

VI.

BAVLI TEMURAH CHAPTER SIX

FOLIOS 28A-31A

6:1

- A. All [animals] which are prohibited for the altar prohibit in any number at all [the utilization for sacred purposes of animals among which they are confused, and these are as follows]: (1) the one which has sexual relations with a human being; (2) and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations; (3) and the one which is set aside [for idolatrous worship]; (4) and the one which has actually been worshiped; (5) and the [harlot's] hire; (6) and the price of a dog [one given in payment for a dog]; (7) and the hybrid; (8) and the terefah; (9) and the one which is born from the side.
- B. What is the one which is set aside [A3]?
- C. The one which is set aside for idolatrous worship.
- D. It is prohibited, but what is on it is permitted.
- E. What is the one which is actually worshiped [A4]?
- F. Any which people serve.
- G. [Both] it and what is on it are prohibited.
- H. This and that [however] are permitted for eating.

I.1 A. Said a master, “‘All [animals] which are prohibited for the altar prohibit in any number at all [animals among which they are confused]’ — *for they are not neutralized in any larger number of animals.*”

The problem of neutralization affects animals designated for various offerings as well, and we now shift into an exegesis of another such problem.

- B. *We have learned in the Mishnah: All animals designated for offerings with which were confused animals designated as sin offerings that were left to die or an ox to be stoned, even one such animal among ten thousand suitable animals are left to die [M. Zeb. 8:1A-C]. And in that connection we raised the question: what is the sense of the use of the word “even”? This is the sense of the matter: if animals that were designated as sin offerings were confused among animals that were consecrated, or an ox condemned to be stoned, even one among ten thousand, all are left to die.*

Do the two Mishnah-paragraphs not make the same point? Why repeat the matter with such emphasis?

D. *It is necessary to add “even one among ten thousand,” [which is comparable to our Mishnah’s language, **in any number at all**,] for I might have thought that there [in our Mishnah-paragraph, which says that a mixture of one such beast in the classifications, the language, **sin offerings that were left to die or an ox to be stoned**, would suffice since any sort of benefit is forbidden in such instances. But here, in which the animals are not forbidden to yield any sort of benefit, I might have concluded that the principle of neutralization in a larger number would apply. Our passage therefore indicates that that is not the case.*

I.2. A. *But the cases of the ox that had sexual relations with a woman or an ox with which a woman had had sexual relations we have also learned in the Mishnah [that neutralization does not take place, as follows]: If animal offerings were confused with an ox upon which a sin was committed, or an ox which had been guilty of killing a man but the evidence came only from a single witness, or the evidence of the owner. an ox that had sexual relations with a woman or an ox with which a human had had sexual relations, an ox that had been set aside for idolatry or one that had been worshipped, an ox that had served as a harlot’s hire or an ox that had served as the price of a dog, or an ox that was crossbred or an ox that was terefah or an ox that was born from the side, let them all pasture until they suffer a blemish [since one of the beasts has been validly consecrated] and then be sold, and let the owner bring another sacrifice, purchased with the proceeds of the best of them of that kind that had been mixed up with invalid beasts [M. **Zeb. 8:1D-F**].*

B. *Said R. Kahana, “I repeated this tradition before R. Shimi bar Ashi. He said to me, ‘The one version [above] refers to unconsecrated beasts [that is, the unacceptable beast was confused with unconsecrated beasts, and then the farmer declared them all to be consecrated], and the other [M. **Zeb. 8:1D-F**] refers to consecrated ones [in which the forbidden beast was confused with already consecrated ones]. And it was necessary to specify both rules. For if we had been given only the rule covering the confusion of already consecrated animals, we might have thought that the reason that neutralization does not take place is that the forbidden animals are rejected as unacceptable, while in the case of unconsecrated beasts, we might have supposed that the forbidden animals will be neutralized.’”*

C. *But have we not already learned in the Mishnah the rule governing unconsecrated beasts: These are forbidden and impose a prohibition in any measure at all: libation wine, an idol, hides with a hole at the heart, an ox that is to be stoned, a heifer, the neck of which is to be broken, birds belonging to a *mesora*, the hair cut off a Nazirite, the unredeemed firstborn of an ass, meat in milk, the goat that is to be sent forth unconsecrated beasts that have been slaughtered in the Temple court yard — lo, these are forbidden and impose a prohibition in any measure at all [M. **A.Z. 5:9A-C**].*

D. *It was nonetheless necessary to specify both matters. For had we been given only the rule just now cited, we might have supposed that the operative consideration was that the cases mentioned are forbidden for common use, but here we might*

have thought that the principle of neutralization in a larger volume would apply; and if we had been given the rule given here alone, we might have said that, as before, the operative consideration is that it is disgusting to use such animals for the altar, but for common use, we might have thought that even things that cannot be used for profit will be neutralized in a greater number. So we are informed that that is not the case.

- II.1 A. [the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations:]** *How do we know that the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations are forbidden to the Most High?*
- B. *It is in accord with that which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. “[When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle] from the herd [or from the flock]” (Lev. 1:32) — thus excluding the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations.
- D. But is it not a matter of logic [so why is a verse of Scripture required as evidence]? If a blemished beast, with which a transgression has not been done, is unfit for the altar, the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations, with which which a transgression has been done, all the more so should be unfit for the altar!
- E. But the case of one who plows with a yoked ox and ass together will prove the contrary, for a transgression has been done with them, and yet they are permitted for use on the altar.
- F. But the distinctive trait of the case of one who plows with a yoked ox and ass together is that the death penalty does not apply [in the case of the deliberate violation of the prohibition]. But will you state the same rule in connection with the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations, where the death penalty does apply?
- G. Then take away what you have contributed [concerning the case of plowing with an ox and an ass] and rely upon the analogy [of the argument a fortiori], for the case of an animal with which a transgression has been done is judged only when there are two witnesses [and in that case the animal is forbidden for use on the altar], but whence do we derive the rule in which a sinful act has been done with the case tried only the strength of only a single witness [in which case the animal is forbidden for the altar but not condemned] or on the evidence of the owner itself? How do we know the rule in such cases?
- H. Said R. Simeon, “I argue as follows: if in the case of a blemished animal, in which case the testimony of two witnesses does not invalidate the animal from being eaten, the testimony of a single witness serves to invalidate it from being offered on the altar, then in the cases of the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations, in which the testimony of two witnesses does disqualify the animal from being eaten, how much more should the testimony of a single witness disqualify the animal from being offered on the altar! Scripture then states, ‘[When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle] from the herd [or from

the flock]' (Lev. 1:32) — thus excluding the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations.”

