

V.

BAVLI PESAHIM CHAPTER FIVE

FOLIOS 58A-65B

5:1

- A. The daily whole-offering [of the afternoon] [generally] was slaughtered at half after the eighth hour [after dawn, about 2:30 p.m.] and offered up at half after the ninth hour [about 3:30 p.m.].
- B. On the eve of Passover, [the daily whole-offering] was slaughtered at half after the seventh hour and offered up at half after the eighth hour,
- C. whether on an ordinary day or on the Sabbath.
- D. [If, however,] the eve of Passover coincided with the eve of the Sabbath [Friday], it was slaughtered at half after the sixth hour [12:30 p.m.] and offered up at half after the seventh hour [1:30 p.m.],
- E. and [then] the Passover-offering [was slaughtered] after it.

I.1 A. *What is the scriptural source of this rule?*

- B. Said R. Joshua b. Levi, “Said Scripture, ‘The one lamb you shall offer in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer between the two evenings’ (Num. 28: 4). [Freedman: Evening is defined as the whole afternoon until nightfall.] Divide it up between the evenings, two and a half hours before, two and a half hours after, and an hour to prepare it.” [Freedman: Two evenings are from midday, six hours, until eight and a half hours, 2:30 p.m., and from nine and a half hours, 3:30 p.m., until nightfall.]

- C. *Objected Raba, “On the eve of Passover, [the daily whole-offering] was slaughtered at half after the seventh hour and offered up at half after the eighth hour, whether on an ordinary day or on the Sabbath. Now, if it should enter your mind that on the authority of the Torah it must be slaughtered at eight and a half hours, then how do we push up the time for it?”*
- D. *Rather, said Raba, “The religious duty of the daily whole-offering takes effect when the evening shadows begin to fall [that is, from 12:30 p.m. onward]. What is the Scriptural basis for this view? Scripture said, ‘...between the two evenings,’ meaning, from the time that the sun begins to decline in the west. Therefore, on the rest of the days of the year, when there are offerings presented in fulfillment of vows and thanksgiving-offerings, concerning which the All-Merciful has stated, ‘and he shall burn upon it the fat of the peace-offerings’ (Lev. 6: 5), concerning which a master has said, “‘upon it” complete all sacrifices,’ we postpone it by two hours and offer it up at eight and a half hours [2:30 p.m.]. But, on the eve of Passover, when there is the Passover-offering to be presented after it, we move it up by one hour and offer it up at seven and a half hours [1:30 p.m.] And, when the eve of Passover coincides with a Friday, so the roasting also has to be done prior to sundown, since that does not override the prohibitions of the Sabbath, we move it up to its own time, at six and a half hours [12:30 p.m.].”*

I.2 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “Just as is the order governing it during the week, so is the order governing it on the Sabbath,” the words of R. Ishmael.
- C. R. Aqiba says, “It is in the order governing it on the eve of Passover.”

I.3 A. *What’s going on here?*

- B. *Said Abbaye, “This is what’s going on: ‘Just as is the order governing it during the weekday that is the eve of Passover, so is the order governing it on the Sabbath that is the eve of Passover,’ the words of R. Ishmael. [In both cases the daily whole-offering is slaughtered at seven and a half hours, 1:30 p.m.] R. Aqiba says, ‘Just as is the order governing it on the eve of Passover that coincides with the eve of the Sabbath [Friday], so is the order governing it on the Sabbath.’ [In both cases it is slaughtered at six and a half hours, 12:30 p.m.] And our Mishnah rule, which states, **whether on an ordinary day or on the Sabbath**, accords with the view of R. Ishmael.”*

- C. *“What is subject to dispute between them?”*
- D. *“What is subject to dispute is whether or not the additional sacrifices take precedence over burning frankincense in the dishes [by the showbread.] [The showbread was put on the table on the Sabbath and removed the next week; the frankincense was burned, and then the priests ate the showbread; the removing, replacing, and burning of the incense took an hour (Freedman).] R. Ishmael takes the view that the additional sacrifices take precedence over burning frankincense in the dishes [by the showbread.] So the priest sacrificed the additional offering at six hours [1 p.m.], burned the incense in the dishes at seven, and then offered the daily whole-offering at seven and a half hours [1:30 p.m.] R. Aqiba maintains that the additional sacrifices take precedence over the additional offerings. Therefore the burning in the dishes took place at the fifth hour [11 A.M.], the additional offering at the sixth [noon], and the daily whole-offering at six and a half hours [12:30 p.m.].”*
- E. *Objected Raba, “But has R. Aqiba stated as the Tannaite rule, Just as is the order governing it on the eve of Passover that coincides with the eve of the Sabbath [Friday]? The language that he uses is, It is in the order governing it on the eve of Passover, without further amplification.”*
- F. *Rather, said Raba, “This is the sense of the statements at hand: ‘Just as is the order governing it during the weekday in general, so is the order governing it on the Sabbath that is the eve of Passover,’ the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, ‘Just as is the order governing it on the eve of Passover [at seven and a half hours, so is the order on the Sabbath, that is, the process starts at 1:30 p.m.].’ And our Mishnah rule, which states, **whether on an ordinary day or on the Sabbath**, accords with the view of R. Aqiba.*
- G. *“What is subject to dispute between them? R. Ishmael maintains that we take account of the heating of the flesh [that is, shrinkage caused by overheating], and R. Aqiba maintains that we do not take account of the heating of the flesh.”*
- H. **[58B]** *Well, then, if we do not take account of the heating of the flesh, we should perform the rite at half after the sixth hour [12:30 p.m.] [Freedman: since there are many Passover sacrifices, while there is no*

need to delay it on account of vows, which are not offered on the Sabbath].

- I. *He takes the view that the burning of frankincense in dishes takes precedence over the additional sacrifices, so he has the additional offerings sacrificed at six hours, burns the frankincense in the dishes at the seventh hour [1 p.m.], and sacrifices the daily whole-offering at half after the seventh hour [1:30 p.m.].*
- J. *Objected Rabbah bar Ulla, “Well, is the language used, ‘As is the order governing it on an ordinary day so is the order governing it on the Sabbath that is the eve of Passover,’ the words of R. Ishmael? The language that is used is, ‘so is the order governing it on the Sabbath,’ the words of R. Ishmael — without further amplification.”*
- K. *Rather, said Rabbah bar Ulla, “This is the sense of the statements at hand: ‘Just as is the order governing it during the weekday in general, so is the order governing it on the Sabbath in general,’ the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, ‘Just as is the order governing it on the eve of Passover in general, so is the order on the Sabbath in general. And our Mishnah rule, which states, **whether on an ordinary day or on the Sabbath**, accords with the view of both authorities.*
- L. *“What is subject to dispute between them? It is whether or not we issue a precautionary decree on account of the many offerings in fulfillment of vows and freewill-offerings on those occasions. R. Ishmael maintains that we issue a precautionary decree on account of the many offerings in fulfillment of vows and freewill-offerings on those occasions, and R. Aqiba holds that we do not issue a precautionary decree on account of the many offerings in fulfillment of vows and freewill-offerings on those occasions.”*
- M. *Well, then, if we don’t issue a precautionary decree, how about carrying out the sacrifice at six and a half hours [12:30 p.m.] [that is, doing it as early as possible]?*
- N. *[Aqiba] maintains that additional sacrifices take precedence over burning frankincense in dishes, so the additional offerings are presented at six hours [noon], the burning in dishes is done at the seventh hour, and the daily whole-offering is offered at seven and a half hours [1 p.m., 1:30 p.m., respectively].*

- O. *An objection was raised: "The daily whole-offering throughout the year is presented in accord with the law governing it: it is slaughtered at eight and a half hours [2:30 p.m.] and offered up at nine and a half hours [3:30 p.m.]; and on the eve of Passover, it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and offered up at eight and a half hours. If that coincided with the Sabbath, it is offered as though it coincided with a Monday [that is, as an ordinary weekday," the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, "It is in accord with its order on the eve of Passover." Now, from the perspective of Abbaye, there is no problem with this formulation of matters. But from the viewpoint of Raba, there is a difficulty. [Freedman: Raba has Ishmael say that just as is the order on weekdays in general, so..., but since Ishmael concludes, it is the same as when it falls on a weekday in general, it is obvious that he does not refer to a weekday in general in the first half of his statement.]*
- P. *Raba can say to you, "Don't say: It is the same as when it falls on a Monday; say, it's the same as a Monday in general."*
- Q. *An objection was raised: "If it coincided with the Sabbath, it is done in accord with the order that governs it throughout the entire year," the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, "It is in accord with the order governing it on the eve of the Passover in general." Now there is no problem in this formulation for Raba [for that's how he reads the original statement], but there is a problem for Abbaye!*
- R. *Abbaye can say to you, "Don't say, it is done in accord with the order that governs it throughout the entire year, but rather say, 'In accord with the order that governs in all other years,' the words of R. Ishmael. R. Aqiba says, 'It is done in accord with the order governing it on the eve of Passover that coincides with the eve of the Sabbath.'"*

I.4 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that nothing whatsoever should take precedence over the daily whole-offering that is presented at dawn? Scripture says, "And he shall lay the burnt-offering in order upon it" (Lev. 6: 5).

I.5 A. *So what's the analysis of the verse that yields that result?*

- B. *Said Raba, "'The burnt-offering' means the first burnt-offering of the day."*

I.6 A. And how on the basis of Scripture do we know that nothing whatsoever should be presented after the daily whole-offering in the evening? As it is stated, “And he shall burn upon it the fat of the peace-offerings” (Lev. 6: 5).

I.7 A. *So what’s the analysis of the verse that yields that result?*

B. Said Abbayye, “After ‘it’ [that is the daily whole-offering of the morning] you may offer peace-offerings, but not after its counterpart in the evening may you offer peace-offerings.”

C. *Objected Raba, “Then draw the conclusion: It is peace-offerings in particular that are not to be offered, lo, burnt-offerings may be offered!”*

D. Rather, said Raba, “‘...the peace-offerings...’ bears the sense, upon it, complete all sacrifices [offering nothing more].”

I.8 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. The daily whole-offering in the evening is presented before the Passover-offering, the Passover-offering is presented before the burning of the evening incense, the evening incense is burned before the kindling of the lamps.

