

II

BAVLI ZEBAHIM CHAPTER TWO

FOLIOS 15B-32B

2:1A-C

- A. [15B] All animal offerings, the blood of which was received by (1) a non-priest, (2) [a priest] mourning his next of kin, (3) a [priest who was] in the status of one who had immersed on that selfsame day and was awaiting sunset to complete the rites of purification [tebul yom], (4) [a priest] lacking proper priestly garments, (5) a [priest] whose atonement is not yet complete, (6) a [priest] whose hands and feet are not washed, (7) [an] uncircumcised [priest], (8) an unclean priest, (9) [a priest] who was sitting down, (10) [a priest] standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow, — he has rendered it invalid.
- B. [If] he received it in his left hand, he has rendered [the sacrifice] invalid.
- C. R. Simeon declares valid.
- I.1** A. [All animal offerings, the blood of which was received by a non-priest — he has rendered it invalid:]
- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know the rule covering the non-priest?*
- C. *It is in line with that which Levi repeated as a Tannaite statement:*
- D. “‘Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the Holy Things of the children of Israel and do not profane my holy name’ (Lev. 22: 2) — now what does the emphatic reference to the ‘sons of Aaron’ then exclude? Shall we say that it excludes from the sacrificial cult the participation of women? But can a woman’s sacrifice be offered in a condition of uncleanness [such as the verse at hand specifies]? Obviously not! Is it to exclude the offerings of gentiles? But for them even the priestly headplate does not propitiate [inadvertent uncleanness in connection with an offering], for a master has said, ‘But in the case of sacrifices presented by gentiles, whether done in a condition of uncleanness unwittingly or deliberately, propitiation is not accomplished, so can these be offered in a condition of uncleanness? So what the verse, ‘Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the Holy Things of the children of Israel and do

not profane my holy name' (Lev. 22: 2) [must involve non-priests]." [Freedman: Since 'the children of Israel' cannot be a limitation, it is interpreted as an additional subject of 'separate,' meaning, the children of Israel, that is, non-priests, must separate themselves from the sacrifices, as otherwise they profane God's name by disqualifying the sacrifice.]

- I.2.** A. *A member of the household of R. Ishmael presented the following as a Tannaite statement: "It derives by an argument a fortiori from the rule governing a priest who is blemished.*
- B. "If a blemished priest, who has a right to eat of the sacrifice, profanes the rite, **[16A]** a non-priest, who may not eat the meat of sacrifices, surely should be subject to the rule that if he has carried out an act of sacrifice, he has profaned the rite."
- C. But the distinctive trait applying to the blemished priest is that the law treats the priest who offers the offering as equivalent to that which is offered [so a blemish disqualifies a priest as much as it disqualifies an animal].
- D. An unclean priest then proves the same point [since he may not officiate, but an animal when alive cannot become unclean and so unfit for a sacrifice].
- E. The distinctive trait of the unclean priest is that he imparts uncleanness to what he touches.
- F. Then the blemished priest will prove the same case — and we are going around in circles. But the definitive trait of the one is not the same as the definitive trait of the other, and the definitive trait of the other is not the same as the definitive trait of the one. G. But what they have in common is that they are subject to an admonition not to officiate, and if they do officiate, they profane the sacrifice. So I adduce in evidence the case of the non-priest, who also is admonished not to officiate; and so if he officiates, he will profane the rite.
- I.3.** A. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a non-priest is admonished in this regard?*
- B. *If one should propose that the admonition derives from, "that they separate themselves" (Lev. 22: 2), that verse makes reference to the very act of profanation itself. Rather it derives from the verse, "But a non-priest shall not draw nigh to you" (Num. 18: 4).*
- C. *But one may then challenge that proof on the basis of the following: what two classes of persons [a blemished priest and an unclean priest] have in common [blemished priest, unclean priest] is that they are not permitted to serve on a high place [permitted until the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem, while a non-priest was permitted to conduct the rite on a high priest, so rules governing him will differ from those governing all classes of priests].*
- D. *But do not say "the unclean priest will prove the contrary," but rather, "the priest mourning the death of the next of kin will prove the contrary," [for he could officiate at a high place but not in the Temple].*
- E. The distinguishing trait of the priest mourning the death of a close relative is that he may not eat food that has been designated as second tithe [Deu. 26:14].
- F. A blemished priest will prove to the contrary [for he may do so] — in which case we have come full circle. The distinguishing trait of the one class does not

correspond to the distinguishing trait of the other, and the distinguishing trait of the other class does not correspond to the distinguishing trait of the one. But the shared trait among them all is that they are subject to an admonition not to officiate, and if they do officiate, they profane the sacrifice. [So I shall adduce the case of the non-priest, who shares in the same admonition].

- G. *Nonetheless, one may raise the following challenge:* the shared trait among them all is that they have not been subjected to an admonition not to officiate in a rite at a high place!
- H. *Objected R. Sama b. Raba, “But who is going to tell us that the priest who has suffered a bereavement indeed is forbidden to officiate at a high place? Perhaps he is permitted to officiate at a high place!”*
- I. *R. Mesharshayya said, “Let the case be derived by an argument a fortiori from the case of a priest who officiates while sitting down. If a priest who officiates while sitting down, though he may eat of the offering while sitting, he profanes the sacrifices if he officiates while sitting, will a non-priest, who any how may not eat of the offering, profane the offering if he should officiate at all?”*
- J. But what is the distinctive characteristic that pertains to the priest who officiates at the altar while sitting down is that he is unfit to testify [just as anyone else who is seated in court may not testify, so the premise is subject to a particular restriction that does not affect the other party (Freedman)].
- K. But a disciple of a sage and gives testimony while sitting down [will prove the contrary, for his testimony is accepted]!
- L. As for the encompassing rule against giving testimony while sitting down, the reason is that such a one is unfit to give testimony [but a non-priest as such is never disqualified from giving testimony (Freedman)].
- M. And should you prose this refutation, that is, the rule is to be inferred from the cases of one who is seated while performing the offering and some one of these other cases [the bereaved priest, the unclean priest, the blemished priest], that may be refuted in a simple way: the one who is sitting while performing an act of sacrifice at a high place is forbidden on the basis of the verse of Scripture, “To stand before the Lord to minister to him” (Deu. 10: 8), meaning, before the Lord [= in the Temple of Jerusalem] you must stand, but not at a high place.

II.1 A. [a priest] mourning his next of kin:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*
- C. As it is written, “Neither shall he go out of the sanctuary, and he shall not profane the sanctuary of his God” (Lev. 21:12) — lo, a priest of another classification who has not left the sanctuary [but performed an act of service] has profaned the rite. [A high priest even when bereaved must remain in the sanctuary and will not disqualify the sacrifice, but an ordinary priest who has suffered a bereavement must leave the sanctuary and not perform an act of sacrifice].
- D. *R. Eleazar said, “It is from the following verse: ‘Behold, have they offered their sin offering and burnt offering this day before the Lord’ (Lev. 10:19). It was I [Aaron] who did the offering, which implies that if they had done the offering, it would have been proper that it was burned up and [not eaten].”* [Freedman: A he-goat was sacrificed as a sin offering on the eighth day of Aaron’s consecration,

so Lev. 8:33-(3). On that same day Aaron's sons died, so Lev. 10: 1-2, and the he goat, instead of being eaten, was burned. Moses was angry and asked whether the reason was that Aaron's other sons, Eleazar and Ethamar, had officiated in their bereavement at the loss of their brothers, to which Aaron replied with Lev. 10:19. Eleazar treats this as a rhetorical question.]

- E. *And how come R. Eleazar does not derive the same conclusion on the strength of the verse, "Neither shall he go out of the sanctuary, and he shall not profane the sanctuary of his God" (Lev. 21:12)?*
- F. *He will say to you, "But is it written, 'lo, a priest of another classification who has not left the sanctuary [but performed an act of service] has profaned the rite'?"*
- G. *And as to the other party, how come he does not derive the same conclusion on the strength of the verse, "Behold, have they offered their sin offering and burnt offering this day before the Lord" (Lev. 10:19)?*
- H. *He takes the view that it was on account of uncleanness that the offering was burned [and the operative consideration in this passage does not pertain to their being bereaved at all].*

II.2. A. *A member of the household of R. Ishmael repeated as a Tannaite formulation the following: "The rule derives by an argument from the rule that covers the blemished priest:*

- B. *"If [16B] a blemished priest, who may actually eat the meat of an offering, should officiate at the altar, he has profaned the offering. A bereaved priest, who may not eat the offering, surely should profane the offering if he should officiate!"*
- C. *"But what distinguishes the classification of blemished priests is that the law has treated blemished priests within the same rules as those that govern blemished animals [for blemishes affecting the priest and those affecting the animal correspond; that of course has no parallel for the bereaved priest, there being no bereavement imputed to animals].*
- D. *"Then let a non-priest prove the point.*
- E. *"But a non-priest is subject to a different disqualification, namely, he has no remedy [for he can never be healed of the trait that disqualifies him].*
- F. *"But a blemished priest can then prove the point — in which case we have come full circle. The distinguishing trait of the one class does not correspond to the distinguishing trait of the other, and the distinguishing trait of the other class does not correspond to the distinguishing trait of the one. But the shared trait among them all is that both are subject to admonition not to officiate at the altar, and if they do do so, they profane the offering. So I present the case of the bereaved priest, who also is admonished not to officiate, so if he does officiate at the altar, he too will profane the offering."*
- G. *And precisely where is he admonished not to officiate? Shall we say that it is in the following text, "Neither shall he go out of the sanctuary"?*
- H. *But that verse pertains itself to profanation [and if you treat it as speaking of an ordinary priest, not a high priest, there is no need to introduce the argument a fortiori (Freedman)].*

- I. *Rather, the answer is at the verse, “Behold, have they offered” [as explained above], in which case the authority at hand takes the view is that the offering was burned up on account of their having made it while they were bereaved.*
- J. *But the proposed argument may be refuted in this way:*
- K. The trait common to both classes of priests is that no exception is made to the encompassing rule [that a non-priest and a blemished priest may not officiate at the altar, but a high priest is exceptional in that even when bereaved, he may officiate].
- L. Then let an analogy drawn from the case of the unclean priest prove the point [Freedman: for there is an exception in his case, if a majority of the people is unclean on the eve of Passover, they offer the Paschal lamb in a state of uncleanness].
- M. But an unclean priest imparts uncleanness to the offering.
- N. But the other classes of priests prove the point — in which case we have come full circle. The distinguishing trait of the one class does not correspond to the distinguishing trait of the other, and the distinguishing trait of the other class does not correspond to the distinguishing trait of the one. But the shared trait among them all is that they are subject to admonition.
- O. *But this too can be refuted:* what they have in common is that there is no exception made to the prohibition that governs such as would favor a high priest in connection with an offering made in behalf of an individual [the Passover offering is classified as an offering made in behalf of an individual].
- P. *Nonetheless, the category of uncleanness’s being forbidden still pertains [that is, an exception to the prohibition of uncleanness in connection with an offering is made, in the case of the Passover offering].*

II.3. A. R. Mesharshayya said, “The rule may be derived from an argument *a fortiori* resting on the case of a priest who officiates while sitting down, namely:

- B. “if a priest, who may eat the offering while sitting down, profanes the sacrifice if he officiates while sitting down, a bereaved priest, who may not eat the offering at all, surely should profane the offering if he should officiate!
- C. “But the operative consideration in the case of the priest who is sitting down is the simple fact that, if he were sitting down in a court, he would be invalidated for giving testimony.
- D. “A disciple of the sage forms an exception to that rule, [since he may give testimony while sitting down].
- E. “As for the classification of all those who are sitting down, the operative consideration is that in such a position, one may not testify.
- F. “*The general rule covering the prohibition of sitting down does not yield a refutation. And if you should maintain that you can refute the argument on the basis of that matter, then you may reply that the rule derives from both the case of one who is sitting down and also from one of the others [as above].*”

II.4. A. All animal offerings, the blood of which [a priest] mourning his next of kin received — he has rendered it invalid:

- B. Said Raba, “This rule has been repeated only in connection with an offering in behalf of an individual, but in the case of a sacrifice performed in behalf of the

community, it is accepted as a valid act of propitiation through the medium of the headplate worn by the high priest.

- C. “It is based on an argument a fortiori from the case of uncleanness: if an offering made in a condition of uncleanness, which is not treated as exceptional and permitted when a high priest performs the rite in connection with an offering of an individual, is treated as an act that is exceptional and permitted when done by an ordinary priest in connection with an offering made in behalf of the community, an act of sacrifice done in a state of bereavement, which is treated as exceptional and permitted when done by a high priest in regard to an offering done in behalf of an individual, surely should be treated as exceptional and permitted when done by an ordinary priest in connection with an offering made in behalf of the community!”
- D. *To this argument an objection was raised by Raba bar Ahilai, “But do not introduce at all the remission of the prohibition of the bereaved high priest in the case of an offering made in behalf of an individual, and that on the basis of an argument a fortiori, as follows: if the prohibition of uncleanness in the case of a high priest who is making an offering in behalf of an individual has not been remitted, though that same prohibition is remitted in the case of an ordinary priest who is making a public sacrifice, then surely the prohibition of performing the rite while in a state of bereavement, which is not remitted for an ordinary priest who is making a sacrifice in behalf of the community, should not be raised for a high priest who is preparing an offering for an individual!”*
- E. But the prohibition of uncleanness affecting a high priest in the case of a sacrifice in behalf of an individual should be remitted on the basis of an argument a fortiori, as follows: if the prohibition of officiation by a bereaved priest is not remitted when an ordinary priest is officiating at an offering in behalf of the community, but it is remitted in the case of a high priest who is officiating in behalf of an individual, then the prohibition of uncleanness, which is remitted in the case of an ordinary priest who is officiating at an offering in behalf of the community surely should be remitted when a high priest is officiating at an offering in behalf of an individual!
- F. But perhaps the remission of the prohibition of uncleanness in the case of an ordinary priest who is officiating at an offering in behalf of the community should not be remitted at all, and that is on the basis of an argument a fortiori, as follows:
- G. if the prohibition of the participation of a bereaved priest, which is remitted when a high priest is officiating over an offering in behalf of an individual, is not remitted when an ordinary priest is officiating in behalf of the community, the prohibition of uncleanness, which is not remitted in the case of a high priest who is officiating over an offering in behalf of an individual, should surely not be remitted when it comes to an ordinary priest who is performing an offering in behalf of the community!
- H. **[17A]** *Rather, one may raise an objection in one aspect, and one can raise an objection in the opposite, and each one will just have to stand in place.* [Freedman, so that each law is assumed to be without exceptions. Thus when Scripture permits bereavement to a high priest, it applies to both private and public sacrifices, while it is forbidden to an ordinary priest in both contexts; when uncleanness is forbidden in the case of a private sacrifice, the interdict applies to

the high priest also; on the other hand, when it is permitted in the case of public sacrifices, that applies to an ordinary priest too.]

III.1 A. a [priest who was] in the status of one who had immersed on that selfsame day and was awaiting sunset to complete the rites of purification [tebul yom]:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*
- C. *It is in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- D. R. Simai says, “Whence in Scripture do we find an indication that if a priest awaiting sunset for the completion of his rite of purification performed an act of service, he has profaned [the offering that he has made for the cult]?”
- E. “Scripture says, ‘They shall be holy to their God and not profane the name of their God’ (Lev. 21: 6).
- F. *“If [because we have already proved the matter on another basis] that verse cannot refer to an unclean priest who served at the altar, for we have derived the fact from the reference to ‘that they separate themselves’ (Lev. 22: 2), apply it to the matter of a priest’s serving at the altar on the day on which he has immersed but prior to sunset.”*
- G. *But why not apply the verse to the matter of making baldness and shaving off the corners of the beard [as at Lev. 21:5. Freedman: perhaps Scripture teaches that a priest who violates these prohibitions profanes the sacrifice at which he officiates]?*
- H. *The reason is that if a priest who officiates while awaiting sunset for the completion of his rite of purification performed an act of service, he is liable to the death penalty.*
- I. *And how do we know that fact?*
- J. We further derive the sense of “profane” here from the sense of “profane” with reference to heave-offering. Just as in that matter, the death penalty is invoked, so here too the death penalty is invoked. On who is unfit to eat food in the classification of priestly rations profanes the act of service that he performs, while one who is not unfit to eat food in the status of heave offering does not profane the act of service that he performs.

III.2. A. Said Rabbah, “How come Scripture has specified the rule item by item covering the unclean priest, the priest who has performed an act of purification and awaits sunset to complete the rite of purification, and the priest who has not yet fully carried out his required rite of atonement? [These fall into the same classification, so a rule affecting the one applies to the other two. Why make them all explicit?]”

- B. *“All were required [since each bears its own distinctive traits as well]. For if Scripture had made reference only to the unclean priest who officiates, I would have said that he alone disqualifies the offering, because he imparts uncleanness to it. [The other cases could not have been derived from that case.] If the law were stated with reference only to the priest awaiting sunset to complete the process of purification, then the priest whose atonement rites had not yet been carried out could not have been derived from it, since the former may not eat food that has been designated as priestly rations, while the latter can. If the rule had been stated only with reference to the priest who has not yet carried out his atonement rites, a priest awaiting sunset for the completion of his purification rite*

cannot have been derived from that case, since the former has omitted a positive action, while the latter can do nothing but wait. [So all three cases had to be made explicit, each for its own limiting factor]."

- C. *Well, granting that the rule cannot have been derived from a single case, then how about deriving one case from two of the others [and still not specify all three of them?]*
- D. *"Which one can have been omitted by Scripture? If Scripture had not made explicit reference to the priest who has not yet carried out his rites of atonement, and the rule then been proposed on the basis of an analogy deriving from the other two cases, then it would have been argued that the distinguishing traits that pertain to the other classifications of priest is that those priests in the specified classifications are unfit to eat food that has been designated as priestly rations."*
- E. *But if Scripture had not made reference to the case of the priest who has immersed on the selfsame day and awaits sunset for his purification-rite to be completed, with the rule governing that case from the other two. For what sort of a challenge can you have raised? That the distinguishing traits of the other two is that what is lacking in their cases is an affirmative action [which does not apply to this priest]? But in the end that is a pretty weak argument, for the uncleanness affecting a priest in the classification of one who has not yet completed atonement rites is less than that of the priest awaiting sunset, for the latter has to wait for sunset but the former does not, so why must Scripture indicate the laws for all three [Freedman]?*
- F. **[17B]** *[Rabbah] takes the view that a priest who has not yet completed his atonement rites is in the same classification as one afflicted with the flux-uncleanness specified at Lev. 15 [Freedman: until the one lacking the completion of atonement rites has presented the required sacrifice, not only must he not partake of the meat of sacrifices, but he incurs extirpation if he does so, just as a person afflicted with flux uncleanness who has not had his immersion will].*
- G. *Whether a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness who has not yet completed his atonement rite is in the same status as a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness is itself subject to dispute among Tannaite statements.*
- H. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. *If the red cow [Num. 19] has been burned by a bereaved priest or one who has not completed his atonement rite, it is still fit.*
- J. *Joseph the Babylonian said, "If a bereaved priest did so, it is fit, but if one who has not yet completed his atonement rites does it, it is unfit."*
- K. *Now is it not concerning the following that the dispute is framed? One authority takes the position that a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness who has not yet completed his atonement rite is in the same status as a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness, and the other authority denies that a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness who has not yet completed his atonement rite is in the same status as a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness.*

- L. *Not at all, for all parties concur that a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness who has not yet completed his atonement rite is in the same status as a person afflicted with flux-uncleanness. But here this is what is at issue:*
- M. It is written, “And the clean person shall sprinkle upon the unclean” (Num. 19:19) — which bears the inference that he is unclean, and that proves that one who awaits the sunset to complete the purification rite is fit to officiate at the sacrifice of the red cow.
- N. *And in this context, one authority takes the view that the same rule applies to every other classification of uncleanness that the Torah sets forth, and the other authority takes the position that the rule applies only to uncleanness dealt with in this chapter alone [which is, corpse uncleanness].*
- O. *It follows that a bereaved priest and a priest awaiting sunset for the completion of his rites of purification, who was made unclean to begin with through a dead creeping thing, each of them subject to a less stringent form of uncleanness, are derived from an argument a minori from the case of the priest who has immersed and completed his rite of purification except for the setting of the sun who was made unclean to begin with through a corpse. But a person affected by flux-uncleanness who now has not yet completed his atonement rite cannot be derived from the same argument, since he is subject to a more stringent form of uncleanness, since the uncleanness affecting him has derived not from an external source but from the workings of his own body.*

IV.1 A. [a priest] lacking proper priestly garments:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we derive this rule?*
- C. *Said R. Abbahu said R. Yohanan (and some attribute it to the name of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon) “It is because Scripture has said, ‘And you shall put coats on them and you shall gird them with girdles...and the priest’s office shall be theirs forever...’ (Exo. 29: 9).*
- D. *“When their garments are upon them, their status as priests applies to them. When their garments are not on them, their status as priests does not apply to them, and they are deemed non-priests,[and a master has said, ‘A non-priest who served at the altar is subject to the death penalty.’]”*
- E. *But does the rule derive from this proof? Surely it derives from another proof altogether.*
- F. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- G. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that those who are drunk who have performed an act of service have profaned the cult?
- H. Scripture states, “Do not drink wine or strong drink...lest you die...that you may differentiate the holy from the profane” (Lev. 10: 9).
- I. And how on the basis of Scripture do we know that the same rule applies to one who is not wearing the proper priestly garments and to one who had not washed his hands and feet?

