

VIII

BAVLI MENAHOT CHAPTER EIGHT

FOLIOS 76B-83B

8:1

- A. [The flour for the loaves of the] thank offering was brought [from] five seahs by the Jerusalem measure, which are six by the wilderness measure [equivalent to],
- B. two ephahs — the ephah is three seahs [by the wilderness measure] —
- C. twenty tenths [of an ephah]:
- D. (1) ten [tenths of an ephah] for what was to be leavened, and (2) ten for what was to be unleavened.
- E. [77A] Ten for what was to be leavened — a tenth [of an ephah] for a loaf.
- F. And ten for what was to be unleavened. And in the unleavened part are three kinds:
- G. (1) loaves,
- H. (2) wafers,
- I. and (3) [oil] — soaked cake[s] [Lev. 8:12].
- J. There turn out to be three and a third tenths [of an ephah] for each kind, three loaves for each tenth [of an ephah].
- K. [And, if we go by A] in the Jerusalem measure were thirty qabs [six qabs = one seah], (1) fifteen [qabs] for that which was unleavened, and (2) fifteen for that which was leavened.
- L. Fifteen for that which was unleavened: a qab and a half per loaf.
- M. And fifteen for that which was leavened: and in that which was unleavened were three kinds: loaves and wafers and soaked cake[s].
- N. They turn out to be five qabs for each kind, two loaves per qab.
- I.1** A. [the ephah is three seahs:] *how on the basis of Scripture do we know [that the ephah is three seahs of grain]?*
- B. Said R. Hisda, “Said Scripture, ‘The ephah and the bath shall be of one and the same measure’ (Eze. 45:11), and just as the bath is three seahs, so the ephah is three seahs.”

- C. *And how to the bath itself, how do we know that fact? If we say that, it is because it is written, "That the bath may contain the tenth part of a homer" (Eze. 45:11)? Then the same is said of the ephah: "And the ephah is the tenth part of a homer" (Eze. 45:11). But then if we do not know how much the homer is in the one case, we also do not know how much it is in the other!*
- D. *Rather, it is on the strength of the following: "And the set portion of oil, of the bath of oil, shall be the tenth part of a bath out of the kor, which is ten baths, even a homer; for ten baths are a homer" (Eze. 45:11) [the homer being thirty seahs].*
- I.2.** A. Said Samuel, "They may not increase the size of the measures [whether or not people concur] by more than a sixth, nor the coins by more than a sixth, and he who makes a profit must not profit by more than a sixth."
- B. *What is the operative consideration for the first of these three rulings?*
- C. *If we say that it is because the market prices will rise, then for that same consideration, it should not be permitted to increase the size of the measures even by a sixth. And if the operative consideration is overreaching, so that the transaction should not have to be annulled, did not Raba say, "One can retract from an agreement that involves fraud in measure, weight, or number, even though it is less than the standard, a sixth, of overreaching." And if the operative consideration is that the dealer may not incur any loss, then is the whole purpose of the law to guard him from loss? Is he not entitled to make a profit? But "buy and sell at no profit, merely to be called a merchant!"*
- D. *Rather, said R. Hisda, "Samuel identified a verse of Scripture and interpreted it, 'And the shekel shall be twenty gerahs, twenty sheqels, twenty-five sheqels, ten and five sheqels shall be your maneh' (Eze. 45:12). Now was the maneh to be two hundred forty denars? [But it is supposed to be twenty five sheqels or a hundred denars (Cashdan).] But three facts are to be inferred from this statement: [1] the maneh used in the sanctuary is worth double what the maneh is usually worth; [2] they may not increase the size of the measures [whether or not people concur] by more than a sixth, and [3] the sixth is added over and above the original [so to add a sixth, the original is divided into five parts and another part of equal value, making a sixth one, then is added to it, so the maneh consisted of 240 denars (Cashdan)]."*
- E. *Said Rabina, "Our Mishnah-paragraph also makes that point, as a close reading will indicate: **The [flour for the loaves of the] thank offering was brought [from] five seahs by the Jerusalem measure, which are six by the wilderness measure.**"*
- F. *That is decisive proof.*

8:2D-I

- D. [77B] **And from all of them did one take one [loaf of each kind] out of ten as heave offering, as it is said, "And he shall offer one out of each offering as a heave offering to the Lord" (Lev. 8:14) —**
- E. **"one" — that he should not take a broken one;**
- F. **"out of each offering" — (I) that all the offerings should be equivalent [ten loaves for each kind of animal],**

- G. and (2) that he should not take [two loaves] from one offering [and none at all] for its fellow [that is, he should take one loaf of each kind],
- H. “to the priest who tosses the blood of the peace offerings it shall belong” (Lev. 8:14) —
- I. and the remainder [of the bread] is eaten by the owner.

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “[And of such he shall offer one cake from each offering, as an offering that is raised up to the Lord;] it shall belong to the priest who throws the blood of the peace offerings:”
- C. [The one cake is to be taken] from the mass [of cakes that are] joined together.
- D. “one:”
- E. meaning that one should not take half a loaf [of five, but rather, a whole loaf of ten. [That is, one should not prepare five loaves of each required type and to take of the five loaves a half of a loaf, which would then yield the requisite one of ten in proposition. Rather, there must be ten loaves of each type, and one takes one loaf of each type, for the requisite tenth.]
- F. “from each offering:”
- G. This teaches that all of the offerings should be equal in size [so that one is not large, another small]. [Or: that all should be treated in one and the same manner.]
- H. [Further,] that one should not take a loaf from one offering in behalf of what is owing from its fellow, [that is, four loaves of a single variety in behalf of all of the loaves of the three sorts.]
- I. “as an offering that is raised up to the Lord:”
- J. I do not know how many are required.
- K. Lo, I reason as follows:
- L. We find here reference to “an offering that is raised up,” and we find the same usage with regard to the offering that is raised up out of the tithe. Just as the latter usage involves one tenth, so here too the requirement is one tenth. [The offering to the Lord is one tenth of the number of cakes and wafers of various sorts, e.g., four out of forty, and the residue is left for the priesthood.]
- M. Or take this route:
- N. We find here reference to “an offering that is raised up,” and we find the same usage with regard to the first fruits.
- O. Just as when we find the usage, “an offering that is raised up” in regard to first fruits, there is no fixed volume that is required, so when we find that same usage here, there is no fixed volume that is required.
- P. Let us then determine the correct analogy:
- Q. Let us draw an analogy for “an offering that is raised up” in which there is no further offering to be made, [namely, the offering of the cakes and wafers] from a case of “an offering that is raised up” in which there is no further

offering to be made [namely, the offering raised up from the tithe itself, from which no further offerings are exacted],

R. but let not the case of the offering of first fruits serve as the generative analogy, from which a further offering thereafter is raised up [specifically, the great offering that is raised up and also the offering that is raised up out of the tithe].

S. Or take this route:

T. We draw an analogy for a case of an offering that is raised up and then eaten in the place in which the offering is made [that is, the offering of the loaves] from the case of an offering that is raised up and then eaten in the place in which the offering is made, [namely, the offering of first fruits, both of them being eaten in Jerusalem],

U. but the offering that is raised up from tithe, which is not eaten in the place in which the offering is made, should not give testimony [since it may be eaten even in the provinces, and not only in Jerusalem].

V. Accordingly, Scripture settles the issue when it says, “as an offering that is raised up to the Lord,”

W. for the use of the language, “raised up,” serves to establish an analogy [between offerings in which exactly that language is used:]

X. We find here reference to “an offering that is raised up,” and we find the same usage with regard to the offering that is raised up out of the tithe. Just as the latter usage involves one tenth, so here too the requirement is one tenth. [The offering to the Lord is one tenth of the number of cakes and wafers of various sorts, and the residue is left for the priesthood.]

Y. Now we have learned that in the case of an offering that is raised up, the requisite proportion is one out of ten.

Z. But I do not know how large a loaf is involved.

AA. Lo, I reason in this way:

BB. Here we find a reference to “leavened bread” [“This offering, with cakes of leavened bread added, he shall offer along with his thanksgiving sacrifice of well being” (Lev. 7:13)], and elsewhere, with reference to the Two Loaves, we find the same [“You shall bake choice flour and bake of it twelve loaves (Lev. 24: 5)].

CC. Just as leavened bread with reference to the Two Loaves involves a tenth ephah per loaf, so leavened bread here involves a tenth ephah for each loaf.

DD. Or take this route:

EE. We find reference to loaves here and likewise with reference to the show bread.

FF. Just as when we find a reference to loaf in regard to the show bread, two tenths of an ephah are required per loaf, so here too, two tenths of an ephah are required for each loaf.

GG. Let us then determine the correct analogy:

HH. Let us derive an appropriate analogy for a meal offering which is presented leavened and is presented along with a sacrifice from a meal offering which is

offered leavened and is presented with a sacrifice, but let the Show Bread not serve, for it is not offered leavened [but only as unleavened bread] and it also is not presented with a sacrifice.

II. Or take this route:

JJ. Let us draw an analogy for a meal offering which derives from grain grown both in the land and abroad, grain that is of the new season along with grain of the old, from a meal offering the grain of which may derive from the land or from abroad, and from grain grown in the new season or grain of the old.

KK. But let the case of the Two Loaves not provide an analogy, for these derive only from grain grown in the land, and they are presented only from loaves back from grain grown in the new growing season.

LL. Scripture states [with references to the Two Loaves], “You shall bring from your settlements two loaves of bread as an elevation offering; [each one made of two tenths of a measure of choice flour, baked after leavening, as first fruits to the Lord. With the bread you shall present as burnt offerings to the Lord seven yearling lambs without blemish...The priest shall elevate these — the two lambs — together with the bread of first fruits as an elevation offering before the Lord...]” (Lev. 23:17-18).

MM. Now Scripture’s reference to “you shall bring” can only mean that you must bring the offering which is analogous to one that is specified in another passage [hence the analogy is between the show bread and the bread offering that goes along with a thanksgiving offering (following the commentary of Rabbenu Hillel)].

NN. Lo, the one is like the other.

OO. Just as the one involves a tenth ephah of fine flour per loaf, so what you bring that is analogous but in another connection involves a single tenth ephah of fine flour per loaf. [That would prove that the two loaves of the show bread are made each of a tenth of a measure of choice flour!]

PP. Or take this route:

QQ. just as these [namely, the Two Loaves of Lev. 23:17-18] have to be made of two tenths of an ephah of fine flour, so those must be two two tenths of an ephah of fine flour.