I. *But since the matter has been proven by analogy [why the scriptural proof]?*

J. **[28B]** *Said R. Ashi, “The reason that the scriptural proof is required is that one may raise an objection to the argument by analogy as follows: the distinctive trait of the blemished beast is that its blemish is discernible to the naked eye. But will you say the same concerning the one who has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations, since in those cases the blemish is not going to be discernible to the naked eye? And since in those cases the blemish is not going to be discernible to the naked eye, they should be suitable to be offered on the altar. That is why scriptural proof is necessary. Scripture then states, ‘[When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle] from the herd [or from the flock]’ (Lev. 1:32) — thus excluding the one which has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations.”*

III.1 A. [(3) and the one which is set aside [for idolatrous worship]; (4) and the one which has actually been worshiped:] “[When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle] from the herd [or from the flock]” (Lev. 1:32) — this serves to exclude from use on the altar the one that has actually been worshipped.

B. But is it not a matter of logic [so why is a verse of Scripture required as evidence]? If in the instances of a harlot’s hire and the price of a dog, in which cases, an overlay of gold or silver [laid on the article given in payment to a harlot or a hustler] are permitted while the animals are forbidden on the altar, in the case of that which actually has been worshipped, in which case an overlay of gold or silver would be forbidden, how much the more so should the animal itself be forbidden for use on the altar!

C. But perhaps to the contrary:

D. If in the instances of a harlot’s hire and the price of a dog, which are forbidden for use on the altar, an overlay of gold or silver [laid on the article given in payment to a harlot or for a dog] is permitted, the overlay of silver and gold associated with an animal that has actually been worshipped, which [absent a specific scriptural prohibition] is permitted for the altar, surely should be permitted!

E. If so, you dismiss the verse, “You shall not desire the gold and silver that is on them nor take it for your own use” (Deu. 7:25).

F. I shall interpret the verse, “You shall not desire the gold and silver that is on them nor take it for your own use” (Deu. 7:25) to speak of what is inanimate, but as to something that is animate, since it is permitted for the altar, its overlaying of gold or silver also should be permitted.

G. Accordingly, we require the following proof supplied by Scripture:

H. “[When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle] from the herd [or from the flock]” (Lev. 1:32) — this serves to exclude from use on the altar the one that has actually been worshipped.

I. *An objection was raised by R. Hanania, “The operative consideration then is that the verse of Scripture has imposed a limitation, but absent such a limitations, then*

the overlayings would be permitted. But is it not written, ‘And you shall destroy their names’ (Deu. 12: 3), which bears the implication that that covers everything that is made for them?”

- J. That verse serves to indicate that one must substitute a nickname for the idol. If they call a place “the high house,” Jews should call it “the house of heaps,” [shifting Galia to Karia, and so throughout], “Face of Molekh” should be called “face of the dog,” “the eye of all” should be called “a thorn in the eye.”

III.2. A. [Reverting to the verse, “When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock” (Lev. 1:32)], *why not effect the following reversal:*

- B. “of the cattle” excludes the animal that has actually been worshipped, and “even of the herd” excludes the animals that have had sexual relationships with humans or that have been subjected to sexual relations by humans?
- C. In the one case we deal with that which pertains to the verse, and in the other, we exclude that which pertains to the verse as well. With regard to the feminine, “cattle,” it is written, “if a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death” (Lev. 20:15), and with respect to the male, herd, it is written, “Thus they changed their glory with that which is like an ox that eats grass” (Psa. 106:20).

III.3. A. [Reverting to the verse, “When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock” (Lev. 1:32)] “from the flock” — this serves to exclude from use on the altar **the one which is set aside [for idolatrous worship]**.

- B. “from the flock” — this serves to exclude from use on the altar a goring ox [that killed a man, where the evidence derives only from a single witness; this beast is not stoned to death].
- C. Said R. Simeon, “Now if Scripture excludes the case of the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman, why do I need a further piece of proof to exclude the goring ox [since in both cases, if there are two witnesses, the animal is stoned to death]? And if Scripture explicitly excludes the case of the goring ox, then why do I need a further piece of scriptural proof to exclude the case of the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman?”
- D. The reason is that there are considerations pertaining to the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman that do not apply to the goring ox, and there are considerations that apply to the goring ox that do not apply to the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman.
- E. There are considerations pertaining to the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman that do not apply to the goring ox, in that the act done unintentionally is treated as equivalent to one that is done deliberately, which does not apply to the goring ox.
- F. There are considerations that apply to the goring ox that do not apply to the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman, in that the owner of the ox pays an indemnity [for killing a man, though the ox is stoned to death], which is not the case with the animal that has had sexual relations with a woman.
- G. Accordingly, it is necessary for Scripture to deal with both classifications explicitly.

