

X.

BAVLI SHABBAT CHAPTER TEN

FOLIOS 90B-96A

10:1

- A. He who put [something] away for seed, for a sample, or for a remedy and [then] took it out on the Sabbath is liable in any amount whatsoever.
- B. But any [other] person is liable on that same account only in the specified measure pertinent to [that sort of thing].
- C. [If the person] went and put it back, he is liable [should he take it out again] only in the specified measure pertinent to it.

- I.1 A. [He who put something away for seed, for a sample, or for a remedy and then took it out on the Sabbath is liable in any amount whatsoever.] *Why use the language, put [something] away? Rather, use the formulation, He who took something out for use for seed, for a sample, or for a remedy and [then] took it out on the Sabbath is liable in any amount whatsoever?*
- B. *Said Abbaye, "Here with what situation do we deal? It is a case in which one put it away and forgot the purpose for which he put it away. Now he carries it out without articulating his purpose. [91A] So what might you have supposed? That his intentionality is null [for he forgot his purpose]? Thus we are informed that, anyone who does something, he does it with his initial purpose in mind.*
- I.2 A. *Said R. Judah said Samuel, "R. Meir imposed liability even on one who carried out a single grain of wheat for sowing."*
- B. *Yeah, so what else is new? We have learned in the Mishnah, for seed — in any amount whatsoever!*

- C. *What might you otherwise have supposed? The language, in any amount whatsoever serves to exclude the standard of the volume of a dried fig, but even so, one is not culpable unless the volume still is as much as an olive's bulk. So we are informed to the contrary.*
- D. *Objected R. Isaac b. R. Judah, "Well, what about this: If he gave thought to carry out his whole house, here, too, would he not be culpable unless he carried out his whole house?"*
- E. In that case, his private intentionality is nullified by the prevailing intentionality [common sense precludes such a case].

II.1 A. But any [other] person is liable on that same account only in the specified measure pertinent to [that sort of thing]:

- B. *Our Mishnah paragraph does not accord with the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. A governing principle did R. Simeon b. Eleazar state, "In the case of anything that is not regarded as suitable for storage, the like of which in general people do not store away, but which a given individual has deemed fit for storage and has stored away, and which another party has come along and removed from storage and taken from one domain to another on the Sabbath — the party who moved the object across the line that separated the two domains has become liable by reason of the intentionality of the party who stored away this thing that is not ordinarily stored."

II.2 A. Said Raba said R. Nahman, "If someone took out the bulk of a fig of seed for eating and changed his mind and decided to use it for sowing, or if he took it out for sowing and changed his mind and decided to eat it instead, he is liable."

B. What could be more obvious! Take this route and the requisite measure has been met, take that route and the requisite measure has been met!

C. What might you otherwise have supposed? We require that the taking up and the putting down of an object be with a single coherent intent, and lo, that condition has not been met. So we are informed to the contrary.

II.3 A. Raba raised this question: "If one carried out into public domain a half fig's bulk for sowing, but it swelled and he decided to eat it, what is the rule? If you should take the position in that case that he is liable, on the grounds, 'Take this route and the requisite measure has been met, take that route and the

requisite measure has been met,' here, since at the moment at which he took the things out, it was not of the volume subject to a valid measure for eating, he should not be culpable for his action. Or perhaps, since, had he kept dumb and not formed an intention regarding it, he would have been liable by reason of the intentionality of using it for seed, here, too, he should be liable. And, further, if you should wish to say, since, had he kept dumb and not formed an intention regarding it, he would have been liable by reason of the intentionality of using it for seed, here, too, he should be liable, then, if he carried out a fig's bulk of the stuff for eating and it dried up and he changed his mind and decided to use it for sowing, what's the law? Here, it is certainly the case that, had he kept dumb and said nothing, on account of his initial intentionality he would not have become culpable? Or perhaps, we adopt as our criterion the situation now prevailing, so he should be liable? And if you should take the view that we adopt as our criterion the situation now prevailing, so he should be liable, if he took out a fig's bulk for eating and it dried up and then went and swelled up again, what is the law? Does the principle of disqualification apply for the Sabbath or does it not?" [The principle of disqualification: Once something is unfit for a certain purpose, it remains so, even if things change. When it shrivels, it becomes unfit to cause liability, being less than the requisite volume; does it remain unfit (Freedman)].

B. *These questions stand.*

II.4 A. *Raba raised this question of R. Nahman, "If one tossed an olive's bulk of food in the status of heave-offering into an unclean room, what is the law? For what purpose? If it has to do with violation of the Sabbath, we require the volume of a dried fig. If it is with respect to uncleanness, then the requisite measure that we require is an egg's bulk for edibles. In point of fact, it has to do with the Sabbath, for instance, a case in which the volume is less than an egg's bulk of food, but this quantity completes the volume to an egg's bulk of food. Then what is the issue? Since the food would effect a combination with respect to uncleanness, he also would be liable in the matter of the Sabbath? Or perhaps, in anything having to do with the Sabbath, we require the volume of a dried fig?"*

B. *He said to him, "You have learned it as a Tannaite statement in the following terms: Abba Saul says, 'As to the two loaves of bread and the show bread, the requisite volume [for one who carries them out on the Sabbath] is the volume of a dried fig. But why should this be the case? Why not say, so far as [91B] taking out this bread from the Temple area, the requisite volume is the size of*

an olive's bulk, here, too, with regard to the Sabbath, the requisite volume is the olive's bulk?"

- C. *But how are the cases parallel? In that case, once he takes the bread outside of the wall of the courtyard, it is invalidated as that which has gone forth, but culpability for violation of the Sabbath is incurred only when he carries it into public domain. Here, the violation of the Sabbath and the uncleanness take place simultaneously.*

III.1 A. [If the person] went and put it back, he is liable [should he take it out again] only in the specified measure pertinent to it:

B. *So what else is new!*

- C. *Said Abbaye, "Here with what situation do we deal? It is one in which he throws it into a storehouse, but the place where it has landed is clearly in sight. What might you have supposed? Since its place is clearly in sight, it remains subject to its original condition? [It is still destined to be sown on its own.] So we are informed that throwing it into a storehouse nullifies the seed" [and it is no longer a distinct seed but merely part of the mass (Freedman)].*

10:2

- A. **He who takes out food and puts it down on the threshold,**
B. **whether he then went and took it out, or someone else took it out,**
C. **is exempt [from liability to a sin-offering],**
D. **for he has not [completely] performed his prohibited act of labor at one time.**
E. **A basket which is full of produce, which one put on the outer [half of the] threshold,**
F. **even though the larger quantity of the produce is outside —**
G. **he is exempt, unless he takes out the entire basket.**

- I.1 A. [He who takes out food and puts it down on the threshold:]** *What is the definition of this threshold? Should I say that it is a threshold that is public domain? Then how can he be exempt, having taken something out from private to public domain? So it must be a threshold in private domain. But then, as to the statement, whether he then went and took it out, or someone else took it out, is exempt [from liability to a sin-offering], lo, what he has done is take something out from private to public domain! So it must be a threshold that is in neglected domain, and in this way we are informed that*

the operative consideration is that it has come to rest in neglected public domain. But if it had not come to rest in neglected public domain, he would have been liable.

