

X.

BAVLI NEDARIM CHAPTER TEN

FOLIOS 66B-79A

10:1

- A. A betrothed girl –
- B. her father and her husband annul her vows.
- C. [67A] [If] the father annulled her vow, but her husband did not annul her vow,
- D. [or if] her husband annulled her vow, but her father did not annul her vow,
- E. it is not annulled.
- F. And it is not necessary to say, if one of them confirmed her vow [and the other did not, that it is not confirmed].

- I.1** A. [And it is not necessary to say, if one of them confirmed her vow and the other did not, that it is not confirmed:] – *so that's the same point as is made at the outset, her father and her husband annul her vows!*
- B. *What might you otherwise have supposed? Either her father or her husband may do so? So we are informed that that is not the case.*

- I.2** A. **And it is not necessary to say, if one of them confirmed her vow and the other did not, that it is not confirmed:** *So if it's not necessary to say so, why say it? After all, if we say that if one of them annuls the vow without the other, the act is null, why also say, if one of them confirmed her vow and the other did not, that it is not confirmed?*

- B. *It was necessary to include the matter in the Tannaite statement to deal with a case in which one of them annulled the vow and the other confirmed it, but then the one who confirmed it wanted to reverse his confirmation. I might have supposed that what he confirmed he may also nullify, so we are taught that both parties must concur in the nullification of the vow.*

I.3

- A. **A betrothed girl – her father and her husband annul her vows:**
- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that fact?*
- C. Said Raba, “Said Scripture, ‘And if her father disallow her in the day that he hears it, none of her vows shall stand, because her father disallowed her. And if she gets married, when she vowed...then he shall make her vow...null’ (Num. 30: 5-8). On the strength of this verse [we conclude that] as to a **betrothed girl – her father and her husband annul her vows.**”
- D. *But might one not say that the cited verse is written in regard to a married woman?*
- E. *Not at all, since with respect to the matter of the married woman, there is a different verse of Scripture to cover her situation, namely: “And if she vowed in her husband’s house” (Num. 30:11).*
- F. *Might one say that both verses refer to a married woman? And, should you maintain, why have two verses refer to the same classification, namely, a married woman? it would be to make the point that the husband cannot nullify vows taken prior to marriage.*
- G. **[68A]** *Yes, but doesn’t that follow automatically?*
- H. *If you wish, I shall say, “to be” refers to betrothal [not to a fully consummated marriage].*
- I. *But maybe the father can nullify the vows on his own?*
- J. *If so, what need is there of the verse that states, “...and bind himself by a bond, being in the father’s house...if her father disallow...none of her vows shall stand...because her father disallowed her” (Num. 30: 4-6)? For if her father can annul the vows on his own even when there is a husband who has betrothed the girl in the picture, obviously he can do so when there is no husband who has betrothed the girl!*
- K. *Well, one may say that the father needs the concurrence of the husband who has betrothed the girl, but the betrothing husband can nullify the vows on his own. And if you should say, if so, why should Scripture make reference to the*

father, the answer is, to show that, if he confirmed the vow, the confirmation is effective.

- L. *If so, why make reference to the clause, “and if she vowed in her father’s house,” since that point derives from a simple argument a fortiori, namely: if in a situation in which the father is present, the husband who has betrothed the girl may on his own nullify the vows, in a situation in which the father is not present, can there be any question of that fact?*
- M. *Say: “And if she vowed in her husband’s house” makes the point that he cannot nullify vows taken before marriage!*
- N. *The proof derives from that fact itself, namely: the basis on which the husband who has betrothed the girl can annul vows taken prior to marriage is only because he is a partner with the father.*

I.4

- A. *A Tannaite statement of the household of R. Ishmael: “These are the statutes which the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife, between the father and his daughter, being yet in her youth in her father’s house’ (Num. 30:17) – on the strength of that verse we know that as to **a betrothed girl – her father and her husband annul her vows.**”*
- B. *Now, from the perspective of the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael, what is the point of the phrase, “and if she be betrothed to a husband” [that proves the same proposition]?*
- C. *He assigns that verse to address the other statement of Raba [given below, at 70A].*
- D. *And how does Raba deal with this statement of the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael?*
- E. *He requires it to prove the point that the husband may nullify vows that a wife takes that cover relationships between him and her.*

I.5

- A. *The question was raised: What is the effect of the husband’s action? Does the action of the husband shear off entirely the half of the vow subject to his action, or does he merely weaken the [effect of the] entire vow?*
- B. *Under what circumstances would the answer to such a question interest us?*
- C. *A case in which a betrothed girl took a vow not to eat food in the volume of two olives of anything, and the husband who has betrothed the girl heard the vow and nullified it, and she ate such a bulk of food. Now, if we maintain that the action of the husband shear the half of the vow subject to his action entirely, then she is flogged [for having violated the other half of the vow,*

which remains fully in effect, since she has eaten one olive's bulk of food, a culpable volume, but a valid vow prohibits her from doing so]. But if we maintain that the effect of his action is merely to weaken the entire vow, then what this represents is a merely prohibited action [but not so strictly prohibited that the woman would be flogged, the vow being suborned by the nullification].

- D. *Come and take note: Under what circumstances did they rule that if the husband died, his power passes to the father [M. Ned. 10:2B]? When the husband did not hear the vow before he died, or the husband heard the vow and remained silent, or heard it and confirmed it, and died that day. This is what we have learned in the Mishnah: If the husband died, his power passes to the father [M. Ned. 10:2B]. [68B] But if the husband heard the vow and confirmed it or heard it and was silent and died the next day, the father cannot annul the vow. If the father heard it and annulled it and died before the husband sufficed to hear it – this is what we have learned in the Mishnah: If the father died, his authority does not pass over to the husband. If the husband heard and annulled the vow and died before the father sufficed to hear of it, this is the case concerning which we have learned in the Mishnah: If the husband died, his authority passes over to the father [T. Ned. 6:2]. If the husband heard the vow and nullified it and the father died before he sufficed to hear of it, the husband cannot annul the vow, because the husband nullifies the vow only in partnership with the father. [69A] If her father heard the vow and nullified it but the husband did not suffice to hear it before he died, the father reverts and nullifies the share of the husband. Said R. Nathan, “This is in fact, the position of the House of Shammai. The House of Hillel say, ‘He cannot nullify the vow’” [T. Ned. 6:3]. The upshot is, from the perspective of the House of Shammai, the action of the husband shears off entirely the half of the vow subject to his action. From the perspective of the House of Hillel, he merely weakens the [effect of the] entire vow.*

E. *True.*

- I.6** A. *Raba raised this question: “Is there the possibility of asking a sage for remission of an act of confirmation of a vow, or is that not the case? If you should find reasons to maintain that there is the possibility of asking a sage for remission of an act of confirmation of a vow, then is there the possibility of asking a sage for remission of an act of nullification of a vow, or is there no such possibility?”*

- B. *Come and take note, for* said R. Yohanan, “A question may be addressed to a sage for purposes of absolving an act of confirmation of a vow, but a question may not be addressed to a sage for purposes of setting aside an act of nullification of a vow.”

