

I

BAVLI MENAHOT CHAPTER ONE

FOLIOS 2A-13A

1:1

- A. All meal offerings from which the handful was taken not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”] are valid [for offering up, and, in the case of the residue, for the priests’ eating].
- B. But they have not gone to their owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation,
- C. except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy [of a suspected adulteress] [which, if improperly designated for a purpose other than that for which originally designated, are invalid].
- D. The meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of a suspected adulteress (1) from which the handful was taken not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”], (2) [or which] one put into a utensil, and (3) conveyed and (4) offered up not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”],
- E. or for for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated [“for its own name”] and not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”],
- F. or not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”] and for for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated [“for its own name”],
- G. are invalid.
- H. How so [in a case of doing one of the afore-listed actions] is it or for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated [“for its own name”] and not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”]?
- I. [If one did one action] (1) for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and (2) [another action] for the sake of a freewill meal offering.

J. Or [how do we define a case of doing one of the afore-listed actions] or not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated ["not for their own name"] and for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated ["for its own name"]

K. For the sake of (2) a freewill meal offering and for the sake of (1) the meal offering of a sinner.

I.1 A. *Why formulate matters as But [they have not gone to their owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation], and not simply state, and [they have not gone to their owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation]?*

B. *In this way the formulation of the rule bears the implication that it is in particular to their owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation that they do not go, but the meal offering itself is entirely valid, and it is forbidden to make any changes in its regard.*

I.2. A. *This further accords with the position of Raba, for Raba has said, "As to a burnt-offering that one slaughtered not under the proper designation, it is forbidden to toss its blood under some other than the proper designation [but the blood can be tossed only within the rules governing the burnt offering]."*

B. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning, but if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture.*

C. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning: even though the status of the beast has been revised [one time], shall the priest go on and make further revisions of the status of the beast? [Obviously not].*

D. *But if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture: "what has come out of your lips you shall observe and do, according as you have vowed a freewill-offering to the Lord your God" (Deu. 23:24).*

E. *Now does this verse refer to a free-will offering? In point of fact, in context, it refers to an offering that is presented in fulfillment of a vow ["what has come out of your lips"]! Rather, the sense is as follows: if you have acted in accord with that which you have vowed, then let it be an offering in fulfillment of a vow, but if not, then let it be a mere freewill offering. [2B] And in the case of a freewill-offering, is it permitted to change its classification in any aspect whatsoever? [Certainly not!].*

I.3 A. *[But they have not gone to their owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation:] May we say that the Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the position of R. Simeon. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. **R. Simeon says, "All meal offerings from which the handful was taken for some purpose other than the originally designated one are valid, and they do go to their owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation [M. Men. 1:1A-B].**

C. **"For meal offerings are not comparable to animal sacrifices.**

D. **"If the priest takes a handful from a meal offering prepared on a griddle and refers to it as one prepared in a pan, the rites pertaining to it in any case indicate that he is dealing with one prepared on a griddle.**

- E. **“If he is dealing with a dry meal offering and refers to it as one mixed with oil, this is of no consequence, because the rites pertaining to it indicate that he is dealing with a dry one.**
- F. **“But in the case of animal sacrifices, there is only one rite that covers all of them, only one mode of slaughter that pertains to all of them, one mode of tossing the blood that pertains to all of them, one mode of receiving the blood that pertains to all of them” [T. Zeb. 1:1A-E].**
- G. *That proposal poses no problem to the position of R. Ashi, who [referring to a contradiction in opinions assigned to Simeon] has said, “In the one case, he took a handful from meal prepared on a griddle and referred to it as though it were meal prepared in a pan, in the other case he took a handful from meal offering prepared on a griddle and referred to it as a meal offering prepared in a pan. [Cashdan: where the officiating priest does not mention ‘meal offering’ but merely the utensil in which it has been prepared, then referring it to one kind rather than another, it is clear that his words bear no meaning and are ignored, since the mode of preparing the meal offering contradicts what he says; the offering is unaffected and carries out the obligation, as stated in the cited passage above]. In the other case, namely, that of our Mishnah, we have a meal offering referred to in so many words as a different meal offering [from that which the owner has designated for his offering].” [Cashdan: the priest has referred to one meal offering as another, so the meal offering is affected by what the priest has said, since he has expressed a wrongful intention in connection with a meal offering, and it therefore does not discharge the owner’s obligation.]*
- H. *But from the perspective of Rabbah and Raba, what is there to be said?*
- I. *For if you should propose to explain matters in accord with Rabbah’s view, which holds, “Here the change in the original designation is in respect to the classification of sanctification of the offering, while there it pertains to the correct designation of the owner,” [where the meal offering prepared in a griddle is referred to as one prepared in a pan, the offering is valid, for the rites indicate its status; when the error concerns the owner of the offering, the offering does not fulfill the actual owner’s obligation (Cashdan)], in point of fact our Mishnah-paragraph refers to a change as to the classification of the status of the offering itself as to sanctification, for lo, it is taught as a Tannaite statement: **How so [in a case of doing one of the afore-listed actions] is it or for for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated [“for its own name”] and not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”]? [If one did one action] (1) for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and (2) [another action] for the sake of a freewill meal offering.***
- J. *And if you should propose to explain matters in accord with Raba’s view, which holds, “Here we deal with a case in which the priest took the handful of meal offering for the sake of a meal offering [of a different classification], [in which case the owner’s commitment has been carried out even though there has been a misdesignation of the classification of meal offering that is represented by the handful], while in the other case [in which the owner’s obligation has not been carried it], we have the case of a priest who took the handful of the meal offering for the sake of an animal offering [and the owner still owes a meal offering],” still,*

our Mishnah-paragraph speaks of a meal offering that is offered under the classification of some other meal offering, in light of this wording: Or [how do we define a case of doing one of the afore-listed actions] or not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”] and for for the purpose for which the meal was originally designated [“for its own name”]? For the sake of (2) a freewill meal offering and for the sake of (1) the meal offering of a sinner.

- K. *So from the perspective of Rabbah and Raba, it would be best simply to conclude that the Mishnah-passages have been set forth not in accord with the view of R. Simeon.*
- I.4.** A. *There is furthermore a contradiction [not only between Simeon’s position and that of the Mishnah-paragraph but also] between two statements in the name of R. Simeon. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. R. Simeon says, “It is written, ‘It is Most Holy Things, as the sin offering and the guilt offering’ (Lev. 6:10) — some meal offerings fall into the classification of the sin offering, and some fall into the classification of the guilt offering. The meal offering brought by a poor person who has sinned falls into the classification of the sin offering, so that if the priest took the handful from the meal that he has presented as his sin offering for some other purpose than that of a sin offering, it is invalid, as is the sin offering invalid. The free will meal offering falls into the classification of the guilt offering, so that if the priest took the handful of meal offering from the grain set aside for a freewill meal offering for some other purpose than the originally designated one, it remains valid. ‘And as the guilt offering’ means, just as the guilt offering is valid even when offered for some purpose other than the one for which the animal was originally designated, but does not then fulfill the obligation of the owner to present a guilt offering, so the free will meal offering is valid but it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who has presented it to present a free will meal offering.” [Cashdan: this latter statement of Simeon concurs with the position of our Mishnah but conflicts with the citation of Simeon in the Tosefta, who holds that the owner’s obligation is fulfilled.]
- C. *Said Rabbah, “There is no contradiction. Here the change in the original designation is in respect to the classification of sanctification of the offering, while there it pertains to the correct designation of the owner,” [where the meal offering prepared in a griddle is referred to as one prepared in a pan, the offering is valid, for the rites indicate its status; when the error concerns the owner of the offering, the offering does not fulfill the actual owner’s obligation (Cashdan) so, in point of fact, our Mishnah-paragraph refers to a change as to the classification of the status of the offering itself as to sanctification].*
- D. *Said to him Abbaye, “Now it is shown by analogy that, from the perspective of the All-Merciful, it is an improper intentionality that invalidates the offering, what difference does it make to me whether the change pertains to the character of the offering or the identification of the owner?”*
- E. *He said to him, “As to the statement of R. Simeon, **because the rites pertaining to it indicate that he is dealing with a dry one**, is based on a supposition as to the reasoning that is behind the law, for R. Simeon is the one who commonly*

presents speculation on the reasoning behind the law of Scripture. Therefore, a wrongful intention that is not obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as an intention that can invalidate an offering, but one that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating the offering.”

Testing the Proposition: a wrongful intention that is not obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as an intention that can invalidate an offering, but one that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating the offering

I.5. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. If the priest pinched the neck of a bird designated as a burnt offering [and so performed the rite] above the red line, declaring the intentionality of doing so under the classification of the sin offering of a bird [rather than a burnt offering], the owner’s obligation should then be carried out, *since the rite that has been applied to the bird offering clearly indicates that it is a burnt offering. For if it were a bird made as a sin offering, the rite would have been carried out below the red line* [since the burnt offering of a bird is prepared above the red line, and the sin offering, below. Here the priest has said he was intending the one but done the other, so treating the bird as a burnt offering; the owner should then have carried out his obligation; but the law is that that is not the case (Cashdan)].
- C. *But is it the fact that the rites for the sin offering of a bird are never performed above the red line? Has not a master stated, “The rite of pinching the neck of the sin offering of a bird may be carried out anywhere on the altar.”* [Cashdan: so the treatment does not clearly mark the offering as a burnt offering.]

I.6. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. If the priest squeezed out the blood of a bird designated as a burnt offering [and so performed the rite] above the red line, declaring the intentionality of doing so under the classification of the sin offering of a bird [rather than a burnt offering], should be accepted, with the owner’s obligation carried out, *since the rite that has been applied to the bird offering clearly indicates that it is a burnt offering. For if it were a bird made as a sin offering, the rite would have been carried out below the red line, and would have sprinkled the blood on the side of the altar* [Cashdan: in the case of bird offerings, one presented as a burnt offering would have the head nipped off but not severed from the body, the blood would then be drained at the side of the altar above the red line, then the whole bird was burnt on the offering; in the case of the sin offering, the same thing was done, the rest of the blood drained at the base of the altar, then the meat was eaten by the priests.]
- C. **[3A]** *It may be said that now that the blood is being drained, with the sprinkled done. For a master has said, “If one squeezed out the blood at any place on the altar, the act is a valid one.*

I.7. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. a bird prepared as a sin offering,¹ the blood of which he sprinkled below the line around the altar for the sake of a bird prepared as a burnt offering *should be acceptable, for the rites concerning it prove that, whatever the intention of the priest, it is a bird prepared as a sin offering, for if it were a bird prepared as a burnt offering, the priest would have performed the tossing of the blood above the red line and drained out the blood there as well!*
- C. *True enough, but did he not say that meal offerings are not equivalent to animal offers?*
- D. *That is so, not like animals offerings, but not unlike meal offerings.* [Cashdan: a bird offering like a meal offering, although offered under a different name, discharges the obligations of the owner, for the treatment thereof clearly indicates the true nature of the sacrifice.]

I.8. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. Most Holy Things that one slaughtered at the northern side of the altar [that is, at the correct location, but] for the sake of Lesser Holy Things *should be accepted, for the rites concerning it prove that, whatever the intention of the priest, for if they were Lesser Holy Things, he would have performed the rite at the southern side of the altar!*
- C. *I may say in response that while the All-Merciful has said that even at the south side of the altar [Lesser Holy Things are to be slaughtered], the sense is, not the south side to the exclusion of the north side of the altar?*
- D. *For we have learned in the Mishnah: **The act of slaughtering them may be performed in any place in the courtyard** [M. Zeb. 5:6B].*

I.9. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. Lesser Holy Things that the priest slaughtered at the south side of the altar for the sake of Most Holy Things *should be accepted, for the rites concerning it prove that, whatever the intention of the priest, they are Lesser Holy Things, for if they were Most Holy Things, then the priest would have prepared them at the northern side of the altar.*
- C. *I may say that they really are Most Holy Things, but the officiating priest has violated the law and slaughtered them at the south side of the altar.*
- D. *If that were so, the same rule should pertain to a meal offering prepared on a griddle that has been classified by the priest as a meal offering prepared in a pan, [Cashdan:] for one might claim that the owner had vowed a meal offering prepared in a pan, and it was the priest who when taking the handful correctly referred to it as prepared in a pan, for it was to be a meal offering prepared in a pan, but the owner had violated his pledge and presented one prepared on a*

griddle. [Cashdan: why in such a case does Simeon hold that the express intention is to be ignored?]

- E. *In that case, even though he had vowed a meal offering prepared in a pan, had he brought it prepared on a griddle, it must be treated as one prepared on a griddle [and speaking of it as a meal offering prepared in a pan is a waste of words (Cashdan)], and that is in line with what we have learned in the Mishnah: He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring a meal offering prepared] in a griddle,” and brought one prepared in a frying pan, [or he who says, “Lo, I pledge myself to bring a meal offering prepared] in a frying pan,” and brought one prepared in a griddle — what he has brought, he has brought [as a separate freewill offering]. But his obligation [for the original pledge] he has not carried out [M. Men. 12:2A-D].*
- F. *But perhaps the language he used involved “this,” in line with that which we have learned in the Mishnah: If he said, “Let **this** meal be brought as a meal offering prepared on a griddle,” and he brought it prepared on a frying pan, or if he said, “Let this meal offering be brought as a meal offering prepared in a pan,” and he brought it prepared on a griddle, it is invalid [M. Men. 12:2E-G].*
- G. *That is a problem from the viewpoint of rabbis, but we are concerned with the position of R. Simeon, and it is the view of R. Simeon that in the first case he has carried out his obligation of the vow. So the description of the meal offering by reference to the particular utensil is null, and it does not matter whether he said “let this be” or “I take it upon myself.”*
- I.10.** A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:
- B. a burnt offering that the officiating priest slaughtered with the intention of classifying it as a sin offering should be acceptable, *for the one is a male and the other a female* [and the statement of the officiating priest is nullified by the facts of the case, which speak for themselves].
- C. *But since there also is the goat presented by the prince, which is a male, people may in fact not know the difference.*
- D. *But if he had said that it was for the sake of the sin offering of a private person, what would there be to say [since then there can be no such ambiguity]? And, furthermore, in the case of a sin offering belonging to an individual which he slaughtered for the same of a burnt offering should be acceptable, because a sin offering is a female and a burnt offering a male.*
- E. *The fat tail is covering the privy parts.*
- F. *That is well enough if he brought a ewe, but if he brought a she-goat, what is to be said?*
- G. *But as to differentiating between male and female animals, that is not something that people have in mind.*

- I.11.** A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. A Passover offering that the officiating priest slaughtered under the classification of a guilt offering *should be acceptable, for the one is a year old, the other two years old.*
- C. *Since there is the matter of the built offering presented by a Nazirite and the guilt offering presented by the person afflicted with the skin ailment [as part of the rites concluding their respective conditions] [and this has to be in the first year], it will not be altogether clear.*
- D. *But what is there to be said if the officiating priest explicitly said that it is a guilt offering presented on account of robbery or sacrilege [which must be a sheep in its second year, so Lev. 5:25, 15]?*
- E. *Furthermore, a guilt offering presented on account of robbery or sacrilege, which the officiating priest declared that he slaughtered in the classification of a Passover offering, also should be acceptable, since the difference would be clear from the character of the beasts, with the Passover being a year old and these two years old?*
- F. *But as to differentiating between one-year-old and two-year-old animals, that is not something that people have in mind, for there may be an animal in its first year that may look like on in the second, and one in the second that may look like one in the first.*

I.12. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. A goat that the officiating priest slaughtered in the classification of a guilt offering *should be acceptable, since the he goat has wool and the other hair [so people will know the difference merely from the facts of the case]!*
- C. *People may say that the he goat is a black ram.*

I.13. A. [If it is the fact that an expressed intention that is obviously wrong is treated by the All-Merciful as incapable of invalidating an offer and simply null,] then how about the following case:

- B. A calf and a bullock that one slaughtered in the classification of a Passover offering or a guilt offering *should be accepted, for a calf or a bullock cannot ever be designated as the Passover offering or as a guilt offering!*
- C. *True enough, but by “animal offerings,” but when he spoke of “sacrifices,” [3B] what he had in mind were the ordinary animal offerings [and not an exceptional case such as this]. [Meal offerings are not like animal offerings in general, but in this case, the variation of the sacrifice as described is so absurd as to be ignored and the sacrifice serves to discharge the obligation of the owner (Cashdan).]*

Reverting to I:4: The Contradiction between Simeon’s Statements

I.14. A. [As to the contradiction between the statements of Simeon,] *Raba said, “There is really no contradiction. In the one case we speak of the handful of a meal offering taken for the sake of some other meal offering, in the other, he took a handful of meal offering but classified it as some sort of animal offering. The case of taking a handful of meal offering for the sake of some other meal offering from the one the owner had designated is covered by the statement, “And this is the law*

of the meal offering,” (Lev. 6: 7), meaning, one law for all meal offerings [and so whatever the priest said, the offering fulfills the donor’s obligation]. But when he classified the meal offering as an animal offering, it does not carry out the owner’s obligation, in line with “and this is the law of the meal offering” — but it is not written, “of the animal offering.”