- III.4.** A. *The following presents proof of the same proposition from the following, which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. As to the beast that has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations, they are in the classification of Holy Things that contracted a transient blemish prior to their being consecrated, and they have to suffer a permanent blemish in order to redeem them, for Scripture says, “Since there is a blemish in them, because of their mutilation, they will not be accepted for you”: (Lev. 22:25).
- C. *But what sort of evidence derives from that passage for the case of the beast that has sexual relations with a human being and the one with whom a human being has sexual relations?*
- D. *The text suffers a lacuna, and this is what the Tannaite teaching is meant to say:*
- E. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that they are forbidden for use on the altar?
- F. Scripture says, “Since there is a blemish in them, because of their mutilation, they will not be accepted for you”: (Lev. 22:25).
- G. *And a Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [says], “In any passage in which the word ‘blemish’ [as in ‘corruption’] occurs, the reference is to lewdness or idolatry,*
- H. *“lewdness: ‘For all flesh had corrupted its way’ (Gen. 6:12) [and the same Hebrew letters occur here and in the cited verse of Lev. 22:25 for blemish];*
- I. *“idolatry: ‘lest you corrupt yourselves and make a graven image the similitude of any figure’ (Deu. 4:16).*
- J. *“Wherever a blemish disqualifies an animal for the altar, ‘lewdness’ and ‘idolatry’ therefore will also disqualify them from the altar.”*
- K. *And how does the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael interpret the verse, “When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock” (Lev. 1: 3)?*
- L. *He requires that verse to make the following point:*
- M. [“When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock”] — excluding the sick, old, or fowl-smelling beast [which are not offered on the altar].
- N. *And as to the Tannaite authority who cites the same verse to deal with the cases of the animal that has committed an act of sexual relations with a human or one upon whom a human has committed such an act, how does he derive the law that the sick, old, or fowl-smelling beast are not permitted on the altar?*
- O. *He derives that rule from the verse, “and if of the flock, of the sheep, or of the goats” (Lev. 1:10).*
- P. *And how does the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael deal with that same verse?*
- Q. *It is the way of Scripture to go over matters in such a manner [no particular lesson to be derived from the repetition].*

IV.1 A. What is the one which is set aside [for idolatrous worship]? The one which is set aside for idolatrous worship. It is prohibited, but what is on it is permitted.

- B. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “What is forbidden for use on the altar is only a beast that has been set aside for idolatrous worship for a span of seven years, as it is said, ‘And it came to pass that the Lord said to him, Take your father’s young bullock even a second bullock, seven years old’ (Jud. 6:25) [one fattened for seven years, and that is the time that it takes to make it suitable for offering to an idol].”
- C. *But in that case, was it only a beast that had been designated for idolatrous purposes? Was it not an instance in which the beast had actually been utilized for that purpose?*
- D. Said R. Aha b. R. Jacob, “It had been designated for use for idolatry but not actually used.”
- E. Raba said, “One still can maintain that it actually was used for that purpose, but that represented an innovation, in line with what R. Abba b. Kahana explained.”
- F. For R. Abba b. Kahana said, “There were eight things that were rendered permissible on that night [the incident of Gideon]: killing an animal outside of the tabernacle, killing it at night, the officiating by a non-priest, [29A] doing so without the use of the ministering utensils, ministering with utensils deriving from an asherah-tree, use of the wood of an asherah-tree, use of an animal that had been set aside for idolatry, use of an animal that had been used in worship of an idol.”

IV.2. A. Said R. Tobi bar Mattenah said R. Josiah, “How do we know on the basis of the Torah that an animal that has been designated for idolatrous purposes is forbidden? As it is said, ‘...shall you observe to offer to me’ (Num. 28: 2), meaning, every animal that is consecrated requires special observation [before it is offered].”

- B. *Abbaye objected, “Then how about the case of bringing a lean lamb without having observed it? Is this too a beast that is not fit to be offered on the altar?”*
- C. *He said to him, “I mean that, when the verse says, , ‘...shall you observe to offer to me’ (Num. 28: 2), ‘the words ‘unto me’ mean, to me but not to any other lord. And what is ‘another lord to whom an offering might be made? This refers to an idol.”*

IV.3. A. Said Raba bar R. Ada said R. Isaac, “A beast that has been set apart for idolatry is prohibited only until an act of labor has been done with it.”

- B. Ulla said R. Yohanan [said], “It is forbidden only until the animal is handed over to the priests of an idol to be eaten [and then it will not be offered on the altar, so is permitted].”
- C. Beha said R. Yohanan [said], “It is forbidden only until they will feed the animal with vetches that have been designated for idolatry.”
- D. *Said R. Abba to Beha, “Do you disagree with Ulla?”*
- E. *He said to him, “No, Ulla himself intends to say that it is fed with vetches that are designated for idolatry.”*
- F. *Said R. Abba, “Beha knows how to explain this tradition. Had he not gone up there [to the Land of Israel], he would not have known how to explain it, for the Land of Israel was the cause [of his acquiring knowledge].”*

G. Said to him R. Isaac, “Beha belonged to both here and there.”

IV.4. A. R. Hanania of Trita repeated on Tannaite authority before R. Yohanan, “**A beast that has been designated for idolatrous purposes is forbidden only until some deed has been done with it [T. Tem. 4:2A-B].**”

B. *He repeated the Tannaite tradition and he went and spelled out out: “What is the meaning of a deed? It is until one shears it or works with it.”*

V.1 A. What is the one that has actually been worshiped? Any which people serve. [Both] it and what is on it are prohibited. This and that [however] are permitted for eating.

B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*

C. Said R. Pappa, “It is because Scripture has stated, ‘and one sheep from every flock of two hundred from the well-watered pastures of Israel’ (Eze. 45:15). The meaning is, from what is permitted to Israelites.”

D. *But if you were to imagine that such beasts had been forbidden for private use, then why do I need a verse of Scripture to show that they are excluded from the altar!*

E. *But is it the fact that in any case in which something is prohibited for private use, there is no need for a verse of Scripture to show that such things are prohibited for the altar? Is there not the case of the terefah-beast, which is forbidden for use by a private person, but Scripture has nonetheless excluded it from use on the altar!*

F. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

G. When Scripture says, “Even of the herd,” which one need not make explicit, that clause serves to exclude from use on the altar a terefah-beast.

H. *It was necessary to make both matters explicit in context. For I might have thought that that rule excludes a case in which the beast was made terefah and afterward consecrated, but if the beast was consecrated and afterward made terefah, I might have said that it was nonetheless permitted for the Most High.*

I. *But lo, that rule derives from the following:*

J. “Whatever passes under the rod” (Lev. 27:32) — excluding the terefah-beast, which does not pass under the rod [and also is not offered, as an animal designated as tithe, on the altar].