RR. [These conflicting results require attention to the language before us.] Scripture states, “will be...,” and the use of the plural indicates that two tenths of an ephah of fine flour are required here.

SS. We have learned in regard to the leavened bread that it is to be ten tenths [in all, for the required loaves].

TT. How do we know that the unleavened bread also is to be made of ten tenths of an ephah of fine flour in all?

UU. Scripture states, “This offering, with cakes of leavened bread added, he shall offer along with his thanksgiving sacrifice of well being” (Lev. 7:13).

VV. As a counterpart to the leavened bread, bring unleavened bread.

WW. Just as the leavened bread involves ten tenths, so the unleavened bread should involve ten tenths of an ephah.

- XX. Might one suppose that the ten tenths of an ephah of fine flour involved in the unleavened bread should form a single offering?
- YY. Scripture states explicitly, “then he shall offer with the thank offering unleavened cakes mixed with oil, unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes of fine flour well mixed with oil.”
- ZZ. And then: “And of such he shall offer one cake from each offering, [as an offering to the Lord].”
- AAA. The upshot is a third of a tenth from each species and so three loaves per tenth, and, further, the upshot is that the bread of a thanksgiving offering is made up of forty loaves. One takes one of them for each species, thus four loaves, and gives them to the priest,
- BBB. “it shall belong to the priest who throws the blood of the peace offerings:”
- CCC. and the remainder is eaten by the owner [LXXXVI:I.1-7]

I.2. A. A master has said, “[And of such he shall offer one cake from each offering, as an offering that is raised up to the Lord;] it shall belong to the priest who throws the blood of the peace offerings:’ [The one cake is to be taken] from the mass [of cakes that are] joined together:”

B. *But what about the following:* “And all the fat thereof shall he take off from it” (Lev. 4:19) — *how here can we carry out the rule of taking the offering from the mass that is joined together?*

C. *The answer accords with what R. Hisda said Abimi said, for said R. Hisda said Abimi, “‘The meat may not be cut up before the portions that are presented as a sacrifice have been removed” [Cashdan: when the fat is taken off, the animal therefore is all connected in a mass].*

I.3. A. A master has said, “We find here reference to ‘an offering that is raised up,’ and we find the same usage with regard to the offering that is raised up out of the tithe. Just as the latter usage involves one tenth, so here too the requirement is one tenth. [The offering to the Lord is one tenth of the number of cakes and wafers of various sorts, and the residue is left for the priesthood].”

B. *But why not derive the appropriate rule from the analogy of the heave offering at Midian [the portion of the spoil at Num. 31:28-29, which was a five hundredth part given to the priest, Eleazar (Cashdan)]?*

C. We adopt as our governing analogy for heave offering that is given throughout all generations the law applying to heave offering that is given throughout all generations, but let not the case of heave offering presented at the episode of Midian decide matters, for it does not apply for all generations to come.

D. *But how about inferring the rule from the analogy of the heave offering in the matter of dough offering [Num. 15:19, a twenty-fourth]?*

E. A Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [stated], “We adopt as our governing analogy for heave offering concerning which the language ‘of it...as heave offering unto the Lord’ (Lev. 7:14) the rule that pertains to heave offering concerning which the language ‘of it...as heave offering unto the Lord’ (Num. 18:26, the heave offering of the tithe) is used, *and that eliminates the heave*

offering of dough, concerning which the language 'of it...as heave offering unto the Lord' is not used."

I.4. A. *Raba raised this question:* "As to the heave offering taken up from the cakes of thank offering, are people liable on that account [should non-priests eat this offering deliberately] to the death penalty or [if the act was inadvertent] to the sanction of paying the added fifth of the value, or is that not the case? Since an analogy is drawn to heave offering of tithe, then in this matter too the analogy applies, or perhaps the All-Merciful has excluded this type of heave offering, otherwise analogous to the other, when it uses the language 'therein' (Lev. 22: 9) and 'from it' (Lev. 22:14) [which pertain only to heave offering of produce, not any other kind of heave offering]?"

B. "If it falls into ordinary food, does it impose upon that food the status of heave offering or not [as would be the case of heave offering of ordinary food was mixed with other produce]?"

C. *The questions stand.*

I.5. A. A master has said, "[**These conflicting results require attention to the language before us.**] **Scripture states, "will be...," and the use of the plural indicates that two tenths of an ephah of fine flour are required here:**"

B. *What is the exegesis that pertains here?*

C. **[78A]** Said R. Isaac bar Abdimi, "'will be' in the plural is used here" [and the word is written with two Ys, each bearing the numerical value of ten, so ten tenths, which can refer not to the Two Loaves, which are said explicitly to be made up of two tenths, it can refer only to the leavened cakes of the thank offering (Cashdan)].

D. *But maybe it means ten qapizas [ten half-qabs]?*

E. Said Raba, "In context, Scripture is speaking of tenth ephahs."

I.6. A. **We have learned in regard to the leavened bread that it is to be ten tenths [in all, for the required loaves]. How do we know that the unleavened bread also is to be made of ten tenths of an ephah of fine flour in all? Scripture states, "This offering, with cakes of leavened bread added, he shall offer along with his thanksgiving sacrifice of well being" (Lev. 7:13). As a counterpart to the leavened bread, bring unleavened bread. Just as the leavened bread involves ten tenths, so the unleavened bread should involve ten tenths of an ephah:**

B. But can a rule that is derived by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]?

C. It is a case in which the original rule was derived on a polythetic basis ["from itself and something else"] [Cashdan: the original inference that the leavened cakes of the thank offering shall consist of ten tenths, a tenth for every cake, was not entirely drawn from the case of the two loaves, in as much as the number of cakes, ten, is deemed to be expressly stated in connection with the leavened cakes of the thank offering by virtue of the expression 'they shall be.' Accordingly, the leavened cakes supplied the rule that there must be ten cakes, and the two loaves supplied the rule that there must be a tenth for each cake.] And any case of

polythetic congruence is not classified as an argument that is basically one from congruence.

- D. *That poses no problem to him who takes the view that it indeed is not classified as an argument from congruence. But from the perspective of him who maintains that it is indeed an argument from congruence, what is to be said?*
- E. The language “you shall bring” is augmentative [=Scripture states explicitly, “then he shall offer with the thank offering unleavened cakes mixed with oil, unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes of fine flour well mixed with oil.” And then: “And of such he shall offer one cake from each offering, [as an offering to the Lord].” The upshot is a third of a tenth from each species and so three loaves per tenth, and, further, the upshot is that the bread of a thanksgiving offering is made up of forty loaves].

8:2A-C

- A. For the [bread brought with] consecration [offering, Lev. 8:22-28] they brought [the offerings] like the unleavened [bread of the meal offering] which goes with the thank offering: (1) loaves and (2) wafers and (3) [oil-] soaked cakes.
- B. The [wafers of the] Nazirite’s [meal offering] consisted of two — thirds of the unleavened [cakes] of the thank offering: [ten unleavened] loaves and [ten unleavened] wafers. But soaked cakes are not [brought along] with it.
- C. They [the Nazirite’s offering] turn out to be ten Jerusalem qabs [five for unleavened loaves, five for unleavened wafers] which are six tenths [of an ephah]; and something left over [six and two-thirds tenths].

I.1 A. [oil-soaked cakes:] *What is the scriptural source for this rule?*

- B. Said R Hisda said R. Hama bar Guria, “Said Scripture, ‘Out of the basket of unleavened bread that was before the Lord, he took one unleavened cake and one oil cake and one wafer’ (Lev. 8:26). Now obviously ‘cake’ means cake, and ‘wafer,’ wafer; but what is the sense of ‘oil cake’? It must mean, a cake soaked in oil.”
- C. [To that rather facile demonstration] objected R. Avia, “Might one not say that it refers to a cake made out of oil that has congealed?”
- D. Rather, the answer to the original question accords with the exegesis that was put forth by R. Nahman b. R. Hisda in the name of R. Tabela: “‘This is the offering of Aaron and of his sons, which they shall offer to the Lord in the day when he is anointed’ (Lev. 6:13) [Cashdan: this verse clearly points to some connection between the offering of ‘his sons,’ the meal offering brought by ordinary priests at their initiation into service, and that of Aaron when he is anointed, which was offered daily by the high priest.] And what is it that we learn in regard to the offering of his sons from the offering when he is anointed? It is that the offering when the ordinary priest is initiated shall be comparable to the offering that is presented when the high priest is anointed. Just as the latter is soaked cakes, so the former will be of soaked cakes.”

I.2. A. Said R. Hisda, “A high priest that is presented for service in the cult requires two tenths of an ephah of fine flour, one for his anointing, the other for his initiation rite.”

B. Mar bar R. Ashi said, “Three.”

C. But they do not disagree with one another. The one speaks of a priest who already has performed an act of service when he was an ordinary priest, the other speaks of a priest who has not already performed an act of service when he was an ordinary priest.

II.1 A. **They [the Nazirite’s offering] turn out to be ten Jerusalem qabs [five for unleavened loaves, five for unleavened wafers] which are six tenths [of an ephah]; and something left over [six and two-thirds tenths]:**

B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. **“his peace offerings:”**

D. **this serves to encompass the peace offerings brought by a Nazirite, indicating that [Sifra lacks:] they [the Nazirite’s offering] turn out to be ten Jerusalem qabs [five for unleavened loaves, five for unleavened wafers] which are six tenths [of an ephah]; and something left over [six and two-thirds tenths].**

E. **Might that involve everything that is stated in the present context?**

F. **Scripture says, “with cakes of unleavened bread,” [Bavli lacks:] [following Elijah of Vilna’s emendation:] and it is not presented saturated in oil. How then am I to interpret the meaning of “his peace offerings,” so far as that phrase encompasses the peace offerings of a Nazirite? It means that the peace offerings of the Nazirite are subject to the rule requiring ten [cakes made of] Jerusalem qabs [of flour] for a quarter of a log of oil] [LXXXV:I.13].**

II.2. A. *What is the exegesis behind this reading?*

B. Said R. Pappa, “[‘His peace offerings’ encompasses within the Nazirite’s offering] only those species that are covered by the language ‘unleavened,’ *excluding soaked cakes, that are not covered by the term ‘unleavened.’*” [Cashdan: This term describes the cakes and wafers prescribed for the thank offering, Lev. 7:12, accordingly the unleavened cakes spoken of in the Nazirite offering signify these same cakes.]