- B. *But did not the Tannaite authority at hand not say, “...the rites pertaining to it in any case indicate its true character”?*
- C. *This is the sense of his statement: “Even though [in the case in which the priest refers to a meal offering prepared on a griddle as one prepared in a pan (Cashdan)] it is a case in which what is said does not correspond with the offering and so the offering should be invalid, nonetheless: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” (Lev. 6: 7), meaning, one law for all meal offerings [and so whatever the priest said, the offering fulfills the donor’s obligation].*
- D. *And what is the sense of the statement, But when he classified the meal offering as an animal offering, it does not carry out the owner’s obligation, in line with “and this is the law of the meal offering” — but it is not written, “of the animal offering”?*
- E. *This is the sense of that statement: even though the same mode of slaughtering the beast applies to all offerings, still, it is written, “and this is the law of the meal offering” — but it is not written, “of the animal offering.”*
- F. Then a sin offering presented because one has inadvertently eaten forbidden fat that was slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering presented by reason of inadvertently eating blood, or in the classification of a sin offering presented by reason of inadvertently worshiping and idol, or in the classification of the sin offering of the Nazirite or of the person afflicted with the skin ailment [each of which is valid only if slaughtered in the classification for which the beast was originally designated] should be validly accepted, in light of the verse of Scripture, “This is the law of the sin offering” (Lev. 6:18), bearing the meaning that there is a single law that covers all sin offerings [in contradiction of the rule, **All animal offerings that were slaughtered not for their own name are valid so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned, but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation, except for the Passover and the sin offering — the Passover at its appointed time, the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan, and the sin offering of any time (M. Zeb. 1:1A-D)**)]!
- G. [Following Cashdan’s text:] *From R. Simeon’s perspective, that is entirely valid. And as to the view of rabbis [who do not accept the interpretation of the cited verse, “This is the law of the sin-offering” (Cashdan)], said Raba, “a sin offering presented because one has inadvertently eaten forbidden fat that was slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering presented by reason of inadvertently eating blood, or in the classification of a sin offering presented by reason of inadvertently worshiping and idol, is valid. If it was slaughtered in the classification of the sin offering of the Nazirite or of the person afflicted with the skin ailment [each of which is valid only if slaughtered in the classification for which the beast was originally designated], it is invalid, for in each of these instances, a burnt offering is presented as well [and the conclusion might then be reached that a sin offering*

presented in the classification of a burnt offering would be valid, and that is not so].”

- H. *R. Aha b. Raba repeated as the Tannaite formulation, “All of the cited cases are invalid, for it is written, ‘And he shall slaughter it for a sin offering’ (Lev. 4:33), meaning, in the classification of the particular sin for the expiation of which the animal has been designated.”*
- I. *R. Ashi said, “There is no contradiction. The one passage refers to a case in which the priest took the handful out of what was prepared in a griddle under the classification of a meal offering prepared in a pan, the other speaks of a case in which he took a handful out of a meal offering prepared on a griddle and spoke of it as a meal offering prepared in a pan. In the case in which the priest took the handful out of what was prepared in a griddle under the classification of a meal offering prepared in a pan, the act fulfils the obligation of the owner, because the improper intention concerns the utensil that has been used, and an incorrect intention in regard to the utensil that has been used does not invalidate the offering. But in the case in which he took a handful out of a meal offering prepared on a griddle and spoke of it as a meal offering prepared in a pan, the improper intentionality concerns the meal offering itself, and that is therefore invalidated.”*
- J. *But did not the Tannaite authority at hand not say, ...the rites pertaining to it in any case indicate its true character?*
- K. *This is the sense of his statement: “Even though the intentionality that has been expressed obviously should be such as to invalidate the offering, that is not the case here, because, in this case, the improper intention concerns the utensil that has been used, and an incorrect intention in regard to the utensil that has been used does not invalidate the offering.*
- L. *And what is the sense of the statement, But when he classified the meal offering as an animal offering, it does not carry out the owner’s obligation?”*
- M. *This is the sense of that statement: even though the same mode of slaughtering the animal applies to all offerings, and the same mode of receiving the blood and sprinkling the blood applies to all offerings, the improper intentionality concerns the act of slaughter, and so the offering is invalidated.*
- N. *Said R. Aha b. Raba to R. Ashi, “Then why did R. Simeon say that a dry meal offering presented in the classification of a meal offering mingled with oil would fulfil the owner’s obligation?”*
- O. *He said to him, “The intentionality concerned whatever might be mingled” [Cashdan: so that to refer to dry meal offering as mingled does not necessarily mean it was intended to be a meal offering mingled with oil, for this would have been expressly stated; it is regarded as empty words, and the offering is unaffected.]*
- P. *Then if the officiating priest referred to a burnt offering as a peace offering, the intentionality could be, anything that brings about peace?*
- Q. *The comparison is in no way apt! For in that case, the actual sacrifice bears the precise title, “peace offerings,” [which is denotative], in line with the verse, “He who offers the blood of the peace offerings” (Lev. 7:33) which is to say, he who*

sprinkles the blood of the peace offering. *In this case, by contrast, it is written, “And every meal offering mingled with oil or dry” Lev. 7:10) — thus, always, “mingled with oil,” never “mingled” without further qualification.*

- I.15.** A. *Now these rabbis are unanimous in not appealing to the explanation of Rabbah [“There is no contradiction. Here the change in the original designation is in respect to the classification of sanctification of the offering, while there it pertains to the correct designation of the owner” that is, where the meal offering prepared in a griddle is referred to as one prepared in a pan, the offering is valid, for the rites indicate its status; when the error concerns the owner of the offering, the offering does not fulfill the actual owner’s obligation so, in point of fact, our Mishnah-paragraph refers to a change as to the classification of the status of the offering itself as to sanctification], for, to the contrary, as to an intentionality that is obviously invalid, the All-Merciful has declared such an intentionality capable of invalidating an offering.*
- B. *Now these rabbis are unanimous in not appealing to the explanation of Raba [“There is really no contradiction. In the one case we speak of the handful of a meal offering taken for the sake of some other meal offering, in the other, he took a handful of meal offering but classified it as some sort of animal offering. The case of taking a handful of meal offering for the sake of some other meal offering from the one the owner had designated is covered by the statement, “And this is the law of the meal offering,” (Lev. 6: 7), meaning, one law for all meal offerings [and so whatever the priest said, the offering fulfills the donor’s obligation]. But when he classified the meal offering as an animal offering, it does not carry out the owner’s obligation, in line with “and this is the law of the meal offering” — but it is not written, “of the animal offering”], because the phrase, “And this is the law of the meal offering,” (Lev. 6: 7), does not bear the meaning for them that he imputes to the verse.*
- C. *Now these rabbis are unanimous in not appealing to the explanation of R. Ashi, [“There is no contradiction. The one passage refers to a case in which the priest took the handful out of what was prepared in a griddle under the classification of a meal offering prepared in a pan, the other speaks of a case in which he took a handful out of a meal offering prepared on a griddle and spoke of it as a meal offering prepared in a pan. In the case in which the priest took the handful out of what was prepared in a griddle under the classification of a meal offering prepared in a pan, the act fulfils the obligation of the owner, because the improper intention concerns the utensil that has been used, and an incorrect intention in regard to the utensil that has been used does not invalidate the offering. But in the case in which case in which he took a handful out of a meal offering prepared on a griddle and spoke of it as a meal offering prepared in a pan, the improper intentionality concerns the meal offering itself, and that is therefore invalidated], by reason of the challenge to that explanation that has been raised by R. Aha b. Raba.*
- I.16.** A. *A matter that was self-evident to Rabbah on the one side [a statement that is obviously absurd because the actions of the officiating priest contradict the intention that is expressed, does not invalidate the offering], and self-evident to Raba on the other side [a statement that is obviously absurd because the actions*

of the officiating priest contradict the intention that is expressed, does invalidate the offering], was a matter of puzzlement to R. Hoshaia. For R. Hoshaia raised the question, and some say, the question was addressed by R. Hoshaia to R. Assi, "If the officiating priest expressed the intentionality of presenting a meal offering as an animal sacrifice, [4A] what is the law in R. Simeon's view? Is the operative consideration in the mind of R. Simeon that the intentionality that is obviously null does not invalidate the offering, and lo, this is a case in which the intentionality is manifestly absurd? Or perhaps the operative consideration in the mind of R. Simeon is because it is written, 'And this is the law of the meal offering' (Lev. 6: 7), and it is not written, '...of the animal offering'?"

- B. He said to him, "Have we ever reached the outer limits of the thinking of R. Simeon?"
- C. *But he did not repeat to him the reply of Rabbah, because of the challenge of Abbaye, and he did not reply to him in accord with Raba, because of the problem raised by the statement, "And this is the law of the sin offering," nor did he respond to him in accord with the view of R. Ashi, because of the challenge raised to him by R. Aha b. Raba.*

II.1 A. ...except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy of a suspected adulteress [both of which, if improperly designated for a purpose other than that for which originally designated, are invalid]:

- B. *Now there is no problem with reference to the meal offering of the sinner too poor to present anything else, because the meal offering is explicitly classified by the All-Merciful as a sin offering [and what is designated for the purpose of a sin offering cannot be presented for any other purpose]: "He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense thereon, for it is a sin offering" (Lev. 5:11).*
- C. *But as to the meal offering of jealousy, where in Scripture do we find such a rule?*
- D. *It is in line with that which a Tannaite authority stated before R. Nahman:*
- E. As to the surplus of [money that had been donated for the purchase of] the meal offering of jealousy, it was used for a freewill offering.
- F. [Following Cashdan's text:] *He said to him, "Quite so. For the language 'iniquity' is used in that regard and also in the context of a sin offering, and just as the surplus of funds contributed for the purchase of animals for sin offerings goes for public free will offerings, so the surplus of funds contributed for the purchase of a meal offering of jealousy goes for sin offerings in behalf of the community. So too, just as the sin offering is invalid if it is offered for any other purpose than the one for which it was originally designated, so the meal offering of jealousy is invalid if it is offered for any other purpose other than that for which it was originally designated."*
- G. *Then what about the following proposal: an animal designated for use as a guilt offering along the same lines should be invalid if presented for any purpose other than that for which it was originally designated, for there is a common verbal intersection based on the use of the word "iniquity" in both matters [at Lev.5:17 for the guilt offering] [but that is not true!]*

- H. *We treat as the foundation for a verbal analogy the use of the word “iniquity” in line with another such use, but not the use of “iniquity” in line with the use of “his iniquity.”*
- I. *What difference does such a slight variation make anyhow! For lo, the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [stated], “‘And the priest shall come again’ (Lev. 14:39) and ‘and the priest shall come in’ (Lev. 14:44) — ‘come again’ and ‘come in’ bear the same sense for purposes of drawing conclusions”!*
- J. *And furthermore, one may draw a correspondence between “his iniquity” that is stated with respect to the guilt offering and “his iniquity” stated in connection with the oath of testimony, in which case it is written, “And if he does not say it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Lev. 5: 1) [and a sin offering is presented for atonement].*
- K. *But the inference to be drawn in regard to the sin offering pertains only to the surplus of funds that have been committed to that purpose, indicating that it is to be spent for freewill offerings. And should you say, “A verbal analogy yields a valid comparison not for only some aspects of the things compared but for all of them,” in point of fact, Scripture itself has made it quite clear in the case of the sin offering, “He will kill it for a sin offering,” meaning, that is the one that is valid when killed for the purpose for which it was originally designated and invalid if slaughtered for some other purpose than that for which it was originally designated, but as to all other Holy Things, whether the beast was slaughtered for the purpose for which it was originally designated or slaughtered for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated, all of them are valid.*
- L. *Then how on the basis of Scripture do we know the rule that **the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy of a suspected adulteress, if improperly designated for a purpose other than that for which originally designated, are invalid?***
- M. *How come if an animal consecrated as a sin offering is presented under a classification other than that for which it was originally designated, it is invalid? It is because “it is” is written in that regard that that is the fact. Here too, lo, “it is” is written in regard to each of these that that is the fact.*
- N. *Then as a matter of fact, in regard to the guilt offering, “it is” is written in the same regard!*
- O. *That in point of fact is stated only in connection with the period of time after the burning of the sacrificial parts, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- P. *But with respect to the guilt offering, the word “it” speaks only of the period after the burning of the parts of the beast that are burned on the altar, and as a matter of fact, even if those parts should not be burned up at all, the offering remains valid. [Freedman, Zebahim: we cannot say that it” teaches that if the parts are burned within the classification of another sacrifice but the one for which the beast was designated, the offering is invalid, since the offering is fit even if those parts are not burned at all.]*
- Q. *So what purpose is served in the context of the guilt offering by the exclusionary particle, “it”?*

- R. *It accords with that which R. Huna said Rab said, for said R. Huna said Rab, “In the case of a beast designated as a guilt offering that was transferred to the pasture, but that was [not set out but rather] slaughtered for an unspecified purpose — the offering is valid. So if it was transferred, the rule is as stated, but if not, it is not as stated. Why not? Scripture says, ‘it is,’ with the sense that it must be [Freedman:] in its essential form.” [Freedman:Unless it was formally transferred to grazing on the instructions of the court, it is not valid as a burnt offering if it was slaughtered without a defined purpose.]*

The Status of the meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated

- II.2 A.** Said Rab, “The meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is invalid, since the purpose of the offering is so as to render permitted the new grain, and this presentation [having been designated for some other purpose, simply] has not accomplished the goal for which it is intended.
- B. “And so you may state in connection with the guilt offering presented by a Nazirite, **[4B]** and the guilt offering presented by person afflicted with the skin ailment. That is to say, If one slaughtered them with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is invalid, since the purpose of the offering is so as to render the person fit, and this presentation [having been designated for some other purpose, simply] has not accomplished the goal for which it is intended.”
- C. *To the contrary, we have learned in the Mishnah: All meal offerings from which the handful was taken not for the purpose for which the meal offering was originally designated [“not for their own name”] are valid [for offering up, and, in the case of the residue, for the priests’ eating]. But they have not gone to their owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation, except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy [of a suspected adulteress] [which, if improperly designated for a purpose other than that for which originally designated, are invalid]. Now if there were any validity in what Rab has proposed, the Mishnah-paragraph should read, “except for the meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated.”*
- D. *At issue in the Mishnah-paragraph are only those meal offerings that are presented by an individual, not those that are presented by the entire community;*
- E. *furthermore, the passage refers only to meal offerings that are presented on their own, and not to meal offerings that are presented along with animal offerings [and the meal offering of the first sheaf of barley is accompanied by animal offerings]’*
- F. *furthermore, the passage refers only to the meal offerings that are presented any time at all, and not to a meal offering that is presented only at a fixed time [Lev. 23:12, the fifteenth of Nisan].*

- II.3.** A. The master has said, “And so you may state in connection with the guilt offering presented by a Nazirite, and the guilt offering presented by person afflicted with the skin ailment. That is to say, If one slaughtered them with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is invalid, since the purpose of the offering is so as to render the person fit, and this presentation [having been designated for some other purpose, simply] has not accomplished the goal for which it is intended:”
- B. *But we have learned in the Mishnah: All animal offerings that were slaughtered not for their own name are valid [so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned] , but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation, except for the Passover and the sin offering — the Passover at its appointed time [the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan], and the sin offering of any time [M. Zebahim 1:1A-E]. Now if there were any validity in what Rab has proposed, the Mishnah-paragraph should read, “except for the guilt offering presented by a Nazirite, and the guilt offering presented by person afflicted with the skin ailment,” for these have been presented to render the person fit, and they have not rendered the person fit.*
- C. *Since one might also have included the guilt offering presented for robbery and the one presented for sacrilege, both of which are supposed to serve for atonement [Cashdan: and from the rule of Rab it is to be inferred that whatsoever is presented for atonement, even if offered under another name, is valid], the rule could not have been presented as an exhaustive statement of the law [e.g., except for the Passover, the sin offering, and the guilt offering, for the rule in the case of the guilt offering is not a flat rule but varies according to the kind of guilt offering that is involved (Cashdan)].*
- D. *But what marks the distinctive trait of the guilt offering presented by a Nazirite, and the guilt offering presented by person afflicted with the skin ailment? It is because they have been presented to render the donor suitable again and they have not accomplished their goal. But the other guilt offerings too are subject to the same judgment, namely, they are presented to effect atonement and they have not effected atonement.*
- E. Said R. Jeremiah, “We find that Scripture has differentiated between those guilt offerings that are presented to make atonement and those guilt offerings that are presented to render a person valid [and fit once more]. Guilt offerings that are presented to effect atonement may well be presented after the death of the person who presents them [Cashdan: the beast that is so designated must be disposed of so that no benefit whatsoever be derived from it by anybody; a sin offering the owner of which has died must be left to die], while the guilt offerings intended to render a person fit are never presented after death. For so we have learned in the Mishnah: **The woman who brought her sin offering, and died — let the heirs bring her burnt offering. [If she brought] her burnt offering and died, the heirs do not bring her sin offering [M. Qin. 2:5/O-Q].**”
- F. *To this proposal objected R. Judah b. R. Simeon b. Pazzi, “But are there no sacrifices that render a person fit that are presented after death? Surely we have learned in the Mishnah: He who designated money for his Nazirite offerings [burnt offering, sin offering, and peace offering] — the money is not*

available for benefit, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them, since all the money may be used for the purchase of peace offerings [cf. M. Naz. 4:4H-I]. [If] he had set aside coins [for the purchase of his Nazirite offerings, and they] had not yet been designated, and he died, they fall to the purchase of a freewill offering. [If] the coins had been set aside and designated for particular purposes, the coins set aside for the purchase of a sin offering go off to the Salt Sea. They are not available for benefit, but they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a burnt offering are used for the bringing of a burnt offering, and they are subject to the laws of sacrilege. The coins set aside for the purchase of a peace offering are used for the bringing of a peace offering, which is eaten on one day and does not require a bread offering [M. Naz. 4:6H-L]! *Now lo, the burnt offering and peace offerings presented by a Nazirite are offerings that render the Nazirite fit, and yet they are presented after death!*"

