

III.

BAVLI TRACTATE ROSH HASHANAH CHAPTER THREE

FOLIOS 25B-29B

3:1

- A. [If] the court and all the [people of] Israel saw [the new moon on the thirtieth day], and the witnesses were examined, but they had no chance to say, “It is sanctified,” before it [actually] got dark,
- B. lo, this [month coming to an end] is an intercalated month.
- C. [If] the court alone saw it, let two of them get up and give testimony before the rest of them,
- D. and then they should say, “It is sanctified, it is sanctified.”
- E. [If] three of them saw it, and they comprise the [entire] court, let two of them arise, and let them seat some of their colleagues with the remaining judge, and give testimony before them, so they may say, “It is sanctified, it is sanctified.”
- F. For an individual is not regarded as trustworthy by himself [to pronounce the sanctification of the month].
- I.1** A. *Why is it taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:1A: If] the court and all the [people of] Israel saw [the new moon]....? [The rule at M. R.H. 3:1A-B seems obvious and need not be stated.]*
- B. *[This rule] is needed! [If this rule were not explicitly stated] you might have thought that, since the court and all the [people of] Israel saw it, it has become general knowledge. [This being the case, the same day should be declared the new moon, and the preceding month] should not be intercalated! So [at M. R.H. 3:1A-B] we are informed [that the contrary applies]. [Even if the witnesses were examined and everyone saw that the new moon appeared, so long as the declaration “It is sanctified” has not been made, the preceding month must be intercalated through the addition of a thirty-first day.]*
- I.2** A. *Now, since it is taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:1A, that] the court and all the [people of] Israel saw [the new moon], why do I need [the additional fact that] the witnesses were examined? [Since all the people saw the new moon, why are witnesses required at all?]*

B. Here is how [M. **R.H. 3:1A-B**] should be understood: [If the court and all the people of Israel saw the new moon on the thirtieth day], or [if] the witnesses were examined, but they had no chance to say, “It is sanctified,” before it [actually] got dark, lo, this [month coming to an end] is an intercalated month.

I.3 A. Now, since it is taught on Tannaite authority [M. **R.H. 3:1A-B**: they had no chance to say, “It is sanctified,”] before it [actually] got dark, lo, this [month coming to an end] is an intercalated month, why should I have taught on Tannaite authority about the examination of the witnesses at all? [Since the declaration “It is sanctified” was not made prior to when it got dark, whether or not the witnesses were examined is irrelevant. In either case, the preceding month must be intercalated.]

B. [The fact of the witnesses’ being examined] is needed! [If the fact of witnesses being examined was not explicitly stated at M. **R.H. 3:1A-B**] you might have thought that the examination of the witnesses is comparable to the beginning of a law-suit and that the statement “It is sanctified, it is sanctified” is comparable to the conclusion of the law-suit. And [in this theory, you might have argued that, in a case in which witnesses already had been examined] one should sanctify [the new moon even] at night, [after it has gotten dark]. [One might draw this conclusion since this is] an approach that does apply in the case of commercial law, as we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. **San. 4:1**]: **In commercial cases they try the case by day and [if necessary] complete it at night.** [Based on this fact, one might have thought that] here too [in the case of the new moon, when witnesses already have been examined, that, to complete “the case”] they sanctify it at night. So we are informed [by M. **R.H. 3:1A-B**, that this is not the case].

C. But can I not say that here too [the rule about completing the case at night applies]?

D. Said Scripture [Psa. 81:4]: “For it is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Jacob.” Under what circumstances is it called a “statue”? At the conclusion of the act of judging. Now [at Psa. 81:4] the merciful calls it a “judgment.” [That is, a statue and judgment, in the sense of a legal proceeding, or “case” are equated.] [This means that] just as a judgment [must take place] by day, so here [the conclusion of the legal case concerning the declaration of the new moon must take place by day].

II.1 A. [If] the court [alone] saw it, let two of them get up and give testimony before the rest of them; [M. **R.H. 3:1C**].

B. But why? [Since the entire court saw the new moon, why is testimony required at all?] [Surely, contrary to what is indicated by the Mishnah’s rule] hearing [about what occurred] should not be given greater weight than [actually] seeing it [oneself]!

C. Said R. Zira, “[The Mishnaic rule applies in a case] such as when they saw it at night.” [Rashi: In such an instance, when the court sits the following day, witnesses are necessary to report what was seen the previous night. The point

seems to be that, since the court was not in session when the evidence was seen, it must, while in session, rely upon testimony.]

III.1 A. [If] three of them saw it, and they comprise the [entire] court, let two of them arise, and let them seat some of their colleagues with the remaining judge [M. R.H. 3:1E].

- B. *But why? [Since the entire court saw the new moon, why is testimony required at all?] Here too [contrary to what is indicated by the Mishnah's rule] hearing [about what occurred] should not be given greater weight than [actually] seeing it [oneself]! And if you say, here too, it is a case such as when they saw it at night, [then] this [case, at M. R.H. 3:1E] would be the same as that [case, at M. R.H. 3:1C-D]. [Since the Mishnah does not contain such redundancies, the point at M. R.H. 3:1E must be different.]*
- C. *[The phrasing of matters as it stands at M. R.H. 3:1E] was necessary in order to set up the conclusion [of the law, at M. R.H. 3:1F, that is]: **For an individual is not regarded as trustworthy by himself [to pronounce the sanctification of the month].***
- D. *[For, if this were not stated] you might have thought: Since, as it is taught on Tannaite authority [M. San. 4:1]: **Commercial cases are to be tried by a court of three judges.** But if the judge was recognized by the community as an expert, he even may judge even all by himself—here too, the sanctification [of the month] may be done by an individual. So we are informed [by M. R.H. 3:1E-F, that this is not the case].*
- E. *But can I not say that here too [the case may be completed by a single judge who is an expert]?*
- F. *[No!] You have no expert recognized by the community greater than Moses, our Rabbi. Yet [even so] the holy one, blessed be he, said to him, “[Do not sanctify the new month] unless Aaron is at your side,” as it is written [Exo.†12: 1-2]: “The Lord said to Moses and Aaron in the land of Egypt, ‘This month shall be for you [the beginning of months].’”*

III.2 A. [M. R.H. 3:1C-D and E] suggest that one who is [able to act as a witness] may be designated a judge. [Since it suggests this] I can argue that the Mishnaic passage does not accord with [the view of] R. Aqiba. For it is taught on Tannaite authority: “Members of a Sanhedrin that saw someone kill someone else—[26a] some of them serve as witnesses, and some of them serve as judges,” the words of R. Tarfon.

- B. R. Aqiba says, “All of them are witnesses, and a witness cannot serve as a judge.”
- C. *[Contrary to B-D] one might even argue that R. Aqiba [concurs with the rules of M. R.H. 3:1C-D and E]. Up to this point, [we can assume that] R. Aqiba did not state [the position given] there [at E, precluding a witness from acting as a judge] except for capital cases, for which the merciful said [Num. 35:24-25]: “Then the congregation shall judge [between the manslayer and the avenger of blood...], and the congregation shall rescue [the manslayer from the hand of the avenger of blood].” [Scripture requires that those who judge be willing to rescue the manslayer from the avenger.] But [Aqiba holds that] once one has seen that [the accused] killed a person, [that witness] will not find in him any merit [so as*

to be willing to rescue him, as required by law]. [For this reason, in capital cases, Aqiba does not allow a witness to act as judge.] But here [in the case of the sanctification of the new moon] even R. Aqiba concurs [with M. R.H. 3:1, that witnesses may act as judges].

3:2

- A. All shofars are valid, except for that of a cow,
- B. because it is a horn.
- C. Said R. Yosé, “But are not all shofars called horns,
- D. “as it is said [Jos. 6:5], ‘And when they make a long blast with the ram’s horn, [as soon as you hear the sound of the shofar, then all the people shall shout with a great shout]’?” [We see in this verse that the term “horn” is equated with the term “shofar.”]
- I.1 A. Correctly has R. Yosé stated [matters, at M. R.H. 3:2C, holding that all shofars are called horns].
- B. But, [as for] the Rabbis, [who stand behind the anonymous rule of M. R.H. 3:2A-B—what can they say to support their position]?
- C. [They can argue that] all shofars are called “shofar” and are called “horn.”
- D. [But] that of a cow is called “horn” but is not called “shofar.”
- E. This is as it is written [Deu. 33:17]: “His firstling bull has majesty, and his horns are the horns of a wild ox.” [The horns of a bull, deemed to be in the same category as a cow, are called by the word “horn” not “shofar.”]
- F. And R. Yosé? [How can he respond to C-E?]
- G. He will say that [the horns of] a cow are also called “shofar.”
- H. This is as it is written [Psa. 69:32]: “This will please the Lord more than a bull-cow [with horns and hoofs]. [The following plays upon the fact that, in Hebrew, the word “bull” is *shor*.]
- I. If bull [is meant], why [does it also say] cow?
- J. If cow [is meant], why [does it also say] bull? [Clearly, the text cannot mean literally “bull-cow”.]
- K. Rather, what [is meant here]?
- L. [The words] “bull-cow” [*shor-par*] refer to [the word] “shofar.”
- M. And [as for] the Rabbis? [How do they interpret Psa. 69:32?]
- N. [They interpret it] like R. Mattenah, for said R. Mattenah, “What is [meant by] ‘bull-cow’?
- O. “[It is a young bull] that grew to be a cow.” [Simon, p. 116, n. 7: “The name *shor* could be applied only to the animal at birth; the name *par* not till it entered its third year.”]
- P. Ulla said, “The explanation of the Rabbis is like that of Rab Hisda.
- Q. “For said Rab Hisda, ‘Why does the high priest not enter the inner most area [that is, the holy-of-holies] to worship there [on the Day of Atonement] wearing golden clothing?
- R. “‘It is because the accuser cannot be made the defender.’” [Gold is reminiscent of the golden calf and so acts as accuser of the people Israel. The high priest and his

worship, including his garments, serve to defend the people. Gold, the accuser, can have no role in that. Ulla's point is that, comparably, a cow's horn, reminiscent of the golden calf, cannot serve as a shofar, the blowing of which defends the people of Israel.]