K. *That too is required to make its own point in its own context, specifically, you might have supposed that that rule applies to a beast that had never for one moment been valid, having been born as a terefah-beast from its mother’s womb, but in a case in which it had had a moment of suitability and had been born and afterward was rendered a terefah-beast, I might have supposed that [in context] that would be permitted for the Most High. So we are informed that that is not the case.*

I.1, 2 do the necessary work of comparing our rule with its counterpart at M. Zeb. 8:1 and M. A. Z. 5:9. We demonstrate that these are not duplicated rules, but each makes its own point. We proceed to a sustained inquiry into the scriptural bases for the rules at hand, and this runs through the remainder of the Talmud before us. Our concern is to show that one verse yields one rule, and that two or more verses do not duplicate the same proposition. What motivates the whole,

therefore, is a sustained interest in demonstrating the inerrant accuracy of Scripture and the Mishnah alike.

6:2

- A. What is the hire [of a harlot]?
- B. He who says to a prostitute, “Here is this lamb for you as your fee.”
- C. Even if [they were] a hundred [among which one such animal is confused], all of them are prohibited.
- D. He who says to his fellow, “Here is this lamb for you, and let your servant girl spend the night with my servant boy” —
- E. Rabbi says, “It is not the hire of a harlot.”
- F. And sages say, “It is the hire of a harlot.”

- I.1** A. A master has said, “Now how can we envision a case in which **Even if [they were] a hundred [among which one such animal is confused], all of them are prohibited?** *If we say that the whore took a hundred animals as her fee? Then it is obvious that all are forbidden, so what difference does it make to me whether it be one or a hundred?*”
- B. *It is indeed necessary to stipulate that rule to cover a case in which she took one lamb as her fee, and then the happy customer gave her a hundred more. All are forbidden, since all of them come by reason of the original transaction.*
- I.2** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. If the john gave her the animal but did not come on top of her, or came on top of her but did not give her a fee, her fee is legitimately set on the altar.
 - C. If the john gave her the animal but did not come on top of her — *do you call that a whore’s fee?*
 - D. *And furthermore, or came on top of her but did not give her a fee — what in the world has he given her anyhow!*
 - E. *But the sense of the passage is as follows:*
 - F. If he gave her an animal as a fee and afterward came upon her, or if he came upon her and afterward gave her an animal, her fee is permitted.
 - G. *But let the classification of a whore’s fee apply to the beast retroactively!*
 - H. Said R. Eleazar, “[**29B**] We deal with a case in which she went and offered the lamb in advance [of having sexual relations with the john].”
 - I. *How may we imagine such a case? Shall we say that he gave her title to the beast forthwith? Then it is obvious that the beast is permitted for the altar, since up to this moment he has not come upon her. Rather, it is a case in which he said to her, “You will not acquire title to the beast until we have sex.”*
 - J. *But under such circumstances, can she offer the animal?* Scripture has said, “And when a man shall consecrate his house to be holy to the Lord” (Lev. 27:14), [with the following result:] just as his house falls within his domain, so whatever falls within his domain [may be consecrated, excluding that to which a person does not in fact have title].
 - K. *The rule was required to cover a case in which he said to her, “You will not acquire title to the beast until we have sex, but if you really need it, then you may*

have title to it from this point onward.” [The upshot is that she has title such as to be able to dedicate the animal, since she can use it if she is in need. The beast is not deemed the hire of a harlot if she went ahead and offered it prior to having sexual relations with the customer.]

- I.3.** A. R. Oshaia raised the following question: “If she went ahead and consecrated the animal prior [to having sex], what is the law?”
- B. *Why not solve the problem by reference to that which R. Eleazar said, for R. Eleazar said, “If she went ahead and offered the animal [in advance of having sexual relations with the john, it is acceptable]”? If she offered it, it is acceptable for the altar, because at the time of intercourse, it is not in existence at all; this then implies that if she dedicated it, since at the moment of the act of intercourse, the animal was in existence, it is forbidden for use on the altar.*
- C. *That is precisely what he was asking: if she offered it up, then lo, it is not in existence at the time of sexual relations, so the animal is acceptable for the altar. But if she had consecrated it at the time of sexual relations, the animal would be forbidden for the altar.*
- D. *Or perhaps, since we have learned, **An oral statement in respect to consecrating something is equivalent to an act of actual transmission in a private transaction [and one cannot retract] [M. Qid. 1:6H], if she consecrated it, it is legitimate for the altar and all the more so is it acceptable for the altar if she had actually offered it.***
- E. *The question stands.*
- I.4.** A. A master has said, “If he gave her an animal as a fee and afterward came upon her, or if he came upon her and afterward gave her an animal, her fee is permitted.”
- B. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. *If he came upon her and gave her the animal, even after twelve months, the animal is in the category of a harlot’s hire and is forbidden.*
- D. *Said R. Hanan bar R. Hisda, “There is no contradiction. In the one case he said to her, ‘Have sex with me in exchange for this lamb,’ and in the other, he said to her, ‘Have sex with me for a lamb,’ without further stipulations.”*
- E. *[But even if he said to her, “Have sex with me in exchange for this lamb,”] still there has been no act of drawing the animal [and thereby acquiring title to it]!*
- F. *We deal with a gentile whore, who does not acquire title to something by an act of drawing the object.*
- G. *If you prefer, I shall explain that we deal even with an Israelite whore, for example, when the beast is standing in her own courtyard [which effects acquisition in the woman’s behalf of title to the beast].*
- H. *If that’s the case, then surely he handed it over to her at the beginning of the transaction [before having sexual relations with her, since the animal has been put in her own courtyard. So how come we claim that he had sexual relations and then handed over the lamb?]*
- I. *It is a case in which he first of all made over to her the animal as security for his debt and said to her, “If I pay you by such and such a day, well and good, and if not, the lamb will be your fee.”*

