

# I

---

## BAVLI ZEBAHIM CHAPTER ONE

FOLIOS 2A-15B

1:1-2

- A. [2A] All animal offerings that were slaughtered not for their own name are valid [so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned] ,
- B. but they do not go to the owner's credit in fulfillment of an obligation,
- C. except for the Passover and the sin offering —
- D. the Passover at its appointed time [the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan],
- E. and the sin offering of any time.
- F. R. Eliezer says, "Also: the guilt offering.
- G. "The Passover at its appointed time,
- H. "and the sin offering and the guilt offering at any time."
- I. Said R. Eliezer, "The sin offering comes on account of sin, and the guilt offering comes on account of sin.
- J. "Just as the sin offering is unfit [if it is offered) under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = "under some other name"], so the guilt offering is unfit if offered under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = "under some other name"].

M. Zebahim 1:1

- A. Yosé b. Honi says, "Those [other offerings] which are slaughtered for the sake of the Passover and for the sake of the sin offering are invalid."
- B. Simeon, brother of Azariah, says, "[If] one slaughtered them for the sake of that which is higher than they, they are valid. [If one slaughtered them] for the sake of that which is lower than they ["But if under the name of a lower grade"], they are invalid.
- C. "How so?

- D. **“Most Holy Things which one slaughtered for the sake of Lesser Holy Things are invalid. Lesser Holy Things which one slaughtered for the sake of Most Holy Things are valid.**
- E. **“The firstling and tithe which one slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings are valid, and peace offerings which one slaughtered for the sake of a firstling, [or] for the sake of tithe, are invalid.”**

#### M. Zebahim 1:2

- I.1 A. *Why did the Tannaite authority repeat in the formulation of the Mishnah, **but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation**? Let him state simply, “and they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation.”*
- B. *[In framing matters as he has, the Tannaite author] so informs us that it is in particular to the owner’s credit that they do not serve in fulfillment of an obligation, but they nonetheless stand in their classification of sanctification, so it is forbidden to change their status in any way.*
- I.2. A. *This further accords with the position of Raba, for Raba has said, “As to a burnt-offering that one slaughtered not under the proper designation, it is forbidden to toss its blood under some other than the proper designation [but the blood can be tossed only within the rules governing the burnt offering].”*
- B. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning, but if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture.*
- C. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning: even though the status of the beast has been revised [one time], shall the priest go on and make further revisions of the status of the beast? [Obviously not].*
- D. *but if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture: “what has come out of your lips you shall observe and do, according as you have vowed a freewill-offering to the Lord your God” (Deu. 23:24). Now does this verse refer to a free-will offering? [2B] In point of fact, in context, it refers to an offering that is presented in fulfillment of a vow [“what has come out of your lips”]! Rather, the sense is as follows: if you have acted in accord with that which you have vowed, then let it be an offering in fulfillment of a vow, but if not, then let it be a mere freewill offering. And in the case of a freewill-offering, is it permitted to change its classification in any aspect whatsoever? [Certainly not!].*
- I.3. A. *Said Rabina to R. Pappa, “You were not with us toward dusk within the Sabbath boundary of Be Harmakh, when Raba contrasted two excellent statements of the law and worked out the contradiction between them. What are these excellent statements of the law? We have learned in the Mishnah: **All animal offerings which were slaughtered not for their own name are valid [so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned], but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation.** The operative consideration, then, is that the beasts were offered under some classification other than that for which they were originally designated. But if no such other purpose had been defined, then the offering of the beast may even fulfill the obligation of their owner. Then it follows that that which is not subjected to an articulated purpose falls into the same category as that which has been assigned its own designated purpose. In*

*contradiction of that premise is the premise of the following: **Any writ of divorce that is not written for the sake of that particular woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid [M. Git. 3:1A].** And if the writ is prepared without specification as to the woman for whom it is intended therefore also is invalid.*

- B. *“And [Raba] harmonized the contradiction [by distinguishing the two cases in the following way:] in the case of animals that have been designated for offerings, where they have not been classified for a specific purpose, in any event are there to be slaughtered under some legitimate classification, while, in the case of a woman, if nothing is made explicit in her regard, she is not there to be divorced [so there are different presumptions that pertain to the two distinct matters, and what is assumed in the one case is the opposite of what is assumed in the other; hence the conflict as to premise is no conflict at all, the cases being not at all parallel to one another].”*
- C. *Now how do we know in point of fact that if one has slaughtered animals designated as sacrifices without articulating the particular classification of offering into which the animal’s sacrifice falls, the act of sacrifice is a valid one?*
- D. *Might one say that it is on the basis of that which we have learned in the Mishnah: **All animal offerings which were slaughtered not for their own name are valid [so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned], but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation,** while the Tannaite authority of the passage has not repeated it as, “**All animal offerings** which were not slaughtered under their own designation.” [Thus the animal had not been classified for any particular offering; it has been sacrificed; the sacrifice of the beast is valid.] In reference to the writ of divorce also, however, it is stated along these same lines: **Any writ of divorce that is not written for the sake of that particular woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid [M. Git. 3:1A]!** The Tannaite authority of the passage here too has not repeated it as, “which was not written in the name of the woman is invalid.”*
- E. *Rather, that principle derives from that which we have learned in the Mishnah: **How [does one do it ] for their own name and not for their own name? For the sake of the Passover [at its correct time] and for the sake of peace offerings. [Not for their own name and for their own name? For the sake of peace offerings and for the sake of the Passover] [M. Zeb. 1:4F-I].** The operative consideration then is that when the farmer designated the beast for an offering, the language that he used was, “in the classification of a Passover-offering and in the classification of a peace-offering.” Lo, if the beast then had been slaughtered in the classification of a Passover-offering, but if the blood was then sprinkled without articulation as to its classification, the offering would have been fit. That proves that if an aspect of an offering was carried out without the articulation of the classification in which the act was done, the offering is valid as it would have been valid if the act had been done under the proper classification [and it follows that where the purpose is undefined, the sacrifice is valid (Freedman)].*
- F. *But perhaps the matter is exceptional, for one may invoke the principle, Whoever carries out an action in connection with the sacrifice of an already-designated beast*

does so within the already-established, original intentionality that pertained to begin with.

- G. *Rather, the principle at hand derives from the second clause of the cited passage of the Mishnah: **Not for their own name and for their own name? For the sake of peace offerings and for the sake of the Passover*** [M. Zeb. 1:4F-I]. *It follows that the offering is invalid because the man has specified, **For the sake of peace offerings and for the sake of the Passover**. But if the priest had carried out the act of slaughter without an articulated classification, but then he tossed the blood within the classification of a Passover-offering, the offering is a valid one [which proves that where the purpose is undefined, the sacrifice is valid (Freedman)].*
- H. *But perhaps the matter is exceptional, for one may invoke the principle, The outcome of the matter governs the initial character of the transaction [Freedman: hence since the end, the sprinkling, was in the name of the Passover offering, we assume the beginning, the slaughtering, to have been likewise]. Or, also, since the Tannaite framer commenced with the language, **for their own name and not for their own name**, he went on to repeat as his formulation, **Not for their own name and for their own name**.*
- I. *Rather, the principle at hand derives from the following: **For the sake of six things is the animal offering sacrificed: (1) for the sake of the animal offering, (2) for the sake of the one who sacrifices it, (3) for the sake of the Lord, (4) for the sake of the altar fires, (5) for the sake of the odor, (6) for the sake of the pleasing smell. And as to the sin offering and the guilt offering, for the sake of the sin [expiated thereby]. Said R. Yosé, “Even: One who was not [mindful] in his heart for the sake of one all of these [but slaughtered without specifying these things] — it is valid, for it is a condition imposed by the court, that intention follows only [the mind of] the one who carries out the act [not the owner; and the officiant does not specify the six things at all]”*** [M. Zeb. 4:6A-D]. *The condition imposed by the court is that one should not specify the purpose for which an offering is made, lest the priest turn out to state a different purpose from the one originally specified by the farmer who consecrated the beast. If you think that not defining a purpose renders the designated beast invalid, would the court have gone and made a regular that would cause the sacrifice of the beast to be invalidated? [This then proves that where the purpose is undefined, the offering of a consecrated beast is valid.]*
- J. *And as to a writ of divorce, how do we know that a writ of divorce that is not subject to an articulated purpose [that is, for the purpose of use in divorcing a specified woman] is invalid?*
- K. *Shall we say that it is on the basis of that which we have learned in the Mishnah: **If one was passing through the market and heard the voice of scribes dictating to students, “Mr. So-and-so is divorcing Mrs. So-and-so from such-and-such a place,” and said, “Why this is my name and the name of my wife” — it is invalid therewith to effect a divorce*** [M. Git. 3:1C-D]? *But perhaps that is to be worked out in line with what R. Pappa said. For said R. Pappa, “Under discussion here is scribes who are practicing how to write the document, so it has not been written out for the sake of severing a marital bond anyhow.”*

- L. *Rather, it is on the basis of the following: [3A] Moreover, if one wrote a writ of divorce for divorcing his wife therewith and then changed his mind, and a fellow townsman found it and said to him, “My name is the same as yours, and my wife”’s name is the same as your wife’s name,” it is invalid therewith to effect a divorce [M. Git. 3:1E-H].*
- M. *But perhaps that case is exceptional, for the writ was specifically designated for divorcing that particular wife.*
- N. *Rather, it is on the basis of the following: Moreover, if one had two wives and their names were the same, if he wrote a writ of divorce to divorce therewith the elder, he shall not divorce the you younger with it [M. Git. 3:1I-L].*
- O. *But perhaps that case is exceptional, for the writ was specifically designated for divorcing that particular wife.*
- P. *Rather, it is on the basis of the following: Moreover, if he said to a scribe, “Write for whichever one I shall decide to divorce,” it is invalid therewith therewith to divorce a woman [M. Git. 3:1M-O].*
- Q. *But perhaps that case is exceptional, for one may not retroactively effect a choice on which wife is to be divorced with that particular writ of divorce.*
- R. *Rather, it is on the basis of the following: He who writes out blank copies of writs of divorce must leave a space for the name of the man, for the name of the woman, and for the date [M. Git. 3:2A], and in that connection said R. Judah said Samuel, “He has also to leave space for the language, “Behold, you are free to marry any man [of your choice].”*
- S. *Now here is another matter in which he contrasted important legal statements: “Did R. Judah say Rab said, ‘In the case of a beast originally designated as a sin-offering, if one has slaughtered it rather in the classification of a burnt-offering, it is invalid. But if one has slaughtered it in the classification of an unconsecrated beast, it is validly done’? Then it must follow that if one has slaughtered it within the designation of its own genus [a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering], the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus [not as a consecrated beast at all], the beast is not rendered null. But note the following, which yields a contradictory premise: Any writ of divorce that is not written for the purpose of divorcing a particular woman is invalid, and that is so even if it is written for the sake of divorcing a gentile woman, it is still invalid for use for that purpose.”*
- T. *Now he further harmonized the contradiction in the following way: in the case of the writ of divorce, omit all reference to the gentile woman, and what you have left is a writ of divorce that is written without an articulated purpose, and such a writ is invalid. But in the case of Holy Things, if you drop the matter of the unconsecrated beast, you have then only a beast that has been consecrated without the further articulation of a purpose for which the beast has been consecrated, and such a beast is valid.*
- U. *Now here is another matter in which he contrasted important legal statements: “Did R. Judah say Rab said, ‘In the case of a beast originally designated as a sin-offering, if one has slaughtered it rather in the classification of a burnt-offering, it is invalid. But if one has slaughtered it in the classification of an unconsecrated beast, it is validly done’? Then it must follow that if one has slaughtered it within*

*the designation of its own genus [a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering], the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus [not as a consecrated beast at all], the beast is not rendered null. But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “And every clay utensil into the inside of which any one of them falls, whatever is in it shall be unclean, and you shall break it’ (Lev. 11:33) — but not if it falls into the contained space that is within the contained space, and even a utensil that may be retrieved from a condition of uncleanness through being immersed [that is, other than a clay utensil] may serve the purpose of affording protection [to the clay utensil and its contents].’ [If there is a utensil in an earthenware oven with the mouth protruding above the top of the oven, and a dead creeping thing falls into the oven, the food inside of that utensil remains clean, for the inside space of the utensil is deemed contained space within the contained space of the oven. This is so not only when the contained space is earthen, but even if it is not a clay utensil. Now a utensil that is not earthenware falls into a different category, since it is subject to a different law as to purification, and yet it protects the food that is within it from uncleanness, so in Freedman’s words, “a different kind too can destroy the status of the food as being inside the oven and gives it the status of being inside the inside”].”*

- V. *And he resolved the contradiction in this way: “Rabbis have treated unconsecrated beasts vis à vis Holy Things as a partition vis à vis an oven. Just as a partition in the setting of an oven produces no effect at all, so unconsecrated beasts in regard to Holy Things produce no effect at all.” For we have learned in the Mishnah: [As to] the oven which one has divided with hangings — [if] an insect is found in [any] one place, the whole is unclean. [As to] a hive, broken down and patched with straw and hung down into the airspace of the oven — [if] the insect is in it [the hive], the oven is unclean. [If] the insect is in the oven, foods which are in it [the hive] are unclean. And R. Eliezer declares clean. Said R. Eliezer, “If it [the hive] saves [affords protection from uncleanness] in the case of a corpse, which is grave, will it not save [afford protection] in the case of a clay utensil, which is lenient?” They said to him, [3B] “If it [the hive] has saved in the case of a corpse, which is grave — for indeed they divide tents — will it save in the case of a clay utensil, which is lenient, for they do not divide a clay utensil?” [M. Kel. 8:1].*

W. *Now that reply serves quite nicely from the perspective of rabbis, but from the viewpoint of R. Eliezer what is there to be said?*

X. *R. Eliezer offers an argument a fortiori [and it is the requirement of that argument that leads him to the position that he takes here].*

Y. *Then here too we can offer an argument a fortiori: if Holy Things may serve to invalidate Holy Things, should not unconsecrated things also invalidate Holy Things? [Freedman: when one kills a sin-offering as a burnt-offering, he is still killing it as something sacred, and yet you say it is unfit. How much more should it be unfit when he kills it as an unconsecrated beast, which is not sacred at all!]*

Z. *Rather, the operative consideration behind the position of Rab accords with the view of R. Eleazar [and the operative consideration is not that a*



*different kind does not have the capacity to invalidate, as suggested earlier, but because there is a scriptural verse that makes the point, which is now given:]*

- AA. *for said R. Eleazar, “What is the operative consideration behind the position of Rab? ‘You shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they set apart to the Lord’ (Lev. 22:15) — Holy Things have the power to render profane other Holy Things, but unconsecrated beasts do not have the power to render unconsecrated beasts that have been classed as Holy Things.’ Therefore a verse of Scripture comes along and invalidates an argument a fortiori.”*
- BB. *Then here too let a verse of Scripture come and invalidate an argument a fortiori, specifically, the reference to “its inside”!*
- CC. *The clause, “its inside,” serves for another purpose altogether, namely, it deals with foods that are pasted around with clay and located within the contained airspace of an oven. You might have supposed that since they cannot be made unclean by contact [being sealed in clay], they also cannot be made unclean because they are contained within the unclean airspace of the oven. But the language at hand informs us that that is not the case.*
- DD. *And rabbis?*
- EE. *To make the point concerning that food no verse of Scripture is required [since that food is self-evidently located within the oven and is affected by the condition of the contained airspace of the oven].*

**I.4.** A. *R. Joseph bar Ammi contrasted the rules governing change of classification with respect to sanctification of the beast and change of classification with respect to the ownership of the beast [the priest expressed an improper intention in regard to the classification of the sacrifice, or he expressed an improper intention with regard to the owner of the beast, thus offering the animal in the name of someone who was not in fact the owner of the beast], and he furthermore resolved the contradiction: “Has Rab not stated, ‘A beast originally designated as a sin-offering that one slaughtered as a sin-offering [but for some sin other than the one that the owner who had consecrated the beast had discovered that he had committed] is validly offered; but if the priest slaughtered the beast designated as a sin-offering in the classification of a burnt-offering, it is invalid.’ It therefore follows that if one has slaughtered it within the designation of its own genus [a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering], the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus [not as a consecrated beast at all], the beast is not rendered null.”*

- B. *He worked matters out in the following way: “And he shall kill it for a sin-offering’ (Lev. 4:33) — so Scripture has said, and lo, the animal designated for use as a sin-offering has indeed been slaughtered as a sin-offering. But here, ‘and the priest shall make atonement for him’ (Lev. 4:26, 31, 35) — for him and not for his fellow, and ‘his fellow’ means, one like himself, that is, one who is obligated to achieve atonement just as he does.”*

**I.5.** A. R. Habiba contrasted the rules governing change of classification with respect to sanctification of the beast and change of classification with respect to the contained inner space within the contained inner space [of the clay utensil] and he resolved the problem: “Has Rab not said, ‘A beast designated as a sin offering which one slaughtered in behalf of one who is liable to offer a sin-offering [but not the one who consecrated the beast] is invalid; if it was slaughtered in behalf of one who was obligated to present a burnt-offering, it is valid.’ *It therefore follows that if one has slaughtered it within the designation of its own genus [a consecrated beast, but for a different classification of offering], the beast is rendered null, while if one has slaughtered it not within the designation of its own genus [not as a consecrated beast at all], the beast is not rendered null. But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:* “And every clay utensil into the inside of which any one of them falls, whatever is in it shall be unclean, and you shall break it” (Lev. 11:33) — but not if it falls into the contained space that is within the contained space, and even a utensil that may be retrieved from a condition of uncleanness through being immersed [that is, other than a clay utensil] may serve the purpose of affording protection [to the clay utensil and its contents].’ [If there is a utensil in an earthenware oven with the mouth protruding above the top of the oven, and a dead creeping thing falls into the oven, the food inside of that utensil remains clean, for the inside space of the utensil is deemed contained space within the contained space of the oven. This is so not only when the contained space is earthen, but even if it is not a clay utensil. Now a utensil that is not earthenware falls into a different category, since it is subject to a different law as to purification, and yet it protects the food that is within it from uncleanness, so in Freedman’s words, “a different kind too can destroy the status of the food as being inside the oven and gives it the status of being inside the inside”].”

B. *And he resolved the contradiction in this way:* “‘Its inside’ is written four times, thus, ‘the inside,’ ‘its inside,’ ‘the inside,’ ‘its inside’ — one serves to express the law itself; another for an argument by analogy; the third bears the implication, ‘the inside of this, but not the inside of another;’ and the fourth teaches: its inside, but not the inside of its inside, and even a utensil that may be retrieved from a condition of uncleanness through being immersed [that is, other than a clay utensil] may serve the purpose of affording protection [to the clay utensil and its contents].”

**II.1** A. **[4A]** [Supply: **All animal offerings which were slaughtered not for their own name are valid [so that the blood is tossed, the entrails burned], but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation:]**

B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that we require that the act of slaughter of a beast designated as a sacrifice be done within the classification for which the beast was originally designated?*

C. As Scripture has said, “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace-offerings” (Lev. 3: 1) — indicating that the sacrifice must be in the name of a peace-offering [if the animal was originally designated for a sacrifice of that classification].

