

VI.

BAVLI TRACTATE NAZIR CHAPTER SIX

FOLIOS 34A-47A

6:1-2

6:1

- A. Three things are prohibited to a Nazirite: [corpse] uncleanness, cutting the hair, and anything that goes forth from the grapevine.
- B. And anything that exudes from the grapevine joins together with anything else that exudes from the grapevine [to form the requisite volume prohibited for use].
- C. And one is liable only if he will eat about an olive's bulk of grapes.
- D. [34B] The first Mishnah: Until he drinks a quarter log of wine.
- E. R. Aqiba says, "Even if he dunked his bread into wine and there is in what is sopped up enough to join together to be in the volume of an olive's bulk, he is liable."

6:2

- A. And he is liable for wine by itself, for grapes by themselves, for grape pits by themselves, and for grape skins by themselves.
- B. R. Eleazar b. Azariah says, "He is liable only if he will eat two pits and their skin [that covers them]."
- C. What are grape pits and what are grape skins?
- D. "Harsanim are what is outside, and zaggim are what is inside," the words of R. Judah.
- E. R. Yosé says, "That you not err:
- F. "It is like the bell of cattle:
- G. "What is outside is the hood, and what is inside is the clapper."

- I.1** A. Three things are prohibited to a Nazirite: [corpse] uncleanness, cutting the hair, and anything that goes forth from the grapevine:
- B. *Is the sense then, anything that goes forth from the grapevine is forbidden, but not the grapevine itself? Then the Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with R. Eleazar, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eleazar says, "Even leaves and shoots of the vine are included [in what is forbidden to the Nazirite]."*
- C. *There are those who derive the issue from the concluding clause: **And one is liable only if he will eat about an olive's bulk of grapes**, thus: an olive's bulk of grapes are covered by the law, but not the vine itself, and so Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with R. Eleazar, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R.*

Eleazar says, “Even leaves and shoots of the vine are included [in what is forbidden to the Nazirite].”

I.2 A. *What is the point subject to dispute between R. Eleazar and rabbis?*

- B. *R. Eleazar interprets [the passages of Scripture] as constituted by amplifications and limitations [clauses that amplify, clauses that restrict], while rabbis interpret these same passages as general statements and particularizations [as will now be explained]:*
- C. *R. Eleazar interprets [passages of Scripture] as constituted by amplifications and limitations [clauses that amplify, clauses that restrict], [with reference to Num. 6: 3: “He shall separate himself from wine and strong drink; he shall drink no vinegar made from wine or strong drink, and shall not drink any juice of grapes or eat grapes, fresh or dried,” and Num. 6: 4: “All the days of his separation he shall eat nothing that is produced by the grapevine, not even the seeds or the skins”]: “He shall separate himself from wine and strong drink” is a restrictive clause, and “he shall eat nothing that is produced by the grapevine” is an amplificatory clause. So we have a clause that restricts and one that amplifies. If we have a restrictive clause followed by an amplification, everything is encompassed. Then what does the amplificatory clause encompass here? Everything deriving from the vine. And what is excluded by the exclusionary clause? the twigs.*
- D. *...while rabbis interpret these same passages as general statements and particularizations: “He shall separate himself from wine and strong drink” is a particularization; “he shall eat nothing that is produced by the grapevine” is generalization. “not even the seeds or the skins” goes and particularizes once again. So we have a particularization, a generalization, and a particularization, and you must construct the governing analogy in line with the indicative traits of the particularization: just as in the particularization, it is made explicit that fruit [grapes and wine] and fruit refuse [vinegar] are specifically particularized, so whatever is in the category of fruit [unripe grapes] or fruit refuse is forbidden [e.g., worm-eaten grapes].*
- E. *Might one then say, just as the particularization speaks of ripe fruit, so only what is ripe fruit is forbidden [encompassing unripe grapes], you may say: if so, what has Scripture by implication left over, when everything is articulated! [Klien: there is no form of ripe fruit different from those mentioned in the cited verses.] Fresh grapes and dried grapes are written, so too wine and vinegar. So the inference must be drawn not from the latter formulation of matters but in accord with the former one.*
- F. *And since in the end we are going to encompass everything comparable to fruit or fruit refuse, why say, “from pressed grapes even to the grape-pit” [separately, and why does not the whole particularization precede the generalization (Klien)]?*
- G. *It is to say to you: in any passage in which you find a particularization followed by a generalization, you are not permitted to extend the terms of the particularization so as to include only what is comparable to it; rather, the generalization serves to widen the coverage of the particularization [including things not similar to the particularization], unless Scripture itself particularizes in the manner in which it does in the case of the Nazirite [the generalization interrupting the two particularizations].*

- H. The master has said, “Just as in the particularization, it is made explicit that fruit [grapes and wine] and fruit refuse [vinegar] are specifically particularized, then whatever is in the category of fruit [unripe grapes] or fruit refuse is forbidden [e.g., worm-eaten grapes]:”
- I. Fruit refers to grapes, *but what is in the category of fruit?* Vinegar.
- J. *What is the meaning of “whatever is in the category of fruit”?*
- K. Unripe grapes.
- L. *And what is the meaning of .fruit refuse?*
- M. *Said R. Kahana, “That serves to encompass worm-eaten grapes.”*
- N. *And what is the meaning of even to the grape-pit?*
- O. *Said Rabina, “That serves to encompass the intermediate part.”*
- P. The master has said, “Might one then say, just as the particularization speaks of ripe fruit, so only what is ripe fruit is forbidden [encompassing unripe grapes], you may say: if so, what has Scripture by implication left over, when everything is articulated! Fresh grapes and dried grapes are written, so too wine and vinegar. So the inference must be drawn not from the latter formulation of matters but in accord with the former one. And since in the end we encompass everything comparable to fruit or fruit refuse, why say, ‘from pressed grapes even to the grape-pit’? It is to say to you: in any passage in which you find a particularization followed by a generalization, you are not permitted to extend the terms of the particularization so as to include only what is comparable to it; rather, the generalization serves to widen the coverage of the particularization [including things not similar to the particularization], unless Scripture itself particularizes **[35A]** in the manner in which it does in the case of the Nazirite:”
- Q. *Now from the perspective of R. Eleazar b. Azariah, who interprets the clause, “from pressed grapes even to the grape pit,” to mean that he is liable only if he eats two pressed grapes and one grape pit, where does he find a second particularization [to continue the argument as rabbis do]?*
- R. *He concurs with the view of R. Eleazar, who expounds the clause as an exclusionary, then an inclusionary, formulation. [No second specification is required.]*
- S. *And if you prefer, I shall say he concurs with rabbis, for if the sole purpose of the clause is to yield the view of R. Eleazar b. Azariah, the Torah could have concluded, “from the pressed grapes even to the grape pit” with the other items specified. Why is the clause introduced after the general statement? It is to indicate that the verse is to be*

read as a general statement followed by a particularization.

- T. *Might one say that that is the sole purpose [with no space for Eleazar b. Azariah's further ruling]?*
- U. *If that were the case, the verse could have read either "pressed grapes and grape pits" [in the plural] or "pressed grape and grape pit" [in the singular]. Why does t he All-Merciful say, "from pressed grapes even to the grape pit"? It can only be to indicate that the passage should be read as a general statement followed by a particularization, and to yield the inference that there is no penalty unless he ate two pressed grapes and one grape pit.*
- V. *Now, since R. Eleazar interprets the passage as a case of amplifications and limitations [clauses that amplify, clauses that restrict], whence would he find a case of a passage to be read as a set of general statements and particularizations?*
- W. *Said R. Abbahu, "He would derive such a case from the following verse of Scripture: 'If a man hand over to his fellow an ass or an ox or a sheep' — a particularization — 'or any beast' — a generalization — 'to keep' (Exo. 23: 9) — a particularization, and thus we have a case of a particularization, a generalization, and a particularization, and one may not construct a governing analogy except in the model of the particularization."*
- X. *Raba said, "He would derive such a case from the following verse of Scripture: 'And if his offering be'— a generalization — 'of the flock' — a particularization — 'whether of the sheep or the goats — a particularization (Lev. 1:10) — and thus have a case of a particularization, a generalization, and a particularization, and one may not construct a governing analogy except in the model of the particularization."*
- Y. *Said R. Judah of Disqarta to Raba, "And why not derive it from the following verse of Scripture: 'You shall bring your offering of' — a particularization — 'the cattle' — a generalization — 'and of the herd or of the flock' — a particularization (Lev. 1: 2) and thus have a case of a particularization, a generalization, and a particularization, and one may not construct a governing analogy except in the model of the particularization [in this case, clean animals only]?"*
- Z. *He said to him, "From that demonstration one cannot make the required inference, for if it were to be the source, I might have supposed, 'the cattle' [35B] encompasses wild beasts [so the second particularization in any event is required to exclude wild beasts, and we cannot use it to derive the method of particularization-generalization-particularization (Klien)]."*
- AA. *He said to him, "Could 'the wild beast' have been encompassed in 'cattle'? 'The herd and the flock' are mentioned, serving as a particularization and a generalization and a particularization, and one may not construct a governing analogy except in the model of the particularization."*

- BB. *And how do we know that that is the case [that reference is made to domestic clean animals, not to wild animals, and mentioning them serves to exclude wild animals]?*
- CC. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- DD. “And you shall spend your money for whatever you want” (Deu. 14:26) — a generalization — “for oxen or for sheep or for wine or for strong drink” — a particularization — “or for whatever you want” — a further generalization. So we have a generalization and a particularization, and then a generalization, and one may not construct a governing analogy except in the model of the particularization. Just as the particularization makes it explicit that we deal with a produce of something that itself is a product [excluding fish], that draws nourishment from the earth; whatever is a product of a product-bearing species that draws sustenance from the earth may be purchased [including chickens].
- EE. *Now, since in a case where we have a generalization, a particularization, and a generalization, we draw a governing analogy from the details of the particularization, what purpose is served by that final generalization?*
- FF. *It is to add to the list whatever resembles the things that are particularized.*
- GG. *Further, since where there is a particularization, a generalization, and a particularization, what is similar to what is particularized is to be inferred, what is the point of the second particularization?*
- HH. *Were it not for the second particularization, I might have supposed that the generalization served to add to the particularization [and in that case, things not fully similar to the generative analogy would be included].*
- II. *Now, if there are two generalizations with a particularization, or two particularizations with a generalization, in either case we impose as the generative analogy the traits of the particularization, what differentiates the two formations?*
- JJ. *What differentiates them is, while where there two generalizations with a particularization in the middle, we include even things that resemble the particularization in only one aspect, where we have two particularizations but only a single generalization, we include what resembles the particularization in two aspects but not what resembles it in only one aspect [that is, polythetic versus monothetic classification]. [In concrete terms, where we accept monothetic classification, in the case of second tithe we do not require that what*

is purchased be attached to the soil and so we do not exclude chickens. In the case of monothetic classification — what resembles it in two aspects but not what is like it in only one aspect — we exclude vine shoots; these are not forbidden to the Nazirite, though they are edible (Klien)].