- I.5. A.** Said Rab, “All the same is the fee [aid to a hustler and the fee paid to any woman with whom it is illegal to have sexual relations. Excepted from the rule is only the fee he paid to his wife when she was menstruating. *What is the scriptural basis for this ruling?* ‘A harlot’ (Deu. 23:19), *and his wife when she is menstruating is not in the category of a harlot.*”
- B. *And Levi said, “Even his wife when she is menstruating is in the category of a harlot [if she accepts a fee from her husband to have sexual relations]. What is the scriptural basis for this view? It is written, ‘an abomination’ (Lev. 18:27), and this encompasses an abomination.”*
- C. *But after all, does not even Levi have to deal with the language of Scripture, “a harlot” (Deu. 23:19)?*
- D. Levi can say to you, “It is to mean, a whore but not a hustler.”
- E. *And how does Rab derive the rule that the law covers a whore but not a hustler[’s fee]?*
- F. *He derives the rule from what Rabbi said, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- G. Rabbi says, **“A fee paid for sexual relations is forbidden only when it comes to someone intercourse with whom constitutes a transgression [T. Tem. 4:7D],** but [an animal given over as] the fee a man paid to his wife to have sex when she is menstruating [and she becomes permissible to him when the period is over], money paid to her for her loss of time [but not for the act of sex], or if the whore paid a lamb to a man as a fee — these all may be legitimately offered up on the altar. Even though there is no clear proof for that proposition, there is at least an indication of it: ‘So you were different from other women in your harlotries, none solicited you to play the harlot, and you gave hire, while no hire was given to you; therefore you were different’ (Eze. 16:34).”
- H. *And how does Rab interpret the language, “an abomination” (Lev. 18:27)?*
- I. *He requires it to make the point of Abbayye.*
- J. For said Abbayye, “A gentile whore — the fee paid to her is forbidden for use on the altar. *What is the scriptural basis for that rule?* It is written here, ‘an abomination,’ *and elsewhere, ‘for whoever does any of all these abominations’ (Lev. 18:29).* Just as the passage there speaks of sexual relations with women who are prohibited to a given person and with whom an act of betrothal by that man would not take effect, so here too we deal with a women with whom an act of betrothal would not take effect.
- K. “And a priest who has sexual relations with such a woman is not flogged on account of having sexual relations with a whore. Why not? Scripture says, ‘and he shall not profane his seed’ (Lev. 21:15), meaning, a case in which his child would be attributed to his paternity, excluding a gentile woman, for a child he fathered with her would not be attributed to his paternity.
- L. “As to an Israelite whore, the hire paid to her is legitimate for the altar. How come? Because an act of betrothal takes effect with her. But a priest who has sexual relations with her is flogged, for having sexual relations with a whore. How come? Because in that case a child he fathered with her would be attributed to his paternity.”

- M. But Raba said, "All the same are the one and the other: the fee paid to her is forbidden for use on the altar, and a priest who has sexual relations with her is flogged on the count of doing so with a whore. *What is the reason? We infer the rule covering the one from the rule covering the other, and vice versa:* just as having sexual relations with an Israelite whore violates a negative commandment, so doing so with a gentile whore violates a negative commandment, and just as the fee paid to a gentile whore is forbidden for use on the altar, so the fee paid for an Israelite whore is forbidden for use on the altar."
- N. *An objection was raised:* all the same are the fee paid to a gentile whore and the one paid to an Israelite whore — it is forbidden for use on the altar. *Is this not a refutation of the position of Abbaye?*
- O. *Abbaye will say to you, "Who stands behind this rule? It is R. Aqiba, who has said, 'An act of betrothal is not valid in cases in which sexual relations violate a negative prohibition'" [and since there is the negative commandment in connection with the Israelite whore, "neither shall he profane...," her hire is forbidden too].*
- P. [Miller adds:] *But does not the passage say in a later clause, "as for example a widow for a high priest or a divorcee or one who has performed the act of removing the shoe for an ordinary priest, her hire is forbidden [and here the betrothal takes effect but the fee is forbidden, and there is no violation of a negative commandment]!"*
- Q. *So we are informed that, in the case of sexual relations with any whore with whom betrothal could not take effect in theory, as in the case of a widow with a high priest, the fee paid is forbidden.*
- R. *And in the view of Raba, how come the language is included, "as for example a widow for a high priest or a divorcee?"*
- S. *The sense is, "it is like the case of a widow with a high priest: just as a widow is not flogged unless she has been warned, so a whore is not subject to a prohibition until he has said to her, "Here is the fee."*
- T. *This then excludes the position of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar has said, "If an unattached man came upon an unattached woman not with the purpose of accomplishing a marriage, he turns her into a whore."*
- U. *But [Raba concurs] in a case in which she was already a whore, here the fee that he has paid [without giving a reason] will be forbidden for the altar.*
- V. *Another version:*
- W. *The passage cited just now speaks of forbidden sexual relations in cases in which an act of betrothal would in any event not take effect [and in such cases even a fee paid to an Israelite whore would be forbidden].*
- X. *And lo, it is further stated at the end of the same passage: "as for example a widow for a high priest or a divorcee or one who has performed the act of removing the shoe for an ordinary priest, her hire is forbidden and here the betrothal takes effect [but the fee is forbidden]..*
- Y. *Who is the authority behind this rule? It is [30A] R. Eleazar, who has said, "If an unattached man came upon an unattached woman not with the purpose of accomplishing a marriage, he turns her into a whore."*

- Z. *If this represents the opinion of R. Eleazar, then how come the language refers to a widow, when it could as well speak of a free agent?*
- AA. *It was necessary explicitly to make reference to a widow. For you might have thought that since this is the typical cases, the others are not forbidden, so the formulation tells us that that is not so.*

II.1 A. He who says to his fellow, “Here is this lamb for you, and let your servant girl spend the night with my servant boy” — Rabbi says, “It is not the hire of a harlot.” And sages say, “It is the hire of a harlot:”

- B. *Lo, is it not the case that a slave-girl is permitted to a slave-boy?*
- C. *Said R. Huna, “The real meaning is, ‘for himself,’ and the reason the man says, ‘my slave,’ is simply to use a euphemism.”*
- D. *Then what is the reason for the position of Rabbi?*
- E. *Said R. Samuel bar R. Isaac, “In point of fact, the Mishnah really does mean, ‘for my slave boy,’ and it speaks of a Hebrew slave.”*
- F. *If so, then what is the reason for the position of rabbis? In point of fact, it is permitted to give a slave-girl to a Hebrew slave.*
- G. *Here with what situation do we deal? A case in which the Hebrew slave does not have a wife and children.*
- H. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. *If a Hebrew slave does not have a wife and children, his master cannot give him a Canaanite slave girl. If he does have a wife and children, his master may give him a Canaanite slave girl.*

The clarification provided by I.1 presents no surprises, except that, to begin with, the question is senseless, for the clear meaning of C is that if there was confusion between a hundred animals, one of which is the hire of a harlot, all the animals are prohibited. The conception that the whore was paid a hundred lambs is fabricated for the occasion. No. 2 then clarifies a Tannaite amplification on the theme. No.3 raises a theoretical question. Then, at No. 4, materials introduced in the course of the prior discussion are taken up. At No. 5 Rab and Levi develop secondary conceptions, all in line with the basic program of our Mishnah-paragraph. II.1 serves as another Mishnah-clarification, nothing more.