B. *Our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the position of Ben Azzai, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. He who carries articles from a shop into the open space via a colonnade [the shop is private domain, the open space public, the colonnade is classified as a neglected portion of public domain, not equivalent to public or private domain] is liable.

C. And Ben Azzai declares him exempt.

II.1 A. A basket which is full of produce, which one put on the outer [half of the] threshold, even though the larger quantity of the produce is outside — he is exempt, unless he takes out the entire basket:

B. Said Hezekiah, “They made this statement only concerning a basket full of cucumbers or gourds [which are partly inside and partly outside], but if it were full of mustard, he would be liable.” *Therefore he takes the view that the union effected by a basket is not classified as a union.* [Freedman: We do not regard all the mustard as one because it is united by the basket and treat it the same as cucumbers and gourds.]

C. And R. Yohanan said, “Even if it is filled with mustard, he is exempt.” *Therefore he takes the view that the union effected by a basket is classified as a union.*

D. *Said R. Zira, “Our Mishnah paragraph is not in accord with Hezekiah, as a close reading will show, nor is it in accord with R. Yohanan, as a close reading will show.*

E. *“Our Mishnah paragraph is not in accord with Hezekiah, as a close reading will show: **unless he takes out the entire basket.** The operative consideration then concerns the whole basket, but if all the produce were outside, he is not culpable. Therefore he takes the view that the union effected by a basket is classified as a union.*

F. *“Nor is it in accord with R. Yohanan, as a close reading will show: **even though the larger quantity of the produce is outside.** The operative consideration then concerns the larger quantity of the produce, but as all of the produce, even though the basket ties the whole within, he would have been liable. Therefore he takes the view*

that the union effected by a basket is not classified as a union. So this is a real challenge.”

G. Hezekiah solves the problem in accord with his theory of matters, and R. Yohanan solves the problem in accord with his theory of matters.

*H. Hezekiah solves the problem in accord with his theory of matters: **unless he takes out the entire basket.** Under what circumstances? In the case of a basket full of cucumbers or gourds [which are partly inside and partly outside], but if it were full of mustard, it is treated as though he had taken out the entire basket, so he would be liable.*

*I. R. Yohanan solves the problem in accord with his theory of matters: **even though the larger quantity of the produce is outside.** And not only most of the produce, but even if all of the produce were outside, he would be exempt, **unless he takes out the entire basket.***

J. An objection was raised: He who carries out a spice peddler's basket and puts it on the outer threshold, even though most of the types of spices are outside, is not liable, unless he carries out the whole basket. In the assumption that this refers to grains of spices [thus is comparable to a basket of mustard seed], this is a problem for Hezekiah.

K. Hezekiah may say to you, “Here with what situation do we deal? With prickly shrubs” [which are not crushed up but in big pieces, like gourds or cucumbers].

*L. Objected R. Bibi bar Abbaye, “**He who steals a purse on the Sabbath is liable [to make restitution] since he had already incurred the liability on account of the theft prior to incurring [through carrying the purse from one domain to another] the liability for violating the Sabbath. If he was dragging it along and so removed it from the domain of the other in that manner, he is exempt since he did not make acquisition of the purse before he had also and simultaneously violated the Sabbath [T. B.Q. 9:19A-C].** Now if you should suppose that the union effected by a basket is classified as a valid unification of the contents of the basket, then the violation of the prohibition of theft has certainly preceded the violation of the Sabbath [for as soon as part of the purse is outside, all the money in that part is regarded as stolen].”*

M. *Well, if he carried it out with its mouth first, that would be true enough. But here with what situation do we deal? It is a case in which he dragged it out by its bottom [and since he can't get at the coins, it is not as though he has as yet stolen them].*

N. *Yeah, well, then how about the place of the seams, [92A] for, if he wanted to, he could rip the seam and take out the money!*

O. *It is a bar of metal [and so long as part of it is inside he has not committed a theft (Freedman).]*

P. *But since the bag has straps to close it, the thief can take it out up to the opening, untie the straps and take out the bar, while the straps still unite it to the inner domain so far as the Sabbath is concerned.*

Q. *We're talking about a money bag without straps, or, it has straps but they're wound around the purse.*

- II.2** A. And so said Raba, ““They made this statement only concerning a basket full of cucumbers or gourds [which are partly inside and partly outside], but if it were full of mustard, he would be liable.” *Therefore he takes the view that the union effected by a basket is not classified as a union.* [Freedman: We do not regard all the mustard as one because it is united by the basket and treat it the same as cucumbers and gourds.]
- B. And Abbaye said, “Even if it is filled with mustard, he is exempt.” *Therefore he takes the view that the union effected by a basket is classified as a union.*
- C. *Abbaye then adopted the position of Raba, and Raba adopted the position of Abbaye, with the result that two positions assigned to Abbaye stood in contradiction, and the same was so for Raba. For it has been stated:*
- D. He who carries produce into the public domain —
- E. Abbaye said, “If he did so by hand, he is liable, but if it was with a utensil, he is exempt.”
- F. And Raba said, “If he did so by hand, he is exempt, but if it was with a utensil, he is liable.”
- G. *So reverse what is attributed: by hand — he is liable!*
- H. *But haven't we learned in the Mishnah: [If] the householder put his hand outside and the beggar took [something] from it, or if [the beggar] put something into it and [the householder] brought it back inside, both of them are exempt [M. Shab. 2:1M-O]?*

- I. *That speaks of a transfer three handbreadths above and here it is below that level* [in the former case, the exemption is because the same person didn't both remove the object and put it down, not because his body has joined the produce together; in the latter case it is technically at rest (Freedman)].