C. *A Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [stated], “‘A basket of unleavened bread’ (Num. 5:16) forms an encompassing generalization; ‘cakes’ and wafers’ then represent particularizations of the foregoing. So we have an encompassing generalization followed by a particularization, and whenever we have an encompassing generalization followed by a particularization, then what is covered under the encompassing generalization is only what is explicitly stated in the particularization: only cakes and wafers, nothing more.”*

8:3A-D

A. **[78B] He who slaughters the thank offering inside [the Temple court], [while] its bread offering is located outside the wall — the bread is not sanctified.**

B. **[If] he slaughtered the thank offering before its bread offering had formed a crust in the oven —**

- C. even if all of them [the loaves] formed a crust except for one of them —
D. the bread is not sanctified.

I.1 A. *What is the meaning of outside the wall?*

- B. R. Yohanan said, “Outside the wall of Bethpage.”
- C. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Outside of the wall of the courtyard.”
- D. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Outside of the wall of the courtyard:” for the sense of the word “with” [in the verse, “with cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering” (Lev. 7:13), *we require that it be near [the sacrifices, that is, within the Temple court]*].
- E. R. Yohanan said, “Outside the wall of Bethpage.” for the sense of the word “with” [in the verse, “with cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering” (Lev. 7:13), but if it is outside of the wall of the courtyard, it is still sanctified, *for we do not require that it be near the sacrifices*].
- F. *Now lo, this same dispute has been set forth once already, for we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who slaughters the Passover offering with leaven [still in his possession] transgresses a negative commandment [Exo. 34:25]. R. Judah says, “Also: the daily whole offering [for the fourteenth of Nisan]” [M. Pes. 5:4A-B].** And said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “He is liable only if the leaven belongs to the one who slaughters the lamb or sprinkles the blood or any of those registered for this offering, and it is also located with him in the Temple court.” And R. Yohanan said, “Even if it is not with him in the Temple court.”*
- G. *But both disputes still have to be expressed explicitly, for if the rule were stated only in that case, in connection with the Passover, I might have said that it is in that case in particular that R. Yohanan regards him as liable, even though the leaven was not physically with the man, for wherever it happens to be located, it is subject to a prohibition, but in the matter of the meaning of “with” in connection with sanctifying the bread, I might suppose that he agrees with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish that if the bread is located within the Temple court, it is sanctified, if outside, it is not. And if the rule were stated only in the present context, I might maintain that it is in this case in particular that R. Simeon b. Laqish takes the view that the bread is sanctified only if it is within the Temple court, but in the other case, I might maintain that he accepts the view of R. Yohanan that one is liable even though the leaven is not near at hand. So both disputes have to be set forth..*
- H. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of R. Yohanan:*

- I. He who slaughters the thank offering within the Temple court while the bread accompanying it is outside of the wall of Beth Page, — the bread is not sanctified.

II.1 A. [If] he slaughtered the thank offering before its bread offering had formed a crust in the oven — even if all of them [the loaves] formed a crust except for one of them — the bread is not sanctified:

- B. *What is the source in Scripture of this rule?*
C. *It is in line with that which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
D. **“[With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving he shall bring his offering] with cakes of leavened bread:”**
E. **This teaches that the bread is not sanctified until its surface will form a crust in the oven.**
F. **“With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving he shall bring his offering:”**
G. **This teaches that the sacrifice itself is sanctified only through the act of slaughter.**
H. **“With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving [he shall bring his offering with cakes of leavened bread]:”**
I. **This teaches that the bread is sanctified only when the slaughtering of the beast is under the designation of the thanksgiving offering. [Sifra adds: On this basis sages have ruled: If one slaughtered the beast under the proper designation but sprinkled the blood not under the proper designation, the bread is deemed to have been sanctified. R. Eliezer b. R. Simeon says, “The bread is not regarded as sanctified” [Sifra LXXXV:I.10-12].**

II.2. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:

- B. People may fulfill their obligation to eat unleavened bread on Passover by eating unleavened bread that is only partly baked, or with unleavened bread prepared in a stew pot.
C. *What is the meaning of unleavened bread that is only partly baked?*
D. Said R. Judah said Samuel, “It is any that when broken has no threads hanging out of it.”

II.3. A. Said Raba, “And that is the rule in the case of loaves of the thank offering.”

- B. *That is self-evident! Here we find the use of the word “bread” and the same is used in the other case [Lev. 7:13, Deu. 16:3]. [Cashdan: and surely what is regarded as bread for the Passover is regarded as bread for the thank offering.]*
C. *What might you otherwise have supposed? Scripture said, “one” (Lev. 7:14), meaning that one may not take what is broken, so what is partially baked is classified as broken.*
D. *So we are informed that that is not the case.*

II.4. A. It has been stated:

- B. A thank offering that one slaughtered in connection with eighty loaves of bread —

- C. Hezekiah said, "Forty of the loaves among the eighty have been sanctified."
- D. R. Yohanan said, "Forty of the loaves among the eighty have not been sanctified."
- E. *Said Zira, "All concur that if the officiating priest said, 'Let forty out of the eighty be sanctified,' they are sanctified. 'The forty shall not be sanctified unless all eighty are sanctified,' they are not sanctified. Where they differ is only when the matter has not been made explicit. One authority takes the view that the unstated intention of the donor in presenting eighty loaves was to make sure that at least forty would be found suitable, and the other authority maintains that the intention was merely to provide a very large offering [so all eighty have to be valid]."*
- F. [Following Cashdan's text:] *Abbayye said, "At issue between them is whether or not utensils of service sanctify the bread when the owner has stated no intention. [Cashdan: the utensil of service, here the knife that slaughters the animal, sanctifies the loaves; here we have more than the requisite number; we do not know the intention of the owner. Does the knife automatically sanctify forty out of the eighty loaves?] One authority takes the view that utensils of service sanctify what is in them even when there is no explicit statement on the matter [Hezekiah then says that automatically, forty of the eighty loaves are sanctified], and the other master takes the view that the utensils of service do not sanctify in the absence of a clear expression of intentionality on the part of the owner of the offering."*
- G. *R. Pappa said, "All parties concur that utensils of service sanctify what is in them even when there is no explicit statement on the matter. And here what is at issue is the effect of the knife. One authority [Hezekiah] takes the position that the knife serves to sanctify, just like any other utensil of service, and the other authority maintains that it is not the fact that the knife serves to sanctify, just like any other utensil of service, since it has no receptacle."*
- H. *And there are those who state matters as follows:*
- I. *R. Pappa said, "All parties concur that utensils of service sanctify only when that accords with the intentionality of the owner. Here what is at issue is the effect of the knife. One authority maintains that the knife bears greater power than any other utensil of service, for even though it has no receptacle, it sanctifies what it affects, and the other authority maintains that the knife is no more effective than any other utensil of service."*

8:3E-L

- E. [If] he slaughtered it [intending to eat its flesh or to toss the blood or to offer up the sacrificial parts] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, the bread is sanctified [and is deemed refuse, M. 2:3].
- F. [If] he slaughtered it [the thank offering], and it turned out to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified [M. Zeb. 9:2-3].
- G. [If] he slaughtered it and it turned out to be blemished —
- H. R. Eliezer says, "It [the bread] is sanctified."
- I. And sages say, "It is not sanctified." [The blemished animal which goes up on the altar is not removed, so Aqiba, M. Zeb. 9:2-3. Eliezer is of the same view.]

- J. [If] he slaughtered it not for its own name [= not under the classification of offering for which the animal originally was designated],
 - K. and so with the ram of consecration, and so the two lambs of Aseret which one slaughtered not for their own name [= not under the classification of offering for which the animal originally was designated] —
 - L. the bread is not sanctified.
- I.1** A. *In accord with the position of which authority is our Mishnah-paragraph's rule?*
- B. *It accords with the position of R. Meir. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
 - C. This is the governing principle: any animal, the invalidation of which has taken place before the act of slaughter — the bread that accompanies the animal has not been sanctified. If the invalidation took place after the slaughter of the animal, the bread has been sanctified.
 - D. “[If] he slaughtered it [intending to eat its flesh or to toss the blood or to offer up the sacrificial parts] outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, the bread is sanctified [and is deemed refuse, M. 2:3].
 - E. [79A] “[If] he slaughtered it [the thank offering], and it turned out to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified [M. Zeb. 9:2-3].
 - F. “[If] he slaughtered it and it turned out to be blemished —
 - G. “R. Eliezer says, ‘It [the bread] is sanctified,’ and R. Joshua says, ‘It is not sanctified,’” the words of R. Meir.
 - H. Said R. Judah, “R. Eliezer and R. Joshua did not dispute about the case in which one has slaughtered the animal with the improper intention to eat when is eaten outside of the proper time, that the bread indeed has been sanctified; nor did they dispute about a case in which one slaughtered the animal and it turned out to be blemished, that the bread has not been sanctified.
 - I. “Concerning what case did they dispute?
 - J. “It was case in which one slaughtered the animal with the improper intention to eat what is to be eaten outside of the proper place.
 - K. “For R. Eliezer says, ‘The bread has been sanctified.’ And R. Joshua says, ‘It has not been sanctified.’
 - L. “Said R. Eliezer, ‘Do you not agree that if one slaughtered it with the improper intention of eating what is to be eaten outside of the proper time, the bread has been sanctified? Also in the case of one who slaughtered it with the improper intention of eating what is to be eaten outside of the proper place, the bread also should be deemed sanctified.’
 - M. “Said to him R. Joshua, ‘Do you not agree that if one slaughtered the beast and it turned out to be blemished, that the bread has not been sanctified? So too in the case of one who has slaughtered it with the improper intention of eating what is to be eaten outside of the proper place, the bread should not be deemed sanctified.’
 - N. “Said to him R. Eliezer, ‘You compare it to the case of a blemished animal, and I compare it to the case of the improper intention of eating what is to be

eaten outside of the proper time. So let us see which is the governing analogy: if it is comparable to the case of a blemished animal, then let us derive the law from that of the blemished animal, and if it is comparable to one in which improper intention has focused on carrying out the specified actions outside of the proper time, let us derive the law from the case of improper intention concerning the proper time.'