D. *But perhaps that is simply the classification of the offering, that is, “sacrifice of peace-offerings,” [so that the above reading, a sacrifice of peace-offerings*



*meaning that the act of sacrifice of the beast designated for peace-offerings must be for the classification of peace-offerings, is null]?*

- E. *Since it is written, “And he who offers the blood of the peace offerings” (Lev. 7:33), and he who tosses the blood of the peace offerings against the altar” (Lev. 7:14), without making reference to “sacrifice,” while here “sacrifice” is stated, you must draw the inference from that fact that the act of slaughter [of a beast designated for use as peace-offerings] must be within the classification of peace-offerings.*

**II.2.** A. *Thus we have found the rule governing the actual act of sacrifice [the killing of the beast, indicating that the priest must perform that act with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind]. How do we know that the same rule pertains to other forms of sacrificial service?*

- B. *Now should you propose to derive the rule from the act of slaughter, one may reply that the act of slaughter is exceptional, for it is invalidated in the case of the sacrifice of a Passover lamb if that is for those who cannot eat it. [Freedman: if one kills the beast in behalf of those who cannot eat, the act of sacrifice is null. But if the blood is sprinkled on their behalf, the offering is not unfit; and so in the case of any other services performed on their behalf.]*

- C. *Rather, Scripture has said, “He who offers the blood of the peace offerings” (Lev. 7:33) — indicating that the receiving of the blood should be done within the classification of peace-offerings.*

- D. *But let Scripture then state the rule only with reference to the receiving of the blood, and one may then derive the rule governing the act of slaughter from that matter?*

- E. *The reason that that was not done is that one may interpose the following argument: the act of receiving the blood is exceptional in that it is invalid if done by a non-priest or a woman. [So the rule applying to that action need not necessarily apply to the act of slaughter, which may be validly done by a non-priest or a woman.]*

**II.3.** A. *Thus we have found the rule governing the actual act of sacrifice and the receiving of the blood, [indicating that the priest must perform that act with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind]. How do we know that the same rule pertains to the tossing of the blood on the altar?*

- B. *Now should you propose to derive the rule from these two prior categories of action, in point of fact these are exceptional, in that both of these actions must be done on the north side of the altar, and both of these actions are done in regard to the sin offerings that are offered on the inner altar [which rules do not pertain universally].*

- C. *Rather, Scripture has said, “He who tosses the blood of the peace-offerings” (Lev. 7:14) — indicating that the tossing of the blood should be done within the classification of peace-offerings.*

- D. *But why should Scripture not simply write that rule in connection with the tossing of the blood, and from that the rule governing other components of the sacrificial rite might be derived?*

- E. *The reason is that one may present the following challenge: tossing of the blood is exceptional, for if a non-priest carries out that particular action, he is subject to the death-penalty.*

**II.4.** A. *Thus we have found the rule governing all of these actions, [indicating that the priest must perform them with the designated purpose for which the beast has been consecrated uppermost in mind]. How do we know that the same rule pertains to the carrying of the limbs to the altar for burning on the altar-fires?*

- B. *Now should you propose to derive the rule from the prior categories of action, in point of fact these are exceptional, in that all of them comprise cultic actions that may not be annulled. But will you say the same of the conveying of the blood, which may be annulled?*

- C. *Rather, Scripture has said, “And the priest shall bring near the whole...to the altar” (Lev. 1:13), and a master has said, “This speaks of carrying the limbs to the altar.”*

D. *And so too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- E. *“And Aaron’s sons shall present the blood” (Lev. 1: 5) — this refers to the receiving of the blood.*

- F. *Scripture refers to this matter with a word that denotes carrying to indicate that carrying is not eliminated from the scope of receiving [so the law that applies to the one applies to the other].*

**II.5.** A. *Thus we have demonstrated that a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast is null. How about a revision as to the ownership of the beast [in which case the officiating priest declares that the beast serves to fulfil the obligation of a person other than the farmer who has consecrated the beast]?*

- B. *Said R. Phineas b. R. Ammi, “Said Scripture, ‘And the meat of the slaughtering of his peace offerings for thanksgiving’ (Lev. 7:15) — this indicates that the act of sacrifice must be within the classification of a thanksgiving offering. Now if this matter cannot pertain to a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast, which we have already derived on another basis entirely, then apply it to a revision as to the ownership of the beast [in which case the officiating priest declares that the beast serves to fulfil the obligation of a person other than the farmer who has consecrated the beast].”*

- C. *But does this verse really serve for the specified purpose? Lo, it has been made to serve for an entirely different purpose, in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- D. *“And the meat of the slaughtering of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Lev. 3: 1) —*

- E. *Abba Hanina says in the name of R. Eliezer, “The verse serves to teach the lesson that in the case of a thanksgiving offering that one has slaughtered under the classification of peace-offerings, the act of slaughter is valid; in the case of peace-offerings that one has slaughtered under the classification of a thanksgiving offering — the act of slaughter is invalid. What is the difference between the one and the other? It is because the thanksgiving offering also is categorized as peace offerings [as in the cited verse], while peace offerings are never categorized as a thanksgiving offering.”*

- F. *We deduce the lesson from the word “slaughtering” [and the foregoing refers to other words in the cited verse altogether]!*
- G. *Nonetheless it is required for the purpose of extending the stated law also to a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, specifically, how do we know the same rule in respect to a sin-offering or a guilt-offering? Scripture uses the word “slaughtering.”*
- H. *[Not at all! For] if so, Scripture could as well have framed matters as, “And the meat of his peace offerings for thanksgiving slaughtering....” Why frame matters as, “The slaughtering of his peace offerings for thanksgiving”? It is so that both conclusions may be reached.*

**II.6.** *A. Thus we have found the rule governing the act of slaughter. How do we know that the same rule applies to all other components of the sacrificial rite?*

- B. *And should you say that they are to be derived from the rule governing the act of sacrifice, what distinguishes the act of sacrifice is that if it is done for the sake of people who cannot eat the meat of the offering, it renders the offering invalid. With regard to a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast reference is made to “sacrifice,” and with regard to a revision as to the ownership of the beast, reference is made likewise to “sacrifice.” Just as when with regard to a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast reference is made to “sacrifice,” there is no distinction between the act of sacrifice and all other aspects of the liturgy [all of them being subject to the same rule, as we have now demonstrated], so when, with regard to a revision as to the ownership of the beast, reference is made likewise to “sacrifice,” there should be no distinction made between the act of sacrifice and all other components of the liturgical process.*
- C. *But one may raise the following objection: what distinguishes the case of revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast is that the invalidation extends to the corpus of the beast itself; and, furthermore, the disqualification pertains to all four components of the act of service, [while if an improper classification of the beast with regard to the owner is formed by the officiating priest, only the sprinkling of the blood, the principal rite of atonement, is affected (Freedman)]; and furthermore, and the disqualification pertains after death [if the owner dies, the son must bring the offering, and if the priest slaughters the beast for a different owner, the act of slaughter is null]; and the disqualification pertains to both the community’s and the individual’s sacrificial beasts. **[4B]** *And even though two of these points of refutation are not precise [as will be spelled out], two of them are indeed precise!**
- D. *To explain: how is a revision in regard to the ownership of the beast exceptional? It is not a disqualification of the corpus of the beast itself, since this is a mere intention. But then a revision in regard to the classification as to sanctification of the beast also is that here too we deal only with a mere intention. But still you have to say, since he intended it for an improper purpose, the priest has disqualified the beast; here too since he intended it for an owner other than the rightful one, he has disqualified the beast.*

- E. And from the viewpoint of R. Phineas b. R. Mari, who has said, “The law governing the revision in regard to the ownership of the beast pertains after death,” *in any event one may raise objection on two grounds.*
- F. Rather, said R. Ashi, “Said Scripture, ‘And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him’ (Lev. 1: 4) — for him but not for someone else.”
- G. *Does that verse serve the stated purpose in particular? Surely it was required in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. “And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him” — R. Simeon says, “The one who owes the sacrifice is responsible to make it up if it is lost, and the one who is not liable to make the sacrifice is not responsible to make it up if it is lost.”
- I. R. Isaac bar Abdimi, “What is the operative consideration here? Since the farmer has said, ‘I take upon myself to bring an offering,’ it is as though he had carried it on his shoulder [and is responsible for it until it is actually sacrificed.”
- J. *R. Ashi derived the rule from the language, “and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement.”*

- II.7.** A. *So we have derived the rule for the matters of sacrificing the beast and tossing the blood. How do we know the rule in respect to receiving the blood?*
- B. *And should you propose to derive it from the matter of sacrificing the animal and tossing the blood,* what distinguishes sacrificing the animal and tossing the blood is that these constitute aspects of the rite for which one bears liability should he perform them outside of the Temple itself. [But if one receives the blood and carries it outside of that area, one is not liable.]
  - C. *Rather, said R. Ashi, “It derives from the rule governing the ram that is offered by the Nazirite. For it is written, ‘And he shall offer the ram for a slaughtering of peace offerings’ (Num. 6:17) — indicating that preparing it should be within the classification of peace offerings. Now if that rule does not pertain to the consideration of revising the classification as to sanctification in which the beast is assigned, for that matter is deduced elsewhere, then apply it to the consideration of revising the ownership of the beast.”*
  - D. *Said R. Aha bar Abba to Raba, “Why not say as follows: ‘And he shall offer’ forms a generalization, then ‘the ram for a slaughtering [of peace offerings]’ serves to particularize the foregoing, so what we have is an encompassing proposition followed by a particularization thereof, and where we have an encompassing proposition followed by a particularization thereof, then the encompassing proposition includes only what is contained within the details of the particularization, in which case slaughtering is covered by the rule [and a change in regard to the ownership invalidates in such a case], but the other acts of service are not covered by that consideration.”*
  - E. *“Had Scripture stated, ‘he shall offer a peace offering as a slaughtering,’ matters would follow your view. But since Scripture has said, ‘And he shall offer the ram for a slaughtering of peace offerings,’ what you have is a general proposition that is not fully articulated, and any general proposition that is not fully articulated*

*cannot be classified as an encompassing rule following by a particularization thereof."*

- F. Rabina said, "In point of fact, we do so regard the matter, but 'unto the Lord' then serves as another general proposition [in which case we have an encompassing rule, a particularization, and an encompassing rule, in which case the encompassing rule encompasses everything that is analogous to the particularization, covering all of the other acts of service]."
- G. *Said R. Aha of Difti to Rabina, "But the opening encompassing rule is hardly similar to the concluding encompassing rule, for the former includes sacrificial acts but nothing more, and the latter encompasses everything that is 'unto the Lord' — even pouring out the residue of the blood and even burning of the sacrificial parts that are to be burned [while under discussion here are only the four services that are sacrificial acts]."*
- H. *Lo, the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [takes the view that] even where there is an encompassing rule and a particularization of this sort, the rule applies that in the case of an encompassing rule followed by a particularization and followed then by an encompassing rule, you still are subject to the particularization: just as explicit reference is made to a sacrificial service and we require proper intentionality, so in the case of every aspect of the sacrificial service, we require proper intentionality.*
- I. Then how about this: just as the particularization refers explicitly to an act of service for which one is culpable for doing it outside of the legitimate location, so is every service encompassed for which one is liable if one does it outside of the proper place, so slaughtering and sprinkling are included, but receiving and carrying are not. *Or, along these same lines, just as the particularization explicitly involved an act of service that must be done on the north side of the altar and that pertains to animals designated as sin offerings that are offered at the inner altar, so all acts of service that have to be done at the north side of the altar and that pertain to the sin offerings done on the inner altar are covered by the rule. In that case, slaughtering and receiving the blood are included, but not sprinkling.*
- J. *Well, you can say this, and you can say that, and they are pretty much balanced against one another, and both arguments are admissible. And some say: they are equally balanced against one another and each one stands). And another version is, sprinkling derives from the deduction made by R. Ashi.*

**II.8.** A. *We now have found that the proposition derives to the ram presented by the Nazirite [which falls into the classification of peace-offerings]. How do we know that the same rule applies to other peace-offerings?*

- B. *And should you say that we should derive the rule from the analogy presented by the ram offered by the Nazirite, what distinguishes the ram presented by the Nazirite is that there are other blood rites that go along with it, [which is not the case elsewhere]. [Freedman: and it is natural that one cannot be sacrificed in the name of one person and a second in the name of another when all are for the same person. The other sacrifices are the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.]*
- C. *If so [if such a deduction from the verse were supposed to pertain only to this particular classification of offering], Scripture should have said, "And he shall*



*offer the ram for his peace-offerings.” Why say it in this way, “for peace offerings”? It is so as to encompass all peace-offerings.*

- II.9.** A. *So we have found a basis for maintaining that the besought proposition applies to all classifications of peace-offerings. How do we know that it applies also to all Holy Things in general?*
- B. *And should you maintain that we should derive the same from the case of peace-offerings, what distinguishes peace-offerings is that they require the laying on of hands, drink offerings, and the waving of the breast and the thigh [but other Holy Things do not require all of those rites and so they may be offered under a designation different from the ones originally assigned in respect to another classification of sanctification or ownership (Freedman)].*
- C. *Rather, Scripture has said, “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings” (Lev. 7:37). In so expressing matters, Scripture has treated them by way of analogy to peace-offerings. Just as in the case of peace-offerings, whether one has effected a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast or a revision as to the ownership of the beast, we require that the offering be carried out within the original classification in which the animal was classified when it was consecrated, so in respect to all Holy Things, we require that the offering be carried out within the original classification in which the animal was classified when it was consecrated.”*
- D. *May one say that if one has slaughtered such beasts not within the original classification, the result is to invalidate the offering?*
- E. *Scripture states, “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering” (Deu. 23:24).*
- F. *Now is this a freewill-offering? Surely it is a vow! The sense is, if you have done what you have vowed, it is an offering in fulfillment of your vow; if not, then it is a freewill offering [so the sacrifice is valid for some other purpose, if not for the proposed one].*

- II.10.** A. *And both proofs are required, namely, “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering” (Deu. 23:24), and also “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings” (Lev. 7:37).*
- B. *For had Scripture written only, “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering” (Deu. 23:24), [5A] I might have reached the false conclusion that I do not know to what the verse refers, so Scripture specified, “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings” (Lev. 7:37).*
- C. *And had Scripture written only, “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings”*



(Lev. 7:37), *I might have reached the conclusion that Scripture meant thereby to invalidate offerings made under improper classifications. So Scripture specified, “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering” (Deu. 23:24).*

- II.11.** A. R. Simeon b. Laqish lay down on his belly in the house of study and raised the following problem: “If the offerings are valid, then let them be accepted for atonement [so that the owner has fulfilled his obligation], and if they do not effect atonement, then why are they offered at all [and why are they valid]?”
- B. Said to him R. Eleazar, “We find a counterpart in the case of offerings that are presented after the owner has died, that they are valid but are not accepted [in propitiation for the deceased], *for we have learned in the Mishnah: A woman who after child birth presented the required sin-offering but then died [prior to offering the burnt offering that also is required] — her estate is liable to present her burnt-offering. If she had presented the required burnt offering that was incumbent on her and then died, her estate should not present the required sin-offering that is incumbent upon her [M. Qin. 2:11].*”
- C. *He said to him, “I concede the matter of the burnt offering, since it is presented after she has died, but as to the guilt offering, which is not presented should she die before it is offered, how in any event do we know that it is valid [our Mishnah-paragraph not including any such case as an exception]?”*
- D. *He said to him, “Lo, support for your contention lies alongside: R. Eliezer says, “Also: the guilt offering. [The Passover at its appointed time, and the sin offering and the guilt offering at any time.” Said R. Eliezer, “The sin offering comes on account of sin, and the guilt offering comes on account of sin. Just as the sin offering is unfit [if it is offered] not for its own name, so the guilt offering is unfit [if offered] not for its own name].”*
- E. *He said, “Is this in line with what people say about him, that he is an eminent authority? I cite a fully-articulated paragraph of the Mishnah, and you cite to me the schismatic opinion of R. Eliezer?!”*
- F. *Rather, said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “I shall find my own solution to the problem, specifically, Scripture states, ‘That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering’ (Deu. 23:24). Now is this a freewill-offering? Surely it is a vow! The sense is, if you have done what you have vowed, it is an offering in fulfillment of your vow; if not, then it is a freewill offering [so the sacrifice is valid for some other purpose, if not for the proposed one].”*
- II.12.** A. R. Zira and R. Isaac bar Abba went into session, and Abayye was in session with them, and in session they were stating, “R. Simeon b. Laqish found a difficulty with the guilt-offering, which is not presented after death, and so he derived the rule from the exegesis, ‘That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering’ (Deu. 23:24). Yet why not say, ‘what may be offered as a vow or as a freewill-offering must be presented but [under the stated circumstances] will not propitiate, while a guilt offering is not to be presented at all?’”

- B. *Said to them Abayye, “R. Simeon b. Laqish solved the problem by appeal to the following: ‘And he shall kill it for a sin offering’ (Lev. 4:33) — that classification of offering, when offered up in the classification for which the animal was originally designated, is valid, but if it is offered up not for the purpose for which it was originally designated it is invalid; lo, in regard to all other Holy Things, even if they are offered up under a classification for which they were not originally designated, they are valid. Might one then suppose that they also should propitiate? Scripture states, ‘That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do: as you have vowed a freewill-offering.’ (Deu. 23:24).”*
- C. *Might one say, what is presented in fulfillment of a vow or a freewill offering must be accepted but will not propitiate, while a guilt-offering will even propitiate?*
- D. *Said Abayye, “That a guilt offering in such a case propitiates is something you cannot allege, for the contrary proposition follows from a burnt offering by an argument a fortiori, namely: if a burnt offering, which does not effect atonement, does not propitiate, a guilt offering, which does effect atonement, surely should not propitiate!”*
- E. But the exceptional quality of the burnt offering is that it is wholly consumed on the altar fires!
- F. Then peace-offerings will prove to the contrary [for they yield food as well].
- G. But the exceptional quality of peace-offerings is that they require drink offerings and waving of the breast and thigh.
- H. The burnt offering will prove to the contrary, for it does not require either.
- I. Then the argument proves circular, and the definitive trait of the one is not the same as the definitive trait of the other, nor is the definitive trait of the other identical with the definitive trait of the one, but what they have in common is that they are Holy Things which one has slaughtered not under the originally specified designation and they are valid, but they do not propitiate. So I shall introduce the case of the guilt offering, which is in the category of Holy Things, and which one has slaughtered not under its originally assigned classification. It too should be valid and not propitiate.
- J. What is the distinguishing trait? It is that they are both offered by the community.
- K. The thanksgiving offering will prove to the contrary.
- L. **[5B]** The distinguishing trait of the thanksgiving offering is that it requires a bread-offering.
- M. A burnt offering and peace offerings will prove to the contrary.
- J. Here again the argument proves circular, and the definitive trait of the one is not the same as the definitive trait of the other, nor is the definitive trait of the other identical with the definitive trait of the one, but what they have in common is that they are Holy Things that have been slaughtered not within the terms of their original classification; they are valid but they do not propitiate. So I shall introduce the case of the guilt offering, which is in the category of Holy Things, and which ‘has been slaughtered not within the terms of the original classification. It too is valid and it does not propitiate.

- K. But the shared distinguishing trait is that they are offered as a result of a vow or as a thanksgiving offering!
- L. Rather, said Raba, “‘This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings’ (Lev. 7:37). In so expressing matters, Scripture has treated them by way of analogy to peace-offerings. Just as in the case of peace-offerings, if they have been slaughtered not within the terms of the original classification, they are valid but do not propitiate, so I shall introduce the case of the guilt offering which is in the category of Holy Things, — if they have been slaughtered not within the terms of the original classification, they are valid but do not propitiate.”
- M. *How come you draw the analogy to peace offerings? Rather draw the analogy to the sin offering!*
- N. *Scripture has used the limiting language, “...it....”* [Lev. 4:24: “And he shall kill it...it is a sin-offering...” that is, it must be brought as such and if offered for some other purpose than the one for which it was designated, it is invalid.]

- II.13.** A. R. Huna and R. Nahman were in session, and R. Sheshet was in session with them, and in session they stated, “R. Simeon b. Laqish found a difficulty in the matter of the guilt-offering, which is not presented after the person who has designated the beast for that purpose has died. [11.C: He said to him, “I concede the matter of the burnt offering, since it is presented after she has died, but as to the guilt offering, which is not presented should she die before it is offered, how in any event do we know that it is valid?”] But R. Eleazar might well have said to him, ‘The guilt offering too may be presented after the death of the person who has designated it.’ [For it is left to graze until blemished, is then sold, with the proceeds spent on a beast designated as a burnt-offering.]”
- B. R. Sheshet said to them, “But how is a guilt-offering presented? It is only as to the residue [of the value of the beast, which has been invested in another beast and presented as a burnt-offering.] But the residue of the sin-offering also is presented. [Freedman: if someone sets aside two animals for a sin offering, to be sure that if one is lost, the other will be there, when the first is offered, the second is classified as a guilt offering the owner of which has died, and a sin-offering may be presented after death in line with the reasoning just now set forth; and if it is sacrificed in some classification other than that for which it was set aside, it is invalid, so the guilt-offering also should be classified in the same way, and that therefore validates R. Simeon b. Laqish’s difficulty].”
  - C. *As to a sin offering, even though the residue is offered, Scripture has used the limiting language, “...it....”*[serving to limit the law affecting that classification of offering to that classification alone. Thus Lev. 4:24: “And he shall kill it...it is a sin-offering...” that is, it must be brought as such and if offered for some other purpose than the one for which it was designated, it is invalid.]
  - D. *In regard to the guilt-offering, that same usage occurs* [at Lev. 7: 5: “and the priest shall make them smoke on the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering”].