- S. *But [can the accuser in fact] not [serve as defender]?*
- T. *For, indicating the contrary, there is the blood of the calf. [Like gold, the calf can be seen as an accuser. Even so its blood is sprinkled by the high priest on the Day of Atonement.]*
- U. *[For the reason given here, the case of blood is different.] Since it has been changed [and no longer is in the form of the calf], it is deemed changed [and, unlike the calf from which it is derived, is not an agent of accusation].*
- V. *[We have a second example that challenges R.] But there is also the ark, with its mercy-seat, and the cherub. [These are agents of atonement are made with a great deal of gold.]*
- W. *[That concern is not at issue for the ark, mercy-seat, and cherub.] [So that these items need not serve as defenders at all] we say that a sinner may not bring an offering.*
- X. *[Again challenging R:] But there is the spoon and censor [made of gold and used by the high priest in the holy-of-holies].*
- Y. *[To avoid the problem] a sinner should not adorn himself [with these things], we say.*
- Z. *But there is the golden clothing used by the high priest outside [of the holy-of-holies]!*
- AA. *[Only] concerning [that which occurs] in the inner areas [of the Temple] did we say [that R applies].*
 - BB. *[We can return to the question of the use of the cow's horn and suggest that, contrary to R, it should not be excluded.] [Now, as for] a shofar, it similarly is used outside [and not in the inner most areas of the sanctuary].*
 - CC. *[The problem with the shofar is different.] Insofar as it is meant to encourage remembering, it is as though [it were used] inside. [Accordingly, as R argued, it cannot derive from an animal that would represent an accusation against the people.]*
- I.2 A.** *[The Talmud reflects upon BB-CC's explanation for the exclusion of the cow's horn, which argues that, as in other instances, "the accuser may not be made the defender." The problem is that M. **R.H. 3:2B** explains on different grounds the exclusion of the cow's horn from use as a shofar.] But [contrary to what is proposed above], lo, the Tannaite authority [at M. **R.H. 3:2B**] teaches [that a cow's horn may not be used as a shofar] **because it is a horn.** [Since the Mishnah states explicitly that this is the reason, the Talmudic explanation, concluded above at BB-CC, cannot be correct.]*
- B. *[A incorrectly evaluates the Mishnaic authority's point.] [Contrary to what A proposes, the Tannaite authority] stated [only] one [possible reason].*

- C. *But [he is able to] state yet another [reason]:*
- D. *[One reason for the exclusion of the cow's horn is] that an accuser may not be made the defender.*
- E. *But another [reason is] **because it is a horn** [as M. **R.H. 3:2B** states].*

I.3 A. *Now, [as for] R. Yosé, [M. **R.H. 3:2C**, who permits use of the cow's horn as a shofar—how does he respond to the claim that a cow's horn may not be used because an accuser may not be made the defender]?]*

- B. *He can say to you: “That which you say, that an accuser may not be made the defender, applies only in the inner areas [of the Temple]. But [as for] a shofar, [it is used] outside [and therefore should be permitted to be made from a cow's horn]. And [as for] your statement [M. **R.H. 3:2B**, that the cow's horn is excluded] **because it is a horn**—[that objection is of no weight, since] all shofars likewise are called ‘horn.’”*

I.4 A. *Abbaye said, “The Rabbis reason [for excluding a cow's horn from use as a shofar, M. **R.H. 3:2A-B**, is that] the merciful said [that is, required] a [single] shofar, but not two or three shofars, and that of a cow, insofar as it is comprised of layer upon layer, appears to be two or three shofars.”*

- B. *But [contrary to what Abbaye proposes], lo, the Tannaite authority [at M. **R.H. 3:2B**] teaches [that a cow's horn may not be used as a shofar] **because it is a horn**. [Since the Mishnah states explicitly that this is the reason, Abbaye's explanation cannot be correct.]*
- C. *[The Tannaite authority] stated [only] one [possible reason]. But [he is able to] state yet another [reason]: [One reason for the exclusion of the cow's horn is] that the merciful said [that is, required] a [single] shofar, but not two or three shofars. But another [reason is] **because it is a horn** [as M. **R.H. 3:2B** states].*
- D. *Now, [as for] R. Yosé, [M. **R.H. 3:2C**, who permits use of the cow's horn as a shofar—how does he respond to the claim that a cow's horn may not be used because it appears to be more than a single horn]?]*
- E. *He can say: “Insofar as you have said that the merciful said [that is, required] one [shofar] and not two or three shofars—since [the layers of the cow's horn] are [tightly] joined to each other, it is [treated as] a single [shofar, so as to be permitted]. And [as for] your statement [M. **R.H. 3:2B**, that the cow's horn is excluded] **because it is a horn**—[that objection is of no weight, since] all shofars likewise are called ‘horn.’”*

I.5 A. *How do we know that the term yobel [found at Jos. 6: 5, and rendered at M. **R.H. 3:2D** as “ram”] actually means “ram”?*

- B. *[We know this] for it is taught on Tannaite authority: Said R. Aqiba, “When I went to Arabia, [I heard that] they called a ram [by the term] ‘yobel.’”*

C. *And said R. Aqiba, “When I went to Gallia, they called a menstruant [by the term] ‘galmuda.’”*

- D. *What is [the meaning of] “galmuda”? This one is set apart [gamul da] from her husband.*
- E. And said R. Aqiba, “When I went to Africa, they called a *maah* [that is, a small coin, by the term] ‘*keshitah*.’”
- F. *What is the practical significance of this [fact]?*
- G. *[It is important] for the interpretation [of Gen. 33:19: “And from the sons of Hamor, Shechem’s father, he bought for] a hundred keshitah [the piece of land on which he had pitched his tent].”*
- H. In Scripture [it refers to] a hundred *danqi*.
- I.6 A.** [The theme of the preceding continues.] Said Rabbi, “When I went to sea-ports, they called ‘selling’ [*mekirah*] [by the term] ‘*kirah*.’”
- B. *What is the practical significance of this [fact]?*
- C. *[It is important] for the interpretation [of Gen. 50: 5, Joseph’s citation of a statement made by Jacob: “In my tomb] which I bought (root: KRH) for myself in the land of Canaan, there shall you bury me].”*
- I.7 A.** [The theme of the preceding continues.] Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “When I went to district of Kennesrin, they called a bride “*ninfe*” and a cock “*sekvi*.”
- B. A bride “*ninfe*”?
- C. *What is the basis for this in Scripture?*
- D. [Psa. 48: 3, referring to Mt. Zion, states]: “beautiful in elevation (*yph nwp*), the joy of all the earth.” [The term “beautiful in elevation is deemed related to the word “*ninfe*,” and hence to describe a bride.)
- E. And a cock “*sekvi*”?
- D. *Said Rab Judah said Rab, and some say, R. Joshua b. Levi, “What is the basis for this in Scripture?*
- E. “[Job. 38:36 says]: ‘Who has put wisdom in the *tuhot*, or given understanding to the *sekvi*?
- F. “‘Who has put wisdom in the *tuhot*’—these are the kidneys.
- G. “‘Or given understanding to the *sekvi*’—this is the cock.
- I.8 A.** [This is a slight variation on the theme of the preceding.] *Levi happened to be in a certain place. A man came before him [and] told him [26b] [that] a certain person is a qaba’an.*
- B. [Levi] *did not know what he was telling him, [since he did not understand the term “qaba’an”].*