I.7 A. *Rabbah raised this question: “If the husband or father said, “It is confirmed for you, it is confirmed for you,” and then sought remission by a sage of the first act of confirmation, what is the law?”*

- B. *Come and take note, for* said Raba, “If one got remission of the first of two vows, the second then becomes binding upon him.”

I.8 A. *Rabbah raised this question: “If the husband or father said, “It is confirmed for you, it is nullified for you, but the confirmation applies only if the nullification takes effect, what is the law?”*

- B. **[69B]** *Come and take note of the dispute of R. Meir and R. Yosé, for we have learned in the Mishnah: “[He who with peace-offerings and burnt-offerings before him says], ‘Lo, this [unconsecrated beast] is the substitute of a burnt-offering and the substitute of peace-offerings,’ lo, this is the substitute of a burnt-offering,” the words of R. Meir. Said R. Yosé, “If to begin with he intended thus, since it is not possible to designate [them] by two names at once, his words are confirmed. But if after he said, ‘It is the substitute of a burnt-offering,’ he changed his mind and said, ‘It is the substitute of peace-offerings,’ lo, this is the substitute of a burnt-offering” [M. Tem. 5:4A-C]. Now even R. Meir took the position that the second statement is null only because the man did not say, “Let the first statement be invalid if the second statement does not take effect.” But here, he has made the statement, the confirmation applies only if the nullification takes effect. And here, even R. Meir would concede that the nullification is valid.*

I.9 A. *Rabbah raised this question: “If he said simultaneously, ‘It is confirmed for you and it is nullified for you,’ what is the law?”*

- B. *Come and take note of what Rabbah said, “In any case in which if a statement would not be valid if one statement followed another, then even if the statements are made simultaneously, they are also null.” [Freedman: Whatever is not valid consecutively is not valid even simultaneously.]*

I.10 A. *Rabbah raised this question: “If he said, ‘It is confirmed for you today,’ what is the law? Do we maintain that it is as though he had said for her, ‘It is*

nullified for you for tomorrow'? Or perhaps we maintain that he has made no such statement? **[70A]** And if you take the view that he has made no such statement, then, if he said to her, 'It is nullified for you for tomorrow,' what is the law? Do we say that he has not got the power to nullify the vow for her only tomorrow, then it is as though he has confirmed it for today? Or perhaps, since he didn't say, 'It is confirmed for you for today,' when he said to her, 'It is nullified for you for tomorrow,' it is as though he meant to do so for today? And if you should say that even so, since he confirmed it for today, it is as though it were in force for tomorrow, too, what if he said, 'It is confirmed for you for an hour'? Do we say, it is as though he said, 'It is annulled for you afterward,' or perhaps he simply made no such statement to her? And should you maintain that he made no such statement, then what if he did explicitly nullify the vow? Do we then say, since he confirmed it, he confirmed it for good, or perhaps, since he can confirm or nullify it for the entire day, if he says, 'It is nullified for you after an hour has passed,' his statement is an effective one?"

- B. Come and take note: **[If the wife said,] "Lo, I am a Nazir," and her husband heard and said, "Me too," he cannot annul [her vow] [M. Naz. 4:11H-I].** Now why should this be the case? Why not say that, when he said, "And I," he referred only to himself, meaning, he will be a Nazirite, but as to her vow, "Lo, I will be a Nazirite," he has confirmed it only for a moment, but thereafter he annuls it? Then why can't he do so? Obviously, it's because, once he has confirmed it, it is permanently confirmed!
- C. No, it is because the Tannaite authority behind that formulation takes the view that anytime someone says, "And I," it is as though he said, "It is permanently confirmed for you."

10:2

- A. **[If] the father died, [his] authority does not pass to the husband.**
- B. **[If] the husband died, [his] authority passes to the father.**
- C. **In this regard the power of the father is greater than the power of the husband.**
- D. **In another regard, however, the power of the husband is greater than the power of the father.**
- E. **For the husband annuls the vows in the case of a grown-up woman, but the father does not annul the vows of a grown-up woman.**

- I.1** A. *What is the scriptural basis for this rule?*
 B. “In her youth, in her father’s house” (Num. 30:17). [Freedman: As long as she is in her youth, she is under parental control; if the father dies, his authority is not transferable.]
- I.2** A. **[If] the father died, [his] authority does not pass to the husband:**
 B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that fact?*
 C. Said Rabbah, “Said Scripture, ‘And if she be at all to a husband and her vows be upon her’ (Num. 30: 7) – **[70B]** *Scripture forms an analogy between vows she made prior to her second betrothal and those made prior to her first betrothal. [Freedman: Since the verse implies a reference to two betrothals, they are treated as equal, and therefore the periods preceding them too; the period preceding the second betrothal is after the first husband’s death.] Just as the vows taken prior to her first betrothal are subject to the father’s nullification alone, so those made prior to the second betrothal are subject to the father’s nullification alone.*”
 D. *But might one say that that is the case of vows that were not known to the husband who has betrothed the girl, but as to those that were known to him, the father cannot nullify them?*
 E. *In the case of vows not known to the husband who has betrothed the girl, the fact that the father annuls them after the death of the first husband who has betrothed the girl derives from the verse, “in her youth she is in her father’s house” [that is, so long as there is no other authority, the father is in charge, which pertains then to vows of which the husband who has betrothed the girl is unaware, so the deduction from, “and if she be at all to a husband” applies even to vows known to the husband who has betrothed the girl before his death (Freedman)].*
- II.1** A. **In this regard the power of the father is greater than the power of the husband....[For the husband annuls the vows in the case of a grown-up woman, but the father does not annul the vows of a grown-up woman:]**
 B. *To what does this statement [For the husband annuls the vows in the case of a grown-up woman, but the father does not annul the vows of a grown-up woman] refer? Should we say that the husband has betrothed her while she was a girl and then she became pubescent? But then note: The father’s death frees her from the father’s authority, and reaching the stage of puberty frees her from her father’s authority; then, just as at death, his authority doesn’t pass to the husband, so when she reaches puberty, his authority*

shouldn't pass to the husband. On the other hand, if he betrothed her when she was pubescent, *in such a case we have a Tannaite statement to the same effect, namely: A grown-up woman who waited twelve months, and a widow who waited thirty days – R. Eliezer says, “Since her husband is liable to support her, he annuls her vows.” And sages say, “The husband does not annul her vows until she enters his domain”* [M. 10:5A-C]. [What we see in any event is that the man who has betrothed her can have the power to nullify the vows of a pubescent girl.]