- E. *That reference is to the disposition after the offering up of the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- F. But with respect to the guilt offering, the word “it” speaks only of the period after the burning of the parts of the beast that are burned on the altar, and as a matter of fact, even if those parts should not be burned up at all, the offering remains valid. [Freedman: we cannot say that it” teaches that if the parts are burned within the classification of another sacrifice but the one for which the beast was designated, the offering is invalid, since the offering is fit even if those parts are not burned at all.]
- G. So what purpose is served by the exclusionary particle, “it”?
- H. *It accords with that which R. Huna said Rab said, for said R. Huna said Rab, “In the case of a beast designated as a guilt offering that was transferred to the pasture, but that was [not set out but rather] slaughtered for an unspecified purpose — the offering is valid. So if it was transferred, the rule is as stated, but if not, it is not as stated. Why not? Scripture says, ‘it is,’ with the sense that it must be [Freedman:] in its essential form.”* [Freedman: Unless it was formally transferred to grazing on the instructions of the court, it is not valid as a burnt offering if it was slaughtered without a defined purpose.]

- II.14.** A. *R. Nahman and R. Sheshet were in session, and R. Adda b. Mattenah was in session with them. They were in session and stated, “As to what R. Eleazar stated, namely, ‘We find a counterpart in the case of offerings that are presented after the owner has died, that they are valid but are not accepted [in propitiation for the deceased], [for we have learned on Tannaite authority: A woman who after child birth presented the required sin-offering but then died prior to offering the burnt offering that also is required — her estate is liable to present her burnt-offering. If she had presented the required burnt offering that was incumbent on her and then died, her estate should not present the required sin-offering that is incumbent upon her],’ why should R. Simeon b. Laqish not reply to him, ‘These too may be presented and effect propitiation’ [for the heirs]?”*
- B. *Said to them R. Adda bar Mattenah, “As for what is owing by a woman who has given birth, if she gave birth, have her children given birth [that they would be expected to make such a sacrifice? Obviously not!].”*
  - C. *Objected R. Assi, “And who is going to tell us whether or not she had been guilty of not observing many affirmative religious requirements, she would not have been atoned for by such an offering [Freedman: through the burnt offering necessitated by childbirth. So this burnt-offering would serve another purpose too]? And since, as a matter of fact, she would have been forgiven if she had been guilty of not carrying out affirmative religious requirements, her heirs too are thus atoned for [if they bore the same guilt].”*
  - D. *Is that to say that the heirs acquire ownership of the designated beast [so that it can make atonement for them]? And has not R. Yohanan said, “If one has left a meal-offering to his two sons and dies, it is offered, and the law of partnership does not apply to it.” Now if it should enter your mind that the sons acquire title to the meal-offering, the All-Merciful has said to the contrary, “And when a soul*

brings a meal-offering” (Lev. 2: 1) [meaning, one, not more than one, so partnership does not pertain]

- E. *Is that to say that the heirs acquire ownership of the designated beast [so that it can make atonement for them]? And has not R. Yohanan said, “If one has left an inheritance of a beast to his two sons and then died, the beast is offered, but the beast is not subject to the law of substitution [so that if the sons declare another beast a substitute for this beast, the law of Lev. 27:33 does not pertain to this beast].” Now if you have taken the position that title to the beast has passed to them, that is why the beast is not subject to the law of substitution, because they have become partners, [6A] and partners cannot effect an act of substitution. But if you maintain that title has not passed to them, then let them be able to effect an act of substitution with the beast! [So the heirs have not acquired ownership of the designated beast.]*
- F. *That case is exceptional, for Scripture has said, “And if he change it at all” (Lev. 27:33), which serves to encompass an heir, with the result that an individual heir has the power of substitution, but two heirs do not have the power of substitution.*
- G. *An objection was raised to this proposition by R. Jacob of Nehar Pegod, “Then in the case of tithe, where it is written, ‘And if someone will redeem anything’ (Lev. 27:31), serving to encompass an heir, here too is it the fact that one may effect redemption but two may not effect redemption?”*
- H. *That case is exceptional, for so far as the father is concerned, redemption can be carried out in a partnership. [Freedman: if the produce belonged to partners in the first place, they could tithe and redeem the tithe in partnership.]*
- I. *Said R. Assi to R. Ashi, “From that very case you may maintain the opposite: that is no problem if you concur that title passes to them, which explains why in any event one of the two does have the power to effect a substitution. But if you hold that title does not pass to them, then how can even one of them effect an act of substitution? Has not R. Abbahu said R. Yohanan said, ‘He who consecrates a beast is the one who adds a fifth when redeeming it, effects atonement through out, effects an act of substitution with it; he who separates heave-offering from his own produce in behalf of someone else’s product enjoys the right of goodwill accruing to the act of separating the heave-offering [giving it to any priest he wants, and if someone offers money for the heave offering to be handed over to a particular priest, that one keeps the money (Freedman)].”*
- J. *Well, in a permanent sort of way, it may not effect atonement, but it does make atonement of a superficial sort [the heir has some slight right of ownership and therefore can effect substitution (Freedman)].*

**II.15.** A. [As to a beast that has been offered for some purpose other than that for which the beast was originally consecrated (“not for its own name,” that is, not within the originally-defined classification of sanctification, but within some other classification altogether, or not in behalf of the owner who did the classifying as to sanctification, but some other owner], *the question was raised: has the owner effected atonement for that for which he has presented the offering, or has he not?*



- B. *Said R. Sheshet b. R. Idi, "It stands to reason that the owner has not gained atonement, for should you imagine that he has gained atonement, why then does he have to bring a further offering at all?"*
- C. *Then what is the upshot, that he has not gained atonement? In that case, why is the beast offered at all?*
- D. *Said R. Ashi, "R. Shisha b. R. Idi was troubled by this problem: if you maintain that the owner has not gained atonement, then the beast that was offered under an improper designation [although it has been slaughtered] at least is presented because it has been dedicated for a valid purpose, and the second offering is presented so as to gain atonement for the owner. But if you maintain that the owner has made atonement, then why in the world is the second beast offered at all?"*

**II.16.** *A. The question was raised: does a burnt-offering effect atonement for a violation of a religious duty involving an affirmative action that is committed after the beast has been designated for the purpose of a burnt offering, or does it not atone for that purpose? Do we maintain that the burnt offering falls into the analogy of the sin offering, and just as a beast that is designated as a sin offering serves to achieve atonement for what was done prior to the designation of the beast for a sin offering but not for what was done afterward, so here too, for that which was done prior to the designation of the beast the offering atones, but for what was done afterward it does not atone? Or perhaps there is no analogy to be drawn to a sin-offering, for a sin-offering is presented on account of each and every individual sin, while in the present case, since a man may be owing an offering on account of any number of violations of religious duties of affirmative actions, it may well atone for all those violations of religious duties of affirmative action that have been done even after the designation of the beast for its present purpose?*

- B. *Come and take note of the following: "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him" (Lev. 1: 4): does the atonement come about in consequence of the laying on of hands? And is it not the fact that the atonement comes about only because of the blood rite, as it is said, "For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life" (Lev. 17:11)? So what purpose is served when Scripture states, "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him" (Lev. 1: 4)? It is to show that if the owner regarded the laying on of hands as the mere afterthought of the religious duty of making the offering, Scripture regards him as though he did not make atonement, even though he did make atonement.*
- C. *What is the meaning of the phrase, Scripture regards him as though he did not make atonement, even though he did make atonement? Surely it is that he has made atonement for what was done prior to the designation of the beast, but he has not made atonement for what was done in respect to the positive requirement of laying on of hands, and that is a positive religious duty of affirmative action that he has carried out after designating the beast [and the question then is answered]!*



- D. *Said Raba, "Do you raise the issue of the affirmative religious requirement of laying on of hands? That is an exceptional matter, for, so long as the beast has not been slaughtered, it is subject to the religious duty, 'go and lay on hands.' When has the affirmative religious duty fallen into neglect? It is only after the act of slaughter has been carried out, and in regard to a religious duty that has fallen into neglect only after the act of slaughter has been carried out, no one has ever raised the question of whether that beast is effective or null anyhow!"*
- E. *Said R. Huna b. Judah to Raba, "Perhaps the sense of 'Scripture regards him as though he did not make atonement, even though he did make atonement' is, 'atonement' is for the person, but [6B] it did not make atonement] before Heaven."* [Freedman: it has technically made atonement, the laying of the hands not being absolutely indispensable, yet not satisfactorily, in the proper way. On this interpretation is has nothing to do with the question of when these precepts were violated.] **For have we not learned in the Mishnah: He [the priest] took part of [the contents of] the log of oil and poured it into the palm of his fellow. And if he poured it into his own palm, he has carried out his obligation. He dipped [his right forefinger into the blood] and sprinkled seven times toward the house of the Holy of Holies. For every sprinkling is a [corresponding] dipping [of the finger]. He came to the leper. Wherever he [in the application of blood] places the blood, there he places the oil, as it is said, "Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering, and the rest of the oil that is in the priest's hand he shall put upon the head of him that is to be cleansed to make atonement (Lev. 14:29). "If he put [the rest of the oil on the head of the leper], he made atonement, and if he did not put [the rest of the oil on the head of the leper], he did not make atonement," the words of R. Aqiba. R. Yohanan b. Nuri says, "These are the remnants of the commandment. Whether he put or whether he did not [put the rest of the oil on the head of the leper], he made atonement. But so far as he [the priest] is concerned, it is credited to him as though he did not make atonement" [M. Neg. 14:10A-K]. What then is the sense of, as though he did not make atonement? Shall we say that the man must bring another animal for the sacrifice? But you have said, Whether he put or whether he did not [put the rest of the oil on the head of the leper], he made atonement! Rather, the sense must be, 'atonement' is for the person, but it did not make atonement] before Heaven. Here too the meaning must be the same!"**
- F. No, there too the sense of "he made atonement" is in regard to putting the oil on the thumbs, and the sense of "he did not make atonement" is in regard to putting the oil on the head.
- G. *Come and take note: R. Simeon says, "As to the sacrificial lambs of Pentecost, for what purpose are they presented?"*
- H. *[...for what purpose are they presented?] Surely these are peace offering!*
- I. *Rather: "For what purpose are the two he-goats of Pentecost presented? It is to make atonement for imparting uncleanness to the Temple and its holy things. If the first one effects atonement, for what does the second one effect atonement? For any uncleanness that takes effect between the one and the other. It follows that all Israelites really should have to bring two goats, but*

**Scripture has had pity on the resources of Israel [T. Shabuot 1:2A-G].** Now here we have a case in which there has been neglect of a positive commandment following the act of designation of the beast for the purpose, and lo, it does effect atonement!

- J. *If the two beasts had been separated at one and the same time, that would be the correct inference, but in point of fact the beasts were designated sequentially [and the second makes atonement for the uncleanness that occurred in the interval on the eve of the festival between the designation of the first and that of the second (Freedman)].*
- K. *Now are we supposed to go and allege that in respect to Scripture the point that two are to be presented pertains only when the animals are designated sequentially?*
- L. *Said R. Pappa, "Have you then raised the issue of offerings that derive from public funds? Offerings that derive from public funds are exceptional, for the court implicitly stipulates in their regard in line with that which R. Judah said Samuel said. For said R. Judah said Samuel, 'As to offerings that derive from public funds, the knife is what in the end designates them for their correct classification.'" [Freedman: If an animal is slaughtered as a sacrifice in behalf of the community yet for a purpose other than that for which they had been originally intended, the knife automatically dedicates it to a legitimate purpose and the sacrifice is valid; the reason is that the court is regarded as tacitly stipulating their purpose, and the same holds good here too.]*
- M. *Said R. Joseph b. R. Samuel to R. Pappa, "But is it the fact that R. Simeon affirms the principle, the court implicitly stipulates in their regard [the principle just now enunciated]? But has not R. Idi bar Abin said R. Amram said R. Isaac said R. Yohanan said, 'Daily whole offerings which turn out not to have been required in fulfillment of the obligations of the community [7A] in the opinion of R. Simeon may not be redeemed when they are unblemished; in the opinion of sages they may be redeemed when unblemished [Freedman: for we assume a tacit stipulation of the court that it is permitted to redeem them even when they are not blemished. Simeon rejects this assumption and holds they cannot be redeemed.]*
- N. *"And furthermore, lo, R. Jeremiah asked R. Zira, 'As to Goats that are offered at Pentecost, the blood of which is collected in two cups, and the blood of the first of which is tossed on the altar — as to the blood of the second of them, for what purpose is it offered?' [And he answered him,] 'It is offered for uncleanness that takes place between the tossing of the blood of the first and the tossing of the blood of the second.' It follows that he has raised the question only in regard to the neglect of a religious duty that has taken place after the slaughter of the first beast, but as to the neglect of a religious duty that has taken place after the designation of the beast, he has raised no such question."*
- O. *Perhaps he presented a merely theoretical question.*

**II.17.** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. As to a thanksgiving offering that the priest has slaughtered in the classification of a thanksgiving offering presented by some other party [than the person who originally designated the beast for this purpose] —

- C. Rabbah said, "It is valid [so the one who originally designated the beast does not now have to present another thanksgiving offering]."
- D. R. Hisda said, "It is invalid."
  - E. Rabbah said, "It is valid, because the animal designated as a thanksgiving offering has indeed been slaughtered in the classification of a thanksgiving offering."
  - F. R. Hisda said, "It is invalid, *for we require that the beast be slaughtered in the classification of this particular person's peace-offerings [and that has not taken place].*"
- G. *Said Rabbah, "How do I know it? It is because it has been taught on Tannaite authority:"*
- H. "‘And the meat of the slaughtering of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering’ (Lev. 3: 1) — Abba Hanina says in the name of R. Eliezer, ‘The verse serves to teach the lesson that in the case of a thanksgiving offering that one has slaughtered under the classification of peace-offerings, the act of slaughter is valid; in the case of peace-offerings that one has slaughtered under the classification of a thanksgiving offering — the act of slaughter is invalid. What is the difference between the one and the other? It is because the thanksgiving offering also is categorized as peace offerings [as in the cited verse], while peace offerings are never categorized as a thanksgiving offering.’"
- I. "If peace-offerings are offered in the classification of a thanksgiving offering, the act is invalid. Lo, if a thanksgiving offering is offered in the classification of a thanksgiving offering, it is valid. *Now does this not yield the implication that that is so even if it is done under the classification of a beast belonging to someone else?*"
- J. *No, that is not so. It applies only if it is offered in the classification of the one who has dedicated it, but if it is offered in the classification of one belonging to another party, what is the rule? It is invalid.*
- K. *Then instead of formulating the Tannaite statement as, "peace-offerings that one has slaughtered under the classification of a thanksgiving offering — the act of slaughter is invalid," the framer of the passage should have stated, "a thanksgiving-offering in the classification of a thanksgiving offering [likewise is] invalid, and all the more so if it were the case of peace-offerings that one has slaughtered under the classification of a thanksgiving offering will the act of slaughter be invalid.*
- L. *The framer of the passage had a special need to specify the matter of peace-offerings that one has slaughtered under the classification of a thanksgiving offering even in the name of the person to whom the beast actually belongs, for you might have thought that one would rule that since the thanksgiving offering also is classified as peace offerings, peace offerings also are to be classified as a thanksgiving offering, with the result that if one has slaughtered a beast designated as peace offerings within the classification of a thanksgiving offering, it would be valid. So he informs us that that is not the case.*

- II.18.** A. Said Rab[a], “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered under the classification of a sin offering is valid. If one slaughtered it in the classification of a burnt offering, it is invalid.
- B. *“What is the scriptural basis for that position? ‘And he shall kill it for a sin-offering’ (Lev. 4:33) is what Scripture has said, and lo, it is an animal designated as a sin offering that has been classified as a sin-offering. But if it were slaughtered in the classification of a burnt offering, it would be invalid.”*
- II.19.** A. And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered in behalf of one who owed a sin offering is invalid. If he slaughtered it in behalf of one who owed a burnt offering, it is valid.
- B. *“What is the scriptural basis for that position? ‘And the priest shall make atonement for him’ (Lev. 4:26, 31, 35) is what Scripture has said, — “for him” and not for his fellow. ‘His fellow’ bears the implication of one who is like him, that is, who is obliged to present an atonement-offer as he is.”*
- II.20.** A. And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered in behalf of one who owed nothing at all is invalid. For you have no Israelite anywhere who is not subject to an obligation in regard to neglect of a positive religious duty.”
- II.21.** A. And said Raba, “A beast designated as a sin offering effects atonement for those who are obligated to an offering by reason of neglecting positive religious duties of affirmative action. That fact derives from the following argument a fortiori: if the beast effects atonement for those who are otherwise liable to extirpation, should it not all the more so effect atonement for those who are obligated to an offering by reason of neglecting positive religious duties of affirmative action?”
- B. *But is this to imply that neglecting positive religious duties of affirmative action falls into the same category as offenses that require the presentation of a sin-offering? And has not Raba said, “A beast designated as a sin offering that one slaughtered in behalf of one who owed a sin offering is invalid. If he slaughtered it in behalf of one who owed a burnt offering, it is valid”? [Freedman: a burnt offering atones for sins of omission. But if these fall into the same category as offenses entailing a sin offering, then just as the latter is invalid when slaughtered on behalf of another who is liable to a sin offering, so should it be invalid when slaughtered on behalf of another who is liable to a burnt offering, for his fellow is then like himself.]*
- C. **[7B]** *[As before,] well, in a permanent sort of way, it may not effect atonement, but it does make atonement of a superficial sort*
- II.22.** A. And said Raba, “As to a burnt-offering that one slaughtered not under the proper designation, it is forbidden to toss its blood under some other than the proper designation [but the blood can be tossed only within the rules governing the burnt offering].”
- B. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning, but if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture.*
- C. *If you prefer, I shall argue that that position derives from mere reasoning: even though the status of the beast has been revised [one time], shall the priest go on and make further revisions of the status of the beast? [Obviously not].*

- D. *...but if you prefer, I shall argue that it derives from Scripture: “what has come out of your lips you shall observe and do, according as you have vowed a freewill-offering to the Lord your God” (Deu. 23:24).*
- E. Now does this verse refer to a free-will offering? In point of fact, in context, it refers to an offering that is presented in fulfillment of a vow [“what has come out of your lips”]! Rather, the sense is as follows: if you have acted in accord with that which you have vowed, then let it be an offering in fulfillment of a vow, but if not, then let it be a mere freewill offering. *And in the case of a freewill-offering, is it permitted to change its classification in any aspect whatsoever? [Certainly not!].*

- II.23.** A. And said Raba, “An animal designated as a burnt offering that is presented after the death of the person who has designated the beast as a burnt offering and that is slaughtered under a different classification of sanctification from that which the owner has designated is invalid. If it is slaughtered in a different classification in regard to ownership, it is valid, for ownership does not pertain after one has died.”
- B. And R. Phineas b. R. Ammi said, “There is ownership after death.”
  - C. *Said R. Ashi to R. Phineas b. R. Ammi, “Do you mean that there is ownership after death in particular so that the heir must bring another burnt offering, or perhaps, if the heir has violated various affirmative religious requirements, the beast will make atonement for him?”*
  - D. *He said to him, “I mean that there is ownership after death in particular so that the heir must bring another burnt offering.”*

- II.24.** A. And said Raba, “A burnt offering falls into the classification of a gift.
- B. *“For how [can it actually effect atonement]? If the donor has not repented of his sin, then it falls into the class of ‘the sacrifice of the wicked if an abomination’ (Pro. 21:27). If the donor has repented, then surely it has been taught on Tannaite authority, ‘If one has neglected to carry out an affirmative religious duty but has repented, he does not move from the spot until he has been forgiven [even without making a sacrifice].’ It follows that a burnt offering falls into the classification of a gift.”*
  - C. *So too it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
  - D. Said R. Simeon, “Why is a sin-offering presented?”
  - E. Why is a sin-offering presented? Surely it is in order to make atonement! F.