KK. *Since in the case of a particularization and a generalization, ion is treated as amplifying and adding to the particularization, all things are included, and when a particularization is followed by a generalization, this amplifies to the fullest extent, everything being encompasses, so what's the difference between those two cases, that is, what is the difference between a construction classified as exclusionary and amplification and one that is classified as a particularization and a generalization?*

LL. *What is the difference is, in the case of a particularization and a generalization, we should encompass under the law both shoots and leaves, in the case of an exclusionary clause followed by an amplificatory close, we should include the shoots but not the leaves.*

II.1 A. [With reference to **Even if he dunked his bread into wine and there is in what is sopped up enough to join together to be in the volume of an olive's bulk, he is liable,**] Said R. Abbahu said R. Yohanan, "In the case of all other prohibitions of the Torah, what is permitted is not joined together with what is forbidden [to form the requisite volume to impose liability; so half an olive's bulk of forbidden fat would not combine together with half an olive's bulk of permitted fat to form the requisite volume of an olive's bulk of forbidden fat to impose liability], but in the case of the prohibitions that pertain to the Nazirite [what is permitted is joined together with what is forbidden to form the requisite volume], for lo, the Torah has explicitly stated, 'Neither shall he drink that which is soaked in grape juice' (Num. 6: 3)." [An olive's bulk of bread soaked in wine is culpable for the Nazirite.]

B. **[36A]** Zeiri said, "Also [an exception] is leaven, which it is forbidden to burn on the altar which is subject to the statement, 'any leaven you shall not burn [on the altar].'" [Klien: any leaven indicates that even in combination it is forbidden, with the full penalty for transgression.]

C. *In accord with which authority [does Zeiri make this statement]? It is in accord with R. Eleazar, who interprets the word "any" [at I.2C].*

D. *If that is so, then a further exception should register in the matter of leaven on Passover [yet Zeiri does not include it on his list, B].*

E. *That is completely correct, but he wished to exclude the position of Abbaye, who has said, "The prohibition of burning leaven on the altar applies to the burning of even less than an olive's bulk of leaven." So he*

informs us, “The prohibition of burning leaven on the altar applies only to a volume of at least an olive’s bulk.” [Klien: although not all the olive’s bulk need be leaven; that leaven on Passover is another exception we are expected to infer.]

- F. [With reference to the statement of Yohanan, “In the case of all other prohibitions of the Torah, what is permitted is not joined together with what is forbidden [to form the requisite volume to impose liability,]” *R. Dimi went into session and was stating this tradition. To it objected Abbaye, “The porridge [made from] heave offering, and the garlic and the oil of unconsecrated food, part of which a tebul-yom touched — he has rendered the whole unfit. Porridge [which is made] from unconsecrated food, and the garlic and the oil of heave offering, part of which a tebul-yom touched — he has rendered unfit only the place which he touched [M. Tebul Yom 2:3A-D]. And we reflected critically on that rule: why is the place that he touched rendered unfit? And said Rabbah bar bar Hanna said R. Yohanan, ‘What is the governing consideration? It is that a non-priest [who may not eat heave offering] would be flogged on account of eating an olive’s bulk of the mixture.’ [Klien: thus the predominance of unconsecrated food does not take away the sacred character of the heave offering that is contained in the mixture.] Now what is the governing consideration? [36B] Is it not because that which is permitted is joined together with that which is prohibited [to form the requisite volume to incur liability]? ”*
- G. [*Dimi*] said to him, “No. What is the meaning of ‘an olive’s bulk’? He means, an olive’s bulk of actual heave offering [not merely of the mixture containing heave offering] that would be eaten in a span of time sufficient for eating half a loaf of bread.” [Klien: since the quantity of heave offering contained in the amount of stew eaten in the interval was an olive’s bulk, there would be a penalty of flogging.]
- H. [Abbaye:] “Is the measurement of ‘a spell of time sufficient for eating half a loaf of bread’ based on the authority of the Torah [so that a flogging would be incurred even if other food is taken in the same span of time (Klien)]?”
- I. He [*Dimi*] said to him, “Yes.”
- J. “If so, then how come rabbis differ from R. Eleazar in the case of Babylonian kutah [a mixture of sour milk, bread crusts, and salt; Eleazar regards it as prohibited on Passover by the authority of the Torah, while rabbis considered it forbidden only by rabbinical decree]?”
- K. [*Dimi*:] “Forget about Babylonian kutah [for if in it forbidden and permitted food combines, you would have a difficulty explaining why rabbis would not consider it forbidden by the authority of the Torah (Klien)]! For it does not involve an olive’s bulk that is consumed in the span of time required to eat a half loaf of bread. For if someone were to wolf down a large quantity at once, we should ignore his rather idiosyncratic taste as against that of everyone in general [who could not eat so much at once], and if someone merely dipped other food into it, you would not find an olive’s bulk consumed in the span of time required for eating a half loaf of bread.” [Ordinary folk don’t eat this mixture as a food, so the man’s action is eccentric. Hence the prohibition is merely by rabbinical authority.]

- L. *[Abbaye] objected, “Two space mortars, one containing heave offering, one containing unconsecrated food, standing before two pots, one containing heave offering and the other containing unconsecrated food, and these fell into those — both mixtures are permitted. For I maintain, the unconsecrated food fell into the unconsecrated food, and the heave offering fell into the heave offering. Now if it should enter your mind that the standard measure of an olive’s bulk eaten in the span of time it takes to eat a half loaf of bread derives from the authority of the Torah, why do we invoke the principle, For I maintain...?”* [Klien: since a mixture of heave offering and unconsecrated food would be forbidden in Torah-law, our doubt concerning the dishes should be resolved in the stricter sense and both should be declared heave offering.]
- M. *[Dimi replied:] “[But if permitted and forbidden food joined together, how can your premise stand, since the doubt would involve a law on the authority of the Torah, so both dishes should be forbidden.] Forget the case of heave offering of spices, for it is sanctified only by the authority of rabbis.”*
- N. *[Abbaye] objected, “Two baskets, one filled with food in the status of heave offering and the other with food in the status of unconsecrated victuals, before which were two seahs [large dry measures of grain], one of unconsecrated food and the other of heave offering, and these fell into those — both are permitted to ordinary folk. For I maintain, the unconsecrated food fell into the unconsecrated food, and the heave offering fell into the heave offering [T. Ter. 6:15]. Now if it should enter your mind that the standard measure of an olive’s bulk eaten in the span of time it takes to eat a half loaf of bread derives from the authority of the Torah, why do we invoke the principle, For I maintain...? [37A] Now, from my perspective, maintaining as I do that what is permitted and what is forbidden combine, there is no problem, for we take for granted that the unconsecrated food has formed the larger part of the mixture [Klien: so there would no longer be a prohibition on the authority of the Torah, for the predominance of the unconsecrated food causes the heave offering to lose its identity, thus the law of the Torah.] But from your perspective, in maintaining that the prohibition applies when an olive’s bulk is eaten within the spell of time required to eat a half loaf of bread, why introduce the consideration that the unconsecrated food forms the larger part? [What difference does that make?]*”
- O. *[He said to him,] “Forget the matter of heave offering altogether, since, at this time [after the destruction of the Temple] its sanctity derives from the authority of rabbis anyhow!”*

II.2 A. *Said Abbaye to [Dimi], “How do we know that the phrase, ‘sopped up,’ means to indicate that what is permitted and what is forbidden combine [only in the case of the Nazirite]? Maybe it serves the purpose of indicating that that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is equivalent to the principal component of the mixture.”* [Klien: anything flavored with a forbidden substance is equally forbidden as the forbidden substance itself.]

B. *But to begin with Abbaye found a problem in R. Dimi’s statement, and so he presented him with various contradictions to what R. Dimi said, and now he proposes that that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is*

equivalent to [and treated as] the principal component of the mixture. [In that case, he rejects the entire proposal of Dimi.]

- C. *After [Dimi] had responded to him, [Abbaye then] said, “Maybe it serves the purpose of indicating that that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is equivalent to [and treated as] the principal component of the mixture.”*
- D. *That is in line with what has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. The word, “soaked in,” serves to make that which imparts the flavor to the mixture equivalent to the principal component of the mixture. Thus if the law has treated the Nazirite soaked grapes in water, and the water contains the flavor of wine, he is liable [for drinking that mixture of water and grapes, by reason of the flavor imparted by the grapes]. And on the basis of this generative analogy, you classify all cases of mixtures of prohibited and permitted substances that the Torah sets forth. For if the Nazirite, the prohibition affecting whom is not permanent, and the prohibition affecting whom is not a prohibition as to deriving benefit [e.g., he may transact business in grapes], and who enjoys the possibility of remission of the prohibition affecting him, so that that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is equivalent to the principal component of the mixture, prohibited mixed seeds in a vineyard [grain among vines, so Deu. 22: 9], the prohibition affecting which is permanent, and the prohibition affecting which is one as to deriving benefit, and the prohibition affecting which can never be remitted — is it not logical that in that case too that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is equivalent to the principal component of the mixture — and that is the law also for the prohibition of using the fruit of a fruit tree in the first three years after it is planted (Lev. 19:23), which shares two of the indicated traits [permanence, prohibition of benefit].
- F. *He said to him, “That derives from the authority of the rabbis [that permitted and forbidden foods combine in the case of the Nazirite prohibition], while R. Abbahu [citing Yohanan] made his statement in accord with the position of R. Aqiba.”*
- G. *Which statement of R. Aqiba? Should I say it is the statement of R. Aqiba in the present context, as we have learned in the Mishnah: **R. Aqiba says, “Even if he dunked his bread into wine and there is in what is sopped up enough to join together to be in the volume of an olive’s bulk, he is liable”?** But how do we know [that the olive’s bulk includes the bread that is eaten [in which case the permitted and forbidden food combines]? Perhaps it means that the wine on its own constitutes an olive’s bulk? And should you object, then what would that imply [being an obvious statement in its own terms]? the answer is, the point is to express an objection to the position of the initial Tannaite authority [**The first Mishnah: Until he drinks a quarter log of wine**], who maintains that the Nazirite is guilty only if he drinks a quarter-log of wine! Rather, the statement of R. Aqiba to which reference is made in Abbahu’s version is the R. Aqiba of the external Tannaite*

formulation, as has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Aqiba says, "A Nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive's bulk of the bread and wine is liable."

- H. *[In that case,] said R. Aha b. R. Avia to R. Ashi, "In the opinion of R. Aqiba, who treats the phrase 'whatever is soaked in' to indicate that permitted and forbidden food combines, whence does R. Aqiba derive the rule that that which imparts the flavor to the mixture is equivalent to [and treated as] the principal component of the mixture?"*
- I. *"He derives that principle from the case of the prohibition of a mixture of meat and milk that have been boiled together. In that case, there is no more than the random taste of the milk, and yet the mixture is forbidden, and here too there is no difference and the same principle applies."*
- J. *But rabbis do not derive the law from the case of meat in milk, because it represents an anomaly.*
- K. *How is it anomalous? Should I say that the anomaly is, this by itself and that by itself are permitted, but when mixed together they are forbidden? In the case of the prohibition of mixed seeds in a vineyard too, this by itself and that by itself are permitted, but when together they are forbidden? Rather, it is the fact that if the entire day one left meat soaked in milk, the meat is permitted, but when the meat and milk are seethed, the mixture becomes forbidden. [No analogy can be drawn from that fact.]*
- L. *But doesn't R. Aqiba also concur that the prohibition of milk and meat seethed together is anomalous [and yields no analogies]?*
- M. *Rather **[37B]** he derives the rule from the requirement to scald utensils of a gentile [before Israelite use], for the All-Merciful has said, "Everything that may stand the fire shall you pass through the fire" (Num. 31:23) — bearing the implication that otherwise they are forbidden. Now, scalding the utensils of an idolater is only because the mere taste is prohibited, and in the present case the same is so.*
- N. *Well, then, rabbis too may derive the same rule for the present case from the generative analogy that scalding the utensils of an idolatry is required!*
- O. *[Ashi] said to him, "In that case too, it is an anomaly, for lo, throughout the entire Torah, if there is a mixture of something which imparts a flavor to the detriment of the mixture, that mixture is permitted, but when it comes to scalding the utensils of idolaters, it is forbidden."*
- P. *Well, then, for R. Aqiba too, that represents an anomaly [and cannot generate our rule]!*