I.9 A. [Explaining the rule just now given:] **[59A]** Let something concerning which the language, in the evening, and between the evenings, is used be postponed to after that in which the language, in the evening is not said, but between the evenings is said. [Freedman: This is why the evening daily whole-offering is before the Passover sacrifice, for in connection with the latter both of these expressions are used, Exo. 12: 6, Deu. 16: 6, respectively; but in connection with the whole-offering, only the between the evenings is stated, at Num. 28: 4.]

B. *If so, then with reference also to the incense and lighting the lights, these, too, should take precedence over the Passover, on the grounds that something concerning which the language, in the evening, and between the evenings, is used be postponed to after that in which the language, in the evening is not said, but between the evenings is said.*

C. *That case is exceptional, since Scripture itself has imposed an exclusionary limiting clause, namely, “it,” for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “To burn from evening to morning” (Exo. 27:21) — supply the lamp with a sufficient measure of oil so that it may burn continually from evening to morning. Furthermore, you have no other*

form of service that is valid when performed from evening to morning except for this one.

- D. How come? Said Scripture, “Aaron and his sons shall set it in order to burn from evening to morning” (Exo. 27:21) — “it” shall be from evening to morning, but nothing else shall be from evening to morning; and the burning of incense is comparable to lighting the lights.
- E. *And it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with our problem:* The daily whole-offering in the evening is offered prior to the burning of the incense, the burning of the incense is prior to the kindling of the lamps, and the kindling of the lamps is prior to the sacrifice of the Passover-offering: something concerning which the language, in the evening, and between the evenings, is used be postponed to after that in which the language, in the evening is not said, but between the evenings is said.
- F. *Sure, but the exclusionary language, “it” also is used in that connection!*
- G. *That exclusionary language, “it” is required to exclude an act of service at the inner altar, and what might that be? It is the burning of the incense [which is comparable to lighting the lights, also in the inner sanctum, and the exclusionary language indicates that no other service in the inner sanctum may take place after lighting the lamp; that of course would not pertain to the Passover, which was done outside]. For it might have entered your mind to suppose that, since it is written, “And when Aaron lights the lamps between the evenings he shall burn it” (Exo. 30: 7), therefore one may say, light the lamps first, then burn the incense. Accordingly, the exclusionary language, “it” is required.*
- H. *Then what need do I have for the language, between the evenings he shall burn it”?*
- I. *This is the sense of the All-Merciful’s statement here: At the time that you light the lamps, the incense must already be burning.*

I.10 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. You have nothing prior to the daily whole-offering of dawn except for the burning of the incense of the morning alone, in regard to which the language, “in the morning in the morning” is used.

I.11 A. Well, by that reasoning, the burning of the incense, in connection with which the language “in the morning, in the morning” is used, since it is written, “And Aaron shall burn thereon incense of sweet spices, in the morning in the morning” (Exo. 30: 7), takes precedence over that in regard to which only one “in the morning” is used [namely, the daily whole-offering, Num. 28: 4 stating, “the one lamb you shall offer in the morning”]?

I.12 A. And you have nothing that may be postponed until after the evening daily whole-offering except for the burning of incense, lighting the lamps, slaughtering of the Passover-offering, and the matter of one who, on the eve of Passover is lacking in the completion of his atonement rite [an unclean person who has not yet brought a sacrifice after immersion, for example, a person afflicted with the flux of Lev. 15, a person afflicted with the skin ailment of Lev. 13, and a woman after childbirth, Lev. 12]; such a person immerses a second time and eats his or her Passover in the evening.

B. R. Ishmael b. R. Yohanan b. Beroqa says, “So, too, on the rest of the days of the year one who is lacking in the completion of his atonement rite [an unclean person who has not yet brought a sacrifice after immersion, for example, a person afflicted with the flux of Lev. 15, a person afflicted with the skin ailment of Lev. 13, and a woman after childbirth, Lev. 12]; such a person immerses a second time and eats Holy Things in the evening.”

I.13 A. *Now there is no difficulty understanding the position of the initial Tannaite authority: Let a commandment of affirmative action concerning Passover, in which case there is the penalty for nonperformance of extirpation, come and override the commandment involving affirmative action of completing the rites of purification, in which instance there is no consideration of extirpation. But from the perspective of R. Ishmael. b. R. Yohanan b. Beroqa, how come this commandment of affirmative action bears more weight than the other commandment of affirmative action?*

B. *Said Rabina said R. Hisda, “Here we are dealing with the case of a sin-offering of fowl, in which case the altar has a claim only on its blood.”* [Freedman: The affirmative commandment of completing the rite of purification refers to burning something on the altar, and that applies only to animal sacrifices.]

- C. *R. Pappa said, “You may even say that we deal with a sin-offering of a beast: He takes it up and keeps it overnight on the top of the altar [burning its fat only in the morning after the daily whole-offering of the dawn].”*
- D. *But there is the matter of the guilt-offering! [The poor person afflicted with the skin ailment has to give a lamb, not only a bird.] From R. Pappa’s perspective, that’s in line with his view that we keep it overnight. But from R. Hisda’s perspective, what is to be said?*
- E. *Say: It is a case in which he has already offered up his guilt-offering [but not the sin-offering].*
- F. *So what about the burnt-offering? And should you say, the burnt-offering is not indispensable to the completion of the process, well, hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: **R. Ishmael, son of R. Judah b. Beroqa, says, “Just as the sin-offering and guilt-offering [brought in the purification rite] are essential [and omission disqualifies the process], so the burnt-offering is essential [and since that is the case, the person securing purification is not likely to omit it” [T. Nazir 4:8].** And should you say it is a case in which his burnt-offering had already been presented, well, then, is there the possibility that one’s burnt-offering is ever presented prior to his sin-offering? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “And he shall first offer that which is designated as the sin-offering” (Lev. 5: 8) — What is the point of Scripture’s making that statement? It cannot be that that is offered first of all, for that is already covered by the implications of the further statement: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt-offering” (Lev. 5: 8)! Rather, this is meant to serve as the generative analogy for all sin-offerings, indicating that they take precedence over any burnt-offering that is presented along with them, whether it is a sin-offering prepared of fowl along with burnt-offering of fowl, or sin-offering prepared of a beast for a burnt-offering prepared of a beast, and even a sin-offering prepared of a bird along with a burnt-offering prepared of a beast. So it is an established fact for us that even a sin-offering of a bird takes precedence over a burnt-offering of a beast!*
- G. *Said Raba, “The case of the burnt-offering of a person afflicted with the skin ailment is exceptional, for the All-Merciful has said, [59B] ‘And the priest shall have offered the burnt-offering’ (Lev. 14:20) —*

that which he has already offered” [Freedman: Hence, although the sin-offering should come before the burnt-offering, yet the verse indicates that the reversed order is valid; the present passage then means he had already sacrificed the burnt-offering.]

- H. *Said R. Shemen bar Abba to R. Pappa, “From your viewpoint, in stating, he takes it up and keeps it overnight on the top of the altar [burning its fat only in the morning after the daily whole-offering of the dawn], are we going to go and do something to the priests that will cause them to stumble? For they’re going to think that that fat belongs to that prior day and turn out to burn it [prior to the morning whole-offering]!”*
- I. He said to him, “The priests are meticulous about their work [and won’t do such a sloppy thing].”
- J. *Said R. Ashi to R. Kahana, and some say, R. Huna b. R. Nathan to R. Pappa, “But lo, so long as the sacrificial parts that are to be burned haven’t yet been burned, the priests may not eat the meat at all [and until they do so, the atonement process is incomplete; the owner of the offering therefore may not eat the Passover-offering if his sin-offering is left overnight (Freedman)]! For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that the priests may eat the breast and thigh meat before the sacrificial parts that are to be burned have been burned up? Scripture states, ‘and the priest shall burn the fat upon the altar’ (Lev. 7:31), and then, ‘but the breast shall belong to Aaron and his sons.’ And, furthermore, so long as the priests haven’t eaten their meat, the owner does not complete his atonement rite, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘And they shall eat those things wherewith atonement was made’ (Exo. 29:33) teaches that the priests eat the residue and thereby the owner of the offering gains atonement.”*
- K. *He said to him, “Since it is not possible [to burn the sacrificial parts that are to be burned after the daily whole-offering of the evening, the parts are treated as though they were made unclean or lost, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Might you suppose that if the sacrificial parts that are to be burned were made unclean or lost, the priests should not have the right to the breast and thigh? Scripture states, ‘But the breast shall belong to Aaron and his sons’ — under all circumstances.”*

- I.14** A. R. Kahana contrasted these verses: “‘Neither shall the fat of my feast remain all night until the morning’ (Exo. 23:18) — so only until morning may it not remain all night, but it may be kept for the whole night until then [he has the whole night for burning the fat]; and by contrast, ‘and he shall burn thereon the fat of the peace-offerings’ (Lev. 6: 5), meaning, after it complete all the sacrifices.”
- B. *He pointed to the contradiction and also harmonized it:* “It is a case in which they were left over” [Freedman: from the sacrifices the blood of which was sprinkled before the whole-offering of the evening; as soon as the blood is sprinkled, the fat is ready for burning on the altar and even if it is delayed, its ultimate burning during the night is regarded as following the whole-offering of the previous morning, not that of the evening].
- I.15** A. R. Safra pointed out to Raba the following contradiction of verses: “‘Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left to the morning’ (Exo. 34:25) — so only until morning may it not be left, but it may be kept all night [of the festival]; and by contrast, ‘the burnt-offering of the Sabbath shall be burned on its Sabbath’ (Num. 28:10) — but not the burnt-offering of a weekday on the Sabbath nor the burnt-offering of a weekday on a festival.” [Freedman: The altar portions of the Passover sacrifice are burnt; these belong to a sacrifice offered on a weekday, that is, the fourteenth of Nisan, but they are burned on the night, which is the festival day itself.]
- B. *He said to him, “R. Abba bar Hiyya has already pointed out that contrast to R. Abbahu, who replied to him, ‘Here we deal with the fourteenth of Nisan that coincided with the Sabbath, in which case, the fat of the sacrifice that is to be burned, that belongs to the Sabbath, may indeed be offered on the festival.’”*
- C. *He said to him, “Well, just because the fat of the sacrifice that is to be burned, that belongs to the Sabbath, may indeed be offered on the festival, shall we go and maintain that that verse speaks only of the very limited case of the fourteenth of Nisan that coincides with the Sabbath?”*
- D. *He said to him, “Now let the verse be, which is after all forced to address only this particular set of circumstances.”*

5:2

- A. An [animal that had originally been designated as a] Passover sacrifice which one slaughtered under an improper designation [“not for its name,” that**

is, for another purpose than the one for which the beast had been selected, namely, as a Passover sacrifice],

- B. or received the blood and tossed the blood of which under an improper designation,
- C. or under its proper designation and under an improper designation,
- D. or under an improper designation and under its proper designation,
- E. is invalid.
- F. How [is it done] both under its proper designation and not under its proper designation?
- G. [If one slaughtered it] for the sake of a Passover-offering and for the sake of peace-offerings.
- H. Under an improper designation and under a proper designation?
- I. [If one slaughtered it] for the sake of peace-offerings and for the sake of a Passover-offering.

