

I.

BAVLI MEILAH CHAPTER ONE

FOLIOS 2A-8A

1:1

- A. Most Holy Things which one slaughtered in the south [side of the altar, instead of the north side, where the rite is supposed to be carried out] —
- B. the laws of sacrilege apply to them
- C. [If] one slaughtered them in the south and received their blood in the north,
- D. in the north and received their blood in the south.
- E. [if] one slaughtered them by day and tossed the blood by night,
- F. by night and tossed the blood by day,
- G. or [if] one slaughtered them [with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place —
- H. the laws of sacrilege apply to them.
- I. A general principle did R. Joshua state: “Whatever has had a moment of availability to [for use by] the priests — the laws of sacrilege do not apply thereto.
- J. “And [whatever] has not [yet] had a moment of availability to the priests — the laws of sacrilege do apply thereto.”
- K. What is that which has had a moment of availability to the priests?
- L. That which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been left overnight, and that which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been made unclean, and that which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has gone forth [beyond the veils].
- M. And what is that which has not [yet] had a moment of availability to the priests?
- N. That which has been slaughtered [with improper intention to eat that which is usually eaten or to offer up that which is usually offered up] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place,
- O. And that, the blood of which invalid men have received or tossed.

I.1. A. *The Tannaite authority frames matters in the language: **Most Holy Things which one slaughtered in the south [side of the altar] — the laws of sacrilege apply to them** — but that is perfectly obvious! Merely because the priest has slaughtered them on the south side of the altar, should we remove the offering from being subject to the law of sacrilege?*

B. *It was necessary to make that point nonetheless. For it might have entered your mind to maintain that since Ulla said R. Yohanan said, “Animals designated as Holy Things that died [not through a proper rite of slaughter] are exempt from the law of sacrilege by the rule of the Torah,” so too, Most Holy Things with respect to a rite performed at the south side of the altar are as though they were strangled [and not properly slaughtered, hence not subject to the law of sacrilege]. So we are informed that that conclusion is not correct.*

C. *[The reason is that] animals designated as Holy Things that died on their own have never been suitable for sacred purposes, but animals slaughtered at the south side of the altar, even though it is not suitable to serve as Most Holy Things, it is suitable to serve as Lesser Holy Things. [Hence it is necessary to state the cited rule.]*

II.1 A. *[Supply **If one slaughtered them in the south and received their blood in the north, in the north and received their blood in the south, if one slaughtered them by day and tossed the blood by night, by night and tossed the blood by day:**] Why was it necessary to list all these details?*

B. *They were required. For if the Tannaite authority had repeated the detail, **If one slaughtered them in the south and received their blood in the north**, here the rule of sacrilege applies, because the receiving of the blood in the north marks a proper part of the rite, but if it was done **in the north and received their blood in the south**, since the priest received the blood at the south side of the altar, one might have supposed that the offering has now been excluded from the law of sacrilege.*

C. *And if the Tannaite authority had given only this detail, [**if one slaughtered them by day and tossed the blood by night,**] I might have supposed that, since the day is the time at which offerings are presented, the laws of sacrilege apply, but in a case in which he slaughtered the beast **by night and tossed the blood by day**, the night is not a time for presenting an offering, and in the case in which he slaughtered the animal by night, I might have supposed that the beast was now exempt from the laws of sacrilege. And if the Tannaite authority had stated only, **by night and tossed the blood by day**, I might have supposed that, since he has received the blood by day, the laws of sacrilege do apply; but if he slaughtered the beast by day and tossed the blood by night, since that is not the time for making an offering, the beast falls into the category of those that have been strangled, and the laws of sacrilege do not apply. So we are informed to the contrary.*

III.1 A. *...or [if] one slaughtered them [with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place — the laws of sacrilege apply to them:*

- B. *To what valid use may such beasts be put, that the laws of sacrilege pertain anyhow?*
- C. [If the blood is properly received and tossed], they do effect atonement and therefore are subject to the laws of refuse [even though they may not be presented on the altar].

- III.2.** A. **[2B]** *The question was raised:* If [the offering that has been slaughtered by a priest with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place] has gone up onto the altar, what is the law as to taking it down from there?
- B. Rabbah said, “If [the offering that has been slaughtered by a priest with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place] has gone up onto the altar, it is removed from there.”
 - C. R. Joseph said, “If [the offering that has been slaughtered by a priest with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place] has gone up onto the altar, it is not removed from there.” [Once it is placed upon the altar, the altar takes possession.]
 - D. [In what follows, reference is made to M. **Zebahim 9:2**, as follows: **R. Judah** says, “(1) That which is slaughtered by night, and (2) that, the blood of which has been poured out, and (3) that, the blood of which has gone forth beyond the veils — if it has gone up, should go down.” **R. Simeon** says, “It should not go down. For the cause of its invalidity [took place] in the sanctuary[.]” For **R. Simeon** did say, “Anything, the cause of the invalidity of which [took place] in the sanctuary — the sanctuary accepts it [so that it should not be removed from the altar]. [If] its invalidity did not [take place] in the sanctuary, the sanctuary does not accept it [and it should be removed from the altar].”] *From the perspective of R. Judah, the question need not be raised, for all parties must concur that* If [the offering that has been slaughtered by a priest with the intention of eating that which is usually eaten or offering up that which is usually offered up] outside of their proper time or outside of their proper place] has gone up onto the altar, it is removed from there.
 - E. *But where there can be a valid dispute, it is within the premise of R. Simeon. Specifically, R. Joseph concurs with R. Simeon [that any invalidated offering stays on the altar].*
 - F. *Rabbah may say to you [in holding that Simeon’s view does not apply to our case], “R. Simeon takes the position that he does only in the case in which drops of blood that are supposed to be flicked below the red line around the altar were flicked above the line, or in which drops of blood that are supposed to be flicked above the red line around the altar were flicked below it, but in any event he holds the view that he does in a case in which the priest properly slaughtered the animal and received the blood at the north side of the altar. [Here the offerings remain on the altar.] But here, since the priest has slaughtered the animal at the south side of the altar, rather than at the north, it is as though the animal were strangled [and has no right to be presented on the altar at all but must be removed if it was put up there].”*