- C. *Now there is a flaw in the body of the passage. You say, A grown-up woman who waited twelve months.... But in her case, why twelve months? Thirty days would be enough* [since at that point, the marriage must be held, and even if it is not held and she is in her father's house, the betrothing man has to support her].
- D. *Read: A pubescent girl and a minor who waited twelve months.*
- E. *One way or the other, there's a problem!* [What we see in any event is that the man who has betrothed her can have the power to nullify the vows of a pubescent girl.]
- F. *If you wish, I shall say, this passage speaks in particular of a pubescent girl, while in the cited one, a pubescent girl is mentioned only because the intent was to set forth the dispute between R. Eliezer and rabbis. Or if you prefer, I shall say, in that passage the reference to the pubescent girl is what is intended, but here, because the language is used, In this regard, the contrary clause is introduced by the same language, In this regard....*

10:3

- A. [71A] [If] she took a vow while she was betrothed and was divorced on that very day [and] betrothed again on that same day [and repeated the process], even a hundred [times]
- B. her father and her last husband annul her vows.
- C. This is the general principle: In the case of any girl who has not gone forth to her own domain for a single moment, her father and her last husband annul her vows.

- I.1 A. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the last of the men who have betrothed the girl has the power to nullify vows known to the first of the men who have betrothed her?*

- B. Said Samuel, “Said Scripture, ‘And if she be at all to a husband and her vows are upon her’ (Num. 30: 7) – this refers to vows that already were ‘upon her.’”
- C. *But maybe that is the rule for vows that were not known to the first man who betrothed her, but as to vows that were known to the first man who betrothed her, the last in line cannot annul them?*
- D. *The clause, “upon her,” represents redundant language [Freedman: to intimate that the last man can annul vows made during the first betrothal].*

I.2 A. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of Samuel: A betrothed girl – her father and her husband annul her vows. How so? If the father heard the vow and annulled it for her, but the husband did not suffice to hear it before he died, and she was then betrothed that very day, even a hundred times, her father and the last of her husbands nullify her vows. If her husband heard the vow and annulled it for her, but the father did not suffice to hear it before the husband died, the father goes and nullifies the portion of the husband. Said R. Nathan, “This is in point of fact the position of the House of Shammai, but the House of Hillel say, “He cannot nullify the vow” [T. Ned. 6:4].*

B. *What is at issue here?*

C. **[71B]** *The House of Shammai take the position that with regard even to vows that are known to the man who has betrothed the girl, the husband’s authority passes over to the father; the husband also shears the vow off; the House of Hillel maintain that her father and the last of the husbands nullify her vows, but the husband does not utterly shear the vow off.*

I.3 A. *The question was raised: Is issuing a writ of divorce equivalent to silence in the context of a vow, or is it regarded as equivalent to confirming the vow?*

B. *So what difference does it make?*

C. *A case in which she took a vow and her husband heard it and then divorced her, but on the same day he remarried her. If you say that the issuing of a writ of divorce is equivalent to silence, then he still can nullify the vow for her. But if you say that it is equivalent to confirming it, then he cannot nullify the vow for her.*

- D. **[72A]** *Come and take note: Under what circumstances did they rule that if the husband died, his power passes to the father [M. Ned. 10:2B]? When*

the husband did not hear the vow before he died, or the husband heard the vow and remained silent, or heard it and confirmed it, and died that day [T. Ned. 6:2]. Now, if you maintain that a writ of divorce is equivalent to the husband's remaining silent, then the Tannaite formulation likewise should state, if he heard and divorced her. Now, since the Tannaite formulation does not follow those lines, it follows that a writ of divorce is equivalent to an act of confirming the vow.

- E. Yeah, well look at what follows: **But if the husband heard the vow and confirmed it or heard it and was silent and died the next day, the father cannot annul the vow.** Now, if you maintain that a writ of divorce is equivalent to an act of confirming the vow, the Tannaite formulation should read: If he heard and divorced..., but since that is not the Tannaite formulation, it must follow that a writ of divorce is equivalent to the husband's remaining silent. So, it must follow, from the cited evidence no firm conclusion is to be drawn. If the intent of the first clause is to word matters exactly, then the second clause is stated to follow the form of the first; if the second is phrased in precise terms, then the first clause is formulated to conform to the wording of the second. So there is no conclusion to be drawn at all.
- F. Come and take note: **[If] she took a vow while she was betrothed and was divorced on that very day [and] betrothed again on that same day [and repeated the process], even a hundred [times], her father and her last husband annul her vows.** Thus it must follow that a writ of divorce is equivalent to the husband's remaining silent, for if it is equivalent to confirming the vow, can the final man who betrothed the girl nullify vows that the first in line has already confirmed anyhow?
- G. Here with what situation do we deal? It is a case in which the first of the men who betrothed her never heard the oath.
- H. If so, then why introduce the language, **on that very day?** Even after a hundred days the same rule would pertain!
- I. It is a case in which the man who betrothed the girl did not hear the vow, but the father heard the vow, in which case on that very day he can nullify the vow, but thereafter he cannot nullify the vow.
- J. Come and take note: **[If] she took a vow on that very day and was divorced on the same day and remarried to the same man on the same day, he cannot annul the vow.** [This is the general principle: [In the case of] any

woman who has gone forth into her own domain for a single moment [M. 10:3C] – he has not got the power to annul the vows] [M. 11:9]. *That proves that a writ of divorce is equivalent to the husband's confirming the vow.*

- K. *Say: Here we deal with a married woman, and the reason that he cannot nullify the vow is that the husband may not nullify vows taken prior to marriage.*