- J. [18A] Scripture states, “statute” in connection with each item, serving to establish an analogy between them [“it shall be a statute for ever,” as against the same usage in regard to washing hands and feet, at Exo. 30:21].
- K. *If the proof had derived from that demonstration, I might have come to the false conclusion that the rule applies only to an act of service parallel to one which, if performed by a non-priest, would yield the death penalty. But in the case of an act of service of a classification of one that, if performed by a non-priest, would not yield the death penalty, I should have concluded that the rule does not apply. So we are informed by this proof [that that is not the case, and the rule applies throughout].*
- L. *So we have found the rule covering one wh lacks priestly garments. How do we know it pertains to one who is drunk with wine?*
- M. As before, Scripture states, “statute” in connection with the one who lacks the proper priestly garments, serving to establish an analogy between them.
- N. *But the Tannaite authority derives it from the rule, “that you may differentiate....”?*
- O. *That was before he proved the existence of a governing analogy.*
- P. *But the Tannaite authority has derived the rule governing one wh lacks the priestly garments from the rule of the drunken priest!*
- Q. *This is the sense of the matter:*
- S. How on the basis of Scripture do we know that there is no distinction whatsoever between the classification of priests who lack the proper priestly garments and the classification of the priests who are drunk and the classification of priests who have not yet washed their hands and feet?
- T. Scripture states “statute” in connection with each one, and that usage serves to establish a governing analogy.
- U. Then why say, “to differentiate...”?
- V. *It is in accord with Rab, for Rab would not appoint an interpreter to amplify his teaching from one festival day to the next on account of drunkenness [so he would give his speech only on the next day, when the wine will have worn off; he learned this from the verse about differentiating holy from profane, which he read to mean that one must not drink before teaching the Torah through which differentiating between holy and profane is taught, so Freedman].*
- W. *Still, is the rule derived from this verse of Scripture? Surely it derives from the following: “And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire upon the altar” (Lev. 1: 7), meaning, in his status as a priest, which teaches that if a high priest put on the garments that belong to an ordinary priest and performed an act of service, his act of service is null.*
- X. *If the deduction had derived from the prior verse, I should have maintained that the rule applies only to an act of service that is essential for completing atonement, but not to an act of service that is not essential for atonement.*
- Y. *And still, it may derive not from this passage but from the following, specifically: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall lay the pieces” (Lev. 1: 8), which means, the priests in their status as priests, on the basis of which we derive the rule that if an*

ordinary priest had put on the garments of a high priest and performed an act of service, his act of service is null.

Z. *From that passage I might have argued that the rule pertains only in a case in which one has not put on sufficient garments [a high priest wearing those of an ordinary priest], but not if one has put on too many. So we are informed that that is not a correct inference.*

IV.2. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. If the priestly garments trailed on the floor or did not reach the floor, if they were threadbare, and a priest officiated while wearing them, his act of service is valid. If he put on two pairs of pants, two girdles, if one garment was lacking, or if there was one too many, or if he had a bandage on a wound in his body, [18B] or if his garments were smeared or torn, and he performed an act of service, his act of service is invalid.
- C. Said R. Judah said Samuel, “If the garments were trailing, they are fit; if they do not reach the floor, they are unfit.”
- D. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: or did not reach the floor, ... a priest officiated while wearing them, his act of service is valid?*
- E. *Said Rami b. Hama, “There is no contradiction.. In the latter case, he has hitched the pant up by the girdle [but the pants are long enough to reach the ground], but in the former case, to begin with they are not long enough.”*
- F. Rab said, “Both the one and the other are unfit.”

IV.3. A. *R. Huna visited Argiza. His host’s son asked the following question to him: “Did not Samuel say, ‘If the garments were trailing, they are fit; if they do not reach the floor, they are unfit’? But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘or did not reach the floor, ... a priest officiated while wearing them, his act of service is valid’?”*

- B. *He said to him, “Ignore that item, for Rami b. Hama has already dealt with it.”*
- C. *But so far as Rab is concerned, there is a problem. And if you should say, ‘what is the sense of “trailing”?’ It is those that are held up by the girdle, for the girdle diminishes the length — then there is the problem with the garments that do not reach the ground at all.*
- D. *Said R. Zera, “Rab treats both as the same: ‘trailing garments that are held up by the girdle are fit.’”*

IV.4. A. *Said R. Jeremiah of Difti, “The rule governing trailing garments that that were not lifted up is subject to a dispute among Tannaite authorities. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:”*

- B. “You shall make yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your garment” (Deu. 22:12) —
- C. “Four” but not three. [Freedman: a garment of three corners only, the fourth being rounded, so that it is not a corner, is exempt.]
- D. Or perhaps the sense is only “four” but not five?

- E. When Scripture says, "...with which you cover yourself" (Deu. 22:12), lo, it refers to a garment of five corners. So how am I to interpret "four"? The meaning must be, "Four" but not three.
- F. How come you determine to include a five-cornered garment but exclude a three cornered one?
- G. I encompass a five-cornered garment because four is covered by five, but I omit a three cornered one, because three does not cover four.
- H. *By contrast, it is taught by yet another statement on Tannaite authority:*
- I. "You shall make yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your garment" (Deu. 22:12) —
- J. "Four," not three; "four," not five.
- K. *Is it not in the following matter that the two versions conflict? One authority takes the position that the additional corner is treated as present, the other takes the view that the additional corner is treated as though it were null [Freedman: and the same principle would apply to priestly garments that trail; one holds that the superfluous length is as non-existent, and so they are fit; while the other maintains that they are as existent and therefore unfit].*
- L. *Not at all. All parties concur that the additional corner is treated as present, but the present case is exceptional, because it is Scripture itself that encompasses the garment of five corners when it says, "...with which you cover yourself" (Deu. 22:12).*
- M. *And as to the other party, to what issue does he assign that same phrase, "...with which you cover yourself" (Deu. 22:12)?*
- N. *He requires it in line with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- O. "...with which you cover yourself" (Deu. 22:12) —
- P. This excludes pajamas [clothing that one wears by night, which is not subject to the requirement of show-fringes].
- Q. But perhaps it serves only to exclude what is worn by a blind man.
- R. When Scripture says, "...with which you cover yourself" (Deu. 22:12), it makes reference also to what a blind man is wearing. How then do I interpret the phrase, "that you may look upon it"? That phrase excludes pajamas.
- S. So how come do you include within the requirement of the law what a blind man wears but exclude pajamas?
- T. I include what a blind man wears, because such a garment surely can be seen by other people, but I exclude pajamas, because [by night] no one sees these.
- U. *And as to the other party?*
- V. *He derives this same conclusion from "wherewith."*
- W. *And the other party?*
- X. *He does not interpret the language, "wherewith" at all.*

Topical Appendix on the Rules Governing the Priestly Garments

- IV.5.** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. "[And the priest shall put on his garment of] linen:"
- C. this teaches that the garments are to be made of linen.

- D. "linen."
- E. this teaches that the garments are to be new.
- F. "linen."
- G. this teaches that the garments are to be of twisted thread.
- H. "linen."
- I. this teaches that the thread must be sixfold.
- J. "linen."
- K. this teaches that the unconsecrated clothing is not to be worn with the priestly garments.
- L. *Said Abayye to R. Joseph, "As to the formulation, "[And the priest shall put on his garment of] linen," this teaches that the garments are to be made of linen,' lo, this serves to teach us that the garments must be made of linen and of no other material. But when the passage proceeds, "linen, " this teaches that the garments are to be new,' what does the passage tell us? That the garments must be new and not worn out? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority, 'Worn-out garments are fit'?"*
- M. *He said to him, "And within your own premise, the portion of the passage that states, "linen," this teaches that the thread must be sixfold' [also poses a problem], for the cited word surely means that each thread is separate [and need not be twisted sixfold]. But this is the sense of the passage: the garments that are subject to discussion here with the word 'linen' have to be made of linen, and new, and of twisted thread, and of thread that is six fold. Some of these rules, to be sure, are given to define the correct fulfillment of the religious duty, others are absolutely indispensable."*

IV.6. A. *And how do we know that the word translated linen actually bears the meaning that it must be flax linen?*

- B. Said R. Joseph b. R. Hanina, "[Since the Hebrew word bears the sense, further, of separate and individual], it must be something that grows from the ground stalk by stalk."
- C. *But might I not say that it means wool?*
- D. *Wool splits.*
- E. *So flax splits too.*
- F. *It splits when it is beaten.*
- G. *Rabina said, "Proof of the proposition derives from the following: 'They shall have linen turbans on their heads and shall have linen breeches upon their loins, they shall not gird themselves with anything that causes sweat' (Eze. 44:18)."*
- H. *Said R. Ashi to Rabina, "So until Ezekiel came along and made that statement, how did we know the correct rule?"*
- I. "According to your reasoning, when R. Hisda made his statement, 'This matter we have not learned from the Torah of our lord, Moses, but from the teachings of Ezekiel b. Buzi we have learned it, "No alien, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter my sanctuary" (Eze. 44: 9),' — until Ezekiel came along and made that

statement, how did we know the correct rule? Rather, it is a tradition that was handed on, and Ezekiel came along and supplied it with support from Scripture. Here too, it is a tradition that was handed on, and Ezekiel came along and supplied it with support from Scripture.”

IV.7. A. *What is the meaning of the statement, “...they shall not gird themselves with anything that causes sweat” (Eze. 44:18)?*

B. Said Abayye, “They should not gird themselves in a place from which they sweat [that is, where the flesh folds over flesh and causes perspiration (Freedman)].”

C. *That is in accord with what is taught on Tannaite authority:*

D. When they gird themselves, they should not do below the loins or above the elbows, but **[19A]** only in the place that corresponds to the elbows.

IV.8. A. *Said R. Ashi, “Said to me Huna bar Nathan, ‘Once I was standing before King Izdegard, and my girdle was high up, so he pulled it down. He said to me, “Concerning you it is written, “And you shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Eze. 19: 6).*

B. *“When I came before Amemar, he said to me, “Through you is carried out the text, ‘And kings shall be your foster-fathers’ (Isa. 49:23).””*

IV.9. A. *There we have learned in the Mishnah: A priest who [on the Sabbath, when healing is prohibited except to save a life] hurt his finger — one ties reed grass around it in the Temple but not in the provinces. But if it is to remove blood, here and there it is prohibited [M. Erub. 10:14A-C].*

B. Said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, “This rule pertains only to use of a reed, but as to a small belt, that would constitute an excess piece of clothing [and may not be used for that reason].”

C. And R. Yohanan said, “That rule that an excess of clothing disqualifies applies only when the further garment would be worn where garments ordinarily are worn, but if not where garments are ordinarily worn, then they would not be an excess of clothing [and even the use of a small belt then would be permitted].”

D. *But why not derive the rule that use of such a thing is forbidden on the count of its interposing [[between the hand of the priest and the sacrificial beast, which he must directly touch, and not through an interposing garment]?*

- E. *At issue is the left hand [which is not used], or even the right hand but not in a place on the hand at which the act of service takes place. And the cited authorities differ concerning the statement made by Raba.*
- F. For said Raba said R. Hisda, “In a place in which one wears garments, the presence of even a single excess thread serves as an improper interposition, but not in a place in which the priest wears the prescribed garments, a piece of clothing three by three fingerbreadths may interpose, but one of less than that size does not interpose at all.”
- G. *Now so far as R. Yohanan is concerned, Raba’s statement assuredly forms a contradiction [since he makes no distinction between where garments are worn and where not], but so far as R. Judah b. R. Hiyya is concerned, does there have to be a point of contradiction [since a small belt is less than the requisite measure of three by three fingerbreadths]?*
- H. *The case of a small belt is exceptional, since it is taken into account [being a complete piece of clothing, even smaller than the usual dimensions].*
- I. *Another version of the same matter:*
- J. Said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, “This rule pertains only to use of a reed, but as to a small belt, that would constitute an excess piece of clothing [and may not be used for that reason].”
- K. And R. Yohanan said, “That rule that an excess of clothing disqualifies applies only when a piece of clothing less than three fingerbreadths square is located where garments ordinarily are worn, but if not where garments are ordinarily worn, then if it is three fingerbreadths square, it interposes, but if less, it does not interpose.”
- L. *And that is in line with the statement made by Raba.* [For said Raba said R. Hisda, “In a place in which one wears garments, the presence of even a single excess thread serves as an improper interposition, but not in a place in which the priest wears the prescribed garments, a piece of clothing three by three fingerbreadths may interpose, but one of less than that size does not interpose at all.”]

- M. *Shall we then say that Raba's statement assuredly forms a contradiction with R. Judah b. R. Hiyya?*
- N. *The case of a small belt is exceptional, since it is taken into account [being a complete piece of clothing, even smaller than the usual dimensions].*
- O. *And from R. Yohanan's perspective, why specify in particular a reed? One could as well mention a small belt.*
- P. *He thus informs us of another matter en passant, which is that a reed also can heal.*

Further Exposition of the Rules Governing the Proper Priestly Garments

- IV.10.** A. *Raba raised the following question, "If wind blew through his garments, what is the rule? Is it that we require that the garment rest upon his flesh, and that condition is not now met? Or perhaps this is quite routine as a way of wearing a garment [so there is no disqualification]?"*
- B. *"What is the rule as to vermin? Is this an interposition? When it is dead, there is no issue, for it certainly forms an interposition, but what is the rule when it is alive? Do we maintain that since it is moving back and forth, it is quite natural and does not interpose, or perhaps since the man finds it objectionable, it is an interposition?"*
 - C. *"What is the rule as to dirt? Is this an interposition?"*
 - D. *Dirt obviously interposes. What sort of a question is this?*
 - E. *Rather: "The dust of death: what is the rule? Does the space between the sleeves and armpit interpose?"*
 - F. *"Do we require that the garment rest on the flesh, which is not the case, or is this just how clothing is worn?"*
 - G. *"What if he put his hand into his bosom? Does his body interpose or not?"*
 - H. *"Does a thread interpose?"*
 - I. *"Does a thread interpose?" Of course a thread interposes! What sort of a question is this?"*
 - J. *Rather, "As to a hanging thread, does it interpose?"*
- IV.11.** A. *Mar b. R. Ashi asked the question, "If one's hair entered beneath the garment, what is the rule? Is the hair deemed part of the body or not?"*
- IV.12.** A. *R. Zira raised the question: "As to one's phylacteries, what is the rule on whether or not they interpose?"*
- B. *In line with the opinion of him who says that the night is no time for the wearing of phylacteries, that is no question for you, for since it is night, they surely constitute an interposition. And since that is so, they are deemed an interposition also by day.*

- C. *Then where does the question arise? It is in the opinion of him who maintains that the night also is a time for wearing phylacteries. Then what is the rule? Does performance of a religious duty that pertains to the body involve the possibility of interposition or is that not the case?*
- D. *The matter circulated until it came before R. Ammi. He said to him, "In our hands we have learned in so many words that phylacteries do interpose."*
- E. *An objection was raised: Priests when engaged in their sacred service, Levites when on their platform and singing, and Israelites serving as a delegation to the Temple, are exempt from the requirement of reciting the Prayer and from the requirement of putting on phylacteries. Does this not mean that, if they did put them on, they would form an interposition?*
- F. *No, it means that if they do put them on, they do not constitute an interposition.*
- G. *So how can you claim that they are exempt from the obligation of putting them on? The passage should specify that they are forbidden to do so.*
- H. *Since the passage refers also to Levites and Israelites, of whom the framer of the passage cannot say, "they are forbidden" [since they are permitted to put them on, since they do not officiate at the altar (Freedman)], he specifies, "They are exempt."*
- I. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. *If the priest put them on, they do not interpose.*
- K. *This does not really form a contradiction, since the formulation of the law that prohibits putting on phylacteries refers to the one put on the hand, and the one that permits doing so refers to putting on the one that goes on the head.*
- L. *What differentiates the one on the hand? It is written in that regard, "And the priest shall put on his linen garment and his linen breeches shall he put on his flesh" (Lev. 6: 3), meaning, nothing may interpose between it and his flesh.*
- M. *So pertinent to the one that is put on the head is the following: "And you shall set the miter upon his head" (Exo. 29: 6)!*
- N. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority: His hair was visible between the headplate and the miter, [19B] and that is where he put on the phylactery. [So it does not interpose.]*

V.1 A. a [priest] whose atonement is not yet complete:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this?*
- C. *Said R. Huna, "Scripture says, 'And the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be clean' (Lev. 12: 8) — 'she shall be clean' shows that, until atonement is made for her, she is deemed unclean [and the same applies to a priest, who then is disqualified if his atonement rites are not complete just as he would be if he were unclean]."*

VI.1 A. a [priest] whose hands and feet are not washed:

- B. *"statute" derives its meaning from the use of the same word in connection with one who is not wearing the sufficient number of priestly garments [and that is the source of the rule].*

VI.2. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:

- B. **A high priest who did not immerse and sanctify himself [by washing the hands and the feet] between putting on one garment and putting on another, or between one act of service and the next, but performed an act of service — his act of service remains valid. But all the same are a high priest and an ordinary priest who did not sanctify the hands and the feet [through washing them] prior to performing the act of service at dawn — the act of service is invalid [T. Kippurim 1:17].**
- C. *Said R. Assi to R. Yohanan, “Now note that the facts acts of immersion and the ten acts of sanctification of hands and feet through washing them that are done on the Day of Atonement derive from the authority of the Torah, and the word ‘statute’ is written in their regard as well. So they should be treated as indispensable to the proper fulfillment of the rite [just as in the case of the offering of the dawn]!”*
- D. He said to him, “Scripture has said, ‘And put them on’ (Lev. 16: 4) — the act of putting on the priestly garments is indispensable to the rite, but nothing else falls into that category.”
- E. *His face brightened. He said to him, “On a tree trunk I have written the letter W for you [a tree trunk is rough, the letter — a mere straight line — will not be visible, and this is idle chatter (Freedman)]. For if that were the case, then even the sanctification prior to carrying out the morning offering also should be dispensable!”*
- F. Said Hezekiah, “Said Scripture, ‘And it shall be a statute for ever to them, even to him and to his seed throughout their generations’ (Exo. 30:21) — what is indispensable so far as his seed is concerned is indispensable for himself, and what is not indispensable so far as his seed is concerned is not indispensable for himself.” [Freedman: ‘his seed’ denotes an ordinary priest, while ‘statute’ implies indispensability; hence the sanctification of the morning which is normally indispensable for an ordinary priest is indispensable for a high priest on the Day of Atonement.]
- G. R. Jonathan said, “Proof derives from here: ‘That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet thereat’ (Exo. 40:31) — what is indispensable so far as his sons is concerned is indispensable for himself, and what is not indispensable so far as his sons is concerned is not indispensable for himself.”
- H. *So how come R. Jonathan does not adduce his proof from the verse of Scripture that is presented by Hezekiah?*
- I. *He may say to you, “That verse is set forth to show that the law applies to all generations [and not for serving as source of an analogy].”*
- J. *And the other party — why does he not deduce his case from the verse at hand?*
- K. *He requires it in line with what R. Yosé b. R. Hanina said.*
- L. For R. Yosé b. R. Hanina said, “You may not wash in a laver that does not contain enough water to sanctify four priests, as it is said, ‘That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet thereat’ (Exo. 40:31).”

Topical Appendix on the religious duty of sanctifying hands and feet by washing

VI.3. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. How is the religious duty of sanctifying [hands and feet by washing them] carried out?
- C. The priest puts his right hand on his right foot, and his left hand on his left foot, and sanctifies them [by washing them simultaneously, pouring water on each set].
- D. R. Yosé b. R. Judah says, “He puts his two hands one on the other and on his two feet one on the other, and sanctifies them.”
- E. They said to him, “You have gone to an extreme! It is simply not possible to do it that way.”
- F. *Is this a valid answer to them?*
- G. Said R. Joseph, “His colleague helps out.”
- H. *So what’s at issue?*
- I. *Said Abayye, “Whether standing up with support is deemed proper standing [with Yosé b. R. Judah holding that it is].”*
- J. *Said R. Sama b. R. Ashi to Rabina, “Then lit him sit down and perform the sanctification?”*
- K. “Scripture says, ‘And you shall anoint Aaron and his sons and sanctify them that they may minister’ (Exo. 30:30) — and that is done standing.”

VI.4. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **“If a priest has sanctified his hands and feet by day, he does not have to do so by night; if he did so by night, he has to do so by day,” the words of Rabbi.**
- C. **For Rabbi would say, “The passage of the night bears consequence for the sanctification of the hands and the feet [in that, when the night passes, the previous act of sanctification is now null].”**
- D. **R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, “The passage of the night does not bear consequence for the sanctification of the hands and the feet [in that, when the night passes, the previous act of sanctification is not null]” [T. **Kippurim 1:19**].**
- E. *A further Tannaite statement on the same subject is as follows:*
- F. **“If a priest was standing and making offerings on the altar all night long, at dawn he has to sanctify his hands and feet,” the words of Rabbi.**
- G. **R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, “Once he has sanctified his hands and his feet at the beginning of his service at the altar, even if ten days of continuous service go by, he does not have to sanctify his hands and feet again” [T. **Men. 1:13**].**
- H. *And both versions of the dispute are required. For if we had in hand only the first of the two formulations, I should have proposed that Rabbi took the position that he does there because there was an interval between one act of service and another, but here, where there is no such interruption, I might suppose that Rabbi takes the same position as R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon.*

I. *And if we had in hand only the second of the two formulations, I might have concluded that it is only in this circumstance that R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon takes the view that he does, but in the former case he concurs with Rabbi.*

J. *Accordingly, both formulations of the matter are required.*

K. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of Rabbi?*

L. *It is written, "When they approach the altar to minister" (Exo. 30:20) [each such approach must constitute a span of service for which the hands must be washed; at daybreak there is a new approach, for new wood supplies are added to the altar (Freedman)].*

K. *What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon?*

L. *It is written, "When they enter into the tent of meeting they shall wash with water" (Exo. 30:20) [so long as the priest is engaged on the sacrifices, there is no new entry-point (Freedman)].*

M. *So from the viewpoint of the other, it still is written, "When they enter into the tent of meeting they shall wash with water" (Exo. 30:20)!*

N. *If "when they approach" but not "when they enter" had been stated, I might have concluded that for each approach, an act of sanctification is required, so the All-Merciful has written, "when they enter" [to exclude that position].*

O. *So from the viewpoint of the other, it still is written, "when they approach"!*

P. *If "when they enter" were written but not "when they approach," I might have supposed that they must wash even for a mere entrance.*

Q. *"For a mere entrance"!?! Surely it is written, "to minister" [which settles that problem anyhow]!*

R. *Rather, "when they approach" serves in line with what R. Aha b. R. Jacob said.*

S. For said R. Aha b. R. Jacob, "All concur with regard to the second act of sanctification that the priest does it when he is clothed. [Freedman: the changing of the garments by the high priest on the Day of Atonement was preceded by immersion, and the immersion was preceded and followed by sanctification. All agree that the second sanctification is done after the priest has donned the robes into which he was to change.] For Scripture has said, 'when they approach,' meaning, he who lacks only the act of approaching washes hands and feet, but he who has yet to clothe himself and then make the approach is excluded.