Rather, “Why is it presented prior to a burnt-offering? It serves as an intercessor who comes before the king to achieve reconciliation. Once the intercessor has achieved reconciliation, then the gift is given.”

- III.1** A. **...except for the Passover and the sin offering — the Passover at its appointed time [the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan], and the sin offering of any time:**
- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that rule in connection with the Passover-offering?*
  - C. As it is written, “Observe the month of Abib and prepare the Passover-offering” (Deu. 16: 1) — meaning that all actions that are done concerning it are in connection with the Passover offering in particular.

- D. *Thus we have found scriptural support for the proposition that a revision in the classification of a beast set aside for the Passover as to the category of sanctification of said beast is invalid. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a revision in the classification of the beast set aside for the Passover as to the ownership of said beast likewise invalidates the offering?*
- E. As has been written, “Then you shall say, It is the slaughtering of the Lord’s Passover” (Exo. 12:27), indicating that the slaughtering of the beast that has been designated for the Passover offering must be carried out within the classification of the Passover offering.
- F. Now since that exegesis cannot refer to the proposition that a revision in the classification of a beast set aside for the Passover as to the category of sanctification of said beast is invalid [which we have proved on the basis of another verse altogether], treat it as though it refers to a revision in the classification of the beast set aside for the Passover as to the ownership of said beast, which likewise invalidates the offering.
- G. *Now we have found evidence that these rules pertain in the correct fulfillment of the religious duty. But how do we know that they are indispensable [so that the offering is ruined if these rules are not observed]?*
- H. Scripture has said, “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering to the Lord your God” (Deu. 16: 2).
- I. *R. Safra objected to this allegation: “Does that verse really serve for the stated purpose? Lo, it is required in connection with that which R. Nahman said. For said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha, ‘How on the basis of Scripture do we know that what is left over of a Passover offering is presented on the altar as a peace offering? Because Scripture has said, “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering to the Lord your God of the flock and of the herd” (Deu. 16: 2). Now as a matter of fact, is it not the case that the Passover offering derives from either lambs or goats [but not from the herd, meaning of larger beasts altogether]? In that case it is shown that what is left over of a Passover offering is presented for something that comes from the flock or from the herd, and what can that be? It can only be a peace offering.”*
- J. Rather, said R. Safra, “‘And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering to the Lord your God of the flock and of the herd’ (Deu. 16: 2) in accord with the interpretation of R. Nahman. ‘Observe the month of Abib and prepare the Passover-offering’ (Deu. 16: 1) is necessary to provide the rule covering a revision in the classification as to sanctification of the beast set aside for a Passover offering. ‘Then you shall say, it is the slaughtering of the Lord’s Passover’ is necessary to provide the rule covering a revision in the classification as to ownership of the beast set aside for a Passover offering. It teaches that the rule regarding change in either aspect is indispensable.”

- III.2.** A. *Now that we have found the rule as it pertains to slaughtering the animal designated as the Passover offering, how do we know that the same rule pertains to the other acts of sacrificial service?*
- B. *Since it has been revealed in the one aspect of the rite, it has been revealed in the other aspects of the same rite.*



- C. R. Ashi said, “The argument, ‘*since it has been revealed in the one aspect of the rite, it has been revealed in the other aspects of the same rite*’ is not to be invoked. How then do we know that the same rule pertains to the other acts of sacrificial service? As it is written, ‘This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings’ (Lev. 7:37). *And it has been taught on Tannaite authority*: “On the day on which he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings” (Lev. 7:38) speaks of the firstling, beast designated as tithe of the herd, and the Passover offering. Scripture in this way draws a comparison between the Passover offering and peace offerings. Just as peace offerings, whether as to a revision in the correct classification of the original designation of the beast in regard to sanctification or in regard to a revision in regard to ownership, we require as a matter of proper fulfillment of the religious duty that there will be no revision in either regard, so in the case of all of these do we treat as a matter of proper fulfillment of the religious duty that there will be no revision in either regard. And, to proceed, the other matters are comparable to the peace offerings in another way: just as in the case of peace offerings, there is no distinction between any aspects of the regulation, so there is no differentiation in the case of the Passover offering between slaughtering and other aspects of the sacrificial cult in regard to indispensability.”
- D. *Then what is the use of “it is”?*
- E. *It is as has been taught on Tannaite authority*: In regard to the Passover offering, “it is” is stated so as to indicate that the rules governing classification are indispensable in respect to slaughtering the beast; in the case of a guilt offering, “it is” serves to prove that that is so only after the burning of the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar, and if those parts should not be burned at all, the offering is still valid.

#### **IV.1 A. [Supply: ...and the sin offering at any time:]**

- B. *How do we know the same for the sin-offering?*
- C. As it is written, **[8A]** “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering” (Lev. 4:34) — so that the receiving of the blood will be within the classification of the sin-offering [for which the beast was originally designated].
- D. So we have found that the same rule pertains to both the slaughtering of the animal and the receiving of its blood. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the same rule applies to the tossing of the blood on the altar?
- E. As it is written, “And the priest shall make atonement for him through his sin offering” (Lev. 4:35) — so that the act of atonement will be carried out within the classification of the sin-offering.
- F. *So we have found the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast for purposes of sanctification. How do we know the rule covering a revision as to the classification of the beast in respect to ownership?*
- G. Scripture has said, “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Lev. 4:35) — for him, and not for some third party.

- H. *So we have found that the rule applies for the proper fulfillment of the religious duty. But how do we know that obedience to the rule is indispensable [so that the offering is spoiled if the rule is not obeyed]?*
- I. *It is in line with what R. Huna b. R. Joshua said, "...sin offering..." would have sufficed. Framing matters as 'his sin offering' [proves that matters must be conducted in accord with the original classification of the beast]."*
- J. *So we have found the scriptural origins of the rule against a revision of the status of the beast from its original designation so far as the definition of the religious duty is concerned, in the aspects of a revision of the status as to sanctification or in respect to ownership in reference to tossing the blood, and this in regard to both the definition of the religious duty, optimally carried out, and of the actual indispensable rules governing the validity of the offering altogether. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that these same requirements are indispensable in regard to other aspects of the sacrificial liturgy so far as a revision in the classification as to sanctification of the beast is concerned, and in regard to the other aspects of the liturgy so far as a change in the classification of the beast as to ownership is concerned, whether in the aspect of defining the correct fulfillment of the rite or in the aspect governing the indispensability of the rite?*
- K. Said R. Jonah, "It is derived by analogy from the rule governing the sin offering of the Nazirite: 'And the priest shall bring them before the Lord and shall prepare his sin-offering and his burnt offering' (Num. 6:16) — so that all actions connected with it be carried out within the classification of the sin-offering."
- L. *Now we have found scriptural evidence in regard to a change in the classification of the beast from its original designation as to sanctification. In regard to a change in the classification of the beast as to ownership, how on the basis of Scripture do we know the rule?*
- M. Said R. Huna b. R. Joshua, "...sin offering..." would have sufficed. Framing matters as 'his sin offering' [proves that matters must be conducted in accord with the original classification of the beast]."
- N. *To this Rabina objected, "Then what about the burnt offering, concerning which 'his burnt offering' is written! How do you interpret that formulation?"*
- O. *But how would Rabina deal with the fact that we have not "meal offering" but "his meal offering," "drink offering" but "his drink offering"?*
- P. *These formulations are required to make the following point: the formulation "their meal offering" and "their drink offering" bears the sense that these function at night; likewise even on the next day.*
- Q. *Then what about the formulation, not "burnt offering" but "his burnt offering"? Furthermore, can the sin offerings of these several parties really be treated as analogous? [Surely not, since if the Nazirite is absolved of his vow, he does not bear any obligation to present an offering, but the sin-offerings of others who are obligated to present that offering must invariably be presented.] The sin offering that is brought for inadvertently eating forbidden fat cannot be dictated by an analogy drawn from the rule governing the sin offering of the Nazirite, for the latter is presented along with yet another sacrifice. And, along these same lines, the rule governing the Nazirite's sin offering cannot be derived by analogy from the rule governing the sin offering that is presented for inadvertently eating*

*forbidden fat, since the penalty for the latter is extirpation [which classifies the offering in an entirely distinct rubric from that of the Nazirite].*

- R. *Rather, said Raba, "The rule governing this case derives from the rule governing the sin offering that is presented by a person healed of the skin ailment [of Lev. 13-14]. In that regard it is written, 'And the priest shall prepare the sin offering' (Lev. 14:19) — so that all actions connected with it be carried out within the classification of the sin-offering."*
- S. *So, in this context, we have found the rule governing a revision as to the classification of the beast in respect to sanctification. How do we derive the rule governing a revision in the classification of the beast in regard to ownership?*
- T. *Scripture has said, "And he shall make atonement for him who is to be purified" (Lev. 14:19) — for this one who is to be purified, and not for some other party who is to be purified.*
- U. *Still, are these really so comparable as to permit the drawing of analogies? In point of fact, the sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat cannot derive its rule from that which governs the sin offering brought in behalf of the person healed of the skin disease, for in connection with the latter, there is another blood rite beside this one. Not only so, but the rule governing the sin offering brought by the person healed of the skin ailment cannot be derived from the rule governing the sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat, because in the latter case, the penalty of extirpation is incurred [for the sin at hand, if it is not atoned for].*
- V. *Well, while the analogy is insufficient for the rule for the one to be derived from the rule for the other, it does suffice to permit the rule for the one to be derived from the rule governing the other two!*
- W. *So how is the rule for the one to be derived from the rule governing the other two?*
- X. *Let Scripture not explicitly write the rule concerning the sin-offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat, and let the rule for that item derive from the rule governing the other two.*
- Y. *But what makes these other two exceptional is that in both cases there is another blood rite accompanying the blood rite of the sin offering.*
- Z. *Then let Scripture not explicitly write out the rule governing the sin offering of the Nazirite and let the rule for that classification of sin offering derive from the one governing the other two.*
- AA. *But what makes these other two exceptional is that in both cases there is no possibility of remitting the obligation to present the offerings by reason of the remission of the vow through an inquiry to a sage [which is the rule for the sin offering of the Nazirite, as noted above].*
- BB. *Then let Scripture not write out the rule for the sin offering brought by the person healed of the skin ailment and let the rule governing that item be derived from these other two.*
- CC. *What is particular to these other two is that if the person is poor, he is not obligated to present them [but the person healed of the skin offering must bring some sort of sin offering suitable for a blood rite].*

- DD. Rather, Scripture has said, “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings” (Lev. 7:37). In so expressing matters, Scripture has treated them by way of analogy to peace-offerings. Just as in the case of peace-offerings, whether one has effected a revision in the classification as to sanctification affecting a consecrated beast or a revision as to the ownership of the beast, as to fulfilling the religious duty properly, we require that the offering be carried out within the original classification in which the animal was classified when it was consecrated, so in respect to all the sin offering, as to fulfilling the religious duty properly, we require that the offering be carried out within the original classification in which the animal was classified when it was consecrated.
- EE. Therefore the definition of the proper way to carry out the religious duty derives from the analogy to peace offerings. As to the verses of Scripture that have been adduced, they serve to indicate that the rule is indispensable to the fulfillment of the rite.
- FF. *So we have found that the rule pertains to the sin offering, in which context “for a sin offering” is explicitly written [at Lev. 4:33]. [But that sin offering pertains in particular to sins that the Torah does not enumerate]. [8B] How do we know that the same offering applies to sin offerings presented on account of the inadvertent violation of the law concerning idolatry, an oath, swearing, and defilement of the sanctuary and its Holy Things, where we do not find the language “for a sin offering” at all?*
- GG. *The rule governing the sin offering presented on account of an inadvertent act of idolatry derives from the rule covering the sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat, because the penalty for that sin is the same as the one for fat, namely, extirpation. The rest of these items then derive from that item by analogy formed on the basis of a shared trait in common [covering the Nazirite and the person healed of the skin ailment]. [Freedman: the only feature they have in common is that they are sin offerings, and both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner disqualify them. Therefore the others here enumerated, which have the same feature, that they are sin offerings, are likewise disqualified by change of sanctity or change of owner.]*

**IV.2. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:**

- B. As to a beast designated for the Passover offering, at the time at which it is supposed to be offered [midday on the fourteenth of Nisan until nightfall], if the beast is slaughtered for the purpose for which it was originally designated, it is valid, and if not slaughtered for the purpose for which it was originally designated, it is invalid.
- C. As to the rest of the year [a beast that is designated as a Passover offering] that is offered for the purpose for which it has been designated is invalid, but if it is not offered for the purpose for which it has been designated, it is valid.
- D. *Now what is the scriptural source for this ruling?*
- E. Said Samuel’s father, “Said Scripture, ‘And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock’ (Lev. 3: 6) — this verse teaches that anything that derives from the flock may serve as a sacrifice of peace offerings. [Freedman:

since a Passover offering comes of the flock, it is included in this deduction; further, that can only mean after its season, for it has already been deduced that if it is offered for anything but itself in its season, it is invalid.]

- F. *Might I say then that if it is offered as a peace offering, it is valid, but if for any other classification of Holy Things, it is not valid?*
- G. Said R. Ila said R. Yohanan, "The language, 'for a sacrifice...' serves as encompassing language any classification of sacrifice."
- H. *Might I then say that whatever the purpose for which it is slaughtered will then be the classification into which the offering must fall [and not just peace offerings, as specified just now]?*
- I. *Had Scripture written, "for peace offerings and a sacrifice," matters would be as you now propose; but since it is written, "for a sacrifice of peace offerings," it follows that for whatever purpose one has slaughtered the beast, it still falls into the category of peace offerings.*
- J. *Might I propose that "for a sacrifice" serves as an encompassing rule, then "peace offerings" as a particularization of the foregoing, and since in the case of an encompassing rule and a particularization thereof, encompassed by the general rule is only what is specified in the particularization, then if it is slaughtered as peace offerings, it is valid, but for any other purpose, it is not valid?*
- K. *When the verse goes on to say, "for the Lord," it provides yet another encompassing rule [vitiating the foregoing proposal].*
- L. *To this R. Jacob of Nehar Peqod objected, "The encompassing rule that occurs at the conclusion is hardly comparable to the encompassing rule that occurs at the outset. The opening encompassing rule includes animal sacrifices but nothing more, while the concluding encompassing rule, 'unto the Lord,' bears the implication that whatever belongs to the Lord, even if one slaughtered the beast under the classification of bird-offerings or meal-offerings [the same rule would apply]."*
- M. *Lo, the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael [takes the view that] even where there is an encompassing rule and a particularization of this sort, the rule applies that in the case of an encompassing rule followed by a particularization and followed then by an encompassing rule, you still are subject to the particularization: just as the particularization makes it explicit that the offering, though not in the classification for which the beast was initially designated, is valid, so in any case in which it is not offered up within the classification for which the beast was originally designated, it is valid.*
- N. Then how about this: just as the particularization makes it explicit that we deal with something that is offered by reason of fulfillment of the conditions of a vow or a free-will offering, so anything that is presented in fulfillment of the conditions of a vow or a free-will offering, such as a burnt offering or peace offerings, will be covered by the rule, while a sin-offering and a guilt offering will not.
- O. Rather, "for a sacrifice" serves as an amplification [Freedman: in which case even cases not similar to itself are included].
- P. *Then might I say that it should be classified within any classification of a Holy Thing for which it is slaughtered?]*

- Q. Said R. Abin, [9A] “We may well assign to the category of Holy Things that yield meat to be eaten a sacrifice [originally bearing some other designation] that is offered up as a Holy Thing that yields meat to be eaten, but we do not assign to a category of Holy Thing that does not yield meat to be eaten an animal that is sacrificed in the classification of a Holy Thing that does yield meat to be eaten.”
- R. *But are not a sin-offering and a guilt offering classifications of sacrifice that yield meat to be eaten? [They certainly do yield meat for the priest.]*
- S. Rather, “We may well assign to the category of Holy Things that yield meat to be eaten by persons of all classifications [not just the priesthood] a sacrifice [originally bearing some other designation] that is offered up as a Holy Thing that yields meat to be eaten by persons of all classifications, but we do not assign to a category of Holy Thing that does not yield meat to be eaten by persons of all classifications an animal that is sacrificed in the classification of a Holy Thing that does yield meat to be eaten by persons of all classifications.”
- T. R. Yosé b. R. Abin said, “We may well assign to the category of Lesser Holy Things a sacrifice that belongs to the category of Lesser Holy Things, but we do not assign to a category of Lesser Holy Things an animal that is sacrificed in the classification of a Most Holy Things.”
- U. *To this proposition objected R. Isaac b. R. Sabarin, “Might I say that if the priest slaughtered an animal designated for some other purpose in the classification of tithe of the herd, it should actually be classified as subject to the rules governing the tithe of the herd? And what difference would such a classification make? That it would not require the presentation of drink offerings, and that one who violates the injunction, ‘It shall not be redeemed’ (Lev. 27:33) would not be subject to the sanction of a flogging.”*
- V. Scripture states, “The tenth shall be holy” (Lev. 27:32) — this one can indeed be classified as tithe of the herd, and no other beast can be classified as tithe of the herd.
- W. *Might one say that if one slaughtered it in the classification of a firstling, then let it be a firstling. And what difference would such a classification make? That it would not require the presentation of drink offerings, and that it should be given to the priests.*
- X. As regards the firstling too, it is analogous to the law governing the beast designated as tithe, since the word “passing” is written in the laws governing both classes of beast (Exo. 13:12, Lev. 27:33).
- Y. *Might one say that if one slaughtered in the classification of a substitute, it should be classed as a substitute? And what difference would such a classification make? That one might incurring the sanction of a flogging on its account on account of violating the law against declaring a beast to be a substitute for an already-consecrated beast; or that on account of that beast one might incur culpability on the count of “it shall not be redeemed.”*
- Z. Said Mar Zutra b. R. Nahman, “Scripture says, ‘Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy’ (Lev. 27:10 — this is a substitute, and no other beast can enter the classification of substitute [Freedman: only if one consecrates a non-sacred animal as a substitute does the law apply, but not when one consecrates as a



substitute an animal that had already been consecrated earlier, as is the case of this lost Passover offering].

- AA. *Then might I say that if one has slaughtered the beast in the classification of a thanksgiving offering, it will fall into the classification of a thanksgiving offering? And what difference would such a classification make? To impose an obligation of a bread offering [such as accompanies this classification of sacrifice].*
- BB. *Is there the possibility that while the Passover offering itself does not require an accompanying bread offering, yet what is left over from it [in this case, a use to which it is put for which it was not originally designated] is going to impose the obligation of a libation-offering?*
- CC. *This is the sense of what we mean to say: if so, then one may well argue, can there be a case in which what is left over of the thanksgiving offering itself requires no bread offering, yet the leftover of that which has been turned into a thanksgiving offering will require a bread offering?*

- IV.3.** A. [With reference to Samuel's father's statement, "Said Scripture, 'And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock' (Lev. 3: 6) — this verse teaches that anything that derives from the flock may serve as a sacrifice of peace offerings, explained by Freedman: since a Passover offering comes of the flock, it is included in this deduction; further, that can only mean after its season, for it has already been deduced that if it is offered for anything but itself in its season, it is invalid.] *to this objected R. Yemar b. R. Hillel, "And how does it follow that that verse is set forth with regard to the residue of a Passover offering. Perhaps it is set forth with reference to the residue of a guilt offering [Freedman: since a guilt offering too was a ram without blemish from the flock, and not from the herd]?"*
- B. Said Raba, "Said Scripture, 'And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings be of the flock' (Lev. 3: 6) — that for which the entirety of the flock is equally suitable [sheep and goats, but a guilt offering may be only a ram]."
  - C. *To this objected R. Abin bar Hiyya — and some say, R. Abin bar Kahana, "In every context you say, 'of' serves to exclude, but here you say that that same usage is inclusive!"*
  - D. *Said R. Mani, "Here too 'of' serves to exclude, indicating that it may not be two years old nor may it be a female [Freedman: by relating the verse to a Passover offering remainder, you exclude a two year old animal and a female]."*
  - E. *To this objected R. Hana of Baghdad, "And can you really say that the verse is written with respect to the residue of a Passover offering? And lo, since it is written, 'If he bring a lamb for his offering...and if his offering be a goat' (Lev. 3:7, 12), it follows that the verse does not speak of the residue of a Passover offering at all." [Freedman: this verse must simply refer to an ordinary peace offering, for if it referred to a Passover remainder, it is obviously a lamb or a goat, and it need not be stated.]*
  - F. *That is required in line with what has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
  - G. "If he bring a lamb" — this is to encompass the Passover offering, in regard to its fat tail [which is to be burned on the altar].