- G. *Said R. Pappa, "This is what R. Jeremiah meant to say: 'We do not find an offering that renders a person fit, subject to an absolute requirement as to the rite in regard to each one of the components of the rite, all of them being indispensable, that can be presented after death. For that of the Nazirite is an offering that renders the Nazirite valid, but it is not subject to an absolute requirement as to the rite in regard to each one of the components of the rite, all of them being indispensable. [5A] For a master has said, "If a Nazirite shaved his head after presenting any one of the three required offerings, he has carried out his obligation."'"*
- H. *An objection was raised: the guilt offering of a person afflicted with the skin ailment that was slaughtered for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated, or the blood of which was not put on the thumb and big toe of the person to be purified — the beast in any event may be offered up, and libations must be presented with it; but another guilt offering is required to render the man fit.*
- I. *That is indeed a refutation of the opinion of Rab [Cashdan: for according to Rab whatever is presented to render the person fit, if offered under any other classification than that for which it was originally designated, is invalid and may not be put onto the altar].*

- II.4. A. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "The meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is valid, [vs. Rab: "The meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is invalid"], but the residue is not to be eaten until another meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain is validly presented so as to render the former permitted to the priests."
- B. *But how is the former validly offered, if the residue may not be eaten? For it is written, "From the liquor of Israel" (Eze. 45:15), with the meaning that, from that which is permitted to Israel['s priesthood].*
- C. *Said R. Ada bar Ahbah, "R. Simeon b. Laqish is of the view that the prohibition of something not offered at the proper time does not pertain to what is presented on*

the selfsame day.” [Cashdan: the prohibition of that the time of which has not yet arrived when the matter may be offered upon the altar does not apply where this same matter will be permitted later on the very day to all Israel; here after the offering of the new barley, the new harvest will be permitted to everybody.]

- D. *Objected R. Ada b. R. Isaac*, “There are prohibitions that pertain to birds that do not pertain to meal offerings, prohibitions that pertain to meal offerings that do not pertain to birds:
- E. “There are prohibitions that pertain to birds that do not pertain to meal offerings: for birds may be presented as a freewill offering by two people jointly, it may be presented by those that lack atonement, and an exception to a general prohibition is made for birds that have been consecrated, conditions that do not apply to meal offerings.
- F. “And there are prohibitions that pertain to meal offerings that do not pertain to birds: for meal offerings require use of a utensil, and waving, and bringing near to the altar, and it may be presented as an offering of the community or of an individual, traits that do not apply to bird offerings. *Now if there were any validity in what R. Ada bar Ahbah says R. Simeon b. Laqish has said*, [namely, if the meal offering of the first barely was offered for some other purpose than the originally designated one, the offering may go forward, although the new barley has still not been permitted], *then with respect to meal offerings one may also maintain that an exception to a general prohibition is made for that which is consecrated, specifically, in the case of the meal offering of the new barley crop!*”
- G. *Since the consideration of the prohibition of something not offered at the proper time does not pertain to what is presented on the selfsame day simply does not pertain at all, this is not deemed a prohibition in any event.* [Cashdan: hence one cannot speak of the offering of the new barley, even though it was offered under another name, as an exception to a general prohibition, since there really is no prohibition at all.]
- H. *Objected R. Sheshet*, “If priority was given to the application of the oil on the person healed of the skin ailment over the application of the blood, the priest has to fill up the log of oil and again put on the oil after applying the blood. If the application of the oil to the thumb and the big toe took priority before the oil was sprinkled seven times before the Lord, he has to fill up the log of oil and again apply it to the thumb and big toe after the oil has been sprinkled seven times. *But why should this be the case, for now if it is the fact that the consideration of the prohibition of something not offered at the proper time does not pertain to what is presented on the selfsame day, why should he go and do it again? What he has done is validly done!*”
- I. *Said R. Pappa*, “*The case of the law of the person afflicted with the skin ailment is exceptional, for in connection with those laws we find a reference to ‘it shall be,’ as it is written, ‘This shall be the law of the person with the skin ailment’ (Lev. 14: 2), and ‘shall be’ bears the meaning, ‘shall always be’ [without any change in procedures].*”
- J. *Objected R. Pappa*, “If the person afflicted with the skin ailment’s sin offering was slaughtered before his guilt offering, another priest should not be assigned to keep stirring the blood until the guilt offering had been presented, but the meat must be

allowed to become disfigured by rotting and it must be taken away to the place of burning.” [Cashdan: the meat of the sin offering must be allowed to remain overnight, lose its freshness, then be burned. The fact that it must be burned proves that whatever is offered out of time is invalid, contrary to Simeon b. Laqish.]

- K. *Why does R. Pappa raise such an objection? And lo, it is R. Pappa himself who has said, “The case of the law of the person afflicted with the skin ailment is exceptional, for in connection with those laws we find a reference to ‘it shall be,’ as it is written, ‘This shall be the law of the person with the skin ailment’ (Lev. 14: 2), and ‘shall be’ bears the meaning, ‘shall always be’ [without any change in procedures]”!*
- L. *Rather, this is the difficulty that faced R. Pappa: “I might suppose that this rule pertains only to what is part of the sacred service, but the act of slaughter is not part of the sacred service [since a non-priest may carry it out]. So if it is the fact that the prohibition of what is ‘out of time’ does not pertain to what is done on the same day, then someone might keep stirring the blood of the sin offering while the guilt offering is being offered, and then the sin offering can be offered.”*
- M. *Rather, said R. Pappa, “This is the operative consideration behind the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish: he takes the position that daybreak at the dawn of the sixteenth day of Nisan is what renders the new grain permitted [without regard to the disposition of the offering of the sheaf of new barley later on the sixteenth].”*
- N. *For both R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish maintain, “Even when the holy house was standing, [5B] it was daybreak at the dawn of the sixteenth day of Nisan that rendered the new grain permitted.” [Even before the barley offering was made, the restrictions had been lifted; so the handful, even though taken for some other purpose than the one for which it was designated, may be burned on the altar, the new grain having been permitted (Cashdan)].*

II.5. A. *This statement of R. Simeon b. Laqish was not stated explicitly but only inferred. For we have learned in the Mishnah: They do not bring [from new produce] meal offerings, first fruits, and the meal offering which accompanies [drink] offerings along with beasts before the omer. And if one brought [any of these before the omer), it is invalid. [As to bringing these items of B] before the two loaves — one should not bring them [Lev. 23:16]. And if one brought them, it is valid [M. Men. 10:6B-E]. And R. Isaac said R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “This statement has been made only with reference to the fourteenth or fifteenth of Nisan, but as to the sixteenth of Nisan, such offerings are valid.”*

B. *It follows that he takes the view that it was daybreak at the dawn of the sixteenth day of Nisan that rendered the new grain permitted.*

- II.6.** A. And Raba said, “The meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is valid, [vs. Rab: “The meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain, the handful of which one took with the intention of making the offering for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated is invalid”], and the residue may be eaten and it is not

necessary to present another meal offering of the first sheaf of barley grain validly so as to render the former permitted to the priests.

- B. “For improper intentionality takes effect only if it is expressed by one who is suitable for carrying out the offering, and in connection with that which is suitable for the offering, and in a location that is suitable for the offering.”
- C. “For improper intentionality takes effect only if it is expressed by one who is suitable for carrying out the offering:” *this serves to exclude a blemished priest.*
- D. “and in connection with that which is suitable for the offering:” *this serves to exclude the meal offering that is unsuitable for any other offering, since it is exceptional* [Cashdan: it is presented of barley, and not barley meal, and all other meal offerings are of wheat].
- E. “and in a location that is suitable for the offering:” *this serves to exclude an altar that was chipped.*

Other Offerings that are improper but may nonetheless be acceptable: The Status of the Terefah-Beast

II.7. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. When Scripture says, “Even of the herd” (Lev. 1: 3), which one need not make explicit, that clause serves to exclude from use on the altar a terefah-beast.
- C. But is that proposition not a matter of an argument a fortiori [and no verse of Scripture should be required]?
- D. if a blemished beast, which is permitted for use by an ordinary person, is forbidden for use by the Most High, a terefah beast, which is forbidden for use by an ordinary person, surely should be forbidden for use by the Most High!
- E. Forbidden fat and blood will prove the contrary, for these are forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.
- F. The distinctive trait of forbidden fat and blood is that they derive from something that is permitted, but will you maintain the same view of a terefah-beast, which is entirely prohibited, so should it not be forbidden to the Most High?
- G. Pinching the neck of the bird will prove to the contrary, for doing so renders the bird entirely forbidden to an ordinary person; it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.
- H. The indicative trait of pinching the neck of the bird is that what renders it sanctified [for use on the altar] also is what renders it forbidden to an ordinary person, but the same is not so of the terefah animal, for it is not possible to say that what renders it sanctified [for use on the altar] also is what renders it forbidden to an ordinary person.
- I. And if you propose to answer, then I reply: when Scripture says, “Even of the herd” (Lev. 1: 3), which one need not make explicit, that clause serves to exclude from use on the altar a terefah-beast.

II.8. A. *What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?*

- B. *Said Rab, “It is because it is possible to say: ‘The meal offering of the sheaf of barley will prove to the contrary, for it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.’”*

- C. What is indicative of the meal offering of the sheaf of barley it permits the new produce.
- D. *The reference is to the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley in the sabbatical year [when there is no new crop to be permitted, the fields lying fallow for the year].*
- E. *But it renders use of the aftergrowth permitted!*
- F. *In point of fact, it is the the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley in the sabbatical year that is meant, but it is in line with the opinion of R. Aqiba, who has said, "The aftergrowth is prohibited in the Seventh Year" [and the offering does not render anything permitted and so is comparable to a terefah-beast (Cashdan)].*

II.9. A. *Said R. Aha bar Abba to R. Ashi, "Even within the position of R. Aqiba it is possible to formulate a challenge:*

- B. "That is the case with the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley in the sabbatical year, since it renders permitted new produce of that year that is produced outside of the Land of Israel" [Cashdan: and so it is not on a par with a terefah-animal, which renders nothing permitted].
- C. *And even within the premise of him who has said that the requirement of rendering the new crop outside of the Land of Israel permitted [by a the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley] in any event is not prohibited by the law of the Torah, there is still a refutation: that is so of the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley for it removes the prohibition that rests upon it [namely, that of new produce. [Cashdan: if in the sabbatical year one were to eat of the remnants of the the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley , he would not be liable for eating the new produce, for this prohibition has been lifted by the offering of the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley, but would only incur guilt for eating produce of the Sabbatical year].*
- D. *Said R. Aha of Difti to Rabina, "If so, then a terefah-beast also should be offered as a sacrifice, in which case it would remove the prohibition that rests upon it." [Cashdan: and one who ate it would not be liable for eating terefah-meat.]*
- E. *But here is the valid challenge: the distinctive trait of the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley is that there is a religious duty pertaining to it [that is, the meal offering of the sheaf of first barley must be brought from new produce, that is the point of the matter; it is not essential that only a terefah-animal be offered, any other one being just fine (Cashdan)].*

II.10. A. [What is the meaning of, "And if you propose to answer"?] *Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "It is because it is possible to say: 'The case of one who compounds the incense can prove the contrary, for what he makes is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.'"*

- B. *"One who compounds the incense" is a person [and what has he got to do with being "permitted to the Most High"]!*
- C. Rather: the compound of incense will prove to the contrary, since it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.

- D. *But here is the valid challenge:* the distinctive trait of the compound of incense is that that is precisely the religious duty that pertains to it.

II.11. A. [What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?] *Said Mar b. Rabina, “It is because it is possible to say: ‘the Sabbath will prove otherwise, for it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High [since food for God may be prepared at the altar on that day, while food for mortals may not be cooked on that day].*

- B. *But here is the valid challenge:* the distinctive trait of the Sabbath is that the prohibition attaching to it is remitted for an ordinary person when it comes to a rite of circumcision [which is indeed performed on that day].

- C. *But is* circumcision carried out for the convenience of the ordinary person, but it is a matter of a religious duty!

- D. *Rather here is the valid challenge:* the distinctive trait of the Sabbath is that that is precisely the religious duty that pertains to it [which obviously does not apply to terefah-meat].

II.12. A. [What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?] *Said R. Adda bar Abba, “It is because it is possible to say: ‘A garment of mixed species can prove to the contrary, for it is forbidden to an ordinary person and yet permitted to the Most High.’*

- B. *But here is the valid challenge:* the distinctive trait of garment of mixed species is that the prevailing prohibition is remitted to an ordinary person in the matter of the show-fringes [which are made of mixed species].

- C. *Rather here is the valid challenge:* [6A] the distinctive trait of the show-fringes is that that is precisely the religious duty that pertains to them, [which obviously does not apply to terefah-meat].

II.13. A. [What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?] *Said R. Shisha bar R. Idi, “It is because it is possible to say: ‘The argument then proves circular, in which case we prove the proposition on the strength of a polythetic argument, namely:*

- B. “[Pinching the neck of the bird will prove to the contrary, for doing so renders the bird entirely forbidden to an ordinary person; it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.] The indicative trait of pinching the neck of the bird is that what renders it sanctified [for use on the altar] also is what renders it forbidden to an ordinary person, but the same is not so of the terefah animal, for it is not possible to say that what renders it sanctified [for use on the altar] also is what renders it forbidden to an ordinary person.

- C. “Forbidden fat and blood will prove the contrary, for these are forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.

- D. “The distinctive trait of forbidden fat and blood is that they derive from something that is permitted, but will you maintain the same view of a terefah-beast, which is entirely prohibited, so should it not be forbidden to the Most High?

- E. “[Pinching the neck of the bird will prove to the contrary, for doing so renders the bird entirely forbidden to an ordinary person; it is forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the Most High.]

- F. “So we go round in circles. The distinctive trait of the one is not the distinctive trait of the other, and the distinctive trait of the other is not the distinctive trait of the one. But what they have in common is that they are forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the most High. So I introduce the matter of the terefah-beast: even though it is forbidden to an ordinary person, it still should be permitted to the Most High.”
- G. [Not at all!] The common trait among them all is that the religious duty involving each of these matters is precisely what characterizes them [but there is no religious duty to offer terefah-animals on the altar!]

II.14. A. [What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?] *Rather, said R. Ashi, “It is because it is possible to say that to begin with the initial proposal of the argument is flimsy. For to begin with, whence did you plan to prove that a terefah-animal might not be offered on the altar? It is from the case of the blemished animal. But that case is exceptional. For the distinctive trait of the blemished animal is that the priest who presents an offering is comparable to the beast that is offered [and both may be blemished by the same disfigurements, which is not the case with a terefah-priest, who may offer an offering even though he suffers from a life-threatening ailment (Cashdan)].”*

- B. *Said to R. Ashi R. Aha the Elder, “But a beast born by caesarean section will prove to the contrary, for the law has not treated those who make the offering as comparable to the things that are offered, and it is nonetheless permitted to an ordinary person even though it is prohibited to the Most High.”*
- C. “But the distinctive trait of the beast born of caesarean section is that it is not subject to sanctification by reason of being first born.”
- D. “The blemished priest will prove the contrary.”
- E. “But the distinctive trait of the blemished priest is that the law has treated those who make the offering as comparable to the things that are offered.”
- F. “The one born of caesarean section will prove the contrary.”
- G. ““So we go round in circles. The distinctive trait of the one is not the distinctive trait of the other, and the distinctive trait of the other is not the distinctive trait of the one. But what they have in common is that they are forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted to the most High. So I introduce the matter of the terefah-beast: even though it is forbidden to an ordinary person, it still should be permitted to the Most High.”
- H. “[Not at all!] The common trait among them all is that in each instance no exception is made to the prevailing prohibition. Can you say the same of the terefah-beast, in which case there is an exception to the prevailing prohibition [if you maintain that it may be offered as a sacrifice]!”
- I. *Said R. Aha b. Raba to R. Ashi, “What is the sense of the statement, ‘The terefah-beast involves an exception to the prevailing prohibition [since it may be offered as a sacrifice]’?”*
- J. *“Should you propose that the reference is to the rite of pinching off the head of a bird being prepared as a burnt offering, so that, even though the bird is thereby made a terefah-beast, it still is permitted to be offered to the Most High, that case then just as well pertains to physical blemishes,*

for a bird with a physical blemish is permitted for offering to the Most High. For the condition of not being blemished and of being of male gender are required only in the case of sacrifices made of beasts, but not of sacrifices made of birds.

