

II.

BAVLI TRACTATE NAZIR CHAPTER TWO

FOLIOS 9A-16A

2:1

- A. [He who says,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite as to dried figs and pressed figs” —
- B. the House of Shammai say, “He is a Nazirite.”
- C. And the House of Hillel say, “He is not a Nazirite.”
- D. Said R. Judah, “Also: When the House of Shammai made this ruling, they made it only with reference to the one who says, ‘Lo, they are unto me as a Qorban [in which case, the Nazirite vow is implied].’”
- I.1 A. [He who says,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite as to dried figs and pressed figs” — the House of Shammai say, “He is a Nazirite” — *now why should that be the case? The All-Merciful has said, “nothing that is made of the grape-vine” (Num. 6: 4)!*
- B. *The House of Shammai concur in the reasoning of R. Meir, who has said, “A person does not use words pointlessly” [and therefore even if what he has said looks like gibberish, we identify the part that bears meaning and hold him to it].*
- C. *And the House of Hillel concur in the reason of R. Yosé, who has said, “For the conclusion of what someone says, he is held accountable” and in the present case, we have both the vow and the gate for releasing the vow alongside. [Klien: by his concluding remarks, he has withdrawn from his vow.]*
- D. *But from the viewpoint of the House of Shammai, surely we have both the vow and the gate for releasing the vow alongside [so that cannot be what is at issue].*
- E. *Rather, the House of Shammai concur with the position of R. Meir, who has said, “A person does not use words pointlessly,” and once he has stated, “Lo, I am a Nazirite,” he indeed becomes a Nazirite. When he proceeded to say, “as to dried figs and pressed figs,” he intended to seek remission from his vow, but the House of Shammai are consistent with their policy, for they maintain, “There is no possibility of seeking remission when it comes to matters of sanctification,” and since “There is no possibility of seeking remission when it comes to matters of sanctification,” there also is no possibility of seeking remission when it comes to Nazirite vows.*
- F. *And the House of Hillel concur with the position of R. Simeon, for we have learned in the Mishnah:*

- G. [He who says,] “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] a meal offering made of barley,” [in any case] must bring one made of wheat. [Free will meal offerings have to be made of wheat.] [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made] of meal,” must bring one made of fine flour. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering] without wine and frankincense,” must bring one with oil and frankincense. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made of] a half-tenth,” must bring one made of a whole tenth. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made of a tenth and a half-tenth,” brings one made of two [whole] tenths [of an ephah of fine flour]. R. Simeon declares free [of the obligation to bring a meal offering in any of the foregoing cases], for [in so specifying,] he has not volunteered [a freewill meal offering] in the way in which people volunteer [to make a freewill meal offering] [M. **Men. 12:3A-G**].

I.2 A. [9B] *Our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the view of the following Tannaite authority, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. R. Nathan says, “The House of Shammai say, ‘He has vowed [not to eat figs] and he has vowed to become a Nazirite.’ And the House of Hillel say, ‘He has vowed [not to eat figs], but he has not undertaken the Nazirite vow.’”

C. *The House of Shammai concur with the view of R. Meir and of R. Judah, and the House of Hillel concur with R. Yosé.* [Meir: people do not say things without meaning something; Judah: represented by the Mishnah-paragraph; Yosé: the intention is settled by the concluding language of the man’s statement, vs. Simeon].

D. *Another version of the same matter:*

E. R. Nathan says, “The House of Shammai say, ‘It is a valid vow but he is not a Nazirite.’ And the House of Hillel say, ‘It is not a valid vow, and, moreover, he is not a Nazirite.’”

F. *In accord with this version, the House of Shammai concur with R. Judah, and the House of Hillel with R. Simeon* [the vow must follow normal procedures.]

A Mishnah-rule that intersects in principle with the one at hand

- I.3 A.** *There we have learned in the Mishnah:* [He who says,] “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] a meal offering made of barley,” [in any case] must bring one made of wheat. [Free will meal offerings have to be made of wheat.] [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made] of meal,” must bring one made of fine flour. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering] without wine and frankincense,” must bring one with oil and frankincense. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made of] a half-tenth,” must bring one made of a whole tenth. [He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering made of a tenth and a half-

tenth,” brings one made of two [whole] tenths [of an ephah of fine flour]. R. Simeon declares free [of the obligation to bring a meal offering in any of the foregoing cases], for [in so specifying,] he has not volunteered [a freewill meal offering] in the way in which people volunteer [to make a freewill meal offering] [M. Men. 12:3A-G].

- B. *Who is the Tannaite authority that takes the position, if he said, “Lo, it is incumbent on me to present a meal-offering of barley,” he presents a meal offering of wheat in any event?*
- C. *Said Hezekiah, “It is subject to dispute, and the Tannaite authority at hand is the House of Shammai, who take the position that we are guided by the words that are initially stated. For we have learned in the Mishnah: [He who says,] ‘Lo, I am a Nazir as to dried figs and pressed figs’ — the House of Shammai say, ‘He is a Nazir.’ And the House of Hillel say, ‘He is not a Nazir’ [M. Naz. 2:1A-C]. Here too, if he said, ‘made of barley,’ he still presents one made of wheat.”*
- D. *R. Yohanan said, “You may even take the position that the ruling before us accords with the opinion of all parties [including the House of Hillel]. We assume that the man said, ‘If I had known that one cannot take a vow in this way, I should never have taken a vow in this way but in the right way.’”*
- E. *Said Hezekiah, “They stated that rule only in a case in which he said, ‘a meal offering of barley.’ But if he had said, ‘a meal offering of lentils,’ that is not the case, and he does not present anything.”*
- F. *Now in accord with which authority does Hezekiah establish this Tannaite ruling? Can it be the House of Shammai? But lo, lentils in the setting of the meal offering are equivalent to dried figs in the setting of the Nazirite vow [and they simply do not pertain], and the House of Shammai has said that he is subject to a Nazirite vow!*
- G. *Hezekiah retracted his opinion.*
- H. *But why should he have had to retract his opinion? [Klien: he could have maintained that the rule of meal offerings represents the House of Shammai and retract from the second statement, holding that the ruling applies even if the man said “lentils”.]*
- I. *Said Raba, “He found difficulties in the Mishnah-rule. Why formulate the Tannaite rule in terms of barley and not lentils? [Klien: if the view of the House of Shammai is that we hold a man to the first portion of his vow, then even if he says, “I intend to offer a meal-offering of lentils,” he should be obliged to bring one of wheat.] So Hezekiah took the view that, when the House of Shammai made their statement, it was in accord with R. Judah’s position” [Klien: Even according to the House of Shammai, where he vowed to bring a meal-offering of barley, he would not be obliged to bring one of wheat unless he explicitly stated that*