- C. *He came to ask in the house of study.*
- D. *They said to him, "He told you [the man is] a robber,*
- E. *"as it is written [Mal. 3: 8]: 'Will man rob [KB] God?'"*
 - F. *Said Raba from Barnish to Rab Ashi, "If I had been there [and had not understood the word], I would have asked him. 'Were did he qaba^c you, of what did he qaba^c you, why did he qaba^c you," and from what he said, I would have found out [the meaning of the term]."*
 - G. *But the other [that is, Levi, had not done this since] he thought the person was referring to a forbidden matter [that Levi was not meant to understand].*
- I.9 A.** *[The theme of the preceding continues.] The Rabbis did not know the meaning of the term serugin [which occurs at M. **Meg. 2:2**, describing a permitted manner of reading the Scroll of Esther].*
- B. *They heard a handmaid of the house of Rabbi, who saw the Rabbis entering a few at a time, say to them, "For how long are you going to keep coming in serugin?"*
- C. *The Rabbis did not know the meaning of the term haluglaot [referred to, e.g., at M. **Sheb. 9:1**].*
- D. *One day they heard a handmaid of the house of Rabbi, who saw a certain man scattering purslane.*
- E. *She said to him, "For how long will you scatter haluglaot."*
- F. *The Rabbis did not know the meaning of [the first word in Pro. 4: 8]: "salsalah and it will exalt you."*
- G. *One day they heard a handmaid of the house of Rabbi, who said to a man who was curling his hair, "For how long will you salsel your hair?"*
- H. *The Rabbis did not know the meaning of [the two related word in Isa. 14:23]: "And I will ta'ta' with the mata'te' of destruction."*
- I. *One day they heard a handmaid of the house of Rabbi, who said to her counterpart, "Take this ta'tita' [broom] and sweep the house."*
- J. *The Rabbis did not know the meaning of [a word in Psa. 55:22]: "Cast your yehab on the Lord, and he will sustain you."*
- K. *Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah, "One day I was traveling with a certain Arab. I was carrying a load, and he said to me, 'Lift up your yehab and place it on [one of] the camels.'"*

3:3

- A. The shofar for the New Year derives from an antelope.
- B. It is straight
- C. and its mouth is overlaid with gold.
- D. And at the sides [of the one who blew the shofar] are two [who blow] trumpets.
- E. The shofar [is sounded] for a long note, and the trumpets [are sounded] for a short note,
- F. for the [religious] obligation of the day applies to the shofar.

3:4

- A. And [those used] on fast days are rams' horns.
- B. They are curved
- C. and their mouth is overlaid with silver.
- D. And in the middle [of those who blew the shofar] are two [who sound] the trumpets.
- E. The shofar [is sounded] for a short note, and the trumpets [are sounded] for a long note,
- F. for the [religious] obligation of that day applies to the trumpets.

3:5

- A. The [proclamation of the] year of Jubilee is equivalent to the New Year in regard to the sounding of the shofar and to the blessings.
- B. R. Judah says, "On the New Year they sound the rams' horn, and at the Jubilee Year they sound antelopes' horns."

- I.1** A. Said R. Levi, "The [religious] obligation of the New Year and the Day of Atonement is [carried out] with curved [shofars], while that of the rest of the year is [carried out] with straight [shofars]."
- B. *But [suggesting the contrary] thus we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:3A-B]: The shofar for the New Year derives from an antelope. It is straight.* [By contrast, Levi, A, says it is curved.]
- C. *That which [Levi] said accords with this Tannaite master, as it is taught on Tannaite authority: R. Judah says, "On the New Year they would blow a ram's [horn] that was curved, while [for purposes of proclaiming] the year of the Jubilee [they used] an antelope's [horn]."*
- D. *[Challenging C:] Now, [if C is correct, then, instead of stating matters in his own words, Levi, A, should simply have] said, "The decided law accords with [the view of] R. Judah."*
- E. *[Levi did not do that since], if you [simply] said that the decided law accords with [the view of] R. Judah, one would believe that you concur with [the view of] R. Judah for [the case] of the [proclamation of the] Jubilee as well. So we are informed [that Levi concurs with Judah about the horn used on New Year but not about that used for proclaiming the year of the Jubilee].*

- I.2 A.** *[The Talmud now evaluates the dispute between Judah and the anonymous authority at M. R.H. 3:3A-B and 3:4A-B.] Concerning what do they disagree?*
- B. *One master [that is, Judah] reasons that on the New Year, the more a man curves his mind, the more effective [is his prayer]. But on the Day of Atonement, the more the person makes his thinking straight-forward, the more effective [is his prayer].*
- C. *But [the other] master reasons [M. R.H. 3:3A-B] that on the New Year the more the person makes his thinking straight-forward, the more effective [is his prayer]. But on fast days [M. R.H. 3:3A-B], the more a man curves his mind, the more effective [is his prayer].*

- II.2 A. [27a]** **And its mouth is overlaid with gold [M. R.H. 3:3C, referring to the shofar used for the New Year].**
- B. *But [suggesting the contrary] thus we have taught on Tannaite authority [T. R.H. 2:4: If] **one overlaid it with gold at a place the mouth touches, it is invalid.***
- C. *[If it is overlaid with gold] at a place the mouth does not touch, it is valid.*
- D. *[Resolving the contradiction] said Abbaye, “That which we taught on Tannaite authority in the Mishnah we also taught in reference to a place the mouth does not touch.”*

III.1 A. And [on New Year] at the sides [of the one who blew the shofar] are two [who blow] trumpets [M. R.H. 3:3D].

- B. *Now [this seems unacceptable, since] can two sounds be [distinctly] heard [at once]? [The affect of playing the shofar and trumpets together is that the shofar will not be heard. This would result in a violation of the religious obligation to hear the shofar.]*
- C. *And [to indicate that, as B states, two distinct sounds cannot be heard at the same time] thus it is taught on Tannaite authority: [The word] “Remember” [in the fourth commandment as recorded at Exo. 20:8] and [the word] “Observe” [in the fourth commandment as recorded at Deu. 5:12] were stated in a single act of speech,*
- D. *which [is something] the [human] mouth cannot pronounce and the ear cannot hear.*
- E. *[In light of B-D, the issue is how the shofar, played along with the trumpets, could be heard. That question is answered here.] For this reason, one plays a long note on the shofar.*

III.2 A. [The implication of the preceding unit is stated.] This is to say that if one hears the end of the blast but not the beginning of the blast, he has fulfilled [his obligation to hear the shofar]. And it goes without saying [that if he heard] the beginning of the blast but not the end of the blast, he has fulfilled [his obligation].

- B. *[The following independent construction explains M. R.H. 4:9] **Come and learn [M. R.H. 4:9: If] one sounded the first Teqi'ah-blast [of the set of three] and then sustained the second blast for twice as long, he [still] has credit only for one.*** *[That is, he cannot count the sustained blast half for the first set and half for a later set.] Why [does he get credit for only one]? [Rather] you should [deem*

the blast to] be divided into two parts [so as to allow credit for two separate blasts]!

- C. *[This cannot be done, since] we do not divide a single blast. [Since a blast is indivisible, in order to fulfill one's obligation to hear the shofar, he must hear all of it.]*
- D. *Come and learn [M. R.H. 3:7]: He who sounds the shofar into a cistern, cellar, or large jar—if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he heard the sound of the echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Why? [To the contrary] let him [be deemed] to have fulfilled his obligation [by having heard] the beginning of the blast, before it became mixed up with the sound [of the echo]!*
- E. *Rather two voices coming from a single person cannot be distinguished. [The point seems to be to reject the notion that one ever can distinguish the sound of the shofar from that of the echo.] [But two voices] coming from two people can be distinguished.*
- F. *Indeed, coming from two people can [separate sounds] be distinguished?*
- G. *But [suggesting the contrary] thus it is taught on Tannaite authority [T. Meg. 3:20]: In [the public reading of] the Torah [in the synagogue] one person reads and one translates [into Aramaic]. But [one should not read while two translate, nor should two read while one translates], nor should two read while two translate. [When two people talk together, neither voice can be distinguished. As a result, the person who hears does not fulfill the obligation to hear the reading of the Torah. Accordingly, it is unclear how what is described at M. R.H. 3:3D can be allowed.]*
- H. *But [the issue of M. R.H. 3:3D] resembles only the conclusion [of the text cited: For the [public recitation of the] Hallel and the Scroll [of Esther], even ten [people] may read [together]. I can argue that, since [these liturgical passages] are beloved, [people] pay attention [and are able to distinguish individual voices]. Here too [in the case of the shofar blown along with trumpets, M. R.H. 3:3D], since [the sound of the shofar] is beloved, [people] pay attention and [distinctly] hears [the sound of the shofar].*
- I. *Then why does one play a long note [on the shofar]?*
- J. *To make known that the [religious] obligation of the day is filled through the shofar [and not the trumpets].*

IV.1 A. And [those used] on fast days are rams' horns. They are curved, and their mouth is overlaid with silver [M. R.H. 3:4A-C].