- K. *“And should you propose that reference is made to the rite of pinching the neck of the head of a bird being prepared as a sin offering, in which case the bird is permitted to the priests, in point of fact the priests get their meat from the table of the Most High.”*

II.15. A. [What is the meaning of, “And if you propose to answer”?] *Rather, it is because it is possible to say: The common trait among them all is that in each instance the disqualifying blemish is readily discerned, but can you say the same of the terefah-beast, the disqualifying blemish of which is not readily discerned? On account of that fact, it was necessary to prove the point by a verse of Scripture.*

II.16. A. *But, in the end, is the fact that the terefah-beast may not be offered on the altar proven from the cited verse [When Scripture says, “Even of the herd” (Lev. 1: 3), which one need not make explicit, that clause serves to exclude from use on the altar a terefah-beast]? Is it not derived from the following:*

- B. *“From the liquor of Israel” (Eze. 45:15), with the meaning, from that which is permitted to Israel[‘s priesthood] [and that cannot apply to the terefah-beast].*
- C. *Or is it not derived from the following:*
- D. *“Whatsoever passes under the rod” (Lev. 27:32) — excluding the terefah-beast, which does not pass under the rod.*
- E. *All three verses of Scripture are required to make the same point.*
- F. *For had proof derives only from the verse, “From the liquor of Israel” (Eze. 45:15), I might have thought that that serves to eliminate only beasts that never had been suitable for a sacrifice, comparable to fruit of fruit trees in the first three years after growth or comparable to mixed seeds in a vineyard. But where the animal was once fit and then unfit, I might suppose that it may then be offered. So it was necessary for Scripture to state as well, “Whatsoever passes under the rod” (Lev. 27:32).*
- G. *And had proof derives only from the verse, “Whatsoever passes under the rod” (Lev. 27:32), I might have thought that only those animals that were to begin with terefah and later on were sanctified, like tithe of the beast, are not offered on the altar, but an animal that was sanctified first and then became terefah, since at the time it was sanctified it was suitable for an offering, I might have supposed may be offered.*
- H. *So all three verses were required.*

1:2A-J

- A. **All the same are the meal offering of a sinner and of all [other sorts of] meal offerings, the handful of which was taken by (1) a non-priest, (2) a priest mourning his next of kin, (3) a priest who is in the status of one who has immersed on the selfsame day and awaits sunset to complete the rite of**

purification [a tebul-yom], (4) a priest lacking proper priestly vestments, (5) a priest whose rites of atonement had not yet been completed, (6) a priest whose hands and feet had not been washed, (7) an uncircumcised priest, (8) an unclean priest, (9) a priest who was seated, (10) a priest who was standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow —

- B. he has rendered [it] invalid.
- C. [If] he took the handful with his left hand, he has rendered [it] invalid.
- D. Ben Beterah says, “Let him put it back, and go and take up a handful in his right hand.”
- E. [If] he took a handful and there came up in his hand a pebble or a grain of salt or a grain of frankincense, it [the pebble, etc.] has rendered [it] invalid.
- F. For they have said, “The handful which is too much or which is too little is invalid.”
- G. What is a case of a [handful] which is too much?
- H. [A case in which] one took an overflowing handful.
- I. And one which is too little?
- J. [A case in which] one took up a handful with his fingertips.

I.1 A. *What need to I have to formulate the Tannaite rule in the language, All the same are the meal offering of a sinner and of all [other sorts of] meal offerings? Why not formulate matters as, “Every meal offering from which the handful was taken by (1) a non-priest, (2) a priest mourning his next of kin, (3) a priest who is in the status of one who has immersed on the selfsame day and awaits sunset to complete the rite of purification [a tebul-yom], (4) a priest lacking proper priestly vestments, (5) a priest whose rites of atonement had not yet been completed, (6) a priest whose hands and feet had not been washed, (7) an uncircumcised priest, (8) an unclean priest, (9) a priest who was seated, (10) a priest who was standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow — he has rendered [it] invalid.*

- B. *It was necessary to formulate the matter in this way on account of R. Simeon’s position. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. Said R. Simeon, “It would have been reasonable that the meal offering of a sinner should require oil and frankincense, so that the sinner should not be rewarded [by being required to present a less expensive offering]. And how come it does not require them? It is so that his offering should not be lavish.
- D. “And it would have been reasonable that a sin offering should require drink offerings alongside, **[6B]** so that the sinner should not be rewarded [by being required to present a less expensive offering]. And how come it does not require them? It is so that his offering should not be lavish.”
- E. *Now it might have entered my mind that since R. Simeon said, “It is so that his offering should not be lavish,” even if an unfit person took out the handful, it should be valid too. So we are told that even from his viewpoint, that is not the case.*

I.2. A. [With reference to M. **Zeb. 2:1A**: All animal offerings, the blood of which was received by (1) a non-priest, (2) [a priest] mourning his next of kin, (3) a

[priest who was] in the status of one who had immersed on that selfsame day and was awaiting sunset to complete the rites of purification [tebul yom], (4) [a priest] lacking proper priestly garments, (5) a [priest] whose atonement is not yet complete, (6) a [priest] whose hands and feet are not washed, (7) [an] uncircumcised [priest], (8) an unclean priest, (9) [a priest] who was sitting down, (10) [a priest] standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow, — he has rendered it invalid,] *the passage likewise should read, All the same are a sin offering of fat and all other offerings, the blood of which was received by (1) a non-priest, (2) [a priest] mourning his next of kin, (3) a [priest who was] in the status of one who had immersed on that selfsame day and was awaiting sunset to complete the rites of purification [tebul yom], (4) [a priest] lacking proper priestly garments, (5) a [priest] whose atonement is not yet complete, (6) a [priest] whose hands and feet are not washed, (7) [an] uncircumcised [priest], (8) an unclean priest, (9) [a priest] who was sitting down, (10) [a priest] standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow, — he has rendered it invalid, and, in line with what has just been said, we should have stated, “It was necessary to formulate the matter in this way on account of R. Simeon’s position.” Therefore, since the Tannaite formulation is, All animal offerings, and not, except..., the intent is to include every offering without exception [even the sin offering, and Simeon concurs]. Here too, if the Tannaite formulation had been, All..., since it does not then say, “except,” it would have included every offering. [Cashdan: even the sinner’s meal offering, and the original question stands.]*

- B. *Nonetheless, it was necessary to formulate matters as we have them, for otherwise I might have reached the conclusion that, since we have shown with reference to the opening paragraph of the Mishnah if our chapter, the rule is formulated not in accord with the position of R. Simeon, we have now to be informed that even in the view of R. Simeon, it is invalid.*

I.3. A. [All the same are the meal offering of a sinner and of all [other sorts of] meal offerings, the handful of which was taken by (1) a non-priest...he has rendered [it] invalid:] said Rab, “If a non-priest did take the handful he should put it back.”

- B. *But lo, we have learned in the Mishnah, he has rendered [it] invalid!*
- C. *What is the meaning of he has rendered [it] invalid? He has rendered it invalid unless he puts it back.*
- D. *If so, then that is the same position as that of Ben Batera [Ben Beterah says, “Let him put it back, and go and take up a handful in his right hand”]!*
- E. *If the handful is yet available, there is no argument of rabbis with Ben Batera. Where there is a disagreement, it concerns a case in which the handful is now lacking. Rabbis take the view that one may not produce other meal from another source and make up the difference, while Ben Batera takes the position that one may bring other meal from home and make up the difference.*
- F. *If so, then how can Ben Batera maintain, “Let him put it back, and go and take up a handful in his right hand”? What he ought to have said is, “Let him bring*

other meal from home and make up the difference **and then take up a handful in his right hand**”!

- G. *When Rab made his statement, it was within the position of Ben Batera. [Cashdan: Rab interpreted Ben Batera’s ruling to apply not only to the case where the handful was taken out with the left hand but also to all the preceding cases enumerated in the Mishnah where the handful was taken out by an unfit person.]*
- H. *Then that’s obvious, so what else is new?*
- I. *One might otherwise have supposed that Ben Batera declared such a procedure valid only in the case of the priest’s taking the handful in the left hand, but as to the other matters of unfit conduct, he would not hold that view. So he informs us that that is not the case.*

II.1 A. [[If] he took the handful with his left hand, he has rendered it invalid:] *what is so special about the left hand [that it has to be specified here]?*

- B. *It is because we find that it is permitted to use the left hand in the service on the Day of Atonement.*
- C. *We find also that a non-priest is suitable to participate in the rite, since he may validly slaughter the animal.*
- D. *The act of slaughter is not classified as part of the liturgy.*
- E. *Isn’t it now? But has not R. Zira said Rab said, “The act of slaughter by a non-priest of the red cow is invalid,” and Rab said in that regard, “It is because ‘Eleazar’ [a priest] and ‘statute’ are written in that regard” [and this proves that the act of slaughter is indeed part of the liturgy]!*
- F. *The case of the red cow is exceptional, because, as a matter of fact, it falls into the classification of Holy Things assigned to the upkeep of the Temple House.*
- G. *Then does that claim not yield an argument a fortiori, namely: if in the case of Holy Things assigned for the upkeep of the Temple house, the priesthood is required, Holy Things assigned to the altar itself surely should require the priesthood as well!*
- H. *Said R. Shisha b. R. Idi, “It may be compared to the matter of the examination of the physical evidence of the presence of the skin disease, which examination obviously is not part of the Temple liturgy, and yet, which requires the priesthood” [and by analogy the slaughtering of the red cow, though not part of the Temple service, requires a priest].*
- I. *But why not prove the point [that a non-priest may not participate in the service] from the analogy of the high place [where non-priests were permitted to perform acts of service, and Rab’s proof is then not required anyhow (Cashdan)]?*
- J. *We are simply not going to draw analogies from the high place to the Temple!*
- K. *Now we’re not, are we? But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- L. *How do we know that that which has been taken out of the Temple courtyard, if it has then been put up on the altar, is not to be taken down? It is from the fact that at a high place what had been taken out of the veils still could be validly offered.*
- M. *The Tannaite formulation in any event relies upon the verse, “This is the law of the burnt offering” (Lev. 6: 2).*

- II.2.** A. *Now we know [that in Ben Batera's view, if an unfit person took a handful of the meal offering, he should put it back and the offering is valid] only because Rab had so informed us [at II.1.A]. If that were not the case, then we should have supposed that, in the case of the other unfit persons on the list, in the opinion of Ben Batera, the rite has been invalidated. And yet it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. **R. Yosé b. R. Judah and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon say, "So did R. Judah ben Batera declare the rite valid in connection with all of those who are invalid to serve as priests" [T. Zeb. 1:15C].**
- C. *And further it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- D. "And he shall take his handful from there" (Lev. 2: 2) — that is, from the place at which the feet of the non-priest may be situated [Cashdan: anywhere in the Temple court, even in the space of eleven cubits at the east side of the court where laymen were permitted to stand].
- E. Ben Batera says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that if one took the handful of meal-offering with the left hand, he should simply put it back and take it again with the right hand? Because it says, 'And he shall take his handful from there' (Lev. 2: 2) — meaning, the place from which he has already taken out the handful of meal offering.
- F. *Now since the verse of Scripture is stated without explication [of why the handful was put back], what difference does it make to me whether it was because the handful was initially taken with the left hand or whether it was taken by anyone on the list of unfit persons? [So what point does Rab tell us, which we otherwise should not have known?]*
- G. *But this is what Rab proposed to tell us: if such a one had not only taken the handful but even sanctified it [by putting it in a utensil of service], the handful still may be put back and taken out correctly, thus eliminating the position of the following Tannaite formulations, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. R. Yosé b. Yosé b. Yosian and R. Judah the Baker said, "Under what circumstances? In a case in which he took the handful but did not sanctify it in a utensil of service. But if he had then sanctified it in a utensil of service, he has invalidated it."
- I. *And some say [that Rab's point is,] if he has taken the handful out alone, it is valid, but if he had sanctified it in a utensil of service, that is not the case. Then he concurs with the view of the cited Tannaite authorities and rejects the position of the initial Tannaite authority [with whom the others differ].*
- J. *Objected R. Nahman, "What are these Tannaite authorities thinking? If it is that the taking of the handful by unfit persons is an act of service, then even if they did not put the handful into a utensil of service, the act should be invalid. And if they hold that the taking of the handful by unfit persons is not an act of service, then what difference does it make to me even if they had put the handful into a utensil of service?" [Cashdan: even if it was put into a utensil of service by such persons, it would still be of no consequence; it should therefore be put back again and again taken out by a proper person.]*

- K. *R. Nahman retracted [and] said, "In point of fact it assuredly is an act of service, but the act of service is not complete until the meal offering has been placed in a utensil of service."* [Cashdan: the act of an unfit person will render the rite invalid only if he performed a complete service; in this case by putting the handful into a utensil of service.]
- L. **[7A]** *But when he puts the handful back to its originally place, it becomes holy, and therefore should be invalid!* [Cashdan: When the non-priest puts back the handful, he completes the act of service, for it does not matter into which particular utensil of service he returns the handful, whether into another utensil or the same utensil from which it was taken.]
- M. Said R. Yohanan, "That is to say utensils of service have the power to sanctify what is put into them only if this is done intentionally."
- N. *Lo, if what is put into them is done intentionally, then they do sanctify? And lo, R. Simeon b. Laqish asked R. Yohanan, "What is the law on whether or not if unfit persons put into utensils of service holy things, the use of the utensils should sanctify to begin with what is put therein, so that it may be offered up on the altar?"*
- O. *And he said to him, "They do not have the power of sanctification under conditions such that what is put into the utensils may be offered up on the altar."*
- P. [The sense of his statement is this:] "They do not sanctify what is put into them by unfit persons in such wise that the materials may be offered up on the altar, but they do have the power of sanctification such that the materials put into the utensils are invalidated." [Cashdan: since it was intentionally put into a utensil of service by an unfit person for the purpose of sanctifying it, the service has been completed by an unfit person and so is invalid and there is no remedy; but it is different in the case in which the handful was put back into the utensil but not for the purpose of sanctifying it by doing so.]

- II.3.** A. [As to the reason that the handful is not sanctified when put back into the utensil from which it was taken (Cashdan),] R. Amram said, "The case at hand is one in which he put it back into a bowl that was heaped up [and what is actually within, but not what is heaped up above, the utensil of service is sanctified by the utensil]."
- B. *But then as to the taking of the handful, how could this initially have been done [since what was taken has to be from within the utensil, not from the heaped up part]?*
- C. Rather, the case at hand is one in which he put the handful back into a bowl that was filled to the brim.
- D. *But if the bowl had originally been filled to the brim, then when he took out the handful, he must have left a hollow, so when he puts back the handful, he puts it into the bowl [and not above its sides]!*
- E. *What he did when he put the handful back was to put it on the side of the utensil, and then he shook the utensil, so that it fell on its own into the bowl proper, and now it is no different from if it were put back by an ape [that is, there being no act directly performed by a human being with intention, the meal is not sanctified, therefore also not invalidated].*

- II.4.** A. *Said R. Jeremiah to R. Zira, “How about assigning the ruling to a case in which he put the meal offering back into a utensil that is lying on the ground? [and that explains why the meal offering is not sanctified (Cashdan).]*
- B. *“[Since that explanation has not been offered,] it follows that the handful may be taken from a utensil of service that is setting on the ground.”*
- C. *“You have now reached a question that was raised for us [already,] for when R. Abimi was repeating the Tannaite version of tractate Menahot at the household of R. Hisda, —*
- D. *— but did Abimi repeat the Tannaite version of tractate Menahot at the household of R. Hisda? And did not R. Hisda state, “[In the context of the following: Our rabbis have repeated (on Tannaite authority: “**The proclamation of the sale of goods of orphans evaluated by the court to meet the father’s debt is for thirty days, and the proclamation of the sale of goods of the sanctuary evaluated by the court is for sixty days**” (M. Ar. 6:1A-B), the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says, “The proclamation of the sale of goods of orphans evaluated by the court to meet the father’s debt is for sixty days, and the proclamation of the sale of goods of the sanctuary evaluated by the court is for ninety days.” And sages say, “In both cases, the proclamation is for sixty days.” Said R. Hisda said Abimi, “The law is that the proclamation of the sale of goods of orphans evaluated by the court to meet the father’s debt is for sixty days (vs. Meir).” R. Hiyya bar Abin was in session and reporting the tradition (just now cited). Said to him R. Nahman bar Isaac to R. Hiyya bar Abin, “Did you say for sixty or for thirty days?” He said to him, “Sixty.” “Of orphans or of the sanctuary?” He said to him, “Of orphans.” “In accord with R. Meir or in accord with R. Judah?” He said to him, “In accord with R. Meir.” “But lo, R. Meir spoke of thirty (days, not sixty!)” He said to him, “This is what R. Hisda said,] “I took many beatings from Abimi on account of this teaching (so as to remember it well): “If one comes to make a proclamation on successive days, it is for thirty days. If it is to be on Mondays and on Thursdays only, it is for sixty days.” [Jung, *Arakhin*, p. 127, n. 1: Until I learnt to understand its apparent contradictions. Abimi taught him that the property of orphans must be proclaimed on the view of R. Meir for sixty days. The disciple, however, knew the above cited Baraitha, that R. Meir limited it to thirty days and thus raised an objection against his Master’s teaching. He had forgotten, however, the instruction offered by the same Master, according to which ‘thirty days’ referred to consecutive ones, whereas ‘sixty days’ were required if the proclamation took place only on Mondays and Thursdays. He could thus appreciate his colleague’s bewilderment from his own experience of the difficulty). “And even though you, Sir, were to count the days on which*

proclamation is actually made as eighteen, since the matter is protracted, people will hear about it.” (Jung, p. 127, n. 2: In sixty days there are eight weeks, containing together sixteen Mondays and Thursdays. If the first week started with a Monday, the four remaining days would include one Monday and Thursday again, which would together amount to the eighteen days, during which the news of such proclamation is made.]. —