had he known that such vows are not made, he would have vowed in the correct manner. But while such a plea would be accepted if he vowed barley, because it could have been a bone-fide error, it could not be admitted if he undertook to offer lentils. Granted this, the rule in Menahot can represent the views of both the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai, hence the reason for Hezekiah's relinquishing his former opinion.]

- J. And R. Yohanan said, "[The rule would apply] even if he said, 'of lentils.'"
- K. *But lo, it is R. Yohanan himself who has said, "We assume that the man said, 'If I had known that one cannot take a vow in this way, I should never have taken a vow in this way but in the right way.'" [That plea is not admitted if he vowed to bring lentils].*
- L. *But when he made his statement, it was within the premises of Hezekiah, specifically: "As to you, how come you retracted? It is because the Mishnah-rule was not formulated in the language of 'lentils.' But perhaps the formulation builds to a climax, thus: it is not necessary to say that when he said 'of lentils,' he presents a proper meal offering, for one may say, he thereby repents his vow, and in that case, we derive his intention from the opening part of his statement. But even if he says, 'of barley,' where we take it as fact that he intends to say, 'it if can become sanctified in the manner of the meal offering of the 'omer [barley], [10A] or the meal offering of the wife accused of adultery, but if not, then I don't want it to be sanctified' — even in such a case, we are told, he must present an offering of wheat."*

2:2

- A. **If one said, "This cow says, 'Lo, I am a Nazirite if I stand up,'**
- B. **"This door says, 'Lo, I am a Nazirite if I am opened'" —**
- C. **the House of Shammai say, "He is a Nazirite."**
- D. **And the House of Hillel say, "He is not a Nazirite."**
- E. **Said R. Judah, "Also: When the House of Shammai made their ruling, they made it only with reference to the one who says, 'Lo, this cow is unto me as a Qorban if it stands up [on its own].'"**

I.1 A. *So do cows talk?*

- B. *Said Rami bar Hama, "Here with what situation do we deal? A case in which a cow was crouching before the man and he said, 'This cow is thinking that it's not going to stand up. Lo, I am a Nazirite as to its meat [and will not eat that meat] if it stands up of its own volition,' and it stood up of its own volition."*

I.2 A. *And the House of Shammai follow their theory of matters, and the House of Hillel follow their theory of matters.*

- B. The House of Shammai, who hold, “[If someone said, ‘**Lo, I am a Nazirite**’] as to **dried figs and pressed figs,**’ he is a Nazirite, *here too maintain*, ‘when he said, “from its meat,” he is a Nazirite.
- C. And the House of Hillel say, “He is not a Nazirite.”
- D. *Well, then, the House of Shammai have made that point one time [and why do they have to repeat it]?*
- E. *Said Raba, “Not only a second but a third time,” and so did R. Hiyya teach, “A second and a third time,” and so said R. Oshaia, “A second and a third time.”*
- F. *And all were necessary, for if the rule had been stated here alone, in the case of the dried figs and pressed figs, one might have supposed that in that case in particular, the House of Shammai held that the man was a Nazirite, because they are interchangeable with grapes, but when it comes to meat, meat is not going to be confused with grapes. And if the decision had been reported only in the setting of meat, one might have supposed that here in particular, the House of Shammai ruled that he was a Nazirite, because meat and wine [form a pair], but dried figs and pressed figs don’t. So we are informed to the contrary.*
- G. *And if the matter had been stated in particular in the two examples just now treated, one might have supposed that in these two instances in particular the House of Shammai rule as they do, but when it comes to the door [“**This door says, ‘Lo, I am a Nazirite if I am opened’**“], I might have supposed that the House of Shammai there concur with the position of the House of Hillel. And had the Tannaite formulation presented only the case of the door, one might have supposed that in that case in particular the House of Hillel take the position that they do, but as to these other two cases, I might have said that they concur with the House of Shammai. So we are informed to the contrary.*

I.3 A. [Reverting to I.1] *said Raba, “But does the Tannaite formulation contain the qualifying language, ‘If it stood up of its own volition’?”*

- B. Rather, said Raba, “We deal with a case in which a cow was crouching before him, and he said, ‘Lo, I pledge to present it as an offering....’”
- C. *Now there is no problem understanding the case of the cow, for it is available for sacrifice, but is a door available for sacrifice?!*
- D. Rather, said Raba, “We deal with a case in which a cow was crouching before him, **[10B]** and he said, ‘Lo, I shall be a Nazirite from wine if it does not stand up [of its own volition],’ and it stood up of its own volition. The House of Shammai say, ‘The obligatory language of this man’s vow was his intention to make the cow get up by force,’ and lo, he did not make it stand up [so he becomes a Nazirite]. The House of Hillel take the view that the vow was made because the cow was crouching, and it has gotten up [and he doesn’t become a Nazirite].”
- E. *If that is the sense of the matter, then let us turn to the concluding clause: Said R. Judah, “Also: When the House of Shammai made their ruling, they made it only with reference to the one who says, ‘Lo, this cow is unto me as a Qorban if it stands up [on its own].’” Does the vow pertain to the cow at all?! [Klien: The words, ‘it is forbidden to me as a sacrifice,’ imply that the heifer itself was the*

object of the vow, while in Raba's explanation, it is the heifer's not standing up that is the condition for the operation of the man's Naziriteship, and he has no intention of attaching any sanctity to the cow.]