I.1 A. [Both under its proper designation and not under its proper designation:]
R. Pappa raised this question: "Have we learned our Mishnah rule with respect to a single act of service [the priest said that one of the acts of service was done both for the proper designation and not for that proper designation], or with respect to two distinct acts of service? Have we learned our Mishnah rule with respect to a single act of service, and the passage represents the position of R. Yosé, who has said, 'One is responsible even for the final statement that he makes'? For if we should maintain that the passage accords with the view of R. Meir, well, lo, he has said, 'One is responsible only for the first statement that he makes' [and not for the final statement that he makes, so once he makes one statement, the contradictory one is no longer effective; hence the situation at hand could represent only Yosé's position on this intersecting principle]! [60A] Or perhaps we have learned the rule at hand with respect to two distinct acts of service, in which case, it is even in accord with R. Meir, [who has said, 'One is responsible only for the first statement that he makes']?" And even from the perspective of R. Meir, who has said, 'One is responsible only for the first statement that he makes,' that is the rule only in regard to a single act of service, but as to acts of service, he would agree that the rite is invalidated."

- B. Say: To which case do we make reference now? Should we say that it is a case in which the statement that the priest made concerned a sacrifice for some other

designated purpose, and then for the originally designated purpose of the beast? Then, whether it was in connection with one act of service or in two distinct acts of service that the invalid statement was made, both R. Meir and R. Yosé *would hold that the rite was invalidated by the first statement. For, according to R. Yosé, too, the language is, “one is held responsible for the last statement that he makes, too”!* [Freedman: They, too, must be taken into account, but the first statement is not going to be ignored.]

- C. *So it is a case in which the priest first made the announcement that the action was performed for the designated purpose, but then he stated, it is not for the designated purpose. Then what is the rule?*
- D. *Come and take note: An [animal that had originally been designated as a] **Passover sacrifice which one slaughtered under an improper designation [“not for its name,” that is, for another purpose than the one for which the beast had been selected, namely, as a Passover sacrifice], or received the blood and tossed the blood of which under an improper designation** — now how are we to imagine this situation? Should we say that the passage is meant precisely as the Tannaite formulation says? Then why do I have to specify that the rule governs only if he forms the improper intention concerning all of the several actions? Even from the first, the offering is invalidated. So this must be the sense of the Tannaite teaching: An [animal that had originally been designated as a] **Passover sacrifice which one slaughtered under an improper designation [“not for its name,” that is, for another purpose than the one for which the beast had been selected, namely, as a Passover sacrifice], or also, that he slaughtered under the proper designation, but the blood of which he then received under an improper designation, or also, that he slaughtered under the proper designation and received the blood and conveyed the blood under the proper designation but tossed not under the proper designation** — in which case there are two distinct acts of service involved here [a valid purpose, then an invalid one].*
- E. *Then look at what follows: **or under its proper designation and under an improper designation.** Now how am I to imagine this situation? Should I say, we are dealing with two distinct acts of service? Then that goes over the ground of the opening clause! So isn't it a case in which it involved only a single act of service, representing then the position only of R. Yosé, who has said, “One is responsible even for the final statement that he makes”?*

- F. *Not at all. In point of fact we deal with two distinct acts of service. But the first clause addresses a case in which the priest is standing in the midst of the process of slaughtering, and his intentionality with correct purpose concerns the slaughtering; or he is involved in the sprinkling and has the improper intention in respect to sprinkling. [The act is thus performed either with proper or improper intentionality in its own regard.] But the concluding clause speaks of a case in which the priest is standing in the midst of the process of slaughtering the beast, but expresses the improper intention with regard to tossing the blood, in which instance he has said, "Lo, I am slaughtering the Passover-offering for the purpose for which the animal was originally designated, so as to toss the blood for a purpose for which the animal was not originally designated," and so we are informed that an act of intentionality expressed in the midst of one act of service takes effect for a distinct act of service. And that is what R. Pappa has asked.*
- G. *Come and take note: **or under an improper designation and under its proper designation, is invalid.** Now how are we to imagine the situation here? Should we say that we are dealing with two distinct acts of service? Then if in a case in which the act was done both for the purpose for which the animal was originally designated and not for that purpose, you have said that the act is invalid, can there be any question of the result of doing so first for the announced purpose other than that for which the animal was originally designated and then for the purpose for which it was originally designated? So isn't it a case in which we deal with a single act of service? And since the concluding clause deals with a single act of service, the initial clause likewise should deal with a single act of service.*
- H. *Not at all! In point of fact we deal with two distinct acts of service. And in strict logic, true, it is not necessary to deal with this case at all, for the reason that you have given, but, since the framer of the passage has used the language, **or under its proper designation and under an improper designation, he balanced that by using the language, or under an improper designation and under its proper designation, is invalid, even though it was not needed.***
- I. *Come and take note: [If] one slaughtered it not for those who [can] eat it or not for those who are registered for it, for uncircumcised men or for unclean ones, it is invalid [M. 5:3A-C]. Now here it is self-evident that it involves only a single act of service, and, since the later component refers to a single act of service, surely the earlier one likewise deals with a single act of service [the two Mishnah paragraphs going together]!*

- J. *What makes you so sure that the two run together? This speaks of its own case, and that speaks of its own case: the later clause speaks of a single act of service, and the earlier one may speak either of one act of service or of two.*
- K. *Come and take note: [If one slaughtered it] for those who eat it and not for those who eat it, for those who are registered for it and not for those who are registered for it, for those who are circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised, for those who are unclean and for those who are clean, it is valid. Now how are we to imagine the situation here? If we say that it involves two acts of service [when he slaughtered the beast, he said it was for those who can eat it, and when he sprinkled the blood, he said it was for those who can't eat it (Freedman)], and the operative consideration that the act is fit is that he intended the beast for non-eaters when he sprinkled the blood, and as a matter of fact no valid intentionality can pertain to those who eat the offering when it is expressed at the moment of sprinkling [such an intentionality is null], then, if it is at one service, slaughtering, where the intentionality concerning those who eat the meat would be effective, the act would have been disqualified — if that is the proposed period, then as a matter of fact it is an established principle with us that, if some are validly among the ones who eat the meat of the offering, the offering is not invalidated. [Freedman: Even if only one wanted to eat the animal's meat, the whole animal must be killed.] **[60B]** So it must refer to a single act of service, and, since the latter clause speaks of a single act of service, the former also must refer to a single act of service.*
- L. *What makes you so sure that the two run together? This speaks of its own case, and that speaks of its own case: the later clause speaks of a single act of service, and the earlier one may speak either of one act of service or of two.*
- I.2 A.** *The question was raised: As to an animal designated as a Passover-offering that one slaughtered on any other day of the year [except for the fourteenth of Nisan] both for the purpose for which the animal had been designated and also not for that purpose — what is the law? Does the purpose of slaughtering the beast for some other designation come along and invalidate the original designation of this beast and so validate it as an offering? Or is that not the case?*
- B. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "I stated this tradition before R. Jeremiah, namely: Since slaughtering it for the purpose for which it is originally designated validates it when that is done at the proper time, and doing so not for the*

purpose for which it was designated validates it when it was not done at the proper time [the fourteenth of Nisan], therefore, just as slaughtering it for the purpose for which it was designated validates it when this is done at the right time but does not remove the beast from the disqualifying effect of doing so for a purpose other than that for which it was designated [that is, he slaughtered it both for the purpose for which it was designated and also for some other purpose, in which case the beast is unfit], therefore, as a necessary counterpoint, slaughtering it not for its designated purpose, which validates it at any time other than the fourteenth of Nisan, should not save it from the disqualifying results of the designation for the purpose of a Passover-offering, and it is therefore unfit. [That was my argument,] and he said to me, ‘Not at all. If you have made that statement in connection with slaughtering it for a purpose other than that for which it was originally designated, in which case, that would pertain to all offerings [that is, in the case of all offerings, if they are slaughtered for a purpose other than that for which the beast was originally designated, they are invalid, in which case the disqualifying power is so strong as to render null the fact that it was slaughtered for its own originally defined purpose as well (Freedman)], will you say the same of doing so under its original designation, in which instance, that would pertain not to all offerings indifferently but only to the Passover in particular?’