T. *"And what is the purpose of the phrase, 'to cause an offering made by fire to smoke' (Exo. 30:20)? [20A] What might you otherwise have said? The act of sanctification is required only for an act of service that is indispensable to achieving atonement, but not for an act of service that is not indispensable for atonement. But this clause tells us otherwise."* [Freedman: 'to cause an offering made

by fire to smoke' refers to burning the limbs on the altar, and that has nothing to do with the validity of the offering]."

- VI.5.** A. *When R. Dimi came, he said that R. Yohanan asked Ilfa, "From the viewpoint of him who maintains, 'The passage of the night does not bear consequence for the sanctification of the hands and the feet [in that, when the night passes, the previous act of sanctification is not null],' what is the rule as to the water of the laver's becoming unfit [after the night has passed]?"*
- B. *"Do we maintain, what is the purpose of that water? It is only for the sanctification of the hands and feet, and since the sanctification of the hands and feet itself is not rendered unfit by the passage of the night, [the water remains valid as well]? Or do we hold that since the water is sanctified in a utensil of service, it does become unfit?"*
- C. *When Rabin came, he said R. Jeremiah said R. Ammi said R. Yohanan said, "Ilfa then worked matters out: the same dispute that concerns the one concerns the other."*
- D. *Said before him R. Isaac bar Bisna, "My lord, do you really say so? This is what R. Ammi said R. Yohanan said in the name of Ilfa, 'If the laver was not lowered into the well in the evening, the priest may perform his sanctifications in it for the service of the night, but on the next day he does not perform his sanctifications in it.' And we raised the question: 'on the next day he does not perform his sanctification' because he does not have to do it any more, or perhaps it is because the water has become unfit through the passage of the night?' Now to us this was not to be resolved, and yet the master finds it so clear?"*
- E. *Come and take note: **Ben Qattin made twelve spouts for the laver; he also made pulleys for the laver, so the water should not become unfit through the passage of the night [T. Yoma 2: G].***
- F. *Does this not represent the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon [which proves that the water is unfit, even though the priest would not require another sanctification at all (Freedman)]?*
- G. *No, it is only the view of Rabbi.*
- H. *But since the opening clause represents the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, should not the concluding clause likewise represent the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon?*
- I. *For it is taught: on Tannaite authority: The high priest came to his bullock, which stood between the porch and the altar, with the head toward the south and the face forward the west, while the priest stood in the east and faced west. And who is it whom you know to take the position that between the porch and the altar was the north side? It is R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon.*
- J. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- K. *"What constitutes the northern space? It is from the northern wall of the altar to the northern wall of the Temple court and the entire space opposite the altar," the words of R. Yosé b. R. Judah.*

- L. R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon added the space between the porch and the altar.
- M. Rabbi adds the space where the priests and Israelites walk.
- N. But all concur that the place on the inside of the chamber that holds the knives it is unfit.
- O. *But do you think that the first formulation represents the view only of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon and not Rabbi? But Rabbi goes beyond the position of R. Yosé b. R. Judah, so will he also not go beyond the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon?*
- P. *This is what we mean to say: if you think that the passage concurs with Rabbi, then let him locate it in the place where the feet of the priests and Israelites go.*
- Q. *What then — is it in accord with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon? Then let him locate it in the area from the northern wall of the altar to the northern wall of the Temple court!*
- R. *Then this is what you have to say: it was located in the position indicated to take account of the exhaustion of the high priest; and on this view too, it was located in the position indicated to take account of the exhaustion of the high priest.*

- VI.6.** A. Said R. Yohanan, “If the priest has sanctified his hands and feet in connection with removing the ashes from the altar [before dawn], he does not have to sanctify them again on the next day [after dawn], because he has already done so at the beginning of his act of service.”
- B. *According to which one of the authorities just now considered is this ruling? If one should propose that it accords with the view of Rabbi, has he not said that the passage of the night invalidates the water in any event? If it is to be in accord with R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, has he not said that the priest does not have to sanctify his hands at all even from the present time for the next ten days?*
 - C. *Said Abayye, “In point of fact the rule accords with the position of Rabbi, for the power of the passage of the night to invalidate the water is only by reason of a decree of rabbis, and he concedes that the passage of the night disqualifies the water in any event only from the cockcrow of the dawn.”*
 - D. *Raba said, “In point of fact the rule accords with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, but R. Yohanan accepted his position only in regard to the beginning of the service at the altar, but not in regard to the end of the service.”* [Freedman: the sanctification here is performed at the beginning of the day’s service; in such a case Yohanan rules along the lines of Eleazar b. R. Simeon’s position; but if it is performed in the evening for the burning of the fact, which is the end of the previous day’s service, he needs a fresh act of sanctification on the morrow].
 - E. *An objection was raised: When his priestly colleagues saw him descend, they wend and went and sanctified their hands and feet at the laver. [20B] Now that formulation of matters poses no problems to Abayye, who classifies the cited passage within the framework of the position of Rabbi,*

and who further holds that Rabbi takes the view that the power of the passage of the night to invalidate the water is only by reason of a decree of rabbis, and he concedes that the passage of the night disqualifies the water in any event only from the cockcrow of the dawn. Then in accord with whom is the cited passage? It is in accord with Rabbi. But that formulation of matters does pose a problem to Raba, who maintains that the initial passage represents the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, while, from the viewpoint of Rabbi, the passage of the night disqualifies the water in any event from the cockcrow of the dawn, in accord with which authority is this cited passage? It cannot be Rabbi, for the passage of the night here has invalidated the water, and it cannot be R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, for lo, he has said that the priest does not have to sanctify his hands at all even from the present time for the next ten days!

- F. *In point of fact the passage accords with R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, but here, with what sort of a case do we deal? It is a case in which the priests are fresh [and are first going to the altar for their liturgy].*

VI.7. A. *The question was raised: What is the rule on whether or not the priest's leaving the Temple court invalidates the prior sanctification of hands and feet? If you take the position that the passage of the night does not invalidate the washing of the hands and feet [as Eleazar b. R. Simeon has now maintained], then that is so because the priest has not left the sacred precincts, but if he has gone out and left the Temple precincts, he no longer concentrates on the rite. Or perhaps since he has the power to return and continue his service, he does not really interrupt his concentration on the rite.*

- B. *Come and take note: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet and was made unclean, he must immerse them in an immersion pool but he does not have to sanctify them again. If his hands or feet went out of the Temple court, they retain the condition of sanctification that he had initially given them by the original act of sanctification. [That would settle the question of A.]*

- C. *We did not raise the question in a case in which his hands and feet went out of the Temple court; we raised the question concerning a case in which the whole of the priest's body went outside of the Temple court.*

- D. *Come and take note: **A priest who had not washed his hands and feet sanctifies them in a utensil of service within the Temple court. If he sanctified them in a utensil of Temple service outside of the Temple court, or if he sanctified them with an unconsecrated utensil inside the Temple court, or if he immersed in cave water, and then performed an act of service, his act of service is null [T. Men. 1:9].** The operative consideration, then, is that the priest has sanctified his hands and feet with a utensil of service outside of the Temple courtyard. Lo, if he had sanctified his hands and feet within the Temple courtyard and then gone forth from the courtyard, his act of service would have been a valid one. [Freedman: for if that too were invalid, then this law is superfluous, since he is standing outside of the courtyard at the very moment of the lustrations.]*

- E. *But what can be meant by the language, If he sanctified them in a utensil of Temple service outside of the Temple court? It is merely that he stretched out his hands and sanctified them outside of the Temple court while standing inside. But if his entire body had gone out, you would surely be in doubt.*
- F. *Said R. Zebid to R. Pappa, "Come and take note: If the priest went outside of the barrier of the wall of the Temple court, if he had the intention of remaining for some length of time, he requires a fresh immersion; if it was only for a brief interval, he requires only the sanctification of the hands and the feet."*
- G. *He said to him, "What is the case at hand? It is a case in which he went out to defecate and urinate."*
- H. *But that is stated explicitly in another context: whoever defecates has to immerse in an immersion pool, and whoever urinates has to sanctify the hands and feet.*
- I. *While having stated the matter as a Tannaite rule in general terms, he then goes on and restates in its particulars.*
- J. *Come and take note: In regard to the red cow,*
- K. *R. Hiyya bar Joseph said, "One sanctifies the hands and feet in a utensil of service inside the Temple court [even though the rite is carried on outside of the Temple altogether]."*
- L. *R. Yohanan said, "He does so even outside of the Temple court and even with an unconsecrated utensil, and even with a clay pot."*
- M. *Said R. Pappa, "The case of preparation for the rite of the red cow is exceptional, since everything that is done in its regard is done outside of the Temple, so the act of going outside of the Temple does not invalidate the rite in any event."*
- N. *So then why does he have to sanctify his hands and feet at all?*
- O. *It is so that the rite may resemble that which is done inside the Temple.*

VI.8. A. *The question was raised: What is the status of uncleanness in regard to the sanctification of the hands and feet [that is, if the priest's hands become unclean but not the rest of his body, does he have to sanctify the hands and feet once again]? If you take the position that the reason that going out of the Temple court does not invalidate the sanctification, it is because the person overall remains valid for conducting the rite; but here the person is no longer fit for conducting the rite, so he no longer is concentrating on the rite. Or perhaps, since he is going to be fit again, he will still pay attention and so not cease to concentrate on the rite.*

B. *Come and take note: If the priest sanctified his hands and feet and they became unclean, he immerses them but he does not have once again to sanctify the hands and feet again.*

C. *To a case in which the hands alone became unfit, we have not addressed our question at all; we have raised the question in a case in which his entire body was made unclean.*

D. *If the issue concerns his whole body, surely I may reach the deduction that the man will cease to concern himself with the rite, since he has to wait for sunset to resume his act of service at the conclusion of the purification rite.*

E. *The question is still a valid one for a case in which the priest became unclean just before sunset [so the process of purification will be a very rapid one].*

F. *Come and take note:* In regard to the red cow,

G.R. Hiyya bar Joseph said, “One sanctifies the hands and feet in a utensil of service inside the Temple court [even though the rite is carried on outside of the Temple altogether].”

H.R. Yohanan said, “He does so even outside of the Temple court and even with an unconsecrated utensil, and even with a clay pot.”

I. **[21A]** *But in the case of the rite of the red cow, we deliberately render the officiating priest unclean, for we have learned in the Mishnah: And they would render the priest who burns the cow unclean, because of the Sadducees, so that they should not say, “It is done by one on whom the sun has set [for the completion of the rite of purification].” They placed their hands on him, and they say to him, “My lord, High Priest, immerse one time.” He descended and immersed, emerged and dried off [M. Par. 3:7H-I, 3:8A-B]. This proves that the priest’s condition of uncleanness does not invalidate the conduct of the rite of the red cow.*

J. *The case of the red cow is different, for the condition of being one awaiting sunset for the completion of the purification rite is not invalid for the priest to conduct that rite.*

K. *If so, then why should he have to sanctify his hands and feet at all?*

L. *It is so that the rite may resemble that which is done inside the Temple.*

VI.9. A. *The question was raised:* What is the rule on the priest’s sanctifying his hands and feet [not by pouring water from the laver but] by sticking them into the laver itself? *Do we maintain that since the All-Merciful has said, “from it” (Exo. 30:19), the meaning is, with water poured from the laver, but not by sticking the hands and feet into the laver? Or perhaps the law would accept doing so even in the laver?*

B. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, “*Come and take note:* [If he sanctified them in a utensil of Temple service outside of the Temple court, or if he sanctified them with an unconsecrated utensil inside the Temple court,] or if he immersed in cave water, and then performed an act of service, his act of service is null [T. Men. 1:9]. Now lo, if he had used the water of the laver in a way similar to the water of a cave and then officiated, will his act of service be valid?

C. *No, it was necessary for the Tannaite framer of the passage to specify the matter of cave water to make the point that you should not suppose that if he can immerse his entire body therein, how much the more so can he immerse his hands and feet [but still, it is possible to suppose that if he can use the water of the laver*

in the same way, that is, by putting his hands and feet into it, his act of service would be invalid].

- VI.10.** A. Said R. Hiyya bar Joseph, “The water of the laver [once the sun has set is invalid for use for] purification the hands and feet in connection with the rite of sprinkling the blood of the sacrifice onto the altar or burning the residue of the meal offering, which rite, when carried out, will permit the parts of the beast available for eating by the priests to be eaten, just as the parts themselves are invalid if they are kept over night [so that the advent of the morning star marks the point at which the water may not be used for that purpose, just as much as the advent of the morning star marks the point at which the parts themselves can no longer be validly burned on the altar]; so too the same fact pertains to the use of the water for burning up the limbs of the animal that are burned on the altar, just as much as the limbs themselves are invalidated by the passage of the same interval of time.” [Freedman: Sprinkling the blood of the sacrifice and burning of the fistful of meal allow the remainder of the sacrifice to be eaten by the priest or make the parts fit for the altar; this has to be done before sunset of the day on which the sacrifice is brought. Now the laver was sunk every day in a pit. If this laver was not sunk into the pit before sunset, the water is unfit on the next day for the sanctification of the hands and feet when the priest proposes to conduct the rite at hand here. Thus just as the blood and fistful of meal become unfit for their purpose at sunset, so is the case here. So too, the limbs of the sacrifice must be burned before dawn of the day following the offering; if the laver is not sunk into the pit before dawn, the water cannot be used for sanctification of hands and feet the next day for the rite of burning the limbs.]
- B. R. Hisda said, “Even for use in connection with purification of the hands for the rite of burning those parts of the beast that, when burned, permit the parts of the beast available for eating by the priests to be eaten, the water is invalidated only at the rise of the morning star.” [Freedman: in preparation for the rite of sprinkling the blood, the water is unfit only if the laver was not sunk into the pit by dawn.]
- C. And R. Yohanan said, “As to the laver, once the laver has been dunked, it is not again drawn up [until dawn].” [If the priest wants to burn the limbs during the night, the laver cannot be drawn up; the water would be made unfit if it were.]
- D. *Does this then bear the implication that what is in it is not fit even for an act of service by night [burning the limbs]? But has not R. Assi said R. Yohanan said in the name of Ilfa, “If the laver has not been dunked in the evening, one may still sanctify hands and feet with its water for an act of service during the night, but on the next day he may not sanctify hands and feet with it”?*
- E. *What is the meaning then of “it is not again drawn up [until dawn]”? It may not be drawn up for a day service, but it is fit for an act of service to be done by night.*
- F. *If so, then that is precisely what R. Hiyya b. R. Joseph has said!*
- G. **[21B]** *The point on which they differ is whether or not what is at hand is merely a cautionary measure having to do with dunking the laver. [Freedman: When Yohanan rules that the laver must not be brought up for performance of an act of service on the following day, it is not because the water is unfit if it is not in the pit during any part of the night; it is only a preventive measure, lest it is not lowered*

again before dawn. That would disqualify the water. So Yohanan does not say that the water is unfit, but merely that the laver must not be brought up.]

- H. But has not R. Yohanan said, "If the priest has sanctified his hands and feet in connection with removing the ashes from the altar [before dawn], he does not have to sanctify them again on the next day [after dawn], because he has already done so at the beginning of his act of service"?
- I. *Now there is no problem from the viewpoint of Raba, who interprets that statement in line with the position of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon; he may then say that this ruling stands within the premise of Rabbi [who holds that the passage of the night invalidates the prior act of sanctification, all the more so then the water of the laver itself is now useless]. But from the perspective of Abayye, who assigns that statement to the premise of Rabbi, there is a contradiction, for Rabbi's statements will then contradict one another, for why must the man dunk the laver there [Freedman: why does he fear that if he brings it up, he will not lower it again] while here he does not have to dunk the laver?*
- J. *The sense is, he raises it [Freedman: in the morning for the rite of removing the ashes] and again lowers it [since Yohanan deals with the sanctification of the hands, not the regulations of the laver].*
- K. *Then what of the phrase, "he does not have to sanctify them again on the next day [after dawn], because he has already done so at the beginning of his act of service"? How come?*
- L. *The sense is that he does not have to sanctify once again, and that is to say, the prior act of sanctification is valid for performing the rite of disposing of those parts of the beast or meal offering which, when disposed of, allow for the priests to eat their share of the remainder.*
- M. *But that is the same as what R. Hisda has said!*
- N. *At issue between them is the duty to dunk the laver. [Freedman: in Yohanan's opinion, it must be do so in the evening, so that when the priest comes to clean the ashes in the morning, he will find it so and remember to lower it again immediately before dawn. Hisda holds that this is unnecessary, and it is sufficient to lower it just before dawn.]*
- O. *An objection was raised: **No one goes in with him, nor is there a light in his hand. But he goes along by the light of the altar fire. They did not see him, nor did they hear a sound from him until they hear the noise of the wooden device which Ben Qattin made for the laver [M. Yom. 3:10]. And they say, "The time has come to sanctify hands and feet at the laver" [M. Tam. 1:4D-G]. Does this not mean that he raised it, which proves that the laver had been sunk down earlier?***
- P. *No, what it means is that he now lowered the laver.*
- P. *But if he lowered it, would not the sound be heard?*
- Q. *He lowered it by the wheel.*
- R. *Another version: he lowered it by the stone, so as to make its noise heard, so the priest would hear it and come.*
- S. *But there was Gebini, the crier [who summoned them]!*

T. *They made two such summonses, some heard the one and came along, others heard the other and did the same.*

VI.11. A. *Reverting to the body of the passage just now cited::*

B. R. Yosé b. R. Hanina said, “You may not wash in a laver that does not contain enough water to sanctify four priests, as it is said, ‘That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet thereat’ (Exo. 40:31).”

C. *An objection was raised to this statement:* the water contained in every sort of utensil serves to sanctify hands and feet, whether the utensils contain a quarter-log of water [22A] or do not contain a quarter log of water, on the sole stipulation that these are in point of fact utensils that have been consecrated for use in the service of the Temple.

D. Said R. Ada bar Aha, “The sense is that one splashes the water out of the laver [onto the hands and feet].”

E. *But the All-Merciful has said, “from it”!*

F. The use of the language “they should wash” (Exo. 40:32) serves to encompass any utensil that has been consecrated for the Temple service.

G. *If that is the case, then an unconsecrated utensil should be equally acceptable!*

H. *Said Abayye, “You may not maintain that an unconsecrated utensil is acceptable, for an argument a fortiori proves to the contrary, namely: if the base of the laver, which was anointed for the sacred service along with the laver, may not be used for sanctification [through water poured out of the base], an unconsecrated utensil, which was not anointed with the laver to begin with, surely should not serve for use in the sanctification of the hands and the feet!”*

I. *And how as to the base of the laver, how to begin with do we know [that it may not be used as a utensil for the sanctification of hands and feet]?*

J. *As has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

K. R. Judah says, “Might one suppose that the base of the laver may be used as a utensil for the sanctification of hands and feet just as the laver itself may be used as a utensil for the sanctification of hands and feet]? Scripture states, ‘You shall also make a laver of brass and the base thereof of brass’ (Exo. 30:18) — It is in regard to the use of the metal brass that I have treated the latter as comparable to the former, and in no other way have I treated the latter as comparable to the former.”

L. Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, “But as to the base, it will not serve to sanctify hands and feed because it has no contained space to be used for water for that purpose, but will you say the same of an unconsecrated vessel that is made with a contained space for holding water? Rather, ‘thereat’ excludes the use of an unconsecrated utensil.”

M. *If so, then the use of some other consecrated utensil, in addition to the base of the laver, likewise should be excluded from use for sanctifying hands and feet!*

N. *Lo, the All-Merciful has encompassed other consecrated utensils [as legitimate for use in sanctifying hands and feet] when it uses the language, “they should wash.”*

O. How come you encompass the one but exclude the other?

P. This requires anointing, just as does the laver, while that does not require anointing like the laver.

VI.12. A. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “Whatever sort of liquid serves to complete the forty seahs of undrawn water required for an immersion pool serves likewise to make up the requisite volume of liquid for the laver [enough water for four priests to sanctify hands and feet], though it may not make up the requisite volume of the quarter-log of water required for the washing of the hands prior to a meal.”

B. *Now what does that formulation serve to exclude from use? If we should say that it serves to exclude miry clay, then what is the sense of the matter? If it is the sort from which a cow would lean over and drink, then it is fit for use even for the quarter-log of water required for the washing of the hands prior to a meal. And if it is such that a cow would not lean over and drink from it, then even for use for completing the requisite volume of liquid an immersion pool it should be excluded.*

C. *If the intent, moreover, is to exclude red insects that originate in water, then these are permitted even in the mass [Freedman: even if the whole immersion pool consists of these, it is fit, while Simeon b. Laqish permits use of such as these only to make up the prescribed volume of water, but not to comprise the entirety of the liquid in the pool]! For lo, it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

D. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “Whatever is created to begin with out of water serves as a suitable liquid for immersion,” and said R. Isaac bar Abdimi, “People may immerse in an immersion pool that is made up solely of fish eyes.”

E. *Said R. Pappa, “What is excluded [by Simeon b. Laqish’s statement] is a case in which one has added a seah of suitable liquid and removed a seah of suitable liquid. For we have learned in the Mishnah: [If] it contained forty seahs, and one put in a seah and took out a seah — lo, this is fit [M. Miq. 7:2N].* And said R. Judah bar Shila said R. Assi said R. Yohanan, “The rule applies up to the greater part of the immersion pool.” [Freedman: any liquid other than water can sometimes make up the requisite volume and sometimes not. If the immersion pool contains thirty nine seahs of proper liquid and another is added of a different liquid, it is not valid; but if it contains forty and then a different liquid is added and then a seah of water is removed, it remains fit, for it had been fit without the added seah, and this is then nullified in the rest and the immersion pool remains fit. Judah says that it remains fit even if in this way one removes up to, but not including, the greater part of the water. But if one has a quarter log of water, adds a little of another liquid, and then removes the same quantity, it is not fit, because a quarter log of water is too little for the other liquid to lose its identity in it.]

F. Said R. Pappa, “If one cut out [of an immersion pool, but making a hollow on the side of the pool, into which the water of the rest of the pool does not freely flow] a quarter log of water, one may immerse needles and hooks, *since the water derived from a valid immersion pool.*”

VI.13. A. Said R. Jeremiah said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “The water of an immersion pool is fit for use for water in a laver” [Freedman: though the former is not running water, it may be drawn into a laver].