10:3

- A. **He who takes [something] out, (1) whether in his right hand or in his left, (2) in his lap or (3) on his shoulder, is liable,**
- B. **for so is the manner of carrying [an object] by the children of Kohath (Num. 7: 9).**
- C. **[If he takes something out] (1) on the back of his hand, (2) on his foot, (3) in his mouth, (4) in his elbow, (5) in his ear, or (6) in his hair,**
- D. **(1) in his wallet with its mouth downward, (2) between his wallet and his cloak, (3) in the hem of his cloak, (4) in his shoe, (5) in his sandal,**
- E. **he is exempt [from liability to a sin-offering].**
- F. **For he has not carried [the object] out the way people [generally] carry out [objects].**

- I.1** A. Said R. Eleazar, "He who carries out a burden at a distance of ten handbreadths above the ground is liable, for that was how the children of Kohath carried a burden."

B. *So how do we know* the way in which the children of Kohath carried burdens? As it is written, "By the tabernacle and by the altar round about" (Num. 3:26) — Scripture thus treats as comparable the altar and the tabernacle. Just as the tabernacle was ten cubits high, so the altar was ten cubits high.

C. *And how do we know that the tabernacle itself was that high?*

D. "Ten cubits shall be the length of a board" (Exo. 26:16), "and he spread the tent over the tabernacle" (Exo. 40:19). And said Rab, "Our lord, Moses, spread it out." On that basis you learn that the Levites were ten cubits tall. *Now we have it as a tradition that any burden that is carried on staves is arranged so that a third of the weight is above the height of the porter and two-thirds below; so it turns out that it was quite elevated.* [Freedman: The altar was carried on staves on the shoulders of the Kohathites; two-thirds was below the top

of their heads; the bottom of the altar would still be a third of ten cubits, that is, three and a third cubits, above the ground, and that is considerably more than ten handbreadths.]

E. *If you prefer, I shall say, the proposition is derived from the ark, for a master has said, "The ark was nine handbreadths high and the mercy seat was one handbreadth, thus ten. Now we have it as a tradition that any burden that is carried on staves is arranged so that a third of the weight is above the height of the porter and two-thirds below; so it turns out that it was quite elevated.*

F. *Why not deduce the same fact from the case of Moses himself?*

G. *But one might maintain that Moses was exceptional, for a master has said, "The presence of God comes to rest only on a sage, who is mighty, rich, and possessed of stature."*

- I.2** A. Said Rab in the name of R. Hiyya, "He who carries out a burden on the Sabbath on his head is liable to a sin-offering, because that's how the people of Husal do it."
- B. *Yeah, so are the people of Husal the majority of the whole world? Rather, if such a statement was made, this is how it had to have been formulated:*
- C. Said Rab in the name of R. Hiyya, "A person from Husal who carries out a burden on the Sabbath on his head is liable to a sin-offering, because that's how the people of his town do it."
- D. But let his practice be treated as null in the context with accepted procedure? [This is not a usual form of carrying, so it should not be culpable.] *Rather, if such a statement was made, this is how it had to have been formulated:*
- E. He who carries out a burden on the Sabbath on his head is exempt.
- F. **[92B]** *But if you want to object, but that's what people in Husal do! — Their practice is treated as null in the context with accepted procedure? [This is not a usual form of carrying, so it should not be culpable.]*

10:4

- A. **He who intends to take out something before him, and it slipped behind him is exempt.**
- B. **[If he intended to carry it out] behind him and it slipped in front of him, he is liable.**

- C. Truly did they say, A woman who wore drawers [and took something out in them], whether in front of her or behind her, is liable,
- D. for they are likely to be moved around.
- E. R. Judah says, “Also: Letter carriers.”

I.1

- A. *What differentiates the case in which he who intends to take out something before him, and it slipped behind him that he is exempt? It is because what he intended to do has not been carried out. But if so, then, [if he intended to carry it out] behind him and it slipped in front of him, [he is liable] — here, too, what he intended to do has not been carried out!*
- B. *Said R. Eleazar, “You’re going to have to split up this rule. The one who repeated the first half of it is not responsible for the second.”*
- C. *Said Raba, “What’s the problem? Maybe in the case in which he intended to carry it before him, and it slipped behind him, this is the reason that he is exempt, because he intended to provide the object with protection of the highest order, but he turned out to provide it with protection of a diminished order. And as to the other part, [if he intended to carry it out] behind him and it slipped in front of him, [he is liable] — here is the reason that he is liable, namely, because he intended to provide the object with protection of a diminished order, but he turned out to provide it with protection of the highest order.”*
- D. *So then what’s [Eleazar’s] problem?*
- E. *The implications of a close reading of the Mishnah paragraph present him with a problem, namely:*
- F. **He who intends to take out something before him, and it slipped behind him is exempt.** *It follows that if he intended to carry it behind him and it came behind him, he would be liable. But then notice the next clause: [If he intended to carry it out] behind him and it slipped in front of him, he is liable. It follows that if he intended to carry it behind him and it worked behind him, he would not be culpable.*
- G. *[So that explains why] said R. Eleazar, “You’re going to have to split up this rule. The one who repeated the first half of it is not responsible for the second.”*
- H. *Said R. Ashi, “Still, what’s the problem? Maybe the intent was to set forth an observation about what goes without saying, namely: It is no problem to deal with the case in which he intended to carry something behind him and it slipped*

behind him, *that he is liable, since what he planned to do he has done; but even if he intended to carry it **behind him and it slipped in front of him, he is liable** — there the rule has to be spelled out. For it might have entered your mind to rule, since what he wanted to do he has not done, he is not liable; so we are informed that he intended to provide only a desultory sort of protection for the object, and he has given it a substantial sort of protection, on which account he is liable.*

- I.2** A. *Does the case in which he intended to carry something behind him and it slipped behind him represent a conflict of Tannaite opinion? For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. **He who intends to take something out in his wallet with its mouth upward and took it out in his wallet with its mouth downward, inside his wallet and took it out between his wallet and his cloak or in the neck of his cloak, is exempt; he who intends to take something out in his wallet with its mouth downward,**
- C. **R. Judah declares him liable. The sages declare him exempt.**
- D. **Said to them R. Judah, “I make one statement and they make one statement. I say to them, ‘Don’t you admit in the case of one who intends to take something out before him and it slipped around behind him that he is exempt, while if he had intentionally taken it out behind him he would have been liable?’ And they said to me, ‘Don’t you concede in the case of one who takes something out on the back of his hand, on the back of his foot, in his mouth, or in his elbow, that he is exempt, for he did not take the thing out the way people usually take things out?’ I have found no reply to their statement, and they have found no reply to mine” [T. Shab. 9:9].**