- F. Rather, we deal with a case in which he said, "Lo, I shall be a Nazirite as to its meat if it does not stand up," and it stood up of its own volition. *The House of Shammai say, 'The obligatory language of this man's vow was his intention to make the cow get up by force,' and lo, he did not make it stand up [so he becomes a Nazirite]. The House of Hillel take the view that the vow was made because the cow was crouching, and it has gotten up [and he doesn't become a Nazirite]."*
- G. *But do the House of Hillel take the view that if the cow doesn't get up, the man becomes a Nazirite? But have they not said, "If it is a vow not to eat its meat, he does not become a Nazirite" [Klien: even as in the case of a vow to abstain from pressed figs]?*
- H. *They made their statement within the premises of the House of Shammai, along these lines: "From our perspective, even if the cow did not get up, he would still not be a Nazirite. But within your premises, in holding that he would be a Nazirite, nonetheless you should concede to us that the vow was made because the cow was crouching, and it has gotten up [and he doesn't become a Nazirite]."*
- I. And the House of Shammai?
- J. *The obligatory language of this man's vow was not his intention to make the cow get up by force,' and lo, he did not make it stand up, [so he becomes a Nazirite].*

2:3

- A. [11A] If they mixed a cup for someone, and he said, "Lo, I am a Nazirite from it,"
- B. lo, this one is a Nazirite.
- C. M'SH B: A woman was drunk and they filled a cup for her, and she said, "Lo, I am a Nazirite from it."
- D. Sages ruled, "She intended only to say, 'Lo, it is unto me as a Qorban.'"
- I.1 A. *So is the case [C-D] cited to contradict the ruling [A-B]? In the beginning you have said, lo, this one is a Nazirite, and then go and repeat, M'SH B: A woman was drunk, therefore in that case in particular he forbids himself to this cup of wine, but he is permitted to drink other wine!*
- B. *The formulation bears a flaw, and this is how it is to be repeated:*
- C. **If they mixed a cup for someone, and he said, "Lo, I am a Nazirite from it," lo, this one is a Nazirite.** But if he was drink and said, "Lo, I am a Nazir from it," he is not a Nazirite. How come? Because he is in the position of someone who said, "Lo, it is [forbidden to me] as an offering [is forbidden] to me."
- D. *And should you say then let him say so in so many words, he was thinking, "They might bring more wine and impose on me, so I'll say this to him, so they'll quit."*
M'SH B: A woman was drunk, etc.

2:4

- A. [If someone said,] "Lo, I am a Nazirite on condition that I shall drink wine and become unclean with corpse uncleanness,"

- B. lo, this one is a Nazirite.
- C. But he is prohibited to do all of these things [that he has specified as conditional upon his vow].
- D. [If he said,] “I recognize that there is such a thing as Naziriteship, but I do not recognize that a Nazirite is prohibited from drinking wine,”
- E. lo, this one is bound [by the Nazirite oath].
- F. And R. Simeon declares him not bound.
- G. [If he said,] “I recognize full well that a Nazirite is prohibited to drink wine, but I was thinking that sages would permit me to do so, because I cannot live without wine,”
- H. or “because I am in the work of burying the dead,”
- I. lo, this one is not bound.
- J. And R. Simeon declares him bound.

I.1 A. *Should R. Simeon not register his disagreement also in the opening case [A-C, as in D-F]?*

- B. Said R. Joshua b. Levi, “R. Simeon disagreed also in the opening case.”
- C. *Rabina said, “R. Simeon did not disagree in the first case. How come? Because it is a case of stating a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, and anyone who stipulates to a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah — his stipulation is null.”*
- D. And R. Joshua b. Levi?
- E. *He will say to you, “This language, ‘on condition’ is equivalent to the language, ‘except for...,’” [Klien: hence the vow was not all-inclusive and therefore Simeon regards it as null].*

I.2 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of Rabina:*

- B. [If he said], “Lo, I am a Nazirite on condition that I shall be drinking wine and making myself unclean with corpse-uncleanness” — Lo, this one is a Nazir [M. **Naz. 2:4A-B**]. But his prior stipulation is null. For he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah, and whoever makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah — his condition is null [T. **2:2**].

II.1 A. [If he said,] “I recognize that there is such a thing as Naziriteship, but I do not recognize that a Nazirite is prohibited from drinking wine,” lo, this one is bound [by the Nazirite oath]:

- B. *[Contrasting D-F and G-I, we note that] in the prior clause, [where he says he did not know wine is forbidden] Rabbis bind the vow and R. Simeon is the one who releases it [and why not the same here]?*
- C. *Say also here, Lo, this one is bound, and R. Simeon releases him from the vow.*
- D. *And if you wish, I shall say, in point of fact do not reverse the text. There [11B] in the first clause, where he takes the vow to abstain from one thing only [e.g., wine but not corpse-uncleanness], from the viewpoint of rabbis, who hold that even if one has taken the Nazirite vow only in respect to one of its prohibitions, he still is held to be a Nazirite, and he is bound by the entire oath. And from the perspective of R. Simeon, who has said, he is a Nazirite only if he takes an oath on*

all counts, he is released from the oath. *As to the latter clause, by contrast, where he takes an oath in respect to all of the prohibitions that pertain to the Nazirite, and who seeks remission for one detail only, then, according to rabbis, who regard him as a Nazirite even if he accepts only one restriction, if he desires the release in respect to one thing only, he is released from that prohibition. From the viewpoint of R. Simeon, who requires him to accept the prohibitions of all things forbidden to the Nazirite, he cannot be released from one thing only, unless he gets a release from them all. This is why we have, in the latter, R. Simeon declares him bound.*