- O. "R. Eliezer says, 'A case of improper intention about eating outside of the proper time produces invalidation through improper intention, and one in which improper intention about eating outside of the proper place produces invalidation through improper intention. But let not the case of the blemished animal prove the point, for in such a case, invalidation is not on account of intention but on account of the facts of the matter.'
- P. "R. Joshua says, 'A blemished animal is invalid and extirpation does not apply to it, and a case of invalidating the animal through improper intention to eat outside of the proper place produces invalidation, and extirpation does not apply to it. But let not the case of improper intention to eat outside of the proper time prove the matter, because in such a case the status of refuse applies, and they are liable on its account to extirpation' [T. Men. 8:18E-G, 8:19].
- Q. "And furthermore, let us find our governing analogy in the slaughtering of a beast for a purpose other than that for which the beast was originally designated, for this is a point of invalidation that derives from improper intentionality but also does not involve the penalty of extirpation."
- R. And R. Eliezer fell silent."
- I.2.** A. *And as to R. Meir, what is the reason that, where the thank offering was slaughtered and turned out to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified, since the flaw is classified as one that has affected the beast prior to slaughtering, while if the beast was slaughtered and found blemished, the bread is (in Eliezer's view) sanctified, for the defect is classed as not having taken place prior to the act of slaughtered?*
- B. *At issue is a film over the eye, in accord with the position of R. Aqiba, who has said, "If beasts with such a defect have gone up onto the altar, they are not to be taken down."*
- I.3.** A. *And the other [Judah vis à vis Eliezer, where the animal is found after slaughtering to be blemished, the bread is not sanctified — why not, since the blemish is minor (Cashdan)?]*
- B. *When R. Aqiba states the view that if the beast in such condition has gone up onto the altar, it is not to be taken down, it is when the point of invalidation pertains to the beast itself. But as to sanctifying the bread in such a case, he has not taken that position.*
- I.4.** A. *It has been stated:*
- B. A sin offering that one slaughtered with the expressed intention of tossing the blood or eating the meat outside of the proper time, and the sacrificial parts of which were put up onto the altar — the are not to be taken down again. If the

intention was to sprinkle the blood or eat the meat outside of the proper place, and the sacrificial parts went up onto the altar —

- C. Raba said, “If is to be taken down.
- D. Rabbah said, “It is not to be taken down.
- E. *Raba accords with R. Joshua, and Rabbah with R. Eliezer.*
- F. *Then Rabbah retracted and accepted the view of Raba, since R. Eliezer retracted in favor of R. Joshua.*
- G. *And there are those who say, “Even though R. Eliezer retracted in favor of the position of R. Joshua, Rabbah did not retract in favor of the position of Raba.*
- H. *“For it was in particular in that case that we derive our governing analogy from the rule for slaughtering the offering for some purpose other than that for which the beast was originally designated. But in this case, if we derive the governing analogy from the rule covering the case of an offering made under a classification other than that for which it was designated, it must follow that, if it was put up on the altar, it is not to be removed” [Cashdan: for it is admitted by all parties that if a sin offering was offered in some classification other than that for which the beast was originally designated and it was put up on the altar, it is not taken down again].*

II.1 A. [If] he slaughtered it not for its own name, and so with the ram of consecration, and so the two lambs of Aseret which one slaughtered not for their own name — the bread is not sanctified:

- B. **[and so with the ram of consecration:]** *Said R. Pappa, “The Tannaite authority of the passage before us has left out the case of the ram of the Nazirite offering, because it is commonly offered, but introduces the case of the ram of the consecration offering [which happened only once in all of history]!”*
- C. *And our Tannaite authority?*
- D. *He has chosen for his specific example the first of all the first such offering. [Cashdan: the consecration was the first offering accompanied by a bread offering, but the law also applies to the ram of the Nazirite offering.]*

8:4A-C

- A. **Drink offerings which were sanctified in a utensil, and the animal sacrifice [with which they were brought] turned out to be invalid —**
- B. **if there is there another animal sacrifice [requiring drink offerings], let them be offered with it.**
- C. **And if not, let them be invalidated by being kept overnight.**

- I.1 A. Said Zeiri, “The drink offerings are consecrated only by the act of slaughtering the designated animal offering” [but prior to that moment they may serve some other purpose than the one for which they are planned].
- B. “What is the Scriptural basis of that view?
- C. “A burnt offering and a meal offering” (Lev. 23:37) [Cashdan: hence the meal offering follows immediately after the animal offering].”
- D. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **Drink offerings which were sanctified in a utensil, and the animal sacrifice [with which they were brought] turned out to be invalid — if there is there another animal sacrifice [requiring drink***

offerings], let them be offered with it. And if not, let them be invalidated by being kept overnight.

- E. *Is not the meaning that the invalidation came about through the act of slaughter?* [Cashdan: nonetheless the drink offerings are sanctified, since to be rendered invalid, they have to be kept over night. Since in this case of slaughtering the animal offering was invalid, that action could not have sanctified the drink offerings, but they must have been sanctified before the act of slaughter — contrary to Zeiri's position.]
- F. No, it means that the invalidation came about through the improper tossing of the blood.
- G. *In accord with whom, then, is this explanation tendered? It accords with Rabbi, who has said, "Two components of a rite that together render the priests' share of the meat of the offering permissible for them to eat may nonetheless individually raise the offering to the level of sanctity each on its own."* [Cf. B. **Men. 72B**: The lambs that are presented at Pentecost sanctify the bread only when they are slaughtered. How so? "If the officiating priest slaughtered them for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, and tossed their blood for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, the bread is likewise sanctified. If the officiating priest slaughtered them not for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, and tossed their blood not for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, the bread is not sanctified. If the officiating priest slaughtered them for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, and tossed their blood not for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, the bread is sanctified but not sanctified," the words of Rabbi. R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, "Under no circumstances is the bread sanctified unless the officiating priest slaughtered them for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated, and tossed their blood for the classification for which the beasts were originally designated"].
- H. *You may even say that it accords with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon. For here with what sort of a case are we dealing? It is one in which the officiating priest received the blood in a cup, and then the cup was poured out, [79B] and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon concurs with his father, who has said, "In any case in which the blood is ready to be sprinkled, it is as though it were sprinkled."*

II.1 A. A master has said, "if there is there another animal sacrifice [requiring drink offerings], let them be offered with it."

- B. *But lo, has not R. Hisda said, "Oil that one has designated for use for a particular meal offering is invalid for use for some other meal offering [so how can this be used for some other offering, having been designated for the one that was not made]"?*
- C. Said R. Yannai, "The court itself stipulates in its heart concerning the drinks, that if they are required, they are necessary for that offering and are so used, but, if not, then they shall be used for another offering."
- D. *So if that is the case, then, let the oil also be subject to the same condition!*

- E. *The oil is an essential component of the meal offering.* [Cashdan: the oil is mingled with the flour and becomes one with the meal offering; hence even before mingling, the oil is so closely related to the meal offering that if the latter is for some reason invalid, the oil cannot be used for any other offering].
- F. *Then why not make a stipulation that [if the drink offerings are not used for the animal offering,] they revert to secular status! [Why stipulate, rather, **And if not, let them be invalidated by being kept overnight?**]*
- G. It is a precautionary decree, lest people say that people may remove what is in a utensil of Temple service and use it as secular.
- H. *Then here too, there should be such a precautionary decree, lest people say that drink offerings that have been designated for one offering are valid when used for some other.*
- I. *Has not Mattithiah b. Judah repeated as a Tannaite formulation:* “[The law of the Mishnah pertains] in a case in which the other animal offering [for which these drink offerings are to be used] was slaughtered at the same time [Cashdan: in this case people would assume that the drink offerings had originally been intended for the other animal offering].”
- J. Then if the other animal offering was not slaughtered at the same time, *what is the law? Would the drink offerings not be left to become invalid by being kept overnight? Then, instead of formulation the final clause, **And if not, let them be invalidated by being kept overnight**, formulate matters in this way instead:* Under what circumstances [may the drink offerings be used for another animal offering]? If another animal offerings had been slaughtered at the same time, but not if another animal offering had not been slaughtered at the same time.
- K. *That is precisely the intent of what the Tannaite formulation of the passage means to say:* Under what circumstances [may the drink offerings be used for another animal offering]? If another animal offerings had been slaughtered at the same time, but if another animal offering had not been slaughtered at the same time, then the drink offerings are invalidated by being regarded as though they had been kept overnight.

- II.2.** A. *Now does R. Simeon take the view, “The court itself stipulates in its heart”? And lo, said R. Idi bar Abin said Amram said R. Isaac said R. Yohanan, “Daily whole offerings that were designated but then not required for offering in the name of the community [and which are left over at the end of the month and could not be used for offering in the next month], in the opinion of R. Simeon are not subject to redemption when they are unblemished [so he does not assume that the stipulation of the court that, if they are not used as needed, they are secular to begin with, is valid], but in the opinion of sages, they are redeemed even without a blemish”!*
- B. *That case is different [in Simeon’s view] since the problem is readily solved by putting the lambs out to pasture and selling them once they are blemished. [But here there is no such remedy, so we appeal to the unstated stipulation of the court.]*

8:3D-M

- D. (1) The offspring of a thank offering
- E. and (2) a beast designated as its substitute [in line with Lev. 27:10] —

- F. and (3) he who sets aside his thank offering,
- G. and it was lost, and he separated another in its place [and thereafter the lost one was found] —
- H. [when they are offered, as they must be,] they do not require bread,
- I. as it is said, “And he shall offer up with the sacrifice of the thank offering” (Lev. 8:12) —
- J. the [one which is offered as a] thank offering requires bread,
- K. but (1) its offspring,
- L. and (3) that which is brought in its place,
- M. and (2) its substitute do not require bread.

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. What is the purpose of the statement, “If he offers it for a thanksgiving offering”?
- C. How do you know the basis for the following ruling:
- D. He who designated a beast for his thanksgiving offering, which was lost, and who then designated another in its stead, and did not suffice to offer it before the first was found, so that lo, both of them are available [cf. M. **Men. 7:4E**/T. **Men. 8:20C-E**] —
- E. how do we know that he brings whichever one of them he prefers, and brings with it the requisite bread offering,
- F. and that as to the second, he presents it without the bread offering?
- G. Scripture says, “If he offers it for a thanksgiving offering.”
- H. Might one suppose that both of the beasts require a bread offering?
- I. Scripture says, “...offers it...,” meaning, one requires a bread offering, but the two of them do not require a bread offering.
- J. And how do I know that the law encompasses the offspring of such beasts and the beasts declared substitutes for them?
- K. Scripture says, “If he offers it for a thanksgiving offering.”
- L. Might one think that all of them require a bread offering?
- M. Scripture refers to “the thanksgiving offering,” meaning, it is the thanksgiving offering that requires a bread offering, but its offspring does not require a bread offering, nor does a beast given in exchange for it, nor does a beast declared to be its substitute, require a bread offering [Sifra **LXXXV:I.1-2**]

I.2. A. [Now in this connection] R. Hanina sent word in the name of R. Yohanan, “They repeated this rule only in connection with the case after atonement had been carried out [with the offering of the mother animal], but if it was before atonement had been carried out, it would have required the bread offering.” [Cashdan: if both animals are available, whichever is offered, whether the original thank offering or the offspring or substitute, requires a bread offering.]