10:4

- A. [72B] **The way of a disciple of sages [is this]:**
B. **Before his daughter goes forth from his home, he says to her, “All vows which you vowed in my house, lo, they are annulled.”**
C. **And so the husband, before she enters his domain, says to her, “All vows which you vowed before you came into my domain, lo, they are annulled.”**
D. **For after she enters his domain, he cannot annul [those prior] vows any more.**

- I.1 A. *R. Ammi bar Hama raised this question: “What is the law on the husband's nullifying the vow without having heard it? Is ‘And her husband heard it’ (Num. 30: 8) what Scripture states in particular, or is that detail not one meant in particular?”*
B. *Said Raba, “Come and take note: **The way of a disciple of sages [is this]: Before his daughter goes forth from his home, he says to her, ‘All vows which you vowed in my house, lo, they are annulled.’ But lo, he never heard them!**”*
C. *Only when he hears them does he nullify them.*
D. *Well, then, if he has not heard them, what need does he have to make such a statement anyhow?*
E. *So we are informed that it is the way of neophyte rabbis to review such matters.*
F. *Come and take note of what follows: **And so the husband, before she enters his domain, says to her, “All vows which you vowed before you came into my domain, lo, they are annulled.”***
G. *Here, too, only when he hears them does he nullify them.*
H. *Come and take note: **He who says to his wife, “All vows which you will vow from this time until I return from such-and-such a place, lo, they are***

confirmed,” has said nothing whatsoever. [If he says], “Lo, they are annulled” – R. Eliezer says, “It is annulled.” But lo, he never heard them!”

- I. *Here, too, the meaning is that he says, “When I hear them....”*
- J. *So why say so up front? Let him just nullify the vow when he hears it?*
- K. *He is concerned that he may be preoccupied at that moment.*
- L. *Come and take note: “He who says to his major domo, ‘All vows that my wife may make from now until I come back from such-and-such a place – you annul for her,’ and he annulled such vows for her –*
- M. *“Might one suppose that the vows should indeed be regarded as nullified?*
- N. *“Scripture states, ‘He husband may confirm it or her husband may annul it’ (Num. 30:14),” the words of R. Josiah.*
- O. *Said to him R. Jonathan, “We find in every passage [in the Torah] that [acts of] the agent of a person are equivalent to [acts of] the person himself.”*
- P. *Now even R. Josiah takes the position that he does only because it is a decree of Scripture, that is, “Scripture states, ‘Her husband may confirm it or her husband may annul it’ (Num. 30:14).” But all parties concur that [acts of] the agent of a person are equivalent to [acts of] the person himself. Yet here, he has not heard the vows!*
- Q. **[73A]** *Here, too, the meaning is that he says, “When I hear them....”*
- R. *So why say so up front? Let him just nullify the vow when he hears it?*
- S. *He is concerned that he may be preoccupied at that moment.*

I.2

- A. *R. Ammi bar Hama raised this question: “What is the law on a deaf man’s nullifying his wife’s vows? If you maintain that the husband may nullify the vow without hearing it, it is because it is something that he can have heard. But the deaf man, who cannot have heard it, would then not be able to nullify it, in line with what R. Zira said. For said R. Zira, ‘In the case of whatever is suitable for mingling, mingling is not essential, and in the case of whatever is not suitable for mingling, mingling is indispensable’ [Cashdan, *Menahot*: in Zira’s view the law is that mingling can be omitted so long as it is possible to do so if one wants, and the Mishnah’s rule would mean that no oil at all was poured in]. Or perhaps ‘and her husband heard it...’ is not essential?”*
- B. *Said Raba, “Come and hear: “‘...and her husband hear...’: excluding the wife of a deaf man.”*
- C. *That proves it.*

- I.3** A. *The question was raised:* “What is the law on the husband’s nullifying vows stated by his two wives simultaneously? Is the reference of the verse to ‘it’ meant literally? Or is it not literal?”
- B. *Said Rabina, “Come and take note: Two accused wives are not made to drink simultaneously so that one not be shameless before the other. R. Judah says, “That is not the reason, but because it is said, And the priest will draw her near (Num. 5:16) – her alone, and he does not draw two women near [at the same time] [T. Sot. 1:6E-H].”* [In Judah’s view, two wives cannot have their vows simultaneously nullified; in the anonymous authority’s ruling, they can.]

10:5

- A. [73B] A grown-up [= pubescent] woman who waited twelve months, and a widow who waited thirty days –
- B. R. Eliezer says, “Since her husband is liable to support her, he annuls her vows.”
- C. And sages say, “The husband does not annul her vows until she enters his domain.”
- I.1** A. Said Rabbah, “R. Eliezer and the original Mishnah say the same thing, *for we have learned in the Mishnah: They give a virgin twelve months to provide for herself from the time that the husband has demanded her. And just as they give [a time of preparation] to the woman, so they give a time of preparation to a man to provide for himself. And to a widow they give thirty days. [If the time came and he did not marry her, she in any event is supported. And she eats food in the status of priestly rations [if he is a priest, and she is not] – R. Tarfon says, “They give her all of her support in food in the status of priestly rations.” R. Aqiba says, “Half in unconsecrated produce and half in food in the status of priestly rations.” The levir cannot feed food in the status of priestly rations [to the sister-in-law who is widowed at the stage of betrothal and is awaiting consummation of the levirate marriage (M. Yeb. 7: 4)]. If she had waited six months for the husband [M. 5:2A], and six months awaited the levir, [or] even if all of them were waiting for the husband but only one day was spent waiting for the levir, or all of them were awaiting the levir, except one day awaiting the husband, she does not eat food in the status of priestly rations. This is the first Mishnah. The succeeding court ruled:*

‘The woman does not eat food in the status of priestly rations until she enters the marriage canopy’ [M. Ket. 5:2-3].”