- B. *Is that to imply that the water used in the laver does not have to qualify as running water? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. “But its inner parts and its legs shall he wash with water” (Lev. 1: 9) — and not with wine.
- D. “But its inner parts and its legs shall he wash with water” (Lev. 1: 9) — and not with wine mixed with water.
- E. “But its inner parts and its legs shall he wash with water” (Lev. 1: 9) — to encompass any kind of water — and all the more so does this encompass water used in a laver.
- F. *Now what can the phrase, “and all the more so does this encompass water used in a laver” possibly mean? Is it not that the water used in a laver is flowing water?*
- G. *No, the superior trait to which allusion is made is water that is holy [so the argument is, all the more is the water of the laver fit, seeing that it is holy (Freedman)].*
- H. *And is the holiness of the water deemed an advantage? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority by R. Samuel [better: Ishmael], “Only water that is not classified in some distinctive water is fit [for use in washing the sacrificial parts of the animal, **22B**] excluding water in the laver, which is classified in a distinctive way [‘has a special name’].” It must follow, then, that the sense is, “water that is fit for the water of the laver” [but not the actual water of a laver], and that means it must be flowing water.*
- I. *In point of fact it is a conflict among Tannaite authorities.*
- J. For said R. Yohanan, “As to the water used for a laver, R. Ishmael says, ‘It must be spring water.’
- K. “And sages say, ‘It may be any sort of water.’”

VII.1 A. [an] uncircumcised [priest]:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this fact?*
- C. Said R. Hisda, ‘This matter we have not learned from the Torah of our lord, Moses, but from the teachings of Ezekiel b. Buzi we have learned it, ‘No alien, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter my sanctuary’ (Eze. 44: 9).”
- D. *And how do we know that, if they officiate, they profane the service?*
- E. As it is written, “In that you have brought aliens, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, to be in my sanctuary, to profane it, even my house, when you offer my bread, the fat and the blood” (Eze. 44: 6).

VII.2. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:

- B. [With reference to the verse, “In that you have brought aliens, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, to be in my sanctuary, to profane it, even my house, when you offer my bread, the fat and the blood” (Eze. 44: 6),] “aliens” — might one suppose that this is actually an alien?
- C. Scripture says, “...uncircumcised in heart.”
- D. Then why does Scripture state, “aliens”?
- E. Because his actions have alienated him from his Father who is in heaven.

- F. I know only that the invalidation of the sacrifice takes place through those who are "...uncircumcised in heart." How do I know that the same is the case for those who are uncircumcised in flesh?
- G. Because the cited verse states explicitly, "uncircumcised in flesh."
- H. *And it was necessary to make explicit reference to both classifications of persons. For if the All-Merciful had made reference only to the uncircumcised of flesh, I might have supposed that that is because that trait is repulsive, but uncircumcision of the heart, which is not physically repulsive, would not disqualify a person.*
- I. *And if the All-Merciful had made reference only to the uncircumcised of heart, I might have supposed that that is because the heart is not directed toward Heaven [so an improper intentionality spoils the cultic act], but as for one who is uncircumcised in the flesh, whose heart is toward Heaven [since there is a valid reason for his not being circumcised, e.g., fear for his survival], I might have supposed that such a one is not disqualified.*
- J. *So it was necessary to make reference to both classifications of persons.*

VIII.1 A. an unclean priest:

- B. Said the sages of the South, "This rule is repeated only in respect to one who has been made unclean by a dead creeping thing, but as to a priest who is unclean through corpse-uncleanness, since the priestly headplate propitiates [despite uncleanness affecting the offering] in the case of a sacrifice made in behalf of the community, it also propitiates in this regard in the case of a sacrifice brought in behalf of an individual." [Freedman: Exo. 28:36-38 states, "And you shall make a plate of pure gold, and it shall be on Aaron's forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the holy things...and it shall always be upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord." This is understood to mean that because of the headplate a sacrifice in behalf of the community is accepted as valid, even if the whole congregation or all the priests are unclean. The public sacrifice, e.g., the daily whole offering, may not be postponed, which accounts for the matter. This is called "propitiating," meaning, making acceptable.]
- C. *If that is the case, then the rule governing the priest who is unclean by reason of a dead creeping thing should likewise be derived from the rule governing the one made unclean by corpse uncleanness so that one unclean even by the mere contact with a dead creeping thing likewise should not invalidate the offering, by reason of an argument a fortiori, namely:*
- D. if for one who is made unclean by a corpse, who has to be subjected to a sprinkling of purification water on the third and seventh days after contamination, the priestly headplate propitiates, for one who is made unclean merely by a dead creeping thing, who does not have to be subjected to a sprinkling of purification water on the third and seventh days after contamination, surely should the priestly headplate propitiate!
- E. *The sages of the South take the position that those who effect atonement, that is, the priests, are to be classified with those for whom atonement is made, which is to say, the community: just as for those for whom atonement is made, if made unclean through corpse uncleanness, the priestly head plate propitiates, but if*

they are unclean by reason of the uncleanness of a dead creeping thing, the headplate does not propitiate, so those who make atonement, if unclean by reason of corpse uncleanness, are included in the power of the headplate to propitiate for uncleanness, but those unclean by reason of contact with a dead creeping thing are not included in the power of the headplate to propitiate for uncleanness.

- F. *Then what is the premise of the sages? If they take for granted that the Passover offering may not be slaughtered, and the blood of such may not be sprinkled, on behalf of a person who has been made unclean through contact with a dead creeping thing, then why may the community not sacrifice the Passover offering in a state of uncleanness? It is established as fact that wherever an individual must offer the second, and not the first, Passover by reason of uncleanness, then the community as such keeps the first Passover offering in a state of uncleanness. Rather, they take the view that one does slaughter and sprinkle the blood of a Passover offering in behalf of one who is unclean by reason of contact with a dead creeping thing.*

VIII.2. A. Said Ulla, “R. Simeon b. Laqish criticized the position of the sages of the South in the following terms: ‘Now [in the context of the Passover offering] whose power is the greater, the power of those who effect atonement, or the power of those for whom atonement is effected? It is surely the power of those for whom atonement is made [since the one for whom atonement is made can send a sacrifice to the Temple even though he is unclean, but the one who effects atonement, the priest, cannot officiate in a state of uncleanness]. Now if in a case in which the owner of a beast has been made unclean by a dead creeping thing, he may send his offering to the Temple, for a priest who has been made unclean by a dead creeping thing the high priest’s headplate does not propitiate, in a case [in the context of the Passover offering] in which the owner has been made unclean by a corpse, in which instance the owner cannot send his sacrifice to the Temple [since he will be unfit to eat of the offering in the evening as much be the rule for the Passover offering], is it not reasonable to suppose that a priest who has suffered corpse-uncleanness should not be subject to the propitiation?’”

- B. *The sages of the South take the view that one who is made unclean by a corpse also has the right to send his offering to the Temple.*
- C. But is it not written, “If any man of you...shall be unclean by reason of a dead body...yet he shall keep the Passover to the Lord in the second month on the fourteenth day at dusk they shall keep it” (Num. 9:10-11). [So it is simply not true that one who is made unclean by a corpse also has the right to send his offering to the Temple.]
- D. *That rule serves merely as a description of the best possible fulfillment of the religious duty but it does not form an indispensable definition, and it is true that one who is made unclean by a corpse also has the right to send his offering to the Temple.*
- E. And lo, it is written, “According to **[23A]** every man’s eating” (Exo. 12: 4) [so the one who presents the Passover offering must be in a position to eat the meat of the offering, as we earlier surmised].

- F. That rule also serves merely as a description of the best possible fulfillment of the religious duty.
- G. *That rule serves merely as a description of the best possible fulfillment of the religious duty but it does not form an indispensable definition.*
- I. *But is it not taught on Tannaite authority:*
- J. “Then he and his neighbor next to him shall take one according to the number of souls” (Exo. 12: 4) — this teaches that the animal designated as a Passover offering is slaughtered only in behalf of those who are registered for it.
- K. Might you suppose that if one slaughters the beast in behalf also of those who are not registered for it, he should be classified as one who has violated the religious duty, [which is to say, the offering nonetheless is fit]?
- L. Scripture states, “You shall make your count” (Exo. 12: 4) — in this way Scripture goes over the same matter a second time, to indicate that this provision of the law is indispensable.
- M. And, moreover, those who eat the meat are treated as falling into the same classification as those who are registered for that beast [Freedman: just as the animal is unfit if slaughtered for those who are not registered for it, so it is unfit if it is slaughtered in behalf of those who cannot eat of it, for the ones who eat are treated as comparable with those ones who are registered].
- N. *The sages of the South do not concur in that classification.*
- O. *Even though the sages of the South do not concur in that classification, there is still a refutation along the same lines, namely:*
- P. if in a case in which the owner of the beast is made unclean by a dead creeping thing, in which instance he may send his offering to begin with, a priest who is made unclean by a dead creeping thing is not subject to the propitiation of the high priest’s front plate, in a case in which the owner is made unclean by a corpse, in which to begin with he may not send his offering to be slaughtered, should it not be the fact that a priest who is made unclean by a corpse should not be subject to the propitiation of the high priest’s frontlet?
- Q. *An objection was raised:* For they have said, In behalf of a Nazirite and in behalf of one preparing the Passover, the priestly frontlet effects atonement in particular for uncleanness affecting the blood of the offering or the handful of meal offering or the drink offerings. The priestly frontlet does not effect atonement for the uncleanness of the body [of such a person. Along these same lines:] **The priestly frontlet does not effect atonement for the uncleanness of the body [of a priest who is unclean with corpse uncleanness, a priest whose atonement rites have not yet been completed, and a priest awaiting sunset for the completion of his purification rite [M. Men. 1:2]. For what does the priestly frontlet effect atonement? For uncleanness affecting the blood of the offering or the handful of meal offering or the drink offerings [T. Men. 1:6A-D].**

- R. *Now what was the source of the uncleanness that has affected the Nazirite or the one who is preparing the Passover offering? If we say that it was the uncleanness of a dead creeping thing? But have you not said, "They slaughter and toss the blood in a case in which the source of the uncleanness was a dead creeping thing." Rather, it must be the uncleanness deriving from a corpse, and yet it is stated, The priestly frontlet does not effect atonement for the uncleanness of the body of such a person. It follows that if the owner of the beast has been made unclean by reason of corpse uncleanness, they in point of fact may not send their offerings to the Temple [and that entire argument folds].*
- S. *Not at all. If the owners had been made unclean through corpse-uncleanness, that would indeed be the fact. But what case confronts us here? Here the sense is that the priest was made unclean by a dead creeping thing.*
- T. *If so, then look at the concluding clause of the same materials: If the priest was made unclean by the uncleanness that emanates from the deep [that is, buried corpse matter that has now been uncovered for the first time], the priest's headplate propitiates [and one does not have to make an offering at the second Passover].*
- U. *But did not R. Hiyya present as a Tannaite statement, "Sages spoke in connection with uncleanness that emanates from the deep only of buried corpse matter." And what is then excluded by that statement? Is it not uncleanness emanating from the deep that is caused by a dead creeping thing that has just been uncovered?*
- V. *Not at all, at issue is the exclusion of uncleanness emanating from the deep that derives from flux-uncleanness. [Freedman: One unclean with flux suffers the uncleanness for seven days, and the Passover offering may not be presented in his behalf. If the eve of Passover marks the seventh day of his uncleanness, he is subject to doubt; if he has no flux that day, he will be clean in the evening, but if he does, he is unclean for seven more days. So he too is unclean with the uncleanness emanating from the deep, and Hiyya then takes the view that the headplate does not propitiate in his case.]*
- W. *And as to the question raised by Rami bar Hama, "As to a priest who propitiates with their sacrifice, is the uncleanness of the deep remitted so far as he is concerned, or is the uncleanness of the deep not remitted so far as he is concerned?" [Freedman: If the priest who offers the Passover sacrifice, or the offerings of a Nazirite, on behalf of the owners was made unclean with uncleanness emanating from the deep, does the headplate propitiate, so that the offering is a valid one, or is that not the case?]" — now you may settle that question in favor of the proposition that the headplate does propitiate, so that the offering is a valid one. For lo, we are here dealing with a priest [as seen by the sages of the South]!*
- X. *Rami bar Hama assuredly differs from the sages of the South.*

- Y. *Come and take note:* “And Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the Holy Things” (Exo. 28:38) [meaning, shall make atonement for the Holy Things]. And precisely what is the sin that he bears?
- Z. **[23B]** If that is the sin involving improper intentionality at the moment of slaughtering the beast as to eating the offerings outside of the proper time-span or sprinkling the blood outside of the proper place, which renders the offering abominable, that particular sin is explicitly specified, “it shall not be accepted” (Lev. 19: 7).
- AA. And if it is the sin involving [actually] leaving over the meat beyond the proper time for eating it, that is subject to the rule, “neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it” (Lev. 7:18).
- BB. So the only sin that the priest bears is the sin of uncleanness, which is remitted, by contrast to the uncleanness affecting the entire community. [If the whole community is unclean, the Passover offering is made in the first of the two months at which it may be made, Nisan, as usual, and not postponed for the second month, Iyyar, as would be the case if it were an individual who is made unclean.]
- CC. *Now what is the source of uncleanness that is under discussion here? If we say, it is the uncleanness deriving from a dead creeping thing, where has that form of uncleanness been remitted [when it affects the entire community]? So at issue can be only the uncleanness deriving from a corpse, and that proves that if the owner becomes unclean by reason of corpse uncleanness, he may nonetheless send his sacrifice.*
- DD. *And of whom is this the rule?* If of a Nazirite, the Scripture has explicitly stated, “And if any man die suddenly beside him” (Num. 6:9 [the Nazirite is made unclean and cannot bring his offerings], so it can refer only to one who is going to offer the Passover offering.
- EE. *In point of fact, at issue is the uncleanness deriving from a dead creeping thing, and uncleanness has been waived in this context [and so this particular form of uncleanness is subject to the general rule that pertains to uncleanness deriving from the corpse, and the headplate will propitiate even here].*
- FF. *There are those who derive the rule [in support of Rami bar Hama and refute the sages of the South] in the following way:*
- GG. The headplate makes atonement only for the sin involving the Holy Things, but not for the sin of those who sanctify these same Holy Things [that is, it propitiates only when the offering itself is made unclean, but not when the owners or priests, those who sanctify the beast, are unclean, since Scripture speaks only of Holy Things, meaning of course the animals that are consecrated as holy].
- HH. *And uncleanness deriving from what source? Should we say it is the uncleanness of a dead creeping thing? But is uncleanness of that origin operative in the case of the community? [Obviously not, we already know that if the community itself is unclean, the rite goes forward at the proper time.] Rather, it can only be the uncleanness deriving from a corpse. And yet here too the*

headplate makes atonement only for the sin involving the Holy Things, but not for the sin of those who sanctify these same Holy Things [that is, it propitiates only when the offering itself is made unclean, but not when the owners or priests, those who sanctify the beast, are unclean]!

II. In point of fact, at issue is the uncleanness deriving from a dead creeping thing, and uncleanness has been waived in this context [and so this particular form of uncleanness is subject to the general rule that pertains to uncleanness deriving from the corpse, and the headplate will propitiate even here].

IX.1 A. [a priest] who was sitting down:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*
- C. Said Raba said R. Nahman, “Said Scripture, ‘for the Lord your God has chosen him out of all the tribes to stand to minister in the name of the Lord’ (Deu. 18: 5) — it is for standing that I have chosen him, not for sitting.”

IX.2. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “to stand to minister” — this represents the description merely of the correct way in which to carry on the rite [but not the prescription of how it must be done].
- C. When Scripture says, “who stand therefore the Lord” (Deu. 18: 7), Scripture has gone over the matter a second time, to indicate that standing is indispensable to the valid performance of the rite.

IX.3. A. *Said Raba to R. Nahman, “Since one who performs the rite sitting down is comparable to a non-priest and profanes the service, then might we go on to maintain, just as a non-priest who performs the rite is subject to the death penalty, so one who performs the rite sitting down is subject to the death penalty? Then why has it been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘An uncircumcised priest, a priest in mourning for a close relative, and one who is sitting down, are not subject to the death penalty if they perform an act of service, but are merely admonished not to do so’?”*

- B. It is because a priest who is not wearing the proper priestly garments and a priest whose hands and feet have not been washed are rules governing two cases that are presented as one [teaching the same thing, which is that they profane the pact of service], [24A] and whenever we have two laws that go over the same point, they do not serve to illuminate the law governing any other case. [If the intent was that a given rule should serve as a generative analogy for a variety of classifications, then only a single version of the rule would be given, so that analogies might be drawn].
- C. *But if one maintains that they do illuminate other cases by analogy, then one who has drunk wine, who is specifically covered, represents still a third statement of a rule of a single classification, and when three laws treat a single classification, all parties concur that no analogy is to be drawn for further cases.*

X.1 A. [a priest] standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow received, — he has rendered the offering invalid:

- B. *How on the basis of Scripture do we know this rule?*

- C. *A Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael stated, "Since the floor of the sanctuary itself has the power of sanctification, and the utensils of service have the power of sanctification, just as in the case of utensils of service, nothing may interpose between the officiating priest and the utensil of service, so in the case of the floor, nothing may interpose between the officiating priest and the floor."*

X.2. A. *And the several enumerated cases are all necessary.*

- B. *For had we been informed of the matter of the priest's standing on utensils, it might have been because standing on utensils disqualifies the rite, because they are not of the category of animate objects, but a beast, which is animate, might have been thought not a disqualifying instance.*
- C. *And had we been informed of the matter of the beast, which is not of the species of man, I might have thought that if it were another person [on whose feet the officiating priest was standing, instead of on the pavement of the Temple], I might have thought that that would not disqualify the act of sacrifice.*
- D. *So it was necessary to specify these several items.*

X.3. A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **R. Eliezer says, "If one foot was on a utensil and one on the pavement, one foot on a stone and one foot on the pavement, we consider the case: in any instance in which, if the utensil or the stone should be removed, the priest can yet stand on his other foot and perform the act of liturgy, then his act of liturgy is valid, but if not, his act of service is invalid" [cf. T. Zeb. 1:5H-L].**

X.4. A. *R. Ammi raised this question: "If a paving stone was loose and he stood on it [so shaking it], what is the law? In a case in which it is not his intention to fit the stone into the pavement, there is no question that the stone constitutes an interposition between him and the pavement. The question arises in connection with a case in which the priest fully intends to fit the stone back into the pavement. What then is the rule? Since he intends to fit the stone back into the pavement, it is as though it were fixed into the pavement? Or perhaps now, in any event, the stone is a distinct entity?"*

- B. *The younger Rabbah asked the question posed by R. Ammi in the following way: "If a stone was broken loose and he stood in its place, what is the rule?"*
- C. *What is the point of this question? It is as follows: when David sanctified the pavement of the Temple mount, it was the upper surface that he sanctified, or perhaps did he sanctify the area right down to the depths of the soil?*
- D. *If that is the question, then the issue should concern the entirety of the Temple courtyard!*
- E. *In point of fact, it was self-evident that David had sanctified the pavement down to the bed rock, but the question was this: is this the natural way or performing an act of service, or is it not the natural way?*
- F. *And that question stands.*

XI.1 A. **[If] he received it in his left hand, he has rendered [the sacrifice] invalid. R. Simeon declares valid:**

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- C. “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it on the horns of the altar” (Lev. 4:25) — “...shall take...” teaching that the receiving of the blood should be only with his right hand.
- D. “with his finger he shall take it,” teaching that the act of placing the blood should be performed only with the right hand.
- E. Said R. Simeon, “But is the word ‘hand’ used at all in connection with the act of receiving the blood? Rather, read as follows: “‘with his finger and put’ — indicating that the placing of the blood should be done only with the right hand.’ Now since there is no reference to using ‘the hand’ in connection with receiving the blood, if the priest received the blood in his left hand, it is a valid offering.”
- F. *But so far as the position of R. Simeon is concerned, how do you really propose to decide matters? If he admits the analogy that proves that where we find a reference to “hand” on the context of a sacrifice, it means the right hand, then even where there is no explicit reference to “hand” in connection with receiving the blood, what difference does that make? And if he does not admit the analogy that proves that where we find a reference to “hand” on the context of a sacrifice, it means the right hand, then even though in connection with receiving the blood, there had been a reference to “hand,” what difference would that have made!*
- G. Said R. Judah, “In point of fact R. Simeon does not admit the analogy that proves that where we find a reference to “hand” on the context of a sacrifice, it means the right hand, but this is the sense of his statement: ‘But is the word ‘hand’ used at all in connection with the act of receiving the blood?’ Since there is no reference to using the right hand in connection with receiving the blood, if he had received the blood with the left hand, the act would have been entirely valid.”
- H. Said Rabbah to him, “If that is the case, then the same rule applies to putting the blood onto the altar as well [where there is no reference to using the right hand in particular]. And furthermore, is it the fact that R. Simeon does not concur in the argument from analogy [that proves that where we find a reference to “hand” on the context of a sacrifice, it means the right hand]? And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:
- I. “‘R. Simeon says, “Any passage in which we find reference to ‘the hand,’ the meaning is only to the right hand; and any passage in which we find reference to ‘the finger,’ the meaning is only to the right finger.’””
- J. Rather, said Raba, “He does indeed concur in the argument from analogy [that proves that where we find a reference to ‘hand’ on the context of a sacrifice, it means the right hand]. But this is the sense of his statement, ‘But is the word “hand” used at all in connection with the act of receiving the blood?’ Since there is no reference to the word “hand” in connection with the act of receiving the blood, but only with reference to the finger, therefore, if the priest received the blood with his left hand, the act is a valid one.”
- K. Said R. Sama b. R. Ashi to Rabina, “But is it possible to make a handle at the edge of the bowl in which the blood is caught and to receive the blood in it?” Freedman: the utensil that receives the blood cannot be held by a finger only, so finger denotes the right hand, refers to applying the blood, not receiving it in the bowl].