- B. *R. Amram considered this statement: “To which case does this ruling pertain? If I should propose that it pertains to what has been presented in place of the thank offering that was obligatory [that is, one has vowed such an offering, designated*

an animal, and then the animal was lost, so another was presented instead], then we already has in hand the Tannaite rule governing the case in which it was offered prior to making atonement and we also have the Tannaite rule governing the case in which it was offered afterward! [Scripture refers to “the thanksgiving offering,” meaning, it is the thanksgiving offering that requires a bread offering, but its offspring does not require a bread offering, nor does a beast given in exchange for it, nor does a beast declared to be its substitute, require a bread offering. Thus whichever one is offered requires the bread offering, and once the offering has been made, the others do not require a bread offering.] [80A] But then should I imagine that at issue is the beast presented in place of a thank offering presented not out of obligation but as a free will donation? Then surely, whether it is offered prior to, or after, atonement, there must be a bread offering, since this is simply an additional thank offering. [Cashdan: since the original is a freewill thank offering, there is no obligation to replace it if lost, so what is brought in replacement is simply another thank offering and does require the bread offering.] Then does the rule pertain to the offspring of an animal designated as a thank offering? Then whether offered before atonement or afterward it does not require a bread offering, since it represents merely the surplus of a thank offering! [Cashdan: any accretion to the original thank offering is treated as surplus, and like the surplus of money used for the purchase of a thank offering, it does not require a bread offering.] Rather, it refers to the offspring of a thank offering that is obligatory. If this is presented prior to atonement, it requires a bread offering, if afterward, it does not require a bread offering.”

- C. *But that is so obvious that we must wonder what the cited passage proposes to tell us that we do not already know?*
- D. R. Yohanan takes the position that someone may attain atonement through using the increase of what is already consecrated [namely, the offspring in this case]. [Cashdan: as the offspring may be used for the atonement, it is deemed a thank offering just as is the mother and therefore requires a bread offering.]
- E. *Abbaye reflected on the matter in precisely the same way.*

I.3. A. *So too it has been stated:*

- B. Said R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan, “Beasts designated to serve in place of a free will offering, whether presented before or after atonement, has to have a bread offering, for it is classified as an additional thank offering. The offspring of a thank offering that is given as a free will offering, whether before or after atonement, does not have to have an accompanying bread offering. It is simply a surplus thank offering. The offspring of a thank offering presented by reason of an obligation, if this is before atonement, has to have a bread offering; if it is after atonement, it does not have to have a bread offering.”

- I.4.** A. Said Samuel, “In any circumstances in which, in the case of a sin offering, the designated beast is left to die, [the cases are, the offspring of a sin offering, the beast designated as a substitute of a sin offering, a sin offering the owner of which has died, a sin offering that was lost and the owner had atoned through another, and a sin offering that is too old (Cashdan)], in the case of a thank offering, there is no obligation to present a bread offering. In any circumstances in which, in the case of a sin offering, the beast is sent out to pasture until blemished then is sold

and the funds used for a sin offering, the counterpart situation in the instance of a thank offering will involve the presentation of a bread offering.”

- B. *To this proposition objected R. Amram [by citing the following:]*
- C. **“What is the purpose of the statement, ‘If he offers it for a thanksgiving offering’?”**
- D. **“How do you know the basis for the following ruling:**
- E. **“He who designated a beast for his thanksgiving offering, which was lost, and who then designated another in its stead, and did not suffice to offer it before the first was found, so that lo, both of them are available [cf. M. Men. 7:4E/T. Men. 8:20C-E] —**
- F. **“how do we know that he brings whichever one of them he prefers, and brings with it the requisite bread offering,**
- G. **“and that as to the second, he presents it without the bread offering?”**
- H. **“Scripture says, ‘If he offers it for a thanksgiving offering.’**
- I. **“Might one suppose that both of the beasts require a bread offering?”**
- J. **“Scripture says, ‘...offers it...,’ meaning, one requires a bread offering, but the two of them do not require a bread offering [Sifra LXXXV:1.1].**
- K. *“Now, with reference to the sin offering, in an equivalent circumstance, the beast is sent out to pasture, for we have learned in the Mishnah: He who separates his sin offering, which was lost, and [who] separated another in its stead — he did not suffice to offer it up before the first turned up — and lo, both of them are totally unblemished — ‘one of them is to be offered as a sin offering. And the other is to be left to die,’ the words of Rabbi. And sages say, ‘Only that sin offering is left to die in the case in which the owners have effected atonement. And coins do not go to the Salt Sea except in the case of those which are found after the owner has effected atonement’ [M. Tem. 4:3X-EE]. Now lo, if it was prior to the owner’s having achieved atonement, it is left to pasture [contrary to Samuel’s position].”*
- L. *Samuel concurs with the view of Rabbi, who maintains that the animal that was lost at the moment at which a replacement was designated is simply left to die [Cashdan: even though it was found before the second animal was offered, it is left to die, for it has been rejected as a sin offering; likewise a thank offering in such circumstances would not require the bread offering, thus along the lines of Samuel’s rule].*
- I.5. A. Then in the view of Rabbi, how shall we ever find a case in which a beast designated as a sin offering will be put out to pasture until blemished?**
- B. *The answer would conform to the position of R. Oshaia, for said R. Oshaia, “He who designates animals for use as a sin-offering [that he has to bring], [doing so] for the sake of security is to attain atonement through one of them, as he may choose, and the other is put out to pasture [until blemished, and the proceeds for the sale of this beast are assigned for the purchase of a freewill-offering].” [Here both animals are in hand at the time of the offering, so Rabbi will concur that it is put out to pasture (Cashdan).]*

- C. *But in such a case, is it not the fact that a thank offering will not require a bread offering [for one merely replaces the other, and what is brought in place of a thank offering does not require a bread offering, so Samuel's rule is violated (Cashdan)]?*
- D. *Rather, Samuel accords with the view of R. Simeon, who has said, "Five classifications of animals designated as sin-offerings are left to die: [the offspring of a sin offering, and the substitute of a sin offering, and a sin offering the owner of which has died, [that] it is in the case of an individual that matters are stated, but not in the case of the community, so in the case of that [animal], the owner of which has effected atonement, or the year of which has passed [and which has become superannuated]" (M. Par. 1:3-4). Miller, Temurah: Five classifications of sin offerings are condemned to die, and none is left to pasture so that the proceeds can be used for freewill offerings.]*
- E. *But lo, R. Simeon takes the view that under no conditions is an animal designated as a sin offering ever left to pasture [so how can Samuel say, "Whatever is the rule of a sin offering left to pasture..." (Cashdan)]?*
- F. *Samuel too has in point of fact given us only a single rule:"In any circumstances in which, in the case of a sin offering, the designated beast is left to die, in the case of a thank offering, there is no obligation to present a bread offering. [Then we omit: In any circumstances in which, in the case of a sin offering, the beast is sent out to pasture until blemished then is sold and the funds used for a sin offering, the counterpart situation in the instance of a thank offering will involve the presentation of a bread offering.]"*
- G. *So what does he tell us that we did not know before?*
- H. *What he has said serves to exclude the proposition presented by R. Yohanan, who has said [2.D], "Someone may attain atonement through using the increase of what is already consecrated [namely, the offspring in this case]." So he indicates that that is not the case.*

I.6. A. Said Rabbah, "[If someone said,] 'This animal shall be a thank offering, and these are the loaves that will accompany it,' if the bread was lost, presents other bread with the thank offering. If the animal designated as the thank offering was lost, he may not designate another to go along with the bread."

- B. *What is the operative consideration?*
- C. The bread is on account of the animal designated as the thank offering, but the animal designated as a thank offering is not on account of the bread.

I.7. A. And said Raba, "He who designated money for the purchase of an animal as a thank offering **[80B]** and there was a surplus of funds after the purchase of the beast presents with the money the loaves for the beast. If he designated money for the purchase of a bread offering to accompany a thank offering and some was left over, he may not use the surplus to present a thank offering."

- B. *What is the operative consideration?*
- C. *Might I say that it is on account of what R. Kahana said? For said R. Kahana, "How on the basis of Scripture we do know that the bread offering that*

accompanies a thank offering is classified as a thank offering? As it is said, ‘And he shall offer with the thank offering unleavened cakes’ (Lev. 7:12).” *But if that were the case, then the contrary should be the rule [surplus of money used for loaves should be available for the thank offering, but we have just established that that is not the fact]!*

D. *The loaves are classified as the thank offering, but the thank offering is not classified as the loaves.*

I.8. A. And said Raba, “He who designated an animal to serve as a thank offering, and the animal was lost, and who then went and designated another instead of the first, and that too was lost, and then went and designated another instead, and then the first two beasts turned up, so that lo, all three of them are available, attains atonement through the first. The second, then does not require a bread offering. But the third requires a bread offering [since it replaces the second, but since the second was not offered, the third cannot be regarded as the surplus of the thank offering but rather as an additional thank offering which requires the bread offering]. If he achieved atonement with the third, then the second offered in sequence does not require a bread offering, but the first does require a bread offering. If it was with the middle one, then the two on either side do not require bread offerings.” [Cashdan: both the first and the third are directly connected with the second, and are not the surplus of what was actually offered.]

B. Abbaye said, “Even though he had attained atonement through any one of them, the others do not require the bread offering, *both of them seen to be serving in the stead of the others.*” [Cashdan: so that even the third, which only indirectly replaced the first, is also exempt from the bread offering.]

I.9. A. Said R. Zira, “So too is the rule for a sin offering: he who designated an animal to serve as a sin offering, and the animal was lost, and who then went and designated another in stead of the first, and that too was lost, and then went and designated another in instead stead, and then the first two beasts turned up, so that lo, all three of them are available, attains atonement through the first. The second, then is left to die. But the third is left to pasture until blemished, then when blemished is sold, and the proceeds are used to purchase another offering. If he achieved atonement with the third, then the second offered in sequence is left to die., but the first is left to pasture until blemished, then when blemished is sold, and the proceeds are used to purchase another offering. If it was with the middle one, then the two on either side do not require are left to die.”