- B. *Said to him Abbaye, “But maybe that’s not so. The first version of the Mishnah informs us only about her right to eat priestly rations which is forbidden only by reason of a decree of rabbis, while as to vows, binding by the law of the Torah, I might say that that is not the case. And in any event you have heard R. Eliezer’s position only in regard to vows on account of what R. Phineas said in the name of Raba, who said, ‘Whoever takes a vow does so with the stipulation of her husband’s concurrence.’ But, in respect to food in the status of heave-offering, it may be that, even though she is forbidden only through a rabbinical decree, she still may not eat that food.”*

10:6

- A. [74A] **A deceased childless brother’s widow awaiting levirate marriage, whether with a single levir or with two levirs –**
- B. **R. Eliezer says, “He annuls her vows.”**
- C. **R. Joshua says, “That is the case with one but not with two.”**
- D. **R. Aqiba says, “That is the case neither with one nor with two.”**
- E. **Said R. Eliezer, “Now if in the case of a woman whom he acquired for himself, lo, he annuls her vows, a woman who is acquired for him by Heaven, is it not logical that he should annul her vows?”**
- F. **Said to him R. Aqiba, “No. If you have so stated the rule in regard to a woman whom he has acquired for himself,**
- G. **“the fact is that others have no claim on her.**
- H. **“But will you say the same in the case of a woman acquired in his behalf by Heaven, in whom others [other levirs] have a claim?”**
- I. **Said to him R. Joshua, “Aqiba, your argument applies in the case of two levirs. What will you say in the case of one levir?”**
- J. **He said to him, “A deceased childless brother’s widow is not wholly [betrothed] to the levir [alone] in the way in which a betrothed girl is wholly [betrothed] to her husband.”**

- I.1** A. *There is no problem in understanding the view of R. Aqiba, for he holds that there is no levirate bond even in the case of one [for the levir cannot annul vows, though a husband can] and according to R. Joshua, there can be a levirate bond where there is only one levir but not where there are two [since in the former case, we know whom she will marry]. But from the perspective*

of R. Eliezer, while there is a levirate bond, we can understand why in the case of one he may annul the vows, but why in the case of two?

- B. Said R. Ammi, “It is a case in which he performed the act of bespeaking with her, and R. Eliezer’s reasoning represents the position of the House of Shammai, which has said, ‘The act of bespeaking effects a complete acquisition of the woman as a wife.’ R. Joshua moreover will say to you, ‘That is the case where there is one levir, but as to two levirs, is there a situation in which, while a brother may come along and prohibit the woman to him by having sexual relations or divorcing her, the first nonetheless can nullify the vows?’ And R. Aqiba maintains that there is no levirate bond bearing legal effect.”
- C. Now in R. Eliezer’s position, in accord with the position of the House of Shammai that the act of bespeaking effects a complete acquisition of the woman, the declaration serves only to render the co-wife ineligible for marriage with the levir, what is to be said? [Why can he nullify the vows?]
- D. Here with what case do we deal? It is one in which he had been called to court and ordered to support her, and that is then in accord with what R. Phineas said in the name of Raba, who said, “Whoever takes a vow does so with the stipulation of her husband’s concurrence.”

I.2 A. [74B] We have learned in the Mishnah: “**Now if in the case of a woman whom he acquired for himself, lo, he annuls her vows, a woman who is acquired for him by Heaven, is it not logical that he should annul her vows?**” But if, as he says, we deal with a case in which there has been an act of bespeaking, then the levir has acquired the woman on his own!

B. The obvious sense is, he has acquired her for himself – through the action of Heaven.

I.3 A. You may now solve the problem raised by Rabbah, that is, From the perspective of the House of Shammai, does the act of bespeaking effect the relationship of a consummated marriage or a betrothal?” You may now solve the problem by concluding that the act of bespeaking effects the relationship of a consummated marriage. For if the effect were merely to effect the relationship of betrothal, lo, we have learned in the Mishnah, **A betrothed girl – her father and her husband annul her vows [M. 10:1A]**. [There is no allusion to the levir.]

B. *Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, "What is the meaning of 'annul'? It means, jointly."*

I.4 A. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of R. Ammi:*

B. **A woman awaiting marriage with a levir, whether it is with one levir or two levirs –**

C. **R. Eliezer says, "He may annul her vows."**

D. **R. Joshua says, "That may be done if there is one, but not two levirs."**

E. **R. Aqiba says, "Neither by one nor by two."**

F. **Said R. Eliezer, Now if in the case of a woman in whom the man has no share prior to her entering his domain, once that woman has come into his domain, she is entirely his, then a woman in whom he has a share even prior to her coming into his domain, when she comes into his domain, she should be entirely his!"**

G. **Said to him R. Aqiba, "Not at all. If you have made such a statement in connection with a woman whom he has acquired on his own account, that is because, as prior to marriage he has no share in her, so others have no share in her, will you say the same of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom, just as he has a share, so other [brothers] have a share as well?"**

H. **Said to him R. Joshua, "Aqiba, your opinion pertains to a case in which there are two levirs. What will you reply to the case in which there is only one levir?"**

I. **He said to him, "So do we make a distinction in law between cases in which there is one levir and those in which there are two, or cases in which there is an act of bespeaking or not? Just as matters are in regard to all other matters, so is the rule when it comes to vows."**

J. **Said Ben Azzai, "Woe is you, Ben Azzai! Woe is you, Ben Azzai! that you did not serve as a disciple to R. Aqiba!" [T. [Ned. 6:5A-J](#)].**

K. So how [75A] does this Tannaite statement accord with the view of R. Ammi anyhow?

L. Because the Tannaite formulation says, **or cases in which there is an act of bespeaking or not**. [That consideration is irrelevant, just as he says.] Or, alternately, it derives from the opening clause: **Once that woman has come into his domain, she is entirely his**. But if he didn't betroth her, how is she entirely his? It follows that he has carried out an act of bespeaking to her.

I.5 A. What is the meaning of the Tannaite statement's phrase, **Just as matters are in regard to all other matters, so is the rule when it comes to vows**?

B. Said Raba, "This is the sense of the Tannaite statement: Don't you concur that if one rapes her, he is not subjected to the penalty of stoning, as would be the case of a betrothed maiden?" [Freedman: Even if an act of bespeaking has been made, the seducer is not stoned to death; which proves she is not yet his wife and the same trait pertains to vows.]

C. Said R. Ashi, "A close reading of the Mishnah paragraph yields the same point: **A deceased childless brother's widow is not wholly [betrothed] to the levir [alone] in the way in which a betrothed girl is wholly [betrothed] to her husband.**"

10:7

- A. He who says to his wife, "All vows which you will vow from this time until I return from such-and-such a place, lo, they are confirmed," has said nothing whatsoever.
- B. [If he says], "Lo, they are annulled" –
- C. R. Eliezer says, "It is annulled."
- D. And sages say, "It is not annulled."
- E. Said R. Eliezer, "If he annulled vows which have the force of a prohibition, will he not annul vows which have not had the force of a prohibition?"