- E. *And if you wish, I shall say, what is subject to dispute is the matter of vows that are violated under constraint, and they pursue the same point as is subject to the dispute of Samuel and R. Assi, for we have learned in the Mishnah:*
- F. **Four [types of] vows did sages declare not binding: (1) Vows of incitement, (2) vows of exaggeration, (3) vows made in error, and (4) vows [broken] under constraint [M. Ned. 3:1A]...**Said R. Judah said R. Assi, "The four classifications of vows at hand have to be released through the address of an inquiry to a sage. *When I made that statement before Samuel, he said, 'the Tannaite authority repeats the statement in the language, Four [types of] vows did sages declare not binding, and yet you make the claim that the four classifications of vows at hand have to be released through the address of an inquiry to a sage?!'*"
- G. *Rabbis concur with the position of Samuel, and R. Simeon, of R. Assi. [Klien: since it is impossible for a Nazirite to work in a graveyard, the vow is null of itself; Simeon/Assi: though he cannot be a Nazirite, the vow must be remitted by a sage.]*

2:5

- A. **[If one said,] "Lo, I am a Nazirite, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of a[nother] Nazirite," and his friend heard and said, "So am I, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of a[nother] Nazirite,"**
- B. **if they are smart, each brings the hair offering of the other,**
- C. **and if not, they bring the hair offering of other Nazirites.**
- I.1** A. *The question was raised: If he heard his fellow take this vow and said simply, "So am I, what is the meaning of this "so am I"? Does this pertain to the entirety of the original statement, or does it pertain only to part of it? And if you should say, it pertains only to part of it, is it to the opening or to the closing clause of the original statement?*
- B. *Come and take note: "So am I, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of a[nother] Nazirite," if they are smart, each brings the hair offering of the other, and if not, they bring the hair offering of other Nazirites. Now, since he has said, "So am I, and I take it upon myself..., that bears the implication that So am I pertains to only part of the prior statement.*
- C. *Well and good, it pertains to only part of the prior statement, but is it to the opening or to the closing clause of the original statement?*

- D. *Since the language is, and I take it upon myself, it follows that So am I likewise pertains to the opening clause of the original statement.*
- E. *Said R. Huna b. R. Joshua to Raba, “Why so? On the contrary, I will say to you, the language, **So am I**, pertains to the entire statement. And as to the consideration of the clause, **and I take it upon myself**, that merely underscores what he has undertaken to do. For if you do not accept this view, then note the later language of the Mishnah, [If one said,] “**Lo, I pledge myself to bring half of the hair offering of a Nazirite,**” and his friend heard and said, “**And I too pledge myself to bring half the hair offering of a Nazirite,**” in that case do we even have two clauses to which to make reference at all?! Rather, we must conclude that in that case, he is simply going over the ground, ‘I have undertaken this objection,’ and here too, perhaps he is merely going over the ground, ‘I have undertaken this obligation.’”*
- F. *Said to him Raba, “What’s going on here! If you maintain that in the initial formulation, the language, ‘I undertake,’ is required but that in the later formulation of the problem that language is not required, then in the later formulation they are repeated — even though not required — on account of their inclusion in the first clause, where they are required [as a parallel formulation] [so we can understand the matter]. But if you maintain that the language of ‘I undertake’ is not required either in the former formulation or in the latter, then why go over the same ground twice when in neither case the statement is not necessary!?”*

Free-standing Exercise that Invokes the Mishnah-Rule at Hand in its Exposition

- I.2 A.** *Said R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan, “He who says to his messenger, [12A] ‘Go and betroth a woman for me,’ without further specification as to which woman, and then the agent died — the man is forbidden to marry any woman in the world [since she might be consanguineous with the woman whom the agent betrothed for him]. The reason is that an agent will be assumed to have carried out his commission, and since the man did not spell out for him whom he wanted, he will not know whom he has betrothed for him.”*
- B. *R. Simeon b. Laqish objected to R. Yohanan, “**An unassigned pair of birds from which one pigeon flew off into the air — or one of which flew among birds which had been left to die — or one of which died — let [the owner] purchase a mate for the second [M. Qm. 2:1A-D].** That bears the implication, if the pair of birds had been assigned, the man would have had no remedy, though all the other pairs in the world would have been valid. Now why should this be so? Why not say, every one of the others may be this one that flew away?” [Klien: and could not be offered except on behalf of the owner who originally designated it.]*

C. *He said to him, "But I was speaking of a woman, who does not wander hither and yon, while you introduce an objection based on things that are prohibited and that fly all about! And should you say, here too, the woman may move about — he might have met her in the market and betrothed her — in that case, the woman nonetheless reverts to a settled situation, but when it comes to a bird, does it ever revert to a settled situation?"*

D. Said Raba, "R. Yohanan concedes in the case of a woman who has no daughter or daughter's daughter or son's daughter or mother or mother's mother or sister, even though she has a sister who was divorced afterward — *that such a woman would be permitted to him. How come? At that time that he gave his orders to the messenger, the woman was yet married, and when someone appoints a messenger, it is to do something that is possible to do at that time. But to do something that is not possible to do at that time, he does not appoint a messenger.*"

E. *We have learned in the Mishnah: [If one said,] "Lo, I am a Nazirite, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of a[nother] Nazirite," and his friend heard and said, "So am I, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of a[nother] Nazirite," if they are smart, each brings the hair offering of the other, and if not, they bring the hair offering of other Nazirites. Now [the advice to provide the hair offering for one another] makes sense for the latter, for the former had already become a Nazirite [and how vow to provide for a Nazirite's hair offering can pertain to the former figure], but as to the latter, was the latter a Nazirite when he made the pledge?*

F. **[12B]** *Rather, this is the sense of his statement: "If I find someone who is a Nazirite, I'll provide for his hair offering." Here too, perhaps the sense is, "If you find one who is divorced, you may betroth her on my behalf"!*

G. *Say: when someone appoints a messenger, it is to do something only that he himself can do at that minute, but he does not appoint a messenger to do something that he himself cannot do at that moment but only later on.*