- Q. Said R. Huna bar Hiyya, “[In Aqiba’s view] the Torah has prohibited only the utensil that was used by an idolater on that very same day, *in which case the flavor is not spoiled [and in that case the use of the utensil is forbidden].*”
- R. And rabbis?
- S. *Even in the case of a utensil used by an idolater on that very same day, it is not possible that the flavor is not spoiled to some small extent.*
- T. *Said R. Aha b. R. Avia to R. Ashi, “On the basis of what Rabbis say, one may infer the view of R. Aqiba. Have not the Rabbis said that the language, ‘whatever is soaked in,’ serves to indicate that what imparts flavor to the mixture constitutes the principal part of the mixture, and on the basis of that case you form the generative analogy for all prohibitions that are set forth in the Torah. Now, from the perspective of R. Aqiba also, who interprets this word, ‘whatever is soaked in,’ to indicate that what is permitted joins together with what is prohibited [to form the requisite volume of a prohibited substance], may one then say, it is on the basis of that case that you form the generative analogy for all prohibitions that are set forth in the Torah?”*
- U. He said to him, “[He does not take that position,] for the Nazirite and the sin offering represent a case of two verses of the Torah that deal with the same matter and yield the same inference, and in any case of two verses of Scripture that deal with the same matter and yield the same inference do not serve to yield inferences beyond themselves. [That is because the Torah has found it necessary to make the same point twice, each in its own context, thus revealing the intent to limit the rule to the specified cases and to prevent the construction of extensions to like cases. Specificity twice over means limitation.]”
- V. [Now to specify how that rule applies to the case(s) at hand:] *The Nazirite is as we have just now said. What is the case of the sin-offering?*
- W. *It is as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- X. “Whatever touches its meat shall be holy” (Lev. 6:20) — might one suppose that that is so even though none of the sin offering is

absorbed by it? Scripture says, “its meat,” meaning, only if it absorbs from its meat [so that forbidden and permitted food has combined], “it then shall be holy” — have the same sanctity as the sin offering itself, which is to say, if it is invalid, the mixture is invalid, and if it is valid, it may be eaten — in accord with the status of the more stringent part of the mixture. [The sin offering could be eaten by the males of the priesthood, within the court, on the same day and evening until midnight; other meats were subject to less strict rules. The status of the more stringent part of the mixture then applies to the entire mixture.]

- Y. And [reverting to the account of Aqiba’s position, we now ask about the position of] rabbis —
- Z. *It was necessary for Scripture to state the same principle in both cases [rather than relying upon the one to yield the rule for the other by analogy]. [Even though the verses pertaining to the Nazirite and the sin offering produce the same inference, how do they establish their rule about the priority of the component of a mixture that establishes the flavor in determining the status of the mixture?] For had Scripture stated the case only with reference to the sin offering, I might have supposed that the rule for the Nazirite does not derive from that case, because the rule for the Nazirite cannot be derived from the law governing Holy Things. And had Scripture stated the rule with reference to the Nazirite, I might have thought that we cannot derive the rule from the case of the Nazirite, for the rule pertaining to the Nazirite is more stringent, since even the skin of the grape is forbidden to him.*
- AA. *And R. Aqiba will say to you, “Both verses are necessary for what!? For certainly had Scripture stated the rule of the sin offering, one might not derive the rule of the Nazirite by analogy, for the rule governing unconsecrated things cannot be derived from the rule governing Holy Things. But why should Scripture not have set forth the rule for the Nazirite, and one should then have derived from that case the rule governing the sin-offering, for lo, the rule governing all of the prohibitions that are*

listed in the Torah is derived from the case of the Nazirite.”

BB. *And rabbis will say to you, “The rule pertaining to the sin-offering serves to indicate that permitted food and forbidden food combine. But we cannot derive from rules pertaining to Holy Things any rule that relates to unconsecrated food, but the phrase, ‘whatever is soaked in,’ tells us that what imparts the flavor to a mixture dictates the status of the mixture itself, from that case you draw an analogy to all other prohibitions that are listed in the Torah [indicating that all are subject to the same principle].”*

CC. *And R. Aqiba?*

DD. *Both verses serve the same task of indicating that what is permitted joins together with what is prohibited to form the requisite volume, in which case we have two verses of Scripture that intersect to make the same point, and on the basis of two such instances, one may not draw an analogy for other cases.*

EE. *Said R. Ashi to R. Kahana, “Well, as to that which has been taught on Tannaite authority, ‘Nothing that is made of the grapevine, from pressed grapes even to the grape pit’ (Num. 6: 4) — this teaches that the various substances that are prohibited to the Nazirite join together to form the requisite volume to impart uncleanness — from the perspective of R. Aqiba, [what is the point of that demonstration, for,] if what is permitted joins together with what is forbidden, can there be any question that what is forbidden joins together with what is forbidden?!”*

FF. [He said to him,] “What is permitted joins together with what is forbidden only if they are mixed together at the same moment, but when it comes to what is forbidden’s joining what is forbidden, that is the case even if this happens in sequence [first the one, then the other].”

GG. Now R. Simeon [38A], who does not derive from the verse, “Nothing that is made...” the principle of joining together [cf. B.

4a: he does not take the view that diverse kinds of food that are prohibited to the Nazirite combine together to form the requisite minimum-mass on account of which liability is incurred, *for it has been taught on Tannaite authority*: R. Simeon says, “Any volume at all of forbidden food suffices to impart liability to a flogging; a quantity of an olive is the minimum that is needed only where an offering is the penalty]— *how does he interpret the same verse?*”

HH. *He will say to you, “That verse is required to teach the lesson, Under no circumstances is he a Nazirite unless he adopts the Nazirite vow with reference to all of the things that are forbidden to the Nazirite.”*

II.3 A. Said R. Abbahu said R. Eleazar, “In none of the cases in the Torah in which the minimum volume is a quarter-log does what is permitted join together with what is forbidden to form the requisite volume to incur liability except for the case of the quarter-log of the Nazirite, for lo, the Torah has used the language of ‘soaked in’ (Num. 6: 3).”

B. *What is the difference of principle between R. Yohanan and R. Eleazar?* [II.1: Said R. Abbahu said R. Yohanan, “In the case of all other prohibitions of the Torah, what is permitted is not joined together with what is forbidden [to form the requisite volume to impose liability; so half an olive’s bulk of forbidden fat would not combine together with half an olive’s bulk of permitted fat to form the requisite volume of an olive’s bulk of forbidden fat to impose liability], but in the case of the prohibitions that pertain to the Nazirite [what is permitted is joined together with what is forbidden to form the requisite volume], for lo, the Torah has explicitly stated, ‘Neither shall he drink that which is soaked in grape juice’ (Num. 6: 3).” [An olive’s bulk of bread soaked in wine is culpable for the Nazirite]

C. *The difference is, R. Yohanan extends the principle even to solid foods, while R. Eleazar says it pertains to liquid but not to other matters.”*

II.4 A. Said R. Eleazar, “There are ten cases involving a quarter-log, and R. Kahana held in his hand a solid tradition that five involved red, and five white liquids.

B. “For the five red liquids here is the mnemonic: ‘A Nazirite and one preparing the Passover who gave instruction in the sanctuary and died. ‘A Nazirite’ refers to the quarter-log of wine of the Nazirite. ‘Preparing the Passover,’ for said R. Judah said Samuel, ‘The four cups of wine at the Seder require a quarter-log of volume.’ ‘Who gave instruction’ — if one has drunk a quarter-log of wine, he should not

give instruction. ‘in the sanctuary’ — if one has drunk a quarter-log of wine and entered the sanctuary, he is liable to the death penalty. ‘and died’ — *as has been taught on Tannaite authority*: how on the basis of Scripture do we know that a quarter-log of blood that exudes from two corpses imparts uncleanness in the tent [joining together to form the requisite volume of blood to affect what is under the same roof and impart corpse uncleanness]? As it is said, ‘Neither shall he go to any dead body’ (Lev. 21:11).

- C. *“For the five white fluids he gave the following mnemonic: ‘The cake of a Nazirite or a person afflicted with the skin ailment who were disqualified on the Sabbath.’ ‘The cake’ — speaks of the quarter of a log of oil for the cake [the unleavened portion of the thank offering, [Lev. 7:12], ‘of a Nazirite’ — the quarter-log of oil that must be presented by the Nazirite [Num. 6:13], ‘or a person afflicted with the skin ailment’ — the quarter of a log of water used for the person afflicted with the skin ailment [Lev. 14: 5], ‘who were disqualified’ — that is in line with what we learned in the Mishnah: **Other unclean liquids invalidate the body if a quarter of a log is consumed [M. Me. 4:5].** ‘on the Sabbath’ — as we have learned in the Mishnah: For all other liquids the requisite volume is a quarter of a log, and for all waste liquids, a quarter of a log.”*
- D. *And are there no others? And lo, there is the following: **With a quarter log of water do they wash the hands for one person, and even for two persons [M. Yad. 1:1]!***
- E. *The statement that he made does not enter into matters that are subject to dispute.*
- F. *And lo, there is the following: **He brought an earthenware jug and poured into it half a log of water from the laver. And R. Judah says, “It was a quarter log” [M. Sotah. 2:2].***
- G. *The statement that he made does not enter into matters that are subject to dispute.*
- H. *And lo, there is the following: How much water does he pour into it? Any small volume at all. R. Zakkai says, “A quarter-log.”*
- I. *The statement that he made does not enter into matters that are subject to dispute.*
- J. *And lo, there is the matter of the immersion pool [which may be used at the volume of a quarter log for immersing small utensils such as needles.*
- K. *The list excludes that item, which rabbis later on nullified.*

III.1 A. [38B] And one is liable only if he will eat about an olive’s bulk of grapes. [The first Mishnah: Until he drinks a quarter log of wine]:

- B. *The original Tannaite authority [behind the first Mishnah] does not treat everything forbidden to the Nazirite as equivalent to drinking, but R. Aqiba, in line with the verse, “Nor eat fresh grapes nor dried” (Num. 6: 3), forms the analogy: just as the prohibition against eating takes effect with an olive’s bulk in volume, so all things that are prohibited take effect with an olive’s bulk in volume.*

IV.1 A. And he is liable for wine by itself, for grapes by themselves, for grape pits by themselves, and for grape skins by themselves:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. *“Nor eat fresh grapes nor dried” (Num. 6: 3) — that disjunctive formulation serves to impose liability for eating this on its own and that on its own.*