6:3

- A. **What is the price of a dog?**
- B. **He who says to his fellow, “Here is this lamb for you, in exchange for this dog.”**
- C. **And so two partners who divided [property] — one took ten [lambs], and one took nine [lambs] and a dog.**
- D. **[all] those which are set over against the dog are prohibited.**
- E. **[but] those which are with the dog are permitted.**
- F. **The hire [rental fee paid for use] of a dog and the price [paid for the purchase, e.g., as a slave] of a prostitute, lo, they are permitted,**
- G. **since it is said, “Even both these [two]” (Deu. 23:19) — but not four.**

H. Their offspring [that is, of animals paid for such] are permitted, since it is said, “They” — and not their offspring.

I.1 A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:

B. What is the price of a dog? These are things given in exchange for a dog, as it is said, “You have sold the people for a trifle and you have not set their price high” (Psa. 44:13) [T. Tem. 4:4A-C].

I.2. A. [Supply: The hire [rental fee paid for use] of a dog and the price [paid for the purchase, e.g., as a slave] of a prostitute, lo, they are permitted, since it is said, “Even both these [two]” (Deu. 23:19) — but not four:] Might one say that “price” refers to the hire of a dog [following Miller’s version]?

B. The cited verse reads “both,” but not three [Miller: and adding the case of the hire of a dog would yield three cases of abomination].

C. But did we say the sense should be both the hire and also the purchase-price of a dog? What we said was that it may mean, the hire but not the price of a dog.

D. If so, let Scripture say, “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot and a dog.” Since Scripture is explicit, “The hire of a harlot or the price of a dog,” the meaning is [the price, not the rental paid, for a dog.]

II.1 A. And so two partners who divided [property]. One took ten [lambs], and one took nine [lambs] and a dog. Those which are set over against the dog are prohibited. Those which are with the dog are permitted.

B. But why not single out a single lamb for the dog, and let the rest of the lambs be available?

C. With what case do we deal here? With one in which the value of the dog is greater than one of them, and this additional value is spread over all the corresponding lambs.

III.1 A. The hire [rental fee] of a dog and the price of a prostitute, lo, they are permitted, since it is said, “Even both these [two]” (Deu. 23:19) — but not four. Their offspring are permitted, since it is said, “They” — and not their offspring:

B. Said Raba of Parzaqia to R. Ashi, [30B] “What is the foundation for what our rabbis have said: the category of prostitution does not pertain to animals [for the Mishnah says that a fee paid for the use of a dog is permitted on the altar]?”

C. He said to him, “Scripture would have said, ‘the hire of a prostitute and of a dog.’”

D. There is a Tannaite teaching to the same effect:

E. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the hire [rental fee] of a dog and the price of a prostitute, lo, they are permitted?

F. Since it is said, “Even both these [two]” (Deu. 23:19) — but not four.

G. Their offspring are permitted, since it is said, “They” — and not their offspring.

III.2. A. Said Raba, “The offspring of a beast that has been subjected to sexual relations with a man while pregnant is forbidden on the altar, for in this context both the mother and the offspring are deemed to have been subjected to sexual relations. A beast that gored while pregnant is disqualified for the altar, for in this context both

the mother and the offspring are deemed to have gored. The offspring of a [pregnant] beast that has been designated for idolatry or actually used for idolatry is valid for the altar. *How come? It is the mother that has been designated and the mother that has been used.*"

- B. Some say, "The offspring of a [pregnant] beast that has been designated for idolatry or actually used for idolatry is forbidden for use on the altar. *How come? Because it is pleasing to the worshipper for the beast to appear full.*"

III.3. A. Said R. Ahadheboi bar Ammi said Rab, "He who betroths a woman by handing over in exchange the cow-shit of a beast that has been condemned to be stoned — the woman is deemed to have been betrothed. If one did so with the shit of calves designated for idolatry, the woman is not betrothed. *How come? If you want, I shall explain that there is a verse of Scripture that suggests so, and if you want, I shall explain that it is a matter of logic.*

- B. *"If you want, I shall explain that it is a matter of logic. it is pleasing to the worshipper for the beast to appear full. [Miller: the dung makes the animal look fatter and therefore cannot be used,] while in the case of the ox that is condemned to be stoned, it is not pleasing to the worshipper for the beast to appear full.*

- C. *"and if you want, I shall explain that there is a verse of Scripture that suggests so: in speaking of idolatry, Scripture states, 'lest you be a cursed thing like it' (Deu. 7:26), meaning, whatever you get from it, lo, it is in its category [encompassing the dung], therefore forbidden for any sort of personal use or gain, while with regard to the ox condemned to be stoned, it is written, 'and its meat shall not be eaten' (Exo. 21:28), meaning, 'its meat' is forbidden but its dung is available for use."*

The Talmud seems to me to clarify or augment the Mishnah-paragraph in quite routine ways. The definition at I.1 is in the Mishnah, so all that is contributed is a wrong superscription. If my sense that II.1 pertains to the cited lines of the Mishnah-paragraph, then here too we have nothing more than amplification of the given. III.1 answers a perfectly reasonable but commonplace question. IV.1 does the same, going over the Mishnah's turf. No. 2 engages in a valuable comparison of categories, and No. 3 does the same.