- F. They said to him, “Lo, Scripture says, ‘Her husband will confirm it and her husband will annul it’ (Num. 30:14) –
- G. **“That which enters the category of confirmation enters the category of annulment. That which does not enter into the category of confirmation does not enter into the category of annulment.”**

- I.1**
- A. *The question was raised: In the theory of R. Eliezer, do the vows take effect and then are annulled, or perhaps they never take effect at all?*
 - B. *Yeah, yeah, so what difference does it make?*
 - C. **[75B]** *A case in which a third party made a vow depend on this one’s vow. If you maintain that the wife’s vows take effect, then the third party’s dependence is valid, and if you say they do not take effect, then there is nothing of substance in the third party’s statement!*
 - D. *Come and take note: “If he annulled vows which have the force of a prohibition, will he not annul vows which have not had the force of a prohibition?” That latter clause proves that the vows never take effect at all.*
 - E. *But is the language used, which do not have the force? The language that is used is, **which have not had the force**, that is to say, which have not yet had the force of a prohibition [Freedman: yet they take effect only to be immediately made void].*
 - F. *Come and take note: Said to them R. Eliezer, “If in a situation in which a man cannot nullify his own vows, namely, once he has taken them, he still can nullify his own vows, that is, prior to taking them [saying, ‘whatever vow I take is null’], then in a case in which he can nullify vows once they are made, namely, in the case of his wife, how much the more should he have the power to nullify vows before the wife has taken them!” [T. Ned. 6:5N]. Doesn’t this mean that his wife’s vows are equivalent to his? That is, just as his vows are null and never take effect, so his wife’s vows should not take effect at all!*
 - G. *Not at all, each is governed by a rule particular to its classification.*
 - H. *Come and take note: They said to R. Eliezer, “The case of an immersion pool will prove the matter. Just as in the case of an immersion pool, which raises unclean things out of their status of uncleanness, does not prevent clean things from contracting uncleanness, a man, who does not have the power to raise something unclean from its condition of uncleanness, surely should not have the power to afford protection for clean things from contracting uncleanness” [T. Ned. 6:5M]. What this*

proves is that the vows never take effect. [A husband may nullify the vow after it has taken effect, not before.]

- I. **[76A]** *Note then what follows:* They said to R. Eliezer, “If they immerse an unclean utensil so as to clean it, will they immerse a clean utensil with the notion that when it later on becomes unclean, it will also at the same moment become clean?” [Obviously not.] *It must therefore follow that the vows do take effect but then are nullified.*
- J. *Say: Rabbis had no clear grasp of the position of R. Eliezer, so their message to him was this: What’s your choice? Do you hold that the vows take effect and then are nullified? Then you are refuted by the analogy of the utensil. If you maintain that they don’t take effect at all, you are refuted by the analogy of the immersion pool.*
- K. *Come and take note:* Said to them R. Eliezer, “If seeds that have contracted uncleanness are made clean of that uncleanness when they are planted in the ground, how much the more so will that be the case if they already are sown and rooted in the ground!” *This proves that the vows don’t take effect at all.*
- L. *So don’t rabbis accept the validity of that argument a fortiori? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:* Is it possible to suppose that a man may sell off his daughter when she is in the status of a pubescent girl [twelve years and a day old through twelve years six months and one day]? You may state the following argument a fortiori [to prove that he may not do so]: Now if a girl who had already been sold goes forth [from the prior relationship] at the time under discussion, one who had never been sold surely may not be sold at all!
- M. **[76B]** *True, enough, in general they do invoke the argument a fortiori, but this case is exceptional, for Scripture has said explicitly, “Her husband may confirm it and her husband may annul it” (Num. 30:14) – That which enters the category of confirmation enters the category of annulment. That which does not enter into the category of confirmation does not enter into the category of annulment.*

10:8

- A. **The annulment of vows [may be done] all day long.**
- B. **There is in this matter a basis for a lenient ruling and for a stringent ruling.**
- C. **How so?**

- D. [If] she vowed on the night of the Sabbath, [the husband] annuls the vow on the night of the Sabbath and on the Sabbath day, down to nightfall.
- E. [But if] she vowed just before nightfall, he annuls the vow only until it gets dark.
- F. For if it should get dark and he should not annul the vow, he cannot annul the vow [any longer].

- I.1** A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority: The annulment of vows [may be done] all day long.*
- B. **R. Yosé b. R. Judah and R. Eliezer b. R. Simeon say, “Twenty-four hours [from the taking of the vow]” [T. Ned. 6:1A].**

C. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of the first of the two Tannaite statements?*

D. Said Scripture, “But if her husband disallows her on the day that he heard it” (Num. 30: 9).

E. *And what is the other sages’ pertinent verse of Scripture?*

F. “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15), [which is to say, twenty-four hours].

G. *Well, then, the first Tannaite authority also has to deal with the verse, “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15)!*

H. *It is necessary to say that verse too, for if in hand we had only the verse, “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15), I might say, by day and not by night. Therefore: “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15).*

I. *According to the authorities that cite, “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15), what about “But if her husband disallows her on the day that he heard it” (Num. 30: 9)?*

J. *It is necessary to say that verse too, for if in hand we had only the verse, “But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day” (Num. 30:15), I might think that he can annul her vows from the first day of one week to the first day of the next; therefore it is written, “But if her husband disallows her on the day that he heard it” (Num. 30: 9).*

I.2 A. Said R. Simeon b. Pazzi said R. Joshua b. Levi, “The decided law is not in accord with the opinion of that pair of authorities.”

B. *Levi considered making a practical ruling in accord with the position of those Tannaite authorities. Said to him Rab, ‘This is what my uncle said, ‘The decided law is not in accord with the opinion of that pair of authorities.’”*

I.3 A. Hiyya bar Rab would shoot arrows and simultaneously examine [the case of someone who wished to be released from a vow].