- H. When Scripture further says, “If he bring a lamb for his offering...[and if his offering be a goat]” (Lev. 3: 7, 12), it serves to encompass a Passover offering that is more than a year old, and a peace offering that comes to accompany a Passover offering, indicating that all of the regulations of peace offerings pertain: they are to be subject to the laying on of hands, drink offerings, the waving of the breast and the shoulder. When Scripture says, “and if his offering be a goat,” it interrupts the subject and indicates that a goat does not require the burning of the fat tail on the altar.
- I. *And does that rule derive from here? Surely it derives from the verse that is adduced in evidence by Samuel’s father. For Samuel’s father said, “‘And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock’ (Lev. 3: 6) — it is something that derives from the flock that must be for a sacrifice of peace offerings.*
- J. *And still it derives from what R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha said, for said R. Nahman said Rabbah bar Abbuha, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a Passover residue is presented in the classification of peace offerings? Because it is said, ‘And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering to the Lord your God of the flock and of the herd’ (Deu. 16: 2). Now is it not the fact that the Passover offering must derive only from the flock and from the herd? So on this basis it is shown with respect to the residue of the Passover offering that it must be used for a classification of offering that is ordinarily presented out of the flock and herd, and what might that be? It is a peace offering. [Freedman: hence if you object that the law under discussion is deducted in accordance with the teaching of Samuel’s father, it can be objected that it follows from the last verse quoted.]*
- K. *Rather, there are three verses in written in this context. [9B] One of them refers to an animal, the time for the slaughter of which has passed and which is superannuated; one refers to an animal the time for the slaughter of which has passed but which is not superannuated; and the third speaks of an animal the time for the slaughter of which has not passed and which is not superannuated.*
- L. *And all three of these verses are required in context. For had Scripture made reference to one of them, I might have come to the conclusion that in a case in which the beast is superannuated and the time for slaughtering has passed, since it is completely disqualified for use as a Passover offering, the law applies. But if the time for slaughtering the beast had passed, but if it was not superannuated, I would say that it is not valid if slaughtered as a peace offering, since it can serve for the second Passover. If the Torah had made reference only to the other two, I would have supposed that they are valid if slaughtered as a peace offering because they have been disqualified for their own purpose. But if neither the time for slaughtering the beast nor the year had passed, so that it is eligible for the first passover, I would have said that that is not the case. So all three are required.*

**IV.4.** A. Said Rab in the name of Mabug, “If one has slaughtered an animal designated for use as a sin offering in the classification of the sin offering presented by Nahshon [Num. 7:12, that is, for the dedication of the altar], it is valid, for Scripture says, ‘This is the law of the sin offering’ (Lev. 6:18) — a single rule governs all classifications of sin offering. [Even though Nahshon’s sin offering

was presented not at all on account of sin, it was valid; by slaughtering a beast categorized to begin with as a sin offering as such, one is not deemed to have changed its purpose, and it is therefore valid (Freedman)].”

- B. *Raba was in session and repeating this tradition. R. Meshershayya objected to Raba, “R. Simeon says, ‘All meal offerings from which the handful was taken for a classification other than the classification of Holy Things for which they were originally designated are valid, and they do go to their owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation [M. Men. 1:1A-B], for meal offerings are not comparable to animal sacrifices. For if the priest takes a handful from meal offering prepared on a griddle and refers to it as though it were one prepared in a pan, the rites pertaining to it in any case indicate that he is dealing with one prepared on a griddle. If he is dealing with a dry meal-offering and refers to it as one mixed with oil, this is of no consequence because the rites pertaining to it indicate that he is dealing with a dry one. But in the case of animal sacrifices, there is only one rite for all of them, and one mode of slaughter for all of them’ [T. Menahot 1:1A-E]. Therefore the operative consideration is solely that the mode of preparing the offering indicates the classification into which the offering falls; then if the mode of preparing it did not prove its classification, that would not be the case. And yet why should that be so? Let us invoke the same conception, namely, ‘This is the law of the meal offering’ (Lev. 6: 7) — a single law pertains to all meal offerings.’*
- C. *“Rather, if such a statement was made, this is how it was formulated: ‘Said Rab in the name of Mabug, “If one has slaughtered an animal on the condition that Nahshon might achieve atonement through it [Num. 7:12, that is, for the dedication of the altar], it is valid, for atonement is not required for the dead.’ [Freedman: a sin offering slaughtered for the wrong person is invalid, if he is liable to a sin offering. But this condition is not met here, so the sacrifice is valid].”*
- D. *Then why not refer to any corpse [and why to Nahshon in particular?*
- E. *By stating matters in this way he informs us that the operative consideration that validates the offering is that Nahshon is dead, so if one slaughtered the beast for a living person who is in the category of Nahshon, it would be an invalid offering. And who are under discussion? Those liable to the sin offering presented by the Nazirite or the sin offering presented by one who has been healed of the skin ailment.*
- F. *But these are classed as burnt offerings [Freedman: a Nazirite’s sin offering is the same as a burnt offering since it is not presented on account of sin, and if one slaughtered a sin offering in the name of someone else, who owes a burnt offering, it is valid].*
- G. *Rather, if the statement was made, this is the form that it took: Said Rab in the name of Mabug, “If one has slaughtered an animal in the name of someone who is liable to a sin offering like that of Nahshon might achieve atonement through it [Num. 7:12, that is, for the dedication of the altar], it is valid, for Nahshon’s sin offering was a burnt offering.”*
- H. *Others say, “Said Rab in the name of Mabug, ‘If one has slaughtered an animal in the classification of that Nahshon, it is invalid, for Nahshon’s sin offering was classified as a burnt offering.”*

- I. *Now introduce the issues of the Nazirite's sin offering or the leper's sin offering [for these are the classes into which Nahshon's falls]?*
- J. *He makes mention of the initial sin-offering of that classification.*

**IV.5.** A. Said Raba, "A sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat which one slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating blood or in the classification of a sin offering presented on account of inadvertent acts of idolatry is valid. If it were slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering presented by a Nazirite or a sin offering presented by a person healed of the skin disease, it is invalid, *for the latter are in fact classified as burnt offerings.*"

- B. *Raba raised this question: "A sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat which one slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering brought on account of inadvertently imparting uncleanness to the sanctuary and its Holy Things — what is the law? Do we maintain that, like the sins for which the beast has been designated, this too involves extirpation? Or perhaps the latter is not assigned a fixed value the way it is assigned a fixed value [if the sinner is too poor, he can give two birds for the one but not for the other]."*
- C. *R. Aha b. Raba repeated all three cases with a ruling that the offering is invalid. What is the scriptural basis for his doing so? "And he shall kill it for a sin offering" (Lev. 4:33) — for the sake of that particular sin offering that is at issue.*
- D. *Said R. Ashi to R. Aha b. Raba, "Then as to the question that has been raised by Raba, how do you repeat it?"*
- E. *He said to him, "We repeat the question in the context of a change in the classification of the beast as to ownership, and this is how we repeat the question: said Raba, 'A beast designated as a sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat which one slaughtered in behalf of someone who was obligated to present a sin offering on account of eating blood or a sin offering on account of an inadvertent act of idolatry is invalid. If he did so in behalf of one who is liable to present the sin offering of a Nazirite or the sin offering of one healed of the skin disease, it is valid.' And as to the question, this is what Raba asked, 'A beast designated as a sin offering brought on account of inadvertently eating forbidden fat which one slaughtered in behalf of someone who was obligated to present a sin offering on account of imparting uncleanness to the sanctuary and its Holy Things — what is the law? Do we maintain that, like the sins for which the beast has been designated, this too involves extirpation? Or perhaps the latter is not assigned a fixed value the way it is assigned a fixed value [if the sinner is too poor, he can give two birds for the one but not for the other].'"*
- F. *The question stands.*

**IV.6.** A. *It was stated:*

- B. If one slaughtered the beast in accord with its original designation, but then he sprinkled the blood on the altar for a purpose not in accord with its original designation —
- C. R. Yohanan said, "It is invalid."

- D. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is valid."
- E. R. Yohanan said, "It is invalid, because intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering, *and we derive that rule by analogy from the power of intentionality when it comes to imparting unfitness to a beast by reason of an improper intention expressed at the moment of slaughter to eat the meat of the offering at the wrong time or to burn its parts in the wrong place.*"
- F. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is valid, because intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may not take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering, *and we do not derive that rule by analogy from the power of intentionality when it comes to imparting unfitness to a beast by reason of an improper intention expressed at the moment of slaughter to eat the meat of the offering at the wrong time or to burn its parts in the wrong place.*"
- G. *And both authorities are consistent with positions expressed elsewhere, for it has been stated:*
- H. **[10A]** He who slaughters a beast on the stated intention of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat in honor of an idol —
- I. R. Yohanan said, "It is forbidden, because intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering, *and we derive that rule by analogy from the rule governing what is done within the Temple courtyard for what is done outside of the Temple courtyard [that is, an act of sacrifice for an idol, which cannot have taken place within the courtyard].*"
- J. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "It is permitted, because intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may not take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering, *and we do not derive that rule by analogy from the rule governing what is done within the Temple courtyard for what is done outside of the Temple courtyard.*"
- K. *Now [both cases are necessary, for] had we been given only the latter case, I might have supposed that it is in particular in that latter case that R. Simeon b. Laqish takes the position that he does, but he will concede that we do draw an analogy from from the rule governing what is done within the Temple courtyard for what is done outside of the Temple courtyard.*"
- L. *And had we been given only the former instance, I might have supposed that R. Yohanan takes the position that he does only there, but he concedes the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish in the present case. So both versions of the dispute are necessary.*
- M. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "R. Jeremiah raised an objection on the side of R. Yohanan, and R. Ela raised an objection on the side of R. Simeon b. Laqish."*
- N. *R. Jeremiah raised an objection on the side of R. Yohanan: "If in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast after its time for slaughtering, the offering is valid, while in a case in which the officiating priest slaughtered the*

beast with the declared intention of tossing the blood outside of the proper time, the beast is invalid, in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast not under its originally designated classification, the offering is invalid, if the officiating priest slaughtered the beast with the expressed intention of tossing the blood not under the offering's originally designated classification, will the offering not be invalid?'

P. *To this objected Raba bar Ahilai*, "The exceptional character of a case in which the priest declares his intention of sprinkling the blood after the assigned time is that the violation of the law is penalized by extirpation [and that explains why the offering is invalidated even at the time of slaughter]."

Q. Rather, said Raba bar Ahilai, "*This is the sense of the statement that he made*: If in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast outside of the proper location for slaughtering, the offering is valid, while in a case in which the officiating priest slaughtered the beast with the declared intention of tossing the blood outside of the proper location, the beast is invalid, in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast not under its originally designated classification, the offering is invalid, if the officiating priest slaughtered the beast with the expressed intention of tossing the blood not under the offering's originally designated classification, will the offering not be invalid?'"

R. *To this objected R. Ashi*, "The exceptional character of a case involving the slaughter of the sacrificial beast outside of its proper place is that that consideration applies to all forms of animal sacrifice. But will you say the same in the case of doing so not under its originally designated classification, a consideration that pertains solely to the Passover offering and to the sin offering?"

S. Rather, said R. Ashi, "*This is the sense of the statement that he made*: If in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast for the sake of Mr. So-and-so [other than the proper owner], the offering is valid, while in a case in which the officiating priest slaughtered the beast with the declared intention of tossing the blood for the sake of Mr. So-and-so [other than the proper owner], the beast is invalid, in a case in which the officiating priest said, 'Lo, I slaughter the beast not under its originally designated classification, the offering is invalid, if the officiating priest slaughtered the beast with the expressed intention of tossing the blood not under the offering's originally designated classification, will the offering not be invalid?'"

T. *And R. Ela raised an objection on the side of R. Simeon b. Laqish*: "Let the rule [that the priest's revision of the classification of the animal from that originally designated for it disqualifies the sacrifice] not be specified for the case of sprinkling blood, and let it be derived by an argument a fortiori on the basis of the law governing the acts of slaughtering and receiving [Freedman: if slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifices disqualifies, though it is valid when done by a non-priest, how much the more sprinkling, which may not be done by a non-priest, will disqualify the sacrifice]. So for what purpose did the All-



*Merciful state the law in Scripture? It was to indicate that intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may not take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering.”*

U. *To this argument objected R. Pappa, “But perhaps the purpose of formulating matters in that way really was to indicate that intentionality expressed in regard to one act of service may not take effect in regard to another act of service of the same offering.”*

V. *If so, then Scripture should have fallen silent so that it might be derived by the argument proposed by R. Ashi to prove the case a fortiori on the basis of the law governing the acts of slaughtering and receiving [Freedman: if slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifices disqualifies, though it is valid when done by a non-priest, how much the more sprinkling, which may not be done by a non-priest, will disqualify the sacrifice].*

W. *And the other party [Yohanan]?*

X. This is how to weaken the argument: as for the rule governing slaughtering and receiving the blood, the operative consideration is that these acts must be done at the north end and are considerations that are in play at the sacrifice of sin offerings on the inner altar.

Y. *And the other party [Simeon b. Laqish]?*

Z. *At this point, as a matter of fact, we are discussing peace offering [and not sin offerings].*

**IV.7.** A. *It has been stated:*

B. If one has slaughtered the beast under its originally designated classification intending to sprinkle the blood under some other than the originally designated classification —

C. R. Nahman said, “The offering is invalid.”

D. Rabbah said, “The offering is valid.”

E. *Rabbah then retracted and accepted the position of R. Nahman by reason of the argument a fortiori such as was proposed by R. Ashi.*

**V.1** A. R. Eliezer says, “Also: the guilt offering. The Passover at its appointed time, and the sin offering and the guilt offering at any time.” Said R. Eliezer, “The sin offering comes on account of sin, and the guilt offering comes on account of sin. Just as the sin offering is unfit [if it is offered] under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = “under some other name”], so the guilt offering is unfit if offered under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = “under some other name”]:

B. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. Said R. Eliezer, “The sin offering comes on account of sin, and the guilt offering comes on account of sin. Just as the sin offering is unfit [if it is offered] under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = “under some other name”], so the guilt offering is unfit if offered under some classification other than that originally designated [not for its own name = “under some other name”].”

- D. Said to him R. Joshua, “No, if you have said so concerning the sin offering, the blood of which is tossed above the red line that is drawn around the altar base, will you say so of a guilt offering, the blood of which is placed below the red line around the altar base, on which account, if one slaughtered the animal for some other than the originally designated classification, it still will be valid?”
- E. Said to him R. Eliezer, “The Passover offering will prove to the contrary, for its blood is tossed below the red line, and yet if one has slaughtered it under some classification other than the originally designated one, the offering is invalid.”
- F. Said to him R. Joshua, “The exceptional trait of the Passover is that it must be offered at a very particular time [which does not pertain elsewhere].”
- G. Said to him R. Eliezer, “The rules governing the sin offering, which is not subject to that exceptional trait, will prove the contrary.”
- H. Said to him R. Joshua, [\[10B\]](#) “We have come full circle.”
- I. R. Eliezer went and offered another argument altogether: “‘In the case of a sin offering, Scripture says, ‘It is a sin offering’ (Lev. 4:24), which suggests that if it is slaughtered under its originally designated classification, it is valid, and if not, it is not valid. Further, in the case of the Passover offering, Scripture says, ‘It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover’ (Exo. 12:27), meaning, if it is sacrificed under the designation originally assigned to the beast, it is valid, and if not, it is not valid. Now with respect to the guilt offering, Scripture says, ‘It is a guilt offering’ (Lev. 7: 5), which bears the same implication, namely, if it is sacrificed under the designation originally assigned to the beast, it is valid, and if not, it is not valid.”
- J. Said to him R. Joshua, “‘It is’ is stated in regard to the sin offering in the aspect of slaughtering the beast, so ‘it is’ bears the sense, ‘if the slaughter is done under the originally designated classification, the act is valid, and if not, it is not valid.’ So too ‘it is’ is stated with reference to the Passover offering in the aspect of slaughtering the beast, with the same result: ‘if the slaughter is done under the originally designated classification, the act is valid, and if not, it is not valid.’ But when it comes to the guilt offering, ‘it is’ is stated in regard to that offering only after the burning of the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar has been noted, and yet, if these parts should not be burned at all, the sacrifice remains a valid one.”
- K. Said to him R. Eliezer, “Lo, Scripture says, ‘As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering’ (Lev. 7: 7) — just as in the case of the sin offering, if the slaughter is done under the originally designated classification, the act is valid, and if not, it is not valid, so in the case of the guilt offering, if the slaughter is done under the originally designated classification, the act is valid, and if not, it is not valid” [\[T. Zeb. 1:1A-Q\]](#).

**V.2.** A. The master has said: Said to him R. Joshua, “We have come full circle:”

- B. *But why not let the argument go in its circle, so that an inference made by drawn on a polythetic basis by reference to the feature common to both [both may be eaten only for one night, and the guilt offering is subject to the same rule, and so*

*should share the trait of the other two in regard to being slaughtered only for the originally designated classification].*

- C. *But that argument can be refuted, since common to both also is the sanction of extirpation.*

**V.3.** A. The master has said: **Said to him R. Joshua, “No, if you have said so concerning the sin offering, the blood of which is tossed above the red line that is drawn around the altar base, will you say so of a guilt offering, the blood of which is placed below the red line around the altar base, on which account, if one slaughtered the animal for some other than the originally designated classification, it still will be valid:”**

- B. *But why should he not say to him, “No, if you invoke that rule in regard to the sin offering, the operative consideration is that the blood is taken to the inner sanctum”?*

- C. *It is because we are speaking of sin offerings that are prepared on the outer altar, in which case if the blood is taken for sprinkling into the inner sanctum, the offering is in fact invalid.*

- D. *R. Eliezer takes the view that if the guilt offering is treated in that way, it too is invalid.*

- E. *[But why should he not say to him,] “It is because it makes atonement for those who are liable to extirpation”?*

- F. *R. Eliezer’s analogy derives from the sin offering that is incurred by reason of the false oath described at Lev. 5: 1ff. [to which extirpation is irrelevant].*

- G. *[But why should he not say to him,] “It is because the blood is supposed to be tossed in four tossings”?*

- H. *R. Eliezer concurs with R. Ishmael, who says, “Every act of tossing the blood requires four tossings.”*

- I. *[But why should he not say to him,] “It is because the blood is supposed to be put on the four corners of the altar”?*

- J. *According to your reasoning, there are distinctions that would be made in respect to the finger, horn, and point [Freedman: the blood of the sin offering must be applied with the finger on the top of the horn, while the blood of other sacrifices is not applied on the top of the point, so if one is seeking distinctions, there are many other than that drawn by Joshua].*

- K. *But R. Joshua calls to the fore one of two or three distinctions only.*

**V.4.** A. The master has said: **Said to him R. Joshua, “No, if you have said so concerning the sin offering, the blood of which is tossed above the red line that is drawn around the altar base, will you say so of a guilt offering, the blood of which is placed below the red line around the altar base, on which account, if one slaughtered the animal for some other than the originally designated classification, it still will be valid:”**

- B. *But why could R. Eliezer not have said to him, “As to the guilt offering too, its blood is sprinkled on top of the altar”?*

- C. *Said Abayye, “In point of fact, you cannot say that as to the guilt offering too, its blood is sprinkled on top of the altar, for the contrary may be proven on the basis*

of an argument a fortiori, as follows: if a burnt offering, which is wholly burned up, yields blood that is sprinkled beneath the red line on the altar, the guilt offering, which is not wholly burned up, all the more so should its blood be sprinkled below.