I.3 A. *Now, since he said to them, “Don’t you agree,” doesn’t it follow that rabbis hold he is not liable [in which case the dispute depends on Tannaite conflict]?*

B. *But according to your thinking, since they said to him, “Don’t you concede...,” doesn’t it follow that R. Judah declares him liable? But surely it has been taught on Tannaite authority: If he did so with the back of his hand or his foot, all parties concur that he is exempt? Rather [this is how the matter is to be read:] [If he intended to carry out an object] behind him and it slipped around behind him, all parties concur that he is liable; if he intended to carry it out with the back of*

his hand or foot, all parties concur that he is exempt. *Where there is an argument it concerns a case in which he is carrying out the object in his wallet with the mouth downward. The one authority deems the pertinent analogy to be carrying it behind him and it comes around behind him, the other compares the case to his planning to carry it out on the back of his hand or foot.*

- II.1** A. **Truly did they say, A woman who wore drawers [and took something out in them], whether in front of her or behind her, is liable, for they are likely to be moved around:**
- B. *A Tannaite statement:* Any statement involving “truly did they say” constitutes the decided law.

- III.1** A. **R. Judah says, “Also: Letter carriers”:**
- B. *A Tannaite statement:* because that’s how the state clerks do it.

10:5A-D

- A. He who takes out a loaf of bread into the public domain is liable.**
- B. [If] two people took it out, they are exempt.**
- C. [If] one person could not take it out, but two people took it out, they are liable.**
- D. And R. Simeon declares [them exempt].**

- I.1** A. *Said R. Judah said Rab, and some say, said Abbaye, and some say, it was set forth in a Tannaite statement:* If either party by himself can [carry out the loaf by himself] —
- B. R. Meir declares him liable.
- C. R. Judah and R. Simeon declare him exempt.
- D. If this one cannot do it by himself and that one cannot do it by himself —
- E. R. Judah and R. Meir declare him liable.
- F. And R. Simeon declares him exempt.
- G. If this one can do it by himself and that one cannot do it by himself, all parties concur that he is liable.

- I.2** A. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. He who carries a loaf of bread out into public domain is liable.
- C. If two carried it out —
- D. R. Meir declares him liable.

E. R. Judah says, “If one of them on his own cannot carry it out but the two of them carried it out, both of them are liable, but if not, they are exempt.”

F. And R. Simeon declares them exempt.

I.3

A. *What is the source in Scripture for this matter?*

B. *It is in line with that which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

C. “And if anyone of the common people sin unwittingly in doing any of the things...” (Lev. 4:27) — he who does the entirety of an action, and not he who does only part of it [is liable]. A single individual who performs a forbidden action is liable; two people who carry it out are exempt.

D. **How so? Two who were holding on to a pitchfork and sweeping grain, or a shuttle and pressing on it, or a quill and writing with it, or a cane, and carrying it out into public domain — might one suppose that they should be liable? Scripture states, “And if anyone of the common people sin unwittingly in doing any of the things...” (Lev. 4:27) — he who does the entirety of an action, and not he who does only part of it [is liable]. A single individual who performs a forbidden action is liable; two people who carry it out are exempt.**

E. **[93A] If two hold a round cake of pressed figs and brought it out into public domain, a beam and brought it out into public domain —**

F. **R. Judah says, “If one of them on his own cannot carry it out but the two of them carried it out, both of them are liable, but if not, they are exempt.”**

G. **And R. Simeon says, “Even though one of them by himself cannot carry it out and both of them carried it out together, the two of them are exempt. That is the purpose of the statement, ‘And if anyone of the common people sin unwittingly in doing any of the things...’ — A single individual who performs a forbidden action is liable; two people who carry it out are exempt” [T. Shab. 9:10].**

I.4

A. *So what is at issue between these authorities?*

B. *At issue is this verse of Scripture: “And if anyone of the common people sin unwittingly in doing any of the things...” (Lev. 4:27) —*

C. *R. Simeon takes the view that there are three exclusionary aspects of this verse: “A person shall sin,” “one shall sin,” “in his doing he shall sin.” One excludes a case in which one party lifts up the object and the other puts it down. One excludes a case in which this party can do the act entirely by*

himself and the other also can do it entirely by himself. *One excludes a case in which* this party cannot do the act entirely by himself and that party cannot do the work entirely by himself.

- D. And R. Judah ?
- E. *One excludes a case in which* one party lifts up the object and the other puts it down. *One excludes a case in which* this party can do the act entirely by himself and the other also can do it entirely by himself. *One excludes a case of* an individual who did an improper deed upon the instruction of a court.
- F. And R. Simeon?
- G. An individual who did an improper deed upon the instruction of a court is liable.
- H. And R. Meir?
- I. *Is the language used, “A person shall sin,” “one shall sin,” “in his doing he shall sin”?* *Only two exclusionary clauses are written, one to exclude the case in which* one party lifts up the object and the other puts it down, *and the other to exclude a case of* an individual who did an improper deed upon the instruction of a court is liable.

I.5 A. The master has said: “If this one can do it by himself and that one cannot do it by himself, all parties concur that he is liable” —

B. *So who’s he [who is liable]?*

C. *Said R. Hisda, “The one who can do the deed, for if it were the one who can’t do the deed, so what has he done anyhow?”*

D. *Said to him R. Hamnuna, “But surely the other party is helping him!”*

E. *He said to him, “‘...helping...’ is quite intangible.”*

F. *Said R. Zebid in the name of Raba, “So, too, we have learned as a Tannaite statement: [If] he was sitting on the bed, and four cloaks were under the four legs of the bed, they are unclean, because it [the bed] cannot stand on three [legs]. R. Simeon declares clean. [If] he was riding on a beast, and four cloaks were under the four hooves of the beast, they are clean, because it can stand on three [hooves]. [If] there was a single cloak under its two forelegs, under its two hind legs, under a foreleg and a hind leg, it is unclean [M. Zab. 4:7]. [Now with reference to the clause, [If] he was riding on a beast, and four cloaks were under the four hooves*

of the beast, they are clean, because it can stand on three [hooves].] why should that be the case? Lo, surely each is helping the other? So it must follow that ‘...helping...’ is quite intangible.

G. Said R. Judah of Disqarta, “In point of fact, I shall tell you: ‘helping...’ is entirely tangible, but this case is exceptional, because the animal takes the foot up entirely off the ground.”