- D. On the basis of that case you construct a generative analogy for all prohibitions that are listed by the Torah: just as in the present case, where we have a single genus and two species, one is liable for this on its own account and for that on its own account, so in all cases where there is a single genus but two species, one is liable for this on its own account and for that on its own account.
- E. *That serves to encompass under the law new wine and grapes* [Klien: although the first can be obtained simply by squeezing the second, a Nazirite who partakes of both is scourged twice].
- F. Said Abbayye, “For eating pressed grapes the Nazirite is flogged twice [the reference to eating nothing of the grapevine [adds one flogging to the total number entailed by eating forbidden substances (Klien)]; for eating pressed grapes and grape pits he is flogged three times.”
- G. Raba said, “He is flogged only once [in the first two cases], for one is not flogged on account of the negative commandment that is formulated as a generalization.”
- H. *Objected R. Pappa*, “R. Eliezer says, **‘A Nazirite who was drinking wine all day long is liable only on one count. If they said to him, “Don’t drink it! Don’t drink it!” and he continues drinking, he is liable on each and every count [of drinking].** If he ate fresh grapes, dried grapes, pressed grapes, grape pits, and squeezed a cluster of grapes and drank the juice, he is flogged on five counts.’ Now, if Abbayye is correct, he should be flogged six times, the additional one on the count, ‘He shall eat nothing made of the grape vine.’”
- I. [Abbayye can reply,] *“The Tannaite master has set forth the teaching but left out potential items from his list”* [so five does not exhaust the counts of the flogging; there are five in addition to others not mentioned].
- J. *So if he has left out the items in question [the generalized prohibition, ‘he shall eat nothing,’] what else has he left out?*
- K. He left out, “He shall not break his word” (Num. 30: 3) [on account of which he is flogged in addition].
- L. *Well, if that’s the alleged omission, then it is no omission, for when he formulated the Tannaite rule, the Tannaite authority included only items that are not located elsewhere, while the one at hand — “He shall not break his word” (Num. 30: 3) — pertains to ordinary vows, not only to the special vow of the Nazirite.*
- M. *Said Rabina of Paraziqa to R. Ashi, “Lo, he has left out of the list a flogging on the count of eating the intermediate part of the grape [the pulp].”*
- N. *Rather, said R. Pappa, “The number ‘five’ is not included in the Tannaite formulation of the matter at all.”* [“He should be flogged on each count,” and Abbayye and Raba read the rule each in his own way (Klien)].
- O. **[39A]** *But lo, [Pappa] objected to [Abbayye’s formulation] by explicitly referring to “five,” and if the Tannaite formulation did not include the number “five,” how come he objected at all!?*

- P. *Said R. Pappa, "I had the theory that Abbaye did not have a tradition in hand, and he would retract when he heard my quotation, for I didn't know it was a tradition nor that he would not retract."*

V.1 A. R. Eleazar b. Azariah says, "He is liable only if he will eat two pits and their skin [that covers them]:"

- B. *Said R. Joseph, "In accord with which authority do we translate in the Targum of Num. 6:4: 'from the kernels even to the skins' [instead of 'from pressed grapes even to the grape pit']? It is in accord with the position of R. Yosé" [M. 6:2E-G: R. Yosé says, "That you not err: It is like the bell of cattle: What is outside is the hood, and what is inside is the clapper"]*.

6:3A-C

- A. A Nazirite vow for an unspecified period of time is [to apply] for thirty days [sufficient to grow hair for cutting for the hair-offering].**
B. If he cut his hair, or thugs forcibly cut his hair, he loses thirty days.
C. A Nazirite who cut his hair, whether with scissors or with a razor, or who pulled out any hair whatsoever, is liable.

- I.1 A.** *The question was raised: as to this growth of the hair, is it from the roots that it grows, or from the tips that it grows?*
- B. *What difference does it make?*
- C. *It matters to the case of a Nazirite whom thugs forcibly shaved, but who left on him enough hair for the end of each hair to curl in towards the root [Klien: a seven days' growth]. Now, if you say that it grows from the root, then the consecrated part has been cut off [and the Nazirite observes another thirty days], but if you say that it grows from the tips, then what he has consecrated is still available.*
- D. *Come and take note of the live nit that is located at the root of a strand of hair. Now, should it enter your mind that the growth is at the root, shouldn't it be located at the tip of the hair [if it stays in place throughout the growth period]?*
- E. *In point of fact, the hair grows from the root, and as the nit is alive, it moves down toward the root.*
- F. *Come and take note of the dead nit that is at the end of a strand of hair. Now, if it should enter your mind that the hair grows from the tip, shouldn't it be found near the root?*
- G. *There too, because it has no strength to grasp the hair [being deceased], it slides along the hair downward.*
- H. *Come and take note of the pig-tails of Ethiopians, which loosen near the root [Klien: so that the new hair must have appeared near the roots].*
- I. *There too, because when he lies on it, he creases it, it gets loose.*
- J. *Come and take note of red paint on the wool [used as marking sheep for tithing], which grows fresh beneath the marking, as we have learned in the Mishnah [M. Bekh. 9:7], and note also that when old men dye their beards, [39B] they grow in white at the roots. Doesn't that prove that the hair grows from the roots?*
- K. *Yes it does.*

- L. *But what about that which we have learned on Tannaite authority: a Nazirite whom thugs forcibly shaved, but on whom they left enough hair for the end of each hair to curl in towards the root does not lose the days already observed [but may present his Nazirite offerings as is]. But if you should imagine that the hair grows from the roots, he should lose some of the days he has already observed!*
- M. No, the rule deals with a case in which they cut his hair after he had completed his Naziriteship, and who is the authority behind the rule? It is R. Eliezer, who has said, "Whatever happens after the completion of the Naziriteship invalidates only seven days already observed."
- N. *What is the foundation for the position of R. Eliezer?*
- O. He draws an analogy between the hair-cut done in a condition of cultic cleanness [after the termination of the vow] and the hair cutting that takes place after cultic uncleanness. Just as in cutting the hair after cultic uncleanness has taken place, the Nazirite loses seven days [during which he is unclean by reason of contracting corpse uncleanness], so in cutting the hair in a condition of cultic cleanness, the loss of days already observed is limited to seven.
- P. *But rabbis have it as established fact that every seven days enough hair grows for the tip to curl inward toward the root [and the thugs left that amount of hair, so there is no waiting period.*

II.1 A. A Nazirite who cut his hair, whether with scissors or with a razor, or who pulled out any hair whatsoever, is liable:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. "‘razor:’ I know only that he is liable if he removed hair with a razor. How do I know that if he tore it out, plucked it up with tweezers, or trimmed it in any measure whatsoever [he is liable]?"
- D. "Scripture states, ‘He shall be holy, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long’ (Num. 6: 5)," the words of R. Josiah.
- E. R. Jonathan says, "‘razor:’ I know only that he is liable if he removed hair with a razor. If he tore it out, plucked it up with tweezers, or trimmed it in any measure whatsoever, he is exempt from all penalty."
- F. But isn't it written, "He shall be holy, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow"?
- G. *That bears the implication, if he removed the hair with a razor, he has liable on both positive and negative counts.*
- H. *And it has further been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. "‘razor:’ I know only that he is liable if he removed hair with a razor. How do I know that if he tore it out, plucked it up with tweezers, or trimmed it in any measure whatsoever [he is liable]?"
- D. Scripture states, "A razor shall not come upon his head" (Num. 6: 5).
- J. Well, since in the end we are going to encompass doing so through any means whatsoever, why does Scripture say, "A razor shall not come upon his head" (Num. 6: 5)?

- K. It is because we should otherwise not derive the rule that the final hair cutting must be done with a razor [Num. 6:18]. To derive that rule from the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment is otherwise not possible, [40A] for we do not construct an argument for the less strict from the more strict and impose on the less strict a greater strictness. [That is, we could not say that because the person afflicted with the skin ailment uses a razor, so the person concluding his Nazirite vow must do so.]
- L. Rabbi says, "It is not necessary to derive the rule from the argument that because the word razor is superfluous, the reference to hair cutting means, with a razor]. Lo, Scripture says, 'A razor shall not come upon his head' (Num. 6: 5). The Torah has said that after fulfillment of his vow, the hair cut is done only with a razor.
- M. "Then is it not written, 'A razor shall not come upon his head' (Num. 6: 5)?
- N. "That is to assign him the violation of a negative commandment on two counts."
- II.2 A.** Said R. Hisda, "For a flogging, one is liable if he removes one hair; for holding up the completion of his Nazirite ship, he is liable if two hairs [remain], and as to nullifying the days of the Naziriteship already observed, one loses the days already observed only if he shaves the greater part of his hair with a razor."
- B. *With a razor, yes, but with any other means of removing the hair no?*
- C. *And lo, it has been taught in a Tannaite rule, How we know that all other modes of removing hair are forbidden?"*
- D. *Rather, say: "removed as though with a razor."*
- E. *So too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- F. **A Nazirite who tore out, plucked it up with tweezers, or trimmed it in any measure whatsoever is liable only if he removed the greater part of the hair of his head with a razor.**
- G. **R. Simeon b. Judah says in the name of R. Simeon, "Just as two hairs if left hold up the end of his Naziriteship, so removing two hairs invalidates the prior period" [T. 4:2].**

Systematic Comparison of the Species of the Genus: Those Who Must Cut their Hair as a Religious Duty

- II.3 A.** *We have learned in the Mishnah elsewhere:*
- B. **There are three who must cut their hair, and their hair-cutting is a religious duty: the Nazirite, the person afflicted with the skin ailment [mesora'], and Levites.**
- C. And in the case of all of them, if one cut the hair without a razor, or left two hairs, he has accomplished nothing [M. **Neg. 14:4**].
- D. The master has said: **There are three who must cut their hair, and their hair-cutting is a religious duty: the Nazirite, the person afflicted with the skin ailment, and Levites**
- E. *That's obvious!*
- F. *What might you otherwise have supposed? They are simply supposed to remove their hair, so that even smearing it with a depilatory is valid, and so we are informed that that is not the case.*

- G. *The Tannaite formulation states: **And in the case of all of them, if one cut the hair without a razor, or left two hairs, he has accomplished nothing:***
- H. *Now, there is no problem in the case of the Nazirite, in which instance it is explicitly stated, “No razor shall come upon his head” (Num. 6: 5), nor is there a problem in the case of the Levite, in which instance it is written, “And let them cause a razor to pass over all their flesh” (Num. 8: 7), but how do we know that the hair-removal of the person afflicted with the skin ailment is to be done with a razor?*
- I. *And should you say [by way of a monothetic proof], provide the proof on the basis of an analogy to the case of the Levites: just as the Levites require a hair cutting and their hair cutting is done only with a razor, so I shall introduce the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment, who requires a hair cutting, so his hair cutting also should take place only with a razor, *one may present the following anomaly to that argument:* the distinctive trait of the Levites is that they have to be offered as a wave offering [Num. 8:11], but can you invoke the same rule for the person afflicted with the skin ailment, who does not?*
- J. *Rather, provide the proof on the basis of an analogy to the case of the Nazirite? [That will not work, for] the Nazirite’s animal offering must be accompanied by a bread offering, but will you invoke the same set of rules for the person afflicted with the skin ailment, for whose animal offering that is not a requirement?*
- K. *Well, then, if monothetic analogy will not produce the required result, [comparing one of the three to another one of the three of the same classification], how about polythetic comparison [in two of the three items of the same classification are shown to share the same traits, in which case other traits of the one apply also to the other]?*
- L. Which two of the three?
- M. How about the Levites: To the objection that the anomalous trait of the Levites is that they require waving of the offering, the Nazirite meets that objection, since they do not. To the objection that the anomalous trait of the Nazirite is that his offering requires the accompaniment of bread, the Levites will prove that that anomalous quality is not in the end determinative [for theirs does not]. So we end up going around in a circle, and the indicative traits of the one are not entirely the same as the indicative traits of the other. But the point that they have in common is that both of them require a hair cutting, and the cutting must be done with a razor. So I introduce the case of the person afflicted with the skin offering, who also has to have a hair cutting, and the hair cutting of whom must also be done with a razor.
- N. *Said Raba of Barnish to R. Ashi, “But one may challenge that argument in these terms: The shared indicative traits of the two of them is that **[40B]** their offerings are not variable by reason of poverty [but must be offered as defined, and if the Levite or Nazirite cannot meet the requirement, he has no choice], but will you invoke the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment, whose offering may be variable by reason of his poverty [since he may offer doves if he cannot afford anything more substantial].*

II.4 A. *Said Raba bar Mesharshaya to Raba, “This Tannaite authority to begin with has said, ‘To derive the rule on the basis of the analogy of the person*

afflicted by the skin ailment is not possible, for we do not construct an argument for the less strict from the one covering the more strict and thereby impose on the less strict a greater strictness. *So then he goes and says, 'Let us derive the rule for the person afflicted with the skin ailment by means of a logical argument of analogy,' but even by appeal to an argument by analogy [based on polythetic classification at that!] he proved unable to accomplish the task!'*