- D. “But the distinguishing trait of the burnt offering is that it does not achieve atonement for any purpose.
- E. “But the sin offering made of a bird will prove the contrary [for its blood is sprinkled below, and it makes atonement].
- F. “But the distinguishing trait of the sin offering of a bird is that it is not a species that requires sacrifice [by the cutting of the throat, the neck being pinched instead].
- G. “The burnt offering will then prove to the contrary.
- H. “The result is that the distinguishing trait of the one is not identical with the distinguishing trait of the other, and the distinguishing trait of the other is not the same as the distinguishing trait of the one. But in this polythetic situation, the shared trait among them is that they are all Most Holy Things, and their blood is sprinkled beneath the red line around the base of the altar. So here I shall introduce the case of the guilt offering, which also falls into the classification of Most Holy Things, and its blood too is sprinkled below the red line around the base of the altar.”
- I. *Said Raba of Parzaqayya to R. Ashi, “But let him offer the following refutation:*
- J. “The distinguishing trait shared among them is that no fixed value is assigned to animals that are used for that purpose, but will you say the same of a guilt offering, which is assigned a fix value [Lev. 5:15]? *Rather, this is the operative consideration in the mind of R. Eliezer: Scripture has said, ‘The priest that offers it for a sin offering’ (Lev. 6:19) — ‘it’ requires that its blood be sprinkled above the red line around the altar, but the blood of no other offering is sprinkled above.*”
- K. *If so, let us say with regard to the sin offering: “it” alone is valid when slaughtered for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and invalid when slaughtered for some purpose other than the one for which it was originally designated, while in the case of all other sacrifices, they are valid whether sacrificed in the classification for which originally designated or not in the classification for which they were originally designated.*
- L. *But that “it” cannot be used with such precision as to eliminate all other classifications of offering, for lo it omits reference to the Passover offering.*
- M. *Then here too, “it” cannot be used with such precision as to eliminate all other classifications of offering, for lo it omits reference to the burnt offering made of a bird.*
- N. *One way or the other, there is no form of sacrifice that is subjected to an act of slaughter that has been omitted.*
- O. *And if you prefer, I shall say: the statement accords with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, who said, “The blood of one is sprinkled in a place by itself, and the blood of the other is sprinkled in a place by itself” [even though the blood of both may be sprinkled above the red line, yet each was sprinkled in its own spot, so the “it” in regard to sprinkling the blood forms no exception at all (Freedman)].*
- P. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- Q. The blood that is to be sprinkled below is sprinkled from the red line and below the red line, and the blood that is sprinkled above is to be sprinkled from the red line and above.
- R. Said R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, "Under what circumstances? In the case of the burnt offering made of a bird, but in the case of a sin offering made of a beast, its blood is applied on the very horn of the altar [and not merely anywhere above the line (Freedman)]."

**V.5.** A. *There we have learned in the Mishnah: [Blood which is to be placed on the altar inside [M. 5:1-2] which is mixed up with blood which is to be placed [on the altar] outside — let it be poured out into the gutter. If the priest without paying mind placed the blood outside and then went and placed it inside, it is valid. If he placed it inside and then went and placed it outside — R. Aqiba declares invalid [the sacrifice on the outer altar]. And sages declare valid.] For R. Aqiba did say, "All drops of blood [which should have been sprinkled outside] which are brought inside the sanctuary to effect atonement are invalid." And sages say, "[This applies] to the sin offering alone [which is invalidated by being brought inside, before the blood is tossed on the outer altar]." R. Eliezer says, "[It also applies] to the guilt offering, since it says, 'As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering' (Lev. 7: 7)" [M. Zebahim 8:11A-I].*

- B. *As for R. Eliezer, there are no problems, because he has stated the operative consideration, deriving from Scripture. But as to rabbis, what is the basis for their position?*
- C. *Said Raba, "You cannot make the argument that blood of the guilt offering that is carried to the inner altar is unfit, for the reverse position derives from the burnt offering. If [11A] the blood of a burnt offering, which is wholly burned up on the altar, is brought in to the inner altar, the offering is valid. In the case of a guilt offering, which is not wholly burned up on the altar, is it not an argument a fortiori that the same should be the rule?*
- D. *"But the distinctive trait of a burnt offering is that it does not effect atonement.*
- E. *"The meal offering brought by a poor sinner will prove to the contrary."*
- F. *But why not say that the sin offering prepared of a bird will prove to the contrary?*
- G. *The sin offering prepared of a bird is the subject of a problem raised by R. Abin [as we shall see below, folio 92B].*
- H. *[Reverting to E:] "Then one may argue: the distinguishing trait of the meal offering brought by a sinner is that it is not a species that requires an act of slaughter.*
- I. *"Then prove the case on the strength of the analogy supplied by the burnt offering.*
- J. *"We find ourselves going around in a circle. The distinctive trait applicable in the one case is not the same as the distinctive trait applicable in the other, and the distinctive trait applicable in the other case is not the same as the distinctive trait applicable in the one. But the shared trait among them is that they are Most Holy Things, brought to the inner altar, and they are valid. So I shall introduce the case of the guilt offering, which also is in the classification of Most Holy Things. So if its blood is erroneously brought into the inner altar, it should nonetheless be valid."*

- K. *Said Raba of Barnesh to R. Ashi, "But why not raise this question: The really pertinent trait that they have in common is that there is no fixed value assigned to the animals, but can you say the same of the guilt offering, which is assigned a fixed value? Rather, this is the operative consideration in the minds of rabbis. Scripture has said, 'And no sin offering, whereof any of its blood is brought into the tent of meeting...shall be eaten; it shall be burned with fire' (Lev. 6:23) — the blood of this sacrifice, not the blood of another.*
- L. *"And as to the the other party, "its blood" yields the contrast, not its meat.'*
- M. *"And as to the the other party, "blood" would have yielded that conclusion; "its blood" yields ours.'*
- N. *"And as to the the other party, he does not deem the contrast between the possible 'blood' and the actual 'its blood' to yield any interpretation of consequence."*
- O. *Now from the viewpoint of rabbis, who maintain, A guilt offering that one has slaughtered in other than its originally designated classification is valid, there is no problem, for that is why we draw an analogy between the meal offering and the sin offering or the meal offering and the guilt offering, as has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Simeon says, "It is most holy, as the sin offering and as the guilt offering' (Lev. 6:10) — the meal offering of a poor sinner, lo, it is classified as a sin offering; therefore if one has taken the handful of meal offering not in the classification for which the meal was originally designated, the offering is invalid; a meal offering brought in fulfillment of a vow is like a guilt offering, so if the priest takes the handful under a different classification from that for which the meal was originally designated, it is valid."*
- P. *But from the viewpoint of R. Eliezer, for what purpose as to law is an analogy drawn between the meal offering and the sin offering, or the meal offering and the guilt offering?*
- Q. *It concerns another ruling of R. Simeon, for we have learned in the Mishnah: [If] the meal offering was not in a utensil of service, it is invalid. R. Simeon declares valid [M. Men. 3:4C-D]. And said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, "What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon? Scripture has said, 'It is most holy, as the sin offering and as the guilt offering' (Lev. 6:10) — if the priest comes to perform the service with his hand, he does it with his right hand, as he would for the sin offering; if he comes to perform the act of service with a utensil, he does so with the left hand, as with a guilt offering."*
- R. *Does R. Simeon utilize the same verse to prove two points?*
- S. *The principal point of the verse that has been cited accords with the reading of R. Judah b. R. Hiyya. The matter concerning the invalidity of a meal offering of a poor sin that has been carried out for a purpose other than originally designated rests on a different consideration, namely: what is the scriptural basis for the rule governing a sin offering? It is because it is written, "it." But "it is" is written also with regard to the meal offering brought by a poor sinner.*
- T. *And in the view of rabbis, what is the practical law that emerges from the fact that a guilt offering is treated as analogous to a sin offering?*



- U. It is to indicate to you, just as a sin offering requires the laying on of hands, so the guilt offering requires the laying on of hands.

**VI.1 A. Yosé b. Honi says, “Those [other offerings] which are slaughtered for the sake of the Passover and for the sake of the sin offering are invalid:”**

- B. Said R. Yohanan, “Joseph b. Honi and R. Eliezer have said exactly the same thing!”
- C. *Rabbah said, “The point of difference between them is in regard to animals set aside for other purposes that were slaughtered in the classification of a sin offering.”*
- D. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: A beast designated for use as a Passover that became superannuated [and so automatically was reclassified into the category of peace offerings], which one slaughtered at the proper time [namely, Passover] and for the originally designated classification [as a Passover], and so too, if people slaughtered animals that had been designated for other offerings for the sake of a Passover offering on the fourteenth of Nisan —*
- E. **R. Eliezer declares these offerings invalid,**
- F. **and R. Joshua declares them valid.**
- G. Said R. Joshua, “Now if on all other days of the year, on which it is not valid to offer an animal sacrifice in the classification of a Passover, animals designated for other purposes are valid if offered in the classification of a Passover, on the fourteenth of Nisan, when it is valid to offer an animal designated as a Passover sacrifice for its stated purpose, that is, as a Passover sacrifice, is it not logical that animals designated for other purposes should be valid when offered in the classification of a Passover?”
- H. Said to him R. Eliezer, “Now if on all the other days of the year, when it is not valid to offer an animal sacrifice in the classification of a Passover, the animal designated as a Passover sacrifice is valid when offered for the purpose of some other classification of sacrifice, then on the fourteenth of Nisan, when it is valid to offer an animal designated as a Passover sacrifice in the classification of a Passover sacrifice, is it not logical that it should be valid when offered both for the classification of a Passover sacrifice and for a classification of some other sacrifice as well — is this what you are saying? But there is this to be said: on what account are animals designated for other purposes valid when offered in the classification of a Passover but on other days of the year? It is because an animal designated as a Passover sacrifice is valid when it is offered for the purpose of other sacrifices [for one may offer it for the sake of peace offerings, even though he has designated it in the classification of a Passover sacrifice. But will animals designated for other sacrifices be valid when offered in the classification of a Passover on the fourteenth of Nisan, on which day an animal designated as a Passover sacrifice in fact cannot be validly offered in any classification of sacrifice other than a Passover sacrifice? It is not logical that animals designated for sacrifices other than that one should be valid when offered for the classification of a Passover.”

- I. Said to him R. Joshua, “If so, you diminish the power of the Passover sacrifice and strength the power of peace offerings.”
- J. R. Eliezer went and took another tack: “We find that he who consecrates coins for the purpose of a Passover sacrifice presents with the excess money left over after the purchase of the Passover lamb peace offerings. But he who consecrates coins for the purchase of peace offerings does not bring with the excess funds left over after the purchase of peace offerings a Passover offering. Now if a Passover offering, in the instance of which he who consecrates funds for it brings peace offerings with the excess, is not valid when it is offered for peace offerings, peace offerings, in the instance of which he who consecrates funds for them does not bring a Passover sacrifice with the excess — is it logical that they should not be valid when brought under the designation of a Passover offering?”
- K. **[11B]** Said to him R. Joshua, “A sin offering will prove the case. For he who consecrates coins for it does not present peace offerings with the excess, but it is valid when offered under the classification of peace offerings. So too you should not be surprised that peace offerings — even though he who consecrates coins for the purchase of peace offerings does not with the excess funds present a Passover sacrifice — they should be valid when offered under the designation of a Passover sacrifice.”
- L. R. Eliezer said to him, “No, that is by no means a valid argument. For if you have stated the rule in the case of a sin offering, which is valid when offered under its proper designation as a sin offering on all other days of the year, will you say the same rule in regard to a beast designated as a Passover, which is not valid if offered under the correct designation as a Passover sacrifice on all the other days of the year [except for Passover]? Since it is not valid when it is offered even under the proper classification as a Passover offering should this take place on any other day of the year, if they slaughtered it for the purpose of other sacrifices on the fourteenth of Nisan, lo, this surely should be invalid” [T. [Pesahim 4:5-6](#)].

- VII.1** A. Simeon, brother of Azariah, says, “[If] one slaughtered them for the sake of that which is higher than they, they are valid. [If one slaughtered them] for the sake of that which is lower than they [“But if under the name of a lower grade”], they are invalid. How so? Most Holy Things which one slaughtered for the sake of [in the classification of] Lesser Holy Things are invalid. Lesser Holy Things which one slaughtered for the sake of [in the classification of] Most Holy Things are valid. The firstling and tithe which one slaughtered for the sake of [in the classification of] peace offerings are valid, and peace offerings which one slaughtered for the sake of a firstling, [or] for the sake of tithe, are invalid:”
- B. *R. Ashi repeated in the name of R. Yohanan, and R. Aha b. Raba repeated in the name of R. Yannai, “What is the scriptural foundation for the position of Simeon the brother of Azariah? It is that Scripture has said, ‘And they shall not profane the Holy Things of the children of Israel, which they raise up to the Lord’ (Lev. 22:15) — through what is at a higher classification than that originally given*

to an animal they are not profaned, but by a classification lower than that originally assigned to the beast they are indeed profaned.”

- C. *But does that verse of Scripture come to serve that particular purpose? Surely it is required in connection with what Samuel said. For Samuel said, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that one who eats wholly untithed food that is liable to the separation of tithes is subject to the death penalty? As it is said, ‘And they shall not profane the Holy Things of the children of Israel, which they raise up to the Lord’ (Lev. 22:15) — Scripture speaks of that which they are going to raise up.”*
- D. *If that were the case, Scripture could as well write, “which they have raised up.” Why use the future tense, “which they will raise up”? It is to yield both points.*

**VII.2.** A. R. Zira raised the question, “Does he take the view that they are valid but do not in any event do not propitiate, in which case he differs in only one respect, or perhaps he takes the view that they are both valid offerings and also propitiate, in which case he differs on two distinct points?”

- B. *Said Abayye, and others say, R. Zeriqa, “Come and take note: **The firstling and tithe which one slaughtered in the classification of [for the sake of] peace offerings are valid, and peace offerings which one slaughtered in the classification of a firstling, [or] of tithe, are invalid.** Now if you really imagine that in his view the offering is valid and also propitiates, then is the firstling a type of sacrifice that involves propitiation in any event? Rather, his position is that they are valid but do not in any event do not propitiate. And since the concluding clause bears the sense that they are valid but do not in any event do not propitiate, the opening clause likewise bears the sense that they are valid but do not in any event do not propitiate.”*
- C. *But how so? Why not say that the one stands as is, and the other stands as is?*
- D. *Then what does he tell us anyhow? The matter concerning the hierarchically higher and lower classifications of sanctification? Surely we have learned it when the passage states simply, **[If] one slaughtered them for the sake of that which is higher than they, they are valid. [If one slaughtered them] for the sake of that which is lower than they [“But if under the name of a lower grade”], they are invalid!***
- E. *What might you have supposed? Where you have Most Holy Things and Lesser Holy Things, then you have a case in which there are hierarchically higher and lower levels of sanctification, but where you have Lesser Holy Things and other Lesser Holy Things, you might not have supposed that the rule is the same. So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- F. *This too forms part of what the Mishnah states quite clearly when it says **Peace offerings take precedence over the firstling, because they require [two placings which are] four placings [of blood], and laying of hands, and drink offerings, and waving of the breast and thigh [M. Zeb. 10:2A]!***
- G. *That is the principal expression of the principle, while what we have before us is stated only incidentally.*

- A. The beast that was designated as a sacrifice for the Passover which one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth [of Nisan] under some classification other than that for which it was originally designated —
- B. R. Joshua declares valid,
- C. as if it were slaughtered on the thirteenth [of Nisan].
- D. Ben Beterah declares invalid,
- E. as if it were slaughtered at twilight [of the fourteenth].
- F. Said Simeon ben Azzai, “I have received a tradition from the seventy-two elder[s],
- G. “on the day on which they seated R. Eleazar b. Azariah in session,
- H. “that: all animal offerings which are eaten,
- I. “which were slaughtered not for the purpose for which they were originally designated
- J. “are fit,
- K. “but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation,
- L. “except for the Passover and the sin offering.”
- M. And Ben Azzai [thereby] added [to L] only the burnt offering.
- N. But sages did not agree with him.

- I.1** A. Said R. Eleazar said R. Oshaia, “Ben Betera would declare the case valid when an animal that had been designated as a Passover offering was slaughtered at dawn on the fourteen of Nisan for the purpose for which it had originally been designated, *because he takes the view that ‘the proper time’ for killing the Passover sacrifice is the entire day [and not only the twilight of the fourteenth]. And what is the sense of as if? Since R. Joshua made use of the expression, as if, he too also made use of the expression, as if.*”
- B. *Then instead of having them dispute a case in which the beast was slaughtered under a different classification from that for which it was originally designated, let them dispute a case in which it was slaughtered for the very purpose for which it was originally designated [Ben Batera would validate the offering, Joshua invalidate].*
- C. *Had the dispute covered a case in which it was slaughtered for the very purpose for which it was originally designated, have thought that in a case in which the animal was offered under a classification other than that for which it was originally designated. R. Joshua would concur with the position of Ben Betera since at least part of the rite was validly done. So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- D. *But surely it is written, “at dusk” (Exo. 12: 6) [so how can Oshaia regard the entire day as the proper time for killing the beast designated as a Passover offering]?*
- E. Said Ulla b. R. Ilai, “The meaning is, ‘between two evenings’ [which meaning the Hebrew can yield, thus, between the evening of the fourteenth, to dawn, and the evening of the fifteenth, consequently the whole day of the fourteenth (Freedman)].”