- C. *So what is the upshot?*
- D. Said Raba, “As to an animal designated as a Passover-offering that one slaughtered on any other day of the year [except for the fourteenth of Nisan] both for the purpose for which the animal had been designated and also not for that purpose is valid. *For lo, it is standing ready without further articulation to be killed for the purpose for which it was originally designated, and even so, if he slaughters it for another purpose than that for which it was originally designated, it is valid. Therefore the designation for some other purpose comes along and removes the force of the designation for its own original purpose as a Passover-offering. So when he slaughters it, too, both for the originally designated purpose and not for the originally designated purpose, the intentionality to offer it not for its originally designated purpose comes along and removes the beast from the classification that was imposed on it by its originally designated purpose.*”
- E. Said R. Ada bar Ahbah to Raba, “But maybe the case is different in which he has said so in so many words from one in which he has not said so in so many words. [Freedman: The other purpose can nullify the unarticulated assumption

that it stands for its own purpose; but it may not be able to nullify the explicit declaration that it is slaughtered for its own purpose, too.] For lo, if he killed it for those who can eat it and for those who can't, it is fit, *but if he kills it only for those who can't eat it, it's invalid. But why should that be the case? Surely without further articulation it stands ready for those who can eat it? So you have to admit that, where he makes the matter explicit, the case is different from one in which he doesn't make the matter explicit; and here, too, where he makes the purpose explicit, it is different from where he doesn't make it explicit.*"

- F. *He said to him, "How are the cases truly parallel? There is no problem in understanding that allegedly parallel case, for there, so long as the priest doesn't articulately invalidate it at the act of slaughter, it is destined, without further articulation, surely to be slaughtered for the purpose for which the owner originally designated the beast. But here, does it stand without further specification only for those who are registered to eat it? Maybe these will withdraw and others will register on it, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **They register and then withdraw their registration from it until the moment that one will slaughter it [M. Pes. 8:3D].**"*

I.3 A. *The question was raised: An animal designated as a Passover-offering [by a specific owner], which they slaughtered on other days of the year [not the fourteenth of Nisan] with a change of ownership [it is slaughtered as a Passover-offering, but for someone other than the one who originally designated the beast as a Passover-offering] — what is the law? Do we treat a change of ownership as equivalent to a change in the purpose, as to sanctification, of the beast, and so validate the offering [since it is no longer a Passover-offering]? Or is that not the case?*

- B. *Said R. Pappa, "I stated this tradition before Raba: Since a change in the definition of the classification of sanctification that pertains to it disqualifies it when it is offered at the proper time, namely, the fourteenth of Nisan, and a change of ownership from the man who originally designated the beast as a Passover-offering also disqualifies the animal if it is offered at the proper time, then, just as a change in the classification of sanctification, which disqualifies it when the animal is offered at the proper time, would validate it if it is offered at some other time than the fourteenth of Nisan, so a change in ownership, which would disqualify the animal if it were offered at the proper time, the fourteenth of Nisan, also will validate it if it is offered at some other time. But he said to me, 'Not at all. If you have invoked that rule in connection with a*

change as to the classification of sanctification, that is because the invalidation is intrinsic [in respect to the beast itself], and, furthermore, it pertains to four distinct acts of service, [61A] and, furthermore, it pertains even after the death of the owner of the sacrifice [since if the owner died and the son presented it, if he presented it for some purpose other than the one that the father had defined, the offering is invalid], and, furthermore, it pertains both to a communal offering and also to an individual one, will you say the same of a change in the ownership of the beast, where the cause of disqualification is extrinsic, where the disqualification does not pertain to four distinct acts of service [but only in connection with the sprinkling of the blood], and which does not apply after the death of the owner, and which does not apply to both public and private offerings? *And even though if two of these points of disqualification are not exact, two of them are, [as we shall now see:] for how is the change of ownership distinctive, that you should say, the point of disqualification is extrinsic to the beast? Because the disqualification concerns merely intentionality? Well, a change in the status of sanctification likewise is no other than a disqualification as to intentionality. And as to the statement, a change of ownership is not operative after death, well, according to R. Phineas b. R. Ammi, who said, 'Disqualification does take effect in ownership after death,' what is to be said? So it follows, two of the distinctions are still quite exact."*

- C. Rather, said Raba, "An animal designated as a Passover-offering [by a specific owner], which they slaughtered on other days of the year [not the fourteenth of Nisan] with a change of ownership [it is slaughtered as a Passover-offering, but for someone other than the one who originally designated the beast as a Passover-offering] is treated as though it had no owner in the proper time, on the fourteenth of Nisan, and therefore is invalidated."

5:3

- A. [If] one slaughtered it not for those who [can] eat it or not for those who are registered for it,
- B. for uncircumcised men or for unclean ones,
- C. it is invalid.
- D. [If one slaughtered it] for those who eat it and not for those who eat it, for those who are registered for it and not for those who are registered for it,
- E. for those who are circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised,
- F. for those who are unclean and for those who are clean,

- G. it is valid.
- H. [If] one slaughtered it before midday, it is invalid,
- I. since it is said, “At twilight” (Exo. 12: 6).
- J. [If] one slaughtered it before [the time of] the daily whole-offering, it is valid,
- K. so long as someone stirs its blood until the blood of the daily whole-offering is tossed.
- L. But if it[s blood] was tossed [before tossing the blood of the daily whole-offering], it is valid.

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. What would be a case in which he slaughtered it not for those who [can] eat it? If one slaughtered the animal designated as a Passover-offering for a sick person or an old person who cannot eat an olive’s bulk of the meat.
- C. And what would be a case in which he slaughtered it not for those who are registered for it? If one slaughtered it for the sake of another group [than the one registered for this animal] [T. **Pisha 4:2I-L**].

I.2 A. *What is the source of this rule?*

- B. *It is in line with that which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. “Then he and his neighbor next to him shall take one according to the number of souls” (Exo. 12: 4) — this teaches that the animal designated as a Passover-offering is slaughtered only in behalf of those who are registered for it.
- D. Might you suppose that if one slaughters the beast in behalf also of those who are not registered for it, he should be classified as one who has violated the religious duty, [which is to say, the offering nonetheless is fit]?
- E. Scripture states, “You shall make your count” (Exo. 12: 4) — in this way Scripture goes over the same matter a second time, to indicate that this provision of the law is indispensable.
- F. Rabbi says, “The language of the verse is in line with the Syriac usage, as someone says to another, ‘Kill me this lamb.’”
- G. *So we have found that it is disqualified if slaughtered for those not registered for it; how do we know that that is so in the case of slaughtering it for those who can’t eat it?*

H. Said Scripture, “According to every person’s eat you shall make your count” — *those who eat are treated as comparable to those who are registered for the beast.*

I.3 A. [61B] If one slaughtered the animal designated as a Passover-offering for circumcised persons, on the stipulation that uncircumcised persons also should gain atonement [that is, should be registered for the beast] with the blood of the beast when it is sprinkled –

B. R. Hisda said, “It is invalid.”

C. Rabbah said, “It is valid.”

D. R. Hisda said, “It is invalid”: intentionality expressed in connection with sprinkling having to do with an uncircumcised male takes effect.

E. Rabbah said, “It is valid”: intentionality expressed in connection with sprinkling having to do with an uncircumcised male does not take effect.

F. *Said Rabbah, “On what basis do I take that position? It is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: Might one suppose that an uncircumcised male should disqualify the association that comes along with him to register for the animal?*

G. “For it is a matter of logic that that should be the case: Since uncircumcision invalidates [one’s right to share in] the Passover-offering, and uncleanness invalidates as well, just as in the case of uncleanness, Scripture has not treated uncleanness of part of those who register for the animal as equivalent to uncleanness of all of those who do [in the former case, the offering is valid], so the uncircumcision of some of those who register for an animal should not be treated as equivalent to the uncircumcision of them all.

H. “Or take this route: Since uncircumcision invalidates and improper intentionality to eat part of the sacrifice after the time in which it is permitted to do so, since even intentionality to eat only part of the offering at the improper time invalidates the entire offering, so uncircumcision of only part of those registered for the animal should be treated as equivalent to uncircumcision in respect to the entire group.

- I. “Then we have to determine the governing analogy: You should draw an analogy between a trait that does not apply to all sacrifices and another trait that does not apply to all sacrifices [uncircumcision and uncleanness do not apply to other sacrifices, for these may be sacrificed even if the owners were uncircumcised or unclean], but the consideration of improper intentionality as to the time of eating the meat of the offering should not contribute an analogy, for that serves as a disqualification in the case of all sacrifices.
- J. “Or perhaps take this route: You should draw an analogy for something that has not been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern, from a matter that has not been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern [an offering may not be eaten by an uncircumcised person nor may it be eaten after the permitted time], but the consideration of uncleanness should not contribute the governing analogy, since it has been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern [if the whole community is unclean, the Passover lamb is sacrificed for them all].
- K. “Since logical argument leads to no clear conclusion, Scripture stated, ‘This is the ordinance of the Passover’ (Exo. 12:43) [which proceeds to disqualify an uncircumcised person; ‘this’ teaches that an uncircumcised person would not, however, disqualify others who register with him (Freedman)].
- L. *“Now what is the force of this ‘this’? Should I say, it is to teach that if all the signatories to the offering are uncircumcised, the offering is invalidated, but if part of them are, it is not invalidated? That fact derives from ‘and all uncircumcised persons shall not eat thereof’ (Exo. 12:48) [meaning: when all who have signed up are uncircumcised, none may eat of it, but if only part of them are, the circumcised members may eat (Freedman)]. So isn’t this the sense of the Tannaite statement: Scripture states, ‘and all uncircumcised shall not eat thereof,’ meaning, if everybody signed up is uncircumcised, the offering is invalidated, but if part are, the offering is not invalidated.*

- M. *“And should you say, that is the same rule also for tossing the blood, so that, if the intentionality is to do so for a group that is wholly made up of uncircumcised males, that intentionality would invalidate the offering, Scripture states, ‘this,’ meaning: only in connection with slaughtering the sacrifice does the state of uncircumcision of all of those signed up for the animal affect the validity of the rite, but that is not the case in respect to sprinkling the blood, where, even if the intentionality covers the uncircumcision of all of the group signed up for the animal, the offering is not invalidated.”*
- N. *“And should you say, [since you assume that ‘this’ teaches a further leniency in respect to uncircumcision (Freedman)], then what further lenient aspect is there to the rule here when it has to do with sprinkling? The answer is, intentionality expressed in connection with sprinkling having to do with an uncircumcised male does not take effect.”*
- O. And R. Hisda?
- P. *“To the contrary! We must take the opposite route, namely: Scripture states, ‘and all uncircumcised persons shall not eat thereof,’ meaning, if the entire group of registrants is uncircumcised, that invalidates the offering, but if part of it is uncircumcised, that doesn’t invalidate the offering; but when it comes to sprinkling the blood, even if part of it is uncircumcised, the offering is invalidated.”*
- Q. *“And should you say, that same law would indeed apply to sprinkling, so that, unless everyone among the registrants is uncircumcised, the beast is not invalidated, Scripture states, ‘this,’ teaching, only in connection with slaughtering the animal would the fact that part is not circumcised not invalidate the offering, but at the matter of sprinkling, intentionality covering a group, part of which is uncircumcised, would disqualify the offering. And should you ask, then what further stringency pertains to sprinkling along with this one? it is that the prohibition of rendering the offering refuse by improper intentionality applies only as to intentionality in respect to sprinkling the blood [but if some improper intention applied to some other act of service, that is null; only if the*

intentionality involves sprinkling is the status fixed and permanent, being the last act of service in the rite].”