- G. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **Most Holy Things which one slaughtered in the south [side of the altar, instead of the north side, where the rite is supposed to be carried out] — the laws of sacrilege apply to them.** Now from the perspective of R. Joseph there is no problem [the offerings remain on the altar, so the laws of sacrilege apply too], but from the viewpoint of Rabbah this presents a challenge!*
- H. *What is the meaning of the formulation, **the laws of sacrilege apply to them?** That is only on the authority of rabbis [but from the viewpoint of the Torah, the laws of sacrilege will not apply].*
- I. *So what difference does it make whether the rule derives from the Torah or from the authority of rabbis?*
- J. *If the rule derives from the authority of the Torah, then when they pay back the sacrilege, they must add the added fifth, but if the penalty derives only from rabbis, that is not the case.*
- K. *Well, then, is there such a thing as sacrilege on the authority of rabbis [but not based on the law of the Torah]?*
- L. *There indeed is such a thing, for said Ulla said R. Yohanan, “Animals designated as Holy Things that died [not through a proper rite of slaughter] are exempt from the law of sacrilege by the rule of the Torah.” Therefore on the strength of the law of the Torah, there is no consideration of sacrilege, but from the viewpoint of rabbis, there is. Here too, it is based on the authority of rabbis.*
- M. *May one say that the Tannaite teaching of Ulla in the name of R. Yohanan has already been mastered [when the Mishnah-passage itself says that Holy Things slaughtered in the wrong place still are subject to the laws of sacrilege]?*
- N. *Nonetheless, it was necessary to make that point explicit in the other context as well, for it might otherwise have entered your mind to suppose that where the animal was slaughtered at the south side of the altar, we apply the laws of sacrilege, since otherwise people will touch the meat [and it will become unclean]. But when it comes to Holy Things that die, since people are going to avoid touching the meat, we do not invoke the laws of sacrilege, even by rabbinic decree. It follows that it was necessary to make the point of Ulla’s teaching so say that the laws of sacrilege do apply even there.*
- O. *[There is a further consideration:] With respect to Holy Things that died, it is taught on Tannaite authority, He who derives benefit from an animal designated as a sin offering does not commit sacrilege unless he brings a blemish upon the animal, but if the animal is dead, he commits sacrilege as soon as he derives any benefit from it whatsoever. Now it might have entered your mind to suppose that **[3A]** the laws of sacrilege apply only if the animal is designated as a sin offering, on which account people will not avoid touching it; but as to Holy Things, since these are not presented for atonement, people will avoid touching the meat, so*

we don't need to apply the laws of sacrilege. So we are informed [by Ulla's teaching that the laws of sacrilege apply to the case].

P. *But is it the fact that the laws of sacrilege apply to an animal designated as a sin offering that has died? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: Animals designated as sin offerings that have been left to die and money that was consecrated and that has to be thrown into the Dead Sea — one may not derive benefit from these things, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply.*

Q. *Say: animals designated as sin offerings that are left to die — people avoid touching them even while they are alive. [The laws of sacrilege then are not required.]*

S. *This then excludes animals designated as sin offerings that are being kept alive for offerings on the altar, for people do not hesitate to touch them [and that is why we have to say that if the animal dies, the laws of sacrilege apply].*

T. [Reverting to the dispute of Joseph and Rabbah on whether invalid offerings are left on the altar,] *objected R. Joseph [who insists we leave them on the altar] to Rabbah by reading one [Mishnah-passage] in light of another, as follows:*

U. **And all of them [which are invalid] do not impart uncleanness in the gullet.** [The carrion of clean fowl imparts uncleanness to the one who is eating it when it is located in the gullet, so that the person eating it becomes a Father of uncleanness. The birds have been properly slaughtered, so they are invalid as sacrifices, but they are not deemed carrion.] **And the laws of sacrilege apply to them, except in the case of the sin offering of the fowl that one prepared below in accord with the rites of the sin offering for the name of the sin offering, [which may be eaten by the priest] [M. [Zeb. 7:3](#)].**

V. *And with the foregoing, he read the following: This is the encompassing principle: Any [bird] that became invalid [while] in the sanctuary [subject to the rites of sacrifice] does not impart uncleanness of the gullet [for the pinching itself is valid to remove the carcass from the category of carrion]. [If] it did not become invalid [while] in the sanctuary [subject to the cultic processes], it does impart uncleanness of the gullet [M. [Zeb. 7:5L-M](#)].*

W. *And alongside, he repeated the following as well: [For R. Simeon did say,] “Anything, the invalidity of which [took place] in the sanctuary — the sanctuary accepts it [so that it should not be removed from the altar]. [If] its invalidity did not [take place] in the sanctuary, the sanctuary does not accept it [and it should be removed from the altar]” [M. [Zeb. 9:2D](#)].*

X. *[And, he alleged,] these passages form a massive refutation of the position of Rabbah. [Haas: the laws of sacrilege apply to certain invalid sacrifices; that is so if the sacrifice was invalidated while in the sanctuary; items rendered invalid while in the sanctuary belong to the altar. So an invalid offering placed on the altar remains there and is burned up.]*

Y. *They do indeed refute the position of Rabbah.*

III.3. A. *Now that concerning which Rabbah and R. Joseph conducted their dispute was a matter of self-evidence to R. Eleazar. For said R. Eleazar, “A burnt offering*

designated for use on a private altar [not the public altar in Jerusalem] that one brought inside [the hangings of the courtyard, that is, the Temple precincts] — **[3B]** the partitions [of the Temple courtyard] have taken hold of it for all purposes [even though it is an invalid offering, having been misdesignated; the laws of sacrilege will apply].” [Why should Rabbah and Joseph have debated a matter concerning which the prior, Tannaite authority expressed no doubts whatsoever?]