H. *Come and take note: "He who says to his major domo, 'All vows that my wife may make from now until I come back from such-and-such a place — you annul for her,' and he annulled such vows for her — Might one*

suppose that the vows should indeed be regarded as nullified? Scripture states, ‘Her husband may confirm it or her husband may annul it’ (Num. 30:14),” the words of R. Josiah. Said to him R. Jonathan, “We find in every passage [in the Torah] that [acts of] the agent of a person are equivalent to [acts of] the person himself.” *Now even R. Josiah takes the position that he does only because it is a decree of Scripture, that is,* “Scripture states, ‘Her husband may confirm it or her husband may annul it’ (Num. 30:14).” *But apart from that consideration, the messenger should have been able to annul her vows, while, so far as the husband is concerned, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:* He who says to his wife, “All vows which you will vow from this time until I return from such-and-such a place, lo, they are confirmed,” has said nothing whatsoever. [If he says], “Lo, they are annulled” – R. Eliezer says, “It is annulled.” And sages say, “It is not annulled.” Now, in the assumption that when R. Josiah made his statement, it was within the framework of rabbis position that he made it, that is, the husband could not invalidate the wife’s vow, and if it were not that Scripture had said, “Her husband may confirm it or her husband may annul it” (Num. 30:14), the messenger otherwise could have nullified them [Klien: which seems to show that a man can appoint a messenger for something that cannot be done at once but can be done later].

- I. *But perhaps he made his ruling within the framework of the position of R. Eliezer, who has said, the major domo can annul the vow!*
- J. *If so, why does he have to appoint the messenger to annul her vows? He can do it himself!*
- K. *He is thinking, maybe he’ll forget [in the turmoil of departure] or be mad or be busy [so this provides for the situation in a more reliable way].*

2:6

- A. “[If one said,] ‘Lo, I pledge myself to bring half of the hair offering of a Nazirite,’ and his friend heard and said, ‘And I too pledge myself to bring half the hair offering of a Nazirite,’
 - B. “this one brings the whole hair offering of a Nazirite and that one brings the whole hair offering of a Nazirite,” the words of R. Meir.
 - C. And sages say, “This one brings half the hair offering of a Nazirite, and that one brings half the hair offering of a Nazirite.”
- I.1** A. Said Raba, “All agree *that in any case in which he said, ‘Half of the offerings of a Nazirite are incumbent on me,’ he brings half of the offerings.* ‘Half of a Nazirite is incumbent on me,’ *he has to bring the entire offering. How come? Because we do not find a partial Naziriteship. Where there is a dispute is in the case of the use of the language recorded in our Mishnah-paragraph. R. Meir takes the view that, once he has said, ‘Lo, incumbent on me...,’ he has become obligated for the entire offering of a Nazirite vow. And when he continued with the language, ‘half of the Naziriteship,’ he does not have the power to [impose further limitations on his pledged word]. Sages take the view that what we have is a vow along with its own remission.*”

2:7-8

2:7

- A. [If one said,] “I will be a Nazirite when a son is born to me,” and a son was born to him, lo, this one is a Nazirite.
- B. If a daughter, a child of unclear sexual traits, or a child bearing the sexual traits of both sexes is born to him, he is not a Nazirite.
- C. If he said, “When I see that a child is born to me, [I shall be a Nazirite,]”
- D. even if a daughter, a child bearing unclear sexual traits, or a child bearing the sexual traits of both sexes, is born to him, lo, he is a Nazirite.

2:8

- A. [13A] [But if] his wife miscarried, he is not a Nazirite.
 - B. R. Simeon says, “He should say, ‘If it was a viable fetus, lo, I am a Nazirite out of obligation. And if not, lo, I am a Nazirite by free choice.’”
 - C. If. she went and gave birth again, lo, this one is a Nazirite.
 - D. R. Simeon says, “He should say, ‘If the first was a viable fetus, the first [Nazirite spell that I observed] is done out of obligation, and this one is by free choice. And if not, then the first was by free choice, and this one is out of obligation.’”
- I.1** A. [If one said, “I will be a Nazirite when a son is born to me,” and a son was born to him, lo, this one is a Nazirite:] *what’s the point of saying this [obvious rule]?*
- B. *It is because of what follows:* If a daughter, a child of unclear sexual traits, or a child bearing the sexual traits of both sexes is born to him, he is not a Nazirite.

- C. *So what else is new!*
- D. *What might you otherwise have supposed? The sense of his statement is, "When I beget children" [the language at hand yielding not only "son" but "to get children"]. So we are informed that that is not the case.*

II.1 A. [But if] his wife miscarried, he is not a Nazirite:

- B. *So what else is new!*
- C. *What might you otherwise have supposed? "A child that is counted among men," is what is required. So we are informed that that is not the case*

II.2 A. [But if] his wife miscarried, he is not a Nazirite:

- B. *Who is the Tannaite authority behind that rule?*
- C. **It is R. Judah of the case of the heap of grain ["Lo, I am a Nazirite, on condition that in this pile of wheat of mine there should be a hundred *kor*," and he went and found it had been stolen or had gotten lost — it is a matter of doubt whether or not there was that volume of wheat in the mound — R. Simeon declares him liable. For in Nazirite-vows, a vow subject to doubt is binding. R. Judah declares him exempt. For in Nazirite-vows a vow subject to doubt is not binding = a vow subject to doubt is treated in a lenient way (T. 2:9A-H)].**

III.1 A. R. Simeon says, "He should say, 'If it was a viable fetus, lo, I am a Nazirite out of obligation. And if not, lo, I am a Nazirite by free choice:'"

- B. *R. Abba asked R. Huna, "[If he said,] 'Lo, I shall be a Nazirite when I shall have a son,' and his wife miscarried, his having set aside animals for the offering of the Nazirite, and his wife then gave birth [to a viable infant, twin of the miscarried infant] what is the law?"*
- C. *Within the premise of which authority is this question framed? It cannot be framed within the theory of R. Simeon, for why should it be a question? Lo, R. Simeon has said, "In Nazirite vows, a vow subject to doubt is treated in a strict way." So it must be in accord with the position of R. Judah, who has said, "In Nazirite vows, a vow subject to doubt is treated in a lenient way." [So what is at issue is] whether the animals that the man has set aside for the Nazirite offering are treated as sanctified or not? [Klien: does the birth of the second child prove that the first was the result of the same pregnancy and consequently not premature and viable, or do we assume that it was the result of a later pregnancy and thus was premature and not-viable?]*
- D. *So what difference does it make?*
- E. *Whether the animal may be sheared or worked [between the first and second child; if it is holy, it may not be used for secular purposes, if it is not, it may be].*
- F. *The question stands.*

III.2 A. Ben Rehum asked Abbaye, "[If he said,] 'Lo, I shall be a Nazirite when I have a son,' and his friend heard and said, 'So I undertake as well,' what is the rule? Is the implicit meaning what the other has said, or is the implicit meaning, what becomes of the person of the other? [If it is to what he has said, then the sense is, "I will become a Nazirite when you have a son." If it is to the status of the friend, the meaning is, "I will become a Nazirite when I have a son."]