- L. *Rather, said Abayye, “At issue is whether [24B] a verse of Scripture is interpreted in context, in line with what precedes and what follows it” [Freedman: Simeon holds that a text can be interpreted only in line with what follows, hence “finger” refers to “and he shall but” but not to “and he shall receive,” which precedes, while rabbis hold that it goes with both.]*

XI.2. A. *Said Abayye, “Now the statement of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon differs from the position of both his father [Simeon, just now cited] and also of rabbis. For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:”*

- B. “R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon says, ‘In any passage in which the word “finger” is used in connection with receiving the blood, if the priest varied from the normal mode of receiving the blood [using the left hand instead of the right], the offering is invalid. If he varied the normal mode of applying the blood in a case in which ‘finger’ is used in connection with applying the blood, the sacrifice is unfit. But if it was in such a case in the manner of receiving the blood, the sacrifice remains fit.’
- C. “And in what context do we find reference to ‘finger’ stated in connection with applying the blood? It is written, ‘And you shall take of the blood of the bullock and put it upon the horns of the altar with your finger’ (Exo. 29:12).
- D. “So he takes the view that a verse of Scripture is interpreted in context, in line with what precedes and not what follows it.”

XI.3. A. *Said Rabbah b. b. Hannah said R. Yohanan, “In any passage in which the words ‘finger’ and ‘priesthood’ appear, only the right hand may be used.”*

B. *It was taken for granted that both words are required for that result, as it is written, “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Lev. 4:25), and as the rule is derived from the case of the one afflicted with the skin ailment [of Lev. 13-14], “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Lev. 14:16).*

C. *[Now — in line with the specified premise — this proposition, A, is challenged:] But lo, concerning the taking of the handful of the meal offering, in connection with which reference is made only to the priesthood, we have learned in the Mishnah: [All the same are the meal offering of a sinner and of all [other sorts of] meal offerings, the handful of which was taken by (1) a non-priest, (2) a priest mourning his next of kin, (3) a priest who is a tebul-yom, (4) a priest lacking proper priestly vestments, (5) a priest whose rites of atonement had not yet been completed, (6) a priest whose hands and feet had not been washed, (7) an uncircumcised priest, (8) an unclean priest, (9) a priest who was seated, (10) a priest who was standing on utensils, on a beast, on the feet of his fellow — he has rendered [it] invalid.] [If] he took the handful with his left hand, he has rendered [it] invalid [M. Men. 1:2A-C]!*

- D. Rather, said Raba, "What [Yohanan] meant was either 'the finger' or 'priesthood' [but not both]."
- E. Said to him Abayye, "Lo, there is the matter of 'priesthood' that is written in the context of carrying the limbs to the ramp around the altar, *in which regard it is written*, 'And the priest shall offer the whole and make it smoke on the altar' (Lev. 1:13), in connection with which a master has said, 'This refers to carrying the limbs to the ramp around the altar.' *And yet we have learned in the Mishnah*: **[All of them turned out to be standing in a row, and the limbs in their hands: (1) the first, with the head and a hind-leg, the head in his right hand, with its muzzle along his arm, and its horns in his fingers, and the place at which it was slaughtered turned upwards, and the fat set on top of it [that place], and the right hind leg in his left hand, and the flayed end outermost; (2) the second, with the two forelegs, that of the right hand in his right hand, and that of the left in his left, with the flayed end outermost; (3) the third, with the rump and the [other] hind leg, the rump in his right hand, and the fat tail hanging down between his fingers, and the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys with it, the left hind leg in his left hand, with the flayed end outermost] [M. Tamid 9:1Q].**"
- F. *When we say*, "either 'the finger' or 'priesthood' [but not both implies the use of the right hand]," that is only in regard to an act of service that is essential for achieving atonement, *as in the case of the person afflicted with the skin ailment*.
- G. *But "priesthood" is written in connection in with receiving the blood, and that is indispensable to achieving atonement, and yet we have learned in the Mishnah*: **[If] he received it in his left hand, he has rendered [the sacrifice] invalid. R. Simeon declares valid!**
- H. *R. Simeon, for his part, requires both [reference to "finger" and "priesthood"]*.
- I. *Now is it the fact that R. Simeon, for his part, requires both [reference to "finger" and "priesthood"]? Has it not been taught on Tannaite authority*: R. Simeon says, "Any passage in which we find reference to 'the hand,' the meaning is only to the right hand; and any passage in which we find reference to 'the finger,' the meaning is only to the right finger."
- J. *Where the passage refers to "finger," R. Simeon does not require, in addition, a reference to "priesthood," but where "priesthood" is stated, he does insist that the word "finger" occur*.
- K. *Then what is the purpose of mentioning "priesthood" [in connection with receiving the blood, since it is already indicated that this must be done by the sons of Aaron (Freedman)]?*
- L. It means that they must be in their condition as priests [wearing the right garments].

- M. *Now the word “priesthood” alone is written in connection with the act of sprinkling, and yet we have learned on Tannaite authority: if he tossed the blood with his left hand, the offering is unfit, and R. Simeon does not differ!*
- N. *Said Abayye, “In a Tannaite formulation of the same matter, he does indeed differ, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority.”*
- O. *If the priest received the blood in his left hand, the offering is unfit, but R. Simeon declares it fit. If he tossed the blood with his left hand, the offering is unfit. And R. Simeon declares it fit.*
- P. *Then as to what Raba said, ““We draw an analogy from the use of the word ‘hand’ [at Lev. 14:14] to the use of the word hand so far as taking a fistful of the meal offering is concerned; from the use of the word ‘foot’ [at Lev. 14:14] for the meaning of the word ‘foot’ in regard to the rite of removing the shoe, and from the use of the word ‘ear’ [at Lev. 14:14] to the meaning of the word ‘ear’ in regard to boring the ear of the slave who does not wish to leave his master [in all three cases, the word is taken to mean the right hand, foot, and ear, in other contexts, and refers also to the right hand, foot, and ear in those that are specified],” — what need do I have for that statement, since, so far as the fistful, it can be deduced from the exegesis proposed by Rabbah b. b. Hannah?*
- Q. *One serves to prove that the taking of the fistful is to be done with the right hand, and the other shows that the sanctification of the fistful also is to be done with the right hand.*
- R. **[25A]** *But from the perspective of R. Simeon, who does not require that the fistful be sanctified at all, or from the perspective of the view that R. Simeon does require the sanctification of the fistful but holds that it is fit if it is done by the left hand, what is the purpose of Raba’s drawing an analogy between the use of the word “hand” at the cited verse of Scripture and the use of the word “hand” in the present context? If it is in regard to the actual taking of the fistful, that has been deduced from what R. Judah b. R. Hiyya said. For said R. Judah b. R. Hiyya, “What is the scriptural basis for the position of R. Simeon? It is that Scripture has said, ‘it is most holy, as the sin offering and as the guilt offering’ (Lev. 6:10), which teaches that if the priest comes to carry out the act of service with his hand, he does so with the right hand, as he would with a sin offering; if he comes to perform the act of service with a utensil, he does so with the left hand, as in the case of the guilt offering.”*
- S. *The passage is required only to deal with the case of a priest who takes the fistful of the meal offering of a sinner. You might have supposed that since R. Simeon said, “The reason is that his sacrifice should not be adorned [with oil or incense] let it be fit also, even though the priest takes the fistful with his left hand. Therefore we are informed that that is not the case.*

D. [If] it [the blood] was poured onto the floor and one [then] collected it, it is invalid.

I.1 A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. “And the anointed priest shall take of the blood of the bullock” (Lev. 4: 5) — of the life-blood [which spurts while the animal is dying], but not of the blood of the skin or of the residual blood that drains after death].
- C. “of the blood of the bullock” — he is to receive the blood directly from the bullock [and not allow it to gush to the pavement and then gather it up, and if he does so, it is invalid for the rite].
- D. *For if you think that “of the blood of the bullock” is meant to make that point, as it is written “of the blood” meaning even a portion of the blood, has not R. Judah said Rab said, “He who slaughters the animal must receive all of the blood of the bullock, for it says, ‘and all the remaining blood of the bullock he shall pour out’ (Lev. 4: 7).” So “from the blood of the bullock” means that he is to receive the blood directly from the bullock [and not allow it to gush to the pavement and then gather it up, and if he does so, it is invalid for the rite]. For the premise here is that [Freedman:] you subtract, add, and interpret [Freedman: you may subtract a letter from one word and add it to another where the context warrants it and then interpret the text in accordance with this alteration. The partitive ‘of’ or ‘from’ here is removed from ‘blood’ and added to ‘the bullock,’ so that it reads: and he shall take the blood from the bullock.]*

I.2. A. *Reverting to the body of the previous text:*

- B. R. Judah said Rab said, “He who slaughters the animal must receive all of the blood of the bullock, for it says, ‘and all the remaining blood of the bullock he shall pour out’ (Lev. 4: 7).”
- C. But lo, this verse is stated specifically in connection with the remainder of the blood!
- D. *If the verse cannot refer to the remnant of the blood, since “all” the blood cannot be available at that moment, it must refer to receiving the blood.*

Topical Appendix: Other Rules on the Collection And Disposition of the Blood of Sacrificial Beasts

I.3. A. Said R. Judah said Samuel, “He who slaughters a beast must raise the knife upward, as it is said, ‘and he shall take of the blood of the bullock’ — but not of the blood of the bullock along with something else.”

- B. *And as to the blood on the knife, with what does he wipe it off?*
- C. *Said Abayye, “With the edge of the bowl, as it is written, ‘cleaners of gold’ (Ezra 1:10).”*

I.4. A. Said R. Hisda said R. Jeremiah bar Abba, “He who slaughters an animal has to let **[25B]** the blood of the jugular veins run straight into the vessel.”

- B. *So too it has been stated:*
- C. Said R. Assi said R. Yohanan, “The jugular veins must be exposed to [directly over] the contained airspace of the utensil that is receiving the blood.”

- I.5.** A. *R. Assi asked R. Yohanan, “If one was receiving the blood and the sides of the bowl split before the blood reached the contained airspace of the blood, what is the law? Is an object that is in the air that will not eventually come to rest treated as though it has come to rest, or is that not the case?”*
- B. *He said to him, “We have learned the following Tannaite formulation: in the case of a jug that is located underneath a spout, water inside and outside the barrel is unfit [for mixing with the ashes of the red cow, since this is not deemed running water.] If one joined the mouth to the spout, the water inside is fit, but the water outside is unfit.” [Freedman: in this case water is running down a spout and below the spout and at some distance is a barrel, not located there in order to receive the water. If one takes a utensil and holds it in the airspace of the barrel or above the mouth of the barrel, hence, outside, and catches the water, it is unfit, because if it had been permitted to come to rest in the barrel, it would have ceased to be running water, so it lacks that status. If the mouth of the barrel is flush with the spout and one holds the utensil inside its air space, the water gathered is unfit. If one holds the utensil just below the spout, the water collected is fit, because it never entered the airspace of the barrel. It follows that an object that enters the airspace is regarded as if at rest.]*
- C. *But how is this pertinent to the question at hand! For he raised a question concerning an object in the air which will not eventually come to rest, but he has given him an answer about something in the air that will eventually come to rest [since the water would ordinarily go into the barrel and stay there]!*
- D. *In point of fact he raised two distinct questions: if you maintain that an object that is in the air where it will not eventually come to rest is not regarded as though it were at rest, then how about an object that is in the air where it will eventually come to rest? [The second question is the one he answered].*
- E. *That is how R. Joseph repeated the Tannaite formulation and analysis. But R. Kahana repeated it with regard to the barrel, and he answered him in connection with the barrel.*
- F. *Rabbah repeated it with regard to the barrel, and he answered him in connection with the barrel, arguing in this way from the case of the bowl: “Do you not agree that, in the case of the bowl, sprinkling the blood is unavoidable?” [Freedman: some of the blood must spout through the air into the bowl. Now if an object in the air is not regarded as already at rest, then the blood has entered the bowl and not directly from the animal’s throat but from the air and should be unfit.]*

I.6. A. *There we have learned in the Mishnah:*

- B. **[If] he placed [under running water] his hand or his foot or vegetable greens so that the water should flow into the barrel, it [the water] is unfit. [If for this purpose he made use of] leaves of reeds or nuts, it is fit. This is the principle: [if one used] something which is susceptible to uncleanness — it is unfit. And [if one used] something which is not susceptible to uncleanness — it is fit [M. Par. 6:4A-C].**
- C. *What is the scriptural basis for this rule?*

- D. Said R. Yohanan in the name of R. Yosé bar Abba, “Said Scripture, ‘Nevertheless a fountain or a cistern in which is a gathering of water shall be clean’ (Lev. 11:36) — it must come about through a process wholly insusceptible to uncleanness.”
- E. Said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, “That is to say, the contained airspace of a utensil is equivalent to the utensil itself.” [Freedman: when the water flows over the hand, it does not fall directly into the barrel but first spreads out over the airspace above it. If that airspace were not equivalent to the barrel itself, the water would be regarded as falling from the air into the barrel and not from the hand and so it would be fit.]
- F. *Said R. Zira to R. Hiyya bar Abba, “But perhaps it refers to a direct flow of water into the barrel?”*
- G. *He said to him, “Idiot! We have learned, so that the water should flow into the barrel! And said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, ‘On the basis of the testimony of R. Sadoq was this Mishnah-paragraph formulated. For we have learned in the Mishnah: R. Sadoq gave testimony concerning flowing water which one led through a channel made from nut leaves, that it is valid [as flowing water] There was a case in Ahaleya, and the case came before the court in the hewn-stone chamber, and they declared the water valid [as flowing water].*[M. Ed 7:4A-C].”
- I.7.** A. R. Zira said Rab said, “He who slit the ear of a bull and afterward received the blood — it is invalid, as it is said, ‘And he shall take of the blood of the bullock’ (Lev. 16:14) — the bullock just as it had been prior [to slaughter].” [That is, it must be in the same state when the priest receives the blood as it was before, namely, unblemished (Freedman)].
- B. *So we have found the rule for Most Holy Things, but whence the same rule for Lesser Holy Things?*
- C. *Said Raba, “It has been taught on Tannaite authority: “Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male of the first year” (Exo. 12: 5) — indicating that it must be unblemished, a year old, when it is slaughtered.*
- D. “How do we know the rule that it must be in the same condition at the time of the receiving of the blood, carrying and sprinkling of it? As it is said, “it shall be,” meaning, at all stages of the rite it must be without blemish and a year old.”
- E. *Objected Abayye to that statement, by citing the following, “R. Joshua says, ‘All the sacrifices that are mentioned in the Torah of which there remained an olive’s bulk of meat and an olive’s bulk of fat — the priest sprinkles the blood on its account. If there remained only a half olive’s bulk of meat or a half olive’s bulk of fat, he does not toss the blood on its account. And in the case of a burnt offering, even if there is a half olive’s bulk of meat or a half olive’s bulk of fat, one tosses the blood on its account, because in any event all of it is suitable for burning. And in the case of a meal offering, if there did not remain of the sacrifice a half olive’s bulk of meat or a half olive’s bulk of fat, even if the whole meal offering in its entirety remains available, one does not sprinkle the blood on its account. As to the Passover, if there is an olive’s bulk for each and every participant, one tosses the blood, and if not, one does not toss the blood’* [T. Zeb. 4:3A-F].”

- F. *Interpret that statement to deal with a beast a year old when the act of slaughter takes place, but [having passed its birthday at that instance] two years old when the blood is carried and sprinkled.* [Freedman: at all of the stages of the sacrifice it must be a year old, but it does not have to be unblemished at all of those stages.]
- G. *And is it in fact possible for a beast to be a year old when the act of slaughter takes place, but [having passed its birthday at that instance] two years old when the blood is carried and sprinkled?*
- H. Said Raba, "That is to say that the passage of even hours may disqualify a beast that has been designated for use as an animal sacrifice."

- I.8.** A. Said R. Ammi said R. Eleazar, "If the beast is inside the Temple court and its foot outside, if someone cut off the legs and then slaughtered the animal, it is fit. **[26A]** If he slaughtered the beast and only then cut off the legs, it is fit." [Freedman: if the blood of a sacrifice passes outside the Temple court before it is sprinkled, it is unfit. In this case if one cut off the legs first, the blood that passed out, that is, from the legs, has not mingled with that which remains inside the Temple court. But if he slaughtered the beast and then cut off the legs, as soon as the beast was slaughtered, the blood of the legs is unfit, and this mingles with the rest of the blood.]
- B. "If someone cut off the legs and then slaughtered the animal, it is fit" — *but in such a case, the priest is offering a blemished beast! Rather, I should say, "If he cut off the legs and then received the blood it is fit; if he received the blood and then cut off the legs, it is unfit."*
 - C. "If he cut off the legs and then received the blood it is fit" — but lo, said R. Zira [said Rab], "He who slit the ear of a firstling and afterward received the blood — it is invalid, as it is said, 'And he shall take of the blood of the bullock' (Lev. 16:14) — the bullock just as it had been prior [to slaughter]."
 - D. Said R. Hisda said Abimi, "He cuts the limb to the bone" [which is not a blemish; the cut stops the blood below it, outside the Temple court, from flowing upward and mingling with the blood above, which is within the Temple court (Freedman)].
 - E. "If he slaughtered the beast and only then cut off the legs, it is fit" — *this bears the implication that* blood that is absorbed in the limbs is classified as blood [for if it did not fall into the category of blood while it is absorbed in the limb, it would not disqualify the other blood, which is received and sprinkled].
 - F. *But perhaps the operative consideration is the fattiness* [Freedman: that is absorbed in the blood; this is deemed meat and it goes up and mingles with the blood that pours out of the neck and so disqualifies it].
 - G. Then there is the inference that if the meat of sacrifices of Lesser Holy Things is taken out of the Temple court prior to the sprinkling of the blood, it is unfit.
 - H. Not at all, perhaps the statement in hand speaks only of sacrifices of Most Holy Things.

I.9. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. Most Holy Things are to be slaughtered on the north side of the Temple court and their blood is to be received in utensils of service on the north side of the Temple court. If the priest stood in the southern part of the court and stretched out his

hand into the north and slaughtered the beast, his act of slaughter is valid. If he received the blood in such a posture, it is invalid.

- C. If he poked his head and the greater part of his body into that space, it is as though the whole of the priest had entered that space.
- D. If in its death throes the beast struggled and went into the southern precinct and then returned to the north, it remains valid.
- E. As to Lesser Holy Things, they are to be slaughtered anywhere within the Temple court and their blood is to be received in utensils of service anywhere within the Temple court. If the priest stood outside of the court and stretched out his hand within the Temple court and slaughtered the beast, his act of slaughter is valid. If he received the blood in such a posture, it is invalid.
- F. If he poked his head and the greater part of his body into that space, it is as though the whole of the priest had not entered that space.
- G. If in its death throes the beast struggled and went outside and then returned to the inside space of the courtyard, it is invalid.
- H. *It follows that* if the meat of Lesser Holy Things was taken outside the courtyard prior to the sprinkling of the blood, it is invalid.
- I. But perhaps this refers only to the fat-tail, lobe above the liver, and two kidneys [which are burned on the altar; while deriving from the Lesser Holy Things, because these parts are burned on the altar, they are subject to the rule of Most Holy Things (Freedman)].

I.10. A. *The father of Samuel asked Samuel*, “What is the rule if the animal is inside the Temple court but the feet are outside?”

- B. He said to him, “It is written, ‘Even that they may bring them to the Lord’ (Lev. 17: 5) — so that the whole of it must be within the Temple court.”
- C. “If one suspended the animal [in the airspace of the Temple court] and slaughtered it, what is the rule?”
- D. He said to him, “It is valid.”
- E. *He said to him, “You err, for the act of slaughter must take place ‘at the side of the altar’ (Lev. 1:11), and that condition has not been met!”*
- F. “If the officiating priest was suspended and in that posture slaughtered the beast, what is the rule?”
- G. He said to him, “He has invalidated the offering.”
- H. He said to him, “*You err*, for the act of slaughter must take place ‘at the side of the altar’ (Lev. 1:11), not that the person who does the slaughtering has to be ‘at the side of the altar’ (Lev. 1:11).”
- I. “If the officiating priest was suspended and in that posture received the blood of the beast, what is the rule?”
- J. He said to him, “It is a valid action.”
- K. He said to him, “*You err*, for that is not the way in which the act of service is done.”
- L. “If he suspended the animal and received the blood from it when it was suspended, what is the rule?”
- M. He said to him, “It is an invalid action.”

N. He said to him, “*You err*, for it is the act of slaughter that must take place ‘at the side of the altar’ (Lev. 1:11), and not the act of receiving the blood.”

I.11. A. Said Abayye, “In the case of offerings classified as Most Holy Things, all of the aforelisted actions are invalid, except for the one in which the priest suspended himself and performed the act of slaughter [in airspace of the Temple courtyard]. In the case of Lesser Holy Things, all of the aforelisted actions are valid, except for the one in which he suspended himself and received the blood” [Freedman: here neither north nor on the side is mentioned; therefore the only invalid case is the exception in that that is not the way the rite is ordinarily carried on].”

B. *Said Raba, “What differentiates the case in which the priest has suspended himself and received the blood in the case of Lesser Holy Things, that that conduct is valid? It is that the contained airspace of the inner part of the courtyard is classified as the courtyard itself. But then the contained airspace of the northern side of the courtyard ought to be classified as equivalent to the northern side of the courtyard, so far as Most Holy Things are concerned!”*

C. Rather, said Raba, “In the case of Most Holy Things as well as Lesser Holy Things, all of the aforelisted actions are valid, except for the case of the priest’s suspending the animal and slaughtering it in the instance of Most Holy Things, and in the cases of both Most Holy Things and Lesser Holy Things where the priest suspended himself and received the blood.”

I.12. A. R. Jeremiah asked R. Zira, “If the priest is inside the Temple court but the locks of his hair [or: his show-fringes] are outside, what is the law?”

B. He said to him, “Have you not stated, ‘...even that they may bring them into the Lord’ bears the meaning that the whole of the animal must enter within the Temple courtyard? Then here too, ‘when they go into the tent of meeting (Exo. 28:43) means, the whole of the priest must enter the Temple courtyard.”

2:1E-K

E. [If] one [a priest who was fit, by contrast to M. 3:1E] sprinkled it [the blood] on the ramp, not by the [altar] base [but rather on the southeast corner, which had no base (Freedman)] —

F. [if] one sprinkled those [drops of blood] which are to be sprinkled below [the red line around the altar], above [the red line around the altar],

G. and those which are to be sprinkled above [the red line around the altar], below [the red line around the altar],

H. those which are to be sprinkled inside [that is, the inner altar], outside [on the outer altar],

I. and those which are to be sprinkled outside [on the outer altar], inside [that is, the inner altar] —

J. it is invalid.

K. And punishment by extirpation does not apply to it [for him who eats thereof, because of M. 2:3J].

I.1 A. [26B] Said Samuel, “While the meat of the animal is unfit, the owners have attained atonement. *What is the scriptural basis for this position? Scripture has said, ‘And I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement’* (Lev. 17:11)

— once the blood of the sacrificial beast has reached the altar, the owners have attained atonement.