- E. *For Abimi, knowledge of the tractate had been uprooted, so he uprooted himself and went to R. Hisda to remind him of its contents.*
- F. *Then why did he not send word to R. Hisda to come to him?*
- G. *He had the theory that in this way he would do better in the project.*
- H. *R. Nahman met Abimi and asked him, “How do they take the handful of meal offering?”*
- I. *He said to him, “From this utensil [one lying on the ground at the moment].”*
- J. *He said to him, “And do they take a handful out of a utensil that is setting on the ground?”*
- K. *He said to him, “When the priest lifts it up they do.”*
- L. *“And how do they sanctify the handful taken of meal offerings?”*
- M. *He said to him, “They put it into this utensil.”*
- N. *He said to him, “And do they put a handful into a utensil that is setting on the ground?”*
- O. *He said to him, “When the priest lifts it up they do.”*
- P. *He said to him, “Then you have necessitated the use of three priests!”*
- Q. *“So what if even thirteen are needed, as is the case with the presentation of the Daily Whole Offering.”*
- R. *He objected: “**This is the general principle: [In] every [case in which] one (1) takes the handful of meal offering, or (2) puts it into a utensil, or (3) conveys it, or (4) offers it up, [with the improper intention] to eat something which is usually eaten [the residue] or to offer up something which is usually offered up [the meal offering — outside of its proper place, it is invalid [M. Men. 1:3N-P]. But no reference is made here to lifting up the utensil! [So how can the lifting up be part of the process?]**”*
- S. *The Tannaite framer of the passage has merely proposed to set forth the order of the various acts of service [without providing an exhaustive list; the Tannaite authority did not tell us how many priests work in each act of service].”*

Rules on taking the handful:

[1] from a utensil that is lying on the ground

[2] Mixing the Meal with Oil

- II.5.** A. *The question was addressed to R. Sheshet: “What is the law on taking the handful from a utensil that is lying on the ground?”*
- B. *He replied, “Do see what people do in the Temple! Four priests enter in, two in [whose] hands are two rows [of showbread], and two in [whose] hands are two dishes [of frankincense]. And four go in before them, two to take out the two rows [of bread], and two to take out the two dishes [of frankincense]. Those who bring them in stand at the north [side of the table], with their faces to the south. Those that bring them out stand at the south with their faces to the north. These draw out [the old loaves] and these lay down [the new ones]. And a handbreadth of one [new row] [lies] up against a handbreadth of another [M. Men. 11:7F-I]. But [7B] we find no reference to lifting up [the table].” [Cashdan: lifting the table would have been to avoid taking the frankincense from a table, that is, a utensil of service, standing on the ground. So it does not matter.]*
- C. *But has it not been stated already, “The Tannaite framer of the passage has merely proposed to set forth the order of the various acts of service [without providing an exhaustive list; the Tannaite authority did not tell us how many priests work in each act of service]”? Here too, the Tannaite framer of the passage has merely proposed to set forth the order of the various acts of service [without providing an exhaustive list; the Tannaite authority did not tell us how many priests work in each act of service].*
- D. *But the comparison is hardly apt, for in the former instance, the Tannaite framer does not even make reference to the number of priests involved in the rite, while here he is quite explicit on the number of priests involved in the rite. And if you were right in maintaining that what is put into a utensil of service that is set on the ground is not sanctified, then in the present passage there surely should be a priest who lifts up the table. This then proves that one may take the handful of meal offering from a utensil of service that is setting on the ground.*
- E. *True enough.*
- II.6.** A. *Said Raba, “It is obvious to me that one may take the handful of meal offering from a utensil that is lying on the ground, for so we find that in the taking away of the dishes of frankincense, that is how the rite is carried on. Furthermore, one may sanctify the meal offering by putting the meal into a utensil that is lying on the ground, for we find that that is the case with setting down the dishes of frankincense.”*
- B. *Raba raised the question: “As to the sanctification of the handful of meal offering, what is the rule? Do we derive the law from the analogy of the rule covering the meal offering itself [and therefore the utensil may be left on the ground, and if meal offering is put into it, it is sanctified]? Or do we derive the rule from the analogy of the law covering receiving the blood [which may not be received in a utensil lying on the ground]?”*

- C. *Then he went and solved the problem, "We derive the rule from the analogy of the law covering receiving the blood [which may not be received in a utensil lying on the ground]"*
- D. *Now has Raba made any such statement? And has it not been stated:*
- E. The handful of meal offering that one divided into two utensils —
- F. R. Nahman said, "It is not sanctified."
- G. And Raba said, "It is sanctified."
- H. *Now if the position of Raba just now outlined were in fact his view, then should he not also draw an analogy in the present case to the rules governing the blood [and if the blood of an animal offering is received in two utensils, it is invalid]!*
- I. *Raba reversed himself in this case.*

II.7. A. *How do we know that if the blood was divided, when it was being received, into separate utensils, it is not sanctified?*

- B. *It is in line with that which has been taught as a Tannaite statement:*
- C. R. Halapta b. Saul [says], "If one sanctified in one utensil less than the volume of purification-water that is required for sprinkling, and in another utensil likewise one has sanctified less than the volume of purification-water that is required for sprinkling, he has not sanctified the purification-water [since the volume that is required must be sanctified in a single utensil of service]."
- D. *And the question was raised: what is the rule as to blood? Is this a received law, and from a received law no analogies are to be drawn to further cases, or perhaps the operative consideration in that case is that Scripture states, "And a clean person shall take hyssop and dip it in the water" (Num. 19:18), and in this context, "And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood" (Lev. 4: 6) [in both cases, implying that there must be sufficient liquid for that purpose]?*
- E. *Come and take note, for* said R. Zeriqa said R. Eleazar, "In the case of blood too if the volume is insufficient, the blood has not been sanctified."
- F. *Said Raba, "It has been taught on Tannaite authority: "*
- G. *"And the priest shall dip + accusative particle et + his finger in the blood and sprinkle the blood seven times before the Lord' (Lev. 4: 6) — but not sponge it up [Freedman: by wiping around the sides of the utensil]. [The accusative particle is treated as an extension also in the phrases "he shall dip" and "in the blood." That usage then yields a number of additional laws about sprinkling and dipping.]*
- H. "In the blood" teaches that there must be sufficient blood [in a single utensil] to begin with to dip [and we do not collect blood in two utensils and pour the blood together to form enough].
- I. "and sprinkle of the blood" — of the blood that is specified in this passage."
- J. *And it is necessary to present the word as both "and he shall dip" and also to write the words "in the blood." For if the All-Merciful had written only "and he shall dip," I might have supposed that even where the blood is to begin with insufficient for dipping, it would be acceptable. Therefore Scripture wrote, "in the blood." And if the All-Merciful had written only, "in the blood," I might have supposed that even if one sponges up the*

blood, it would be acceptable. Accordingly, Scripture used the wording, “and he shall dip.”

- K. *What is excluded by the formulation, “and sprinkle of the blood” — of the blood that is specified in this passage?*
- L. *Said Raba, “It is meant to exclude blood that may be remaining on his finger [so that the priest must not sprinkle with blood left on his finger but must dip the finger into the blood for each of the seven sprinklings.]”*
- M. *That supports the position of R. Eleazar, for said R. Eleazar, “Remnants of blood left on the finger are unfit [for sprinkling].”*
- N. *Said Rabin bar R. Ada to Raba, “Said your disciple said R. Amram, ‘There is the following Tannaite statement: If [in connection with a sin offering prepared at the inner altar,] the priest was sprinkling, and the blood of the sprinkling spurted out of his hand onto a garment, if this took place before he had sprinkled, the garment requires washing, but if this was after he sprinkled, the garment does not require washing.’ Now is this not the sense of that statement: If this took place before he had finished sprinkling, the garment has to be washed, but if this was after he had finished sprinkling, the garment does not have to be washed. Then this implies that [Freedman, Zebahim: if blood that remained on his finger after one of the sprinklings spurted onto a garment, it must be washed; as a corollary, that] the remaining blood must be fit for sprinkling, [for only such necessitates washing, and hence this contradicts Eleazar]?”*
- O. *Not at all! This is the sense of the statement: if this took place before the sprinkling had left his hand, it requires washing; if it was afterward, it does not [Freedman: he dipped his finger into the blood; if this blood spurted off the finger before he had sprinkled it, the garment has to be washed; if it was afterward, the garment does not have to be washed, because it is then residue of the blood].*
- P. *Objected Abbaye, “When the officiating priest at the slaughter of the red cow for ashes for purification water had finished sprinkling the blood, he wipes his hand on the body of the cow [so that the blood will be burned together with the cow]. Thus, only if he had finished does he do so, but not if he had not finished [Freedman: yet if he does not wipe it, he is using this blood for the next sprinkling, among the seven required sprinklings].”*
- Q. *He said to him, “‘It was when he finished that he wiped his hand on the body of the cow, but if he did not finish, he wipes only his finger.’ Now there is no problem with the rule that it was when he finished that he wiped his hand on the body of the cow, for it is said, ‘And the meat shall he burn in his sight, the hide, the meat, and the blood shall be burned’ (Num. 19: 5). But on what does he wipe his finger [between sprinklings]?” [He cannot wipe it on the body, as he would get hair from the hide onto the finger (Freedman)]?*
- R. *Said Abbaye, “On the edge of the bowl: ‘wipers of gold’ (Ezra 1:10).”*
- II.8.** *A. But did R. Eleazar make such a statement [“In the case of blood too if the volume is insufficient, the blood has not been sanctified”]? And lo, it has been stated:*
- B. *As to the meal offering of the high priest [prepared on a griddle and presented daily, half in the morning, half in the evening,]*

- C. R. Yohanan said, "It is not sanctified if presented half at a time."
- D. R. Eleazar said, "Since it is offered half at a time, it also is sanctified half at a time."
- E. **[8A]** *Now if he held the view [that the meal offering of the high priest is invalid if brought a half tenths at a time, just as it is invalid if the blood of an animal offering were received in two utensils], then he should have derived the rule for the high priest's meal offering from the law governing the blood.*
- F. *And should you claim by way of reply that R. Eleazar is not inclined to derive the rule by analogy from one case from another case, in point of fact, has not R. Eleazar stated, "The handful of meal offering that was taken up in the inner sanctum is valid. For so we find the rite done in connection with the censers of frankincense." [Freedman, Zebahim: When the censers of frankincense were removed from the tables on which the twelve loaves of the showbread were placed in the inner sanctum, the showbread was available for the priests to eat. So removing the censers of frankincense corresponded to taking the handful, in that this rendered the rest permitted. Since the former was done in the inner sanctum, if the latter was done there, it also is valid.]*
- G. *While he is prepared to derive the rule governing one meal offering from the one pertaining to some other, he is not prepared to derive the rule for a meal offering from the rule covering a blood-rite.*
- H. *And is it the fact that he is prepared to derive the rule governing one meal offering from the one pertaining to some other?*
- I. *And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. *If before the loaf was removed from the mold it was broken, the showbread is invalid, and the priest may not on its account burn the dishes of frankincense; if after the loaf had been removed from the mold it was broken, while the showbread is invalid, the priest may burn on its account the dishes of frankincense. And in this regard said R. Eleazar, "The meaning is not literally 'after the loaf had been removed,' but rather, after the time for removing the bread had arrived, in the sense that, even though it had not yet been removed, it is regarded as already removed." And why should this be the case? It should be regarded as equivalent to a meal offering that was found to be lacking the requisite volume prior to the taking of the handful from the mass [Cashdan: in which case the handful may not be burned on the altar; and here the showbread has not in fact been removed from the table; since the ruling is that the frankincense may be offered, Eleazar clearly does not derive the rule governing one meal offering from that pertaining to another (Cashdan)]?*
- K. *That is no problem. In the case of the meal offering, the handful is not a separate entity [and until it has actually been taken out, it is not the handful at all (Cashdan)]. Here in the case of the showbread, the counterpart to the handful [the dishes of frankincense] are in point of fact distinct.*
- L. *But surely the case should be comparable to the remainder of the meal offering found to be lacking after the handful had been taken out but*

before the handful has been burned, in which case the handful may not be burned.

- M. *Does this not represent a dispute? R. Eleazar takes the position of him who says, "In the case of the residue of meal offering found to be lacking after the handful had been taken but before it was burned, the handful is burned."*

II.9. *A. Reverting to the body of the foregoing:*

- B. As to the meal offering of the high priest [prepared on a griddle and presented daily, half in the morning, half in the evening,]
C. R. Yohanan said, "It is not sanctified if presented half at a time."
D. R. Eleazar said, "Since it is offered half at a time, it also is sanctified half at a time."

F. *Said R. Aha, "What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Yohanan? Scripture said, 'For a meal offering...half of it in the morning' (Lev. 6:13), meaning, he brings the meal offering and then he divides it into halves."*

G. *An objection was raised: **The griddle cakes of the high priest were not offered in half [tenths of an ephah at a time]. But one brings a whole tenth and divides it, and offers half in the morning and half at twilight. [M. Men. 4:5A-C].***

H. *And it has further been taught as a Tannaite statement:*

I. Had Scripture said, "For a meal offering, a half," I might have reached the conclusion that he brings a half tenth from his own resources in the morning and offer it, and a half tenth from his own resources in the evening and offer that. But Scripture says, "half of it in the morning," meaning, he must offer half of a whole tenth.

J. That is merely to describe the proper manner of carrying out the religious duty [but that procedure is not indispensable].

K. *Said R. Gebiha of Be Ketil to R. Ashi, "But lo, the word 'statute' is written in connection with the rite [at Lev. 6:15] [meaning, these really are indispensable details]."*

L. *He said to him, "The meaning is only that he must bring the entirety of the tenth from his own resources [but one may sanctify the meal in a utensil half a tenth at a time]."*

II.10. *A. [With reference to the statement, As to the meal offering of the high priest prepared on a griddle and presented daily, half in the morning, half in the evening, R. Yohanan said, "It*

is not sanctified if presented half at a time,"] *did R. Yohanan make any such statement? And lo, it has been stated:*

- B. If one set aside in a utensil of service a half tenth of flour for his meal offering [rather than the requisite minimum of a tenth], with the intention of adding to the volume in due course,
- C. Rab said, "It is not sanctified."
- D. R. Yohanan said, "It is sanctified."
 - E. *Now if it were the case that R. Yohanan took the position above that is assigned to him, namely, that the high priest's meal offering if brought half at a time is not sanctified, then he should draw an analogy for the present case from the case of the meal offering of the high priest!* [Cashdan: and just as the high priest's meal offering is not hallowed if brought half at a time, so should be the rule for every meal offering.]
 - F. *And should you claim by way of reply that R. Yohanan is not inclined to derive the rule by analogy from one case from another case, in point of fact, has not R. Yohanan stated, "Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the inner sanctum are valid, as it is said, 'And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting' (Lev. 3: 2), and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal."* [Freedman, *Zebahim*: since it must be killed at the door of the tent of meeting, the tent of meeting, corresponding to the inner sanctum, obviously is the principal place for it, while the Temple court is but an adjunct thereto.] [So he is inclined to draw such analogies.]
 - G. *A case in which he has in mind to add to what is already in hand is exceptional, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
 - H. "Both of them filled with fine flour:" "filled" means "complete."
 - I. Said R. Yosé, "When would that qualification pertain? That rule [that the utensil has to be filled] applies only if the priest's plan was not to add more; but if the priest's plan was to add more, then as each drop falls into the utensil, it is sanctified."

II.11. A. *And in respect to the high priest's meal offering, whose view does Rab accept [when, in the case of a meal offering, he maintains that if only part of it was put into a utensil of service, it is not sanctified]? If he is in accord with R.*

Eleazar, then he should derive the rule governing the ordinary meal offering from the rule governing the high priest's meal offering.