H. But since sometimes it lifts up one foot and sometimes another, let it be comparable to a person afflicted with flux (Lev. 15) who moves around [shifting his weight from one support to the other], for haven’t we learned in the Mishnah: **A Zab who was lying on five benches, or on five bags — lengthwise, they are unclean, breadthwise, they are clean. [If] he slept — [if] there is a doubt whether he rolled over on them, they are unclean. [If] he was lying on six seats, with his two hands on two, his two feet on two, his head on one, and his body on one — unclean is only this one which is under the body. [If] he is standing on two chairs — R. Simeon says, “[If] they are far from one another, they are clean” [M. Zab. 4:4]?** So isn’t it the fact that we do maintain, ‘...helping...’ is quite intangible?

I. Said R. Pappi in the name of Raba, “So we, too, have learned as a Tannaite statement: **[93B] R. Yosé says, ‘The horse imparts uncleanness with the hind legs, the ass with his forelegs. For the horse leans on its hind legs, and the ass leans on its forelegs’ [M. Zab. 4:7].** Now why should this be the case, since the feet work together to bear the animal’s weight? Doesn’t it then follow that we say, ‘...helping...’ is quite intangible?

J. Said R. Ashi, “So we, too, have learned as a Tannaite statement: **R. Eliezer says, ‘If one foot was on a utensil and one on the pavement, one foot on a stone and one foot on the pavement, we consider the case: In any instance in which, if the utensil or the stone should be removed, the priest can yet stand on his other foot and perform the act of liturgy, then his act of liturgy is valid, but if not, his act of service is invalid’ [cf. T. Zeb. 1:5H-L].** Now why should this be the case? Lo, the feet are helping one another? So

does it not follow that we say, ‘...helping...’ is quite intangible?”

K. Said Rabina, “So we, too, have learned as a Tannaite statement: **If the priest received the blood in his right hand and the left hand helped him in the act, his act of service is valid [T. Zeb. 1:5L].** Now why should this be the case? Lo, the hands are helping one another? So does it not follow that we say, ‘...helping...’ is quite intangible?”

I.6 A. The master has said: “He who carries a loaf of bread out into public domain is liable. If two carried it out — R. Meir declares him liable” —

B. *The question was raised: Do we require that this party carry out the requisite measure to incur culpability, and that party likewise, or perhaps if together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable?*

C. R. Hisda and R. Hamnuna —

D. One said, “[We require that] this party carry out the requisite measure to incur culpability, and that party likewise.”

E. The other said, “If together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable.”

F. Said R. Pappa in the name of Raba, “So, too, we have learned as a Tannaite statement: **[If] he was sitting on the bed, and four cloaks were under the four legs of the bed, they are unclean, because it [the bed] cannot stand on three [legs] [M. Zab. 4:7].** But why should this be the case? Why not require that the standard volume of flux affect each? So it must follow, we require this condition to be met, If together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable.”

G. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, “So, too, we have learned as a Tannaite statement: **A deer which entered a house, and someone locked it in — he [who locked it in] is liable. [If] two people locked it in, they are exempt. [If] one person could not lock the door, and two people did so, they are liable. And R. Simeon declares them exempt [M. 13:6].** But why should this be the case? Why not require that the requisite actions involved in trapping the beast be carried out by each party? So it must follow, we require this condition to

be met, If together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable."

H. *Said Rabina, "So, too, we have learned as a Tannaite statement: If partners stole and slaughtered the beast, they are liable. Now why should this be the case? Why not require that the requisite action involved in slaughtering the beast be carried out by this party and also by that party? So it must follow, we require this condition to be met, If together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable."*

I. *And said R. Ashi, "So, too, we have learned as a Tannaite statement: Two who together carried out a weaver's quill are liable. Now why should this be the case? Why not require that the requisite action involved in carrying be accomplished by each? So it must follow, we require this condition to be met, If together they meet the requisite measure, they are liable."*

J. *Said R. Aha b. Raba to R. Ashi, "But maybe that is the case when the burden that has been carried by each party in carrying the object contains enough fuel to boil a lightly cooked egg?"*

K. *"If so, the Tannaite authority should tell us about a cane in general [in which case the standard that has been invoked would pertain]. Why mention one of weavers in particular?"*

L. *"But maybe it is sufficiently big so that each party to the carrying carries as much as would be sufficient to weave a cloth? So this doesn't prove a thing."*

M. *A Tannaite authority repeated before R. Nahman: "Two who carried out into public domain a weaver's cane are exempt. And R. Simeon declares them liable."*

N. *"This belongs on [an ass's] behind! [Simeon obviously rules to the contrary!] Rather, say: 'They are liable, and R. Simeon declares them exempt.'"*

10:5E-K

- E. He who takes out food in a volume less than the specified measure in a utensil is exempt even on account of [taking out] the utensil,**
- F. for the utensil is secondary to it [the food].**

- G. [He who takes out] a living person in a bed is exempt even on account of [taking out] the bed,
- H. for the bed is secondary to him.
- I. [If he took out] a corpse in a bed, he is liable.
- J. And so [one who takes out] an olive's bulk of corpse matter and an olive's bulk of carrion and a lentil's bulk of a dead creeping thing is liable.
- K. And R. Simeon declares [him] exempt.

I.1

- A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. He who takes out food in a volume sufficient to meet the specified measure — if he does so in a utensil, he is liable for taking out the food but exempt for taking out the utensil. But if the utensil was necessary for carrying out the food, he is liable also for the utensil [so he is liable on two counts].
 - C. *It is then to be inferred that he who eats two pieces of forbidden fat each of an olive's bulk in volume, in a single spell of inadvertence, he is liable on two counts! [But that is not so, even though the cases are analogous!]*
 - D. *Said R. Sheshet, "Here with what situation do we deal? It is, for instance, [94A] a case in which he acted inadvertently so far as the food was concerned but deliberately so far as the utensil was concerned."*
 - E. *Objected R. Ashi, "But the language is used, he is liable also!"*
 - F. *Rather, said R. Ashi, "It would be a case in which he acted inadvertently in both matters, but he was first informed about the one, then about the other, and what is at stake here is what is subject to dispute between R. Yohanan and R. Simeon b. Laqish."* [B. Shab. 71B: *It has been stated: If one ate two olives' bulks of forbidden fat in a single spell of inadvertence, and he became aware of the first and then again he became aware of the second — R. Yohanan said, "He is liable on two counts." R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "He is liable on only one count."*]