- B. *R. Eleazar raised the following question [which deals with matter of the unresolved issues that prompted the later authorities to debate the topic]: “A burnt offering designated for a high place belonging to a private person that one brought into the sanctuary and that there became invalidated — if they put it up on the altar, what is the law as to removing it?”*
- C. *[Now how are we to interpret this question?] Since he raised this question in particular, does it follow that all other matters are self-evident to him, either in accord with the position of Rabbah or in accord with the position of R. Joseph?*
- D. *He raised that question so as to figure out how to resolve the principle at hand, one way or the other.*
- E. *[He could focus upon the position of Rabbah or upon that of Joseph, as follows:] Rabbah took the position that he did in the case before him, namely, “If offerings are put up on the altar, they must be taken down,” only if the offerings were properly brought to the sanctuary and were invalidated [by reason of being slaughtered on the south side of the altar]. But if to begin with the offerings did not belong in the sanctuary, they are not invalidated and stay up on the altar.*
- F. *Or perhaps, even in accord with R. Joseph, who said, “If offerings are put up on the altar, they are not taken down,” only if the animal was properly assigned to the sanctuary and so was taken over by it; but if the offering to begin with was not properly assigned to the sanctuary, it is not taken over by the sanctuary and so must be taken down.*
- G. *The question stands.*

We now pursue from another angle the question of whether disqualified offerings are subject to the laws of sacrilege.

III.4. A. Said R. Giddal said Rab, “Tossing the blood of an offering that had been rendered piggul by the officiating priest’s improper intention, at the moment of slaughter, improperly to dispose of the blood or the priestly portion of the animal nonetheless does not remove the meat of the sacrificial beast from being subject to the laws of sacrilege, nor does it impose upon Lesser Holy Things liability to the laws of sacrilege.”

- B. *In session, Abbaye stated this tradition.”*
- C. *Objected R. Pappa to Abbaye, “He who slaughters the thank offering inside [the Temple court], [while] its bread offering is located outside the wall — the bread is not sanctified. [If] he slaughtered the thank offering before its bread offering had formed a crust in the oven — even if all of them [the loaves] formed a crust except for one of them — the bread is not sanctified. [If] he slaughtered it [intending to eat its flesh or to toss the blood or to offer up the sacrificial parts] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, the bread is sanctified [and is deemed refuse [M. Zebahim 8:3A-E]. It*

therefore follows that an offering that had been rendered piggul by the officiating priest's improper intention, at the moment of slaughter, improperly to dispose of the blood or the priestly portion of the animal nonetheless does impose liability to the laws of sacrilege."

- D. *Abbaye fell silent. When he later on came to R. Abba, he said to him, "[But what is the law as to] the tossing of the blood [which is what is at stake in the citation of Rab]?"*
- E. *Said R. Ashi to Raba, "[Tossing the blood of a disqualified offering exempts Most Holy Things from the laws of sacrilege,] for lo, said Ulla, 'If the handful of meal offering that has been invalidated under the rules of piggul [the improper intention of the officiating priest having taken effect] is placed on the altar, the affect upon it of the status of piggul bursts off [and is null, so the meal offering is left to burn up on the altar]. Now taking the handful of the meal offering is equivalent to the act of slaughter.'" [Putting the meal on the altar is equivalent to tossing the blood. Just as putting the disqualified meal offering on the altar removes the rules of sacrilege, and so too, the same goes for tossing the blood; Rab has said that tossing the blood is null, but we now see that it is not null at all.]*
- F. *He said to him, "[The meal offering is not disqualified] for the prohibition that would lead to the disqualification [is all that is at stake, but the priest has properly placed the meal offering on the altar]."*
- G. **[4A]** *[He said to him,] "But lo, The Tannaite teaching states, if improper intentionality disqualifies other parts of the offering, does it not follow that improper intentionality will disqualify the meal offering as well? Here too, there is an act that disqualifies the meal offering."*
- H. *[In what follows, reference is made to M. Zeb. 2:5G-I: Said R. Judah, "This is the general rule: if the [improper] intention concerning time came before the [improper] intention concerning the place, it is refuse, and they are liable on its account for extirpation. And if the [improper] intention concerning the place came before the [improper] intention concerning the time, it is invalid. And extirpation does not apply to him." And sages say, "This and that are invalid. And extirpation does not apply to him."]* *Said Rabina to R. Ashi, "But didn't Ilpa say in that regard, 'The dispute [between Judah and sages, M. 2:5G-K] concerns two acts of service, but in the case of a single act of service, all parties concur that what we have is a mingling of two aspects of intentionality.'* *[Judah concurs that where both aspects of intentionality are expressed in connection with the same act of service, the sacrificial animal is not classified as refuse but only as unfit, and that is so even if the intentionality that will have imposed the status of refuse preceded the one that will have merely rendered the offering unfit (Freedman)]. For example, if the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I am slaughtering the first, the windpipe, with the intention of using the sacrificial meat outside of the proper time, and I shall sever the second, the gullet, intending to use the meat outside of its proper place, rendering it piggul by reason of the first intentionality and unfit by reason of the second].'" [Judah maintains that the second act is null, the animal being disqualified as piggul; sages assume that both acts take effect]. But in the case of a single act of service, all parties concur that we have a case in which the two distinct intentionalities are melded [and the*

animal is neither fully piggul nor fully unfit]. Here too, when the blood is tossed, the matter may readily be clarified, whether there was a single act of service that was performed, or two acts of service.” [Haas: if the priest had a distinct improper intention as regards each individual act, that is, if he intended to eat the animal outside the proper time while slaughtered, and then intended to eat the meat outside the proper place when tossing the blood, the carcass would be piggul by reason of the first intention; if both applied to the same act, the carcass would be both piggul and unfit at the same time.]