- B. *If you prefer to rule, what becomes of the person of the other, then if he said, “Lo, I shall become a Nazirite when you have a son,” and his friend heard and said, “So I undertake as well,” what is the law? Does the man make reference to himself [and he therefore becomes a Nazirite when his wife has a son] or perhaps this is what he means to say: “I am as good a friend to you as you are to yourself” [so his intent is to say, “I shall become a Nazirite when you have a son”].*
- C. *If you prefer to rule, whenever the other is present and at hand, [13B] he is embarrassed [to refer to himself], then if he said, “Lo, I shall be a Nazirite when Mr. So-and-so has a son,” and his friend heard and said, “So I undertake as well,” what would be the law? Do we say, because the other is not present, his intent is to speak of himself, or does he mean, “I am as good a friend of his as you are” [and therefore when he has a son, I shall be a Nazirite]?*
- D. *The question stands.*

2:9

- A. **[He who said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite, and [again] a Nazirite if a son is born to me,”**
- B. **if he began counting out the Nazirite days covering his own vow, and afterward a son was born to him,**
- C. **he completes the days of his own vow and afterward counts out the days of the vow pertaining to his son.**
- D. **[If he said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite when a son will be born to me, and [again] a Nazirite,”**
- E. **if he began to count out the days covering his own vow, and afterward a son was born to him,**
- F. **he puts aside [the observance of the days of] his own vow and counts out the days covering the vow he made for his son.**
- G. **And afterward he completes the days required for his own vow.**
- I.1 A. *Raba raised this question: “If he said, ‘Lo, I shall be a Nazirite after twenty days time,’ and then he said, ‘For one hundred days, starting now,’ what is the law? Since these hundred days will not be complete in twenty days, they do not take effect [for now]? Or perhaps, since there will be ample time for him to grow a new head of hair for the purification-rite at the end of the hundred days, the twenty days do take effect immediately?” [Klien: He will count twenty days, observe an ordinary Naziriteship of thirty days, and then count eighty days to complete the Naziriteship of one hundred days.]*
- B. *But why not frame the question to begin with of a second Naziriteship of a short duration [“I shall be a Nazirite when twenty days have passed,” and then, “I shall be a Nazirite starting now]?*
- C. *He is raising a question within a question [as will now be spelled out]. [14A] And if you prefer to rule, in the case of a shorter Naziriteship, since only ten days remain, the ten days would not be counted [Klien: as completing the first Naziriteship by adding them to the twenty days, since ten days do not allow for the hair to grow long and therefore this Naziriteship does not commence until the other is finished], [what are we to say] as to the Naziriteship of one hundred*

days? [Klien: is it on the same footing as the short one or does it commence at once?] *Since eighty remain at the end, do they count [as completing the first Naziriteship] or not?*

- D. *And if you prefer to rule, the Naziriteship takes effect immediately, what is the rule if he said, “Lo, I shall be a Nazirite after twenty days have passed, and, from this time forward, I shall be a lifelong Nazirite” — what is the rule? Does the vow become operative at once or not? [Though a lifelong Nazirite cuts his hair every thirty days, the Naziriteship is continuous and cannot be interrupted; thus once the life-Naziriteship operates, it is impossible for the ordinary Naziriteship to take effect.]*
- E. *And if you prefer to rule, here, since it is possible to present a question to a sage that would release the vow [that takes effect in twenty days], they become operative at once [and he must get a release from the Naziriteship that was to have taken effect after twenty days], if he said, “Lo, I shall be a Nazirite in the status of Samson after twenty days have passed, and I shall be a Nazirite without further specification as of now,” what is the law? Here, since there is no possibility of securing a release [Samson having been unable to secure a release from his vow], does the vow take effect at all? or perhaps that is not the case?*
- F. If he said, “...like Moses, on the seventh of Adar” [the day he was born and the day he died], *what is the rule?* [Klien: as after the death of Moses, when many Nazirite vows were taken, or “after the birth of Moses,” a festive occasion].
- G. *Of all these questions, the one you can solve is the first: “Lo, I shall be a Nazirite after twenty days time,” and then he said, “For one hundred days, starting now” — he observes the twenty day, and then he observes thirty, and then he observes eighty, so as to complete the first of his Nazirite vows [T. 2:10A-C].*

II.1 A. [If he said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite when a son will be born to me, and [again] a Nazirite:”

- B. If he contracted uncleanness in the time of the Nazirite vow observed in honor of his son —
- C. R. Yohanan said, “He loses the first period as well [that is, the days observed before his son was born, on his own account].”
- D. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He does not lose the first period as well [that is, the days observed before his son was born, on his own account].”
- E. R. Yohanan said, “He loses the first period as well [that is, the days observed before his son was born, on his own account]:” *it is regarded as a single protracted spell of Naziriteship.*
- F. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “He does not lose the first period as well [that is, the days observed before his son was born, on his own account]]” — *the Nazirite vow taken on his own account is one thing, the Nazirite vow taken in honor of his son is another, distinct spell.*
- G. **[14B]** [If he contracts the skin ailment of Lev. 13 during his Nazirite spell, and then is cured, he completes his Nazirite vow when the skin ailment is cured. Now, if,] during the period that he is suffering from the skin ailment [and so not subject to the fulfillment of the vow], he contracts corpse uncleanness,