R. *Objected R. Ashi, “But how do you know that the language, ‘and all uncircumcised persons’ refers to the entirety of the group? Maybe the statement, ‘and all uncircumcised persons,’ speaks of any group in which there is any uncircumcision at all [even a single uncircumcised male would invalidate the sacrifice for them all]? Then it would follow that the All-Merciful used the word ‘this’ to teach that unless the entire group is uncircumcised, the sacrifice is not invalidated, since there is no difference between whether the intentionality of the priest to cover such a situation affects slaughtering or sprinkling the animal [there being no basis to intimate a distinction between the one and the other (Freedman)]?”*

S. *Rather, said R. Ashi, “R. Hisda and Rabbah [62A] dispute the following verse of Scripture: ‘And it [sprinkling the blood] shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him’ (Lev. 1: 4) — for him, not for his fellow. Rabbah reasons that ‘his fellow’ is comparable to him: just as he must be subject to atonement, so his fellow must be subject to atonement, excluding an uncircumcised male, who is not subject to atonement. And R. Hisda takes the view that, as to this uncircumcised person, too, since he is subject to the obligation to make the offering, he also is subject to atonement, for, if he wants, he can make himself fit.”*

T. *But does R. Hisda accept an argument based on an argument from “since”? And hasn’t it been stated:*

U. *One who baked [bread] on a festival day for use on a [following] weekday –*

V. *R. Hisda says, “He receives stripes.”*

W. *Rabbah says, “He does not receive stripes.”*

- X. Rabbah said, “He does not receive stripes. *[For] we do invoke the argument, Since, if [visitors dropped by, he may use the bread for them, therefore, even though no visitors came, he may use the bread on a festival day and is not culpable for baking it].*”
- Y. R. Hisda says, “He [is deemed a transgressor and] receives stripes. *[This is because] we do not invoke the argument: since, if visitors dropped by, [the bread] would be permitted for him [to serve to them on the festival day itself, therefore], even though [he does not have visitors, the bread] is permitted for use by him.*”
- Z. *For Rabbah there is no problem, he is consistent: Here, with respect to circumcision, a concrete action is required [circumcision, then he will be fit, and we do not regard his potential action as an actual one], and there, no concrete action that the man can take is required. But for R. Hisda, isn’t there a problem of self contradiction?*
- AA. *Say: When R. Hisda does not invoke the argument from “since...,” it is where it would produce a lenient ruling, but where it would produce a strict ruling, he does invoke such an argument!*

I.4 A. *Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “The Tannaite formulation is: Since uncircumcision invalidates [one’s right to share in] the Passover-offering, and uncleanness invalidates as well, just as in the case of uncleanness, Scripture has not treated uncleanness of part of those who register for the animal as equivalent to uncleanness of all of those who do [in the former case, the offering is valid], so the uncircumcision of some of those who register for an animal should not be treated as equivalent to the uncircumcision of them all. Now as to this uncleanness to which reference is made, how is it to be defined? Should I say that we speak of uncleanness pertaining to a person, and what is the meaning of, just as in the case of uncleanness, Scripture has not treated uncleanness of part as equivalent to uncleanness of all? It is, if there are four or five unclean persons and four or five clean ones [signed up for the same lamb], the unclean persons don’t invalidate the offering for the clean ones, then, in the case of a mixture of uncircumcised and circumcised*

persons, they don't invalidate the offering, since we have learned in the Mishnah: **for those who are circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised...it is valid [M. 5:3E-G]**. In that case, how is uncleanness different, in that he is certain about the rule, from uncircumcision, in which case he is doubtful about the rule [so that one has to be deduced from the other as in the argument here]? So at issue must be uncleanness affecting the meat itself, and what is the meaning of, just as in the case of uncleanness, Scripture has not treated uncleanness of part as equivalent to uncleanness of all? It is, if one of the limbs contracted uncleanness, then the one that contracted uncleanness do we burn, but the other limbs we eat."

- B. *Well, now, how have you interpreted the matter? With reference to uncleanness affecting the meat of the offering? Then look what follows in context: You should draw an analogy between a trait that does not apply to all sacrifices and another trait that does not apply to all sacrifices [uncircumcision and uncleanness do not apply to other sacrifices, for these may be sacrificed even if the owners were uncircumcised or unclean], but the consideration of improper intentionality as to the time of eating the meat of the offering should not contribute an analogy, for that serves as a disqualification in the case of all sacrifices. Then what is the meaning of uncleanness? If I should say, that refers to uncleanness of the meat, then how can it be said that it does not apply to all sacrifices? So it is obvious that this refers to uncleanness pertaining to persons. And what is the meaning of a trait that does not apply to all sacrifices? For with respect to all other offerings, an uncircumcised person or an unclean person may send their offerings [through fit persons, not being able to present them themselves], while with respect to the Passover, an uncircumcised person or an unclean person may not send his Passover-offering.*
- C. *So the upshot is, the opening statement pertains to uncleanness of meat, and the concluding one, uncleanness of persons?*
- D. *He said to him, "Yes, he is introducing the criterion of the classification of uncleanness [that is, he is speaking of uncleanness as a source of invalidation but he is not telling us the classification thereof (Freedman)]. Or if you prefer, I shall say, the concluding clause likewise deals with the uncleanness of the meat, and what is the meaning of the language, a trait that does not apply to all sacrifices? With respect to all other offerings, whether the offering contracted uncleanness at the sacrificial fat, while the meat remained valid, the priest sprinkles the blood, or the offering contracted uncleanness at the meat*

but the sacrificial fat is intact, the priest sprinkles the blood; but with respect to the Passover-offering, if the sacrificial fat contracted uncleanness and the meat remains valid, the priest sprinkles the blood, but if the meat contracted uncleanness but the fat was valid, he doesn't sprinkle the blood.

- E. *How then have you interpreted the statement? To pertain to the uncleanness of the meat? Then look to what follows: Or perhaps take this route: You should draw an analogy for something that has not been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern, from a matter that has not been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern [an offering may not be eaten by an uncircumcised person nor may it be eaten after the permitted time], but the consideration of uncleanness should not contribute the governing analogy, since it has been exempted from the general rule that would otherwise govern [if the whole community is unclean, the Passover lamb is sacrificed for them all]! Now how shall we identify that which has been exempted from the general rule governing it? Should I say, **[62B]** it is the uncleanness of the meat? Then where has that been permitted? So it obviously speaks of uncleanness of the person, and where has that been permitted? In the case of the community? Then it would emerge that the first clause speaks of uncleanness of meat and the second uncleanness of the person!*
- F. *Yes, indeed, he is introducing the criterion of the classification of uncleanness. Or if you prefer, I shall say, the entire passage speaks of uncleanness of the meat and where was the meat permitted? It is in the case of the Passover lamb itself, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **[But] the Passover-offering, which is offered in a state of cultic uncleanness, is eaten in a state of cultic uncleanness, for to begin with it is offered only for eating [M. Pes. 7:4C-D].***
- G. *Objected R. Huna b. R. Joshua, "A beast designated for use as a Passover-offering that became superannuated [and so automatically was reclassified into the category of peace-offerings], which one slaughtered at the proper time [namely, Passover-offering] and for the originally designated classification [as a Passover-offering], and so, too, if people slaughtered animals that had been designated for other offerings for the sake of a Passover-offering on the fourteenth of Nisan — R. Eliezer declares these offerings invalid, and R. Joshua declares them valid. The operative consideration [behind Eliezer's ruling] is that it was slaughtered at the proper time. Lo, if it were slaughtered not at the proper time [the fourteenth of Nisan], it would have been valid. But why should that be the case? Why not say, since doing it in*

the proper time invalidates it, doing it not in the proper time likewise invalidates it?”

- H. *Said R. Pappa, “That case is exceptional, since Scripture has said, ‘Then you shall say, the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover it is’ (Exo. 12:27) — it remains in its own status: It may not be slaughtered under the classification of any other offering, and an animal designated for any other offering may not be offered in its classification; in its time, on the fourteenth of Nisan, when if slaughtered for some other purpose, it is invalidated, others are invalidated if slaughtered in its classification; at some other time, when if it is slaughtered for some other classification, it is fit, others slaughtered in its classification likewise are fit.”*

I.5 A. *R. Simlai came before R. Yohanan. He said to me, “Will the master repeat for me the Book of Genealogies?”*

B. *He said to him, “Where do you come from?”*

C. *He said to him, “From Lud.”*

D. *“And where are you living?”*

E. *“In Nehardea.”*

F. *He said to him, “We do not repeat that document either to people from Lud or people from Nehardea, all the more so you, who came from Lud and dwells in Nehardea.” But he pressed him so the other agreed.*

G. *He said to him, “Let’s repeat it in three months.”*

H. *He took a clod of dirt and tossed it at him, saying, “If Beruriah, wife of R. Meir and daughter of R. Hanina b. Teradion, who studied three hundred laws from three hundred teachers in a single day, couldn’t do justice to that document in three years, do you really imagine you can learn it in three months?”*

I. *When he was taking his leave from him, he said to him, “My lord, what is the distinction that differentiates a Passover-offering that is presented both for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and for some other classification of offering [which is invalid] and one that is presented in behalf of both those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it [which is valid]?”*

J. *He said to him, “Since you’re a disciple of sages, come and I’ll tell you: As to a Passover-offering that is presented both for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and for some other classification of offering [which is invalid], the invalidating cause is in the body of the beast itself; as to one that is presented in behalf of both those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it [which is valid], the invalidating cause is not in the body of the beast itself. As to a Passover-offering that is presented both for the purpose for which the*

beast was originally designated and for some other classification of offering [which is invalid], it is not possible to differentiate the point at which the invalidating trait has taken effect [for example, this part of the beast was sacrificed under the proper designation, that part was not], but as to one that is presented in behalf of both those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it [which is valid], it is possible to differentiate the point at which the invalidating trait has taken effect. As to a Passover-offering that is presented both for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and for some other classification of offering [which is invalid], the invalidating intentionality affects four distinct acts of priestly service; but as to one that is presented in behalf of both those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it [which is valid], the invalidating intentionality does not affect four distinct acts of priestly service. As to a Passover-offering that is presented both for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and for some other classification of offering [which is invalid], the invalidating intentionality applies to the community's and to an individual's sacrifice; but as to one that is presented in behalf of both those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it [which is valid], the invalidating intentionality does not apply to the community's as much as to an individual's sacrifice [but only the Passover, which is an individual's sacrifice]."