- B. *What is distinctive there [in the case of the shofar used for New Year, M. R.H. 3:3C, such that] gold [is used]? And what is distinctive here [in the case of the shofar used for fast days such that] silver [is used]?*
- C. *If you wish I can explain that [for] all public assemblies silver [is used], as it is written [Num. 10: 2]: "Make two silver trumpets; [of hammered work you shall make them, and you shall use them for summoning the congregation and for breaking camp]." And if you wish I can explain that the Torah took pity upon the wealth of [the people of] Israel, [allowing the use of silver to spare expense].*

- D. *[If that is the case] there too [in the case of the shofar used for New Year] it should be made with silver!*
- E. *Despite this consideration the honor due the holiday took precedence, [so that gold was prescribed].*

IV.2 A. *Rab Pappa bar Samuel intended to do things as [described] in the Mishnah, [that is, using both a shofar and trumpets].*

- B. *Said to him Raba, “They gave that instruction only for the sanctuary.”*
- C. *That which is taught on Tannaite authority makes the same point: For what [circumstance] were these things [at M. R.H. 3:3-5] said? For the sanctuary. But outside of the Temple, in a situation in which [one uses] trumpets [e.g., on fast days], there is no shofar. [And] in a situation in which [one uses] a shofar [e.g., for New Year and to proclaim the start of the Jubilee], there are not trumpets.*
- D. *And thus did R. Halafta direct [the community to act] in Sepphoris,*
- E. *and R. Hanania b. Teradion in Sikni. [From the continuation of the passage, it appears that, like Pappa bar Samuel, A, Halafta and Hanania wished to use both trumpets and shofar outside of the Temple.]*
- F. *And when this matter came before the sages, they said, “They do not follow this practice [of using trumpets and shofar except at the Eastern Gate and on the Temple Mount [itself].”*
- G. *Said Raba, and some say R. Joshua b. Levi, “What is the [foundation] in Scripture [for this rule]? As it is written [Psa. 98: 6]: ‘With trumpets and the sound of the horn make a joyful noise in the presence of the King, the Lord!’ [The verse indicates that] ‘in the presence of the King, the Lord’ [that is, in the Temple itself] we require trumpets and the sound of the shofar. But anywhere else, no!”*

V.1 A. **The [proclamation of the] year of Jubilee is equivalent to the New Year in regard to the sounding of the shofar and to the blessings [M. R.H. 3:5A].**

- B. *Said Rab Samuel bar Isaac, “Nowadays, on whose [authority] do we pray [on New Year]: ‘Today is the beginning of your works, the commemoration of the first day’?*
- C. *On whose [authority]?*
- D. *On [the authority of] Eliezer, who said, “In Tishré, the world was created.”*
- E. *Objected Rab Ena [to the premise of M. R.H. 3:5A, which states]: “**The [proclamation of the] year of Jubilee is equivalent to the New Year in regard to the sounding of the shofar and to the blessings.** But [this clearly is not the case], since we have [the statement], ‘Today is the beginning of your works, the commemoration of the first day’ which applies on the New Year but does not apply in the Jubilee.” [Accordingly it appears that the blessings used on New Year are not the same as those used for the proclamation of the Jubilee.]*
- G. *When [the statement at M. R.H. 3:5A] was taught on Tannaite authority, [it was taught] in reference to all other aspects [of New Year and the Jubilee].*
- H. *Rab Shisha the son of Rab Idi teaches [the preceding discussion] as follows:*
- I. *Said Rab Samuel bar Isaac, “That which we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:5A]: **The [proclamation of the] year of Jubilee is equivalent to the***

New Year in regard to the sounding of the shofar and to the blessings—in accordance with which [authority is this stated]?

- J. *It is not in accordance with [the view of] R. Eliezer.*
- K. *For if [one were to claim that it is] R. Eliezer, [that would not make sense], since he said, “In Tishré, the world was created.”*
- L. *Lo, we have [the statement, which Eliezer will accept], “Today is the beginning of your works, the commemoration of the first day,” which applies on the New Year but does not apply in the Jubilee. [Eliezer, who accepts this statement, cannot stand behind M. **R.H. 3:5A**, which holds that the blessings for New Year and the proclamation of the Jubilee are the same.]*
- M. *When [the statement at M. **R.H. 3:5A**] was taught on Tannaite authority, [it was taught] in reference to all other aspects [of New Year and the Jubilee].*

3:6

- A. **A shofar which cracked and which they stuck together is invalid.**
- B. **[If] one stuck together the shreds of shofars, [the shofar constructed in that way] is invalid.**
- C. **[27b] [If] it was perforated and one filled up the hole—**
- D. **if [the filled hole] affects the sound of the shofar, it is invalid.**
- E. **But if not, it is valid.**

3:7

- A. **He who sounds the shofar into a cistern, cellar, or large jar—**
- B. **if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation.**
- C. **But he heard the sound of the echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation.**
- D. **And so too: He who was going along behind a synagogue,**
- E. **or whose house was near a synagogue,**
- F. **and who heard the sound of the shofar**
- G. **or the sound of [the reading of] the Scroll of Esther—**
- H. **if he directed his heart [thereby intending to carry out his obligation], he has fulfilled his obligation.**
- I. **But if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.**
- J. **Even though this one heard and that one [also] heard, [only one of them has fulfilled his obligation, for] this one directed his heart, and that one did not direct his heart [to what he heard].**

- I.1 A. Our Rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority [T. **R.H. 2:4**: If a shofar was] long and one cut it down, it is valid.**
- B. **[If] one shaved it down, and left it as thin as its coating, it is valid.**
- C. **[If] one overlaid it with gold at the place the mouth touches, [or if one added to it any amount at all, even of the same substance], it is invalid.**
- D. **[If one overlaid it] at a place the mouth does not touch, it is valid.**
- E. **[If] one overlaid it with gold on the inside, it is invalid.**
- F. **[If one did so] on the outside—if the sound is altered from the way it had been, it is invalid.**

- G. But if not, it is valid.
- H. [M. **R.H. 3:6C-E**: If] it was perforated and one filled up the hole—
- I. if [the filled hole] affects the sound of the shofar, it is invalid.
- J. But if not, it is valid.
- K. [If] one placed one shofar inside another shofar [and sounded them]—
- L. If he heard the sound [made by] the inner one, he has fulfilled [the obligation to hear the shofar].
- M. But if he heard the sound of the outer one, he has not fulfilled [his obligation].

I.2 A. *Our Rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority* [T. **R.H. 2:4**: If] one shaved it down, whether inside or outside, it is valid.

- B. [If] one shaved it down, and left it as thin as its coating, it is valid.
- C. [If] one set one shofar inside another shofar [and sounded them]—
- D. If he heard the sound [made by] the inner one, he has fulfilled [the obligation to hear the shofar].
- E. But if he heard the sound of the outer one, he has not fulfilled [his obligation].

I.3 A. If he [softened the shofar and] turned it inside out, he has not fulfilled [his obligation].

- B. *Said Rab Pappa, “Do not say [that this applies] simply if he turned it inside out like a coat. Rather, [even] if he broadened the narrow part and narrowed the broad part [it still is not valid]. What is the basis in Scripture [for this]? It accords with [the view of] Rab Mattenah, for said Rab Mattenah, ‘[Lev. 25:9 says], “Then you shall carry [the loud trumpet on the tenth day of the seventh month].” ‘[This means that] we require [the shofar to be in the form in which] it is carried [by the ram].”*

II.1 A. [If] one stuck together the shreds of shofars, [the shofar constructed in that way] is invalid [M. **R.H. 3:6B**].

- B. *Our Rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority* [see T. **R.H. 2:4**: If] one added to it in any amount, whether of the same substance or of some different substance, it is invalid.
- C. [If] it was perforated and one filled up the hole [M. **R.H. 3:6C**], whether with the same substance or with some different substance, it is invalid.
- D. R. Nathan says, “[If it is] with the same substance, it is valid;
- E. “[but] with some different substance, it is invalid.”
- F. [The Tannaite citation at A-E is interrupted with a gloss on Nathan’s statement, D.] “[If it is] with the same substance, it is valid”—
- G. Said R. Yohanan, “But this applies [only] if the majority [of the original shofar] remains.”
- H. *From this [statement of Yohanan] we can derive the rule that, [if it is] with some different substance [that one fills the hole], then even though the majority [of the original shofar] remains, it is invalid.*

- I. *There are those who teach [Yohanan's gloss] in reference to the latter gloss [of Nathan's statement, E]: "[but] with some different substance, it is invalid."*
- J. Said R. Yohanan, "But this applies [only] if the majority [of the original shofar] is removed."
- K. *From this [statement of Yohanan] we can derive the rule that, [if it is] with the same substance [that one fills the hole], then even though the majority [of the original shofar] is removed, it is valid.*
- L. [We continue the Tannaite passage begun at A-E.] **[If] one overlaid it with gold on the inside, it is invalid.**
- M. **[If one did so] on the outside—if the sound is altered from the way it had been, it is invalid.**
- N. **But if not, it is valid.**
- O. **[If] it was split open lengthwise, is it invalid.**
- P. **[If it was split] along its breadth—**
- Q. **if enough of it remains to make a blast, it is valid.**
- R. **But if not, it is invalid.**
- T. **[T. R.H. 2:4, with variations:] Now, what is the [minimum] measure [to permit the creation of a proper blast]?**
- U. **Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel explained: "Sufficiently large so that a person can hold it in his hand and see [a part of it sticking out] on either side."**
- V. If its sound is thin, thick, or course, it [in all events] is valid,
- W. since all sounds made by a shofar are valid.