- B. *He said to him, "That is so, because the initial discussion is based on the position of rabbis [who prove from an independent source that a person afflicted with the skin ailment cuts the hair with a razor], but the latter exercise [showing that a person afflicted with the skin ailment uses a razor by analogy to the Nazirite's obligation to do so] is based on the position of R. Eliezer, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **And one is liable only if he will pluck out the hair with a razor. R. Eliezer says, 'Even if he plucks it with tweezers or with a plane, he is liable' [M. Mak. 3:5H-I].**"*
- C. *What is the scriptural foundation for the position of rabbis to which reference has just been made?*
- D. *It is as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. **"And his beard" (Lev. 14: 9):**
- F. **Why does Scripture say so?**
- G. **Because it is said, "The corner of their beard they [priests] shall not shave" (Lev. 12: 5). Might one think that this is the case even if he is afflicted with plague? Scripture specifies, "His beard"(Lev. 14: 9) [Sifra 151/Parashat Mesora Pereq 2/4].**
- H. *How do we know that he must use a razor? It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. **"Neither shall they shave off the corner of their beards" (Lev. 21: 5). Might that mean, even if they shaved it with scissors, they would be liable? Scripture states, "Neither shall you mar the corners of your beard." Might one suppose that that is the case even if he plucks it with tweezers or with a plane? Scripture states, "Neither shall they shave off the corner of their beards" (Lev. 21: 5). How so? Shaving that also mars the beard is done with a razor [Sifra 151/Parashat Mesora Pereq 2/4]. [Klien: and since what is forbidden to the ordinary person is prescribed for the person afflicted with the skin ailment, as is inferred in the previous demonstration, the person afflicted with the skin ailment is required to use a razor.]**
- K. *But why does that necessarily follow that he must use a razor? Maybe the meaning is, even if he removed it with tweezers or with a plane, he also has carried out the religious duty. And lo, the point of the verse is to indicate to us that even if he did it with a razor, he is not liable on that account.*

- L. *Say: if it enters your mind that even if he removed it with tweezers or with a plane, he also has carried out the deed quite properly, then the verse should have said nothing on the subject [omitting the word, shave], and I should have supposed, if in the case of a Nazirite, who has done a prohibited deed [by contracting corpse uncleanness], he is required to use a razor, the person afflicted with the skin ailment, who now is doing a religious duty [bearing no responsibility for his condition, engaged as he now is in an act of purification, so not expiating a sin but carrying out a commandment], all the more so [should use a razor]!*
- M. **[41A]** *Furthermore, if it should enter your mind that, if he uses tweezers or a plane, he is carrying out a religious duty because “razor” is not mentioned in so many words, in fact it should be wholly forbidden [Klien: even if the word ‘shave’ and been used without the additional use of the word, ‘his beard,’ we should not have made the inference that he is allowed to use a razor, because of] what R. Simeon b. Laqish said: “In any passage in which you find a positive and a negative commandment, if you can carry out both of them, well and good, but if not, then let the positive commandment come and override the negative commandment.”*
- N. *And as to R. Eliezer, what is the scriptural foundation for his position? He derives the rule from the analogy supplied by the reference to “his head,”*
- O. *as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- P. **“His head” (Lev. 14: 9) — why does Scripture say so? Because it is said, “A razor shall not pass across his [the Nazir’s] head” (Num. 6: 5), I think that this [prohibition] applies even though he is afflicted with plague? Scripture says, “His head” (Lev. 14: 9) [Sifra 151/Parashat Mesora Perek 2/3].**
- Q. *] But why does that necessarily follow? Maybe the meaning is, even if he removed it with tweezers or with a plane, he also has carried out the religious duty. And if you should say, what need is there for a reference to the razor [Num. 6:5, since everything is forbidden], it is to imply that even with a razor [the person afflicted with the skin ailment may shave his hair]. For it might have entered one’s mind to say, since in the case of a Nazirite, when he does it with a razor, he is liable, also with reference to the person afflicted with the skin ailment, too, he should be liable on the same count. So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- R. *If it should enter your mind that, even if he removed it with tweezers or with a plane, he also has carried out the religious duty, ‘we should not have made the inference that he is allowed to use a razor, because of] what R. Simeon b. Laqish said: “In any passage*

in which you find a positive and a negative commandment, if you can carry out both of them, well and good, but if not, then let the positive commandment come and override the negative commandment.”

- S. *And as to rabbis, how do they interpret the reference to “His head”?*
- T. *They require it to [providing a scriptural basis to] override [in the case of the Nazirite,] the prevailing prohibition against rounding the corners of the head, as has been taught on Tannaite authority: “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Lev. 19:27) — might one suppose that that pertains also to the person afflicted with the skin ailment? So Scripture says, “his head.”*
- U. *But what need do I have for Scripture to refer to “his head”? Let the rule be derived from the reference to “his beard,” for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:] “And his beard” (Lev. 14: 9): Why does Scripture say so? Because it is said, “The corner of their beard they [priests] shall not shave” (Lev. 12: 5). Might one think that this is the case even if he is afflicted with plague? Scripture specifies, “His beard”(Lev. 14: 9).*
 - V. *So what need do I have for Scripture to make explicit reference to “his head” and what need do I have for Scripture to make explicit reference to “his beard”?*
 - W. *Both were required, for if the All-Merciful had made reference to his beard and not made reference to his head, I might have suppose that rounding the whole head is not classified as rounding [it is forbidden only to round the corners but not the rest of the head], so it was necessary for the All-Merciful to make explicit reference to “his head.”*
 - X. **[41B]** *And if Scripture had made reference to “his head” and had not made reference to “his beard,” I might have supposed that there are two implications, first, a positive commandment to shave overrides the negative commandment, and, second, rounding the whole head violates the commandment against rounding. But there would still remain the question: how do we know that a razor must be used? So the All-Merciful makes reference to “his beard.”*
 - Y. *And how does R. Eliezer know that a positive commandment comes along and overrides a negative commandment?*

Z. *He derives it from the commandment to wear knotted cords [42A], for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

AA. “You shall not wear a mingled fabric of linen and wool together” (Deu. 22:11) — and nonetheless, “You shall make twisted knots of them” (Deu. 22:12).

II.5 A. The Master has said: **And in the case of all of them, if one cut the hair without a razor, or left two hairs, he has accomplished nothing [M. Neg. 14:4]:**

- B. Said R. Aha b. R. Iqa, “That is to say, ‘The principle that the greater part is tantamount to the entirety [the majority counts as the whole] derives from the authority of the Torah.
- C. *“How so? Because the All-Merciful has revealed that fact with reference to the Nazirite: ‘On the seventh day he shall shave it’ Num. 6: 9) [which repeats the prior verse, ‘He shall shave his head on the day of his cleansing,’ and that indicates the whole of the head must be shaved (Klien)], here alone [and no where else] the obligation is completed only if the whole of the head is shaved. Lo, in general, the greater part is tantamount to the entirety.”*
- D. *Objected R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “But that verse is stated solely in connection with the Nazirite who has contracted uncleanness” [but the cited rule, A, speaks of a clean Nazirite who has left two hairs standing].*
- E. *In the West they ridiculed that objection: “So whence do we know the rule that the Nazirite who has contracted uncleanness must shave with a razor? It derives from the rule governing the Nazirite who is clean. Then let the Nazirite who is clean come and derive a rule from that covering the Nazirite who has contracted uncleanness: just as the Nazirite who has left behind two hairs has done nothing, so too, if this one left behind two hairs, he has done nothing.”*
- F. *Abbaye raised this question: “A Nazirite who shaved and left behind two hairs, then his head sprouted and produced new growth, and then he shaved off those two hairs — what is the rule? Does that stand in the way of the fulfillment of the obligation, or is that not the case?”*
- G. *Raba raised this question: ““A Nazirite who shaved and left behind two hairs, and then he shaved off one and left the other [so the two hairs were not properly removed] — [what is the law]?”*
- H. *Said R. Aha of Difti to Rabina, “Does Raba raise a question in a case in which the man has shaved off the hair one at a time! [That cannot be a question, for in such a case at the end there would be two left, and if he continued and cut off one, that would do the job.]*
- I. *“Rather, say: if one fell out and he shaved the other [so at the end of the process, only one hair was left], what is the law?*
- J. *He said to him, “Here there is no hair cutting, because there is no hair.”*
- K. *“If there is no hair, then can there have been a hair cutting here?”*

- L. *“This is the sense of the statement: even though there is no hair here, the religious duty of hair cutting has not been correctly carried out.”*

6:3D

D. A Nazirite shampoos and parts his hair [with his fingers] but he does not comb his hair.

- I.1 A.** *As to the rule on shampooing the hair and parting it with his fingers, who is the authority?*
- B. *It is R. Simeon, who has said, “Something that one does not intend to do is permitted [the comb is forbidden, because it pulls out hair, but to the removal of hair these other activities are incidental].”*
- C. **but he does not comb his hair** *accords with the position of rabbis [for the same reasoning can apply]! So we are left with a rule, the opening clause of which accords with R. Simeon, and the concluding clause of which accords with rabbis!?*
- D. Said Rabbah, “The entirety of the passage accords with the position of R. Simeon. Anyone who combs his hair intends to remove loose strands.”

6:3E-F

**E. R. Ishmael says, “He should not shampoo his head in the dirt,
F. “because it makes the hair fall out.”**

- I.1 A.** *The question was raised: is the Tannaite wording of the rule, because it makes the hair fall out, or perhaps, “because of kinds of earth that make the hair fall out”?*
- B. *So what difference does it make?*
- C. *A case in which there is dirt that does not make the hair fall out. If you say that the Tannaite reading is, , because it makes the hair fall out, then in a case in which we know that it does not make the hair fall out, there is no problem, but if you say, because of kinds of earth that make the hair fall out, then he may not use any kind of dirt.*
- D. *The question stands.*

6:4

- A. A Nazirite who was drinking wine all day long is liable only on one count.**
- B. If they said to him, “Don’t drink it! Don’t drink it!” and he continues drinking, he is liable on each and every count [of drinking].**
- C. If he was cutting his hair all day long, he is liable only on a single count.**
- D. If they said to him, “Don’t cut it! Don’t cut it!” and he continued to cut his hair, he is liable for each and every count [of cutting].**
- E. If he was contracting corpse uncleanness all day long, he is liable on only one count.**
- F. If they said to him, “Don’t contract corpse uncleanness! Don’t contract corpse uncleanness!” and he continued to contract corpse uncleanness, he is liable for each and every count.**