K. *R. Ashi said, "The issues of intrinsic and extrinsic source of disqualification and of distinguishing that which is invalid from that which is not are one and the same. Then why does he say that the source of invalidation is intrinsic? Because one cannot identify the prohibited component of the beast."*

I.6 A. Said R. Ammi bar R. Yuda said Rab, "From the day on which the Book of Genealogies was suppressed, the power of sages has grown feeble, and the light of their eyes has dimmed."

B. *Said Mar Zutra, "On the passage beginning with 'And Azel had six sons' (1Ch. 8:38) and the one ending 'these were the sons of Azel' (1Ch. 9:44), they were burdened with four hundred camels loaded with [books of] interpretations [of those few verses alone]."*

I.7 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. Others say, "If in his formulation of his intentionality, the priest gave priority to the circumcised before the uncircumcised [saying, 'I am doing this for circumcised

persons, and then, I am doing this for uncircumcised persons,'] the act is valid. If the officiating priest gave precedence, in his intentionality, as to slaughtering the Passover animal, first to the uncircumcised persons then the circumcised ones, the act is invalid." [While slaughtering the Passover lamb in behalf of a number of people, both circumcised and not, the priest cut one organ of the animal's throat in behalf of one class of people, then the second on behalf of the other.]

- C. *Now what differentiates the case in which he gave precedence to circumcised over uncircumcised, that the act is valid?*
- D. *It is because we require the entire group to be uncircumcised to invalidate the offering, and that condition has not been met.*
- E. *Then where he gave precedence to the uncircumcised over the circumcised, we should require them all to be uncircumcised, and that condition has still not been met so as to invalidate the offering!*
- F. **[63A]** *So shall we then maintain that "others" take the position, slaughtering the animal takes effect only at the end, in accord with the position of Raba, who said, "There is still a controversy"? Thus, if he gave precedence to the circumcised over the uncircumcised, the intentionality concerning the circumcised takes effect, that concerning the uncircumcised doesn't take effect. But if he gave precedence to the uncircumcised over the circumcised, the intentionality concerning the uncircumcised takes effect, and that concerning the circumcised doesn't take effect?*
- G. *Said Raba, "Not at all. In point of fact, 'others' take the view that slaughtering the animal takes effect from beginning to end [and the intentionality expressed at any point in that process is affective upon the status of the offering], but here, what is at issue? A case in which the priest has formed the intentionality to do it for both classes of persons, circumcised and uncircumcised, and he expressed in words the intentionality concerning the uncircumcised but had not time to say the language, and for the circumcised, before he completed the act of slaughter, so that the sole expressed intentionality was for the uncircumcised; and what is at issue is this: R. Meir [=others] maintains that we do not require what he says and what his intentionality in his mind is to be one and the same; the rabbis hold that we do require that what he says and what he is thinking to be one and the same."*

- H. *So is it the fact, then, that R. Meir maintains, we do not require what he says and what his intentionality in his mind is to be one and the same? And by contrast: (1) One who [in designating agricultural gifts] intends to say, “heave-offering,” but says, “tithe,” “tithe,” but says “heave-offering,” (2) [or who, in designating a sacrifice, intends to say,] “burnt-offering,” but says, “peace-offering,” “peace-offering,” but says, “burnt-offering”; (3) [or who, in making a vow, intends to say], “that I will not enter this house,” but says, “that house,” “that I will not derive benefit from this one,” but says, “from that one,” has not said anything, until his mouth and heart agree [M. Ter. 3:8]. [The anonymous rule is assumed to belong to Meir.]*
- I. *Rather, said Abbayye, “The first clause means this: If he said, ‘I cut the first organ in behalf of the circumcised and the second for the uncircumcised as well, so that at the second organ, the circumcised also are included, then it is valid. The second clause means, he stated, ‘I cut the first organ for the uncircumcised and the second for the circumcised,’ so that the first organ’s cutting is not for the circumcised. And R. Meir is quite consistent with views expressed elsewhere, for he does say, after all, that when one is making an offering, if he has accomplished the rite governing half of the service that permits the priests to enjoy their share of the offering, an invalidating intentionality which renders the offering refuse takes effect; rabbis are consistent with their position, for they maintain that if he has accomplished the rite governing half of the service that permits the priests to enjoy their share of the offering, an invalidating intentionality which renders the offering refuse does not take effect.”*

5:4

- A. He who slaughters the Passover-offering with leaven [still in his possession] transgresses a negative commandment (Exo. 34:25).
- B. R. Judah says, “Also: the daily whole-offering [for the fourteenth of Nisan].”
- C. R. Simeon says, “[He who slaughters] the Passover-offering on the fourteenth [with leaven in his possession] under the proper designation is liable.
- D. “[If he did so] not under the proper designation, he is exempt.
- E. “And so to all other offerings, [whether he slaughtered them] under the proper designation or under an improper designation, he is exempt.

- F. “And on the festival [itself, if he slaughtered it] under a proper designation, he is exempt. [If he slaughtered it] under an improper designation, he is liable.
- G. “And as to all other offerings, whether he slaughtered them under their proper designation or under an improper designation, he is liable,
- H. “except for a sin-offering which he slaughtered under an improper designation.”

I.1 A. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “In point of fact, one is liable only if the leaven belongs to the one who slaughters the animal or to the one who tosses the blood, **[63B]**, or to one of the members of the association formed for the purpose of offering that particular beast; and only if the leaven is with him in the Temple court.”

B. R. Yohanan said, “Even though it is not with him in the Temple court, he is liable.”

C. *What is subject to dispute here? Should I say that what is at issue concerns whether the word “with” at Exo. 34:25 means, in physical proximity, with R. Simeon b. Laqish taking the view that “with” means, in physical proximity, and R. Yohanan maintaining that “with” doesn’t mean in physical proximity? But they’ve already had that dispute elsewhere, for we have learned in the Mishnah:*

D. **He who slaughters the thank-offering inside [the Temple court], [while] its bread-offering is located outside the wall — the bread is not sanctified [M. Men. 8:3A].**

E. *What is the meaning of outside the wall?*

F. R. Yohanan said, “Outside the wall of Bethpage.”

G. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Outside of the wall of the courtyard.”

H. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Outside of the wall of the courtyard”: for the sense of the word “with” [in the verse, “with cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering” (Lev. 7:13)], *we require that it be near [the sacrifices, that is, within the Temple court].*

I. R. Yohanan said, “Outside the wall of Bethpage”: for the sense of the word “with” [in the verse, “with cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering” (Lev. 7:13)], but if it is outside of the wall of the courtyard, it is still sanctified, *for we do not require that it be near the sacrifices.*

- J. *Rather, they differ on the effect of a warning the validity of which is subject to doubt* [if the leaven is in the Temple court, the man can be warned knowing that his proposed action is forbidden, but if not, we don't know whether the admonition is valid, since we don't know whether he has leaven at home, so it is a warning subject to doubt; Simeon holds that it is invalid and there is no flogging, Yohanan has him flogged if later on we find leaven at home (Freedman)].
- K. *But they've already had that argument, too, for it has been stated:*
- L. [If someone said,] "by an oath, today I shall eat this loaf of bread," both R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish say, "He is not flogged."
- M. R. Yohanan said, "He is not flogged," because what we have here is a negative commandment that does not involve a concrete deed, and on account of a negative commandment that does not involve a concrete deed, no flogging is administered. But an admonition subject to doubt is classified as a valid admonition.
- N. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is not flogged," since here we have admonition that is subject to doubt, and admonition that is subject to doubt is not classified as an admonition. but as for a negative commandment in which no action is involved, we do administer a flogging.
- O. *Well, I shall tell you: In point of fact they do differ on whether or not "with" means, physical proximity. Yet it is necessary to go over the dispute here as well as there. But both disputes still have to be expressed explicitly, for if the rule were stated only in that case, in connection with leaven and the Passover, I might have said that it is in that case in particular that R. Yohanan regards him as liable, even though the leaven was not physically with the man, for wherever it happens to be located, it is subject to a prohibition, but in the matter of the meaning of "with" in connection with sanctifying the bread, I might suppose that he agrees with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish*

that if the bread is located within the Temple court, it is sanctified, if outside, it is not. And if the rule were stated only in the present context, I might maintain that it is in this case in particular that R. Simeon b. Laqish takes the view that the bread is sanctified only if it is within the Temple court, but in the other case, I might maintain that he accepts the view of R. Yohanan that one is liable even though the leaven is not near at hand. So both disputes have to be set forth.

- I.2** A. *R. Oshayya asked this question of R. Ammi: “If the one who slaughters the Passover-offering has no leaven, but one of the members of the association owning the animals does, what is the rule?”*
- B. *He said to him, “Is it written, ‘you shall not slaughter the blood of my sacrifice with your leavened bread’? What is written is, ‘you shall not slaughter the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread’ (Exo. 34:25) [so he is liable].”*
- C. *“If so, then wouldn’t he be liable even if someone on the other side of the world had leaven?”*
- D. *He said to him, “Said Scripture, ‘you shall not slaughter the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left overnight to the morning,’ so: ‘you shall not slaughter...with leavened bread’ applies in particular to those who are subject to the consideration, ‘it shall not be left overnight’ [which means, only the owners].”*
- E. *Said R. Pappa, “Therefore a priest who offers up the sacrificial fat on the altar violates a negative commandment, since he is subject to the prohibition of leaving overnight the sacrificial parts to be burned.”*
- F. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the proposition of R. Pappa:*
- G. **He who slaughters the Passover lamb while possessing leaven violates a negative commandment. Under what conditions? That is when the leaven belongs to the one who slaughters the animal or to the one who tosses the blood or to any one of the members of the association. If someone had leaven over on the other side of the world, one is not obligated to take that into account. And all the same are the ones who slaughter the animal and who toss the blood and who offer up the sacrificial parts: such would be liable. But the one who twists off the neck of a bird on the**

fourteenth of Nisan does not violate a negative commandment of any kind [T. **Pisha 4:3**].