- I. *[Ashi replies,] “If so, then in the case of the thank offering, [we should be unable to determine the status of the meal offering presented with the thank offering] until the blood is tossed.” [But Ilpa has maintained that two improper acts of intentionality can pertain to a single act, and he must be wrong.]*
- J. *[As to the rule, **He who slaughters the thank offering inside [the Temple court], [while] its bread offering is located outside the wall — the bread is not sanctified. [If] he slaughtered the thank offering before its bread offering had formed a crust in the oven — even if all of them [the loaves] formed a crust except for one of them — the bread is not sanctified. [If] he slaughtered it [intending to eat its flesh or to toss the blood or to offer up the sacrificial parts] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, the bread is sanctified [and is deemed refuse] (M. Zebahim 8:3A-E),**]* *what is the meaning of the bread is sanctified?*

K. *It means, the offering is disqualified and must be disposed of by being burned.*

- III.5.** A. *May we say that the following sustains [Rab’s position, that tossing the blood of a disqualified offering is null]? An offering in the status of piggul [by reason of the improper intentionality of the priest to eat the meat at the wrong time] under all circumstances is subject to the laws of sacrilege. Now doesn’t this mean, even though the blood has been tossed, and this would support his position?*
- B. *No, it refers to a case in which the blood has not been tossed.*
- C. *Well, now, if the blood has not been tossed, then what’s the point? [Before the blood is tossed, Most Holy Things are always subject to the laws of sacrilege, so the statement can only refer to the case] even after the blood has been tossed!*
- D. *[In any event that does not support Rab’s view, for] when that Tannaite teaching was set forth, it pertained to a burnt offering [that is subject to the law of sacrilege until it is burned up, for there is no part of the burnt offering that ever is assigned to the priest].*
- E. *Well, then, if reference is made to the burnt offering, it is self-evident that the laws of sacrilege continue to apply, since it belongs wholly to the Most High! [The statement cited at the outset therefore must refer to all offerings, not just to the burnt offering.] **[4B]** And furthermore, the same Tannaite rule goes on to say, If he left the blood over night, even though he went and tossed it, the laws of sacrilege continue to apply. Now, if you maintain that we speak of a sin offering, there is no problem here. But if you hold that we deal with a burnt offering, is it possible to make such a statement at all? [Properly tossing the blood of a burnt offering makes no difference so far as the matter of sacrilege is concerned, so the rule cannot possibly speak of burnt offerings, but must refer also to sin offerings at the very least].*

- F. *Well, the clause just now cited certainly supports Rab, but does the opening clause support his position as well?*
- G. *Oh, come on — since the concluding clause supports his position, the opening clause obviously must support his position as well!*
- H. *Well, does the concluding clause really support him? For what difference is it going to make if he left the blood overnight or intended to leave the meat to be eaten at an improper time, since, in either case, the animal remains subject to the laws of sacrilege!*
- I. *There really is a difference, for if he left the blood overnight, that is an affirmation action, on which account the later tossing of the blood has no effect and does not exempt the offering from the laws of sacrilege; but if he merely intended to leave the meat overnight, which is not an affirmative action, the tossing the blood makes a difference because it exempts the offering from the laws of sacrilege.*

III.6. A. *May we say that the following sustains [Rab's position, that tossing the blood of a disqualified offering is null]? Meat that has been rendered piggul in the case of Most Holy Things is subject to the laws of sacrilege. Is it not the point, then, that even though the blood has been tossed, that is the case, in which case that supports his view?*

B. *No, the statement speaks of a situation in which the blood has not been tossed [and the animal remains subject to the laws of sacrilege on that account]. And what is the law that applies after the blood has been tossed? Is it not the fact that the meat is not subject to the law of sacrilege [proving that tossing the blood has effect]?*

C. *Then why does the latter part of the rule go on to say, nor does it impose upon Lesser Holy Things liability to the laws of sacrilege? [This shows that the status of the disqualified offering is the same even after the blood has been tossed, If the rule were other than that,] let the framer of the passage make the distinction in his opening clause, saying, '...before the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply, after the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege do not apply. And that [received formulation, which does not make the cited distinction,] most certainly supports the position of Rab. And since the second clause supports the position of Rab, the second clause likewise supports his position.*

D. *It is not necessarily so, for the two clauses address different matters. For in respect to Lesser Holy Things that are disqualified, the law is clear that tossing the blood is null. But as to Most Holy Things that are disqualified, the law is not at all so clear.*

IV.1 A. **A general principle did R. Joshua state: "Whatever has had a moment of availability to [for use by] the priests — the laws of sacrilege do not apply thereto. [Once available to the priests, the offering is never again subject to the laws of sacrilege.] And [whatever] has not [yet] had a moment of availability to the priests — the laws of sacrilege do apply thereto." What is that which has had a moment of availability to the priests? That which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been left overnight, and that which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been made unclean, and that which [after the**

proper tossing of the blood] has gone forth [beyond the veils]. And what is that which has not [yet] had a moment of availability to the priests? That which has been slaughtered [with improper intention to eat that which is usually eaten or to offer up that which is usually offered up] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, And that, the blood of which invalid men have received or tossed:

- B. Said Bar Qappara to Bar Pedat, “Nephew, pay attention to what you are going to ask me tomorrow in the school house: have we learned to repeat the rule that Holy Things become permitted to the priest when properly slaughtered, **[5A]** or do we repeat the rule to indicate that they become permitted when they are ready for the tossing of the blood, or do we teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat?”
- C. Hezekiah said, “We teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat.”
- D. R. Yohanan said, We teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat.”
- E. *Said R. Zira, “A close reading of our Mishnah-paragraph does not yield a result in accord with either Hezekiah or R. Yohanan. We have learned in the Mishnah, That which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been left overnight, and that which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has been made unclean, and that which [after the proper tossing of the blood] has gone forth [beyond the veils]. Is the sense, then, not the blood of which has been left overnight, and it is taught as the Tannaite rule, the laws of sacrilege do not apply thereto? That then proves that what we have learned in repeating our Mishnah rule is, they become permitted when they are ready for the tossing of the blood.”*
- F. *Not at all, the sense is, that the meat has been kept over night. But the blood has been properly tossed. And on that account, it is taught, the laws of sacrilege do not apply thereto.*

IV.2. A. *We have learned in the Mishnah-passage: And what is that which has not [yet] had a moment of availability to the priests? That which has been slaughtered [with improper intention to eat that which is usually eaten or to offer up that which is usually offered up] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, And that, the blood of which invalid men have received or tossed. Now how are we to imagine this clause [about invalid men receiving or tossing the blood]? Should I say that unfit men tossed and also received the blood? Then why must two improper acts be required to render the offering unfit? So should it not rather mean, the offering is rendered unfit either when an invalid priest received the blood or an invalid priest tossed it? [Rashi: if invalid priests received the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply even though valid priests tossed it? The point is, if only one of the acts is performed by invalid priests, the offering is invalidated.] And the Tannaite rule yields the rule, what we have learned in repeating our Mishnah rule is, they become permitted when they are ready for the tossing of the blood.”*

- B. *Objected R. Joseph to this proposition, “But do you imagine that the passage intends to treat as distinct actions the receiving and tossing of the blood? In*

point of fact, both acts are considered as one. For we have learned in the Mishnah in the following passage: An invalid sin offering — its blood [that had spurted on a garment] does not require washing, (1) whether it had a moment of validity [for tossing the blood] or (2) it did not have a moment of validity [having been invalidated before the receiving of the blood]. What is the sort which had a moment of validity? That which remained overnight or which was made unclean or which went forth [beyond the veils] [since prior to these events, the offering had been entirely valid]. And what is the sort which did not have a moment of validity? That which was slaughtered [with the intention to eat the meat or to toss the blood] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, and that [the blood of] which unfit people received, or the blood of which [unfit people] tossed [M. Zebahim 11:2]. Now how shall we imagine such a case? If we say that it is one in which unfit priests received the blood and unfit priests tossed it, yielding a case in which the blood that splattered does not have to be laundered out, then in a case in which valid priests received and tossed the blood, that is one in which the blood that splattered has to be laundered. [In either case, we note, receiving and tossing the blood are considered as a single action, as Joseph maintains.]

- C. *Read the relevant verse, “When any of the received blood will be tossed on a garment, you shall wash it” (Lev. 6:20) — you do not wait until the blood has been tossed. [If the blood has been received but not tossed, the offering is valid; the two acts are treated as distinct].*
- D. *[The wording of M. Zeb. 10:1, bearing the opposite implication,] is not precise. [5B] Here too, the wording is not exact.*
- E. *Said R. Assi, “If so, then what need to I have to use the same phrase twice [concerning receiving and sprinkling the blood, both here and in the intersecting passage of Mishnah-tractate Zebahim]? Rather, the rule governing sacrilege is expressed in precise terms. [The use of the future tense at Lev. 6:20] serves to teach us that, when an unfit priest tosses the blood, he turns the remaining blood into remnant [that may not be tossed in the future to render meat available to the priests]. Even though an unfit priest has received the blood and an invalid priest tossed it, then a valid priest received the blood and tossed it in succession, that second action is null. How come? It is because the remaining blood is classified now as remnant.”*
- F. *But lo, R. Simeon b. Laqish asked R. Yohanan, “As to an invalid priest, what is the law on his rendered the remaining blood remnant?”*
- G. *And he replied, “You have nothing that imparts the status of remnant upon the blood except the improper intention of the priest to eat the meat outside the proper time or the proper place, since only the act of tossing the blood can disqualify an offering [and the status of the priest is null in that regard], since propitiation is gained for sacrifices that their improper intention has rendered invalid.”*
- H. *But isn’t there also the exception involving an invalid priest [the remaining blood is not unfit as remnant if he tossed it]?*
- I. *No, the rule is that even if an invalid priest tossed the blood, the rule is the same, since the language is used, You have nothing that imparts the status of remnant*

upon the blood except the improper intention of the priest to eat the meat outside the proper time or the proper place.