I.1 A. [42B] *It was stated:*

- B. Said Rabbah said R. Huna, “Scripture makes a complete statement of the matter, ‘He shall not contract corpse uncleanness’ (Num. 6: 7), when it says, ‘he shall not come by a corpse’ (Num. 5: 6). The one statement admonishes him against contracting corpse uncleanness by contact with a corpse, and the other admonishes him against entering a tent where a corpse is located [Num. 19] but not against contact with two sources of uncleanness at the same time [Klien: e.g., for touching two corpses at the same time, he is flogged only one count, even though he is admonished separately for each].”
- C. And R. Joseph said, “By God! Said R. Huna, ‘Even for contact with two separate sources of uncleanness at the same time, [he is flogged on both counts].’ For said R. Huna, ‘A Nazirite who was standing in a grave yard and to whom someone handed the corpse of his own relation or some other corpse and who touched it is liable [for touching the corpse, even while standing in the cemetery.]’ *Now why should this be so? Lo, he is already contracting corpse uncleanness continually [by standing in the graveyard]? Does not that yield the inference,* said R. Huna, ‘Even for contact with two separate sources of uncleanness at the same time, [he is flogged on both counts].’”
- D. *Objected Abbaye*, “A priest [alt.: Nazirite] who had a corpse lying on his back, and to whom someone handed over his deceased or some other corpse, which he touched — might one suppose that he should incur liability [on that additional count]? Scripture says, ‘Nor profane the sanctuary’ (Lev. 21:12) — thus speaking of one who is not already profaned, excluding this one, who already is profaned!” [But there should be an additional penalty in accord with Joseph’s version of Huna’s position.]
- E. *He said to him*, “*Our Mishnah-paragraph should present the same objection to you, for we have learned in the Mishnah: If he was contracting corpse uncleanness all day long, he is liable on only one count. If they said to him, “Don’t contract corpse uncleanness! Don’t contract corpse uncleanness!” and he continued to contract corpse uncleanness, he is liable for each and every count. Now why should this be so? Lo, he is already contracting corpse uncleanness continually! So there is a contradiction between our Mishnah-paragraph and the cited passage.*”
- F. *There is no contradiction.* The cited passage deals with a case in which there is simultaneity, the former where this is no simultaneity. [In the former case, the Nazirite and the two corpses are in contact simultaneously, so there is no extra penalty. In the latter case, there is serial contact, and an additional penalty is incurred sequentially.]
- G. *But does contracting uncleanness through simultaneity a law of the Torah? Lo*, said R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yannai, “The principle that uncleanness is contracted through simultaneity [with all that that entails] applies only to food in the status of heave-offering [priestly rations] and Holy Things, but it does not apply to the Nazirite or to the one who is preparing a Passover.” [Klien: a person unclean through concatenation (simultaneity) is forbidden to eat heave offering or sacrificial meats for seven days, as though there had been direct contact with the corpse; but the Nazirite and the person preparing a Passover is unclean, in the

same situation, for only one day.] *Now, if you maintain that the uncleanness produced through simultaneity derives from the authority of the Torah, what's the difference [between the two cases?]* [Klien: hence concatenation (simultaneity) is not a Torah enactment, and why should there be the difference between the Mishnah and the baraita?]

- H. There what takes place is simultaneity of one man with another, in our case, simultaneity of the man with the corpse. [Klien: In the one case, a man touches another man in contact with a corpse; the uncleanness for seven days instead of one rests on authority of the rabbis. In our case, the man is touching a corpse; if he touches another corpse, there is no further count of uncleanness that is incurred.]
- I. But not against contact with two sources of uncleanness at the same time [as in Rabbah's version, B]: *for lo, he is continually contracting corpse uncleanness.*
- J. *Well, then, if there is uncleanness through contact and through entering a tent containing a corpse, isn't he also already unclean [so why two floggings now, in Rabbah's version?]*
- K. Said R. Yohanan, "In the latter case he enters a house while not unclean, in the former, in the open field, there cannot be two counts." [Klien: In the house, he contracts uncleanness and enters the house at the same instant, so the two prohibitions are violated at the same instant; in the field, he contracts uncleanness by his first contact with a corpse, then no further penalty can lie for contact or entering a tent of the dead.]
- L. **[43A]** *In the case of a house, too, as soon as his hand is inside, he contracts uncleanness, so that when he goes in, he is already unclean [so how can there be an additional count for his entering the house?]*
 - M. Rather, said R. Eleazar, "If he clasped hands and entered, *there would be a count for contacting uncleanness but not for entering*; if he straightened up with his hands at his sides and entered, *he would both contract uncleanness and enter at the same moment.*"
 - N. *Yeah, but it's not possible for his nose not to go in first of all and contract uncleanness before he enters whole hog!*
 - O. *Rather, said Raba, "If he poked his hand in, then he is liable on the count of uncleanness, but not liable on the count of entering the place. If he poked in his body, then you have a case of contracting uncleanness and entry at one and the same moment."*
 - P. *Yeah, but it's not possible that his toes not enter first and contract uncleanness!*
 - Q. Said R. Pappa, "We deal with a case in which he entered while carried in a box, chest, or armoire [and so be contained in a separate domain], and his fellow came along and broke away the covering, *in which case, he has both contracted uncleanness and entered in at one fell swoop.*"
 - R. *Mar b. R. Ashi said, "We might deal with a case in which he went in while the other person was dying, and his soul expired while the man was sitting there,*

in which case he contracts uncleanness and enters at the same moment."

When Priests Contract Corpse-Uncleanness: Topical Appendix

I.2 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. "To profane himself" (Lev. 21: 4) ["Speak to the priests and say to the that none of them shall defile himself for the dead among his people except for his nearest of kin...he shall not defile himself as a husband among his people and so profane himself" (Lev. 21: 1-4)] — up to the hour that the other dies [he may continue to remain] [Klien: only the actual profanation is forbidden].
- C. Rabbi says, "'when they die' [Num. 6: 7, with reference to the Nazirite] means, he may continue to be in physical contact with them until they die."
- D. *What's the difference [between "up to the hour" and "until"]?*
- E. *Said R. Yohanan, "At issue between them is only the implications of the texts that they have expounded [but there is no practical difference at all]."*
- F. *R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "At issue between them is the rule in the case of the dying man. In the opinion of him who has said, to profane himself' maintains that even [the priest's contact with] a dying man [is covered by the prohibition, and the one who has said, 'when they die,' holds that the prohibition takes effect only when he has died, and there is no prohibition in the case of his ministering to a dying man."*
- G. *Now, according to the one who derives the law from the phrase, "to profane himself," what about the text, "when they die"?*
- H. *"When they die" is required in line with that which Rabbi said, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Rabbi says, "'When they die' is forbidden to contract uncleanness, but he may contract uncleanness through contact when they are afflicted with the skin ailment or with a flux [Lev. 13, 15, respectively]."*
- I. *Now, accord to the one who derives the law from the phrase, "when they die," he too requires the text to make the same point in accord with this reasoning!*
- J. *If so, Scripture should have sufficed in saying, "in death." Why say, "in their death"? It is to yield two distinct lessons.*
- K. *Now, according to the one who derives the law from the phrase, "In their death," what about the text, "to profane himself"?*
- L. *The phrase, "to profane himself," comes to deal with the following matter: one who is not profaned is subject to liability, but not the one who is already profaned.*
- M. *Now from the perspective of the one who requires the phrase, "to profane himself," for the stated purpose, does he not need the verse to prove that point as well?*
- N. *If so [if the verse yielded only a single point, as now specified], the language used would have been, "to profane." Why add, "himself"? It is to yield two distinct propositions.*

- O. *An objection was raised: A man becomes a source of corpse uncleanness only when his soul has expired, and even if his arteries are severed or is dying [M. Oh. 1:6].*
- P. *Now according to the one who derives the rule from the phrase, “to profane himself,” does it not state in the Tannaite formulation that they do not convey corpse uncleanness [until the specified moment] [and so how does Simeon b. Laqish’s reading of the matter stand?]*
- Q. *As to conveying corpse uncleanness, that commences only when the soul expires, but as to profanation, the profanation takes place even beforehand.*

- I.3 A. [43B]** Said R. Hisda said Rab, “[A priest] whose father was decapitated does not contract corpse uncleanness on his account. How come? ‘For his father’ (Lev. 21: 2) is what Scripture has said, meaning, when he is whole and not when he is lacking.”
- B. *Said to him R. Hamnuna, “What about this case: if he was traveling through the valley of Arabot and thugs cut off his head — here too, to your way of thinking, would he not contract corpse uncleanness for him?”*
 - C. *He said to him, “Do you raise the case of a neglected corpse [burial of which is an urgent religious obligation]? Now, if for others he is obligated to attend to his burial, even at the cost of contracting corpse uncleanness, all the more so for his father.”*
 - D. *But would you regard the present case as falling into the category of a neglected corpse? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: What is the definition of a neglected corpse? It is any that has none to bury him, but if it were a case of one who should call out, and others would reply, such a one does not fall into the category of a neglected corpse. Now, lo, in this case, he has a son!*
 - E. *Since he is going along on a journey, he is as if he had none to bury him.*
 - F. *An objection was raised: “For her may he defile himself” (Lev. 21: 3) [speaking of the unmarried sister of a priest] — for the whole of her does he contract corpse uncleanness, but he does not contract corpse uncleanness to deal with her separated limbs. For he does not contract corpse uncleanness from a limb cut off even of his [living] father, but he does go in search of a bone even the size of a barley grain. [Klien: if he is burying his father, he may search for any parts missing to restore them to the corpse.] What is the meaning of, but he does go in search of a bone even the size of a barley grain? Does it not mean, if there is some small part missing [he still contracts corpse uncleanness to bury him]?]*
 - G. *No, that statement represents the view of R. Judah, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, ““For her may he defile himself” (Lev. 21: 3) [speaking of the unmarried sister of a priest] — for the whole of her does he contract corpse uncleanness, but he does not contract corpse uncleanness to deal with her separated limbs. For he does not contract corpse uncleanness from a limb cut off of his [living] father, but he does go in search of a limb cut off from his deceased father.”*

- H. *But did not R. Kahana teach as a Tannaite formulation of R. Eliezer b. Jacob, “‘For her may he defile himself’ — but he does not contract corpse uncleanness for limbs, thus excluding an olive’s bulk of flesh or a corpse, an olive’s bulk of corpse matter, or a spoonful of corpse mould. Might one suppose that he should not contract uncleanness to bury the back bone, the skull, or the greater part of the bone structure or the greater number of the bones [of the sister’s corpse]? Scripture states, ‘And say to them’ (Lev. 21: 1) [which is a superfluous clause], and thereby Scripture has added for you uncleanness of other kinds [such as these]. [44A] Might one suppose he also should not contract corpse uncleanness in order to bury the back bone, the skull, or the greater part of the bone structure or the greater number of the bones of other relatives? Say: just as his sister is particular in that her body depends on him for burial [while that of strangers does not], and he contracts corpse uncleanness in order to bury the back bone, the skull, or the greater part of the bone structure or the greater number of the bones, so in the case of any other relative who depends on him for burial, he contracts corpse uncleanness in order to bury the back bone, the skull, or the greater part of the bone structure or the greater number of the bones.” [This contradicts the position of Rab, A.]*
- I. *That too represents the position of R. Judah, while Rab made his statement in accord with the position of this Tannaite authority, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. *There was the case that the father of R. Isaac of Ginzaq died, and they came and informed him of that fact after three years, and he came and asked R. Joshua b. Elisha, along with the four elders who were with him, and they said to him, “‘For his father’ (Lev. 21: 2) is what Scripture has said, meaning, when he is whole and not when he is lacking.”*

6:5

- A. **Three things are prohibited to a Nazirite: [corpse] uncleanness, cutting the hair, and anything that goes forth from the grapevine.**
- B. **A more strict rule applies to corpse uncleanness and haircutting than applies to that which comes forth from the grapevine.**
- C. **For corpse uncleanness and haircutting cause the loss of the days already observed, but [violating the prohibition against] that which goes forth from the vine does not cause the loss of the days already observed.**
- D. **A more strict rule applies to that which goes forth from the vine than applies to corpse uncleanness and haircutting.**
- E. **For that which goes forth from the vine allows for no exception, but corpse uncleanness and haircutting allow for exceptions,**
- F. **in the case of [cutting the hair for] a religious duty and in the case of finding a neglected corpse [with no one else to provide for burial, in which case, the Nazirite is absolutely required to bury the corpse].**
- G. **A more strict rule applies to corpse uncleanness than to haircutting.**
- H. **For corpse uncleanness causes the loss of all the days previously observed and imposes the liability for an offering.**