II.2 A. *They sent the father of Samuel [the rule: If] one pierced it and [anyway] used it for the [required] blast, he has fulfilled [his religious obligation].*

- B. *This is obvious [and goes without saying, since] all [shofars] are pierced. [Without the hole, no sound can be produced.]*
- C. *[To explain that A is not obvious] said Rab Ashi, "[This applies even if] he pierced the bony projection [over which the horn grows on the animal]. [That bone normally is entirely removed in the production of a shofar.] [Had that rule not been taught] what might you have thought? [Even though the bone] is of the same category [of the material comprising the horn itself], it interposes [between the mouth and the horn so that, if it is not entirely removed, the shofar is invalid]. So we are informed [by the rule at A, that if the bone is pierced but not removed, the shofar is valid]."*

III.1 A. **He who sounds the shofar into a cistern, cellar, [or large jar...[M. R.H. 3:7A]:**

- B. Said Rab Huna, "They did not teach [this rule to apply] except to those who are standing on the edge of the cistern. [Such people have fulfilled their obligation only if they hear the sound of the shofar itself, not an echo.]
- C. "But those who are standing in the cistern [itself, and who hear the shofar being blown into the cistern], have fulfilled [the obligation of hearing the shofar]." [Such people are assumed to have heard the shofar, not the echo.]

- D. *That which is taught on Tannaite authority makes the same point: He who sounds the shofar into a cistern or cellar has fulfilled his [religious] obligation.*
- E. *But [indicating the contrary] we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:7C]: he has not fulfilled his obligation! [M. R.H. 3:7C applies this statement to the case in which the individual heard the echo, not the shofar itself. That fact is ignored here.]*
- F. *Accordingly, you cannot interpret this [statement, at E, out of its larger context].*
- G. *[Rather] following [the perspective of] Rab Huna you must interpret it, [distinguishing between individuals who are at the edge of the cistern, who have not fulfilled their obligation (E), and those who are in the cistern, who have fulfilled their obligation (D)].*
- H. *[Contrary to the solution offered at F-G], some view the statements [at D vs. E] as in opposition [to each other]:*
- I. *We have taught on Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:7A+C]: He who sounds the shofar into a cistern or cellar has not fulfilled his obligation. But [to the contrary, it is taught on Tannaite authority: [He who sounds the shofar into a cistern or cellar] has fulfilled his [religious] obligation.*
- J. *[Resolving the contradiction raised at H-J] said R. Huna, “There is no contradiction! This [statement] applies to those who are standing on the edge of the cistern, while this [statement] applies to those who are standing in the cistern [itself].”*

III.2 A. Said Rabbah, [28a] “[If] one heard part of the blast while in the cistern and [having stepped out] part of the blast on the edge of the cistern, he has fulfilled [his obligation].

B. “[If] one heard part of the blast prior to dawn and part of the blast after dawn, he has not fulfilled [his obligation].”

C. *Said to him Abbaye, “What is the difference [between the two cases]? [Do you claim the difference to be that] there [in the situation described at B] we require the entire blast [to be heard in a period of time in which] one is obligated [to hear the shofar], and [this condition is] not [met]? [That argument fails, since I can respond that] here too [in the case described at A] we require the entire blast [to be heard] as one is obligated, but [this condition is] not [met]!” [At A, as at B, half of the blast that the individual hears cannot be counted towards the fulfillment of the obligation, lest he heard an echo, not the shofar itself. Abbaye’s question, C, stands: why is the rule at A different from that of B?]*

D. *Are the two cases really parallel? [Distinguishing the cases is the fact that] there [at B] it is night, which is not a time of obligation [to hear the shofar] at all. [Accordingly, that which the individual hears cannot fulfill his obligation.] But here [at A, we deal with] a cistern, in which those who stand are obligated [to hear the shofar]. [Since, at A, both before and after the individual stepped out of the cistern, the obligation to hear the shofar existed, and the shofar was heard, we deem the individual to have fulfilled the obligation. This is different from the case at B, where the beginning of the blast was heard when there was obligation at all.]*

III.3 A. *This is to say that Rabbah reasons that if one hears the end of the blast but not the beginning of the blast, he has fulfilled [his obligation to hear the shofar].*

- B. And it goes without saying [that if he heard] the beginning of the blast but not the end of the blast, he has fulfilled [his obligation].
- C. *[Come and learn [M. R.H. 4:9: If] one sounded the first Teqi'ah-blast [of the set of three] and then sustained the second blast for twice as long, he [still] has credit only for one. [That is, he cannot count the sustained blast half for the first set and half for a later set.] Why [does he get credit for only one]?*
- D. *[Rather] you should [deem the blast to] be divided into two parts [so as to allow credit for two separate blasts]! [Since a blast is indivisible, in order to fulfill one's obligation to hear the shofar, he must hear all of it.]*
- E. *Come and learn [a refutation of Rabbah's notion that one who hears only half of the blast has fulfilled his obligation. M. R.H. 3:7 states]: He who sounds the shofar into a cistern, cellar, or large jar—if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he heard the sound of the echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Why? Let him [be deemed] to have fulfilled his obligation [by having heard] the beginning of the blast, before it became mixed up with the sound [of the echo]! [This would be in line with Rabbah's explicit statement that one who hears part of the blast while in the cistern and, having stepped out, hears the rest of the blast on the edge of the cistern has fulfilled his obligation.]*
- F. *When Rabbah spoke, he referred to a case in which [the person standing in the cistern] himself blew [the shofar] while he stepped [out of the cistern]. [In this situation, it is clear that the person heard the entire blast and, accordingly, has fulfilled his obligation. This is different from the circumstance described at M. R.H. 3:7, where the person does not hear the entire blast. Rabbah agrees with M. R.H. 3:7's rule. That rule in no way conflicts with Rabbah's perspective.]*
- G. *If this [is what Rabbah means], what does he mean to say [that is not anyway obvious]?*
- H. *[Had we not heard Rabbah's statement] what might you have thought? At times he sticks his head [out of the cistern] while the shofar [he is blowing] still is in the cistern, and as a result the sound [of the shofar] becomes mixed up [with the sound of the echo, so that even the person playing the shofar cannot distinguish between the two]. So we are informed [by Rabbah that even in this situation, the person has fulfilled his obligation to hear the shofar].*

III.4 A. Said Rab Judah, "One may not blow a shofar from a burnt-offering, but if he blew [such a shofar], he has fulfilled [his religious obligation].

- B. "“One may not blow a shofar from a peace-offering, and if he blew [such a shofar], he has not fulfilled [his religious obligation].”
- C. *What is the reason [for the distinction]?*
- D. A burnt-offering [A] is subject to the laws regarding trespass [that is, the use of a holy thing for a secular purpose].
- E. *[Therefore] once one committed an act of trespass with it, it has entered the status of that which is unconsecrated [such as to comprise a valid shofar].*
- F. Peace-offerings [B] are not subject to the laws regarding trespass.

- G. *[Therefore] they are saddled with the prohibition [that applies to them as consecrated things], and [even if used for a secular purpose] they do not enter the status of that which is unconsecrated.*
- H. *Raba objected to this [claim that, if used, a shofar from a burnt-offering is valid]: At what point has he committed an act of trespass? Once he [already] has blown [the shofar]. [Therefore] when he blew, he blew that which was forbidden [and, contrary to A, cannot be deemed to have fulfilled his obligation]!*
- I. Rather, said Raba, “The rule is the same in both cases: [Whether he used a shofar from a burnt-offering, A, or peace-offerings, B], he has not fulfilled [his obligation].”
- L. *[Later] Raba reconsidered and said, “The rule is the same in both cases: [Whether he used a shofar from a burnt-offering, A, or peace-offerings, B], he has fulfilled [his obligation]. [Religious] obligations are not for purposes of enjoyment. [Since blowing the shofar entails no personal enjoyment or material benefit, using a shofar from a consecrated animal does not comprise trespass. Use of such a shofar is permitted in the first place.]”*

III.5 A. Said Rab Judah, “With a shofar from [an animal used for] idolatry one should not blow, but if he blew [such a shofar], he has fulfilled [his obligation].

B. “With a shofar from [an animal from] a dedicated city [Deu. 13:12-17], one should not blow, and if he blew [such a shofar], he has not fulfilled [his obligation].”

