and he said, “Lo, I am a Nazirite on condition that I may bring a hair offering with the coins [set aside by my] father” —
- Q. said R. Yosé, “Lo, these coins fall to the purchase of a free-will offering.
- R. “This one does not bring a hair offering [with money set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father.
- S. “And what is the case in which one brings a hair offering [with money set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father?
- T. “He who, along with his father, was a Nazirite,
- U. “and his father set aside coins that were not designated for the purchase of particular animals for the fulfillment of his Nazirite vow and his father then] died —
- V. “this is a case in which one brings a hair offering [with offerings set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father.”
- I.1** A. *How come but a woman does not bring a hair offering [with offerings set aside] for the Naziriteship of her father?*
- B. Said R. Yohanan, “It is a traditional law in connection with the Nazirite.”
- C. *That is obvious and why was it necessary to make such a statement, since a son inherits his father's estate but a daughter does not inherit her father's estate!*
- D. *No, it was necessary to specify the rule to deal with a case in which the man has only a daughter. What might you have supposed? That the tradition pertains to heirs [eligible for a hair offering]? [30B] So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- I.2** A. *The question was raised: Do rabbis differ from R. Yosé or do they not differ from him? And if you should find reason to maintain that they differ, do they differ as to the first clause alone [O-R] or also as to the later clause [O-R, S-V] as well? [Klien: do they permit the son to do so in both cases, or do they permit only the one Yosé forbids and vice versa?]*
- B. *Come and take note: Under what circumstances have they ruled, “A man brings a hair offering [with offerings set aside] for the Naziriteship of his father”? “He whose father had been a Nazirite and whose father had set aside money for the purchase of the Nazirite offerings owing by him at the end of the vow, and whose father died, and who said, ‘Lo, I shall be a*

Nazirite on condition that I may present a Nazirite offering for my hair through the money of father' — this is the case of one who brings a hair offering with funds set aside for the purchase of offerings of his now-deceased father. But he who was a Nazirite along with his father, whose father set aside money for the offerings for his Nazirite vow at the fulfillment of the spell, and whose father died — lo, that money falls to the purchase of a free will offering,” the words of R. Yosé. R. Eliezer, R. Meir, and R. Judah said, “This is one who may present a hair offering with money set aside by his father” [T. 3:15, with variations]. [Klien: These rabbis differ from Yosé, the difference covers both cases.]

- I.3** A. *Rabbah raised this question: “If the father had two sons, both of them Nazirites, what is the law? Do we have in hand a tradition to the effect that whoever was the first to take the Nazirite vow may use the funds for the hair offering, or did the tradition maintain that the son may use the money because it is by inheritance, so they divide it up?”*
- B. *Raba raised this question: “In the case of a first-born and an ordinary son, what is the law? Do we have in hand a tradition to the effect that the first-born is not entitled to receive a share of the funds for the hair offering in the same proportion as he receives in the rest of the estate, or is the money for the Nazirite sacrifices part of his inheritance, such that, just as he gets a double portion there, so he gets a double portion in the money for the hair offering?”*
- C. [A first born does not get a double portion of the sanctified animals left at the father’s death, so the question follows:] *“And if you should find reason to maintain that the money is received as an inheritance, and just as the first born receives for the hair offering in proportion to what he receives of the rest of the estate, is it the rule that the first born receives the double portion only when the money is not consecrated, but not when it becomes consecrated or perhaps it makes no difference, since he has acquired his double portion for the costs of the hair offering? [Does he get two thirds of the money left toward his own Nazirite sacrifices, but after the animals have been slaughtered and sacrificed, does he then return part of the meat to his brother, so each gets just half of the meat to be eaten?]*
- D. *“If the father was a lifelong Nazirite, and he was a Nazirite subject to an unspecified term and therefore obligated for thirty days, or if the father was such an ordinary Nazirite and the son was a lifelong Nazirite, what is the law? When we have received the traditional law, it pertained to the ordinary vow of Naziriteship, or perhaps there is no difference?”*

E. *“And if you should determine that [he may use the money] because both the father and the son were in a condition of cultic cleanness [so there is no distinction between the one and the other classification of Naziriteship that each has undertaken,]” R. Ashi raised the question, “If the son was an unclean Nazirite and he was a clean Nazirite, the father was a clean Nazirite and he was an unclean one, what is the law”?*

F. *These questions stand.*