- F. *In respect to the daily whole offering, concerning which “at dusk” is written, will the same position pertain so that the entire day is suitable for preparing the daily whole offering?*
- G. *In that case, since it is written, “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning” (Exo. 29:39) it follows that the sense of “at dusk” must be literal.*
- H. *But might I not say that one of the lambs must be offered in the morning, and the other may be offered any time during the day?*
- I. *[The sense of Scripture is,] one in the morning and not two in the morning.*
- J. *What about the matter of lighting of the lamps, concerning which “at dusk” is stated (Exo. 30: 8) — will you say that this too may be done any time during the entire day?*
- K. *That case is exceptional, for in that matter it is written, “to burn from evening to morning” (Exo. 27:21), and it has been taught on Tannaite authority: “to burn from evening to morning” (Exo. 27:21) — supply the lamp with a sufficient measure of oil so that it may burn continually from evening to morning.*
- L. *Furthermore, you have no other form of service that is valid when performed from evening to morning except for this one.*
- M. *What about the matter of the incense, concerning which it is written, “at dusk” (Exo. 30: 8) — will you say that this too may be done any time during the entire day?*
- N. *The case of incense is exceptional [12A] for it is treated as comparable to the lighting of the lamps.*
- O. *There too it is written, “There you shall sacrifice the Passover offering at evening” (Deu. 16: 6) [which makes the matter explicit]!*
- P. *That serves to set forth the law governing the deferment of the offering, as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- Q. *Let the matters concerning which both “in the evening” and “between the evenings/at twilight” are said be given second place, after the matters in which only “between the evenings/at twilight” alone is stated [both expressions occur in connection with the Passover offering, while in regard to the daily whole offering, only one is used, so the former is to be offered up after the latter].*
- R. *But is there any class of rite concerning which, if one did the act of slaughter in the morning, you say that that is the proper time for the rite, while when the twilight comes, you say that it should be postponed [as stated at N, or is this a series of one, fabricated for the occasion]?*
- S. *Well, as a matter of fact, there is, for has not R. Yohanan said, “The law is that one recites the Prayer that is to be said at twilight and then one recites the Prayer of the Additional Service” [on the Sabbath, festivals, and New Moon, when there are morning, additional, and twilight service in that order, the additional service is to begin before the time of the afternoon service, but if one has not recited it by then, he must give priority to the twilight service, an exact analogy (Freedman)].*
- T. *Now as to “at twilight” that is written in the setting of the kindling of the lamps and in connection with the incense offering, what is the purpose of that statement?*

- U. And, furthermore, Rabbi replied to what R. Joshua said in context of R. Judah b. Betera as follows: "It is not true [that it is as though the beast had been slaughtered on the thirteen]. For if you introduce the thirteenth of Nisan, no part of which is suitable for the Passover offering, will you also make the same statement of the fourteenth of Nisan, where part of the day is fit?" *But if this is so [that Ben Batera regards the whole of the fourteenth as the proper time], then the whole of it is fit [and not only part].*
- V. [Rejecting Oshaia's thesis,] said R. Yohanan, "Ben Batera declared unfit the sacrifice of an animal designated as a Passover offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth, whether it was sacrificed within the classification into which the owner had originally designated it, as a Passover offering, or whether he did so within any other classification, since part of that day is suitable for the sacrifice of the Passover offering." [Freedman: if slaughtered in its own name, it is invalid, because the proper time is the afternoon; if not, it is invalid, because part of the day is the proper time.]
- W. *R. Abbahu ridiculed this view: "If so, then from Ben Batera's viewpoint, when is it possible for a Passover offering to be fit? If one designates the beast only now, it is to begin with dismissed; if one had designated it yesterday, it had been suitable but is now rejected."* [Freedman: if one separates the animal for a Passover offering on the morning of the fourteenth, it is fit for nothing at all then, neither for a Passover offering nor for a peace offering. Thus from the very beginning it is ineligible, and Yohanan holds that in such circumstances it can never be eligible again, even if conditions subsequently change. If one separated it the previous day, it was then eligible for a peace offering, but on the following morning it was rejected, becoming ineligible, and in the view of all rabbis, it then remains permanently rejected.]
- X. Rather, said R. Abbahu, "It must be designated after midday [Freedman: when it is actually eligible.]"
- Y. *Abayye said, "You may even maintain that one may designate the beast that morning, in the argument that the disqualification of the beast's being insufficiently mature does not pertain to that very day on which it is designated."* [Freedman: where an animal becomes eligible for a particular purpose during the day, the earlier part of the same day is not regarded as premature.]
- Z. *R., Pappa said, "You may even maintain that one may designate the beast the prior evening, in the argument that the disqualification of the beast's being insufficiently mature does not pertain to the night."*
- AA. *For a member of the household of R. Ishmael repeated as a Tannaite statement, "On the night of the eighth day after birth, a beast that belongs to the tithing year enters the corral for tithing [even though an animal to be fit for sacrifice, hence also for tithing, must be eight days old; if the tithing is at night on the eighth day, so that the beast will be eight days old the next morning, it is sent down the tithing chute; hence he disqualification of the beast's being insufficiently mature does not pertain to the night.]"*
- BB. *This, furthermore, is fully in accord with R. Aptoriqui, for R. Aptoriqui contrasted the verses as follows: "It is written, 'Then it shall be seven days*



under its dam' (Lev. 22:27), *so that the night following it is eligible; and it is written, 'But from the eighth day and thenceforth it may be accepted for an offering' (Lev. 22:27), so that on the prior night it is not eligible. So how are matters to be reconciled? On the prior night it reaches the classification of sanctification, and in the following morning it enters the classification of acceptability for sacrifice.*"

- I.2.** A. Said R. Zira to R. Abbahu, "May one then say that R. Yohanan takes the position that living animals may be permanently invalidated for offering [Freedman: for otherwise you need not answer that one separates it after midday]?"
- B. *He said to him, "Indeed so."*
- C. For said R. Yohanan, "In the case of a beast that belongs to two partners, if one of them consecrated his own half, and then he went and bought the half belonging to the other party and consecrated that part, it is indeed deemed consecrated, but it is not offered up. Still, it has the power to effect an act of substitution [with a secular beast with which it is exchanged], and the beast that is exchanged for it is in the same status.
- D. *Three rules are to be derived from this ruling.*
- E. *One may deduce, first of all, that a beast that is consecrated can be removed for ever from sacred use [and even though later on they became fit to be offered, they cannot be offered, since they have prior been suspended from use on the altar for some reason].*
- F. *And one may deduce, second, that if to begin with [at the point of its consecration] an animal is removed from sacred use, then the suspension remains valid forever.*
- G. *And you may deduce, third, [12B] that the consecration of animals that have been dedicated as to their value can be removed.*
- I.3.** A. Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, "If one [inadvertently] ate forbidden fat, and, [in penance,] set aside an animal for an offering, but [before actually sacrificing the beast] apostatized, and then repented and returned to Judaism, once the sacrifice has been put off, it has been put off [it is invalidated since apostates cannot offer sacrifices], and remains so. [It cannot now be used for the original, inadvertent sin.]"
- B. *It has been stated on Amoraic authority along these same lines:*
- C. Said R. Jeremiah said R. Abbahu said R. Yohanan, "If one [inadvertently] ate forbidden fat and in penance set aside an animal for an offering, but then lost his sanity, and then regained his sanity, once the sacrifice that has been put off, it has been put off [it is invalidated, since the man, when not in command of his senses, cannot bring the offering], and remains so [and cannot now be used for the original, inadvertent sin]."
- D. *And it is necessary [to have both teachings]. For had we learned only the former, we might have concluded that, because the man himself is responsible, through his own actions, for the sacrifice's being put off, [the animal cannot again be used], but here, where the animal has been set aside in the natural course of events, I might say that it is as if the man who had set it aside was merely sleeping [and in no way bears*

*responsibility for the postponement of the use of the animal in expiation for his sin]. [So the beast may be used.]*

- E. *And if we had learned only the present case, it is because the man has not the power to recover, but in the first case, where the man has the power to revert, one might hold [that the animal has] not [been permanently invalidated].*
- F. *Accordingly, it is necessary to have both rulings.*

**I.4.** A. *R. Jeremiah raised this question: “If one has inadvertently eaten forbidden fat and designated an animal as an offering and then a court instructed that forbidden fat is permitted but then the court retracted, what is the law? Does this constitute a case in which the animal has been rejected or does this not constitute a case in which the animal has been rejected?”*

- B. *A certain sage said to him, “When R. Yohanan undertook to announce his rulings on the principle of animals designated for use as sacrifices that have for some reason been rejected, it was this very case with which he began.*
- C. *“How come? In the instances of apostasy and insanity, it is the person that has been set aside, but the beast designated as an offering has not been set aside, but in this case it is whether or not the beast is needed as a sacrifice that has been called into question.”*

**II.1** A. **Said Simeon ben Azzai, “I have received a tradition from the seventy-two elder[s], on the day on which they seated R. Eleazar b. Azariah in session, that: all animal offerings which are eaten, which were slaughtered not for the purpose for which they were originally designated are fit, but they do not go to the owner’s credit in fulfillment of an obligation, except for the Passover and the sin offering:”**

- B. *Why does the Tannaite formulation refer specifically to **seventy-two**?*
- C. *It is because all of them were of one mind on this matter.*

**III.1** A. **And Ben Azzai added only the burnt offering. But sages did not agree with him:**

- B. *Said R. Huna, “What is the scriptural basis for Ben Azzai’s position? ‘It is a burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor to the Lord’ (Lev. 1:17) — ‘It is’ means, when it is slaughtered in the classification for which the animal was originally designated, it is valid, when it is slaughtered not in the classification for which the animal was originally designated, it is invalid.”*
- C. *But with reference to the guilt offering, “it is” also is written!*
- D. *This is stated only with reference to the point in the offering after the burning of the parts that are to be burned up.*
- E. *But in the present context as well, “it is” is stated only with reference to the point in the offering after the burning of the parts that are to be burned up.*
- F. *“It is” is written two times [in the context of the burnt offering].*
- G. *“It is” is written two times in the context of the guilt offering as well.*
- H. *Rather, Ben Azzai drew the rule on the basis of an argument a fortiori, as follows:*
- I. *if in the case of an animal designated for use as a sin offering, which, when offered, is not wholly burned up on the altar fires, if one has slaughtered the beast not*

within the classification for which it was originally designated, the offering is invalid, will that rule not pertain all the more so to a burnt offering, which is wholly burned up on the altar fires?

- J. No, as for the sin offering, the reason that the rule pertains is that it makes atonement for the original donor.
- K. But the Passover offering will prove to the contrary.
- L. What makes the Passover offering exceptional is that the time for presenting it is fixed.
- M. The sin offering proves the contrary.
- N. So we end up going around in circles, and what is particular to the one item is not distinctive to the other, and the feature distinctive to the other item is not particular to the one, but in common they have the fact that both of them are Holy Things, and if one slaughters the beast under a classification different from the original designation, the offering is null; so I will introduce the burnt offering, which is Holy Things, so that if one slaughters the beast under a classification different from the original designation, the offering is null.
- O. The operative quality that is shared among the stated items is that both of them address sins that are subject to the sanction of extirpation [which does not pertain here].
- P. *Ben Azzai [13A] did not raise the question concerning the matter of extirpation.*
- Q. *Then let him present the issue of the guilt offering as well [which is invalid when not slaughtered under the originally introduced designation, since the same analogy will work, so long as extirpation is not involved; but since he does not admit that refutation, the analogy should stand].*
- R. *The common feature in this context is that they both apply to both communal and personal offerings [which is not the case for the guilt offering, which is only a personal offering, never a communal one].*
- S. *Or if you prefer I shall concede that Ben Azzai did not raise the question concerning the matter of extirpation. But Ben Azzai had received this rule as a tradition, and when R. Huna proposed the argument a fortiori, it was solely with the intention of sharpening his disciples' wit.*

### 1:4

- A. **The animal designated as a Passover and the sin offering which one slaughtered not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated —**
- B. **the blood [of which] one received, conveyed, or tossed not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated —**
- C. **or for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and also not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated —**
- D. **or not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and also for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated —**
- E. **are unfit.**

- F. How [does one do it for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and also not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated ?
- G. For the sake of the Passover [at its time] and for the sake of peace offerings.
- H. ...not for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated and also for the purpose for which the beast was originally designated?
- I. For the sake of peace offerings and for the sake of the Passover.
- J. For an animal offering is made unfit [by improper intention or deed] in four respects:
- K. (1) in slaughtering, and (2) in receiving [the blood], and (3) in conveying [the blood], and (4) in tossing [the blood].
- L. R. Simeon declares fit in the case of [improperly] conveying [the blood].
- M. For R. Simeon did say, "It is not possible [to prepare an animal offering] without slaughtering, and without receiving [the blood] and without tossing [the blood]. But it is possible [to make an animal offering] without conveying [the blood]."
- N. "One slaughters [the animal] at the side of the altar and [forthwith, without conveying the blood at all] tosses [the blood onto the altar]."
- O. R. Eleazar says, "He who conveys [the blood] —
- P. "[if he does so] in a situation in which he has to convey [the blood], [the wrong] intention renders invalid [the act of sacrifice]. [If he does so] in a situation in which he does not have to convey [the blood], the [wrong] intention does not render [the act of sacrifice] invalid."
- I.1** A. [With reference to **For an animal offering is made unfit by improper intention or deed in four respects: (1) in slaughtering, and (2) in receiving [the blood], and (3) in conveying the blood, and (4) in tossing the blood:]** *But can an inappropriate intention or deed with respect to receive the blood disqualify the offering? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. "And they shall present" (Lev. 1: 5) — this refers to the receiving of the blood.
- C. You say that this refers to the receiving of the blood. But perhaps it speaks only of the sprinkling of the blood?
- D. When Scripture says, "And they shall dash the blood" (Lev. 1: 5), lo, reference is made to sprinkling the blood. Then how am I supposed to interpret "And they shall present" (Lev. 1: 5)? It refers to the receiving of the blood.
- E. "Aaron's sons, the priests" (Lev. 1: 5) — this indicates that the rite must be done by a valid priest,
- F. and by one who is wearing the proper clothing for service at the altar.
- G. Said R. Aqiba, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the rite must be done only by a valid priest, and by one who is wearing the proper clothing for service at the altar? Here we find reference to 'Aaron's sons,' and elsewhere, 'These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed' (Num. 3: 3). Just as that passage speaks of a valid priest, who is wearing the proper clothing for service at the altar, so the passage before us addresses the case only of a valid priest, who is wearing the proper clothing for service at the altar."

- H. Said R. Tarfon, "May I bury my sons if I have not heard a distinction between the receiving of the blood and the tossing of the blood, but I cannot myself express what that distinction is."
- I. Said R. Aqiba, "I shall set forth the required distinction. In the case of receiving the blood, the law has not treated an improper intention as equivalent to an improper deed, but in the case of tossing the blood, the law has treated an improper intention as equivalent to an improper deed."
- J. "If, further, one has received the blood outside of the proper Temple area, he is not liable to extirpation; if he tossed it outside of the proper area, he is subject to the sanction of extirpation."
- K. "If unfit priests received the blood, they are not liable on that account, but if unfit priests tossed the blood, they are culpable on that account."
- L. He said to him, "By the Temple service! You have not deviated right or left. I heard the tradition but could not explain its distinction, while you expound matters in such a way as to straighten out the tradition."
- M. With this language did he speak to him, "Aqiba, whoever leaves you is as though he had abandoned his very life."
- N. Said Raba, "There is no contradiction [between what Tarfon has as a tradition and our rule, for the one refers to making the meat an abomination through an intention [expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal] to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time, while our Mishnah-paragraph refers to an intentionality of some other sort."
- O. *"That can be seen through an analysis of the language of the Tannaite formulation itself, for it states clearly, **For an animal offering is made unfit [by improper intention or deed] in four respects, and it makes no reference to 'the sacrifice's being rendered an abomination through making the meat an abomination through an intention [expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal] to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time.'**"*
- P. *That proves it.*
- I.2.** A. But does an intention [expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal] to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time [only render the meat abominable but] not render the act of sacrifice invalid?
- B. *And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. Might one suppose that an improper intentionality [expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal] to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time should pertain only to the tossing of the blood alone? How on the basis of Scripture do we know that subject to the same improper intentionality are the acts of slaughtering the animal and receiving the blood?
- D. "And if any of the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted...it shall be an abomination" (Lev. 7:18).
- E. Scripture speaks of actions that lead to the eating of the meat.
- F. Might one suppose that I should encompass within the rule even the act of pouring out the remnants of the blood into the gutter around the altar and the act of burning up the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar?

- G. Scripture states, "...on the third day, it shall not be accepted...it shall be an abomination, nor shall it be credited to him who offers it" (Lev. 7:18).
- H. Now sprinkling the blood was covered by the general rule, and why has it been singled out? It is to make of it the basis of an analogy, so as to tell you, just as tossing the blood is distinctive in that it is an act of service and is indispensable for the attaining of atonement, so any act of service that is indispensable to attaining atonement is subject to the same rule, which then excepts the act of pouring out the remnants of the blood into the gutter around the altar and the act of burning up the parts of the beast that are to be burned on the altar, which are not indispensable to attaining atonement.
- I. **[13B]** [Reverting to the question, "But does an intention [expressed at the time of sacrificing the animal] to eat the meat of the sacrifice outside of the proper time [only render the meat abominable but] not render the act of sacrifice invalid?"] rather, in the one case, he has said, "Lo, I am slaughtering this animal on the stipulation that I shall receive its blood tomorrow," and the other case involves a priest who has said, "Lo, I am receiving the blood on the stipulation that I shall pour out the residue tomorrow" [Freedman: both are intentions that yield the result of rendering the offering abominable, and these both pertain to receiving the blood, but the former does not disqualify the rite while the latter does].
- I.3.** A. *Said a certain one of the rabbis to Raba, "But does improper intentionality not invalidate pouring out of the residue of the blood and burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: might one suppose that improper intentionality is affective only in connection with eating the meat of the offering? How on the basis of Scripture do we know that the law encompasses pouring out of the residue of the blood and burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires?"*
- B. "“And if any of the meat be at all eaten on the third day...it shall be an abomination” (Lev. 7:18) — using the intensive form, Scripture refers to two acts of eating, one the consumption by man, the other consumption by the altar [thus burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires].”
- C. *That poses no contradiction. In the one case the priest declares, “Lo, I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of pouring out the residue tomorrow” [the sacrifice is then rendered an abomination, since he intends to feed the altar its food on the next day, which is after the appointed time (Freedman)], and in the other case, he says, “Lo, I am pouring out the residue with the intention of burning the sacrificial parts on the altar tomorrow” [which does not render the offering an abomination, since the improper intentionality is not in connection with one of the four specified acts of service].*
- I.4.** A. Said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, “I have heard that improper intentionality expressed in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering [‘And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood and sprinkle of the blood’ (Lev. 4: 6)] has the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering that is prepared on the inner altar.”
- B. *Ilfa heard this. He stated it before R. Peda. He said, “Have we not derived the entire matter of improper intentionality’s rendering an offering an abomination only from the matter of peace offerings? But just as in the case of peace offerings, an*



improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has not got the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering that is prepared on the inner altar, so in the case of a sin offering, an improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has not got the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering that is prepared on the inner altar.”

- C. But have we really derived the entire matter of improper intentionality’s rendering an offering an abomination only from the matter of peace offerings? Then try this approach: just as an act of service in the classification of another classification does not remove a peace offering from the status of an abomination caused by an improper intentionality in respect to eating the meat, so an act of service in the classification of a different sacrifice from that for which the animal was originally designated will not remove the sin offering from the status of abomination, should the officiating priest express an improper intentionality [but that is simply not the case for the sin offering, since a change in the classification of the offering from that for which the beast was originally designated does disqualify the beast. So the rule governing the status of abomination affecting other sacrifices is not entirely analogous to that affecting the peace offering, so Bar Peda’s objection is null.]
- D. *Rather, what do you have to say? The matter is to be deduced from an extension [of the rule of abomination through improper intentional to other sacrifices not through analogy but through augmentative particles in the text, so the conditions of removing the other sacrifices from that status need not be the same; so the conditions for imparting that status need not be the same].*

**I.5.** A. Said R. Joshua b. Levi, “In this upper chamber I have heard that that improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering [‘And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood and sprinkle of the blood’ (Lev. 4: 6)] has the power to impart the status of an abomination.”

B. *R. Simeon b. Laqish reflected on the matter:* “Have we not derived the entire matter of improper intentionality’s rendering an offering an abomination only from the matter of peace offerings? But just as in the case of peace offerings, an improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has not got the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering that is prepared on the inner altar, so in the case of a sin offering, an improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has not got the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering.”

C. But have we really derived the entire matter of improper intentionality’s rendering an offering an abomination only from the matter of peace offerings? Then try this approach: just as an act of service in the classification of another classification does not remove a peace offering from the status of an abomination caused by an improper intentionality in respect to eating the meat, so an act of service in the classification of a different sacrifice from that for which the animal was originally designated will not remove the sin offering from the status of abomination, should the officiating priest express an improper intentionality [but that is simply not the case for the sin offering, since a change in the classification of the offering from that for which the beast was originally designated].