II.1

- A. [He who takes out] a living person in a bed is exempt even on account of [taking out] the bed, for the bed is secondary to him:
- B. *May we say that our Mishnah paragraph accords with the position of R. Nathan and not rabbis, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- C. **He who carries out into public domain any sort of domestic beast or wild animal or fowl, whether alive or dead — lo, this one is liable.**
- D. **R. Nathan says, “If they are slaughtered, he is liable, if they are alive, he is exempt” [T. **Shab. 8:34A-C**],** for a living creature is deemed to carry itself.
- E. *Said Raba, “You may even maintain that the rule before us represents the position of rabbis. Rabbis differ from R. Nathan only in the case of a wild beast, domesticated animal, or fowl, which stiffen themselves [and become dead weight (Freedman)], but as to a man, when he is alive, he carries his own weight, and hence even rabbis would concur with R. Nathan.”*
- F. *Said R. Adda bar Ahbah to Raba, “But lo, we have learned in the Mishnah: [In a place in which they are accustomed to sell small cattle to gentiles, they sell them. In a place in which they are accustomed not to sell [small cattle] to them, they do not sell them. And in no place do they sell them large cattle, calves, or foals, whether whole or lame. R. Judah permits in the case of lame ones.] And Ben Beterah permits in the case of a horse [M. **A.Z. 1:6A-E**]. And it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Ben Betera permits in the case of a horse [M. **1:6D**], which does not perform any sort of labor on the Sabbath on account of which they are liable to a sin-offering [T. **A.Z. 2:3E-H**], and said R. Yohanan, ‘Ben Betera and R. Nathan have said the same thing.’ Now if you maintain that rabbis and R. Nathan differ only with respect to an animal, beast or bird, since they stiffen themselves, then why make reference in particular to Ben Betera and R. Nathan? Surely you just said, even rabbis concur!?”*
- G. *“When R. Yohanan made that statement, he made it with respect to a horse that was designated for carrying birds.”*
- H. *Yeah, so who ever heard of a horse designated for carrying birds?!*
- I. *Sure as hell there is, the one trained for use in falconry.*
- J. *Said R. Yohanan, “But R. Nathan concurs in the case of a living human being who is tied up [for he certainly can’t carry himself if he is all trussed up].”*
- K. *Said R. Adda bar Mattenah to Abbayye, “But lo, Persians are comparable to men who are trussed up [wearing the heavy armaments that they do], and yet, said R. Yohanan, ‘Ben Betera and R. Nathan have said the same thing.’”*
- L. *In the case of the Persians, it is because of their arrogance [that they look so stiff], as in the case of a certain high official with whom the king got angry, and he ran three miles by foot [wearing the same armaments]!*

III.1 A. [If he took out] a corpse in a bed, he is liable...And R. Simeon declares [him] exempt:

- B. *Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan, and said R. Joseph said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "R. Simeon would declare exempt [94B] even one who carries out a corpse to bury it."*
- C. *Said Raba, "R. Simeon concedes in the case of one who carries out a spade for digging or a scroll of the Torah for recitation, that he is liable [since that's for his own need, not the corpse's]."*
- D. *That's pretty obvious! If this, too, were classified as labor not required for its own purpose, then what definition could there ever be of labor required for its own purpose [these objects obviously being for digging or recitation, respectively]!*
- E. *No, no, no! What might you otherwise have imagined? That liability is incurred only if the work is carried out both for the purpose of the one who does the carrying and also for the purpose for which the object is ordinarily used, for instance, a spade would have to be carried out with the purpose of making it into a metal plate, and also for digging therewith; a scroll of the Torah would have to have been carried out for the purpose of correcting any scribal errors therein and also for reading it; so we are informed that that is not the requisite dual condition at all.*

III.2 A. *There was a corpse that was lying in Daruqra. R. Nahman bar Isaac permitted carrying it out into neglected public domain. Said R. Yohanan, brother of Mar b. Rabina to R. Nahman bar Isaac, "In accord with what authority have you made this decision? Could it be in accord with R. Simeon? Well, I can concur that R. Simeon declared one exempt from having to present a sin-offering, but there is, nonetheless, a prohibition of such an action that rabbis have in any event made."*

B. *He said to him, "By God! You yourself may bring it in! Even R. Judah himself permits carrying it, [and he holds that an act of labor not needed for itself is nonetheless culpable]. Did I say that it may be carried out into public domain? I said, only into neglected public domain [which is quasi-private domain], for the dignity owing to human beings is so great that it overrides even a negative commandment of the Torah."*

IV.1 A. [And so [one who takes out] an olive's bulk of corpse matter and an olive's bulk of carrion and a lentil's bulk of a dead creeping thing is liable:]

B. *We have learned in the Mishnah there: He who removes the tokens of uncleanness or cauterizes the quick flesh transgresses a negative rule [M. Neg. 7:4A].*

C. *It has been stated:*

D. If he removed one out of two hairs, he is liable. [There is no longer a valid symptom for the skin ailment.] If it was one out of three —

E. R. Nahman said, "He is liable."

F. R. Sheshet said, "He is exempt."

G. R. Nahman said, "He is liable": *What he has done is effective, since if another hair were removed, the uncleanness afflicting him would take its leave.*

H. R. Sheshet said, "He is exempt": *Now, in any case, the uncleanness is still present [with the remaining two hairs].*

I. *Said R. Sheshet, "On what basis do I make this statement? Because we have learned in the Mishnah: And so [one who takes out] an olive's bulk of corpse matter and an olive's bulk of carrion and a lentil's bulk of a dead creeping thing is liable. That bears the implication, for a bulk half of the volume of an olive, he would be exempt. And yet, it is taught on Tannaite authority: For a bulk half of the volume of an olive, he is liable. So doesn't this mean, where the Tannaite rule is that he is liable, it is, he carries out half of an olive's bulk from a piece of an olive's bulk in volume, and where the implication is that he is exempt, it means, he carries out half the size of an olive's bulk from what is of the volume of an olive and a half?"*

J. And R. Nahman?

K. *In both cases he is liable, and what is the context of the ruling that he is exempt? That is a case in which he carries out half of an olive's bulk of corpse matter from a big corpse [Freedman: for even if another half is carried out, that makes no difference in respect to the uncleanness of the corpse itself].*

10:6A-E

- A. He who pares his fingernails with one another, or with his teeth,
- B. so, too, [if he pulled out the hair of] his (1) head, (2) moustache, or (3) beard —
- C. and so she who (1) dresses her hair, (2) puts on eye-shadow, or (3) rouges her face —
- D. R. Eliezer declares liable [for doing so on the Sabbath].
- E. And sages prohibit [doing so] because of [the principle of] Sabbath rest.