- J. *This is the sense of the statement:* The only action that does not render a public sacrifice acceptable and yet that renders the blood unfit as remnant is tossing the blood with the improper intention of eating the meat outside the proper time or place. But as to an unclean priest, he may offer a public offering that is valid, and he can impose the improper intention that renders the blood unfit as remnant. *But priests rendered invalid for other considerations, who may not offer public offerings, do not have the power to render blood unfit as remnant.*

IV.3. A. *Come and take note:* An offering in the status of piggul [by reason of the improper intentionality of the priest to eat the meat at the wrong time] under all circumstances is subject to the laws of sacrilege [III.5.A]. *Does this not mean, even though the blood has not been tossed, and that yields the inference, we repeat the rule to indicate that they become permitted when they are ready for the tossing of the blood?*

- B. Not at all, what is at stake is a situation in which the priest has already tossed the blood. *And what is the sense of* under all circumstances? *Lo, we are informed of the rule in accord with what R. Giddal said Rab said, for said R. Giddal said Rab, "The tossing of the blood of an offering that has been rendered unsuitable by reason of the officiating priest's improper intentionality does not remove the offering from the laws of sacrilege, in the case of Most Holy Things, nor does it bring Lesser Holy Things into the framework of the laws of sacrilege."*

IV.4. A. **[6A]** *Come and take note:* **R. Simeon says, "There is remnant to which the laws of sacrilege apply, and there is remnant to which the laws of sacrilege do not apply. How so? [If] the meat was left over night before the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to it. [If this happened] after the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege do not apply" [T. Me. 1:3A-D].** *Now, we note, in any event the Tannaite rule says, to which the laws of sacrilege apply. Does this not refer to a moment in which there was an interval in which, had the priest wanted, he could have tossed the blood? [Indeed so, and why didn't the priest toss it? Because there was no time to eat the meat before sunset]. And does this not yield the conclusion, we teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat?*

- B. *Not at all. It speaks of a case in which he received the blood near sunset, so that there was no time to toss the blood.*
- C. *But if there was no time to toss the blood, what is the rule?*
- D. *In this case, the meat would be exempt from the laws of sacrilege [since blood that is ready to be tossed is regarded as though it had been tossed].*
- E. *But if that were the consideration, that blood ready to be tossed is treated as though it were tossed, then why formulate the Tannaite ruling, **before the blood is tossed?** Formulate it in more general terms as, before sunset, when there is time to toss the blood, or after sunset, when the blood cannot be tossed?*
- F. *That is precisely the Tannaite formulation, for the language "before the blood is tossed" actually means, before it is ready to be tossed, and after the blood is tossed means, after it is ready to be tossed.*

IV.5. A. *Come and take note:* R. Simeon says, “There is remnant to which the laws of sacrilege apply, and there is remnant to which the laws of sacrilege do not apply. How so? [If] the meat was left over night before the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to it. [If this happened] after the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege do not apply” [T. Me. 1:3A-D]. Now, we note, in any event the Tannaite rule says, **to which the laws of sacrilege do apply.** [So blood of a disqualified offering does yield effects.] *Does this not refer to a moment in which there was an interval in which, had the priest wanted, he could have tossed the blood? Now the Tannaite rule is, the laws of sacrilege do apply. So doesn't that bear the implication,* we teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat?

- B. *Not at all. It speaks of a case in which there was no interval for sprinkling the blood.*
- C. *But if there was time to toss the blood, what is the rule?*
- D. *In this case, the meat would be exempt from the laws of sacrilege [since blood that is ready to be tossed is regarded as though it had been tossed].*
- E. *But if that were the consideration, that blood ready to be tossed is treated as though it were tossed, then why formulate the Tannaite ruling, **after the blood is tossed?** Formulate it in more general terms as, after sunset, when the blood cannot be tossed?*
- F. *That is precisely the intent of the statement, namely, before it is ready to be tossed, and after the blood is tossed means, after it is ready to be tossed.*

IV.6. A. *Come and take note:* An offering that has been rendered invalid by reason of the officiating priest's improper intentionality to eat the meat at the wrong time in the case of Most Holy Things is subject to the law of sacrilege. *Does this not mean that the blood has been tossed, and does it not yield the conclusion, we teach that they become permitted when they are ready for the priests to eat?*

- B. *No, it speaks of a case in which the blood had not been tossed.*
- C. *But if the blood had been tossed what is the rule?*
- D. *In such a case, too, the laws of sacrilege do not apply.*
- E. *If that is so [that the consideration concerns the tossing of the blood', then why does the Tannaite formulation proceed to specify, nor does it impose upon Lesser Holy Things liability to the laws of sacrilege? Why not formulate matters in terms of the distinction between the rule applying before the blood has been tossed and afterward? [Haas: since this distinction is not made, we must conclude that the Mishnah here is not concerned with teaching about the disposition of the blood.]*
- F. *Distinguishing between Most Holy Things and Lesser Holy Things comes to present the inference that “ the word **Whatever** serves to encompass under the laws of sacrilege anything that becomes the priest's property, meaning, Lesser Holy Things, through the tossing of the blood; everything is exempted from the law of sacrilege by being made fit for the altar alone, that is, Most Holy Things, which are exempted to the law of sacrilege even though the blood has been tossed improperly. [What matters is the actual tossing of the blood, not merely the fact that the blood is ready to be tossed.]*

I:1 clarifies the language of the Mishnah and explains its implications. II:1 explains why all the details of the Mishnah's wording are required. III:1-6 carry forward a systematic exegesis of the Mishnah's statement, and IV:1-6 present a large-scale study of the implications of the Mishnah's language, raising a question left open for discussion thereby.