- B. *“But if so, should not the meat too be deemed fit? Not at all, for Scripture has said, ‘to make atonement’ (Lev. 17:11) — which is to say, ‘I have given it for atonement, but not for any other purpose.’”*
- C. *It therefore follows that Samuel takes the position that putting the blood not in its proper place is tantamount to putting it in its proper place [for the purpose just now stated]. But in the next chapter of our tractate we have learned in the Mishnah: [If after the blood was received in a utensil, it poured from the utensil onto the pavement and one gathered it up, it is valid.] [If he who was unfit] tossed it on the ramp, not against the foundation of the altar, [if] he tossed those which are to be tossed below, above, or those which are to be tossed above, below, those which are to be tossed inside, outside, or those which are to be tossed outside, inside, if the lifeblood still remained in the beast, a suitable person should go and receive it [and repeat the sprinklings] [M. 3:1G-K]. Now if you should imagine that putting the blood not in its proper place is tantamount to putting it in its proper place, why is it the rule that a suitable person should go and receive it [and repeat the sprinklings]? And should you say that the purpose is to permit the eating of the meat of the animal, is there an act of sprinkling that at one and the same time does not effect atonement but nonetheless permits the meat of the animal to be eaten by the priests [for atonement has already been achieved]?*
- D. *Well, if a fit priest had tossed the blood to begin with, that indeed would have been a decisive consideration. But here, with what sort of a situation do we deal? It is one in which an unfit priest has tossed the blood to begin with [so there is an issue of atonement in the second tossing of the blood].*
- E. *[But if blood not tossed in the right spot is as though it were tossed in the right spot, which invalidates the offering and which cannot be repaired (Freedman),] then let the rejection of the entire process be complete! For we have learned in the Mishnah: **But all of them [who are unfit] who received the blood [intending to eat the flesh] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, if the lifeblood [suitable for tossing] still remained [in the beast, that is, the blood which issues at the moment of death] — a fit person should go and [with proper intention] receive [it] [since the improper intention of unfit people is null in respect to receiving, conveying, and tossing the blood. The offering remains valid in the case of [M. 3:1F-H]. It follows that only if they had received the blood with improper intention does the rule apply, but not if they sprinkled it with improper intention [in which case there is no remedy at all]. And what is the reason? Is it not because this effects a complete rejection of the offering?***
- F. *No, it is that the offering became unfit through the application on the part of the officiating priest of an illegitimate intention.*
- G. *If that is the case, then why should the receiving of the blood not be equally affected by the illegitimate intention? And furthermore, does an illegitimate intention on the part of an unfit priest invalidate an offering at all? Has not Raba said, “An illegitimate intentionality is affective only on the part of one who is*

suitable to perform the rite, only in regard for something that is appropriate for the Temple service, and only in the place in which the rite is appropriately carried on”?

- H. *Then do not say, “but not if they sprinkled it,” but rather, “but not if they slaughtered it in this way” [because even unfit priests may slaughter the beast as may non-priests, so their illegitimate intentionality is affective in that aspect of the rite].*
- I. *Then what is the point here? That an illegitimate intention disqualifies under such circumstances? But we have learned in the Mishnah: [All unfit people [e.g., the ten listed at M. 2:1A] who slaughtered — their act of slaughter is valid. For an act of slaughter is valid [when done] by non-priests, women, slaves, and unclean men, even in the case of [their slaughtering] Most Holy Things. And [this is so] on condition that the unclean people do not touch the meat.] Therefore they [also] invalidate by improper intention [in the act of slaughtering] [M. Zeb. 3:1A-E; operative language: E].*
- J. *The point that the framer wishes to make is that from the act of receiving the blood and onwards through the rite, improper intentionality on the part of the unfit priest does not invalidate, and what is the operative consideration? It is in accord with that which was stated by Raba.*
- K. *An objection to this proposition was raised on the basis of the following: [If] the officiating priest slaughtered it on condition to sprinkle those which are to be sprinkled below, above, or those which are to be sprinkled above, below — if the intention was to do this immediately [on that day itself, which is the proper time], the act is still valid [for the illegitimate intention does not disqualify]. If he then formed and expressed the intention [27A] of eating the meat outside of the proper place, it is invalid, but the penalty of extirpation does not pertain. If he intended eating the meat after a while, it is invalid, and the penalty of extirpation does apply. If he formed the intention of sprinkling the blood in the wrong place on the next day, it is invalid; if he then intended to eat the meat out of the proper space or after the proper time, it is invalid, and the penalty of extirpation does not apply. Now if you take the position, as you have proposed, that blood not put in the proper place on the altar is in the category of blood that has been put in the proper place, is this merely invalid? Surely the outcome of this improper intentionality is that the officiating priest through his improper intentionality ought to have rendered the offering refuse [and not merely invalid]!*
- L. *Said Mar Zutra, “Improper intentionality having to do with sprinkling that permits the meat of the offering to be eaten has the power of classifying the meat as refuse, but improper intentionality having to do with sprinkling that does not permit the offering to be eaten does not have the power of classifying the meat as refuse.” [The former involves the intentionality to sprinkle the blood in its proper place, but if the blood is not sprinkled on the proper place on the altar, as Samuel has said, the meat may not be eaten, even though the offering has achieved atonement for the owners (Freedman)].*
- M. *Said R. Ashi to Mar Zutra, “How do you know this? Is it because it is written, ‘And if any of the meat of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day...it shall be an abhorred thing and the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity’ [of extirpation] (Lev. 7:18), so extirpation is incurred only when the improper*

intentionality that classifies the offering as abhorred prevents the meat from being eaten, which then excludes a case in which the improper intentionality that classifies the offering as abhorred is not the cause of the meat's being prohibited, but some other consideration causes that prohibition. *But then, if that is not an illegitimate intentionality as to sprinkling, then the offering should not be disqualified either!*"

- N. *Said R. Nahman b. Isaac, "It is comparable to the case in which the improper intentionality concerns leaving the blood over for sprinkling until the next day, and that matter is treated in accord with the position of R. Judah [who maintains that in the case of such an intentionality, the offering is invalid]."* [Freedman: In intending to sprinkle the blood in the wrong place on the next day, the priest has also tacitly expressed his intention of leaving the blood until the next day.]
- O. [Contrary to the view of Samuel, that the sense of the Mishnah's statement that the offering is unfit is that while the meat of the animal is unfit, the owners have attained atonement,] R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "In point of fact when the Mishnah says, 'unfit,' that is meant literally [and the whole offering is invalid]. *It still follows [as it does for Samuel] that putting the blood not in its proper place is tantamount to putting it in its proper place. But there is no contradiction.* For in the one case the priest applied the blood in silence, and in the other, he applied it with an articulated intentionality." [Freedman: The verse adduced by Samuel, which intimates that the owners are forgiven, holds good where the priest sprinkled the blood in the wrong place, with no unlawful intention attending the sprinkling. The Mishnah, which states that it is unfit, implying that the owners are not forgiven either, holds good where in addition to sprinkling the blood in the wrong place the priest intended eating the meat after the right time. The Mishnah thus teaches that in such a case the sacrifice is unfit but not refuse, since the sprinkling which was not in its proper place did not permit the eating of the meat.]
- P. *But in the next chapter of our tractate we have learned in the Mishnah: [If after the blood was received in a utensil, it poured from the utensil onto the pavement and one gathered it up, it is valid.] [If he who was unfit] tossed it on the ramp, not against the foundation of the altar, [if] he tossed those which are to be tossed below, above, or those which are to be tossed above, below, those which are to be tossed inside, outside, or those which are to be tossed outside, inside, if the lifeblood still remained in the beast, a suitable person should go and receive it [and repeat the sprinklings] [M. 3:1G-K]. Now if you should imagine that putting the blood not in its proper place is tantamount to putting it in its proper place, why is it the rule that a suitable person should go and receive it [and repeat the sprinklings]? And should you say that the purpose is to permit the eating of the meat of the animal, is there an act of sprinkling that at one and the same time does not effect atonement but nonetheless permits the meat of the animal to be eaten by the priests [for atonement has already been achieved]?*
- Q. *Well, if a fit priest had tossed the blood to begin with, that indeed would have been a decisive consideration. But here, with what sort of a situation do we deal? It is one in which an unfit priest has tossed the blood to begin with [so there is an issue of atonement in the second tossing of the blood].*

- R. [But if blood not tossed in the right spot is as though it were tossed in the right spot, which invalidates the offering and which cannot be repaired (Freedman),] *then let the rejection of the entire process be complete! For we have learned in the Mishnah: But all of them [who are unfit] who received the blood [intending to eat the flesh] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, if the lifeblood [suitable for tossing] still remained [in the beast, that is, the blood which issues at the moment of death] — a fit person should go and [with proper intention] receive [it] [since the improper intention of unfit people is null in respect to receiving, conveying, and tossing the blood. The offering remains valid in the case of [M. 3:1F-H]. It follows that only if they had received the blood with improper intention does the rule apply, but not if they sprinkled it with improper intention [in which case there is no remedy at all]. And what is the reason? Is it not because this effects a complete rejection of the offering?*
- S. *No, it is that the offering became unfit through the application on the part of the officiating priest of an illegitimate intention.*
- T. *If that is the case, then why should the receiving of the blood not be equally affected by the illegitimate intention? And furthermore, does an illegitimate intention on the part of an unfit priest invalidate an offering at all? Has not Raba said, “An illegitimate intentionality is affective only on the part of one who is suitable to perform the rite, only in regard for something that is appropriate for the Temple service, and only in the place in which the rite is appropriately carried on”?*
- U. *Then do not say, “but not if they sprinkled it,” but rather, “but not if they slaughtered it in this way” [because even unfit priests may slaughter the beast as may non-priests, so their illegitimate intentionality is affective in that aspect of the rite].*
- V. *Then what is the point here? That an illegitimate intention disqualifies under such circumstances? But we have learned in the Mishnah: [All unfit people [e.g., the ten listed at M. 2:1A] who slaughtered — their act of slaughter is valid. For an act of slaughter is valid [when done] by non-priests, women, slaves, and unclean men, even in the case of [their slaughtering] Most Holy Things. And [this is so] on condition that the unclean people do not touch the meat.] Therefore they [also] invalidate by improper intention [in the act of slaughtering] [M. Zeb. 3:1A-E; operative language: E].*
- W. *The point that the framer wishes to make is that from the act of receiving the blood and onwards through the rite, improper intentionality on the part of the unfit priest does not invalidate, and what is the operative consideration? It is in accord with that which was stated by Raba.*
- X. *An objection to this proposition was raised on the basis of the following: [If] the officiating priest slaughtered it on condition to sprinkle those which are to be sprinkled below, above, or those which are to be sprinkled above, below — if the intention was to do this immediately [on that day itself, which is the proper time], the act is still valid [for the illegitimate intention does not disqualify]. If he then formed and expressed the intention of eating the meat outside of the proper place, it is invalid, but the penalty of extirpation does not pertain. If he intended eating the meat after a while, it is invalid, and the penalty of extirpation does apply. If he*

formed the intention of sprinkling the blood in the wrong place on the next day, it is invalid; if he then intended to eat the meat out of the proper space or after the proper time, it is invalid, and the penalty of extirpation does not apply. *Now if you take the position, as you have proposed, that blood not put in the proper place on the altar is in the category of blood that has been put in the proper place, is this merely invalid? Surely the outcome of this improper intentionality is that the officiating priest through his improper intentionality ought to have rendered the offering refuse [and not merely invalid]!*

- Y. *Said Mar Zutra, "Improper intentionality having to do with sprinkling that permits the meat of the offering to be eaten has the power of classifying the meat as refuse, but improper intentionality having to do with sprinkling that does not permit the offering to be eaten does not have the power of classifying the meat as refuse."* [The former involves the intentionality to sprinkle the blood in its proper place, but if the blood is not sprinkled on the proper place on the altar, as Samuel has said, the meat may not be eaten, even though the offering has achieved atonement for the owners (Freedman)].
- Z. *Said R. Ashi to Mar Zutra, "How do you know this? Is it because it is written, 'And if any of the meat of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day...it shall be an abhorred thing and the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity' [of extirpation] (Lev. 7:18), so extirpation is incurred only when the improper intentionality that classifies the offering as abhorred prevents the meat from being eaten, which then excludes a case in which the improper intentionality that classifies the offering as abhorred is not the cause of the meat's being prohibited, but some other consideration causes that prohibition. But then, if that is not an illegitimate intentionality as to sprinkling, then the offering should not be disqualified either!"*
- AA. *Said R. Nahman b. Isaac, "It is comparable to the case in which the improper intentionality concerns leaving the blood over for sprinkling until the next day, and that matter is treated in accord with the position of R. Judah [who maintains that in the case of such an intentionality, the offering is invalid]."* [Freedman: In intending to sprinkle the blood in the wrong place on the next day, the priest has also tacitly expressed his intention of leaving the blood until the next day.]
- BB. R. Yohanan said, "Both cases [the Mishnah-paragraph before us, which states that the upshot is an unfit offering, and the Mishnah-paragraph just now cited, which teaches that the blood has to be sprinkled again] address a case in which the officiating priest has sprinkled the blood in silence, and still the operative principle is that doing so in the wrong place is not tantamount to doing so in the right place. But the one rule applies where the life-blood is still gushing, and the other deals with a case in which it is not still gushing."

I.2. A. We have learned in the Mishnah: He who slaughters the animal offering [intending] to toss its blood outside [of the Temple court], (1) or part of its blood outside, to burn its sacrificial portions outside, (1) or part of its sacrificial portions outside, to eat its meat outside (1) or an olive's bulk of its meat outside, or to eat an olive's bulk of the skin of the fat tail outside — it is invalid. And punishment by extirpation

does not apply to it [e.g., in the case of the priest who eats thereof] [M. 2:2A-G].

- B. *Now from the viewpoint of R. Simeon b. Laqish, that presents no problem, since the passage quite properly says, **it is invalid. And punishment by extirpation does not apply to it.** But from the perspective of R. Yohanan, why say that **punishment by extirpation does not apply to it?***
- C. *That is indeed a problem.*
- D. *And from the viewpoint of Samuel, what is the meaning of **punishment by extirpation does not apply to it?***
- E. *This is the sense of the statement at hand: If he sprinkled it in such a manner with an improper intention, then **it is invalid. And punishment by extirpation does not apply to it.***
- F. *Now as to the view of R. Yohanan, if the sprinkling the blood on the wrong place on the altar is not tantamount to having sprinkled the blood on the right place [so this does not count as sprinkling at all], then why not treat the case as though the blood had been spilled from the utensil of service on to the pavement, and let the priest collect it once again and resprinkle the blood?*
- G. *He takes the view of him who has said that the blood may not be collected and sprinkled again.*
- H. *For said R. Isaac bar Joseph said R. Yohanan, “All parties concur in the case of blood that was supposed to be sprinkled above the red line, which one has sprinkled above the red line, or concerning blood that was supposed to be sprinkled below the red line, which one has sprinkled below it, but not in accord with the religious duty that pertains to such an action [e.g., it was done with the left hand, or without the proper intentionality (Freedman)], one should not then collect the blood and resprinkle it. The difference comes in a case in which blood that was supposed to be sprinkled above the red line was sprinkled below, or blood that was supposed to be sprinkled below the red line was sprinkled above, for R. Yosé says, ‘One may not collect it and resprinkle it,’ and r. Simeon says, ‘One may collect the blood and resprinkle it.’ [27B] And our Mishnah-paragraph is in accord with the one who says, ‘One may not collect it and resprinkle it.’”*
- I. *But R. Hisda said Abimi said, “All parties concur in the case of blood that was to be sprinkled below the red line which one sprinkled above, that one should not collect it and resprinkle it, and all the more so blood that was to be sprinkled above the red line that one sprinkled below it, since the blood that is sprinkled above will run down below, [so it is as though it were sprinkled below]. Where they differ is only in the case of blood that was to be sprinkled on the inner altar, which one sprinkled on the outer altar, or on the outer altar, which one sprinkled on the inner altar, for R. Yosé says, ‘One may not collect it and resprinkle it,’ and R. Simeon says, ‘One may collect the blood and resprinkle it.’”*

I.3. *A. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, “So we too have learned on Tannaite authority:”*

- B. R. Judah says, “‘This is the Torah of the burnt offering, it is that which goes up’ (Lev. 6:23) — lo, there are three exclusionary statements, thus meaning to exclude, first, a sacrifice that was slaughtered by night, second, one the blood of which has been spilled, and third, one the blood of which has been taken outside of the Temple veils. [These sacrifices are excluded from the law that holds that once a sacrifice has been placed on the altar, it may not be removed from the altar, so that,] in these cases, if an offering has gone up on the altar, it is to be removed from it.”
- C. R. Simeon says, “From the word ‘burnt offering’ I know only that the law pertains to a valid offering. How do I know that the law encompasses the sacrifice that was slaughtered by night, one the blood of which has been spilled, and one the blood of which has been taken outside of the Temple veils, as well as the one that has been left over night, and the one that has been taken outside, and the one that has become unclean, and the one that was left over, and the one that was slaughtered by the officiating priest after he had formed the intention to toss the blood outside of its proper time or outside of its proper place, or one the blood of which has been received by unfit priests, or one the blood of which has been tossed in such a way that what was supposed to be tossed above the red line around the altar has been tossed below, and what was supposed to be tossed below the red line around the altar has been tossed above, and one the blood of which was supposed to be tossed inside that was tossed outside, and one the blood of which was supposed to be tossed outside that was tossed inside, and the Passover and the sin offering that the officiating priest has slaughtered not for the sake of those designated purposes at all? Scripture states, ‘This is the Torah of the burnt offering’ (Lev. 6:23). This serves to extend the rule, so that a single Torah applies to all manner of burnt offerings, so that if they should go up on the altar, they are not to be brought down from there.
- D. “Might I suppose that I should extend that same law to the animal that has committed an act of sexual relations with a woman or upon whom a man has committed an act of sexual relations, an animal designated as an offering to an animal and one that has actually been used for that purpose, the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog, a hybrid beast and a terefah-beast and one that has been born through caesarean section? Scripture to the contrary states, ‘This....’
- E. “And how come you encompass the one set and exclude the other?
- F. “Since Scripture has both extended the law and also stated matters in an exclusive way, you might say, ‘I shall encompass these, the invalidating aspect of which has taken place in the sanctuary, but I shall exclude those, the invalidating aspect of which did not come about within the sanctuary.’”

G. *In any event, among the cases that are listed are those in which or one the blood of which has been tossed in such a way that what was supposed to be tossed above the red line around the altar has been tossed below, and what was supposed to be tossed below the red line around the altar has been tossed above, and R. Judah does not take issue. Is not the operative consideration that the altar has received the blood and sanctified it, in the sense that it cannot be collected for resprinkling [Freedman]?*

I.4. A. Said R. Eleazar, “The inner altar has the power to sanctify even what is unfit [so that if what is unfit is put on the altar, it is not removed, and that is the case even though the Scripture refers only to the outer altar].”

B. *Of what does he now tell us, for have we not learned the rule when it is stated above, the blood of which was supposed to be tossed inside that was tossed outside, and one the blood of which was supposed to be tossed outside that was tossed inside?*

C. *If I had to derive the rule from that formulation, I might have supposed that that is the rule governing blood,, which is appropriate to the altar, but as to a handful of meal offering, should it be tossed on the inner altar, which is not eligible for use on the inner altar [since meal is never burned on the inner altar], I might have supposed that that is not the rule. So we are informed to the contrary.*

D. *An objection was raised:* If inappropriate incense [that is, incense provided only for an individual to fulfil a vow, which is inappropriate because Scripture allows for only incense offered in behalf of the community along with communal sacrifices] that was put up on the altar, it is to be removed, for only the outer altar can sanctify what is unfit, in the case of an offering that would otherwise be eligible for it. *It follows that the rule governs the outer altar but not the inner altar.*

E. *This is how to iron out the problem:* If inappropriate incense [that is, incense provided only for an individual to fulfil a vow, which is inappropriate because Scripture allows for only incense offered in behalf of the community along with communal sacrifices] that was put up on the outer altar, it is to be removed, for only the outer altar can sanctify what is unfit, in the case of an offering that would otherwise be eligible for it. But as to the inner altar, it sanctifies both what is appropriate for use on it and what is not appropriate for use on it. *What is the operative consideration? The outer altar is comparable only to the pavement [Freedman: it is an immovable unanointed construction of stone] and the inner altar is comparable to a utensil of service*

[Freedman: it is moveable and consecrated by anointing; therefore its sanctity and sanctifying powers are greater].

2:2

- A. He who slaughters the animal offering [intending]
 - B. to toss its blood outside [of the Temple court], (1) or part of its blood outside,
 - C. to burn its sacrificial portions outside, (1) or part of its sacrificial portions outside,
 - D. to eat its meat outside (1) or an olive's bulk of its meat outside,
 - E. or to eat an olive's bulk of the skin of the fat tail outside —
 - F. it is invalid.
 - G. But punishment by extirpation does not apply to it [e.g., in the case of the priest who eats thereof].
 - H. [Supply: He who slaughters the animal offering, intending]
 - I. to toss its blood on the next day, (1) or part of its blood on the next day,
 - J. to burn its sacrificial portions on the next day, (1) or part of its sacrificial portions on the next day,
 - K. to eat its meat on the next day, (1) or part of its meat on the next day,
 - L. or an olive's bulk of the skin of the fat tail on the next day —
 - M. it is refuse.
 - N. And they [who eat it, even at the proper time] are liable on its account to punishment by extirpation.
- I.1** A. *It was assumed that the skin of the fat-tail is [28A] to be classified as the fat-tail, in which case there is the following difficulty: surely the priest has formed an intention concerning a human being's eating what is in point of fact consumed by the altar [and such an intentionality should be null and produce no effects]!*
- B. *Said Samuel, "Who is the authority of this rule? It is R. Eliezer, who takes the view that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who slaughters the animal sacrifice [intending] to eat something which is not usually eaten, to burn something which is not usually burned — it is valid. R. Eliezer declares invalid [M. Zeb. 3:3A-D].** [The intentionality that has confused the categories of food yielded by the sacrifice is therefore valid in Eliezer's view, which means that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat.]"*
- C. *Now in accord with whose position have you assigned the passage of the Mishnah, R. Eliezer? Then let me cite the concluding part of the Mishnah-paragraph before us: **This is the general rule: Whoever slaughters, or receives [the blood], or conveys [the blood], or sprinkles [the blood] [intending] to eat something which is usually eaten [flesh], to burn something which is usually burned [entrails]... [M. 2:3A-C] — thus if it is something that is usually eaten, then the improper intentionality is affective, but it is not something that is usually***

eaten, the improper intentionality is null. So would it appear that the opening clause accords with the position of R. Eliezer, while the concluding generation with the position of rabbis [vis a vis R. Eliezer]?