- I. But haircutting causes the loss of only thirty days and does not impose liability for an offering.**
- I.1 A.** [For that which goes forth from the vine allows for no exception, but corpse uncleanness and haircutting allow for exceptions]: But the matter of contracting corpse uncleanness also should permit no exception, on the basis of an argument a fortiori from wine: if wine, which does not cause the loss of days already observed [if he should drink it] permits no exception, contracting corpse uncleanness, which does cause the loss of days already observed, surely should permit no exception! To obviate that claim, Scripture states, “Nor contract corpse uncleanness for his father or his mother” (Lev. 21:11) [pertaining to the high priest and the Nazirite as well] — for his father and his mother he does not contract corpse uncleanness, but he should contract corpse uncleanness for a neglected corpse.
- B.** But then wine should permit an exception from the general prohibition, on the basis of an argument a fortiori from the matter of contracting corpse uncleanness, specifically: if contracting corpse uncleanness, on account of which days already observed are lost, is permits an exception from the prevailing prohibition, wine, which does not cause a loss of days already observed, surely should bear an exception from the general rule thereto pertaining! To obviate that claim, Scripture states, “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink” (Num. 6: 3) — prohibiting the drinking of wine that is required as a religious duty as much as wine that is drink at one’s own option.
- C.** Then drinking wine should cause the loss of all days already observed, on the basis of an argument a fortiori from contracting corpse uncleanness: if contracting corpse uncleanness, which bears an exception from the general rule prohibiting the matter, causes the loss of all days already observed, wine, which is never permitted an exception to the rule, all the more so should cause such a loss. To obviate that claim, Scripture states, “But the former days shall be void because his consecration was defiled” (Num. 6:12) — contracting corpse uncleanness causes the loss of the days already observed, but drinking wine does not cause the loss of days already observed.
- D.** Then getting a hair cut should cause a loss of all the days already observed on the basis of an argument a fortiori from contracting corpse uncleanness: if contracting corpse uncleanness, in which case the one who imparts uncleanness is not treated as equivalent to the one who is made unclean, causes the loss of all days formerly observed, a haircut, in which case the law has treated the one who does the hair cutting as equivalent to the one whose hair is cut [both being flogged] surely should cause the loss of all the days already observed. To obviate that possibility, Scripture has said, “But the former days shall be void because his consecration was defiled” (Num. 6:12) — contracting corpse uncleanness causes the loss of the days already observed, but getting a hair cut does not cause the loss of all the days already observed.
- E.** Then in the case of contracting corpse uncleanness, the one who imparts the uncleanness should be treated as the same as the one who is made unclean,

on the basis of an argument from getting a haircut: if in the case of a haircut, which causes the loss of only thirty days, the law has treated as equivalent the one who does the cutting and the one who gets the hair cut, contracting corpse uncleanness, which causes the loss of all the days already observed, surely should cause the one who imparts corpse uncleanness to be treated in the same way as the one who is made unclean! But Scripture has said, “And he defile his consecrated head” (Num. 6: 9) — penalized is only the one who contracts uncleanness for his own consecrated head.

- F. Then in the case of a hair cut, the law should not treat the one who gives the haircut as equivalent to the one whose hair is cut, on the basis of an argument from contracting corpse uncleanness: if in case of the Nazirite’s contracting corpse uncleanness, which causes the loss of all the days already observed, the sages have not treated the one who imparts corpse uncleanness as equivalent to the one who contracts it, in the case of a hair cut, which does not cause the loss of more than thirty days, all the more so should it be the rule that we do not treat the one who gives the haircut as equivalent to the one who gets it. To obviate that possible conclusion, Scripture has said, “There shall no razor come upon his head” (Num. 6: 5) — reading the words to mean, “he shall not make it come himself and no one else should make it come either.”
- G. Then getting a hair cut should not bear an exception to the general rule, based on an argument a fortiori from wine: if wine, which does not cause the loss of days already observed, does not bear an exception from the general prohibition, getting a hair cut, which does cause the loss of days already observed, surely should not bear an exception from the general rule concerning it. But the All-Merciful has said, “his head,” and the All-Merciful has said, “His beard.”
- H. Then getting a hair cut should not cause the loss of any days at all, from an argument a fortiori based on wine: if wine, which does not bear an exception from the general prohibition, does not cause the loss of days already observed, then a hair cut, which does bear an exception from the general rule pertaining to it, surely should not cause the loss of days already observed!
- I. *We require a growth of hair, and lo, at this point it is lacking.*
- J. Then wine should cause the loss of thirty days, through an argument a fortiori based on hair cutting: if hair cutting, which bears an exception to the general prohibition pertaining to it, causes the loss of days, wine, which bears no exception to the general rule, surely should cause the loss of days already observed.
- K. Look, isn’t the operative consideration only that there has to be a growth of hair — but in the case of wine drinking, there is plenty of hair! [Sifré to Numbers XXIII.1].

6:6

- A. [44B] Cutting off the hair on account of contracting corpse uncleanness: how [is it done]?

- B. “[After contracting corpse uncleanness], one would sprinkle [with purification water] on the third and seventh day [in line with Numbers 19] and cut off his hair on the seventh day and bring his offerings on the eighth day.
- C. “But if he cut off his hair on the eighth day, he brings his offerings on that same day,” the words of R. Aqiba.
- D. Said R. Tarfon, “What is the difference between this one and a mesora’, [who, if he cuts his hair on the eighth day, brings the offerings on the ninth]?”
- E. He said to him, “In the case of this one, cleaning him is contingent on the passing of his [seven] days, but in the case of the mesora’, declaring him clean is [also] contingent upon his haircutting.
- F. “And he brings on offering only when the sun has set [after conclusion of his purification rite].”

I.1 A. *Did [Tarfon] accept this answer from him or not?*

- B. *Come and take note: Hillel repeated as a Tannaite rule: “If the Nazirite cut his hair on the eighth day, he presents his offerings on the ninth.” Now, if you should suppose that he accepted that answer, shouldn’t he present his offerings on the eighth day? [Unless Tarfon still differed from Aqiba, who would be the authority behind this rule? (Klien)].*
- C. *Said Raba, “That really is no problem. The one speaks of a case in which he immersed on the seventh day, the other of a case in which he did not immerse on the seventh day.” [Even if Tarfon agreed with Aqiba, the one rule speaks of bathing on the seventh day, the one that has him wait until the ninth day assumes he bathed on the eighth day, so he had to wait for the sun to set, to complete the process of purification.]*

I.2 A. *Said Abbaye, “I came across the colleagues of R. Nathan Bar Hoshaia, who were in session and saying, “‘And come before the Lord to the door of the tent of meeting and give them to the priest’ (Lev. 15:14) [in the setting of one who has become clean after having a flux] — when does he come? When he has immersed and waited until the sun to set; then he may do so; but if he has not immersed and waited for the sun to set, he may not do so.’ Therefore these authorities maintain that a person afflicted by flux who has immersed on the selfsame day is equivalent to a person afflicted by flux [and still unclean]. So I said to them, ‘Then what about the case of a Nazirite who is unclean, concerning whom it is written, ‘He shall bring two turtle doves to the priest to the door of the tent of meeting’ (Num. 6:10) — here too: when does he come? Only if he has immersed and waited for sunset. [45A] Now, where did the gates of Niqanor stand? They were at the entrance to the camp of the Levites. And yet it has been taught on Tannaite authority: **One unclean with corpse uncleanness is permitted to enter into the camp of the Levites, and not only one who has contracted corpse uncleanness alone, but even the corpse itself, as it is said, ‘And Moses took the bones of Joseph with him’ (Exo. 13:19), and “with him” means, “in his own section [T. Kel. 1:9]. It must follow, therefore,” said Abbaye, “that a man who has suffered a flux and who has immersed on the selfsame day is equivalent in***

uncleanness to a man who has suffered a flux, and even so, because he still has not accomplished his atonement rite, he may not enter into the Temple [camp of the Levites to give his offerings to the priest, not because he is unclean as though he still suffered from the flux uncleanness, but only because he has not yet offered the atonement offerings. In general a person lacking atonement rites is not forbidden to enter the camp of the Levites but only the camp of the Presence (Klien)]. Now if at issue is the camp of the Levites, why does Scripture refer to it as 'the tent of meeting'? It is to say, just as one who has not yet completed the atonement rites may not enter there, so one who lacks atonement may not enter the camp of the Levites."

- B. *How is it known in that case [that one who has not completed the atonement rites may not enter the camp of the divine presence]? As has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. "He shall be unclean" (Num. 19:13) — encompasses one who has immersed on the same day prior to sunset; "his uncleanness is still upon him" — that serves to encompass one who has not yet completed his atonement rite. [That is, person who has contracted corpse uncleanness and has not immersed cannot enter the sanctuary, and the use of the future tense indicates even a Tebul Yom may not enter (Klien)].

6:7

- A. **The cutting of hair in the case of [completing the vow in a state of] cleanness: How is it done?**
- B. **One would bring three beasts, a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering (Num. 6:14).**
- C. **"and he would slaughter the peace offering and cut off his hair after they are [slaughtered]," the words of R. Judah.**
- D. **R. Eleazar says, "He would cut his hair only after the sin offering.**
- E. **"For the sin offering takes precedence under all circumstances."**
- F. **But if he cut his hair after any one of the three of them, he has carried out his obligation.**

6:8A-B

- A. **Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, " If one brought three beasts and did not specify [their purposes, respectively],**
- B. **"that which is suitable to serve as a sin offering [a ewe-lamb in its first year] is offered as a sin offering; [that which is suitable to serve as] a burnt offering [a he-lamb in its first year] is offered as a burnt offering, and [that which is suitable to serve as] a peace offering [a ram two years old] is offered as a peace offering."**
- I.1 A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:**
 - B. **"And the Nazirite will shave at the door of the tent of meeting" (Num. 6:18) — It is concerning peace offerings that Scripture speaks, as it is said, "And he will slaughter it at the door of the tent of meeting" (Lev. 3: 2).**
 - C. **You say that it is concerning peace offerings that Scripture speaks. But may it actually mean, literally, "at the door of the tent of meeting"?**

- D. Say: if so, it would be a demeaning way of speaking of the sanctuary.**
- E. R. Josiah says, “That is not the required proof. Lo, the Torah has said, ‘Neither shall you go up by steps upon my altar’ (Exo. 20:23) — all the more so, it is forbidden to show contempt.”**
- F. R. Isaac says, “That is not the required proof. Lo, Scripture states, ‘And shall take the hair of his consecrated head and put it on the fire that is under the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Num. 6:18) — this refers to one who lacks only the act of taking and placing the offering, excluding this one, who lacks the taking, the bringing, and the placing [of the offerings].” [The Nazirite saves at the tent of meeting door. From where he shaved to the place where the Nazirites would broil the peace offering, he would have to take it and get it and put it on the altar. The first half of the verse therefore cannot be taken literally as referring to a location but must speak of time, that is, after the slaughter of the peace offering (Klien)].**
- G. *There are those that say:* R. Isaac says, “It is concerning peace offerings that Scripture speaks.**
- H. “You say that it is concerning peace offerings that Scripture speaks. But may it actually mean, literally, ‘at the door of the tent of meeting’?**
- I. “Scripture states, ‘And shall take the hair of his consecrated head and put it on the fire that is under the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Num. 6:18) — in the place where he broils the peace offering, there he would shave.”**
- J. Abba Hanan says in the name of R. Eliezer, “‘And the Nazirite will shave at the door of the tent of meeting’ (Num. 6:18) — so long as the gate of the tent of meeting is not open, he does not shave” [Sifré to Numbers XXXIV:I.1].**
- K. R. Simeon Shezuri says, “‘And the Nazirite [male] will shave at the door of the tent of meeting’ (Num. 6:18) — and not the Nazirite woman. [45B] — lest the young priests be tempted by her [so she would shave in private].”**
- L. They said to him, “In your view, the disposition of the wife accused of adultery would prove the opposite, for there it is written, ‘And the priest shall set her before the Lord’ (Num. 5:16). Now we do not take account of the possibility that the young priests will be tempted by her.”**
- M. He said to them, “This one [the Nazirite woman] uses eye shadow and rouge, but that one does not use eye shadow or rouge.”**

6:8C-H

- C. He would take “the hair of the head of his separation” (Num. 6:18) and cast it under the cauldron [in which the peace offering is cooked].**
- D. And if he cut it off in the provinces, he would [in any event] cast it under the cauldron.**
- E. Under what circumstances?**
- F. In the case of [completing the vow and] cutting the hair in a state of cleanness.**
- G. But in the case of cutting the hair in a state of uncleanness, he would not cast it under the cauldron.**

H. R. Meir says, “All cast hair under the cauldron except only for one who was unclean [and who cut off his hair outside the Temple,] in the provinces.”