- H. R. Yohanan said, "He loses [the earlier period of the Naziriteship, observed prior to his suffering the skin ailment]."
- I. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He does not lose the first period as well."
- J. R. Yohanan said, "He loses [the earlier period of the Naziriteship, observed prior to his suffering the skin ailment]:" — *lo, he stands in the midst of his period of Naziriteship [the period not having been completed]*.
- K. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He does not lose the first period as well:" — *the spell observed when subject to the skin ailment is one thing and the Nazirite vow is another*.
- L. *And it was necessary to state both disputes, for if the first dispute alone had been stated, one might have thought that it was in that case in particular that R. Yohanan said, "He loses [the earlier period of the Naziriteship]," because there we deal with a single Naziriteship. But in this latter case, I might have said that he concurs with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish that the Naziriteship is one thing, the affliction of the skin ailment is another thing. And if the dispute had been stated only in this latter case, I might have supposed that in the latter case, R. Simeon b. Laqish took the position that he did, but in the former, I might say that he concurs with the view of R. Yohanan, Accordingly, both disputes were required.*
- M. If the man contracted uncleanness on a day during the period that his hair was growing [if he had his hair cut willy-nilly, his Naziriteship is not interrupted; he completes the period; if this is less than for thirty days, he still has to grow hair for thirty days; these additional days are "the period that his hair was growing"] —
- N. Rab said, "He does not lose the days already observed in the prior spell. Even in the view of R. Yohanan, who has said, 'He loses those days,' *that is the rule in a case in which he is actually subject to the Nazirite vow. But the period of growing the hair complements the Nazirite vow.*"
- O. Samuel said, "He does lose the days already observed. Even in the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish, who has said, 'He does not lose those days,' *that is the position he takes there, where there are two distinct Nazirite vows in question, but here we deal with a single Nazirite vow.*"
- P. Said R. Hisda, "All concur that if his hair is sanctified [Num. 6:11] when the blood of his offering was sprinkling [and he contracted corpse uncleanness at that moment], there is no remedy for his situation."
- Q. *Within the premises of what authority is this statement made? It cannot be in accord with the position of R. Eliezer, for, since in his view, the cutting of the hair for the hair offering of the Nazirite vow still stands in the way of his drinking wine, the uncleanness that he has contracted is still prior to the moment of "the fulfillment of his consecration" (Num. 6:13). [He cannot drink wine after*

the hair offering, but only after all the rites are completed, so he does not fall into the situation set forth by Hisda.] And it also cannot be in accord with the position of rabbis, who hold that the cutting of the hair does not stand in the way of his drinking wine [Klien: and defilement after the termination of his period does not affect the Naziriteship].

- R. *Indeed, the statement stands within the premises of rabbi, and the statement, “there is no remedy for his situation” means, “as to the religious duty of presenting the hair offering in a state of cultic cleanness.”*

II.2 A. Said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “A Nazirite who has completed the period of his vow [but not yet presented his offerings] is flogged for contracting cultic uncleanness but not for cutting the hair or drinking wine.”

- B. *What differentiates contracting corpse uncleanness, on account of which he is flogged? It is because Scripture states, “All the days that he consecrates himself to the Lord, he shall not come near a dead body” (Num. 6: 6) — [the “all”] encompasses the days after he has fulfilled the vow along with the days prior to his fulfilling the vow.*

- C. *If that is so, then he should be equally liable for cutting his hair [at that interstitial period], for lo, the All-Merciful has said, “All the days of his Naziriteship no razor shall come upon his head” (Num. 6: 5) — [the “all”] encompasses the days after he has fulfilled the vow along with the days prior to his fulfilling the vow.*

- D. And furthermore, “All the days of his Naziriteship he shall eat nothing made of the grape vine” (Num. 6: 4) — [the “all”] encompasses the days after he has fulfilled the vow along with the days prior to his fulfilling the vow!

- E. **[15A]** *The present case is exceptional, for the All-Merciful has said, “And he defile his consecrated head” (Num. 6: 9) — affecting whatever in the Naziriteship depends upon the head [Klien: as long as his head is uncut though the days of his consecration are fulfilled].*

- F. *An objection was raised: A Nazirite whose days under the vow have been completed is forbidden to cut his hair, drink wine, or*

contract corpse uncleanness. And if he cut his hair, drank wine, or contracted corpse uncleanness, lo, he incurs a flogging of forty stripes.

G. *That refutes [R. Yosé b. R. Hanina's thesis].*

2:10

- A. [If he said,] “Lo, I am a Nazirite when a son will be born to me and a Nazirite for a hundred days,”
- B. if a son was born to him before seventy days [had passed], he has lost nothing. [The Naziriteship of thirty days on account of the son takes effect. Then he finishes up the hundred days on account of the vow taken for his own name.]
- C. [If the son was born] after seventy days [so the vow taken in regard to the son is now in effect], he loses the seventy days he has observed,
- D. for there is no cutting of hair in less than thirty days [from the beginning of the observance of the vow] [there are not thirty days left over from the first Naziriteship, the whole then does not count and he starts his own hundred days once more].
- I.1 A. Said Rab, “The seventieth day counts for this Nazirite oath and for that one.” [It is reckoned within both periods.]
- B. *We have learned in the Mishnah, if a son was born to him before seventy days [had passed], he has lost nothing. Now, if you should suppose that the seventieth day counts for this Nazirite oath and for that one, [the language “he has lost nothing” does not pertain, but rather,] he profits!*
- C. *Rather, in strict logic, the Tannaite formulation should not have encompassed the period before seventy days [had passed], but because in the latter part of the formulation of the rule, the Tannaite framer stated, [If the son was born] after seventy days, he loses the seventy days he has observed, he made reference also in the earlier clause to the seventy days.*
- D. *Come and take note of what follows: [If the son was born] after seventy days, he loses the seventy days he has observed. [Why not “seventy-one” days!]*
- E. *What is the meaning of “after”? “After” the day after the seventieth day. [That is the seventy-second day, which by no measure would leave more than twenty-nine days.] But as to the day after itself, what is the rule? Here too he does not lose the days already observed [there being time to grow thirty days of hair prior to the one hundredth day].*
- F. *If so, why did the Tannaite formulation say, if a son was born to him before seventy days [had passed], he has lost nothing even if it were born after the seventieth day, the same thing can have been said! But that proves that “after” is meant literally, and the Mishnah-rule certainly contradicts Rab's thesis.*
- G. *And as to Rab, in accord with which authority did he state his tradition?*
- H. *May one propose it is in accord with Abba Saul, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: He who buries his dead three days before the festival — the requirement of the seven days of mourning is nullified for him. [He who buries his*