1:2-3

1:2

- A. The meat of Most Holy Things which went forth [beyond the veils] before the tossing of the blood —
- B. R. Eliezer says, "The laws of sacrilege apply to it. And they are not liable on its account because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness."
- C. R. Aqiba says, "The laws of sacrilege do not apply to it. Truly are they liable on its account because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness."
- D. Said R. Aqiba, "Now, lo, he who separates a sin offering which is lost, and separated another in its stead, and afterward the first turns up, and lo, both of them are available —
- E. "is it not so that just as its blood exempts its flesh [from the laws of sacrilege], so it exempts the flesh of its fellow?
- F. "Now if [the proper tossing of] its blood has exempted the flesh of its fellow from being subject to the laws of sacrilege, is it not logical that it should exempt its own flesh?"

1:3

- A. The sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things which went forth [beyond the veils] before the tossing of the blood —
- B. R. Eliezer says, "The laws of sacrilege do not apply to them. And they are not liable on their account because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness."
- C. R. Aqiba says, "The laws of sacrilege do apply to them. And they are liable on their account because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness."

- I.1.** A. [The meat of Most Holy Things which went forth [beyond the veils] before the tossing of the blood...The sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things which went forth [beyond the veils] before the tossing of the blood:] *What need to I have for both of these cases?*
- B. *Both of them were required. For if the rule had been stated only in the case of Most Holy Things, I might have come to the conclusion that it is in that case in particular that R. Eliezer takes the position that the laws of sacrilege apply, since the proper tossing of the blood renders them exempt, and if the blood is not properly tossed, they are not exempted from the laws of sacrilege, as in the case at hand. But in respect to subjecting Lesser Holy Things to the laws of sacrilege, he would concur with R. Aqiba that even improperly tossing the blood imposes upon them liability to the laws of sacrilege.*

- C. *And if the rule was stated solely in the context of Lesser Holy Things, I might have come to the conclusion that it is in particular in respect to Lesser Holy Things that R. Aqiba takes the position that he does, that the laws of sacrilege apply, since in his view even tossing of the blood that is done improperly imposes liability to the laws of sacrilege, but when it comes to Most Holy Things, he would concur with R. Eliezer that they are not exempt, because improper tossing of the blood will not exempt them from the laws of sacrilege.*
- D. *So we are informed of the true state of opinion.*

I.2. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. Said R. Yohanan, "When R. Aqiba said that the proper tossing of the blood affects them even after the meat is taken beyond the veil [**the laws of sacrilege do apply to them**], that pertains to a case in which only part of the meat was carried beyond the veil. But in a case in which the whole of the meat of the beast was carried beyond the veil, R. Aqiba did not take that position."
- C. Said R. Assi to R. Yohanan, "My colleagues in the Exile have already taught me: **[7A]** 'An intentionality [that affects the meat, e.g., improperly to dispose of it by eating it at the wrong time or in the wrong place] pertaining to an offering that was lost or burned [disqualifies the whole of the offering, even though it concerned only part of it].' *Now lo, an offering that has been lost or burned is not here in hand, and yet we learn that improper intentionality concerning it affects the status of the whole.*" [*Here where we have the entirety of the offering and it is taken beyond the veil, intentionality concerning any part of it surely take effect.*]
- D. *But did R. Assi make such a statement? And lo, R. Assi is the very one who asked R. Yohanan, "If one gave thought concerning what is to be poured out [namely, the blood of an offering] to do so on the following day [not on the same day as the slaughter of the beast, as the law requires], what is the law?" [Haas: this blood is like the burned or lost portion of the sacrifice insofar as the priest intends to throw it out. Do intentions concerning that blood have any affect on the status of the offering as a whole?]*
- E. Said to him R. Zira, "You yourself have already repeated to us the principle in the context of unwanted meat trimmings, *namely: in respect to unwanted meat trimmings, since they are regarded as valueless and null, cannot contract uncleanness. The same should apply to the life-blood: since it is to be poured out as waste, improper intentionality concerning it has no affect upon it.*"
- F. *Now with reference to the Tannaite rule concerning the meat that is lost or burned up [that has been subjected to an improper intentionality], there is surely a conflict [between the rule just now given on unwanted meat trimmings and the rule given in the name of Assi].*
- G. Said Raba, "Say: [*the rule at C*] does not concern what is going to go to waste or what is going to be burned [and which therefore is regarded as having value]."

II.1 A. [**R. Aqiba says, "The laws of sacrilege do apply to them. And they are liable on their account because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness."**] said R. Pappa, "Said R. Aqiba, 'Tossing the blood takes effect even after part of the animal goes forth beyond the veil only if the meat in

particular is what has been carried beyond the limits, but if it was part of the blood, then tossing the rest of the blood is null.”

- B. *So too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. If one slaughtered the animal in silence [without voicing an improper intentionality], and the blood of the beast was taken outside of the holy place, even though it was brought back and tossed, the priest has done nothing.
- D. In the case of Most Holy Things, the laws of sacrilege apply; and in the case of Lesser Holy Things, the laws of sacrilege do not apply.

III.1 A. [Said R. Aqiba, “Now, lo, he who separates a sin offering which is lost, and separated another in its stead, and afterward the first turns up, and lo, both of them are available — is it not so that just as its blood exempts its flesh [from the laws of sacrilege], so it exempts the flesh of its fellow:”] Said R. Aqiba, “Lo, to what is this case comparable?...”

- B. Said R. Eleazar, “When R. Aqiba ruled [that tossing the blood of the original animal permits use of both its meat and the meat of its replacement, he took that position solely in a case in which both were slaughtered] at one and the same moment. But if they were slaughtered in sequence, he did not take that position.”

C. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- D. **Said R. Simeon, “When I passed the Sabbath in Kefar Beth Page a certain one of the disciples of R. Aqiba [Bavli: sage] came upon me and said to me, R. Aqiba maintained that tossing the blood takes effect in the case of that which has been taken forth beyond the veils.’ [Tosefta’s version: ‘Meat which has gone forth beyond the veils and in behalf of which the blood was tossed has been accepted.’] But when I came and laid the matters out before my colleagues in Galilee, they said to me, ‘And is it not invalidated? So how [does the frontlet] effect atonement for that which is invalid?’ So when I came and laid the matters out before R. Aqiba himself then he said to me, ‘My son, don’t you take that same position yourself? Lo, he who separates his sin-offering, which is lost, and separated another in its stead, and afterward the first turns up, and lo, both are available [M. **Me. 1:2D**] — the laws of sacrilege apply to both of them. [If] one slaughtered it, and lo, its blood is setting in cups the laws of sacrilege apply to both of them. [7B] If the blood of one of them is tossed, don’t you agree that just as its blood exempts its meat from subjection to the laws of sacrilege, so it should exempt the meat of its fellow from those same laws? Now, if it has afforded protection for the flesh of its fellow from liability to the laws of sacrilege, even though it is invalid, surely it should afford protection in this context for its own meat. [Tosefta’s wording:] If it has afforded protection for the flesh of its fellow from liability to the laws of sacrilege, even though it [the fellow] is invalid, it surely is logical that it should afford protection for its own flesh [as well]!” [T. **Me. 1:5**].**

- E. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish in the name of R. Oshaiah, “A disingenuous answer to R. Aqiba give to that disciple, namely, he took that position solely in a case in which both were slaughtered] at one and the same moment. But if they were slaughtered in sequence, he did not take that position. But since it is invalid in any event, what difference does it make to me whether the slaughter of the two beasts took place at

one and the same moment or sequentially? [One way or the other, the tossing of the blood makes no difference to the status of either one.]”

- F. Said R. Yohanan to R. Simeon b. Laqish, “[Not so, it does make a difference, since if they are slaughtered sequentially, they are classified as separate offerings, so that if part of one went out, that does not affect the status of the other.] Now don’t you yourself take that position? If someone designated two animals as guilt offerings, one as guarantee for the other, and then slaughtered both and tossed the blood of one of them and brought the sacrificial parts of the other up to the altar before tossing its blood, don’t you concur that the meat that is put up on the altar is taken down [until its blood too is tossed]? *But if you should maintain that they form a single corpus, then why* should the sacrificial parts that have been placed up on the altar be brought down? Didn’t Ulla say, ‘The sacrificial parts of Lesser Holy Things that are placed up on the altar before the tossing of the blood are not to be removed? They are treated as the bread of the altar [as soon as the blood is tossed]’? [Since you maintain that the sacrificial parts are removed, you surely deem the animals to be treated separately, just as Aqiba does].”
- G. *He kept silent.*
- H. *Said R. Yohanan, “I have made that youngster trip over his own feet.”*
I.1 provides standard Mishnah-criticism, and I.2 clarifies Aqiba’s position, as do II.1 and III.1.

1:4

- A. **A deed having to do with the blood in the case of Most Holy Things produces a ruling which is lenient and one which is stringent.**
- B. **But in the case of Lesser Holy Things, the whole [tendency] is to impose a stringent ruling.**
- C. **How so?**
- D. **Most Holy Things before the tossing of the blood —**
- E. **the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts and to the meat [which is for the priests].**
- F. **After the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts but they do not apply to the flesh.**
- G. **On account of this and on account of that are they liable because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness.**
- H. **But in the case of Lesser Holy Things, the whole [tendency] is to impose a stringent ruling — how so?**
- I. **Lesser Holy Things before the tossing of the blood —**
- J. **the laws of sacrilege do not apply either to the sacrificial parts or to the flesh. And they are not liable because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness.**
- K. **After the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts, but they do not apply to the flesh.**
- L. **On account of this and on account of that they are liable because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness.**

M. It turns out that a deed having to do with the blood in the case of Most Holy Things produces a ruling which is lenient and one which is stringent, but in the case of Lesser Holy Things, the whole [tendency] is to impose a stringent ruling.

- I.1. A. After the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts but they do not apply to the flesh: lo, the laws of sacrilege are the rules that do not apply, but the prohibition of the meat to the priests continues in place. But why should that be the case? Lo, it is in fact the property of the priest!**
- B. That is no problem. Since the first clause states, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts and to the meat, the parallel phrase is used in the next clause, namely, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts but they do not apply to the flesh. [But no further deduction is warranted.]**
- C. But then note what follows: But in the case of Lesser Holy Things, the whole [tendency] is to impose a stringent ruling — how so? Lesser Holy Things before the tossing of the blood — the laws of sacrilege do not apply either to the sacrificial parts or to the flesh. And they are not liable because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness. After the tossing of the blood, the laws of sacrilege apply to the sacrificial parts, but they do not apply to the flesh. On account of this and on account of that they are liable because of violation of the laws of refuse, remnant, and uncleanness. It is in particular the laws of sacrilege that do not apply, but the prohibition of the meat to the priests continues in place. But why should that be the case? Lo, it is in fact the property of the owner of the beast [who has brought it in fulfillment of his obligation].**
- D. Said R. Hanina, “The prohibition applies only to meat that was taken beyond the vails and brought back in [and the priests may not eat it; in other cases, the priests may eat it].”**
- E. It represents the position of R. Aqiba. For when R. Aqiba said that tossing the blood of Lesser Holy Things that went forth beyond the hangings takes effect, that is as to burning the meat, [8A] but as to eating it, it does not render the meat fit to be eaten.” [That is the meat the priests do not get and that is subjection to the stated prohibition.]**

The completion of the Mishnah-exegesis brings us to the end of our chapter; there is nothing here but close Mishnah-criticism of the finest kind.