C. *What is the reason [for the distinction]?*

D. *[In the case of] a dedicated city, [all of] its measures have been crushed [that is, no horn of appropriate size for a shofar remains]. [Deu. 13:12-17 requires the destruction of everything in a city the inhabitants of which have engaged in idolatry.]*

III.6 A. Said Raba, “[As for] one who vows not to benefit from his neighbor—[that neighbor in all events] is permitted to blow the required Teqi’ah [sound] for him. [Hearing the shofar is not deemed to entail personal enjoyment.]

B. “[Comparably] one who vows not to benefit from a [particular] shofar is permitted to blow the required Teqi’ah on it.”

C. And [along the same lines] said Raba, “[As for] one who vows not to benefit from his neighbor—[that neighbor in all events] is permitted to sprinkle on him the water of the sin-offering [derived from the red heifer, which purifies from corpse uncleanness].

D. “[This applies] in the rainy season, but not in the sunny-season.” [The ritual act of sprinkling the water so as to cleanse the person of corpse uncleanness is deemed not to involve physical enjoyment and so, despite the vow, is permitted. But in the summer, as a secondary result of the ritual act, the person who is sprinkled enjoys the cooling affect of the waters. For this reason, at that time, a person from whom he has vowed not to benefit may not sprinkle him.]

E. A person who vows not to benefit from a [particular] spring may [anyway] dunk in it for purposes of a obligatory immersion [that is, using the spring as a ritual bath, a mikveh].

F. [This applies] in the rainy season, but not in the sunny-season [when the bather will physically enjoy the cool water].

- III.7** A. *They sent to the father of Samuel* [saying: If on Passover] they compelled [a person] to eat unleavened bread, [by doing so] he fulfilled [his obligation to eat unleavened bread]. [This is the case even though he did not intend to fulfill the religious obligation.]
- B. *Who compelled him?*
- C. *Might I say [it was] a demon?*
- D. *Now, [that would be unacceptable, since, to the contrary], thus it is taught on Tannaite authority* [T. Ter. 1:3: **If one is] at times lucid and at times crazy—whenever he is lucid, lo, he is equivalent to a person of sound senses in every respect; when he is crazy, lo, he is deemed crazy in every respect.** [In the case at A, if the person believes a demon forced him to eat unleavened bread, he is deemed crazy and therefore not subject to the fulfillment of religious obligations anyway. A thus cannot refer to a case such as is proposed by C.]
- E. *Said Rab Ashi, “[It refers to a case] in which the Persians compelled him.”*
- F. *Said Raba, “This [rule at A, explained by E, which states that an act not intended to fulfill a religious obligation still is efficacious] suggests: One who blows [a shofar simply] to produce music [in all events] fulfills his obligation.”*
- G. *This is obvious, [since the cases at A+E and F] are [exactly] the same!*
- H. *[G is shown to be incorrect.] [Had Raba not explicitly stated the rule at F] what might you have said? There [in the situation described at A], the merciful [simply] said, “Eat unleavened bread,” and [in fact] the individual ate [unleavened bread]. [Even though he was compelled, he carried out the requirement and therefore has fulfilled his obligation.] **[28b]** But here [regarding the hearing of the shofar, at Lev. 23:24], “a memorial proclaimed with blast of trumpets” is written. Now, this one [referred to by Raba, F] is [simply] fooling around [and so does not fulfill the biblical requirement of producing “a memorial”]. So we are informed [by Raba, F, that, even so, he has fulfilled his obligation].*

Does the performance of religious obligations require intention?

- III.8** A. *[The implication of Raba’s view is drawn out and evaluated.] [Based upon the preceding] I can say that Raba reasons [that] the [performance of religious] obligations does not require intention?*
- B. *[There is] an objection [to A’s perspective, that religious obligations do not require intention, based upon M. **Ber. 2:1**: **If] one was reading [the verses of the Shema] in the Torah and the time for the recitation [of the Shema] arrived: If he directed his heart, he fulfilled his obligation [to recite]. But if not, he has not fulfill his obligation. What [does it mean]? Does it not [mean]: “If he did [not] direct his heart [towards the fulfillment of the obligation, then, he has not fulfilled that obligation]”?***
- C. *No, [rather, the deficiency is that he did not direct his heart] to read [the passage]! [In this reading, M. **Ber. 2:1** says nothing about a requirement of intention towards the fulfillment of a religious obligation. The person has not fulfilled his obligation because he paid no attention to the reading*

itself. If he had paid attention to the reading, the fact that he had no consciousness of performing a religious obligation would have been irrelevant. He in all events would have been deemed to fulfill the obligation to read the Shema.]

- D. *[The deficiency is that he did not direct his heart] to read [the passage]!?*
- E. *How can this be the issue since he was [in fact] in the middle of reading [the required passage]? [Since the individual was reading, it seems unreasonable to declare that, since he was not paying attention to reading, he has not fulfilled his obligation to read the Shema.]*
- F. *At issue here is a case] in which he is reading [a Torah scroll] so as to correct [it]. [Such an individual does not pay attention to the act of reading but, rather, to the checking of the scroll for errors. The individual has not fulfilled the obligation to read the Shema because of his failure to direct his attention to the act of reading. His lack of intention towards fulfilling the religious obligation is irrelevant.]*
- G. *Come and learn [M. **R.H. 3:7**]: **He who was going along behind a synagogue, or whose house was near a synagogue, and who heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of [the reading of] the Scroll of Esther—if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. What [does it mean]? Does it not [mean]: “If he did [not] direct his heart [towards the fulfillment of the obligation, then, he has not fulfilled that obligation]”?***
- H. *No, [rather, the deficiency is that he did not direct his heart] to hear [the blast]! [M. **R.H. 3:7** says nothing about a requirement of intention towards the fulfillment of a religious obligation. The person has not fulfilled his obligation because he paid no attention to hearing the blast. If he had paid attention to hearing, the fact that he had no consciousness of performing a religious obligation would have been irrelevant. He in all events would have been deemed to fulfill the obligation to hear the shofar.]*
- I. *[The deficiency is that he did not direct his heart] to hear [the shofar]!?*
[How can this be the issue since, in the case described at A] he did [in fact] hear [the shofar]? [The fact of the case is that the individual heard the shofar. It therefore seems unreasonable to declare that, since he was not paying attention to hearing, he has not fulfilled his obligation.]
- J. *[The failure to direct one’s attention to hearing is an issue here since otherwise] he might think [that he simply is hearing] a donkey [braying, and not a shofar at all]. [Since the individual described at M. **R.H. 3:7** might not even realize that he is hearing a shofar, he has not fulfilled his obligation. But if he did direct his attention to the hearing, he would be deemed to fulfill that obligation.]*
- K. *There is [another] objection A Tannaite source states: If] the one who hears [the blast] directed his heart, but the one who makes [the blast] heard [that is, the shofar-blower] did not direct his heart; [or if] the one who makes [the blast] heard directed his heart but the one who hears [the blast] did not direct his heart—he did not fulfill his obligation [to hear the shofar].*

[This is the case] until the point at which [both] the one who hears and the one who makes [the blast] heard direct their heart.

- L. *Granted*, “if the one who makes [the blast] heard directed his heart but the one who hears [the blast] did not direct his heart [he has not fulfilled his obligation” makes sense], that is because the hearer might think [that he simply is hearing] a donkey [braying, and not a shofar at all]. But “If the one who hears [the blast] directed his heart, but the one who makes [the blast] heard did not direct his heart [he did not fulfill his obligation]”—*how can this occur? Is it not [an instance in which the individual] blows [the shofar simply] to produce music?* [In this case, the person has directed his attention towards playing but not towards fulfillment of the religious obligation of hearing the shofar. Since under this circumstance he has not fulfilled that religious obligation, this rule appears to support the contention that the fulfillment of religious obligations requires intention.]
- M. *Perhaps [the passage refers to a case in which he simply] made a barking sound.* [To accomplish this, the individual did not even focus his intention upon playing the shofar. For this reason he does not fulfill the religious obligation. Again, the fact that he did not formulate the intention to fulfill that obligation is irrelevant.]
- N. Abbaye said to Raba,, “Based upon this [notion, that the performance of religious obligations does not require intention], one who [inadvertently] sleeps in a booth [constructed for the festival of Tabernacles] on the eighth night [when doing so is not required] should be flogged.” [Rashi: The individual transgressed the requirement that one not extend Biblical commandments. Abbaye’s point is that, in Raba’s theory that intention does not matter, this individual is culpable even though he did not intentionally extend the Bible’s rule.]
- O. *[Raba] said to him, “[The circumstance you describe] is different [and not subject to the prohibition against extending commandments], since I say [that, as for religious] obligations—one does not transgress them except during their own period [of applicability].”* [Once Tabernacles is over, a person under no circumstance can be deemed culpable for extending the holiday. A person is culpable for transgressing this prohibition only by adding to what is required while it is required, for instance (Rashi) by placing five fringes on a prayer shawl instead of the required four.]
- P. *Objected Rab Shaman b. Abba to Raba, “The following legal source invalidates your claim that the prohibition against extending a religious obligation applies only during the period of that obligation]:* From what [verse in Scripture do we know] that a priest who mounts the stage [from which the priestly benediction is recited] should not say, ‘Since the Torah has given me the right to bless [the people of] Israel, I shall add a blessing of my own, for instance, [citing Deu. 1:11]: “May the Lord, the God of your fathers, make you [a thousand times as many as you are, and bless you, as he has promised you!]”’? [We know this is impermissible, since] Scripture states [Deu. 4: 2]: ‘You shall not add to the word [which I

command you].’ Now, here, since he [already] has blessed them [that is, the people, with the words of the priestly benediction], the time [of the obligation to bless the people] has passed! But [anyway] it is taught on Tannaite authority that [by adding his own blessing at this point] he transgresses!” [Accordingly Raba’s claim is unacceptable. Abbaye is correct.]