- B. *And should you claim by way of reply that Rab is not inclined to derive the rule by analogy from one case from another case, in point of fact, has not Rab said, "A meal offering is sanctified even though it has been put into a utensil of service without oil, for so we find the rule in the case of the showbread [with which oil is not mixed]; and the same is so if it is put in without frank incense, for so we find is the rule in the case of drink offerings [no frankincense being used with the flour and oil for a meal offering and wine for a libation]; and if it is put in without oil and without frankincense, since so we find is the rule for the meal offering presented by the poor sinner [with which neither one is mixed together]"? [In all three cases, an analogy is drawn from one meal offering to another.]*
- C. *You have therefore to reach the conclusion that Rab accords with R. Yohanan [Cashdan: that the high priest's meal offering may not be sanctified by halves, just as Rab has explicitly stated in connection with an ordinary meal offering].*

II.12. A. *Reverting to the body of the foregoing:*

- B. Said Rab, "A meal offering is sanctified even though it has been put into a utensil of service without oil, for so we find the rule in the case of the showbread [with which oil is not mixed]; and the same is so if it is put in without frank incense, for so we find is the rule in the case of drink offerings [no frankincense being used with the flour and oil for a meal offering and wine for a libation]; and if it is put in without oil and without frankincense, since so we find is the rule for the meal offering presented by the poor sinner [with which neither one is mixed together]."
- C. *Oil and frankincense are sanctified in a utensil of service, each on its own, one without the other,*
- D. *oil without flour or frankincense, since so we find the rule in the case of the log of oil of the person healed of the skin ailment;*
- E. *frankincense without flour and oil, for so we find the rule in the case of dishes of frankincense.*
- F. And R. Hanina said, **[8B]** "The one is not sanctified without the other, and the other without the one" [Cashdan: all the ingredients of the meal offering must be put together into the utensil of service].

- G. And from the perspective of R. Hinina, then why was the measure for the tenth-ephah anointed [if the flour by itself is not sanctified in the measure used for it, the tenth ephah, since it had to be mixed in another utensil of service along with these other ingredients]?
- H. It was for the measurement of the meal offering of the sinner [which is without these other ingredients anyhow].
- I. And why was the log-measure anointed?
- J. To measure the log of oil of the leper.

II.13. A. *And so too Samuel takes the view of this opinion of Rab, for we have learned in the Mishnah:*

- B. **[Just as the altar sanctifies that which is appropriate to it, so the ramp sanctifies. Just as the altar and the ramp sanctify that which is appropriate to them, so utensils [Exo. 30:28-29] sanctify [that which is appropriate to them]:] (1) utensils for liquids [blood, wine, oil, water] sanctify liquid; (2) and measures for drystuffs [the tenth of the ephah and half issaron measures] sanctify that which is dry. Utensils for liquids do not sanctify that which is dry, and measures for drystuffs do not sanctify that which is liquid [M. Zeb. 9:7A-C].** In this regard said Samuel, “This pertains only to measuring utensils, but as to bowls used for sprinkling, they also sanctify what is dry, for it is written, ‘Both of them full of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering’ (Num. 7:13) [Cashdan: the sprinkling bowl, mentioned in the same verse, sanctifies the flour that was put into it].”
- C. Said R. Aha of Difti to Rabina, “But it was a wet meal offering anyhow” [so the proposed conclusion does not follow].
- D. *He said to him, “The ruling pertains in particular to the dry parts of the flour [and all the flour, including the dry, is sanctified, because the sprinkling bowl can sanctify dry things put into it (Cashdan)].”*
- E. *If you prefer, I shall say, “When compared to blood, a meal offering even though mingled with oil is always going to be seen as dry.”*

II.14. A. *Reverting to the body of the prior materials:*

- B. Said R. Eleazar, “The handful of meal offering that was taken up in the inner sanctum is valid. For so

we find the rite done in connection with the censers of frankincense.” [Freedman, *Zebahim*: When the censers of frankincense were removed from the tables on which the twelve loaves of the showbread were placed in the inner sanctum, the showbread was available for the priests to eat. So removing the censers of frankincense corresponded to taking the handful, in that this rendered the rest permitted. Since the former was done in the inner sanctum, if the latter was done there, it also is valid.]

- C. *Objected R. Jeremiah*, “‘And he shall take his handful from there’ (Lev. 2: 2) — that is, from the place at which the feet of the non-priest may be situated [Cashdan: anywhere in the Temple court, even in the space of eleven cubits at the east side of the court where laymen were permitted to stand].
- D. Ben Batera says, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that if one took the handful of meal-offering with the left hand, he should simply put it back and take it again with the right hand? Because it says, ‘And he shall take his handful from there’ (Lev. 2: 2) — meaning, the place from which he has already taken out the handful of meal offering.
- E. *There are those who say, [Jeremiah] not only raised the objection but also solved the problem.*
- F. *Others say that R. Jacob said to R. Jeremiah bar Tahalipa*, “I will explain the matter to you. The purpose of the verse is only to validate the entire courtyard as a whole, so that you should not say, just as a burnt offering is Most Holy Things, and a meal offering is most Holy Things, just as the burnt offering has to be presented at the north side of the altar, so the meal offering has to be presented at the north side of the altar. But what distinguishes the burnt offering from the other is that it is holy burned up. So the analogy should be drawn to the sin offering [also Most Holy and slaughtered at the north side of the altar]. But what distinguishes the sin offering is that it effects atonement for those who are liable to extirpation. So the analogy should be drawn to the guilt offering. But what distinguishes the guilt offering is that it effects atonement through the blood rite. And one also could not produce an argument based on all three rites taken together, since what they have in common is that all of them effect atonement through a blood rite.”

- G. *The verse of Scripture is required, nonetheless, to make the point for I might have supposed that, since it is written, “And it shall be presented to the priest, and he shall bring it to the altar” (Lev. 2: 8), and then, “and he shall take out the handful” just as the meal offering is presented at the southwestern corner of the altar, so the handful must be taken out at the southwestern corner of the altar. So we are taught to the contrary, [by means of the cited verse, that the handful may be taken out anywhere in the courtyard].*

II.15. A. *Reverting to the body of the prior materials:*

- B. [At 11.F,] said R. Yohanan, “Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the inner sanctum are valid, as it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting’ (Lev. 3: 2), and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal.” [Freedman, *Zebahim*: since it must be killed at the door of the tent of meeting, the tent of meeting, corresponding to the inner sanctum, obviously is the principal place for it, while the Temple court is but an adjunct thereto.]
- C. *An objection was raised:* R. Judah b. Batera says, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that, if gentiles besieged the courtyard of the Temple, the priests may go into the inner sanctum and there eat Most Holy Things as well as the residue of the meal offerings? Scripture states, [9A] ‘In the most holy place shall you eat thereof’ (Num. 18:10).” *Now what need do I have for a verse of Scripture? Why not simply invoke the proof based on the verse, “And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting” (Lev. 3: 2), together with the observation, “and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal”?* [Cashdan: If Most Holy Things may be eaten in the Temple court, how much more so on the argument of Yohanan is the Temple proper, so no verse should be necessary to permit doing so.]
- D. *In regard to an act of service, in which case a man would perform an act of service in the presence of his master, we invoke the principle, “and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal,” but with respect to eating the food, in which instance a man would not eat in the presence of his master, such an act is*

permitted [in the Temple proper] only by reason of Scripture's having made an explicit statement. Without the verse, we should not have invoked the principle, "and that which is ancillary cannot be subject to a more strict rule than that which is principal."

II.16. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. The meal offering that one mixed with oil outside of the walls of the Temple court —
- C. R. Yohanan said, "It is invalid."
- D. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is valid."
- E. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is valid:" for it is written, "And he shall pour oil upon it and put frankincense on it" and then, "and he shall bring it to Aaron's sons the priests, and he shall take therefrom his handful" (Lev. 2: 1-2). It follows that it is from the taking of the handful and thereafter that the religious duty involves the priesthood. This then teaches concerning the pouring on of oil and the stirring of the mixture that these may be validly done by a non-priest. *And since there is no requirement that the priesthood do the act of service, there is also no requirement that it be done within the temple courtyard.*
- F. R. Yohanan said, "It is invalid:" *since the preparation is done in a utensil of service, even though there is no requirement that the priesthood do the act of service, there nonetheless is the requirement that it be done within the Temple courtyard.*
- G. *There is a Tannaite statement of the matter in accord with the position of R. Yohanan:*
- H. If a non-priest mixed the meal offering, it is valid. If the mixing was done outside of the walls of the Temple courtyard, it is invalid.

II.17. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. The meal offering that was diminished before the handful was taken from it —
- C. R. Yohanan said, "Let the priest bring more meal from his own resources and make up the lacking volume."
- D. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "Let the priest not bring more meal from his own resources and make up the lacking volume."
- E. R. Yohanan said, "Let the priest bring more meal from his own resources and make up the lacking volume:" it is the taking of the handful that assigns the grain the status of a meal offering [Cashdan: and so long as the handful has not been taken, one may add to the flour of the meal offering].
- F. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "Let the priest not bring more meal from his own resources and make up the lacking volume:" it is the act of sanctifying the mixture in a utensil that assigns the grain the status of a meal offering.
- G. *R. Yohanan objected to R. Simeon b. Laqish, "If the log was found lacking before he poured it out, one should fill it up. [If it was found lacking] after*

he poured it out, let him bring other [oil] anew,' the words of R. Aqiba [M. Neg. 14:10L-M].”

H. *That is a valid refutation of the contrary position.*

II.18. A. *It has been stated:*

B. The meal offering, the remainder of which was found to be lacking between the taking of the handful and the burning of the handful —

C. R. Yohanan said, “One may nonetheless offer up the handful of meal offering on account of it.”

D. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, ““One may not offer up the handful of meal offering on account of it.”

E. *In respect to the position of R. Eliezer’s position, all parties concur* [Cashdan: if where the remainder was lost entirely, the handful may still be burned, how much the more so where only a part of the remainder was lacking]. *Where there is a dispute, it is within the position of R. Joshua, for we have learned in the Mishnah: [If before the handful was offered up] its residue was made unclean, [if] its residue was burned, [if] its residue was lost, in accord with the reasoning of R. Eliezer, it is valid, and in accord with the reasoning of R. Joshua, it is invalid [M. Men. 3:4A-B]. One who declares the offering invalid accords with the position of R. Joshua. The one who declares the offering valid [maintains] that R. Joshua took the position that he did only in a case in which none of the residue remained, but where some of the residue remained, even R. Joshua conceded [that it is valid].*

F. *So it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

G. R. Joshua says, “In the case of all offerings that are listed in the Torah in which at least an olive’s bulk of them remained of the meat or of the fat, one may toss the blood; if half an olive’s bulk of meat and of fat remained, one may not toss the blood. And in the case of a burnt offering, even if a half olive’s bulk of meat and a half olive’s bulk of fat remained, one may toss the blood, because in the case of the burnt offering, the whole of it in any event is burned up on the altar fires. And in the case of a meal offering, even though the whole of it remains, one may not toss the blood.”

H. **[9B]** *What is the meal offering doing here anyhow?*

I. *[The connection between the meal offering and sprinkling the blood is this,] said R. Pappa, “The reference is to the meal offering that accompanies the drink offerings. For it might have entered your mind to suppose that since it is presented along with an animal sacrifice, it is comparable to the body of the animal sacrifice itself. [Cashdan: the blood of the offering may be sprinkled, even though all the meat and fat were gone, since the whole of the meal offering that belongs to the animal offering remains.] So we are informed that that is not the case.”*

J. *And as to the one who invalidates the matter?*

K. *Here [the meal offering] is exceptional, for the verse of Scripture states, “And the priest shall offer up from the meal offering the memorial thereof, and he shall burn it upon the altar” (Lev. 2: 9), so “the meal offering” refers to the whole of the meal*

offering in its entirety. [The whole of it must be in hand at the time of the burning of the handful, or it may not be burned (Cashdan).]

L. *And the other party?*

M. “From the meal offering” means, the meal offering was once whole [even if now it is not whole].

N. *R. Yohanan objected to R. Simeon b. Laqish: “If before the loaf was removed from the mold it was broken, the showbread is invalid, and the priest may not on its account burn the dishes of frankincense; if after the loaf had been removed from the mold it was broken, while the showbread is invalid, the priest may burn on its account the dishes of frankincense. And in this regard said R. Eleazar, “The meaning is not literally ‘after the loaf had been removed,’ but rather, after the time for removing the bread had arrived, in the sense that, even though it had not yet been removed, it is regarded as already removed.” And why should this be the case? It should be regarded as equivalent to a meal offering that was found to be lacking the requisite volume prior to the taking of the handful from the mass* [Cashdan: in which case the handful may not be burned on the altar; and here the showbread has not in fact been removed from the table; since the ruling is that the frankincense may be offered, Eleazar clearly does not derive the rule governing one meal offering from that pertaining to another].”

O. *He said to him, “Lo, who is the authority behind the rule? It is R. Eliezer* [Cashdan: according to whom the diminution, and even the entire destruction, of the residue of the meal offering does not prevent burning the handful on the altar].”

P. He said to him, “I cite to you a Mishnah that is unblemished by dispute [and therefore represents the decided law], and you tell me that it is R. Eliezer’s view? If it is R. Eliezer, why does the formulation speak only of part of the showbread’s being broken, since even if it were entirely burned or lost, he would also permit the burning of the frankincense.”

Q. *The other party shut up.*

R. *But why did he shut up? Let him say to him, “The case of an offering in behalf of the community is exceptional, for just as uncleanness is permitted in the case of an offering in behalf of the entire community, so for the community as a whole diminishing the offering is also permitted.”*

S. Said R. Ada bar Ahbah, “That [silence of Simeon b. Laqish] is to say that insufficient meal offering is comparable to a physical blemish, and no animal bearing a blemish is permitted for use even by the entire community.”

T. *R. Pappa was in session and stating this formulation. Said R. Joseph bar Shemaiah to R. Pappa, “In the matter of R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish, do we not deal with the case of a meal offering that is a communal offering?”* [Cashdan: the sense of Joseph’s remark is that the dispute between Yohanan and Simeon b. Laqish related also to the showbread, which is a communal meal offering.]

U. *Said R. Malkio, “One Tannaite formulation has, “of the fine flour thereof” (Lev. 2: 2) means that if it had diminished, however little, it is invalid; “of the oil thereof” means that if it had diminished, however little, it*

is valid.’ *Another Tannaite formulation has, “of the fine flour thereof”* (Lev. 2: 2) excludes the case in which the meal offering or handful had diminished, or when none of the frank incense had been burned’ [Cashdan: but where the frankincense had been burned on the altar and then it was found to be wanting, the meal offering is still valid.

- V. “Now what need do I have for two verses of Scripture to exclude the validity of any diminished meal offering? The answer is that one must refer to a case in which the meal offering had diminished before the handful was taken, the other, where the remainder had diminished between the taking of the handful and the burning of the handful” [Yohanan has said we may make up the lack in the meal offering by adding more flour, and that the handful may be burned in this second case]. *So this serves as a refutation of R. Yohanan in both aspects of his position.”*
- W. *Not at all. One of the verses of Scripture deals with a meal offering that was found diminished prior to the taking of the handful, in which case, if the priest brings more flour from his own resources and makes up the lack, it is valid, but if not, it is not valid. The other verse deals with the case of the residue that was found to be lacking between the taking of the handful and the offering up thereof, indicating that while the priest may burn the handful on account of the residue, it is forbidden to eat the residue.*
- X. *For the question had been raised: “In the opinion of him who says, ‘the residue that was found to be lacking between the taking of the handful and the offering up thereof, the priest may burn the handful on account of the residue, as to the residue, what is the law on eating it?’”*
- Y. Said Zeiri, “Said Scripture, ‘And that which is left of the meal offering’ (Lev. 2: 3) — not that which is left of the residue.”
- Z. And R. Yannai said, “““of the meal offering...,’ that is the meal offering that was once whole.”

III.1 A. [If] he took the handful with his left hand, he has rendered [it] invalid:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*
- C. Said R. Zira, “Said Scripture, ‘And he presented the meal offering and filled his hand therefrom’ (Lev. 9:17). Now I do not know to which hand reference is made here, but another verse states, ‘And the priest shall take of the log of oil and pour it into the palm of his own left hand’ (Lev. 14:15), so at that other passage I learn that the left hand is meant. Then everywhere else where there is a reference to hand without further specification, it must mean the right hand.”
- D. *But is not the cited verse required to make its own point [that only the left hand is to be used in this rite, and not the right hand, and there can be no further inference for the passage from other cases (Cashdan)]?*
- E. *In context the left hand is mentioned a second time [at Lev. 14:16].*
- F. *Then why not invoke the principle that there is no exclusionary phrase following another exclusionary phrase except with the intention of expanding the range of application of the law? [Cashdan: since the left hand is stated twice, and each by itself excludes the right hand, we have successive limitations; these serve to*

amplify the law and include the right hand so that it too may be used in the rites under discussion].