D. *He said to him, "True."*

I.2. A. *R. Huna said, "The skin of the fat-tail is not to be classified as the fat-tail."*

B. *Said Raba, "What is the scriptural basis behind the position of R. Huna? It is that Scripture has said, 'The fat thereof is the [entire] fat tail' (Lev. 3: 9) [but not the skin of the fat-tail]."*

C. *R. Hisda said, "In point of fact "The skin of the fat-tail is to be classified as the fat-tail, but here [in our Mishnah's rule] with what case do we deal? It is the fat-tail of a goat [which is not burned on the altar (Freedman)]."*

D. *Now all of the cited scholars do not state matters in line with Samuel, for they did not wish to assign the opening clause of the rule to R. Eliezer and the closing clause to rabbis. And, further, they did not wish to state matters in line with the view of R. Huna, because they do maintain that the skin of the fat tail is classified as is the fat tail itself. But why do they not concur with R. Hisda?*

E. *Because if he is right, then on his view, what does the framer of the passage tell us? It is that the skin of the fat tail is classified as the fat tail. But that we have already learned in the Mishnah: [In the case of] these, their skin [hide] is [deemed] equivalent to their meat: (1) the skin of man, and (2) the skin of a domesticated pig — R. Yosé says, "Also: The hide of a wild boar" — and (3) skin of the hump of a young camel, and (4) the skin of the head of a young calf, and (5) the skin of the hooves, and (6) the skin of the genitals, and (7) the skin of the foetus, and (8) the skin which is under the fat tail, and (9) the skin of the hedgehog, and the chameleon, and the lizard, and the snail [M. Hul. 9:2A-D].*

F. *R. Hisda found it necessary to reiterate the rule here as well, because he thought that one might have supposed that, in the context of the above-cited Mishnah-paragraph, which refers to joining together of various parts of the cited classifications of animate beings, the rule pertained in particular in regard to cultic uncleanness, because where the skin is soft, it joins together with the meat. But here, I might have invoked the passage of Scripture, "Even all the hallowed things of the children of Israel to you have I given them for a consecrated portion" (Num. 18: 8), meaning, as a mark of greatness, to be eaten in the way that kings eat their food; and this [skin] is not eaten by kings. So I might have thought that that rule does not apply in the present context, and he therefore informs us that that is not a valid conclusion to be drawn.*

G. *An objection was raised: He who slaughters an animal sacrifice intending to eat an olive's bulk of the skin of the fat tail outside of its proper place — the offering is unfit, but the penalty of extirpation does not apply to the case. If he does so intending to eat an olive's bulk of the skin of the fat tail outside of its proper time, it is refuse, and they are liable on its account for extirpation. R. Eleazar b. Judah of Eiblayyim says in the name of R. Simeon, and so did R. Simeon b. Judah of Kefar Akkum say in the name of R. Simeon, "All the same are the skin of the fat tail and the skin of the head and of the tender calf and the skin of the hooves in the case of small cattle and everything that is*

eaten, including the skin of the pudenda: the skin is equivalent to the meat. So if one slaughters the animal intending to eat any of the aforementioned items outside of their proper time, the sacrifice is unfit, but extirpation therefore does not apply to the act. If he does so intending to eat any of them outside of the proper time, the offering is refuse, and the penalty of extirpation is incurred” [T. Zeb. 2:3A-D]. *This pertains then to the burnt offering but not to a sacrifice. As for R. Huna there is no problem, for that is in line with his specification that we deal with a burnt offering [so the rule before us can speak of a burnt offering but to sacrifices of no other classification]. But as to R. Hisda, why specify “burnt offering,” when he can as well have framed matters in terms of sacrifices of any classification?*

- H. *R. Hisda can say to you, “If you wish, I may say that this refers to the fat tail of a goat [which can be eaten in the wrong area and subjected therefore to that intentionality, but which is not burned on the altar], and if you prefer, I may say that the passage is to be read simply, ‘sacrifice.’”*

II.1 A. it is invalid. But punishment by extirpation does not apply to it [e.g., in the case of the priest who eats thereof]:

- B. *What is the scriptural source for the rule at hand?*
- C. *Said Samuel, “There are two pertinent verses of Scripture.”*
- D. *And what might they be?*
- E. *Said Rabbah, “‘And if any of the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day’ (Lev. 7:18) — this refers to the intentionality of eating the meat after the specified time limit, ‘it shall be refuse’ (Lev. 7:18) refers to the intentionality of eating the meat in the wrong place, ‘and the soul of the one who eats it shall bear his iniquity’ (Lev. 7:18) — only one such action involves the penalty of extirpation, but not both of them, and the penalty applies in particular to improper intentionality, not deed].”*
- F. *But might I not say that the clause, “and the soul of the one who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Lev. 7:18) refers to the intentionality of eating the meat in the wrong place, serving to exclude the matter of the improper intentionality of eating the meat after the specified span of time?*
- G. *It stands to reason that the matter of the improper intentionality of eating the meat after the specified span of time is the weightier of the two matters, since Scripture begins with reference to that subject.*
- H. *To the contrary, the matter of the improper intentionality of eating the meat outside of the specified location is the weightier of the two matters, since that matter is inserted alongside the reference to the result, which is making the offering into refuse.*
- I. *Rather, said Abayye, “When R. Isaac bar Abdimi came, he said Rab said, “Raba depends upon that which a Tannaite authority repeated, specifically: ‘When Scripture says, “the third day” in the passage that concerns “you shall be holy” [Lev. 19:1ff.: “And if the meat of a sacrifice be eaten at all on the third day, it is refuse, it shall not be accepted”], which hardly requires articulation for the matter has already been set forth when Scripture says, “And if any one the meat of his sacrifices be at all eaten on the third day,” [28B] since the matter is redundant in*

respect to the consideration of eating the meat after the proper time to do so, apply it to the consideration of eating the meat outside of the proper location. *And yet the All-Merciful has expressed a limitation in connection with eating left-over meat [that is, after the proper time], when it says, “But every one who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Lev. 19: 8), which excludes eating or intending to eat the meat outside of the proper place.’”*

- J. *But why not take the view that “But every one who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Lev. 19: 8) refers to eating so outside of the proper place, so excluding the one who eats left-over sacrificial meat from the penalty of extirpation?*
- K. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the consideration of not eating left-over sacrificial meat should involve extirpation, so that the sense of a reference to “iniquity” where the context is intentionality to eat the meat after the proper time may be derived from analogy, since it is similarly used in regard to the consideration of eating the meat at the proper time and eating the meat at a high place. [Freedman: At Lev. 7:18 and at Lev. 19: 8, Scripture says that one who eats meat in a given classification “shall bear his iniquity,” and at the latter verse this means extirpation: “and that soul shall be cut off from his people.” Now on the present exegesis this latter verse may refer either to eating left-over sacrificial meat or eating outside the proper location, while the former verse, Lev. 7:18, definitely refers to eating the meat before it is actually left-over and when it is within the proper location, after the improper intentionality of eating it after the right time in which to do so. Now, if the penalty of extirpation at Lev. 19: 8 is made to refer to left-over sacrificial meat, then we can argue that “iniquity” at Lev. 7:18 also means extirpation, by analogy with the meaning of the same word at Lev. 19: 8. And the reason for drawing this analogy is that the two are alike in two respects: both are defects arising through time, the classification of left-over applying to a case in which the priest actually eats the meat after the right time, and Lev. 7:18 then refers to the illegitimate intentionality of eating after the proper time. Both were forbidden not only in the Temple but also in the high places used before the Temple was built.]*
- L. *To the contrary, eating the meat outside of the proper place should involve the penalty of extirpation, so that the meaning of “iniquity” where it refers to intentionality of eating after the proper time, may be learned by analogy, since it is comparable in respect to the rules governing intentionality, the liability for what does with only part of a portion of the meat, the consideration of the blood, and the consideration of the third day. [Freedman: The intentionality, not the actual deed, to violate the prohibition of eating the meat after the proper time and also of eating the meat outside of the proper place applies to both matters; in both matters, improper intentionality in respect to only part of the meat disqualifies; both will disqualify only if expressed during the service of sacrifice in connection with sprinkling the blood, but not if this is after sprinkling the blood; and “the third day” is stated with regard to both.] It would follow that the meaning of “iniquity” when referring to improper intentionality of eating after the proper time may be derived by analogy, since in this aspect it is comparable to the rules governing intentionality, the liability for what does with only part of a portion of the meat, the consideration of the blood, and the consideration of the third day.*

- M. *Rather, said R. Yohanan, “Zabeda bar Levi taught the following on Tannaite authority: ‘The meaning of the word holy’ in one context is to be derived from the meaning of the same word in another context. Here it is written, “Because he has profaned the holy thing of the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Lev. 19: 8), and elsewhere, “And if aught of the meat of the consecration or of the bread remain to the morning, then you shall burn the left-over with fire, it shall not be eaten, because it is holy” (Exo. 29:34). Just as in that latter passage, “holy” pertains to left-over, so too here, the same word pertains to left-over. And the All-Merciful has imposed a limitation in connection with its reference to left-over, specifically: “But every one who eats it shall be his iniquity,” which excludes from the penalty of extirpation the matter of eating the meat outside of the proper place.”*
- N. *And how come you prefer to interpret the protracted verse to refer to eating the meat after the proper time, and the reference to “third” in the passage, “You shall be holy” to refer to eating the meat beyond the proper space; perhaps I should reverse matters!*
- O. *It is more reasonable to suppose that the protracted verse refers to eating the meat after the proper time, for the meaning of the word “iniquity” derives by analogy from the use of the word with reference to left-over sacrificial meat, and the rule governing eating the meat after the specified time limit derives from the comparison with the rule governing the considerations of time and the rule on the high places [Lev. 7:18, 19:8, cited above].*
- P. *To the contrary, why not say that the protracted version speaks of eating the meat outside of the proper space, and the reference to “third” in the passage, “You shall be holy” refers to eating the meat after the specified time, for the materials are analogous and Scripture sets it near the pertinent language and imposes a limitation on the matter to indicate that extirpation is not the penalty!*
- Q. *Rather, said Raba, “The entire rule derives from the protracted statement. For it is written, ‘And if any of the meat be at all eaten on the third day...it shall be an abomination’ (Lev. 7:18) — using the intensive form, Scripture refers to two acts of eating, one the consumption by man, the other consumption by the altar [thus burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar-fires]. ‘Of the sacrifice of his peace offerings’ — just as improper intentionality concerning parts of the peace offering may impose the status of refuse, and improper intentionality concerning parts of the peace offering may be given the status of refuse, so in sacrifices where there are parts that can impose on the whole the status of refuse and parts that can be rendered subject to the status of refuse, so the law of refuse pertains. [Freedman: the blood of the peace offering is the medium through which the status of refuse is effected, that is, if an improper intentionality is expressed during one of the acts of service connected with the blood, the meat and the parts that are to be burned are thereby given the status of refuse. Just as this is so in the case of the peace offering, so does the law of refuse operate in the case of all sacrifices of this the same can be said. This excludes the meal offerings of priests and of the anointed priest and of the drink offerings.] ‘Third’ refers then to an intentionality to eat the meat after a specified span of time. ‘It shall not be accepted’ means, as the acceptance of the valid sacrifice so is that of the invalid; and as the acceptance of the valid sacrifice*

means that all of the parts that permit the meat to be eaten by the priest must be offered up, so the acceptance of the invalid one means that all of the parts the correct disposition of which permit the offering to be eaten by the priests likewise are to be offered. ‘Him that offers’ — it becomes unfit in offering, but it does not become unfit through the actual act of being eaten on the third day [hence sacrifice becomes refuse through an illegitimate intention; for it becomes unfit only when it is actually being offered, if the priest at that moment intends later on to eat the meat on the third day; but if there was no illegitimate intention at the actual moment of offered yet the priest actually ate the meat on the third day, the meat does not retrospectively become refuse (Freedman)]. ‘It’ means that Scripture speaks of the sacrifice and not the priest. ‘It shall not be imputed’ [29A] means that other aspects of intentionality must not be confused therein [so the animal becomes refuse only if the intention pertains to eating it after the right time was the only intention; but if the priest expressed any other disqualifying intentionality that would disqualify the offering without rendering it refuse, the one intentionality negates the other]. ‘...refuse...’ this refers to the intention of eating the meat outside of the proper time. ‘It shall be’ teaches that they combine with each other [both improper aspects of intentionality combine together and so if he intended eating half as much as an olive’s bulk after the proper time and half outside of the proper place, the intentionality affecting each half is effective in that it joins with the other half to invalidate the offering]. ‘And the soul that eats of it:’ one but not two, and which is it? It is the intention of eating it after the proper time, for the meaning of ‘iniquity’ derives from the sense that pertains with regard to left-over meat of the offering, since it is subject to the same rules as to time and the high places.”

- R. *Said R. Pappa to Raba, “In your view, how do you interpret the use of ‘third’ in the passage on ‘you shall be holy’?”*
- S. *That is required to show that the improper intention must pertain to a place that has a three-fold function, in regard to blood, meat, and the sacrificial parts that are burned on the altar [the offering is disqualified only if the officiating priest announces that he intends to it in a place where the blood is sprinkled, the meat eaten, and the parts burned, that is, outside of the Temple court; if he plans to eat the meat in the court, where the meat is not eat nor the sacrificial parts burned, it would not prove an effective intention].”*
- T. *But may I not derive that conception from the prior passage, namely, “And if it be at all eaten,” since the All-Merciful there expresses these considerations when it uses the word “third”?*
- U. *Said R. Ashi, “I reported this matter to R. Mattenah, who said to me, ‘If I deduced it from that passage, I might claim, “third” represents a particularization, and “refuse,” a generalization, so the generalization becomes an addition to the particularization, and therefore becomes an addition to the particularization, with the result that other places are included too. Hence, “you shall be holy” informs us that that is not the case.’”*

II.2. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. And if any of the meat of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day” (Lev. 7:18) —

- C. Said R. Eliezer, "Pay attention to listen to what this passage states. Scripture speaks of one who simply intends to eat the meat of his sacrifice on the third day. But perhaps that is not the case, but it speaks rather of one who actually does eat the meat of the sacrifice on the third day? You may reply as follows: after it has become fit, is it going then to become unfit later on?"
- D. Said to him R. Aqiba, "But in point of fact we find in the cases of the male and female unclean with flux-uncleanness and the woman who watches from day to day [to determine whether or not her menstrual period or her flux-period is upon her] are assumed to be clean. But if they do have a discharge at a later point on the day on which they are assumed to be clean, they then are assumed to have been unclean for the whole of the prior day. So you should not find it surprising here too that after the sacrifice has become fit, it then is deemed to have become unfit!"
- E. He said to him, "Lo, Scripture says, 'to him who offers...', meaning, it becomes unfit at the offering, but it does not become unfit on the third day."
- F. "But perhaps that is not the case, but Scripture may say, 'him who offers' to mean that the priest who offers it [is the one who is unfit to officiate, and this has no bearing on the offering itself]?"
- F. "When Scripture says 'it,' Scripture is speaking of the sacrifice, not of the priest."
- G. Ben Azzai says, "...it..." why is this stated? Because it is said, 'When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it' (Deu. 23:22). You might think that the one who delays keeping his vow is subject to the penalty, 'it shall not be accepted,' therefore Scripture says, 'it,' meaning, 'it,' that is, refuse, is subject to the penalty, 'it shall not be accepted,' but he who delays fulfilling his vow is not subject to the penalty, 'it shall not be accepted.'"
- H. Others say, "...it shall not be imputed' teaches that it becomes unfit on account of illegal intentionality but it does not become unfit if it is actually eaten on the third day."
- I. *How does Ben Azzai know that Scripture is speaking of the sacrifice and not the priest [since for him, "it" serves a different exclusionary purpose altogether]?*
- J. *If you wish, I shall answer, he deduces that rule from the exegesis of "others say," and if you prefer, I can answer that it is written, "It shall not be accepted," and "it shall not be accepted" speaks only of the matter of a sacrifice.*
- K. *Now Ben Azzai makes the deduction, "it" is subject to "it shall not be accepted," — but he who delays fulfilling his vow is not subject to the consideration, "it shall not be accepted." But is it from the present verse that that is to be deduced? Surely that is deducted from the text that is cited by "others say." For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Others say, "One might suppose that a firstling, the year of which has passed [which is therefore superannuated and no longer suitable for offering] should be classified [29B] as are Holy Things that are unfit and so should be deemed unfit [and so cannot be offered]. But Scripture states, "And you will eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain wine and oil, and the firstborn of beasts," Scripture therefore compares the firstling with tithe, with the result that, just as tithe is not rendered unfit if it is superannuated, so the firstling is not rendered unfit if it is superannuated.*

- L. *It is necessary to deduce it from the passage that he cites. For otherwise, you might have supposed that this is the case only of a firstling, which is not subject to acceptance [since it does not effect atonement], but other sacrifices, which are a matter of acceptance and atonement, may not be accepted under the present conditions [so the one who has made the vow has not carried out his vow and must present another offering]. So “it” tells me that that is not the case.*
- M. *Still, the rule might be adduced elsewhere, namely, “You shall not delay to pay it...and it will be a sin to you,” which teaches, but it will not be a sin in your offering [and the offering remains valid].*
- N. *But we have interpreted this in line with Ben Azzai, “and it will be a sin to you,” but not for your wife.”*
- O. *For you might have supposed that one might say, since R. Eleazar, others say, R. Yohanan, said, “A man’s wife dies only if money is demanded from him and he does not have it, for it says, ‘If you have not got wherewith to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you’ (Pro. 22:27),” she also dies on account of the sin of his violating the rule, “you shall not delay,” so Scripture tells us that that is not the case.*
- P. Others say, “‘...it shall not be imputed’ teaches that it becomes unfit on account of illegal intentionality but it does not become unfit if it is actually eaten on the third day.” — *how does R. Eliezer interpret the verse, “It shall not be imputed”?*
- Q. *He requires it in line with that which has been taught by R. Yannai. For said R. Yannai, “How on the basis of Scripture do we know that improper intentionality in two distinct matters nullify one another? Because it says, ‘It shall not be imputed,’ meaning, other aspects of improper intentionality are not to be mingled therein.”*
- R. *And R. Mari repeated the matter in this language: “Said R. Yannai, ‘How on the basis of Scripture do we know that in the case of Holy Things, the penalty for an improper intentionality is flogging? Because it says, “It shall not be imputed.””*
- S. Said R. Ashi to R. Mari, “But that would involve a negative commandment, in which an actual deed is not involved [but just a statement], and one is not subjected to a flogging on account of a negative commandment, in which an actual deed is not involved.”
- T. *He said to him, “This is formulated in line with the position of R. Judah, who said, ‘One is flogged on account of violating a negative commandment, in which an actual deed is not involved.’”*

2:3-5

2:3

- A. This is the general rule:**
- B. Whoever slaughters, or receives [the blood], or conveys [the blood], or sprinkles [the blood] [intending]**
- C. to eat something which is usually eaten [meat], [or] to burn something which is usually burned [entrails],**

- D. outside of its proper place [which is, the Temple court for Most Holy Things, the walled city of Jerusalem for Lesser Holy Things] —
- E. it is invalid [and the meat may not be eaten]. And extirpation does not apply to it.
- F. [Supply: Whoever slaughters, or receives the blood, or conveys the blood, or sprinkles (the blood), intending to eat something which is usually eaten, to burn something which is usually burned]
- G. outside of its proper time —
- H. it is refuse.
- I. And they are liable on its account to extirpation [even if despite their declared intention, they actually eat the meat within the time limit].
- J. And [the foregoing rule applies] on condition that what renders the offering permissible [the blood, which permits the sacrificial portions to be burned on the altar and the meat to be eaten by the priest or owner, that is, the proper sprinkling or tossing of the blood] is offered in accord with its requirement.

2:4

- A. How is “what renders the offering permissible offered in accord with its requirement”?
- B. [If] one slaughtered in silence [lacking improper intent],
- C. [but] received [the blood] and conveyed [the blood] and sprinkled [the blood] [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its proper time,
- D. or [if one] slaughtered [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of the proper time, received [the blood] and conveyed [the blood] and sprinkled [the blood] in silence [lacking improper intent] ,
- E. or [if he] slaughtered, received [the blood], and conveyed [the blood] and sprinkled [the blood] [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its proper time —
- F. this is a case in which what renders the offering permissible is offered in accord with its requirement.
- G. How is “what renders the offering permissible not offered in accord with its requirement”?
- H. [If] one slaughtered [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its place, received [the blood] and conveyed [the blood] and tossed [the blood] [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its time,
- I. or [if] one slaughtered [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside its proper time, received [the blood] and conveyed [the blood] and tossed [the blood] [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its place,
- J. or [if one] slaughtered, received [the blood] and conveyed [the blood] and tossed [the blood] [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of its place —
- K. the Passover and the sin offering which one slaughtered not for their own name [that is, the beast was designated as a Passover or a sin offering but was slaughtered for some purpose other than that for which it originally had been designated] —

- L. [the blood of which] one [also] received and conveyed and tossed [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of their proper time,
- M. or which one slaughtered [intending to eat or burn the flesh] outside of their proper time, [and the blood of which] one received and conveyed and tossed not for their own name [that is, the beast was designated as a Passover or a sin offering but was slaughtered for some purpose other than that for which it had been designated] —
- N. or which one slaughtered, received, and conveyed and tossed not for their own name [that is, the beast was designated as a Passover or a sin offering but was slaughtered for some purpose other than that for which it had been designated] —
- O. this is a case in which what renders the offering permissible is not offered in accord with its requirement.