- Q. *Here with what [circumstances] are we dealing? [It is a case] in which [the priest] did not conclude [the priestly benediction prior to adding his own prayer]. [The fact that this is prohibited does not disprove Raba’s claim, C.]*
- R. *But thus it is [explicitly] taught on Tannaite authority: [If] he completed [his required benediction, he still may not add a blessing of his own].*
- S. *He had finished [only] one [of the three] benedictions!*
- T. *But thus it is [explicitly] taught on Tannaite authority: [If] he completed all his [required] benedictions, [he still may not add a blessing of his own].*
- U. *This [case of a priest who recites the priestly benediction] is distinctive [and not subject to evaluation under the regular rule]. Since, if he [later] chances upon another community, he goes and blesses them [as well], the entire day is treated as the time [for the performance of this religious obligation]. [Raba’s general principle, C, however stands. One transgresses a commandment only by extending it while it still is in affect.]*
- V. *[The argument of the preceding unit continues on a new basis.] On what grounds do you say this [that is, that one transgresses a commandment only by extending it while it still is in affect]? For we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. **Zeb. 8:10: Blood of a sacrifice**] which is to be tossed in a single act of tossing which was mixed up with [blood] which is to be tossed in a single act of tossing—let them be tossed in a single act of tossing. [Blood] which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing [which was mixed up with] blood which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing—let them be tossed in four acts of tossing. [Blood] which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing [which was mixed up] with blood which is to be tossed in one act of tossing— R. Eliezer says, “Let them be tossed in four acts of tossing.” R. Joshua says, “Let them be tossed in a single act of tossing.” Said to him R. Eliezer, “But, lo, [in your approach] he transgresses the rule against diminishing [that which God requires; Deu. 4: 2].” Said to him R. Joshua, “But, lo, [in your approach] he transgresses the rule against adding [to that which God requires; Deu. 4: 2].” Said to him R. Eliezer, “The prohibition against adding applies only [if the additional act is performed] with the same object [through which the obligation already was completed].” [Eliezer requirement, that the blood be tossed four times, accordingly does not comprise an prohibited extension of the number of times the blood supposed to be tossed once is tossed. This is because each amount of blood, once tossed, is not*

itself tossed again. Since different blood is taken from the basin and tossed, in Eliezer's view, this is not a violation of the prohibition against extending that which is required.] **Said to him R. Joshua, "The prohibition against diminishing applies only [if that which was meant to be done is withheld] from the same object."** [Since, once thrown, the same blood in all events could not be tossed again, the priest has not transgressed the prohibition against diminishing. This is the case even though the blood of that particular sacrifice, which was meant to be thrown four times, winds up being thrown only once.] **And further did R. Joshua say, "If [as I require] you did not toss [the blood four times, then, even if, as you say], you [thereby] transgress the prohibition against diminishing, [at least] you did not do [any prohibited] deed with your own hand. But if [as you require] you tossed [the blood four times, then, as I have explained], you transgressed the prohibition against adding, and you [also] did the [forbidden] deed with your own hand [by tossing four times blood meant to be tossed once] ."**

- W. [We now examine the implication of the cited passage for the question of whether or not the prohibition against extending applies after the time within which an obligation applies has passed.] *Now, here, as soon as he tossed [the blood once] for the firstling, the time period within which he was subject to the obligation [to toss the blood] had passed. Yet [even so] it is taught on Tannaite authority that, [in Joshua's view, an individual who continues to toss such blood] has transgressed the prohibition against adding [to required actions]!* [Accordingly, Joshua appears to reject the principle that the prohibition against extending applies only during an obligations period of applicability.] *[Is not [the reason that Joshua deems this individual culpable] that we say that, since, if [the priest] chances upon another firstling, he goes and [upon its being sacrificed] tosses its [blood as well], the entire day is treated as the time [for the performance of this religious obligation]!? [Despite his ruling in the particular case at hand, Joshua concurs with the general principle phrased by Raba. One transgresses a commandment only by extending it while it still is in affect.]*
- X. *Perhaps R. Joshua [in fact] reasons [that, as for religious] obligations—one does transgress them even outside of own period [of applicability]!*
- Z. *Thus we can state [in order to find support for Raba's view].*
- Y. *[Then why did Shaman bar Abba not adduce that case in his challenge to Raba] [As for] Rab Shaman bar Abba, for what reason did he ignore [the more authoritative Mishnaic passage, M. Zeb. 8:10] and object [to Raba's principle] on the basis of the [non-Mishnaic] Tannaite*

statement? [If Joshua at M. **Zeb. 8:10** means what is claimed, Shaman] should have objected [to Raba's view] on the basis of this Mishnaic passage! [As for] the Mishnaic passage—what is the reason [Shaman] did not [use it as the foundation for his] objection [to Raba's view]?

- Z. [This was because M. **Zeb. 8:10** is subject to a special consideration, such that it does not in fact challenge Raba's perspective.] [M. **Zeb. 8:10** was not an appropriate basis for the objection, since], if [the priest] chances upon another firstling, he goes and [upon its being sacrificed] tosses its [blood as well], the entire day is treated as the time [for the performance of this religious obligation].
- AA. [The same consideration applies in the case of the Tannaite rule that Shaman did cite.] [In the case of] the Tannaite statement too, since, if he [later] chances upon another community, he goes and blesses them [as well], the entire day is treated as the time [for the performance of this religious obligation].
- BB. Now, [how does] Rab Shaman bar Abba [respond so as to explain his use of the Tannaite rule instead of M. **Zeb. 8:10**]?]
- CC. There [at M. **Zeb. 8:10**] there is no possibility of [the priest's] not tossing [the blood of a firstling he later finds]. [The entire day is deemed the period of the tossing of the blood, so that whenever a priest tosses more times than are required, he has transgressed the prohibition against adding. This case, accordingly, cannot serve to disprove Raba's view that the prohibition against adding applies only during an obligation's period of applicability.] [By contrast] here [in the case of the priestly benediction], if [a priest who, having blessed one group later chances upon a different group]—if he wishes, he blesses them [as well]; if he wishes, he does not bless [them]. [For this reason, in the case of the priestly benediction, Shaman rejects the contention that the entire day is deemed the obligations period of applicability. Accordingly, his challenge to Raba stands. In the case of the priestly benediction, the prohibition against adding applies even after the period of the obligation's applicability. This is contrary to the principle Raba articulates, that this prohibition applies only so long as the religious obligation itself pertains.]

III.9 A. Raba said, "The fulfillment [of a religious obligation] does not require intention.

Transgression [of the prohibition against adding] does require intention.”