- H. *But by contrast: He who slaughters the Passover-offering with leaven [still in his possession] transgresses a negative commandment (Exo. 34:25). R. Judah says, “Also: the daily whole-offering [for the fourteenth of Nisan].” They said to him, “Sages have made that rule only in connection with the Passover alone. Under what conditions? That is when the leaven belongs to the one who slaughters the animal or to the one who tosses the blood or to any one of the members of the association. If someone had leaven over on the other side of the world, one is not obligated to take that into account. And all the same are the ones who slaughter the animal and who toss the blood or who twist off the neck of the bird or sprinkle the blood of the bird — he is liable. But he who takes a handful of the meal-offering does not violate a negative commandment. He who offers up the sacrificial parts does not violate a negative commandment. [64A] So there is a contradiction between the two rulings that pertain to twisting off the neck, and there also is a contradiction between the two rulings on burning the sacrificial fats.*
- I. *Well, then, by your reasoning, there is a contradiction in the body of the passage itself, for the Tannaite formulation announces, Sages have made that rule only in connection with the Passover alone, but then it goes on to say, And all the same are the ones who slaughter the animal and who toss the blood or who twist off the neck of the bird or sprinkle the blood of the bird [and that would extend the law far beyond the Passover!]. Rather, both statements represent the position of R. Simeon.*
- J. *And there is no contradiction between the two rulings that pertain to twisting off the neck: The one speaks of the fourteenth of Nisan, the other, the intermediate days of the festival; and so both statements accord with R. Simeon. And the rulings on the burning of the fat do not contradict one another, for there is a Tannaite dispute on that matter: some treat burning as comparable to slaughtering, others don't.*

II.1 A. R. Judah says, “Also: the daily whole-offering [for the fourteenth of Nisan]”:

B. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Judah?*

C. He will say to you, “‘you shall not slaughter the blood of my sacrifice’ (Exo. 23:18, 34:25), meaning, a sacrifice that is particular to me, *and what might that be?* It is the daily whole-offering.”

III.1 A. R. Simeon says, “[He who slaughters] the Passover-offering on the fourteenth [with leaven in his possession] under the proper designation is liable”:

B. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon?*

C. As it is written, “‘...my sacrifice’ is written twice (Exo. 23:18, 34:25); *thus ‘my sacrifices.’ [That would cover all others.] Why did the All-Merciful divide them from one another and not say ‘my sacrifices’ in a single word? To indicate: when there is a sacrifice [the paschal lamb] you are not liable on account of ‘my sacrifices,’ and when there is no ‘sacrifice,’ then you are liable for ‘my sacrifices.’*”

IV.1 A. [If he did so] not under the proper designation, he is exempt:

B. *The operative consideration is that it is for a purpose other than that for which the beast was originally designated. Then if the purpose of the beast’s consecration for an offering is not specified, he would be exempt. But why should that be the rule? After all, the beast that is suitable for a Passover-offering when offered at any other day in the year is simply classified as a peace-offering [willy-nilly] [so why is it necessary explicitly to designate it for the stated purpose]? So that proves that the animal that serves as a Passover-offering during the rest of the year would require the nullification of its character as a Passover-offering [and this is not done willy-nilly but only articulately].*

C. Said R. Hiyya bar Gameda, “The following was set forth on the authority of the collegium of sages, who said, ‘It would involve a case in which the beast’s owners were unclean with corpse uncleanness, so being postponed as to their offering to the second Passover, *with the result that, even though its purpose is not articulated, it still retains its standing as a Passover-offering for use on the second Passover.*’”

5:5

- A. The Passover [-offering] is slaughtered [by people divided into] three groups,
- B. as it is said, “And the whole [1] assembly of the [2] congregation of [3] Israel shall slaughter it” (Exo. 12: 6) —
- C. [this yields] assembly, congregation, and Israel.
- D. [When] the first group entered, the courtyard was packed, [then] the doors of the courtyard were locked.
- E. They blew on the shofar a sustained, a quavering, and a sustained note.
- F. The priests stood in rows, with basins of silver and gold in their hands.
- G. One row had wholly silver ones, another wholly gold ones; they were not mixed up.
- H. And the basins did not have bases, lest they put them down, and the blood [of the Passover sacrifice] congeal.

5:6

- A. An Israelite slaughtered [the Passover lamb] and a priest received the blood, handed it to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow,
- B. [each one] receiving a full basin and handing back an empty one.
- C. The priest nearest the altar tossed [the blood] in a single act of tossing, toward the base.

5:7

- A. The first group went out and the second group came in.
- B. The second group went out and the third group came in.
- C. In accord with the rite of the first group were the rites of the second and third.
- D. [The Levites meanwhile] proclaimed the Hallel Psalms [113-118].
- E. If they completed [the recitation], they repeated it, and if they completed the second time, they repeated it for a third —
- F. even though they never in all their days had to repeat it a third time.
- G. R. Judah says, “In all the days of the third group they never even reached the verse, I love the Lord because he has heard my voice (Psa. 116: 1), because its numbers were small.”

5:8

- A. In accord with the rite as conducted on an ordinary day, so was the conduct of the rite on the Sabbath.
- B. And the priests mopped up the courtyard [on the Sabbath, just as on a weekday],
- C. contrary to sages' wishes.
- D. R. Judah says, "A cup was filled with the mingled blood [which had been spilled]. One tossed it with a single act of tossing on the altar."
- E. And sages did not concur with him.

5:9

- A. How do they hang up [the carcasses] and flay them?
- B. Iron hooks were set into the walls and pillars, on which they would hang up and flay the carcasses [M. Mid. 3:5].
- C. And for whoever did not have space for hanging and flaying his carcass,
- D. there were thin smooth poles, and one would put one end on his shoulder and one on the shoulder of his fellow,
- E. and [thereon] hang and flay the carcass.
- F. R. Eliezer says, "On the fourteenth of Nisan which coincided with the Sabbath, he would put his hand on the shoulder of his fellow, and the hand of his fellow on his shoulder, and thereon suspend and flay the carcass."

5:10

- A. He slit open the carcass and removed its sacrificial portions, put them on a tray and [a priest] burned them on the altar.
- B. [When the fourteenth of Nisan coincided with the Sabbath], the first group went out and took seats on the Temple mount, the second on the Rampart, and the third remained in its place.
- C. Once it got dark, they went out and roasted their Passover lambs.

- I.1** A. [The Passover [-offering] is slaughtered [by people divided into] three groups, as it is said, "And the whole [1] assembly of the [2] congregation of [3] Israel shall slaughter it" (Exo. 12: 6) — [this yields] assembly, congregation, and Israel:] Said R. Isaac, "The Passover-offering is slaughtered only by three groups made up of thirty men. How come?

‘Assembly...congregation...Israel’ — *we are subject to doubt whether that means simultaneously or consecutively. Therefore we require that there be three groups made up of thirty men. For if they are simultaneous, then the requisite number obviously is there; but if consecutively, the requisite number still is there. And therefore fifty also would suffice, for thirty go in and prepare their offering, ten enter and ten leave, another ten enter and another ten leave.*”

II.1 A. [When] the first group entered, the courtyard was packed, [then] the doors of the courtyard were locked:

- B. *It was stated:*
- C. *Abbaye said, “We repeat the Mishnah wording as **locked [themselves]**.”*
- D. *Raba said, “We repeat the Mishnah wording as **they locked**.”*
 - E. *So what’s at stake?*
 - F. *At issue between them is whether or not we rely on miracles.*
 - G. *Abbaye said, “We repeat the Mishnah wording as **locked [themselves]**: as many as went in went in, and we rely on a miracle.”*
 - H. *Raba said, “We repeat the Mishnah wording as **they locked**, and we do not rely on a miracle.”*
 - I. *And as to that which we have learned in the Mishnah: [Aqabia b. Mahalalel gave testimony in four matters. They said to him, “Aqabia, retract the four rulings which you laid down, and we shall make you patriarch of the court of Israel.” He said to them, “It is better for me to be called a fool my whole life but not be deemed a wicked person before the Omnipresent for even one minute, so that people should not say, ‘Because he craved after high office, he retracted’”...They excommunicated him, and he died while he was subject to the excommunication, so the court stoned his bier.] Said R. Judah, “God forbid that Aqabia was excommunicated! For the courtyard is never locked before any Israelite of the wisdom and fear of sin of a man like Aqabia b. Mahalalel [M. Ed. 5:6A-O] — Abbaye works out the matter in accord with his theory, and Raba in accord with his.*
 - J. *Abbaye works out the matter in accord with his theory: At the time that the Temple court closed itself upon every man in Israel, there was no one in the court of the wisdom and fear of sin of a man like Aqabia b. Mahalalel.*

- K. *And Raba in accord with his:* At the time that they closed the Temple court upon every man in Israel, there was no one in the court **of the wisdom and fear of sin of a man like Aqabia b. Mahalalel.**

II.2 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. No one was ever crushed in the Temple court, except for one Passover that took place in the time of Hillel, on which someone was crushed to death, and they would call it, “The Passover of the crushed.”