- I.1**
- A. Said R. Eleazar, “There is a difference of opinion only when one does so by hand, but if it is with an implement, all parties concur that he is liable.”
 - B. *Well, that’s not surprising; after all, in the Mishnah we learn the formulation, with one another!*
 - C. *What might you otherwise have supposed? Rabbis would also declare one exempt for using a utensil, too, and the reason that the language, with one another, is used is to show you just how far R. Eliezer is prepared to go. So we are informed to the contrary.*

- I.2**
- A. And said R. Eleazar, “There is a difference of opinion only when one does so for himself, but if he does it for another, all concur that he is exempt.”
 - B. *Well, that’s not surprising, after all, in the Mishnah we learn the formulation, his fingernails!*
 - C. *What might you otherwise have supposed? R. Eliezer would also declare one liable even if he did it for another, and the reason for the reference to his fingernails is to tell you the full extent to which rabbis are prepared to go. So we are informed to the contrary.*

- II.1**
- A. **So, too, if he pulled out the hair of his head, moustache, or beard:**
 - B. *A Tannaite statement: One who on the Sabbath removes a scissors’ nip of hair is liable [if he did so inadvertently] to a sin-offering.” And how much is “a scissors’ nip of hair”?*
 - C. Said R. Judah, “Two hairs.”
 - D. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “What is the measure of a baldness in connection with violating the law against making a bald spot?...Two hairs”! [The measure is then specific to the bald spot.]*
 - E. Say, “*Also the same minimum applies in the case of making a bald spot.*”

F. *So, too, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: He who removes on the Sabbath a scissors' nip of hair is liable. And how much is a scissors' nip of hair? Two.*

G. R. Eliezer says, "One."

H. But sages concur with R. Eliezer in the case of one who removes white hair from among black hair that he is liable for removing even one. And such an action is forbidden even on weekdays by virtue of "And a man shall not put on a woman's garment" (Deu. 22: 5) [T. **Shab. 9:12**].

II.2 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

B. **R. Simeon b. Eleazar** says, "In the case of a fingernail the greater part of which has fallen off, or shreds of skin the greater part of which has fallen off, if he removed them by hand, he is exempt; if he removed them with a utensil, lo, this one is liable" [T. **Shab. 9:12D-F**].

II.3 A. *Well, then, is there anything which, if done with a utensil, makes one liable to a sin-offering, but which to begin with is permitted to be done by hand?*

B. *Here is the sense of the statement:* If the greater part was removed by hand, it is permitted wholly to remove them; if done with a utensil, one is not liable, but it is prohibited. If the greater part was not severed, if wholly removed by hand, one is not liable, but it is prohibited; if it was removed by a utensil, one is liable to a sin-offering.

II.4 A. Said R. Judah, "The decided law accords with the position of R. Simeon b. Eleazar."

B. Said Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan, "But that is the case if they are severed toward the top, so that they are causing pain."

III.1 A. **And so she who dresses her hair, puts on eye-shadow, or rouges her face:**

B. **She who dresses her hair, puts on eye-shadow, or rouges her face — on what count is she liable?**

C. Said R. Abin said R. Yosé bar Hanina, "**she who dresses her hair — on the count of weaving, puts on eye-shadow — on the count of writing, or rouges her face — on the count of spinning.**"

- D. Said rabbis before R. Abbahu, “So is that how weaving is carried on, is that how writing is carried on, is that how spinning is carried on?” [These would all be unusual ways of performing such actions and therefore exempt.]
- E. Rather, said R. Abbahu, “To me personally did R. Yosé bar Hanina explain the matter in these terms: **[95A] She who dresses her hair** — on the count of dyeing, **puts on eye-shadow or rouges her face** — on the count of building.”
 - F. *Yeah, well, is that the way people build?*
 - G. *Well, as a matter of fact, it is, in line with what R. Simeon b. Menassia expounded: “‘And the Lord God built the rib which he took from the man into a woman, and he brought her to the man’ (Gen. 2:22) — this teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, first plaited Eve’s hair and then brought her to Adam. For so in the seashore villages they call ‘network’ by a word that uses the consonants for the word for ‘built.’”*

III.2 A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **R. Simeon b. Eleazar says, “She who plaits the hair or paints the eyes or rouges the face — if she does it to herself, she is exempt; if to someone else, she is liable.”**
- C. **And so said R. Simeon b. Eleazar in the name of R. Eliezer, “A woman should not put paint on her face, on the count of dyeing” [T. **Shab. 9:13A-D**].**
- D. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- E. **He who milks, sets milks to curdle, makes cheese — the requisite volume is the volume of a dried fig. He who sweeps the floor, lays the dust, removes loaves of honey, if he does it inadvertently, is liable to a sin-offering, if deliberately, on a festival, he is flagellated with forty lashes,” the words of R. Eliezer.**
- F. **And sages say, “In both cases it is forbidden merely as a precaution to protect Sabbath rest” [T. **Shab. 9:13F-I**].**

III.3 A. *R. Nahman bar Guria came to Nehardea. They asked him this question: “He who milks — on what count is he liable?”*

- B. He said to them, “On the count of milking.”
- C. “He who sets milk — on what count is he liable?”
- D. He said to them, “On the count of setting milk.”
- E. “He who makes cheese — on what count is he liable?”

F. He said to them, “On the count of making cheese.”

G. *They said to him, “Your master [who taught you such nonsense] is a reed cutter in a swamp.”*

H. *He came and asked at the schoolhouse. They said to him, “He who milks is liable on the count of unloading, he who sets milk is liable on the count of selecting, he who makes cheese is liable on the count of building.”*

III.4 A. **He who sweeps the floor, lays the dust, removes loaves of honey, if he does it inadvertently, is liable to a sin-offering, if deliberately, on a festival, he is flagellated with forty lashes,” the words of R. Eliezer —**

B. Said R. Eleazar, “*What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Eliezer? It is written, ‘And he dipped it in the honeycomb’ (1Sa. 14:27). So what has a forest to do with honey? But it is to teach you, just as one who plucks something from a wood on the Sabbath is liable to a sin-offering, so one who takes honey from a comb on the Sabbath is liable to a sin-offering.*”

III.5 A. *In Mehoza Amemar permitted sprinkling floors. He said, “How come rabbis have made the rule that they did? It is lest one level up holes in the earthen floor. But here there aren’t any holes in the floors.”*