dead] eight days [before the festival] — the requirement of the thirty days of mourning is nullified for him. And he should get a hair cut on the eve of the festival. If he did not get a haircut on the eve of the festival, it is forbidden to get a haircut after the festival. [15B] Abba Saul says, “Even if he did not get a haircut before the festival, it is permitted to him to get a haircut after the festival, for just as the religious duty of observing three days vitiates the religious duty of observing seven [which, after the festival, are null], so the religious duty of observing seven days vitiates the religious duty of observing thirty.” [B. M.Q. 13:5-6 I.2/9B] *Now what is the theory of Abba Saul? Is it not because the seventh day of mourning counts in both directions [Abba Saul takes the view that part of a day is classified as the whole of the day, and here the seventh day of mourning counts in both directions — after part has been observed for the seventh day, the rest counts as the eighth day, with its easier rules; and Rab counts the day within both periods as well]?*

- I. *But perhaps Abba Saul takes the position that he does only in connection with the period of mourning for seven days, which is decreed by rabbis, but since the law covering the Nazirite derives from the Torah, he may not take the same view at all! Rather, Rab states his opinion on the basis of the view of R. Yosé, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. R. Yosé says, “A woman who is watching from day to day, in behalf of whom the priest slaughtered the Passover lamb and sprinkled the blood on her second day, and who then produced a discharge, may not eat the sacrifice, but she also is exempt from observing the second Passover.” [Reference is made to the eleven days between the menstrual period and the next one, during which time a flow of blood is classified not as menstrual blood but as flux. These are called ‘flux-days.’ A discharge on one or two days within the eleven imparts uncleanness for that day alone. The one cannot immerse and conduct the purification rite until a day has passed in which no flux emerged, so she is called ‘a woman who is watching from day to day.’ If another discharge comes on the third day, she has to wait for seven days without issue. The eve of Passover occurred on the second day of her discharge; the sacrifice was offered, the blood sprinkled. That was prior to a discharge on that day. If she had not had a discharge, she would have been fit to eat in the evening. But she did, so she cannot eat the sacrifice or immerse until — the next day being clean — the following evening] *What is the operative consideration here? Isn’t it that part of the day is deemed equivalent to the whole of the day?*
- K. *But perhaps it is because R. Yosé maintains that it is from the time that the flux appears and thereafter that she is unclean [if she discharges on one day, waits part of the following and immerses, she is clean; if she subsequently discharges on the same day, she becomes unclean anew; but does not continue her prior uncleanness; hence when the sacrifice was slaughtered, she was actually clean, having already performed immersion, so no propitiation is required].*
- L. *But is that the opinion of R. Yosé? And hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Yosé says, “A person afflicted with flux who has produced two flows, in behalf of whom they slaughtered the Passover lamb and tossed the blood on the seventh day of counting of clean days, and who afterward produced a flux,*

and so too, a woman awaiting day against day in behalf of whom they slaughtered the Passover lamb and tossed the blood and who afterward produced a flux — lo, these retroactively impart uncleanness to objects on which they lie and sit and they are exempt from preparing a Passover at the second Passover.” [So they are not unclean only for the future and yet they are exempt from a second Passover; the reason must be that it is an uncleanness of the deep of flux and the head-plate then propitiates.]

- M. *Say: what is the meaning of “retroactively”? It is only by decree of rabbis.* [According to the law of the Torah she was clean during the interval between the immersion until the third discharge.]
- N. *And that stands to reason, for if you say it is based on the law of the Torah, why should they be exempt from having to prepare the Passover at the second season [a month later] [since they were unclean when the Passover was slaughtered]?*
- O. No, that proves nothing. The uncleanness is retrospective in the law of the Torah as well. For the impurity that wells up from the abyss [which is unknown until it breaks forth] of the flux-uncleanness sages have dismissed as an obstacle to offering the Passover. [It is not taken into account.]
- P. *So too R. Oshayya maintains that the retroactive uncleanness derives only from a decree of rabbis, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- Q. R. Oshayya said, “But a person afflicted with flux who produced a discharge on his seven day looses the prior clean days [and has to count out another seven clean days].”
- R. And said to him R. Yohanan, “He should only lose that one day [which we ignore, he needs only one more clean day to become clean again].”
- S. *[That is a poor version of his statement, for] what’s your choice? If one maintains that the uncleanness is retroactive, then he should lose all seven days; and if he takes the view that it is only from now on that he is unclean, then he should also not lose even that one day! Rather, say, “He does not lose even that day.”*
- T. **[16A]** *And [Oshayya] said to him, “R. Yosé concurs with your view.”* [since he exempts her from observing the second Passover, he holds she is not retrospectively unclean.]
- U. But lo, R. Yosé says, “These retroactively impart uncleanness to objects on which they lie and sit”!
- V. *So doesn’t it follow that the retroactive uncleanness derives only from a decree of rabbis?*
- W. *Yes, it does follow.*
- X. *Well, then, if R. Yosé takes the position that part of a day is equivalent to the whole of a day, how are you going to find a case of a woman totally in the grip of flux uncleanness such that she has to present an offering* [since he holds that part of the day is counted as a whole day, and she is unclean only from when she discharges, each day is distinct and she can never be unclean for the three consecutive days that are necessary to establish that status].

Y. *It would be a case in which she had a continuous discharge; for three days or, if you prefer, she has a discharge for the entirety of three successive twilights [thus the end of one day and the beginning of the next, e.g., Sunday and Monday yields Sunday, Monday, Tuesday], so that there is no part of the day that is reckoned as a period of cleanness.*