- D. Said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “Indeed it is the fact that we really have derived the entire matter of improper intentionality’s rendering an offering an abomination only from the matter of peace offering. Since improper intentionality to eat the meat outside of the proper place invalidates a peace offering, and doing the action for a purpose other than that for which the animal was originally designated invalidates in the case of a sin offering, just as improper intentionality on eating the meat in the wrong place, which invalidates the peace offering, also frees that offering from the possibility of classification as to an abomination, so doing the action for a purpose other than that for which the animal was originally designated, which invalidates in the case of a sin offering, also frees that offering from the possibility of classification as to an abomination.”
- E. Said R. Jeremiah, “*Right alongside that argument is located its refutation*: what is singular about intentionality to eat the meat outside of its proper place, which invalidates the peace offering, is that it applies to all sacrifices equally, but will you invoke that consideration by way of analogy to doing the action for a purpose other than that for which the animal was originally designated, a consideration that pertains to only the Passover offering and the sin offering!”
- F. “*Rather, what can you say in this matter?* Improper intentionality concerning that which may disqualify a peace offering frees it from the consideration of being rendered an abomination by reason of improper intentionality as to eating the meat outside of the proper time, while improper intentionality concerning that which is absolutely indispensable for the proper conduct subjects the offering to the possibility of being rendered an abomination by reason of improper intentionality as to eating the meat outside of the proper time.”
- G. Said R. Mari, “*We too have learned that conception in the following Tannaite statement: This is the general principle: [In] every [case in which] one (1) takes the handful of meal offering, or (2) puts it into a utensil, or (3) conveys it, or (4) offers it up, [with the improper intention] to eat something which is usually eaten [the residue] or to offer up something which is usually offered up [the meal offering — outside of its proper place, it is invalid. But extirpation does not apply to it. [If one does so with the improper intention to eat the residue or to offer up the meal offering] outside of its proper time, it is refuse. And they are liable on its account to extirpation [M. Men. 1:3N-R]. Now in respect to taking the handful of the meal offering, that is in line with the corresponding affect of slaughtering [with improper intentionality], and carrying the handful corresponds to carrying the blood, burning the handful to sprinkling of the blood. But to what does putting the handful of meal offering into a utensil correspond? Shall we say that it is analogous to receiving the blood? But are these things really similar, since in the case of receiving the blood, it comes about on its own, whereas here the priest has to take it himself and put it into the utensil. But since the rite does not suffice without placing it into the utensil, you have to conclude that it is an important component of the rite; here too, since the rite does not suffice without dipping the finger, it is part of the rite of carrying the blood to the altar.*”
- H. *Not at all! In point of fact it is analogous to receiving the blood, and, in respect to your argument, “Shall we say that it is analogous to receiving the blood? But*

*are these things really similar, since in the case of receiving the blood, it comes about on its own, whereas here the priest has to take it himself and put it into the utensil,” the answer is, since both are cases of putting something in a utensil, what difference does it make to me whether it happens on its own or whether the priest has personally to take and place the substance there?*

- I.6.** A. *May we say that the issue [of whether improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has the power to impart the status of an abomination] also was disputed among Tannaite authorities?*
- B. *For while it has been taught on Tannaite authority, “Improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has the power to impart the status of an abomination to a sin offering,”*
- C. *it also has been taught on Tannaite authority, “Improper intentionality in connection with the act of dipping the finger in the blood of the offering has not got the power to impart the status of an abomination.”*
- D. *Does this then not represent a dispute on the topic before us among Tannaite authorities?*
- E. *No, the one side represents the view of our rabbis, the other of R. Simeon [who in our Mishnah-paragraph holds that the consideration of improper intentionality that can lead to classifying the offering as an abomination does not pertain to carrying the blood anyhow, of which the dipping of the finger is a component].*
- F. *If it is R. Simeon’s view, then why focus in particular on dipping the finger? Has he not said that [14A] whatever is not offered on the outer altar, for example, peace offerings, is simply not subject to the consideration of improper intentionality that can lead to classifying the offering as an abomination?*
- G. *Rather, both opinions just now cited represent the view of our rabbis, but they do not contradict one another, for the one view pertains to sin offerings that are prepared on the outer altar, the other to sin offerings that are prepared on the inner altar.*
- H. *As to sin offerings prepared on the outer altar, that is obvious, for it is not written in their regard, “And he shall dip.”*
- I. *But it was necessary to make that point explicit, for you might have imagined maintaining that since it is written, “and he shall take,” and if an ape came and put the blood on his finger, the priest must take the blood again, it is as though “and he shall dip” were written [Freedman: since we interpret ‘he shall take’ in the sense that he must personally take the blood from the utensil, which is impossible without dipping his finger into it]. So we are informed that for that reason, “and he shall dip” is not written, so that it may imply both the one and the other [Freedman: by not saying “and he shall dip,” Scripture intimates that the dipping is not an act of service on a par with the other services, and so it is not subject to the consideration of improper intentionality leading to the status of abomination for the offering. At the same time, “and he shall take” definitely implies that the priest personally must do this, which is in fact dipping.]*

**II.1 A. R. Simeon declares fit in the case of [improper intentionally in connection with] conveying [the blood]. For R. Simeon did say, “It is not possible [to make an animal offering] without slaughtering, without receiving [the blood], and without tossing [the blood]. But it is possible [to make an animal offering] without conveying [the blood]. One [simply] slaughters [the animal] at the side of the altar and [forthwith, without conveying the blood at all] tosses [the blood onto the altar].”**

- B. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “R. Simeon concedes in the case of conveying the blood for a sin offerings prepared at the inner altar that improper intentionality in connection with conveying the blood does invalidate the offering, since it is an act of service that one cannot omit.”
- C. But has not R. Simeon said, “Priests guilty of improper intentionality concerning any offering that is not prepared on the altar outer altar like peace offerings [from which the rule concerning improper intentionality concerning eating the meat, yielding an abomination of the offering derives] are not liable on that account”?
- D. Said R. Yosé b. R. Hanina, “He concedes that the offering is nonetheless invalidated [though the priest is not liable to extirpation, as he would have been in connection with an offering prepared on the outer altar], on the strength of an argument a fortiori: if offerings prepared in a classification other than that for which the animals were originally designated are deemed valid in the case of peace offerings but invalid in connection with a sin offering, improper intentionality [expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughtering the meat] to eat the meat outside of the proper time, which invalidates offerings in the classification of peace offerings, surely should invalidate offerings in the classification of sin offerings!”
- E. *Thus we have found that improper intention, expressed by the officiating priest at the time of the slaughter of the beast, to eat the meat outside of the proper time [invalidates the offering]. How do we know the rule governing an inappropriate intention concerning doing so outside of the proper place?*
- F. If an improper intention to eat the meat outside of its proper time, expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughter, should be asked to yield such an argument, in point of fact the intentionality concerning eating the meat outside of the proper time is exceptional, because violation of the law is penalized by extirpation.
- G. If the rule concerning offering the sacrifice for a purpose other than that for which the beast was originally designated be asked to yield such an argument, in point of fact the exceptional trait of that rule is that it pertains even to a high place [and not only to the Temple in Jerusalem; but slaughtering the offering outside of Jerusalem did not disqualify the offering].
- H. But in what classifications of offering does the consideration of sacrificing the beast for some purpose other than that for which it was originally designated pertain? It is to the Passover offering and the sin offering — and the Passover offering and the sin offering to begin with were not prepared on a high place [so the refutation does not in fact stand].
- I. *If you prefer, I shall say, it is a matter of an analogy supplied by Scripture, specifically, “And if any of the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all*

eaten on the third day, it shall become an abomination” (Lev. 7:18) — “third” refers in particular to the invalidation of the offering brought about by the expressed intentionality of the officiating priest to eat the meat beyond the established time limit; “it shall become an abomination” refers to intentionality that concerns the inappropriate location for doing so. [So the same law applies to both, and the analogy need not cover every detail].

**II.2.** A. *Said Raba, “If you should want to maintain that R. Simeon concurs with his son [Eleazar b. R. Simeon], who has said, ‘The area between the porch and the altar falls into the classification of “north [of the altar],”’ then improper intentionality [expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughtering the animal concerning eating the meat at the wrong time] will produce effect when it is expressed in connection with conveying the blood of sin offerings offered on the inner altar only concerning the movement from the entrance of the porch and inward. And if you should want to maintain that R. Simeon concurs with R. Judah, who has said, ‘The whole inner part of the Temple court is classified as sanctified, then he will maintain that improper intentionality [expressed by the officiating priest at the time of slaughtering the animal concerning eating the meat at the wrong time] will produce effect when it is expressed in connection with removing the incense dishes only from the entrance of the hall containing the golden altar and outwards.*

[Freedman: A sin offering is slaughtered at the north side of the altar. Simeon can concur with his son that the northern part of the Temple court, between the hall contained the golden altar and the altar, though west of the altar, is classified as north respect to offerings that require a higher level of sanctification; Simeon holds that an improper intentionality expressed during the passage of the blood from the place of slaughtering to the hall containing the golden altar is disregarded, since that passage can have been avoided by slaughtering the beast at the entrance of that hall. But if he concurred with Yosé that the offering must be slaughtered between the northern side of the altar and the northern wall of the Temple court, conveying the blood would be indispensable, and therefore an illegitimate intention during the passage would disqualify it. If Simeon holds that the whole of the inner part of the Temple court is sanctified, so that incense can be burned there and not necessarily at the altar only, then conveying it to the altar is not an essential act, and therefore an illegitimate intention does not render the showbread abominable.]

B. *“If you should want to maintain that R. Simeon takes the view that the sanctity of the hall containing the golden altar and the entrance of the hall containing the golden altar is one and the same, then an improper intentionality expressed during the passage of the blood takes effect only if it concerns the area from the entrance to the hall containing the golden altar and outward. If you prefer to maintain that the area from within the altar and inward is classified as the inner sanctum, then an improper intentionality expressed during the passage of the blood produces no effect whatsoever, not even for a single step, except within the space to be traversed by reaching out one’s hand [standing at the entrance and stretching out the hand to the pavement, during which an improper intentionality expressed during the passage of the blood is effective]. But if you should prefer to take the*



view that conveying the blood that does not involve footsteps is not classified as conveying the blood at all, then an improper intentionality expressed during the passage of the blood is utterly null under all circumstances.”

- II.3.** A. *Said Abayye to the precept of R. Hisda, “Ask R. Hisda, what is the rule if the blood is conveyed by a non-priest?”*
- B. He said to him, “It is valid, and a verse of Scripture supports my view: ‘And they killed the Passover lamb, and the priests dashed the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them’ (2Ch. 35:11).” [Freedman: thus the priests were only required for the sprinkling, but the blood was brought to them, which is the carrying, by those who slaughtered the sacrifice, these being non-priests.]
- C. *Objected R. Sheshet, “A non-priest, priest mourning near of kin,[14B] drunk priest, or blemished priest, is unfit for receiving, conveying, or tossing the blood, and so too one who is sitting down or one who does it by the left hand.’ That refutes [the proposition offered by Abayye.]”*
- D. *But lo, R. Hisda has cited a verse of Scripture in behalf of his position!*
- E. *It means that the non-priest served the function of a mere post in the ground* [Freedman: on which the blood was placed; a priest received the blood and gave it to a non-priest, who held it until another priest took it from him and carried it to the altar.]
- II.4.** A. *Both Rabbah and R. Joseph stated, “Whether or not conveying a blood by a non-priest invalidates the offering is subject to debate between R. Simeon and rabbis. For R. Simeon said, ‘An act of service that can be omitted is not a part of the liturgy,’ so conveying of the blood by a non-priest is valid. And from the viewpoint of rabbis who differ with his principle, it is invalid.”*
- B. *Said to them Abayye, “And lo, the very act of slaughter, which is a component of the liturgy that cannot be omitted, is valid when done by a non-priest.”*
- C. *They said to him, “The act of slaughter is not a component of the liturgy [since people who are not priests may perform that, but no other part of the liturgy].”*
- D. *Now it isn’t, is it? But has not R. Zira said Rab said, “The act of slaughter of the red cow for the preparation of purification-offices when done by a non-priest is invalid”? And in that connection said R. Pappa, “The reason is that ‘Eleazar’ and ‘statute’ are stated in that regard [at Num. 2ff., so Eleazar, who was a priest, must do the act of slaughter, and ‘statute’ bears the sense that that component of the whole is not to be omitted].”*
- E. *The case of the slaughter of the red cow is exceptional, because it falls into the classification of things that are done for the upkeep of the Temple and its Holy Things [which have to be purified by the water; it is not an offering in the strict sense of the word and therefore yields no precedents for other offerings].*
- F. *But then does not an argument a fortiori follow? Namely, it is an act of service in connection with the upkeep of the Temple and its Holy Things, so will it not also form an act of service in connection with Holy Things that are offered on the altar? [Surely it will be classified as an act of service in connection with Holy Things that are offered on the altar, which service is more important than what is done for the upkeep of the Temple and its Holy Things].*



- G. *Said R. Shisha b. R. Idi, "It is analogous to that which has to do with the examination of the evidence of the presence of the skin ailment [of Lev. 13-14], which is not an act of liturgy, and yet which has to be done by a priest."*
- H. And lo, there is the case of carrying the limbs to the ramp that leads to the altar, which is an act of service that can be omitted, and yet which is invalid when done by a non-priest, in line with the verse, "And the priest [not a non-priest] shall bring near the whole and burn it upon the altar" (Lev. 1:13), and in this connection, a master has said, "This speaks of carrying the limbs to the ramp that leads to the altar."
- I. *If Scripture has revealed the rule in a given case, the rule applies in the case in which it is revealed, but if Scripture has not revealed the rule, it has not been revealed and does not apply [so no analogy is to be drawn].*
- J. *But then does not an argument a fortiori follow? Namely, if carrying the limbs to the ramp, which is not essential to achieving atonement, must be done by the priest, then how much the more will carrying the blood require a priest, for that is essential to achieving atonement.*
- K. *So too it has been stated:*
- L. Said Ulla said R. Eleazar, "Carrying by a non-priest is invalid, even according to R. Simeon."

**II.5.** A. *The question was raised: is carrying that does not involve moving a foot classified as carrying, or is it not classified as carrying?*

- B. *Come and take note: [a priest] who was sitting down...[If] he received it in his left hand, he has rendered [the sacrifice] invalid [M. Zeb. 2:1A]. So standing that is similar to sitting [that is, standing without moving] is valid.*
- C. *But perhaps "sitting" means that he drags himself along, so "standing similar to sitting" means that he moves ever so much.*
- D. *Come and take note: an Israelite slaughtered the Passover offering, and a priest received the blood, who handed it to his colleague, and his colleague to his [until the blood reached the altar; so the blood was carried with the priests' moving their feet (Freedman)].*
- E. *There too, the sense is, they moved ever so much.*
- F. *So what does the Tannaite framer of the passage tell us?*
- G. "In the multitude of people is the king's glory" (Pro. 14:28).
- H. *Come and take note: if a fit person received the blood and handed it over to an unfit one, the latter must give it back to the former [Freedman: hence carrying without using the feet is null, for otherwise, the unfit might simply be regarded as a post, on which the fit person had placed the blood, and it would not be necessary for the unfit person to return the blood to the fit one, but he could simply pass it on to another fit person].*
- I. Say: "the fit person must go back and get it."

**II.6.** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, "Carrying that does not involve moving a foot is not classified as carrying. **[15A]** But is it possible, should such a thing take place, to straighten matters out, or is it not possible to straighten matters out?" [Freedman:

Do we regard the carriage as simply having been omitted, in which case the blood can be taken back and the carriage performed, or do we regard the carriage as having been performed improperly, thus disqualifying the blood permanent, so that it cannot be repaired, and the sacrifice is consequently invalid?]

- C. *Come and take note:* if an fit person received the blood and handed it over to an unfit one, the latter must give it back to the former. *Now, granting that the fit person receives it back, still, if you think that the matter cannot be straightened out, then it already has been invalidated.*
- D. *That hardly proves a thing. For do you suppose that the non-priest is standing inside? Not at all, it means that he was standing outside* [Freedman: further away from the altar, not nearer to it; so the blood has been handed backward, and that is not an act of conveying the blood at all, so that action can be repaired. But at issue here is whether a wrongly performed act of service can be repaired.]

**II.7.** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. Said Ulla said R. Yohanan, “Carrying that does not involve moving a foot is invalid. *Therefore* it is not possible to straighten matters out.”
- C. R. Nahman objected to Ulla, “[**If**] **it [the blood] was poured onto the floor and one [then] collected it, it is invalid** [**M. Zeb. 2:1D**].” [Freedman: assuming that the blood has run down toward the altar, we have a form of carriage without moving the foot, and this can be repaired by collecting the blood].
- D. *With what sort of a case do we deal here? It is one in which the blood flowed outward [away from the altar].*
- E. *Now is the blood likely to flow outward but not inward? [It would flow everywhere.]*
- F. *It was on an incline [away from the altar].*
- G. *If you prefer, I shall explain that it flowed into a hole, or if you prefer, I shall say that the blood was thick [so did not flow at all].*
- H. *But is the Tannaite framer of the passage likely to cover all these matters? And furthermore, instead of including the matter in another chapter, namely, [**If**] **it [the blood] was poured onto the floor and one [then] collected it, it is invalid** [**M. Zeb. 2:1D**], why not have him make a distinction in the case at hand, along these lines: When does this rule apply? When the blood flowed away from the altar, but if it flowed inward, it is invalid.*
- I. *That is a valid refutation.*

**II.8.** A. *It has been stated:*

- B. *Whether or not carrying that does not involve moving a foot is valid or invalid represents a dispute between R. Simeon and rabbis. But as to carrying a substantial distance, all parties concur that it is invalid. Where there is a dispute, it concerns carrying only a small distance.*
- C. *In the West they ridiculed that allegation: what about an illegitimate intentionality expressed in connection with a sin offering made of a bird [which produces only a little blood] — how is it possible in the view of R. Simeon? If the priest expressed the improper intention before the blood had flowed, it is null; if this was after the blood had flowed, then surely the religious duty has already*

*been carried out* [for the bird is killed near the altar and the blood is squeezed right onto the altar, and this spurting is conveying the blood over a very short distance. So from Simeon's viewpoint, there can never be a disqualification by reason of improper intentionality.]

- D. *Now what sort of a question is this! Perhaps the improper intention was expressed between the moment that the blood issued and the moment that it reached the altar! For did not R. Jeremiah ask R. Zira, "What if one was sprinkling blood, and the hand of the one who was doing the sprinkling was cut off before the blood reached the air space of the altar?" And he replied, "It is invalid. Why so? Because it is indispensable to the rite that 'he shall sprinkle' and 'he shall put' the blood on the horns of the altar be properly carried out."*
- E. *When R. Pappa and R. Huna b. R. Joshua arrived from the house of the master, they said, "This is the basis for the ridicule: 'But as to carrying a substantial distance, all parties concur that it is invalid,' — Now lo, when they had their dispute, it did indeed concern carrying the blood a substantial distance. But as to conveying the blood only a small distance, there was no dispute, that that would not invalidate the offering. Where there is a dispute, it did indeed concern carrying the blood a substantial distance."*

**II.9.** A. If a non-priest conveyed the blood, and a priest brought it back, and then he went and conveyed it himself —

- B. *in that matter there was a disagreement between the sons of R. Hiyya and R. Yannai.*
- C. One party said, "It is valid."
- D. And the other party said, "It is invalid."
- E. *One party takes the view that it is possible to straighten matters out, and the other party takes the view that it is not possible to straighten matters out.*
- F. If the priest conveyed the blood and brought it back, and then a non-priest went and conveyed it —
- G. said R. Shimi bar Ashi, "In the opinion of the party who declares the rite valid in the former case, it is invalid, and in the view of the one who declares it invalid, it is valid." [Freedman: the former makes the status of the last person who carries it the determining factor, while the latter reverses it.]
- H. Raba said, "Even in the view of the one who declares the rite in the former case to be invalid, it is invalid. *How come? Because he has [15B] to bring it up to the altar.*" [Freedman: since in fact the blood was taken away from the altar, it must be brought back; this becomes an act of service and therefore disqualified if a non-priest does it].
- I. *Said R. Jeremiah to R. Ashi, "This is what R. Jeremiah of Difti said, 'Whether or not we accept the argument, "Because he has to bring it up to the altar," is subject to dispute between R. Eliezer and rabbis. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: R. Eliezer says, 'If a priest having formulated an improper intentionality conveys the blood where it is supposed to go, such an intentionality invalidates the rite; if he conveys it where it does not need to go, an illegitimate intentionality does not disqualify it.'"*

- J. And said Raba, "All parties concur that if the priest received the blood outside of the proper place and conveyed it within, it is conveying the blood to where it has to go. If he received it within and carried it outside, it is conveying the blood to where it does not have to go. Where there is a disagreement, it concerns a case in which he conveyed it inside and then carried it outside again. *One authority takes the view that he must certainly bring it up to the altar [so an improper intentionality during the second passage to the altar disqualifies it], and the other master maintains that this is not comparable to conveying the blood in the way in which it is required for the act of service* [Freedman: since there was no need in the first place to take the blood away from the altar, so an illegitimate intention during that passage does not disqualify it]."
- K. *Abayye objected*, "R. Eliezer says, 'If a priest having formulated an improper intentionality conveys the blood where it is supposed to go, such an intentionality invalidates the rite; if he conveys it where it does not need to go, an illegitimate intentionality does not disqualify it.' If he received the blood outside and brought it inside, this is an act of conveying the blood that is absolutely necessary. If he received it inside and brought it outside, this is an act of conveying the blood that is not at all necessary. Then lo, if he then went and brought it in, it is an act of conveying the blood that is necessary."
- L. *He said to him*, "If that is how the Tannaite formulation has come down, that is how matters are."