- G. *There is yet a third reference to the left hand [at Lev. 14:26 and therefore that possibility then is dismissed], so here “hand” means the left hand, and elsewhere it cannot mean the left hand.*
- H. *How about the opposite possibility — just as here, hand means the left hand, so in all other contexts, hand means the left hand?*
- I. *There are four references to left hand, twice in the case of the poor, twice in the case of the rich person cured of the skin ailment [Lev. 15:14, 16, 26, 27]. [Cashdan: the first in each case is required for its own purpose, the second is to indicate that only here “hand” means left hand, but not elsewhere; the third precludes the suggestion that the first two are regarded as the basis to invoke the principle that there is no exclusionary phrase following another exclusionary phrase except with the intention of expanding the range of application of the law; the fourth precludes the inference that just as here, hand means the left hand, so in all other contexts, hand means the left hand.]*

III.2. A. Said R. Jeremiah to R. Zira, “What need is there for Scripture to state, ‘Upon the thumb of his right hand,’ and ‘upon the big toe of his right foot’ (Lev. 14:17, 28)?”

- B. **[10A]** *One validates putting the oil on the sides [of the thumb or big toe], and the other invalidates putting oil on the sides of the sides [Cashdin: the inner side of the thumb, facing the palm, and the lower side of the big toe, facing the ground].*
- C. “And ‘upon the blood of the guilt offering’ and ‘upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering’ (Lev. 14:17, 28) — *for what purpose are these iterated?*”
- D. “*They are necessary, for had the All-Merciful written only, ‘upon the blood of the guilt offering,’ I might have supposed that only if the blood was still there is it valid, but if it had been wiped off, that is not so; therefore the All-Merciful said, ‘upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering.’ And if the All-Merciful had written only, ‘upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,’ I might have supposed that it is only if the blood was wiped off that it is valid, but if it is still present, I might say that it effects interposition and invalidates the right, and so we are informed by ‘upon the blood of the guilt offering’ that that is not the case.*”

III.3. A. Said Raba, “Since [in regard to applying oil on the person healed of the skin ailment] it is written, ‘Upon the thumb of his right hand,’ and ‘upon the big toe of his right foot’ (Lev. 14:17, 28), and, further, since in the context of applying the blood, ‘right’ is used, why does the verse go on to state in connection with applying the oil on the person healed of the skin ailment, ‘upon the thumb of his right hand and upon the big toe of his right leg’ in speaking of both the rich and the poor man?” [Why say ‘right’ since we should have known that the right hand and leg were intended (Cashdan)]?

- B. So, said Raba, “The use of ‘hand’ provides the basis of a verbal analogy with ‘hand’ that refers to taking the handful; the word ‘leg’ forms the basis of a verbal analogy with the word ‘leg’ in the context of the rite of removing the shoe; and the word ‘ear’ provides a verbal analogy for the use of ‘ear’ in the boring of the ear [of

the slave who wishes to remain with his master]. [In all three cases, the right hand, leg, and ear are the ones to be used in the rite described by the Torah.]”

- C. *What about the reference to “the left...” [Lev. 14:26: “And the priest shall dip his right finger in the oil that is in his left hand”]?*
- D. *Said R. Shisha b. R. Idi, “It serves to invalidate use of the right hand of the priest in the matter of the person afflicted with the skin ailment.*
- E. *“It is so that you may not maintain the following position: if in a case in which use of the left hand is not encompassed [within the law], use of the right hand is, then when the use of the left hand is encompassed within the law, all the more so should the use of the right hand be permitted!*
- F. *“And as to the further reference to the left hand [at Lev. 14:27] in the context of the rite conducted for the poor person afflicted with the skin ailment?*
- G. *“It is in accord with that which has been taught as a Tannaite statement in the household of R. Ishmael: ‘Any passage which is both stated and repeated is repeated only on account of something that is innovated in the repetition’” [and the new point here is that we have rites that a poor person can afford, different from those that a rich one can pay for].*

III.4. A. Said Rabbah bar Bar Hanna said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “In any passage in which the words ‘finger’ and ‘priesthood’ appear, only the right hand may be used.”

- B. *It was taken for granted that both words are required for that result, as it is written, “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Lev. 4:25), and as the rule is derived from the case of the one afflicted with the skin ailment [of Lev. 13-14], “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Lev. 14:16).*
- C. *[Now this proposition, A, is challenged:] But lo, concerning the taking of the handful of the meal offering, in connection with which reference is made only to the priesthood, we have learned in the Mishnah: [All the same are the meal offering of a sinner and of all [other sorts of] meal offerings, the handful of which was taken by (1) a non-priest, (2) a priest mourning his next of kin, (3) a priest who is a tebul-yom, (4) a priest lacking proper priestly vestments, (5) a priest whose rites of atonement had not yet been completed, (6) a priest whose hands and feet had not been washed, (7) an uncircumcised priest, (8) an unclean priest, (9) a priest who was seated, (10) a priest who was standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow — he has rendered [it] invalid.] [If] he took the handful with his left hand, he has rendered [it] invalid [M. Men. 1:2A-C]!*
- D. Rather, said Raba, “What he meant was either ‘the finger’ or ‘priesthood’ [but not both].”
- E. Said to him Abbayye, “Lo, there is the matter of ‘priesthood’ that is written in the context of carrying the limbs to the ramp around the altar, *in which regard it is written*, ‘And the priest shall offer the whole and make it smoke on the altar’ (Lev. 1:13), in connection with which a master has said, ‘This refers to carrying the limbs to the ramp around the altar.’ *And yet we have learned in the Mishnah: [All of them turned out to be standing in a row, and the limbs in their hands:*

(1) the first, with the head and a hind-leg, the head in his right hand, with its muzzle along his arm, and its horns in his fingers, and the place at which it was slaughtered turned upwards, and the fat set on top of it [that place,] and the right hind leg in his left hand, and the flayed end outermost; [(2) the second, with the two forelegs, that of the right hand in his right hand, and that of the left in his left, with the flayed end outermost; (3) the third, with the rump and the [other] hind leg, the rump in his right hand, and the fat tail hanging down between his fingers, and the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys with it, the left hind leg in his left hand, with the flayed end outermost] [M. **Tamid 9:1Q**].”

- F. *When we say, “either ‘the finger’ or ‘priesthood’ [but not both implies the use of the right hand],” that is only in regard to an act of service that is essential for achieving atonement, as in the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment.*
- G. *But “priesthood” is written in connection in with receiving the blood, and that is indispensable to achieving atonement, as it is said, “and the priest shall present the whole and burnt it upon the altar” (Lev. 1:13), and yet we have learned in the Mishnah: [If] he received it in his left hand, he has rendered [the sacrifice] invalid. R. Simeon declares valid!*
- H. *The statement has been made within the premises of R. Simeon.*
- I. *But R. Simeon, for his part, requires both [reference to “finger” and “priesthood”].*
- J. *Now is it the fact that R. Simeon, for his part, requires both [reference to “finger” and “priesthood”? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon says, “Any passage in which we find reference to ‘the hand,’ the meaning is only to the right hand; and any passage in which we find reference to ‘the finger,’ the meaning is only to the right finger.”*
- K. *Where the passage refers to “finger,” R. Simeon does not require, in addition, a reference to “priesthood,” but where “priesthood” is stated, he does insist that the word “finger” occur.*
- L. *Then what is the purpose of mentioning “priesthood” [in connection with receiving the blood, since it is already indicated that this must be done by the sons of Aaron (Freedman)]?*
- M. **[10B]** *It means that they must be in their condition as priests [wearing the right garments].*
- N. *Now the word “priesthood” alone is written in connection with the act of sprinkling, and yet we have learned on Tannaite authority: if he tossed the blood with his left hand, the offering is unfit, and R. Simeon does not differ!*
- O. *Said Abbaye, “In a Tannaite formulation of the same matter, he does indeed differ, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority.”*
- P. *If the priest received the blood in his left hand, the offering is unfit, but R. Simeon declares it fit. If he tossed the blood with his left hand, the offering is unfit. And R. Simeon declares it fit.*
- Q. *Then as to what Raba said, ““We draw an analogy from the use of the word ‘hand’ [at Lev. 14:14] to the use of the word hand so far as taking a fistful of the meal offering is concerned; from the use of the word ‘foot’ [at*

Lev. 14:14] for the meaning of the word ‘foot in regard to the rite of removing the shoe, and from the use of the word ‘ear’ [at Lev. 14:14] to the meaning of the word ‘ear’ in regard to boring the ear of the slave who does not wish to leave his master [in all three cases, the word is taken to mean the right hand, foot, and ear, in other contexts, and refers also to the right hand, foot, and ear in those that are specified],” — *what need do I have for that statement, since, so far as the fistful, it can be deduced from the exegesis proposed by Rabbah b. b. Hannah?*

- R. *One serves to prove that the taking of the fistful is to be done with the right hand, and the other shows that the sanctification of the fistful also is to be done with the right hand.*
- S. *But from the perspective of R. Simeon, who does not require that the fistful be sanctified at all, or from the perspective of the view that R. Simeon does require the sanctification of the fistful but holds that it is fit if it is done by the left hand, what is the purpose of Raba’s drawing an analogy between the use of the word “hand” at the cited verse of Scripture and the use of the word “hand” in the present context? If it is in regard to the actual taking of the fistful, that has been deduced from what R. Judah b. R. Hiyya said. For said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, “What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon? It is that Scripture has said, ‘it is most holy, as the sin offering and as the guilt offering’ (Lev. 6:10), which teaches that if the priest comes to carry out the act of service with his hand, he does so with the right hand, as he would with a sin offering; if he comes to perform the act of service with a utensil, he does so with the left hand, as in the case of the guilt offering.”*
- T. *The passage is required only to deal with the case of a priest who takes the fistful of the meal offering of a sinner. You might have supposed that since R. Simeon said, “The reason is that his sacrifice should not be adorned [with oil or incense] let it be fit also, even though the priest takes the fistful with his left hand. Therefore we are informed that that is not the case.*

IV.1 A. [If] he took a handful and there came up in his hand a pebble or a grain of salt [11A] or a grain of frankincense, it [the pebble, etc.] has rendered [it] invalid:

- B. *Why list all of these items individually?*
- C. *All of them are required severally and jointly.*
- D. *For if the Tannaite formulation had encompassed only a pebble, I might have thought that that is because it is something that in any event cannot be presented on the altar, but as to salt, which is something that can be presented on the altar, I might have supposed that the offering would be valid.*
- E. *And if the Tannaite formulation had referred only to salt, I might have thought that that is not required to be presented with the meal offering to begin with, but, as for frankincense, which is required to be presented with the meal offering to begin with, I might have thought that it does not invalidate the handful.*
- F. *So all of the items had to be included in the formulation of the rule.*

V.1 A. For they have said, “The handful which is too much or which is too little is invalid:”

- B. *How come that the operative consideration is that it is **too much or too little**? Why not simply disqualify the handful by reason of interposition [in that the stone separates the flour from the fingers and so interposes and invalidates the handful]?*
- C. Said R. Jeremiah, “It might have been at the side [and so it might not interpose, in which case the sole consideration is that the handful has too little flour because of the volume of the stone (Cashdan)].”

V.2. A. Said Abbayye to Raba, “How do they take the handful?”

- B. *He said to him, “The usual way” [Cashdan: using all the fingers of the hand, including the little finger].*
- C. *He objected: “This little finger is used for measuring the span, the next for taking the handful, the next for measuring the cubit, the next is the finger proper, and the next is the thumb.”*
- D. [Cashdan:] “[The little finger] is used only to smooth the edge” [Cashdan: the little finger was to be employed only to smooth level the side of the handful so that none of the flour should appear to be bursting out; this leveling was also performed at the other end by the thumb; it is clear that the actual handful was made up by bending the middle three fingers over the palm.]
- E. *So then how do they take the handful?*
- F. Said R. Zutra bar Tobiah said Rab, “**He stretches out his three fingertips over the palm of his hand [M 1:2L].**and then he takes the handful.”
- G. *So too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. “And he shall take out a handful” (Lev. 2: 2) —
- I. Might one suppose that it should be overflowing?
- J. Scripture states, “In his handful” (Lev. 6: 8) [Cashdan: the flour is to be entirely within the handful, none bursting out at the ends or between the fingers].
- K. If In his handful” (Lev. 6: 8), might one suppose that it is to be only with the tips of his fingers?
- L. Scripture states, “And he shall take out a handful” (Lev. 2: 2).
- M. How so?
- N. **He stretches out his three fingertips over the palm of his hand [M 1:2L].and then he takes the handful. In the case of a meal offered prepared on a griddle or on a pan [which are first baked into cakes and then broken up, and the priest takes a handful of the broken cakes, so particles protrude on all sides,] he must level it with his thumb on top and his little finger below. And this was by far the most difficult act of service that was required in the sanctuary [cf. T. Zeb. 1:17B-C].**
- O. *So were there no other exceedingly difficult acts of service in the Temple? Was there not the pinching of the bird of the neck and the taking of “both hands full” [of incense on the day of atonement, both of them not easily performed]?*

P. Rather, “This is one of the most difficult acts of service that were required in the sanctuary.”

V.3. A. Said R. Pappa, “It is obvious to me that “a full handful” refers to the way in which people ordinarily take a handful.”

B. R. Pappa raised this question, “If the priest took the handful with his fingertips, or with the sides of his hands, or from below upwards [Cashdan: he cupped his hand and pressed it, palm upwards, into the flour and thus took a handful] — what is the law?”

C. The question stands.

V.4. A. Said R. Pappa, “It is obvious to me that “his hands full” refers to the way in which people ordinarily fill the hands.”

B. R. Pappa raised this question, “If the priest filled his hands with his fingertips, or if he filled the hands one by one and then brought them together — what is the law?”

C. The question stands.

V.5. A. R. Pappa raised this question, “If the priest stuck the handful to the side of the utensil [rather than pouring it to the bottom] — what is the law? Do we require putting it inside the utensil and that condition has been met here, or must it be put down inside of the utensil, which condition has not been met here?”

B. The question stands.

V.6. A. Mar bar R. Ashi raised the question, “If the priest turned the utensil upside down and put the handful of meal on the bottom of the utensil, what is the law? Do we require putting it inside the utensil and that condition has been met here, or must the rite be done in the correct manner, and that condition has not been met here?”

B. The question stands.

1:2K-L, 1:3A

1:2K-L

K. What does one do?

L. He stretches out his fingertips over the palm of his hand.

1:3A

A. [If] he put in too much of its oil [M. 9:3] or put in too little oil or put in too little frankincense [M. 13:3], it is invalid.

I.1 A. [If he put in too much of its oil:] what is the meaning of put in too much oil?

B. Said R. Eleazar, “For instance, if one designated for the mixture two logs of oil [Cashdan: and the oil was mixed with the flour, so that to all appearances there are here two meal offerings].”

C. But why not interpret the passage to speak of a case in which he mixed in unconsecrated oil or oil from another meal offering? And should you take the view that adding unconsecrated oil or oil from another meal offering will not invalidate the offering, then did not R. Zutra b. Tobiah object, “Then how can we ever find a case in which the meal offering of a sinner is ever invalidated by adding oil [since it is to be without oil]? If you say that it is oil designated for it,

it in fact does not have to have any oil, and if you say that unconsecrated oil or oil for another meal offering was added to it, you have just now said that this would not invalidate the meal offering?”

- D. *So how would R. Eleazar respond to this objection?*
- E. *What he meant to present is an argument that ascends to an ever more strict ruling, namely: “It is not only the fact that unconsecrated oil or oil from another meal offering will invalidate it, but even if one designated for the mixture two logs of oil, since the one is suitable for use for the purpose and the other, on its own, is suitable, so I might have supposed that these would not invalidate the meal offering, in point of fact we are informed that the meal offering is invalidated.”*
- F. *And how does R. Eleazar know this?*
- G. *Said Raba, “The Mishnah itself posed this problem to him: why does it say, **If he put in too much of its oil?** It could as well have said, **If he put in too much oil!** But in this formulation we are informed that it is invalidated even though he designated for the mixture two logs of oil.”*

II.1 A. or put in too little frankincense:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. **If he put in too little incense, even only two grains, it is valid,” the words of R. Judah.**
- D. *And R. Simeon says, “If there lacked one grain, it is valid; if less, it is invalid” [cf. T. Men. 1:17F-G].*
- E. **[12A]** *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “**If the handful of frankincense lacked ever so little, it is invalid**” [T. Men. 1:17G]?*
- F. *Formulate the Tannaite version in this way: If a grain of frankincense frankincense was diminished, no matter by how little, it is invalid.*
- F. *If you prefer, I shall say: the version of the matter that contains the dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon speaks of frankincense offered along with the meal offering [and the offering is valid with however little frankincense], the other to an offering made up only of frankincense [in which case a handful is required].*

II.2. A. Said R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan, “In this matter there are three contending positions.

- B. *“R. Meir [the anonymous version of our Mishnah-paragraph] takes the view that a handful of frankincense is required at the outset and a handful at the end.*
- C. *“R. Judah maintains that a handful of frankincense is required at the outset, but even if there are only two grains at the end, that suffices.*
- D. *“R. Simeon holds that a handful of frankincense is required at the outset, but even if there is only two grain at the end, that suffices.*
- E. *“And all three of them interpret one and the same verse of Scripture: ‘And all the frankincense that is upon the meal offering’ (Lev. 6: 8) —*
- F. *“R. Meir [the anonymous version of our Mishnah-paragraph] takes the view that the offering is valid only if all of the frankincense that was put into the mixture with the meal offering at the outset is present at the end.*

- G. “R. Judah maintains that ‘all’ means, even one grain, and the use of the accusative particle *et* adds another.
- H. “*R. Simeon [while concurring with Judah] does not attach any meaning to the accusative particle.*”

II.3. A. Moreover R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan said, “The dispute concerns frankincense offered along with the meal offering [and the offering is valid with however little frankincense], but as to an offering made up only of frankincense, all parties concur that there must be a handful to begin with and a handful at the end.