B. Abbaye said, “Even though he attained atonement through any one of them, the other two are left to die, *both of them seen to be serving in the stead of the others.*”

I.10. A. *What is the meaning of the language, So too is the rule?*

B. *What might you otherwise have supposed? It is in particular in that case that the rule applies, on the principle of presenting additional thank offerings, but that would not be the rule in the case of a sin offering, since we cannot maintain that one is offering additional sin offerings [for a sin offering must be designated for a particular inadvertent sin]. So we are informed that that is not the case, and the same rule pertains here as well.*

- I.11.** A. *R. Hiyya presented as a Tannaite statement: “An animal designated for a thank offering that was confused with a beast that had been declared a substitute for that animal, and one of the animals died — the other has no remedy [but must be left to die]. For what should the owner do? Should he present a bread offering with the surviving beast [as he must do if it is a thank offering]? Perhaps it is the beast designated as a substitute, and not the original. Should he then not present a bread offering with it? Perhaps the surviving beast is the one originally designated as a thank offering.*
- B. *But why not let him say, ‘Lo, Incumbent on me is a thank offering,’ he has no choice but to present such an offering [since the obligation is incumbent on him personally, not on the beast that has been designated]. And let him present the bread offering as well with it. He then states, ‘If the surviving animal is the substitute, then let this be a thank offering and this the bread offering, and if the surviving animal is the original, then let this be the bread offering for it, and the animal that I have designated later on serve as security for it [which does not require a bread offering].’*
- C. The case is one in which he had said [not ‘incumbent on me’ but], “Let this beast be a sin offering.”
- I.12.** A. Said those who debate in the presence of Rabbi, “Let him present a bread offering and say, ‘If this first beast was the designated thank offering, then since that is the offering, this is the bread offering that accompanies it. If not, then let the bread be unconsecrated.’”
- B. He said to them, “So do people really bring unconsecrated food into the sanctuary!”
- I.13.** A. *Let him present a beast and a bread offering, and say, “If this first beast was the substitute, then this is the thank offering and this is the bread offering that accompanies it. If the first beast was the thank offering, then this will be the required bread offering for it, and the other beast, which I am now presenting, will be simply a peace offering.”*
- B. *He said to him, “That is not a valid procedure since [in the latter case] it would represent diminishing the time available for the eating of the meat of peace offerings.”*
- I.14.** A. Said Levi to Rabbi, “Then let him bring a beast and a bread offering and say, ‘If the first beast was a substitute for a thank offering, then this is the thank offering and this is the bread that accompanies it. If this one before us is the thank offering, then this is the bread offering, and the animal at hand is the surplus of the thank offering [offering without the bread offering, as we very well know].’”
- B. He said to him, “I wonder whether this idiot has a brain in his head! **[81A]** Do people really to begin with designate an animal to serve as the surplus of an offering?”
- I.15.** A. In session, R. Isaac bar Samuel bar Marta before R. Nahman stated, “But then let him bring a beast and a bread offering and state, ‘If the first beast was a substitute for a thank offering, then this is the thank offering and this is the bread that accompanies it. If this one before us is the original thank offering, then this

bread is the bread offering that is required for it, and the animal before us will be the substitute of the thank offering.”

- B. *[Declaring a beast a substitute for an already consecrated one is a violation of a negative commandment and is sanctioned by flogging,] so he said to him, “Tell me, my lord, if this man is subject to forty stripes, is such a procedure a valid one?”*
- I.16.** A. R. Ila fell ill. Abbaye and rabbis came by and went into session stating, “If the law accords with the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, ‘The bread may be sanctified even though it is located outside of the wall of the sanctuary when the thank offering itself is slaughtered,’ let the man bring the bread offering and put it down outside of the wall of the courtyard and say, ‘If the original beast was the thank offering, then this is its bread. And if not, then let the bread be dismissed as unconsecrated.’”
- B. *The reason that that procedure will not work is that there are the four cakes that have to be waved. So what can anybody now do? Should the priest wave them outside? It is written, ‘Before the Lord’ (Lev. 7:30). Should he wave them inside? Then he is bringing unconsecrated food into the sanctuary, which cannot be done.*
- C. *Objected R. Shisha b. R. Idi, “If the law accords with the position of Hezekiah, who has said, ‘Forty out of the eighty cakes are sanctified [if somebody brought eighty cakes along with a thank offering, though only forty are due],’ let the man present a beast and eighty cakes with it and say, ‘If the original beast was a thank offering, then let this beast too be a thank offering, and here are eighty cakes covering the bread offering of both of them. If this first beast was a substitute, then this one is a thank offering, and here is the bread offering that accompanies it, and forty out of the eighty cakes are sanctified along with it.’”*
- D. *The reason that that procedure will not work is that one would then impose limitations on the occasion for eating the four cakes. [Cashdan: the priest, thinking he is not entitled to more than four of the cakes, those for one thank offering, would eat only four and leave four; the owners would not eat the rest and the remainder would be destroyed unnecessarily. Or: eight cakes are given to the priest, but only four are holy, so the other four will be burned, even though they are holy.]*
- E. *Said R. Ashi to R. Kahana, “If the law accords with the position of R. Yohanan, who has said, ‘If one designated as a sin offering a pregnant beast, which then gave birth, he may make atonement if he wishes with the mother or he may do so if he wishes with the offspring,’ let the man present a pregnant beast and wait until it gives birth, then present eighty cakes along with it and make this declaration: ‘If the surviving animal is the substitute, then let the mother beast and its offspring be thank offerings, and here are the eighty cakes that are required for the two of them. If the surviving beast is the original thank offering, let the mother beast be a thank offering as well, and here are eighty cakes to cover both. And the offspring for its part will be classified as the surplus of the thank offering.’”*
- F. *He said to him, “Well, who is going to tell us that the operative consideration for R. Yohanan’s ruling is that he holds, if the farmer were to impose a stipulation on*

the offspring, that would be a valid stipulation? Perhaps if the farmer imposed on the offspring a stipulation, it is not so classified. And then the operative consideration behind R. Yohanan's ruling is that he takes the view that a man may attain atonement through the increase of what is already in the status of Holy Things."

- I.17.** A. *Rabina visited Mahurayya. Said R. Dimi b. R. Huna of Damahurayya to Rabina, "Let the man bring a beast and make this declaration: 'Lo, incumbent upon me [is a thank offering], and then let him bring another animal and along with it eighty cakes and make this declaration: 'If the first beast was the substitute, then these two other beasts are thank offerings, and here are the eighty cakes that are going to serve the two of them. If the first beast was a thank offering, then the beast concerning which I said, 'Lo, incumbent upon me [is a thank offering], will be a thank offering, and here are the eighty cakes for the two, and let the third beast serve merely as security."*
- B. He said to him, "The Torah has said, 'It is better not to take a vow than to take a vow and not pay' (Qoh. 5: 4), and yet you say he should go ahead and take a vow!"

8:5

- A. **He who says, "Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] a thank offering" brings it and its bread from that which is unconsecrated [not purchased with second-tithe coins].**
- B. **[81B] [He who says], "A thank offering from that which is unconsecrated, and its bread from tithe," brings its bread from that which is unconsecrated.**
- C. **[He who says], "A thank offering from tithe and its bread from that which is unconsecrated," brings [the things just as he has specified].**
- D. **[He who says], "A thank offering — it and its bread from tithe," brings [the things just as he has specified].**
- E. **But [even in this case] he should not bring it from wheat which itself is second tithe, but only [with wheat purchased by] coins [used for the redemption of] second tithe.**
- I.1** A. Said R. Huna, "He who says, 'Lo, incumbent on me are loaves of bread to accompany a thank offering' must bring both the thank offering and the bread that accompanies it. *What is the operative consideration? That man most certainly knows that bread without an animal designated as a thank offering is simply not offered, so what he meant to say was 'a thank offering and its bread,' and when he said, 'loaves of bread to accompany a thank offering,' what he said was simply the conclusion of the thought."*
- B. *We have learned in the Mishnah: He who says], "A thank offering from tithe and its bread from that which is unconsecrated," brings [the things just as he has specified]. But why should that be the case in light of this reasoning? Once the man has said, "and its bread offering from unconsecrated produce," let him bring both it and its bread offering from unconsecrated produce!*
- C. *That case is exceptional, for, since the man has said, "A thank offering from a beast designated as tithe," it is as though he had said, "Lo, incumbent on me is a bread offering to fulfill the obligation of Mr. So-and-so." [Cashdan: the vow is*

binding, and he must bring the bread from what is unconsecrated, whether that other's thank offering was of second tithe or unconsecrated; so too in the case of our rule, the man meant to offer bread from what was unconsecrated so as to exempt from this obligation his own thank offering brought from second tithe.]

- D. *If that is so, then in respect to the first clause of the Mishnah-paragraph, [He who says], "A thank offering from that which is unconsecrated, and its bread from tithe," brings its bread from that which is unconsecrated, here too, it should be interpreted as though he had said, "Lo, incumbent upon me is an offering of the thank offering for Mr. So-and-so's bread"!*
 - E. *But the two cases are hardly comparable. Now with respect to a bread offering that serves to fulfill the requirement of such an offering to accompany a thank offering, that can be presented. But is there any case in which a thank offering is presented to carry out the obligation of a bread offering that it be accompanying by such a thank offering?*
 - F. *Come and take note of the following: He who says, "Lo, incumbent on me is a thank offering without bread," or "a sacrifice without drink offerings," — they force him to bring a thank offering with its associated bread offering, a sacrifice with its associated drink offerings." Now the operative consideration is that he has said "a thank offering." But if he did not say "a thank offering," he would not have had to make any presentation whatever [against Huna's position]!*
 - G. *Not at all. The same law applies even though he did not say "a thank offering" [Cashdan: by offering the bread of a thank offering, he is compelled to bring the thank offering too]. But since the Tannaite framer of the passage wanted to state the rule governing the sacrifice without drink offerings, where the obverse could not have been stated [drink offerings without an animal offering], he also stated the rule governing the thank offering [Cashdan: but even where the man did not say, "a thank offering," but only the bread offering, he is compelled to bring a thank offering as well, in accord with Huna's position].*
- I.2.** A. *[Since it is the fact that if someone vowed to present a thank offering without bread, he has to bring the bread anyhow,] why is that the rule? Is this not merely the case in which one has taken a vow that contains within itself the grounds for its own remission? [And such a vow is null!]*
- B. *Said Hezekiah, "Lo, who is the authority behind this rule? It is the House of Shammai, who take the position that the words that are initially expressed are the ones that are binding. For we have learned in the Mishnah: [He who says,] 'Lo, I am a Nazir as to dried figs and pressed figs' — the House of Shammai say, 'He is a Nazir.' And the House of Hillel say, 'He is not a Nazir' [M. Naz. 2:1A-C]."*
 - C. *R. Yohanan said, "You may even take the position that the ruling before us accords with the House of Hillel. We assume that the man said, 'If I had known that one cannot take a vow in this way [promising a thank offering without bread], I should never have taken a vow in this way but in the right way.'"*
 - D. *Then why do they have to compel him?*
 - E. *That is, if now he wants to change his mind.*

- F. *Come and take note:* He who says, “Lo, incumbent on me is a thank offering without bread,” or “a sacrifice without drink offerings,” and they said to him, “Bring a thank offering and its required bread offering,” or, “a sacrifice and its accompanying drink offerings,” and then he said, “If I had known that that is the rule, I should never have taken the vow at all,” they force him and instruct him, “Observe and obey” (Deu. 12:28). *Now from the perspective of Hezekiah, there is no difficulty. But from the view of R. Yohanan, there is a real problem!*
- G. *R. Yohanan may say to you, “This assuredly represents the position of the House of Shammai.”*

I.3. A. *What is the meaning of “Observe and obey” (Deu. 12:28)?*

- B. Said Abbayye, “‘Observe’ to present the thank offering, and ‘obey’ to present the required bread offering.”
- C. Raba said, “‘Observe’ to present the thank offering and the required bread offering, and ‘obey’ not to habitually take such vows!”