II.3 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **Once Agrippa the king wanted to know the census of the population. He said to the high priest, “Look at the Passover sacrifices.” So he took one kidney from each, and 600,000 pairs of kidneys turned up, twice as many as those who had made the exodus from Egypt, not counting the ones who were unclean or were away on a distant trip [who would celebrate Passover on the second go-around, in the coming month]. And you have no Passover lamb on which more than ten people hadn’t registered, so they called it “the crowded Passover” [T. Pisha 4:15].**

II.4 A. **He took one kidney from each:**

- B. *But lo, it has to be burned up on the altar!*
C. *In fact, he went and burned them up later.*
D. But isn’t it written in Scripture, “And Aaron’s sons shall burn it” (Lev. 3: 5) — meaning, he mustn’t mix the fat of one offering with that of another?
E. *In fact, he went and burned them up one by one.*
F. *But hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall burn them” (Lev. 3:16) — this teaches that all must be burned simultaneously?*
G. *It was just a general confiscation, meaning, he took these from them until they gave him something else in their place.*

III.1 A. **The priests stood in rows, with basins of silver and gold in their hands. One row had wholly silver ones, another wholly gold ones; they were not mixed up:**

- B. *How come? Should I say that it was, lest they take a basin of gold but give back one of silver? Here, too, they might take a basin that would hold two hundred and hand back one of one hundred [so that cannot be the operative consideration]. Rather, it is, it is nicer this way.*

IV.1 A. And the basins did not have bases, lest they put them down, and the blood [of the Passover sacrifice] congeal:

B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. None of the basins in the Temple had flat bottoms, except the basins of the frankincense for the showbread, lest they put them down [on the rows of bread] and they break up the bread.

V.1 A. An Israelite slaughtered [the Passover lamb] and a priest received the blood, handed it to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow, [each one] receiving a full basin and handing back an empty one:

B. *Is it essential that it be an Israelite? [Couldn't a priest do it?]*

C. *The Tannaite formulation of the rule is meant itself to inform us that if the act of slaughter is done by a non-priest, it is acceptable.*

VI.1 A. And a priest received the blood?

B. *So we are informed that from the receiving of the blood onwards, it is the task of the priest to carry out the rite.*

VII.1 A. Handed it to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow:

B. *This yields the inference that carrying without moving the feet is classified as an act of carrying.*

C. *But maybe he moved a bit.*

D. *If so, then what's the point of this detail?*

E. *So he informs us that "in the multitude of people is the king's glory" (Pro. 14:28).*

VIII.1 A. [Each one] receiving a full basin and handing back an empty one:

B. *But not the other way around [is this the fixed order]? Then that sustains the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish, for said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "People are not to bypass commandments [but must do them as soon as possible]."*

IX.1 A. The priest nearest the altar tossed [the blood] in a single act of tossing, toward the base:

B. *Who is the Tannaite authority who takes the view that it is necessary to sprinkle on the corners of the altar the blood of the Passover-offering [and the blood isn't just poured on the altar]?*

C. *Said R. Hisda, "It is R. Yosé the Galilean, for so it has been taught on Tannaite authority":*

D. *R. Yosé the Galilean says, "[But the firstling of an ox or the firstling of a sheep or the firstling of a goat you shall not redeem; they are holy;] you shall dash their*

blood against the altar and you shall make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire' (Num. 18:17)] — not 'its blood' but 'their blood,' not 'its fat' but 'their fat.' This teaches concerning the case of a beast designated as tithe of the herd and of a beast designated as a Passover-offering that there must be a placing of blood on the altar and a burning up of the sacrificial parts on the altar."

- E. *How do we know that the sprinkling of the blood is supposed to be done against the base of the altar?*
- F. *Said R. Eleazar, "We form a verbally based analogy to deduce the rule governing sprinkling from the rule governing a burnt-offering. Here it is written, 'You shall sprinkle their blood against the altar,' and elsewhere, 'And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall sprinkle its blood against the altar round about' (Lev. 1:11) — just as the blood of the burnt-offering has to be sprinkled against the base, so does the blood of the Passover-offering have to be sprinkled against the base."*
- G. **[65A]** *And how do we know that fact concerning the burnt-offering itself?*
- H. *Scripture says, "At the base of the altar of the burnt-offering" (Lev. 4: 7) — therefore the blood of the burnt-offering has to be sprinkled at the base of the altar.*

X.1 A. The first group went out and the second group came in. The second group went out and the third group came in:

- B. *A Tannaite statement: It is called the slothful group [T. Pisha 4:11G].*
- C. *Well, then, wouldn't the rite be carried out if it isn't done this way? What ought they to have done?*
- D. *Nonetheless, they ought to have made the effort to make haste, as it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. **Rabbi says, "You have no trade that passes out of the world. Happy is him who sees his parents in an honored profession, woe is he who sees his parents in a mean profession.**
- F. **"It is not possible to have a world without either a spice dealer or a tanner. But happy is the one who makes his living as a spice dealer, and woe is the one who makes his living as a tanner. It is not possible to have a world without either males or females, but happy is the one whose children are males, and woe for him whose children are females" [T. Qid. 5:14C-D].**

- XI.1** A. In accord with the rite as conducted on an ordinary day, so was the conduct of the rite on the Sabbath. And the priests mopped up the courtyard [on the Sabbath, just as on a weekday], contrary to sages' wishes:
- B. *Against the wishes of whom in particular?*
- C. *Said R. Hisda, "Against the wishes of R. Eliezer. For it cannot be against the wishes of rabbis, for lo, they have said, it is merely a matter of what is prohibited by reason of the general considerations of Sabbath rest, and the general considerations of Sabbath rest do not apply to the sanctuary."*
- D. *To what is allusion made here?*
- E. *To that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: "He who milks, set milks to curdle, makes cheese — the requisite volume is the volume of a dried fig. He who sweeps the floor, lays the dust, removes loaves of honey, if he does it inadvertently, is liable to a sin-offering, if deliberately, on a festival, he is flagellated with forty lashes," the words of R. Eliezer.*
- F. And sages say, "In both cases it is forbidden merely as a precaution to protect Sabbath rest" [T. **Shab. 9:13F-I**].
- G. *R. Ashi said, "You may even say that it was against the wishes of rabbis, and it represents the position of R. Nathan, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Nathan says, 'An act that would be prohibited under general considerations of Sabbath rest that is nonetheless necessary they permitted in the Temple, but one that is not necessary they didn't permit.'"*
- XII.1** A. R. Judah says, "A cup was filled with the mingled blood [which had been spilled]. One tossed it with a single act of tossing on the altar." And sages did not concur with him.
- B. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. R. Judah says, "The priest would fill one cup with mingled blood and sprinkle it once against the base of the altar [for if the blood of one of them was mixed in, this would turn out to validate it.]"
- D. They said to him, "And is it not so that it is not received in a utensil? [And blood which has not been received in a utensil is invalid for the altar. Another matter: this is blood that exudes at the end, and blood that merely exudes at the end, not life blood, is invalid for use on the altar.]"

He said to them, “If so, then why do they stop up the courtyard, so that the priests slipped around in blood up to their ankles?” They said to him, “It is a good thing for the priests to walk in blood up to their ankles” (T. Pes. 4:12D-I)].

- E. *How do they know [that it has not been caught in a utensil? Rather they said to him, “But perhaps it has not been caught in a utensil [but poured from the animal’s throat right onto the ground]?”*
- F. He said to them, “I, too, spoke only of blood that was received in a utensil.”
- G. *And how does he know that?*
- H. *The priests are meticulous, but while they do their work quickly, blood may spill.*
- I. But blood that exudes in the end is mixed up with the blood [and only lifeblood can be used for sprinkling]!
- J. *R. Judah is consistent with principles expressed elsewhere, for he has said, “Blood that exudes at the end is classified as blood.”*
- K. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- L. Use of blood that has exuded is prohibited by an admonition to the contrary [and so flogging is inflicted, but not extirpation].
- M. R. Judah says, “It is subject to extirpation.”
- N. But has not R. Eleazar said, “R. Judah concedes as to the issue of atonement that the blood does not make atonement, since it is said, ‘For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life’ (Lev. 17:11) — **[65B]** it is the blood with the flow of which life expires, and blood with the flow of which life does not expire is not classified as blood”?
- O. *Rather, R. Judah is consistent with his view in that he has said, “Blood does not nullify blood of another classification.” [Freedman: There is certainly a little of lifeblood in the cup of mixed blood, and that suffices for atonement.]*
- P. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority: **Said to them R. Judah, “If so, then why do they stop up the courtyard, so that the priests slipped around in blood up to their ankles?”***

- Q. They said to him, “It is a good thing for the sons of Aaron [the priests] to walk in blood up to their ankles” [T. Pes. 4:12D-I].
- R. *But lo, blood forms an interposition [between the feet of the priests and the pavement of the courtyard]!*
- S. *It is liquid and does not constitute an interposition, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If blood, ink, honey, and milk are coagulated, they interpose; but if in liquid form, they do not interpose.*
- T. *But lo, their garments become filthy, and it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If a priest’s garments were dirty and he performed an act of service, his act of service is unfit.*
- U. *And if you should reply that they would hold up their hems, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall put on his linen measure” (Lev. 6: 3) — meaning that it may not be too short or too long.*
- V. *They did so when they were bringing the limbs up the ramp, which is not in the category of an act of service.*
- W. *Now is it not? But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “And the priest shall offer it all and burn it on the altar” (Lev. 1:13)?*
- X. *Rather, they did so when putting the wood on the altar, which is not in the category of an act of service.*
- Y. *So when they walked about for the purposes of acts of service, how did they do it?*
- Z. *They walked about on projections [along the walls].*

XIII.1 A. How do they hang up [the carcasses] and flay them? Iron hooks were set into the walls and pillars, on which they would hang up and flay the carcasses [M. Mid. 3:5]. And for whoever did not have space for hanging and flaying his carcass, there were thin smooth poles, and one would put one end on his shoulder and one on the shoulder of his fellow, and [thereon] hang and flay the carcass. R. Eliezer says, “On the fourteenth of Nisan which coincided with the Sabbath, he would put his hand on the shoulder of his fellow, and the hand of his fellow on his shoulder, and thereon suspend and flay the carcass.” He slit open the carcass and

removed its sacrificial portions, put them on a tray and [a priest] burned them on the altar:

- B. *Did he himself burn them?*
- C. *Say: to burn them on the altar.*

XIV.1 A. [When the fourteenth of Nisan coincided with the Sabbath], the first group went out and took seats on the Temple mount, the second on the Rampart, and the third remained in its place. Once it got dark, they went out and roasted their Passover lambs:

- B. *A Tannaite statement: Each one would put his Passover lamb into its hide and sling it over his shoulder."*
- C. *Said R. Ilish, "Like the Tai-Arabs."*