- B. *But [contrary to B, in the case of] the sprinkling of the blood [of a firstling]—according to R. Joshua, [M. Zeb. 8:10, by sprinkling the blood of a firstling four times instead of once], he transgresses [the prohibition against adding] and [for this to be deemed a transgression] does not require intention. [By sprinkling four times, the priest here certainly does not intend to transgress the prohibition against adding. Even so, Joshua deems him culpable for that prohibited act.]*
- C. *Rather, said Raba, “The fulfillment [of a religious obligation] does not require intention. Transgression [of the prohibition against adding to a religious obligation] during its period of applicability [also] does not require intention. [But transgression of the prohibition against adding to a religious obligation] outside of its period of applicability does require intention.”*

- III.10** A. *Said R. Zira to his servant, [29a] “Focus your intention [upon fulfilling the religious obligation] and [then] blow the shofar for me [to hear].”*
- B. *[Based on this] I can say he reasoned [that] the one who makes [the blast] heard must have the intention [to fulfill the obligation].*
 - C. *They objected [on the basis of M. R.H. 3:7: If] he who was going along behind a synagogue, or [if] his house was near a synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of [the reading of] the Scroll of Esther—if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.*
 - D. *And if [as at D] he does direct his heart, so what? [Even so] the other one [who is blowing the shofar] has not himself formulated the intention [to fulfill the commandment]! [Accordingly it seems clear that, contrary to what A proposes, the one who blows the shofar need not formulate the intention to fulfill his religious obligation.]*
 - E. *[Here [in the Mishnah] we deal with a [professional] representative of the community, who [always] intends [to fulfill religious obligations] on behalf of all of the community. [Accordingly, A’s phrasing of matters stands.]*

- F. *Come and learn [from the following Tannaite statement: If] the one who hears [the blast] directed his heart, but the one who makes [the blast] heard [that is, the shofar-blower] did not direct his heart; [or if] the one who makes [the blast] heard directed his heart but the one who hears [the blast] did not direct his heart—he did not fulfill his obligation [to hear the shofar]. [This is the case] until the point at which [both] the one who hears and the one who makes [the blast] heard direct their heart.*
- G. *That which is taught on Tannaite authority draws an analogy between the one who makes [the blast] heard and the one who hears [the blast]—Just as the one who hears [the blast] hears [only] for himself [that is, to fulfill his own religious obligation], so [if] the one who makes [the blast] heard, makes [it] heard only for himself [that is, does not formulate the intention for his blast to fulfill the obligation of others], it is taught on Tannaite authority [A+C] that he does not fulfill [others' religious obligation].*
- H. *There is [a dispute] among Tannaite authorities [regarding this matter]. For it is taught on Tannaite authority: The one who hears [the blast] hears [only] for himself [that is, to fulfill his own religious obligation], but the one who makes [the blast] heard, does so according to his own practice [and need not formulate the intention to fulfill the obligation on behalf of others]. Said R. Yosé, “For what case is this [rule] stated? For the case of an agent of the community. [As a matter of practice, the agent intends to fulfill religious obligations on behalf of others. Whether or not he is conscious of formulating that intention to do this, his actions are efficacious on behalf of others.] But [in the case of] an [ordinary] individual, he did not fulfill his obligation [to hear the shofar] unless [both] the one who hears and the one who makes [the blast] heard direct their heart.*

3:8

- A. **“Now it happened that when Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed, [and when he let his hand fall, Amalek prevailed;” Exo. 17:11].**
- B. **Now do Moses’ hands make war or break it off?**
- C. **[They do not.] Rather, [the point of the verse is] to say this to you:**
- D. **So long as the Israelites would set their eyes upward and submit their hearts to their Father in heaven, they would grow stronger. And if not, they fell.**

- E. Similarly, you may say [the following, citing Num. 21: 8]: “Make yourself a fiery serpent and set it on a standard, and it shall come to pass that every one who is bitten, when he sees it, shall live.”
 - G. Now does that serpent [on the standard] kill or give life?
 - H. [It does not.] Rather: So long as the Israelites would set their eyes upward and submit to their Father in heaven, they would be healed. And if not, they decayed [from the bites].
 - I. [The shofar blasts of] a deaf-mute, idiot, and minor do not fulfill the obligation of the community.
 - J. This is the governing principle: Whoever is not obligated to carry out a particular deed cannot effect the obligation of the community either
- I.1** A. *Our Rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority [T. R.H. 2:5]: All are obligated regarding sounding the shofar: priests, Levites, Israelites, converts, freed slaves, [disqualified priests, *netins*, *mamzers*], one of uncertain sex, hermaphrodites, and one who is half slave and half free.*
- B. **One of uncertain sex does not [perform a religious act so as to] exempt [from that act] either one of his own kind or one who is not of his own kind.**
 - C. **A hermaphrodite may [perform a religious act so as to] exempt [from that act] one who is of his own kind but not one who is not of his own kind.**
 - D. **One who is half slave and half free does not [perform a religious act so as to] exempt [from that act] either one of his own kind or one who is not of his own kind.**
 - E. A master said, [T. R.H. 2:5 states]: **All are obligated regarding sounding the shofar: priests, Levites, Israelites.**
 - F. *This is obvious [and goes without saying]! [For], if these [three categories of people] are not obligated, who is?*
 - G. *[As for] priests—they needed [to be explicitly mentioned]. You might have thought, since it is written [Num. 29: 1: “On the first day of the seventh month you shall have a holy convocation; you shall do no laborious work]. It is a day for you to sound the blast [of the shofar]”—[this means] one who has only one day that is a day of blowing is obligated [regarding the sounding of the shofar]. But [as for] these priests, since they have [occasion] for blowing the shofar all through the year, as it is written [Num. 10:10]: “You shall blow the trumpets over your burnt offerings [and over the sacrifices of your peace offerings],” you might have said, they should not be obligated [regarding the sounding of the shofar on New Year]. So we are informed [by T. R.H. 2:5, cited at A, that even priests are so obligated].*
 - H. *Are [the requirements indicated by Num. 29: 1 and Num. 10:10] analogous? There [at Num. 10:10 we speak of] trumpets; but here [at Num. 29: 1, we speak of] the shofar! [Accordingly, one should not even imagine that the priest’s obligation indicated by Num. 10:10 has an impact upon his being subject to the requirement indicated at Num. 29: 1. The question regarding priests stands.]*
 - I. *[A second explanation for the inclusion of priests is given.] Rather, [as for] priests—they needed [to be explicitly mentioned for the following reason]: [Had they not been mentioned] you might have thought, since we have taught on*

Tannaite authority [M. R.H. 3:5]: The [proclamation of the] year of Jubilee is equivalent to the New Year in regard to the sounding of the shofar and to the blessings— [therefore] one who is subject to the obligations of the year of Jubilee also is subject to the obligations of the New Year. But these priests, since they are not subject to the obligations of the year of Jubilee— as we have taught on Tannaite authority [M. Ar. 9:8]: Priests and Levites sell at any time and redeem at any time [without regard for the Jubilee’s restrictions listed at M. Ar. 9:1, M. Ar. 9:5, and M. Ar. 9:7]— I might have said [that, to] the obligations of the New Year, they should not be obligated. So we are informed [by T. R.H 2:5, that they are obligated].

I.2 A. [T. R.H. 2:5:] One who is half slave and half free does not [perform a religious act so as to] exempt [from that act] either one of his own kind or one who is not of his own kind.

- B. Said Rab Huna, “But he may [perform a religious act so as to] exempt himself.”
- C. *Said Rab Nahman to Rab Huna, “What is distinctive about the case of others, such that [he may] not [perform a religious act so as to] exempt them? For [his] enslaved side cannot act [on behalf of others’] freed side.”*
- E. *[Huna responds, rejecting this explanation: “Then regarding himself as well, his enslaved side cannot act [on behalf of] his own freed side.”*
- F. Rather, said Rab Nahman, “[Indeed] he may not even [perform a religious act so as to] exempt himself [from that act].”
- G. *That which is taught on Tannaite authority makes the same point: One who is half slave and half free does not [perform a religious act so as to] exempt himself [from that act].*

- I.3 A.** *Ahba the son of Rab Zira taught on Tannaite authority: “[As for] all blessings— even though one [already has recited them, so as to] fulfill [his own requirement], he [still may recite them again, so as to] exempt [others from the obligation].*
- B. “[This applies] except for the blessings over bread and wine, in the case of which, if he has not [yet] fulfilled [his obligation], he may fulfill the obligation [on behalf of others], but if he [already] fulfilled [his own obligation], he may not fulfill the obligation [on behalf of others].”
 - C. *Asked Raba, [29b] “[As for] the blessing over bread [said] upon [eating] unleavened bread and the blessing over wine [said] on [the occasion of] the sanctification [of the Sabbath]—what is the law [whether or not these blessings may be said by one who already has fulfilled his own obligation in order to fulfill the obligation others]? Since [the occasions on which these blessings are said] are obligatory, [do we hold that, in contrast to the case described at B] he may fulfill he obligation [on behalf of others]? Or, perhaps, [we hold that] the blessing is not obligatory, [and that, as at B, one who already fulfilled his own obligation may not fulfill the obligation on behalf of others]?”*
 - D. *Come and learn [an answer to Raba’s question]: For Rab Ashi said, “When we were in the house of Rab Pappi, he would say the sanctification on our behalf.*

And [later] when the laborers came from the field, he would say the sanctification [again], on their behalf.” [Accordingly, in contrast to what is described, on the occasion of the sanctification or other obligatory blessings, even though one already fulfilled his own obligation, he still may fulfill the obligation on behalf of others.]

- I.4 A.** [The Talmud develops the general theme of the preceding.] *Our Rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:* A person should not break bread [and say the blessing] for visitors unless he is going to eat with them.
- B. But he may break bread [and say the blessing] for his children and the members of his household [even if he is not going to eat with them],
- C. in order to teach them about [the performance of religious] obligations.
- D. And regarding the [recitation of the] Hallel and [the reading of] the Scroll [of Esther]—even though he [already has performed these duties and] fulfilled [his religious] obligation, he may [perform the duty again so as to] fulfill the obligation [on behalf of others].