II.1. A. **[He who says), “A thank offering — it and its bread from tithe,” brings [the things just as he has specified]:**

- B. **brings [the things just as he has specified]? But has he no alternative but to bring it as specified?**
- C. R. Nahman and R. Hisda said, “If he wants, he presents it, and if he did not want, he does not do so” [Cashdan: but he may present it from what is unconsecrated.

III.1 A. **But [even in this case] he should not bring it from wheat which itself is second tithe but only [with wheat purchased by] coins [used for the redemption of] second tithe:**

- B. R. Nahman and R. Hisda both said, “The stated rule refers only to grains of wheat that are themselves designated as second tithe, but he may present the offering from grains of wheat that have been purchased with coins that have been exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe.”

III.2. A. *R. Jeremiah went into session before R. Zira, and, in session, he stated, “The stated rule refers only to grains of wheat that are themselves designated as second tithe, but he may present the offering from grains of wheat that have been purchased with coins that have been exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe.”*

- B. He said to him, “My lord, you say so. But I take the view that even from grains of wheat that have been purchased with coins that have been exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe he may not present the offering. *Now I shall set forth the operative consideration behind my ruling, and you can set forth the operative consideration behind your ruling. Now I shall set forth the operative consideration behind your ruling, which is this: how do you know to begin with that the thank offering may be purchased with coins that have been exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe and been transported to Jerusalem for use in purchasing food there? The rule derives from the analogy of peace offerings, [82A] and in the case of peace offerings, that same rule derives from a verbal analogy effected by the use of the word ‘there’ stated in the context of both peace offerings and second tithe. So it follows that peace offerings are not presented out of what has actually been designated as second tithe produce, and the bread*

of the thank offering likewise may not be presented from produce that has actually been designated as produce in the status of second tithe, and what bought with second tithe money falls into the category of what is not actually produce that itself has been designated as second tithe. Now I shall set forth the operative consideration behind my ruling: how do I know the governing rule for thank offerings? We derive it from the analogy of peace offerings. And, as before, in the case of peace offerings, that same rule derives from a verbal analogy effected by the use of the word 'there' stated in the context of both peace offerings and second tithe. So it follows that just as peace offerings are not of the same species as produce in the status of second tithe [being animals, not vegetables or fruit], so the bread of the thank offering may not derive from that which is of the same species as produce in the status of second tithe. Excluded, then, is wheat bought from the proceeds of selling produce in the status of second tithe, which falls into the same species as the second tithe itself."

- III.3.** A. Said R. Ammi, "He who assigned to the purpose of buying an animal for a peace offering money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe — the coins are not assigned to the sole purpose of buying such an animal [but may be used for any other purpose]. *How come not? Because the sanctity of the peace offering is insufficiently strong to take over the sanctity attaching to second tithe.*"
- B. *An objection was raised: If in Jerusalem, using coins designated as an exchange for produce in the status of second tithe, either a wild beast to serve as a peace offering, or cattle to serve as common food [without prior slaughter as peace offerings] [and neither is correct, since a wild beast cannot be an offering, and cattle bought for that money can only be presented as peace offerings], — the hide of the beast may not be treated as secular [M. M.S. 1:3A-B]. Is that not because the sanctity of the peace offering is sufficiently strong to take over the sanctity attaching to second tithe that pertains to the hide?'"*
- C. *Lo, it has been stated in this regard: said Rab, "The peace offering has not effected ownership of the hide, and what is the meaning of the hide of the beast may not be treated as secular? This is the sense of that statement: The wild animal does not fall within the classification of its peace offerings, such that its hide may become secular."*
- D. *Why not?*
- E. Said Rabbah, "The case is treated as one in which one has purchased an ox for ploughing [Cashdan: in which case the ox must be sold and the money received must be treated within the rules of sanctity governing produce in the status of second tithe and proceeds therefor].

III.4. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. He who assigned to the purpose of buying an animal for a peace offering money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe —
- C. R. Yohanan said, "The status of the peace offering takes over."
- D. R. Eleazar says, "The status of the peace offering does not take over."
- E. *In respect to the position of R. Judah, who holds the view that what is in the status of second tithe is classified as the property of an ordinary person*

[not a priest and holy], all parties concur that the status of the peace offering takes over. [Cashdan: the sanctity of the peace offerings immediately takes hold of secular property.] Where there is a dispute, it is with regard to the position of R. Meir who has said that what is in the status of second tithe is classified as the property of the Most High. He who maintains that the status of the peace offering does not take over concurs with the view of R. Meir, and he who maintains that the status of the peace offering does take over maintains that since the classification is that of second tithe, and since second tithe funds are usually presented in the form of peace offerings, once someone has classified money as second tithe money for a peace offering, the designation is binding.

- F. *An objection was raised: He who designates money in the status of second tithe for the purpose of a peace offering, when he redeems the things that are consecrated or produce in the status of second tithe or money in that status, exchanging it for other money, he has to add to the money that is paid in exchange two fifth parts of its value [Lev. 27:13, 15], one fifth in regard to what has been consecrated, the other fifth in regard to the status of second tithe. [Cashdan: it is thus quite evidence that the sanctity of the peace offering rests upon the second tithe money that was merely designated for a peace offering, contrary to the view of Eleazar.]*
- G. *Yes, but do you really think that this represents the view of all parties? Lo, who is the authority behind that formulation? It is only R. Judah.*

8:6

- A. **How on the basis of Scripture do we know that he who says, “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] a thank offering,” should bring it only from unconsecrated beasts?**
- B. **As it is said, “And you will slaughter a Passover to the Lord, your God, of the flock or of the herd” (Deu. 16: 2) —**
- C. **And does not the Passover derive only from lambs or goats?**
- D. **If so, why is flock or herd said?**
- E. **But: it is to compare whatever derives from the flock or from the herd to the Passover.**
- F. **Just as the Passover, which is brought in fulfillment of an obligation, is brought only from unconsecrated beasts, so everything which is brought in fulfillment of an obligation is brought only from unconsecrated beasts.**
- G. **Therefore: He who says, “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] a thank offering,” “Lo, I pledge myself [to bring] peace offerings” —**
- H. **since they are brought in fulfillment of an obligation, should bring them only from unconsecrated [funds].**
- I. **And drink offerings under all circumstances [even at M. 8:5D-E] should derive only from unconsecrated [funds].**
- I.1** A. *But how on the basis of Scripture do we know the rule covering the Passover offering itself?*
- B. *It is in accord with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- C. R. Eliezer says, “We find a reference to the offering of a Passover offering to be presented in Egypt, and a reference to the offering of a Passover offering for generations to come. Just as the Passover offering that was presented in Egypt could derive only from what was unconsecrated, so the Passover offering that was to be presented in generations to come might derive only from what was unconsecrated.”
- D. Said to him R. Aqiba, “But is it right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible [Cashdan: for at that time the law of the second tithe had not been promulgated, and even later, when it was given, it came into force only when the Israelites had entered the promised land. So in Egypt there was no possibility of presenting the Passover offering from a beast designated as second tithe.]”
- E. He said to him, “Even though it was not possible, it does represent probative evidence, so that we should derive the rule from that case.”
- F. R. Aqiba retracted and put forth another argument: “Well, since the Passover presented in Egypt did not involve tossing blood on the altar and burning up the sacrificial parts on the altar, [82B] will you invoke that analogy to provide governing rules for the Passover offering that would be presented for generations to come, which does involve tossing blood on the altar and burning up the sacrificial parts on the altar?”
- G. He said to him, “Lo, it is written, ‘And you shall keep this service in this month’ (Exo. 13: 5), meaning, whatever you do this month should conform to the analogy of what is done at this month now [so that passover offerings brought in the future will derive from unconsecrated beasts or funds].”

- I.2. A. *Now what is the premise of R. Aqiba’s position? If he really holds that it is not right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible, let him stand by his argument. If he retracted that position, so that the only reason that he did not derive the law from the case of the Passover offering in Egypt was the refutation that he set forth, then that can be demolished by appeal to the analogy of the Passover offering that was presented in the wilderness, which proves the opposite [for in that offering there was a sprinkling of blood and a burning up of sacrificial portions on the altar in the tabernacle; yet it was presented only from what was unconsecrated, there being no law of second tithe in effect in the wilderness anyhow]!”*
- B. *He stated his position within the premise of R. Eliezer, and this is what he meant to say: “From my perspective, it is the fact that it is not right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible. But from your perspective, which is that it is right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible, [I state my argument:] since the Passover presented in Egypt did not involve tossing blood on the altar and burning up the sacrificial parts on the altar, will you invoke that analogy to provide governing rules for the Passover offering that would be presented for generations to come, which does involve tossing blood on the altar and burning up the sacrificial parts on the altar?”*
- C. And it was to this argument that R. Eliezer stated in reply, “Lo, it is written, ‘And you shall keep this service in this month’ (Exo. 13: 5), meaning, whatever you do

this month should conform to the analogy of what is done at this month now [so that passover offerings brought in the future will derive from unconsecrated beasts or funds].”