B. Rabbah b. R. Huna would sit down in session and get up again.

- I.4** A. **[77A]** *We have learned in the Mishnah elsewhere: They abrogate vows on the Sabbath. And on the Sabbath they receive applications for the nullification of vows concerning matters which are required for the Sabbath [M. Shab. 24:5A-B]. So the question was raised: Do they abrogate on the Sabbath vows only if it is necessary for purposes of the Sabbath observance, or perhaps that is not a condition upon which sages insist?*
- B. *Come and take note of what R. Zuti of the household of R. Pappi presented as a Tannaite statement: Vows are nullified on the Sabbath only when they have to do with the necessities of observing the Sabbath.*
- C. *Said R. Ashi, “But have we not learned in the Mishnah along these lines: [But if] she vowed just before nightfall, he annuls the vow only until it gets dark? But if you maintain that the nullification can take place only when it is necessary for Sabbath observance but not otherwise, why specify that he may do so only before nightfall? He cannot nullify the vow even by day, since the nullification is unnecessary for the Sabbath observance [that is, it cannot be necessary for the sake of the Sabbath to nullify a vow made just before nightfall].”*
- D. *It is a conflict among Tannaite formulations, namely: The annulment of vows [may be done] all day long. R. Yosé b. R. Judah and R. Eliezer b. R. Simeon say, “Twenty-four hours [from the taking of the vow]” [T. Ned. 6:1A].*
- E. *From the perspective of him who maintains that they can be nullified only the whole of that day but not afterward, he can nullify them even if it is not necessary for the Sabbath. On the view of him who holds that he may do so*

for twenty-four hours, he may nullify the vow only if it is necessary for the Sabbath observance, but not otherwise.

- I.5** A. **And on the Sabbath they receive applications for the nullification of vows concerning matters which are required for the Sabbath [M. Shab. 24:5A-B].** *The question was raised: Is that the rule only if he had no time to do so prior to the Sabbath, or even if he had time to do so prior to the Sabbath does that rule apply?*
- B. *Come and take note of the fact that rabbis accepted an inquiry for the son of R. Zutra b. R. Zeira even in the case of vows when they had sufficient time to do so while it was still day.*
- I.6** A. *R. Joseph considered ruling, "Inquiries are accepted on the Sabbath in the case of an individual who is expert, but not in the case of three common folk [who are not experts in the matter], because these latter would appear to be a court convened on the Sabbath."*
- B. *Said to him Abbaye, "Well, anyhow, since we take the view that it may be done even standing up [not only sitting, as in the cases of judges], even by relatives, and even at night, such a body would never appear to be a court."*
- I.7** A. *Said R. Abba said R. Huna said Rab, "The decided law is that at night they nullify vows."*
- B. *Well, [what's the big deal?] After all, that's an explicit statement in our Mishnah: [If] she vowed on the night of the Sabbath, [the husband] annuls the vow on the night of the Sabbath and on the Sabbath day, down to nightfall.*
- C. *Rather, say: "The decided law is that at night they accept inquiries concerning the nullification of vows."*
- D. *Said R. Abba to R. Huna, "Did Rab really say so?"*
- E. *He said, "He shut up."*
- F. *He said to him, "Do you mean to say that he shut up, or that he was drinking?"*
- G. *Said R. Iqa bar Abin, "Rab accepted the inquiry of Rabbah [77B] in a room in the household of Rab, while the master was standing, all by himself, and at night."*
- I.8** A. *Said Raba said R. Nahman, "The decided law is that they accept inquiries concerning the nullification of vows while standing, doing so as an individual, conducting the proceeding at night, on the Sabbath, even if related to the party*

in question, and even if the people had time to do it while it was still day [prior to the Sabbath].”

B. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:* Rabban Gamaliel got off his ass, wrapped himself in a robe, sat down, and released his vow?

C. *Rabban Gamaliel took the view that the master who is asked to release the vow must provide a proposed basis for releasing the vow, so that the vow may be released to begin with; since this requires some reflection, he sat down.*

- D. *R. Nahman, by contrast, took the view that they do not have to provide a proposed basis for releasing the vow; therefore the sage involved may even remain standing.*
- E. *Said Raba to R. Nahman, “See, master, one of the rabbis has come from the West and said, ‘Our rabbis accepted the inquiry of the son of R. Huna bar Abin and released his vow, saying to him, ‘Go, pray for mercy, for you have sinned.’”*
- F. *For R. Dimi, brother of R. Safra, stated as a Tannaite formulation, “Whoever takes a vow, even though he carries it out, is called a sinner.”*
- G. *Said R. Zebid, “What is the pertinent verse of Scripture? ‘But if you shall forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in you’ (Deu. 23:23) – lo, if you did not forbear, it is a sin.”*

I.9 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **He who says to his wife, “All the vows that you may take – I object to your taking vows,” or, “They are not vows” – has said nothing whatsoever.**
- C. **“Well done,” “There is no one like you,” “if you hadn’t vowed, I would have imposed a vow on you” – these statements of his are effective [cf. T. Ned. 6:1H-J].**
- D. A man should not say to his wife on the Sabbath, “It is annulled for you,” or, “It is voided for you,” in the manner in which he would make such a statement, in response to a vow, taken on weekdays; but he should say, “Take and eat it,” “Take and drink it,” and the vow is released on its own.
- E. Said R. Yohanan, “He must nullify the vow in his heart.”

I.10 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. The House of Shammai say, “On the Sabbath he nullifies it in his heart, and on a weekday he makes an explicit statement to the same effect.”
- C. And the House of Hillel say, “The same rule applies to both cases: He may nullify it in his heart, and he does not have to make an explicit statement to the same effect.”

I.11 A. Said R. Yohanan, “A sage who made a statement in the language that a husband would use, or a husband who made a statement in the language that a sage would use, has said nothing.”

B. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Num. 30: 2) – the sage declares a vow released, and a husband does not declare a vow released.

D. For one might to the contrary have supposed, if the husband, who cannot nullify the vow, can release the vow, the husband, who can nullify the vow, surely should be able to release it once it has taken effect!

E. Scripture therefore says, **[78A]** “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Num. 30: 2) – the sage declares a vow released, and a husband does not declare a vow released.

I.12 A. *Furthermore it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Num. 30: 2) – the husband nullifies the vow, and the sage does not nullify the vow.
- C. For one might to the contrary have supposed, if the husband, who cannot release the vow, has the power to nullify the vow, the sage, who does have the power to release the vow, surely should have the power also to nullify the vow!
- D. Scripture therefore says, “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Num. 30: 2) – the husband nullifies the vow, and the sage does not nullify the vow.

I.13 A. Here we find, “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Num. 30: 2), and elsewhere, in the context of making sacrifices outside of the Temple court, it is written, “This is the thing that the Lord has commanded” (Lev. 17: 2). Just as in the latter case, Aaron and his sons as well as all Israelites are covered by the law, so the chapter on vows pertains to Aaron, his sons, and all Israel.

And just as here, the address is to the heads of the tribes, so there, too, the reference is to the heads of the tribes.