III.6 A. *Raba Tosefaah came across Rabina who was suffering from the heat — others say, Mar Qashisha son of Raba came across R. Ashi who was suffering from the heat. He said to him, “Doesn’t the master accept that which has been taught on Tannaite authority: He who wants to sprinkle his house on the Sabbath may bring a trough full of water, wash his face in one corner, his hands in another, and his feet in another, and on its own the house will be sprinkled?”*

B. *He said to him, “Golly, I never thought of that.”*

III.7 A. *A Tannaite statement: A smart woman may sprinkle her house on the Sabbath [for instance, the way just now described].*

B. *But now that we accept the thinking of R. Simeon, even to begin with it is permitted to do it [without subterfuge].*

10:6F-H

- F. He who picks [something] from a pot which has a hole [in the bottom] is liable.
- G. [If he picks something from a pot] which has no hole [in the bottom], he is exempt.
- H. And R. Simeon exempts him on this account and on that account.

- I.1 A. For Raba Abbayye contrasted the following — and others say, for Rab R. Hiyya bar Rab contrasted the following: “We have learned in the Mishnah: **And R. Simeon exempts him on this account and on that account.** Therefore, it follows, from R. Simeon’s perspective, a perforated pot is disposed of in the same way as an unperforated pot. But by contradiction: R. Simeon says, ‘The sole difference between a perforated pot and one that is not perforated is **[95B]** that plants in an unperforated pot are rendered susceptible to uncleanness if water falls on them [but that is not so for those in an unperforated pot].”
- B. He said to him, “In every aspect, R. Simeon treats it as detached, but as to uncleanness that is exceptional, because the Torah used augmentative language when it comes to cleanness of plants or seeds: ‘And if anything of their carcass fall on any sowing seed which is to be sown, it is clean’ (Lev. 11:37) [and that includes a perforated pot].”
- I.2 A. A certain elder asked R. Zira, “If the root is over the hole, how does R. Simeon rule [if someone pulls up the root on the Sabbath, this root being nourished directly by the ground]?”
- B. He shut up and said not a word. Later on, however, he found him in session and teaching: “And Rabbi Simeon concedes that if the pot is perforated such that it is made insusceptible to uncleanness, [the hole being so large that the pot ceases to be a utensil] [then one is liable] [because now the contents of the pot are attached to the soil].”
- C. So he said to him, “Now I raised the question of you concerning a case in which the root of the plant was over the hole in the pot, and you didn’t say a thing to me. But can there be any question about a pot that is perforated such that it is no longer susceptible to uncleanness? [If you didn’t know about the former case, should you not be in doubt about the latter too?]”

- D. *Said Abbayye, “If such a statement of R. Zira was made, this is how it had to have been formulated: ‘And R. Simeon concedes that if the hole was such that the pot could no longer hold so much as a quarter-log of liquid, one is liable.’”*

Topical Appendix on Clay Utensils

- I.3** A. Said Raba, “There are five measurements that pertain to a clay utensil that has a hole in it: If it has a hole such that liquid flows out, it is insusceptible to receiving uncleanness on the count of being a damaged utensil, but it is still regarded as a utensil so far as use for collecting water for mixing with the ashes to form purification water; if it has a hole so that waters flow in [a bigger hole than the prior one], it is insusceptible to uncleanness such that it is no longer a utensil and so is no longer a utensil so far as use for collecting water for mixing with the ashes to form purification water, but it still is regarded as a utensil in such a way that plants that are in it are regarded as rendered susceptible to uncleanness if water touches them while they are in such a pot [though if they were attached to the ground, that water would have no affect upon them]; if it has a hole big enough for a small root to penetrate, it is then clean in that it is no longer deemed a utensil in such a way that plants that are in it are regarded as rendered susceptible to uncleanness if water touches them while they are in such a pot [now they are deemed attached to the ground, so that water would have no affect upon them], but it is still a utensil in that it can hold olives. If it has a hole big enough for olives to fall out, it is clean in that it can’t hold olives but it is still a utensil so far as holding pomegranates is concerned [and if that is its purpose, it is still susceptible to uncleanness]; if it has a hole big enough for pomegranates to fall through, it is clean and insusceptible in all regards. But still, if it is closed and sealed with a tightly sealed lid, it is still a utensil, until the greater part of the pot is broken.”
- I.4** A. Said R. Assi, “I have heard that there is a measure pertaining to a clay utensil ‘such as lets a pomegranate fall out.’”
- B. Said to him Raba, “Maybe you heard that rule only with respect to a clay utensil that is tightly sealed?” [Freedman: It affords no protection if it has a hole that big.]
- C. *But lo, it’s Raba himself who said,* But still, if it is closed and sealed with a tightly sealed lid, it is still a utensil, until the greater part of the pot is broken/
- D. *No problem, [96A] the one speaks of big ones, the other, little ones.*
- I.5** A. Said R. Ashi, “They repeat: ‘A clay utensil — the measure of a hole that renders the utensil unfit for use in collecting purification water is sufficient to

let liquid in; one that will let a liquid flow out is mentioned only in regard to whether or not it is a defective utensil.”

B. *What is the operative consideration?*

C. Said Mar Zutra b. R. Nahman, “It is because people do not say, ‘Bring a defective utensil for another defective utensil’” [Slotki: that the former should receive the leakage from the latter; a defective utensil may be so used under an otherwise sound one, since the latter is not discarded on account of a very small hole. When such a hole occurs in a defective utensil, it is completely discarded and therefore loses its status].”

I.6 A. *Said Ulla, “Two Amoraic authorities in the West disputed this matter, R. Yosé bar Abin and R. Yosé bar Zabeda. One said, ‘the requisite hole is that it be large enough to let pomegranates fall out,’ and the other said, ‘the requisite hole is that it be large enough for a small root to penetrate.’ Your mnemonic is, ‘all the same is the one who does a lot or a little.’”*

I.7 A. *Said R. Hinena bar Kahana in the name of R. Eliezer, “A clay utensil — the measure of a hole that renders it insusceptible is one large enough for olives to fall through.”*

B. *And Mar Qashisha b. Rabbah completes the statement in the name of R. Eliezer: “And lo, they are in the status of utensils made of cow shit, stone, or clay, in that they do not receive uncleanness by either the law of the Torah or the decrees of rabbis; but as to the matter of a utensil with a tightly sealed lid, it counts as a utensil until the greater portion of the vessel is broken.”*