B. “*Therefore Scripture had to frame matters as ‘[And all the frankincense] that is upon the meal offering’ (Lev. 6: 8), meaning that that is the rule only concerning frankincense offered along with the meal offering [and the offering is valid with however little frankincense], but not with regard to an offering made up only of frankincense.*”

II.4. A. Moreover R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan said, “The dispute concerns only frankincense offered along with the meal offering, but as to frankincense that is offered in dish all parties concur that there must be two handfuls to begin with and two handfuls at the end [a handful of frankincense in each dish throughout the time the dishes are set on the table until they are taken away to be burned up].”

B. *So what else is new?*

C. *What might you have thought otherwise? Since the frankincense in the two dishes is presented along with the showbread, it falls into the same classification as that which is offered with a meal offering. So we are informed that that is not the case.*

II.5. A. *R. Ammi and R. Isaac Nappaha disputed the matter.*

B. *One said,* “The dispute concerns frankincense that is presented along with a meal offering, but as to frankincense that is presented on its own, all parties concur that there has to be a handful at the beginning and a handful at the end.”

C. *And the other said,* “As is the dispute concerning frankincense that is presented along with a meal offering, so runs the dispute as to frankincense that is presented on its own.”

II.6. A. **or put in too little frankincense [M. 13:3], it is invalid:** *Therefore if he put in too much it is valid. But, in contradiction to that implication, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If he put in too much, it is invalid.*

C. Said R. Ammi bar Hama, “It would involve a case in which he designated for use two handfuls of frankincense [which is too much, therefore invalid].”

II.7. A. And said R. Ammi bar Hama, “If someone designated two handfuls of frankincense and then lost one of them before taking up the handful of flour, the offering remains valid, for the handfuls of frankincense have not yet been designated for this particular meal offering.

B. “If after the taking of the handful one of them was lost, then the offering is invalid, for the two handfuls have already been designated for this particular meal offering.”

II.8. A. And said R. Ammi bar Hama, “If one set apart four handfuls of frankincense for the two dishes of frankincense to be set with the showbread, and two of them were

lost before the dishes were removed, the offering is valid, for the handfuls of frankincense have not yet been designated for this particular meal offering.

- B. If after the taking of the handful one of them was lost, then the offering is invalid, for the four handfuls have already been designated for this particular meal offering.”
- C. *Why do I need yet another case to make the same point? They're redundant!*
- D. *What might you otherwise have thought? Since in this case the handful is distinct from the rest of the offering [standing in a dish apart from the bread], once the time for removing it has come, it is treated as though it were already removed [Cashdan: as soon as the time of removal of the dishes of frankincense of the past week has arrived, the frankincense that has been set apart is regarded as already designated for the purpose of the coming week and therefore it is invalid if part of it was lost]. So we are informed that that is not the case.*

1:3B-X, 1:4A-O

1:3B-X

- B. He who takes up the handful of meal offering [with the improper intention] to eat its residue outside,
- C. or an olive's bulk of its residue outside,
- D. to burn a handful thereof outside,
- E. or an olive's bulk of a handful thereof outside,
- F. or to burn its frankincense outside —
- G. it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it.
- H. [If he takes up the handful of meal offering with the improper intention] to eat its residue on the next day,
- I. or an olive's bulk of its residue on the next day,
- J. to burn a handful thereof on the next day,
- K. or an olive's bulk of a handful thereof on the next day,
- L. or to burn its frankincense on the next day,
- M. [12A] it is refuse. And they are liable to extirpation on its account.
- N. This is the general principle:
- O. [In] every [case in which] one (1) takes the handful of meal offering, or (2) puts it into a utensil, or (3) conveys it, or (4) offers it up, [with the improper intention] to eat something which is usually eaten [the residue] or to offer up something which is usually offered up [the meal offering —
- P. outside of its proper place,
- Q. it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it.
- R. [If one does so with the improper intention to eat the residue or to offer up the meal offering] outside of its proper time, it is refuse. And they are liable on its account to extirpation.
- S. [And the foregoing rule applies] on condition that that which renders the offering permissible is offered in accord with its requirement.
- T. How is that which renders the offering permissible offered in accord with its requirement?

- U. [If] one took the handful in silence [without improper intention] and put it into the utensil and conveyed and offered it up [with the improper intention to do so] outside of its proper time,
- V or [if] one took the handful of meal offering [with the improper intention of eating that which is eaten or offering up that which is offered up] outside of its proper time, and [then] put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up in silence [without improper intention],
- W or [if] one took the handful and put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up [with the improper intention to eat that which is eaten or to burn that which is burned] outside of its proper time [only] —
- X. this is a case in which that which renders the offering permissible is offered up in accord with its requirement.

1:4A-O

- A. How is that which renders the offering permissible not offered in accord with its requirement?
- B. [If] one took the handful [with the improper intention of eating that which is eaten or burning that which is burned] outside of its proper place, and [then] put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up [with the improper intention of eating that which is eaten or burning that which is burned] outside of its proper time,
- C. or [if] one took the handful [with the improper intention of eating or burning] outside of its proper time, and [then] put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up [with the improper intention of eating or burning] outside of its proper place,
- D. or [if] one took the handful and put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up [with the improper intention of eating or burning] outside of its proper place [in addition to time] —
- E. [and likewise] the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of a suspected adulteress of which one took the handful not for their own name, and put into the utensil and conveyed and offered up [with the improper intention of eating or burning] outside of their proper time,
- F. or [if one took the handful [with improper intention to eat or burn outside of their proper time, and [then] placed [it] into the utensil and conveyed and offered it up not for their own name,
- G. or [if] one took the handful and put it into a utensil and conveyed and offered it up not for their own name [at all] —
- H. this is a case in which that which renders the offering permissible has not been offered up in accord with its requirement.
- I. If one did so to eat an olive's bulk outside and an olive's bulk on the next day,
- J. an olive's bulk on the next day and an olive's bulk outside,
- K. a half-olive's bulk outside and a half-olive's bulk on the next day,
- L. a half-olive's bulk on the next day and a half-olive's bulk outside —
- M. it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it.

- N. Said R. Judah, “This is the general rule: If the improper intention concerning time came before the improper intention concerning place, it is refuse. And they are liable on its account to extirpation. But if the improper intention concerning place came before the improper intention concerning time, it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it.”
- O. And sages say, “Both this and that are invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it.”
- I.1** A. *The question was raised, “In the opinion of him who says, ‘The residue that was found to be lacking between the taking of the handful and the offering up thereof, the priest may burn the handful on account of the residue,’ in which matter we had further established the fact that that residue nonetheless may not be eaten, what is the law on the following issue: can the burning takes effect over the status of the residue that the improper intentionality expressed by the priest when burning the handful to eat the residue [which may not be eaten at all, lacking the proper volume] outside of the proper time will classify the residue as refuse, and also can the burning so affect the status of the residue as to remove the residue from the coverage of the laws of sacrilege [for after the handful is burned, the residue is no longer subject to the law of sacrilege; here, even after the burning, the priests cannot eat the residue, so it may be that the law of sacrilege still applies (Cashdan)]?”*
- B. Said R. Huna, “Even in the opinion of R. Aqiba, who has said that the tossing of the blood takes effect over that meat that is taken outside of the Temple courtyard [and in point of fact may not be eaten] [after sprinkling the blood of animal offerings, the holy meat is no longer subject to the law of sacrilege and may be eaten by the priests; this rule applies even to what was taken out of bounds and may not be eaten (Cashdin)], *that position pertains to meat that is taken outside of the courtyard that is, nonetheless, still available, but has been rendered invalid by reason of some extraneous factor. But as to the residue that is lacking in the proper volume, the invalid aspect of which is intrinsic to the thing itself, the burning of the handful will be null and void.*”
- C. *Said to him Raba, “To the contrary! Even in the position of R. Eliezer, who has said that the tossing of the blood does not take effect over that meat that is taken outside of the Temple courtyard [and even though, in point of fact, that meat may not be eaten, still, after sprinkling the blood of animal offerings, the holy meat is no longer subject to the law of sacrilege], that position pertains to meat that is taken outside of the courtyard, for it obviously is no longer located inside the Temple courtyard. But upon that which, while diminished in volume, still is located inside the courtyard, the burning surely can take effect [in the manner suggested].”*
- D. *Said Raba, “On what basis do I make my statement? It is because we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who takes up the handful of meal offering [with the improper intention] to eat its residue outside, or an olive’s bulk of its residue outside, [to burn a handful thereof outside, or an olive’s bulk of a handful thereof outside, or to burn its frankincense outside — it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it], and in that connection R. Hiyya taught as a Tannaite version, ‘He who took a handful from the meal offering,’ but he did***

*not include in his formulation, or an olive's bulk of its residue. Now how come he did not include in his formulation, or an olive's bulk of its residue? Surely it is because he took for granted that at issue is a case in which the remainder had diminished in volume until only an olive's bulk was left [if at the time of taking the handful, the meal offering had diminished, it is invalid, and no improper intention can take effect in any event (Cashdan)]; and since with regard to the acts of service of putting the handful into a utensil, bringing it near, and burning it, [Hiyya] could not have stated, **[12B] or an olive's bulk of its residue**, he therefore did not state or an olive's bulk of its residue even with regard to the act of service of taking out the handful. Nonetheless, at the concluding clause, he does state, **[If he takes up the handful of meal offering with the improper intention] to eat its residue on the next day, or an olive's bulk of its residue on the next day, to burn a handful thereof on the next day, or an olive's bulk of a handful thereof on the next day, or to burn its frankincense on the next day, it is refuse. And they are liable to extirpation on its account. Therefore, it must follow, the burning of the handful does take effect on the residue that is of less than adequate volume.**"*

- E. *Said to him Abbayye, "Lo, who is the authority behind this formulation? It is R. Eleazar, [Cashdan: the reason Hiyya omits 'or an olive's bulk' is not the one given by Raba, but that Hiyya has formulated matters in accord with Eleazar]. For we have learned in the Mishnah: (1) The handful, and (2) the frankincense, and (3) the incense, and (4) the meal offering of priests, and (5) the meal offering of the anointed priest, and (6) the meal offering which goes along with drink offerings, an olive's bulk of one of which one offered up outside of the Temple — he is liable. R. Eleazar declares him free of liability, until he offers up the entire [volume of the meal offering] [M. Zeb. 13:4D-E]. Now, since the expression 'of an olive's bulk' cannot be formulated as the Tannaite statement in connection with burning the handful, the language, 'of an olive's bulk' also is not stated in connection with the residue. [Cashdan: hence according to Eleazar to burn only an olive's bulk of the handful is no burning, and an intention to do so outside its proper time expressed during another service would not render the offering refuse. Accordingly, one must omit the expression 'of an olive's bulk' from the first clause, which deals with wrongful intention in connection with the burning of the handful, and for the sake of consistency, the expression was omitted by Hiyya throughout.]"*
- F. *But if the formulation accords with the view of R. Eleazar, then why is it stated, to burn a handful thereof? It should say, 'intending to burn the handful and the frankincense.' For we have learned in the Mishnah: The handful and the frankincense, one of the two of which one offered up outside — he is liable [since either one alone is suitable for offering inside on its own]. R. Eleazar declares free of liability unless he offers up the second [M. Zeb. 13:6A-B]."*
- G. *Reference is made here to the handful of the meal offering of a poor sinner [in which there is no frankincense at all, so that the burning is only of the handful].*
- H. *So did the Tannaite framer of the passage go to the trouble of telling us the rule governing the handful of the sinner's meal offering?*

- I. *Yes indeed. And so when R. Dimi came, he said R. Eleazar said, “Reference is made here to the handful of the meal offering of a poor sinner, and this accords with the position of R. Eleazar.”*
- J. *Retracting, Raba said, “What is said is null. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “‘It is’ (Lev. 24: 9) [‘it (the showbread) is Most Holy unto him’] — if any one of the loaves was broken, all of them are invalid.’ So therefore too, if one of them was taken outside of the sanctuary, the ones that are inside remain valid. Now of whom have you heard, who takes the position that the tossing of the blood takes effect over that meat that is taken outside of the Temple courtyard? It is R. Aqiba. And yet the passage states, ‘If any one of the loaves was broken, all of them are invalid.’” [Cashdan: hence although the burning can have an affect upon what was taken out, even according to Aqiba it can have no affect upon that which had diminished, so if one loaf was broken, all are invalid; Raba then accepts the position of Huna.]*
- K. *Said to him Abbaye, “Does the cited Tannaite statement make it explicit that, ‘if one was taken out, the others remain valid’? Perhaps the sense is, ‘If one became unclean, the others are valid,’ and what is the reason? It is that the frontplate of the high priest effects acceptance even for what is unclean. But if the loaf was taken outside, that is not the case. And who is the authority behind the Tannaite statement? It is R. Eliezer, who has said, ‘The tossing of the blood takes effect over that meat that is taken outside of the Temple courtyard.’ And, further, it would have been entirely reasonable for the framer of the passage to state the rule covering the case in which one of the loaves was taken out, but he stated only the case where one was broken so as to indicate that, even though it is still inside of the sanctuary, burning does not take effect. According to R. Aqiba, however, who has said, ‘If one was taken out, the others remain valid,’ burning will take effect upon what has diminished [Cashdan: contrary to Huna’s view].”*

1:4P-Q

- P** **[If one took up the handful with the improper intention to eat a half-olive’s bulk and to offer up a half-olive’s bulk [at the wrong time or in the wrong place], it is invalid.**
- Q.** **For [improper intention concerning] eating and [improper intention concerning] offering up do not join together.**
- I.1 A.** **[If one intends] to eat half an olive’s bulk and to burn half an olive’s bulk, it is valid. For eating and burning do not join together]:** *The operative consideration here is that the intentionality concerns eating and burning. But if the officiating priest expressed the intentionality of eating what is fit for eating and of eating what is not fit for eating [that is, he would burn the sacrificial parts, which are not fit for eating], then they would combine. But the first clause nonetheless teaches, ...[intending] to eat something which is usually eaten [meat], [or] to burn something which is usually burned [entrails], outside of its proper place [which is, the Temple court for Most Holy Things, the walled city of Jerusalem for Lesser Holy Things] — it is invalid [and the meat may not be eaten]. And extirpation does not apply to it. So the rule applies to what is usually eaten, but not to what is not usually eaten!*

I.2. A. Who is the Tannaite authority behind this rule?

- B. *Said R. Jeremiah, “Who is the authority behind this rule? It is R. Eliezer, who takes the view that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who took up the handful [intending] to eat something which is not usually eaten, to burn something which is not usually burned — it is valid. R. Eliezer declares invalid [M. Zeb. 3:3A-D].** [The intentionality that has confused the categories of food yielded by the sacrifice is therefore valid in Eliezer’s view, which means that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat.]”*
- C. *Abbaye said, “You may even say that the rule accords with rabbis [vis à vis Eliezer], but do not draw the conclusion that the rule applies to what is usually eaten, but not to what is not usually eaten [so the offering would be fit]. Rather explain as follows: lo, if the officiating priest expresses the intention to eat what is usually eaten and to eat what is usually eaten, it is invalid [the two intentions in respect to two half bulks do combine].”*
- D. *And then what does he tell us? If it is the law governing what is ordinarily eaten, that point can be inferred from the opening clause: **If one did so to eat an olive’s bulk outside and an olive’s bulk on the next day, an olive’s bulk on the next day and an olive’s bulk outside, a half-olive’s bulk outside and a half-olive’s bulk on the next day, a half-olive’s bulk on the next day and a half-olive’s bulk outside — it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it. [13A]** What further, then, do I require? If it is to indicate, if the intention was to eat a half olive’s bulk of what is usually eaten and to eat a half olive’s bulk of what is not usually eaten, so that they can be joined together to form the requisite volume, that is clear from the opening clause of the same sequence of Mishnah-paragraphs. If it is to indicate, if the improper intention was to eat and burn a half olive’s bulk, they do not join together to form the requisite volume, this is to be inferred from the prior statement as well. For if intention to eat what is usual to eat and to eat what is not ordinarily eaten are not joined together to form the requisite volume, do we then have to say also that the intention to eat and the intention to burn do not join together to form the requisite volume? [Since intentionality to eat what is normally eaten and to eat what is not normally eaten do not combine, do we have to be told about the unmiscibility of the intentionalities to eat and to burn the meal offering?]*
- E. *What is necessary is to specify the rule governing intentionalities to eat and to burn the meat. For you might have thought that it is only in that case [when the priest will eat what is ordinarily eaten and to burn what is not ordinarily eaten] that the intentionalities do not combine, because this is not a normal intentionality, but here where the intention governing each is normal [in that the priest intends to eat what is eaten and to burn what is burned, though not in the right time or place (Freedman, Zebahim)], I might have supposed that they do combine, so he tells us that they do not combine.*