B. *With regard to the chapter on vows, for what concrete purpose is the law set forth?*

C. Said R. Aha bar Jacob, "It is to validate the action when done by three untrained persons."

D. *But lo, the Scripture makes reference in context to the heads of the tribes!*

E. Said R. Hisda – others say, R. Yohanan, "It is to show that an individual who is an expert may do so."

F. *With regard to slaughtering animals as sacrifices outside of the Temple court, for what concrete purpose is the law set forth?*

G. Said R. Sheshet, "To indicate that there is the possibility of releasing a statement of sanctification of an object [just as one may release a vow]."

H. *And from the perspective of the House of Shammai, which has said, "There is no possibility of releasing a statement of sanctification of an object [just as one may release a vow]," for what concrete purpose is the law set forth in regard to slaughtering animals as sacrifices outside of the Temple court?*

I. *The House of Shammai does not accept the validity of this particular argument based on a verbal analogy.*

J. *And for what purpose is "This is the thing" written with regard to the passage that deals with vows?*

K. It is to say that a sage releases a vow, but a husband does not release a vow, a husband nullifies a vow, and a sage does not nullify a vow.

L. *And for what purpose is "This is the thing" written with regard to the passage that deals with slaughtering animals as sacrifices outside of the Temple court?*

M. To say that one is liable for performing outside of the Temple court an act of slaughter, but one is not liable for killing a bird by wringing its neck outside of the Temple court.

N. *And from the perspective of the House of Shammai, how on the basis of Scripture do we validate the action when done by three untrained persons?*

O. *They derive that proposition from what R. Assi bar Nathan said, "It is written, 'And Moses declared to the children of Israel the set feasts of the Lord' (Lev. 23:44), on which it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Yosé the Galilean says, 'Reference is made in particular to the set feasts, but not to the Sabbath that commemorates creation.' Ben Azzai says, 'Reference is made to set feasts, and reference is not made to the chapter concerning vows.'"*

P. *Now R. Assi bar Nathan found this Tannaite passage difficult, so he went to Nehardea, to R. Sheshet, but did not find him. He went after him to Mehoza. He said to him, "'Reference is made in particular to the set feasts, but not to the Sabbath that commemorates creation'? But lo, the Sabbath is written right along with them [at Lev. 23:3, 38]! And furthermore, 'Reference is made to set feasts, and reference is not made to the chapter concerning vows'? Lo, right alongside, that matter is set forth [at Num. 28-29, right before Num. 30, which deals with vows]!"*

Q. *He said to him, "This is the sense of the Tannaite statement: [78B] The set feasts of the Lord require sanctification by a court, but the Sabbath that commemorates creation does not have to be sanctified by a court. The set feasts of the Lord require the supervision of a specialist, but the administration of the chapter dealing with vows does not require the supervision of a specialist. Even a court of unlettered people may do the work."*

R. *But in reference to the chapter dealing with vows, reference is made to the heads of the tribes!*

S. Said R. Hisda – and some say, R. Yohanán –
“That speaks of a highly qualified individual.”

- I.14** A. Said R. Yohanán, “He who in order to bait his wife keeps silence when his wife vows may subsequently nullify the vow, even ten days later.”
- B. *Objected Raba*, “**Under what circumstances did they rule that if the husband died, his power passes to the father [M. Ned. 10:2B]? When the husband did not hear the vow before he died, or the husband heard the vow and remained silent, or heard it and confirmed it, and died that day. This is what we have learned in the Mishnah: if the husband died, his power passes to the father [M. Ned. 10:2B]. But if the husband heard the vow and confirmed it or heard it and was silent and died the next day, the father cannot annul the vow [T. Ned. 6:2]. Now does this not make reference to a case in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed?**”
- C. No, it was a case in which he kept silence in order to confirm the vow.
- D. *If so, then this is the same thing as* **heard it and confirmed it!**
- E. Rather, it means, he kept silent without further articulating his reason.
- F. *Objected R. Hisda*, “A more strict rule concerns confirming vows than nullifying them, and nullifying vows than confirming them. A more strict rule concerns confirming vows [79A] than nullifying them, for remaining silent serves to confirm a vow, but remaining silent does not serve to nullify a vow. If he confirmed it in his heart, it is confirmed, but if he nullified it in his heart, it is not nullified; if he confirmed it, he cannot nullify it; if he nullified it, he cannot confirm it. *Now it is stated as the Tannaite rule*, remaining silent serves to confirm a vow! *Does this not refer to a case in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed?*”
- G. No, it was a case in which he kept silence in order to confirm the vow.
- H. *If so, then this is the same thing as* **heard it and confirmed it!**
- I. Rather, it means, he kept silent without further articulating his reason.
- J. *So we have found our instance in which* a more strict rule concerns confirming vows than nullifying them. *What about a case in which* a more strict rule concerns nullifying vows than confirming them?
- K. Said R. Yohanán, “A question may be accepted for release of a vow that has been confirmed, but not for imposition of a vow that has been nullified.”

- L. *Objected R. Kahana, “‘But if her husband altogether hold his peace at her from day to day’ (Num. 30:15) – Scripture speaks of a case in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed. You say that Scripture speaks of a case in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed. But perhaps it speaks of a case in which he kept silent in order to confirm the vow? When Scripture says, ‘because he held his peace,’ it has made reference to the husband who kept silent in order to confirm the vow; so to what situation pertains the clause, ‘but if the husband altogether holds his peace at her’? Here Scripture speaks of a case in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed.”*
- N. *That is indeed a refutation.*
- O. *Why not have one clause speak of silence to confirm a vow, and the other, silence without further articulation as to the husband’s intent?*
- P. *Because there are further clauses at hand [covering all classifications of silence].*
- Q. *Objected Raba, “ [But if] she vowed just before nightfall, he annuls the vow only until it gets dark. For if it should get dark and he should not annul the vow, he cannot annul the vow [any longer] [M. 10:8E-F]. Now why should this be the case? Let it be a case parallel to one in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed?”*
- R. *That is indeed a refutation.*
- S. *Objected R. Ashi, “[If he said,] ‘I was aware that there are vows, but I was not aware that there is the possibility of annulling them,’ he may annul [the vow]. [If he said], ‘I was aware that there is the possibility of annulling vows, but I was not aware that this particular statement was a vow’ – R. Meir says, ‘He may not annul the vow.’ And sages say, ‘He may annul the vow’ [M. 11:7A-D]. Now why should this be the case? Let it be a case parallel to one in which he who in order to bait his wife kept silence when his wife vowed?”*
- T. *That is indeed a refutation.*