I.1 A. He would take “the hair of the head of his separation” (Num. 6:18):

B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. Then he took the broth [of the peace offering], put it, along with the hair of his consecrated head, and threw it under the pot containing the peace offering. But if he threw it under the pot containing the sin offering or guilt offering, he has carried out his obligation nonetheless.

D. *But does a clean Nazirite present a guilt offering?*

E. *Said Raba, “This is the sense of the statement: And if it is an unclean Nazirite, if he put it under the pot of the guilt offering, he has carried out his obligation nonetheless.”*

I.2 A. What is the source of this rule [that the broth has to be cast under the pot]?

B. *Said Raba, “Said Scripture, ‘which is under the sacrifice of the peace offerings’ (Num. 6:18) — part of its sacrifice should be underneath it” [that is, the fire should be underneath the sacrifice, not merely underneath the pot (Klien)].*

C. *But if he threw it under the pot containing the sin offering or guilt offering, he has carried out his obligation nonetheless:*

D. *What is the basis in Scripture?*

E. *Said Scripture, “the sacrifice of” — which redundancy serves to encompass the sin offering and the guilt offering [even though the peace offering is principal].*

F. *But lo, you have made use of the words “the sacrifice of” for the rule concerning the broth!*

G. *If that were the case, the verse could have said merely, “of the broth of the peace offerings.” Why frame matters in the language, “the sacrifice of”? It is to encompass the sin offering and the guilt offering.*

H. *Might one then say that the entire purpose of the formulation is to encompass the matters of the sin offering and the guilt offering?*

I. *If so, Scripture could as well have said, “peace offerings or sacrifice.” What is the point of “the sacrifice of the peace offering”? That is meant to yield two lessons.*

II.1 A. [R. Meir says, “All cast hair under the cauldron except only for one who was unclean [and who cut off his hair outside the Temple,] in the provinces”]: *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. **“All Nazirites would toss their hair underneath the pot, except for an unclean Nazirite who cut his hair in the province, because his hair was simply buried,” the words of R. Meir.**

C. **R. Judah says, “Those who were cutting their hair in a condition of cleanness located both here and there would toss their hair under the pot. Those who cut their hair in a state of uncleanness both here and there would not toss their hair under the pot.”**

- D. And sages say, “No one would toss hair under the pot except for a clean Nazirite located in the sanctuary itself, for it is only in his case that the religious duty has been properly carried out” [T. 4:6A-G].

6:9

- A. He would cook the peace offerings or seethe [the offering].
- B. The priest takes “the cooked shoulder of the ram and one unleavened cake out of the basket and one unleavened wafer and puts them into the hand of the Nazirite” (Num. 6:19).
- C. And he waves them.
- D. “And afterwards the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine” (Num. 6:19) and to contract corpse uncleanness.
- E. [46A] R. Simeon says, “Once the blood of any one of the sacrifices has been tossed in his behalf, the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to contract corpse uncleanness.”

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “‘And afterwards the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine’ (Num. 6:19) — after all of the actions that are required,” the words of R. Eliezer.
- C. And sages say, “After any single required action” [even the first action, sprinkling of one kind of blood (Klien)].
- D. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of rabbis?*
- E. *Here it is written, “And afterwards the Nazirite is permitted to drink wine” (Num. 6:19), and elsewhere, “After he has shaven his consecrated head” (Num. 6:19) — just as in that passage, reference is made to a single action, so here, reference is made to a single action.*
- F. *Might one say, that is so only if both required actions are carried out?*
- G. *If that were the meaning, then what need do I have for the analogy established through common language?*

II.1 A. [And he waves them:] Said Rab, “The act of waving in the case of the Nazirite is essential to the correct performance of the rite.”

- B. *In accord with which Tannaite authority does this opinion stand? Should I say, it is in accord with the view of Rabbis? But the hair cutting itself, rabbis maintain, is not essential to the rite, so can there be any question about the status of the waving of the offerings? Rather, it must accord with the position of R. Eliezer [at I.1.B].*
- C. *Well, that’s pretty obvious, for didn’t R. Eliezer say, “after all of the actions that are required” [including the waving]?*
- D. *What might you otherwise have supposed? Since as to the matter of atonement, these represent the mere details of the religious duty [which are dispensable], here too, it should not be deemed essential? So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- E. [46B] *And is it really essential to the rite? Hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: “This is the law of the Nazirite” (Num. 6:21) — whether or not he has hands [T. 1:5H-I].* [Klien: the meaning is assumed to be, if he has no hands,

the waving rite can be omitted, so that even if he has hands it does not prevent him from drinking wine before it has taken place].

F. *Then lo, note that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

G. **“This is the law of the Nazirite” (Num. 6:21) — whether the man has hair or does not have hair [even though it is said, [And the Nazirite shall shave his consecrated head at the door of the tent of meeting and shall take the hair from his consecrated head and put it on the fire (Num. 6:18)] [T. 1:5G-H].**

H. *Here too, do you claim, it is not essential to the rite? But lo, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

I. **A totally hairless Nazir — the House of Shammai say, “He does not have to pass a razor across his whole body.” And the House of Hillel say, “He does have to do so.” And so is the dispute concerning the mesora’, and so is the dispute concerning Levites [T. 1:6A-D].**

J. *And said Rabina, “What is the meaning of the House of Shammai’s He does not have to pass a razor across his whole body? It means he has no remedy [Klien: since he can never shave, he will never be able to drink wine]. And as to the statement of the House of Hillel, He does have to do so, the meaning is, he does have a remedy.*

K. *And that is in accord with the position of R. Pedat, for said R. Pedat, “The House of Shammai and R. Eliezer have stated the same position.”*

L. *What is that of R. Eliezer? It is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority, “If the person afflicted with the skin ailment who comes for the purification process has no right thumb or bit toe, he can never become clean,” the words of R. Eliezer. R. Simeon says, “Let the priest put the oil on the place where the thumb or big toe should be, and that carries out the obligation.” Sages say, “Let him put it on the left hand thumb or big toe, and that carries out the obligation” [M. Neg. 14:9].*

M. *There is another version that people supply:*

N. **[And he waves them:]** Said Rab, “The act of waving in the case of the Nazirite is essential to the correct performance of the rite.”

O. *In accord with which Tannaite authority does this opinion stand? Should I say that it is in accord with the view of R. Eliezer [at I.1.B]? Well, that’s pretty obvious, for didn’t R. Eliezer say, “after all of the actions that are required” [including the waving]? So it must be stated in accord with the position of rabbis. But then, one has to say, the hair cutting itself, rabbis maintain, is not essential to the rite, so can there be any question about the status of the waving of the offerings?*

P. *But is it not essential? Hasn’t it been taught on Tannaite authority: “This is the law of the Nazirite” (Num. 6:21) — whether or not he has hands [T. 1:5H-I].*

Q. *Then lo, note that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: “This is the law of the Nazirite” (Num. 6:21) — whether the man has hair or does not have hair [even though it is said, [And the Nazirite shall shave his consecrated*

head at the door of the tent of meeting and shall take the hair from his consecrated head and put it on the fire (Num. 6:18)] [T. 1:5G-H].

- R. *Here too, do you claim, it is essential to the rite? But lo, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- S. **A totally hairless Nazir — the House of Shammai say, “He does not have to pass a razor across his whole body.” And the House of Hillel say, “He does have to do so.” And so is the dispute concerning the mesora’, and so is the dispute concerning Levites [T. 1:6A-D].**
- T. Said R. Abina, *“What is the meaning of the statement of the House of Hillel, He does have to do so? The meaning is, he does not have a remedy. As to the House of Shammai’s He does not have to pass a razor across his whole body means he has no remedy.”*
- U. *And this version differs from that of R. Pedat.*

6:10

- A. **If he cut off his hair after a sacrifice and the sacrifice turned out to be invalid, his cutting of the hair is invalid, and his sacrifices have not gone to his credit.**
- B. **If he cut his hair after a sin offering made not for its own name [under an incorrect designation], and afterward he brought his [other] offerings under their proper designation,**
- C. **his cutting of the hair is invalid, and his sacrifices have not gone to his credit.**
- D. **If he cut his hair after the burnt offering or the peace offering improperly designated and afterward he brought his [other] offerings under their proper designation, his cutting of the hair is invalid, and his sacrifices have not gone to his credit.**
- E. **R. Simeon says, “That particular sacrifice has not gone to his credit, [when beast designated as a burnt offering or peace offering is offered under an incorrect designation, they register as voluntary peace offerings, but the Nazirite still has to replace them and make the proper offering], but the other sacrifices have gone to his credit.”**
- F. **And if he cut his hair after all three of them and one of them turned out to be valid, his cutting of the hair is valid, and he brings the other sacrifices.**
- I.1 A. *Said R. Ada bar Ahbah, “That is to say, R. Simeon takes the view that a Nazirite who cut his hair after offering a votive peace offering has carried out his obligation [since he refers to a Nazirite who cut his hair after a votive offering].”*
- B. *What is the scriptural basis for his position?*
- C. *Said Scripture, “And put it on the fire that is under the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Num. 6:18) — not his peace offerings [so any peace offering is valid].*

6:11

- A. **He in whose behalf one of the drops of blood has been properly tossed and who [then] is made unclean**
- B. **R. Eliezer says, “He loses the whole [set of offerings already offered up].”**

- C. And sages say, “Let him bring the rest of his offerings when he becomes clean.”
 - D. They said to him, M'SH B: “In behalf of Miriam of Tadmor [Palmyra], one of the drops of blood was properly tossed, and they came and told her that her daughter was dying, and she went and found her dead.
 - E. “And sages said, ‘Let her bring the rest of her offerings when she will be clean.’”
- I.1** A. *The Tannaite formulate states, R. Eliezer says, “He loses the whole [set of offerings already offered up].” But has R. Eliezer not said, “Any [uncleanness that is contracted] after the fulfillment causes the loss of only seven days”?*
- B. *Said Rab, “What is meant by ‘causes the loss’ that R. Eliezer has stated? It means, ‘causes the loss of his offerings [Klien: the sacrifice of the blood that has been sprinkled is invalid and must be replaced, in accord with Eliezer’s view that the whole termination ceremony of the Nazirite hangs together].”*
 - C. *And that stands to reason, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: And sages say, “Let him bring the rest of his offerings when he becomes clean.” They said to him, M'SH B: “In behalf of Miriam of Tadmor [Palmyra], one of the drops of blood was properly tossed, and they came and told her that her daughter was dying, and she went and found her dead. And sages said, ‘Let her bring the rest of her offerings when she will be clean.’”*
 - D. *That proves it.*