6:4

- A. [If] one gave her [pieces of] silver, lo, they are permitted [e.g., for use in purchasing gifts for the altar].
- B. [If he gave her bottles] of wine, [jars of] oil, meal, or anything the like of which is offered on the altar, it is prohibited.
- C. [If] he gave her [already] consecrated animals, lo, they are permitted.
- D. [If he gave her] fowl, lo, they are prohibited.
- E. For it might have been logical [to argue thus]: Now if to the case of consecrated animals, which a blemish invalidates, the consideration of the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog does not apply,
- F. to the case of fowl, which a blemish does not invalidate in any event, is it not logical that the consideration of the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog should not apply?

G. Scripture states, “For any vow” (Deu. 23:19) — to encompass fowl.

6:5

- A. All those animals which are prohibited for the altar — their offspring are permitted.**
- B. The offspring of a terefah animal —**
- C. R. Eliezer says, “It is not to be offered on the altar.”**
- D. And sages say, “It is to be offered.”**
- E. R. Hananiah b. Antigonus says, “A valid animal which sucked from a terefah animal is invalid on the altar.”**
- F. All Holy Things which became terefah — they do not redeem them.**
- G. For they do not redeem Holy Things merely to feed them to the dogs.**

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. If one gave her wheat for making into flour, grapes for making wine, olives for making oil, a cow that became pregnant while in her domain and gave birth [T. Tem. 4:7A] —**
- C. one Tannaite version states, “They are forbidden.”**
- D. And another Tannaite version states, “They are permitted.”**
- E. Said R. Joseph, “Gurion of Aspora recited on Tannaite authority: the House of Shammai prohibit [use of these things on the altar] and the House of Hillel permit.”**
- F. “The House of Hillel permit, *for the House of Hillel reason*, Scripture says, ‘them,’ meaning, ‘them but not their offspring;’ ‘them,’ but not the things made from them. The House of Shammai prohibit [use of these things on the altar], *for the House of Shammai maintain that Scripture says, ‘them,’* but not their offspring; but the word ‘even’ means to encompass what is made of them.”**
- G. And the House of Hillel surely must deal with this same “even”!**
- H. The use of the word “even” does present a problem to the House of Hillel.**

I.2. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “‘In the house of the Lord your God’ (Deu. 23:19) — this excludes the rite of the burning of the red cow, which does not come to the Temple house,” the words of R. Eleazar. [That rite is not subject to the prohibition of the hire of a prostitute and the price of a dog.]**
- C. But sages say, “This means to include golden overlay [from use in covering the altar, if it derives from the fees paid to a prostitute or for a dog].”**
- D. And whom does the attribution to sages represent?**
- E. Said R. Hisda, “It represents the opinion of R. Yosé b. R. Judah.”**
- F. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:**
- G. If one gave her gold — R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, “They do not make therewith beaten gold plates, even for the back of the Holy of Holies” [T. Tem. 4:8A-B].**

II.1 A. [If] he gave her already consecrated animals, lo, they are permitted. [If he gave her fowl, lo, they are prohibited. For it might have been logical to argue

thus: Now if to the case of consecrated animals, which a blemish invalidates, the consideration of the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog does not apply, to the case of fowl, which a blemish does not invalidate, is it not logical that the consideration of the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog should not apply? Scripture states, “For any vow” (Deu. 23:19) — to encompass fowl]:

- B. And why, simply on the foundation of an argument a fortiori, should the prohibition of the harlot’s hire and the price of a dog not also cover the beasts that have already been consecrated?
- C. If fowl, which are not invalidated by a blemish, are invalidated if they fall into the category of the harlot’s hire and the price of a dog, beasts that have already been consecrated, which are invalidated by a blemish, surely should fall into the classification of the hire of a harlot or the price of a dog [and should therefore be invalidated if they have been paid over in that regard]!
- D. Scripture states, “For any vow” (Deu. 23:19), thus excluding what already has been subjected to a vow.
- E. *Now the operative consideration appears to be that Scripture itself has excluded them from the classification at hand. But if Scripture had not excluded consecrated beasts, might I have thought that, if one gave a harlot animals that had already been consecrated, the law of the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog would apply to them? But then can someone impart a prohibition upon property that does not belong to him?*
- F. Said R. Oshaia, “We deal with a case in which he has assigned a share in his Passover lamb to her as his fee for her services, and the ruling represents the position of Rabbi. [Rabbi will allow it here, because in his view, one can dedicate something that is in his possession in such a way as to pay others so that he can purchase something not connected with the offering that has been consecrated. The case involves selling a share in the Passover lamb. Rabbi’s position is that one can exchange a share in the Passover lamb for the services of a whore.]”
- G. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. “And if the household is too small to require a lamb” (Exo. 12: 4) — [being unable to purchase a lamb, having insufficient means, e.g., to buy wood (Miller)], then one provide him with a limb from the lamb that is sufficient for food but not for purchase [that is, one may not sell others a share in the lamb so as to get money to buy clothing, since such an article has no connection with the Passover offering (Miller)].
- I. Rabbi says, “One may assign a place to others for sale even if the money would be used for a purchase; if he did not have enough money, he can assign a share for others along with himself in his Passover lamb and in his festival offerings, and the money is considered unconsecrated, for it is on that condition that Israelites consecrate their lambs for Passover offerings.” [Miller: One may therefore acquire something not connected with the Passover lamb.]

III.1 A. All those animals which are prohibited for the altar — their offspring are permitted [M. Tem. 6:5A]:

- B. Said Rab, “**All those animals which are prohibited for the altar — their offspring are permitted.** *In this connection it has been taught on Tannaite*

authority: R. Eliezer forbids using the offspring for such a purpose. [So this is at issue among Tannaite authorities.]