- I.3.** A. *And why should not R. Eliezer say to him, “The Passover offering that was presented in the wilderness will prove my case [having been presented only from unconsecrated. He stated his position within the premise of R. Aqiba, and this is what he meant to say: “From my perspective, it is the fact that it is right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible. But from your perspective, which is that it is not right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible, and in respect to your refutation, as a matter of fact, the Passover offering that was presented in the wilderness will prove my case [having been presented only from unconsecrated beasts, yet yielded blood to be sprinkled and sacrificial parts to be burned].”*
- B. *“But from your perspective, which is that it is not right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible, lo, it is written, ‘And you shall keep this service in this month’ (Exo. 13: 5), meaning, whatever you do this month should conform to the analogy of what is done at this month now [so that passover offerings brought in the future will derive from unconsecrated beasts or funds].”*
- C. *But now too let [Aqiba] raise the objection that it is not right to derive the rule governing what is possible from a case involving what is not possible!*
- D. Said R. Sheshet, “That is to say, ‘It is not proper to present an objection against a proposition that has been derived on the basis of a verbal analogy.’”
- E. *In the [Cashdan:] school garden, it was stated: “Can a rule that is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy go and present a lesson on the basis of a verbal analogy [of another kind]?” [Cashdan: for here we propose by such an argument based on the Passover offerings presented in generations to come that all obligatory offerings may derive only from what is unconsecrated; but that rule derives for Passover offerings of later generations only by a verbal analogy drawn from the Passover offering in Egypt, and it is the fact that in matters having to do with sacrifices, a rule derived by verbal analogy cannot yield another such rule.]*
- F. *In point of fact, it has been stated as a rule governing the entire classification, and all Passover offerings fall into a single classification.*
- I.4.** A. *So how does R. Aqiba, for his part, derive the rule that the Passover offering may derive only from what is unconsecrated?*
- B. *He derives that rule from that which Samuel said in the name of R. Eliezer:*
- C. *“This is the Torah of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, of the sin offering, of the guilt offering, of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Lev. 7:37) [all of which are covered by the same rule].*
- D. *“the burnt offering:’ just as a burnt offering requires the use of a utensil for receiving the blood, so all the others require the use of a utensil for that same purpose.”*
- E. *What sort of a utensil can be meant? If it is a basin, then in respect to peace offerings in behalf of the community it is written, “And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins” (Exo. 24: 6). [Freedman, Zebahim:*

the blood was that of burnt offerings and peace offerings, hence peace offerings need not be inferred from burnt offerings.]

- F. *Rather, it means a knife.*
- G. *And how do we know that in the case of a burnt offering that is the case?*
- H. *Because it is written, "And Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to kill his son" (Gen. 22:10), and that was a burnt offering: "And offered him up for a burnt offering instead of his son" (Gen. 22:13).*
- I. [Resuming from where the amplification of the proof text was interrupted:] "'of the meal offering:' just as a meal offering is eaten only by male priests, so all of the others may be eaten only by male priests.
- J. *Which can be meant here? If reference is made to the sin offering and guilt offering, [83A] as a matter of fact that is stated explicitly in their regard: "Every male among the priests may eat thereof" (Lev. 7: 6). And if it is peace offerings presented in behalf of the community, that is derived from an extension of Scripture: "In a most holy place you shall eat of it, every male may eat of it" (Num. 18:10) teaches that peace offerings may be eaten only by male priests.*
- K. *As a matter of fact, it is a dispute among Tannaite formulations, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- L. *There are those who infer the rule from the one verse, and there are those who infer it from the other.*
- M. [Resuming from where the amplification of the proof text was interrupted:] "'of the sin offering:' just as a sin offering imparts the status of sanctity to that which absorbs its brine, so all sacrifice impart the status of sanctity to those that absorb its brine.
- N. "'of the guilt offering:' just as in the case of the guilt offering, the foetus and afterbirth inside it are not holy, so in the case of all Holy Things, the foetus and the afterbirth inside are not holy.
- O. The framer maintains that the offspring of Holy Things become holy only when they have come into existence and that we infer what is possible even from what is not possible [a guilt offering is a male, so there will be no foetus].
- P. [Resuming from where the amplification of the proof text was interrupted:] "'of the consecration offering:' just as in the case of the consecration offering, what is left over is burned, and there are no living animals among what is left over, so for all other Holy Things, the left over meat is burned, but living things are not classified as left over. [Freedman, *Zebahim*: Only meat and bread are left over, these alone were burned; whatever remains of a sacrifice is burned, but that does not apply to a living beast that is left over, e.g., designated for the offering, lost, replaced, then found, and the like.]
- Q. "'and of the sacrifice of peace offerings:' just as the improper intentionality of the officiating priest in the case of a peace offering imparts to the parts of the offering the status of refuse which those parts then impart to other things, or just as the parts of the peace offering may be subjected to the status of refuse deriving from

other parts that are subject to that status, so the same pertains throughout wherever the law of refuse applies.”

I.5. A. *In a Tannaite formulation it was repeated in the name of R. Aqiba:*

- B. “[‘This is the Torah of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, of the sin offering, of the guilt offering, of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings’ (Lev. 7:37) all of which are covered by the same rule]:
- C. “‘the meal offering:’ just as the burnt offering becomes holy if it absorbs that which is holy, so everything else becomes holy if it absorbs that which is holy.”
- D. *[That rule is expressed explicitly in connection with the meal offerings at Lev. 6:11, and the same is stated explicitly in connection with sin offerings, and] it was necessary to make the matter explicit in both cases. For had we been given an inference in regard to the meal offering, that might be thought to be so because it is soft and so absorbs, but as to a sin offering, I might have been led to think that that is not the case. And if we had been given the rule on the sin offering, I might have thought that that is because it is solid, but a meal offering might not be subject to the rule. Thus both are necessary.*
- E. [Resuming from where the exposition was broken off:] “‘sin offering:’ just as the sin offering derives only from unconsecrated beasts, and is offered only by day, and is presented only with the use of the right hand of the priest, so all Holy Things are subject to the rule that each derives only from unconsecrated beasts, and is offered only by day, and is presented only with the use of the right hand of the priest.”
- F. *And how do we know that that is the fact for the sin offering itself?*
- G. Said R. Hisda, “Scripture has said, ‘And Aaron shall present the bullock of the sin offering which is his’ (Lev. 16: 6) — thus it must belong to him personally and not to the community or tithe.
- H. “As to the rule that it must be by day: *that derives from the statement*, ‘in the day that he commanded’ (Lev. 6:38). *That pertains to all Holy Things.*”
 - I. *As to the use of the right hand?*
 - J. *That is in line with Rabbah bar bar Hannah, for said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “Every passage in which reference is made to ‘finger’ and ‘priesthood,’ the right hand only is what is meant.” That pertains to all Holy Things.*
 - K. *And if you prefer, I shall say that he is in accord with R. Simeon, who has said that a reference to “finger” then excludes the requirement that a priest officiate, and a reference to “priesthood” includes the requirement that the finger be used. [Freedman: both are stated in connection with a sin offering, but only priesthood is stated in connection with the others; hence they must be inferred from a sin offering.]*
- L. [Resuming from where the exposition was broken off:] “‘of the guilt offering:’ just as in the case of the guilt offering, the bones are permitted, so in the case of all other Holy Things, the bones are permitted.”

I.6. A. *And as to R. Aqiba, how does he read the verse, [83B] “And you shall slaughter the Passover offering” ((Deu. 16:20) [which our Mishnah-paragraph invokes to indicate that the thank offering may derive only from what is unconsecrated, since*

Aqiba derives the rule from the sin offering that all obligatory offerings must be brought only from what is unconsecrated (Cashdan)?

- B. *He requires it to serve the exegetical purpose that has been spelled out in accord with R. Nahman. For said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a beast designated for use as a Passover offering that turned out to be surplus [or money in the same classification] is presented in the classification of peace offerings? Because it is said, 'And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering to the Lord your God of the flock and of the herd' (Deu. 16: 2). Now is it not the fact that the Passover offering must derive only from the flock and from the herd? So on this basis it is shown with respect to the residue of the Passover offering that it must be used for a classification of offering that is ordinarily presented out of the flock and herd, and what might that be? It is a peace offering."*

- I.7.** A. *But is the rule that the surplus of the Passover offering may be presented as peace offerings derived from that verse? In fact it derives as shown by the father of Samuel. For it is written, "And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock' (Lev. 3: 6), in which connection said the father of Samuel, "This verse teaches that anything that derives from the flock may serve as a sacrifice of peace offerings. [Freedman: since a Passover offering comes of the flock, it is included in this deduction; further, that can only mean after its season, for it has already been deduced that if it is offered for anything but itself in its season, it is invalid.]*

- F. *Might I say then that if it is offered as a peace offering, it is valid, but if for any other classification of Holy Things, it is not valid?*

- I.8.** A. *Still, does it derive from that passage? Surely it derives from the follow, which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. "If he bring a lamb" — this is to encompass the Passover offering, in regard to its fat tail [which is to be burned on the altar].

- C. When Scripture further says, "If he bring a lamb for his offering...[and if his offering be a goat]" (Lev. 3: 7, 12), it serves to encompass a Passover offering that is more than a year old, and a peace offering that comes to accompany a Passover offering, indicating that all of the regulations of peace offerings pertain: they are to be subject to the laying on of hands, drink offerings, the waving of the breast and the shoulder. When Scripture says, "and if his offering be a goat," it interrupts the subject and indicates that a goat does not require the burning of the fat tail on the altar.

- D. [Following the version of **B. Zeb. 9A**, supply:] And does that rule derive from here? Surely it derives from the verse that is adduced in evidence by Samuel's father. For Samuel's father said, "And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock' (Lev. 3: 6) — it is something that derives from the flock that must be for a sacrifice of peace offerings. *And still it derives from what R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha said, for*

- E. *Rather, there are three verses in written in this context. One of them refers to an animal, the time for the slaughter of which has passed and which is superannuated; one refers to an animal the time for the slaughter of which has*

passed but which is not superannuated; and the third speaks of an animal the time for the slaughter of which has not passed and which is not superannuated.

- F. *And all three of these verses are required in context. For had Scripture made reference to one of them, I might have come to the conclusion that in a case in which the beast is superannuated and the time for slaughtering has passed, since it is completely disqualified for use as a Passover offering, the law applies. But if the time for slaughtering the beast had passed, but if it was not superannuated, I would say that it is not valid if slaughtered as a peace offering, since it can serve for the second Passover. If the Torah had made reference only to the other two, I would have supposed that they are valid if slaughtered as a peace offering because they have been disqualified for their own purpose. But if neither the time for slaughtering the beast nor the year had passed, so that it is eligible for the first passover, I would have said that that is not the case. So all three are required.*