- C. Said R. Huna bar Hinena said R. Nahman, “The dispute pertains to a case in which the beasts were pregnant and then fucked by a man, for R. Eliezer maintains that the status of the embryo is the equivalent to the status of the thigh of the mother, while rabbis maintain that it is not equivalent to the status of the thigh of the mother. But in the case of animals that were fucked and then became pregnant, all parties concur that they are permitted.”
- D. Raba said, “The dispute pertains to a case in which they were fucked and then became pregnant, for R. Eliezer maintains that the one or the other condition makes the beast forbidden, while rabbis maintain that the one or the other condition leaves the beast permitted; but if the beasts were pregnant and then got fucked, all parties concur that they are forbidden.”
- E. *Raba is consistent with principles held elsewhere, for* Raba has said, “The offspring of a cow that was fucked by a man is forbidden, both the cow and the offspring are deemed to have been fucked by a man. The offspring of a beast that gored while pregnant is unfit for the altar, for both the mother and the offspring are deemed to have gored.”
- F. *There is another version in which the matter is set forth, namely:*
- G. Said R. Huna bar Hinena said R. Nahman, “The dispute pertains to a case in which the beasts were fucked when they had already been sanctified, *for R. Eliezer maintains that such a thing is degrading, while sages do not take that view*, but if the beasts were fucked while still unconsecrated, since their status as been changed, all parties concur that they are permitted.”
- H. Raba said R. Nahman said, “The dispute covers a case in which they had been fucked when still unconsecrated, for R. Eliezer maintains that it is a degrading thing, while rabbis maintain that, since their status as subsequently been changed [from profane to sacred], they are permitted, but if they were fucked when they were consecrated, all parties concur that they are forbidden.”

IV.1 A. [31A] The offspring of a terefah animal — R. Eliezer says, “It is not to be offered on the altar.” And sages say, “It is to be offered.”

- B. *In the opinion of one who maintains that a terefah-beast can produce offspring, we may explain that the Mishnah-paragraph refers to a case in which the beast became terefah and then pregnant, and at issue here is that R. Eliezer holds the view that if there were two efficient causes, one of which is subject to a prohibition, then the offspring is forbidden, while rabbis take the position that if there were two efficient causes, one of which is subject to a prohibition, then the offspring is permitted.*
- C. *In the opinion of one who maintains that a terefah-beast cannot produce offspring, we may explain that the Mishnah-paragraph refers to a case in which the beast got pregnant and then became terefah, and at stake in the dispute is this issue: R. Eliezer takes the position that the embryo is nothing more than the thigh of its mother, while rabbis hold that the embryo is not merely regarded as equivalent to the thigh of the mother.”*

- D. Said R. Huna, "But sages concede to R. Eliezer that the fledgling from the egg of a bird that was a terefah-bird is forbidden for use on the altar. *How come? They differ with R. Eliezer only with regard to the offspring of a beast, since it grows on its own, but the case of the young bird from the egg of a bird that was made terefah is different, since it grows wholly from the body of the bird, [is different, and here they concur with him].*" [Miller: the embryo of an animal is not attached to the mother's body but develops on its own and hangs in the air, while the egg, so long as it is not completed, is attached to the body and completed inside the bird].
- E. *Said Raba to R. Huna, "There is a Tannaite teaching that sustains your view:*
- F. *"A spoon-full of worms that come from a living person [who subsequently died] — R. Eliezer declares unclean, but sages declare not-contaminating [by reason of corpse uncleanness]."* [Miller: since the material was separated from the person while he was alive, it is regarded as mere dirt and is not considered part of the body.]
- G. *"Rabbis will differ concerning worms of a human body, for they are classified merely as a discharge, but as to an egg, which is part of the body of the bird, they would concur [Miller: that the bird from the egg is forbidden for use on the altar]."*
- H. *Said Abbaye to him, "To the contrary! R. Eliezer will differ from rabbis only in connection with worms that come from a man while yet alive, since it is written, 'How much less man that is a worm, and the son of man, that is a maggot' (Job. 25: 6), but as to the case of a fledgling, even R. Eliezer would concur [that it is fit for the altar [for the fledgling has developed after the deterioration of the egg, and at that point the egg is mere dust, so here Eliezer will concur (Miller)]."*
- I. *"Furthermore, there is a Tannaite version that is explicit:*
- J. *"R. Eliezer concurs with sages in the case of a fledgling from an egg of a bird that became terefah, that it is permitted for use on the altar."*
- K. *He said to him, "If that is how it has been taught on Tannaite authority, so that's what the Tannaite ruling is."*

V.1 A. R. Hananiah b. Antigonus says, "A valid animal which sucked from a terefah animal is invalid on the altar:"

- B. *What consideration is operative here? If we say that the criterion is that the offspring has sucked from the terefah-beast, then note the following: if one fed the beast with vetches that were designated for idolatrous purposes, here too would the beast be forbidden? [Obviously not. We know that under those conditions, the beast is permitted.]*
- C. *Rather, on Tannaite authority R. Hanina of Trita repeated before R. Yohanan, "We deal with a case in which the offspring sucked hot milk from the terefah-beast every morning, since on that it can live for twenty-four hours" [that is, from the milk without other food. So the growth and development of the animal derive from the nourishment of the terefah-beast, and that is why the offspring is forbidden from the altar. As to eating vetches, the beast cannot live on vetches alone for a twenty-four hour period (Miller)].*

VI.1 A. All Holy Things which became terefah — they do not redeem them. For they do not redeem Holy Things to feed them to the dogs:

- B. *What is the scriptural source of this rule?*
- C. *It is as our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- D. “You may kill and eat flesh” (Deu. 12:15):
- E. “You may kill.” but you may not shear the beast
- F. “and eat :” you but not your dogs.
- G. “flesh:” meat but not milk.
- H. On this basis we derive the rule that **they do not redeem Holy Things to feed them to the dogs.**
- I. *There are those who say matters in the following way:*
- J. “You may kill and eat flesh” (Deu. 12:15):
- K. your access to them commences only from the moment of slaughter and beyond,
- L. for the Tannaite authority takes the view that **they do redeem Holy Things to feed them to the dogs.**

The entire Talmud centers upon the amplification of the statements of the Mishnah. I.1, 2 are devoted to the clarification of Tannaite augmentations of our rule. II.1 asks why we require a scriptural basis for the rule. III.1, IV.1 present exercises in identifying the principles that are at stake in the Mishnah’s rule. V.1 reverts to the issue of finding a practical case to which the Mishnah can refer and then identifying the principle that the case contains, and VI.1 gives us a scriptural basis for the Mishnah’s rule. So the Talmud is internally coherent.