2:5

- A. [Supply: If a man slaughtered an animal offering and received, conveyed, and tossed the blood intending] —
- B. to eat an olive's bulk outside [the proper place] and an olive's bulk on the next day [at an improper time],
- C. an olive's bulk on the next day and an olive's bulk outside,
- D. half an olive's bulk outside and half an olive's bulk on the next day,
- E. half an olive's bulk on the next day and half an olive's bulk outside —
- F. it is unfit. But extirpation does not apply to it.
- G. Said R. Judah, "This is the general rule: if the [improper] intention concerning time came before the [improper] intention concerning the place, it is refuse, and they are liable on its account for extirpation.
- H. "And if the [improper] intention concerning the place came before the [improper] intention concerning the time, it is invalid. And extirpation does not apply to him."
- I. And sages say, "This and that are invalid. And extirpation does not apply to him."
- J. [If one intends] to eat half an olive's bulk and to burn half an olive's bulk, the offering is valid.
- K. For eating and burning are not joined together.

- I.1** A. Said Ilfa, "*The dispute [between Judah and sages, M. 2:5G-I] concerns two acts of service, but in the case of a single act of service, all parties concur that what we have is a mingling of two aspects of intentionality.*" [Judah concurs that where both aspects of intentionality are expressed in connection with the same act of service, the sacrificial animal is not classified as refuse but only as unfit, and that is so even if the intentionality that will have imposed the status of refuse preceded the one that will have merely rendered the offering unfit (Freedman)]."
- B. And R. Yohanan said, "Even in a case of a single act of service [Judah will maintain that same position.]"
- C. *Now in regard to the interpretation proposed by Ilfa, there is no problem, since the first clause addresses two distinct acts of service [If a man slaughtered an*

animal offering and received, conveyed, and tossed the blood intending to eat an olive's bulk outside the proper place and an olive's bulk on the next day at an improper time], the second of the two clauses likewise must be conceived to address two distinct acts of service [an olive's bulk on the next day and an olive's bulk outside]. But from the perspective of R. Yohanan, are we to suppose that while the first clause addresses two distinct acts of service, the second speaks of only a single act of service?

- D. **[30A]** *That is quite true, the first clause addresses two distinct acts of service, the second speaks of only a single act of service.*
- E. *We have learned in the Mishnah: Said R. Judah, "This is the general rule: if the [improper] intention concerning time came before the [improper] intention concerning the place, it is refuse, and they are liable on its account for extirpation. Now from the viewpoint of R. Yohanan, that is in line with the Tannaite formulation, This is the general rule [since what is included in the generalization is the otherwise ignored case in which both aspects of intentionality are expressed in connection with a single act of service]. But from the viewpoint of Ilfa, what is the sense of the language, This is the general rule?*
- F. *That is a problem.*
- I.2.** A. *We have learned there in the Mishnah: "[He who with peace offerings and burnt offerings before him says], 'Lo, this [unconsecrated beast] is the substitute of a burnt offering and the substitute of peace offerings,' lo, this is classified solely as the substitute of a burnt offering," the words of R. Meir. Said R. Yosé, "If to begin with he intended thus, his words are confirmed, since it is not possible to designate [them] by two names at once. But if after he said, 'It is the substitute of a burnt offering,' he changed his mind and said, 'It is the substitute of peace offerings,' lo, this is the substitute of a burnt offering" [M. Tem. 5:4A-C].*
- B. *The question was raised: If the man had said, "Lo, this is a substitute for a burnt offering and peace offering," or, "Lo, this animal is a substitute for half of a burnt offering and half of a peace offering," what is the law?*
- C. *Said Abayye, "In that case, R. Meir certainly concedes [that Yosé's position is the valid one]."*
- D. *Raba said, "The dispute pertains even here."*
- E. *Said Raba to Abayye, "From your perspective, in that you maintain, 'In that case, R. Meir certainly concedes [that Yosé's position is the valid one],' lo, the act of slaughter, which is analogous to a case in which there is intentionality to eat half an olive's bulk outside the proper place, and half an olive's bulk after the proper time, and yet they disagree" [and the second aspect of intentionality is not an afterthought cancelling the first, since both are possible, and yet there two, Judah treats only the first of the two statements as effective, and this is analogous to making an animal a substitute for half of a burnt offering and half of a peace offering, for here too both are possible; Meir, who regards the first statement only in substitution, agrees with Judah in our Mishnah and therefore in the declaration in question too he should regard the first statement only (Freedman)].*

- F. *He said to him, "But do you take the position that pertinent to the act of slaughter is only the outcome [when both of the pertinent organs have been slit]? No, the act of slaughter is affective from beginning to end [as each of the pertinent organs is slit], and the sense of the Mishnah-passage before us is that the man declared that he cut one organ with the intention of eating the meat after the proper time, and the second organ with the intention of eating the meat outside of the proper place."*
- G. *And lo, there is the matter of the taking of the handful of meal offering, which is analogous to a case in which there is intentionality to eat half an olive's bulk outside the proper place, and half an olive's bulk after the proper time, and yet they disagree.* [Freedman: The priest takes the handful of meal offering for burning on the altar while expressing the intention of eating an olive's bulk after the prescribed time and an olive's bulk outside of the proper place, and there we have the same dispute.]
- H. *In that case too, we deal with an instance in which the priest burned the handful of the meal offering with the intention of eating the residue after the proper time and a handful of frankincense intending to eat the residue outside of the proper place.*
- I. *And lo, there is the case of the handful of the meal offering of a sinner, in which there is no burning of frankincense alongside, and yet there too they differ!*
- J. *They do not differ in that case.*
- K. *Said R. Ashi, "If you prefer to say that they do disagree in that case, they disagree concerning the steps [taken by the priest]." [Freedman: as the priest took one step in carrying the fistful to the altar, he declared his intention of partaking of the offering outside of the proper place, and as he took another step, he declared his intention of eating it after the proper time. Hence we have two distinct statements.]*
- L. *R. Shimi repeated the formulation of the passage in accord with the viewpoint of Abayye. R. Huna bar Nathan repeated it in accord with the formulation of Raba.*
- M. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "R. Meir made his statement within the theory of R. Judah, who took the position that we are guided by the first thing that the man has said. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **This is the general rule: if the [improper] intention concerning time came before the [improper] intention concerning the place, it is refuse, and they are liable on its account for extirpation.**"*
- N. **[30B]** *Said to him Abayye, "And lo, Rabbah bar bar Hannah said R. Yohanan [said], 'When you bring about an intersection between R. Meir and R. Yosé, you find that they do not disagree [Freedman: for as will be shown, both reject the view that only the first of two statements is taken into account; so Meir's rule on substitution does not agree with Judah in the Mishnah before us]. So do they not disagree? They certainly do disagree!'"*
- O. *He said to him, "They differ concerning what they differ, and they concur concerning what they concur."*
- P. *For, [with reference to the passage before us, "**He who with peace offerings and burnt offerings before him says, 'Lo, this unconsecrated beast is the substitute of a burnt offering and the substitute of peace offerings,' lo, this is***

the substitute of a burnt offering,” the words of R. Meir. Said R. Yosé, “If to begin with he intended thus, since it is not possible to designate them by two names at once, his words are confirmed. But if after he said, ‘It is the substitute of a burnt offering,’ he changed his mind and said, ‘It is the substitute of peace offerings,’ lo, this is the substitute of a burnt offering”] said R. Isaac b. R. Yosé said R. Yohanan, “All parties concur *that if he said, ‘Let this take effect’ [that is, the exchange of the secular beast for the beast designated as a burnt offering], and then he said, ‘Let this take effect’ [the exchange for the peace offering], all parties maintain that the language that he has stated to begin with is the language that applies. If he said, ‘Let this take effect only if that takes effect,’ both beasts are deemed consecrated.*

Q. “The dispute concerns only that case given by our Mishnah, in which one has said, **‘Lo, this [unconsecrated beast] is the substitute of a burnt offering and the substitute of peace offerings.’** Here R. Meir takes the view that since he ought to have said, ‘the exchange of a burnt offering and peace offerings,’ but he has said, ‘the exchange of a burnt offering, the exchange of peace offerings,’ it is as though he had said, ‘Let this take effect’ [that is, the exchange of the secular beast for the beast designated as a burnt offering], and then he said, ‘Let this take effect’ [the exchange for the peace offering]. And R. Yosé takes the view that if he had said, ‘the exchange of a burnt offering and peace offerings,’ I should have concluded that while the beast is indeed consecrated, it is not offered up [because of the contradictory rites that each of the designations would required]. So we are informed [that his words are confirmed] [Miller, *Temurah*: since he really intended that both should be an exchange, this being on a par with a case where one says, This should not take effect without the other taking effect].”

R. Said R. Dimi to Abayye, “Rabbah bar bar Hannah said that they do not disagree, but I hold that they do disagree.”

A Topical Appendix: Forming the Requisite Volume to Incur a Penalty. The Joining Together of Distinct Half-Olive’s Bulks Subjected to Improper Intentionality

I.3. A. Said Ulla, and some say, R. Oshaia, “Is it possible that our Babylonian colleagues know whether the formulation of our Mishnah-paragraph is ‘as much as an olive’s bulk...as much as an olive’s bulk...,’ or ‘about as much as an olive’s bulk...and about as much as an olive’s bulk.’ At stake in the answer to the question is this: have we learned in the Mishnah, **‘as much as an olive’s bulk...as much as an olive’s bulk...,’** but if the man said, ‘about as much as an olive’s bulk...and about as much as an olive’s bulk,’ all would concur that here we have a confusion of distinct aspects of intentionality [in which case the offering is not deemed refuse]. Or perhaps we have learned to formulate our Mishnah as, **‘about as much as an olive’s bulk...and about as much as an olive’s bulk,’** with the result that, from R. Judah’s perspective, this would then constitute an articulated enumeration [in which case each forms a distinct statement and there is no confusion of aspects of intentionality, with the result that we are guided by the first of the two statements alone]. And all the more so would that

be his position if the man had said, ‘as much as an olive’s bulk...as much as an olive’s bulk....’”

- B. *Come and take note of what Levi asked Rabbi, “If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating an olive’s bulk on the next day outside of the proper place, what is the rule?”*
- C. *He said to him, “That is the question. It certainly involves a confusion of distinct aspects of intentionality [in Judah’s opinion too].”*
- D. *Said before him R. Simeon beRibbi, “Is that not covered in our Mishnah-paragraph, when it makes the following statement: **If a priest slaughtered an animal offering and received, conveyed, and tossed the blood intending] — to eat an olive’s bulk outside [the proper place], an olive’s bulk on the next day [at an improper time], an olive’s bulk on the next day, an olive’s bulk outside, half an olive’s bulk outside, half an olive’s bulk on the next day, half an olive’s bulk on the next day and half an olive’s bulk outside.** So lo, the other case [where the officiating priest expresses both intentions with regard to the same piece of meat (Freedman)] would then constitute a confusion of diverse aspects of intentionality [so why say that was such a good question]!”*
- E. *He said to him, “He has asked me a question of considerable wisdom, even though you maintain that it is contained within our Mishnah-paragraph. Since I repeated both cases to you, you find no problem there, but to him I have repeated only one of the cases, and he heard that rabbis had read both questions. He then produced this theory: was my formulation of the matter exact [that the controversy applies to one case only (Freedman)], so their second case then involves a confusion of intentionality, or perhaps their version is exact, while I have simply omitted one case when I repeated the matter to him, in consequence of which he may have supposed that just as I omitted this case, so they omitted the other [Freedman: two declarations in respect to the same piece of meat, so he was right to raise the question].”*
- F. *Now which of the two cases did he teach him? If we say that he taught him “...as much as an olive and as much as an olive,” surely that is not an omission [Freedman: for the case of “as much as an olive...as much as an olive” follows a fortiori. That is, if Judah holds that we have a detailed enumeration and no mingling of intentions even when the priest uses and, how much more so when his statements are disjoined. Hence he would have understood that this too is included, but only this and no other, so that a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece would certainly be a mingling of intentions, and there would be no room for his question.] So he must have repeated to him the language, “As much as an olive...as much as an olive...” [Freedman: only on this assumption is there room for his question; this proves that the reading in the Mishnah must be, “as much as an olive...as much as an olive....”]*

- G. *Then let him ask about the case “as much as an olive ...and as much as an olive...”!* [Freedman: according to the explanation above, he was in doubt about that too.]
- H. *This was his reasoning: “ I will ask the rule from him about a single case, from which I may infer the rule governing both cases. For if I ask about the language, ‘as much as an olive and as much as an olive,’ it is well if he answers me that that is an encompassing statement, so all the so is it the case of ‘as much as an olive beyond the proper time, outside of the proper place.’ But if he answers me that it is in fact an articulated enumeration of the matter, I still have to raise the question about the language, ‘as much as an olive beyond the proper time, outside of the proper place.’”*
- I. *If so, then here too, it is all right if he answered that the language, “as much as an olive beyond the proper time, outside of the proper place,” is in fact an articulated enumeration of the matter, all the more so is that the case if the language is, “as much as an olive and as much as an olive.” But if he answered him that it is in fact an articulated enumeration of the matter, he would still have to present the question on the language, “as much as an olive and as much as an olive.”*
- J. *If so, Rabbi would have been irritated!* **[31A]** *If the language “as much as an olive and as much as an olive” is classified as an encompassing rule, is there any reasonable question to be raised about the language, “as much as an olive beyond the proper time, outside of the proper place”?*

I.4. A. *It has been stated:*

- B. [If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating] a half olive's bulk outside of the proper time and a half olive's bulk outside of the proper place and a half olive's bulk after the proper time —
- C. Said Raba, “The question of refuse is then aroused as is one who has been asleep” [Freedman: the first half, on finding the last half, “awakes from its slumber” (Psa. 78:65) and combines with it; thus the priest intends to eat as much as an olive after the proper time, and this renders the offering refuse, and that cannot be undone by the intention of eating half as much as an olive outside of the proper place].
- D. And R. Hamnuna said, “This is a case of the confusion of distinct aspects of intentionality.”
- E. *Said Raba, “On what basis do I make my judgment? It is because we have learned in the Mishnah: [Food which is made unclean by a Father of Uncleaness and that which is made unclean by an Offspring of Uncleaness join together with one another to convey the lighter remove of uncleaness of the two. How so? A half-egg's bulk of food which is unclean in the first remove and a half-egg's bulk of food which is unclean in the second remove which one mixed with one another — the consequent mixture is unclean in the] second remove of uncleaness. A*

half-egg's bulk of food unclean in the second remove of uncleanness and a half-egg's bulk of food unclean in the third remove of uncleanness which one mixed together with one another — [it is unclean in the] first [remove of uncleanness. But] an egg's bulk of food unclean in the first remove of uncleanness and an egg's bulk of food unclean in the second remove of uncleanness which one mixed together with one another — [it is unclean in the] first [remove of uncleanness.] [If] one divided them up — this is unclean in the second remove of uncleanness, and this is unclean in the second remove of uncleanness [M. Toh. 1:5]. *Lo, if one then went and mixed them up again, they are once more unclean in the first remove.* [This proves that what is unclean in the first remove in each component of the mixture combines with what is unclean in the first remove in the other, and the same is true here (Freedman)]. *How does this follow? Because it is taught as the Tannaite formulation in the latter part of the same passage: This one fell by itself and this one by itself on a loaf of heave offering — they have rendered it unfit. [If] the two of them fell on it simultaneously — they have made it unclean in the second remove of uncleanness [M. Toh. 1:5]."*

F. *And R. Hamnuna will say, "In that case you have the requisite volume [to impart uncleanness, an egg's bulk], but here you do not have the requisite volume [to constitute a sufficient amount of meat to make a difference]."*

G. *Said R. Hamnuna, "On what basis do I make my judgment? It is because we have learned in the Mishnah: Food which has been made unclean by a Father of Uncleanness and that which has been made unclean by an Offspring of Uncleanness join together to impart uncleanness in accord with the lesser remove of uncleanness of the two of them [M. Me. 4:4F-H]. Does this not mean, even if the standard volume is later on reached."* [Freedman: even if one adds a food unclean in the first remove to make up the requisite volume of an egg's bulk, since the combination is only unclean in the second remove, that portion of the mixture which is in the first remove of uncleanness does not then combine with the addition].

H. *No, perhaps this rule applies even if the standard mixture is not reached [by a later addition of food unclean in the first remove].*

I.5. A. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating half an olive's bulk of the offering outside of the proper place and half outside of the proper time, and [then] half an olive's bulk outside of the proper time, Bar Qappara repeated as the Tannaite formulation, 'The offering is classified as refuse, for a statement in regard to half an olive's bulk of meat has no effect in a case in which a statement has been made in regard to an entire olive's bulk of the meat.'"*

- B. *When Rabin came, he said, "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating half an olive's bulk outside of the proper time and half an olive's bulk outside of the proper place, Bar Qappara repeated as the Tannaite formulation, 'The offering is classified as refuse, for a statement in regard to half an olive's bulk of meat has no effect in a case in which a statement has been made in regard to an entire olive's bulk of the meat.'"*
- C. *R. Ashi repeated the matter in the following language: "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating half an olive's bulk of the meat outside of the proper time, and, as to an olive's bulk, half of the olive's bulk of the meat outside of the proper place and half of the olive's bulk outside of the proper time, Bar Qappara repeated as the Tannaite formulation, 'The offering is classified as refuse, for a statement in regard to half an olive's bulk of meat has no effect in a case in which a statement has been made in regard to an entire olive's bulk of the meat.'"*
- I.6.** A. Said R. Yannai, "If the officiating priest formed the intention that dogs eat the meat on the next day, the offering is forthwith rendered refuse, for it is written, 'And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel' (2Ki. 9:10) [and the act of eating performed by dogs is classified as an effective act of eating, as much as if the priest had thought that he himself would eat the meat]."
- B. *To this proposition objected R. Ammi, "But how about the following: If the officiating priest formed the intention that fire eat the meat on the next day, as it is written, 'A fire not blown by men shall eat him' (Job. 20:26), would the same judgment apply, that the offering is refuse? And should you say that that is indeed the case, then have we not learned in the Mishnah: [If one intends] to eat half an olive's bulk and to burn half an olive's bulk, it is valid. For eating and burning are not joined together?"*
- C. [He said to him,] "If the officiating priest had expressed his intention in language involving 'eating,' that indeed would be a problem. But here with what case do we deal? It is one in which he expressed his intentionality in the language of burning, and they do not combine, because eating is in its classification, burning in another classification."
- I.7.** A. R. Ashi raised this question: "If the officiating priest expressed the intention of having the olive's bulk of meat eaten improperly by two distinct individuals, what is the rule? Are we guided by the intentionality, in which case the intention of the priest has affected a sufficient volume of meat, or are we guided by the ones who are supposed to eat the meat, and there is then not a sufficient volume of the meat?"
- B. Said Abayye, "Come and take note: **[If one intends] to eat half an olive's bulk and to burn half an olive's bulk, it is valid. For eating and burning are not joined together. [31B]** So if the officiating priest intended to eat half an olive's bulk and to eat half an olive's bulk in a manner similar to the intentionality of eating and burning — and how

would that be the case, if not that the two half olives would be eaten by two distinct men — they indeed would join together.”

C. *That proves it.*

I.8. A. *Raba raised this question: “If the officiating priest expressed the intention of eating an olive’s bulk of the meat during a span of time greater than it takes to eat a half a loaf of bread, what is the rule? [The eating of forbidden food in general is punishable only if as much as an olive’s bulk of the forbidden food is eaten during the time of an ordinary meal, but not merely nibbled over a long period of time (Freedman)]. Do we draw an analogy in the present case to the span of time required for eating the sacrificial parts that are burned up on the altar by the Most High, or do we draw an analogy in the present case to the span of time required for eating an ordinary meal by human beings?”*

B. *Said Abayye, “Come and take note: [If one intends] to eat half an olive’s bulk and to burn half an olive’s bulk, it is valid. For eating and burning are not joined together. So is the rule only for eating and burning; but eating and eating in a war similar to eating and burning do join together, even though the burning of the food requires more than the time allotted to eating half a loaf of bread.”*

C. *But perhaps it means in a large fire [which would consume the meat very quickly anyhow].*

II.1 A. **[If one intends] to eat half an olive’s bulk and to burn half an olive’s bulk, it is valid. For eating and burning are not joined together:**

B. *The operative consideration here is that the intentionality concerns eating and burning. But if the officiating priest expressed the intentionality of eating what is fit for eating and of eating what is not fit for eating [that is, he would burn the sacrificial parts, which are not fit for eating], then they would combine. But the first clause nonetheless teaches, **Whoever slaughters, or receives [the blood], or conveys [the blood], or sprinkles [the blood] [intending] to eat something which is usually eaten [meat], [or] to burn something which is usually burned [entrails], outside of its proper place [which is, the Temple court for Most Holy Things, the walled city of Jerusalem for Lesser Holy Things] — it is invalid [and the meat may not be eaten]. And extirpation does not apply to it [M. 2:3B]. So the rule applies to what is usually eaten, but not to what is not usually eaten!***

C. *Said R. Jeremiah, “Who is the authority behind this rule? It is R. Eliezer, who takes the view that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat. For we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who slaughters the animal sacrifice [intending] to eat something which is not usually eaten, to burn something which is not usually burned — it is valid. R. Eliezer declares invalid [M. Zeb. 3:3A-D].** [The intentionality that has confused the categories of food yielded by the sacrifice is therefore valid in Eliezer’s view, which means that improper intentionality in respect to what human beings eat may affect the classification of*

what the altar eats, and intentionality in respect to what the altar eats may affect the classification of what human beings eat.]”

- D. *Abayye said, “You may even say that the rule accords with rabbis [vis à vis Eliezer], but do not draw the conclusion that the rule applies to what is usually eaten, but not to what is not usually eaten [so the offering would be fit]. Rather explain as follows: lo, if the officiating priest expresses the intention to eat what is usually eaten and to eat what is usually eaten, it is invalid [the two intentions in respect to two half bulks combine].”*
- E. *And then what does he tell us? If it is the law governing what is ordinarily eaten, that point can be inferred from the opening clause: **half an olive’s bulk outside and half an olive’s bulk on the next day, half an olive’s bulk on the next day and half an olive’s bulk outside....** And if the framer of the passage proposes to give us the rule about the officiating priest’s intentionality to eat and to burn the meat [and to tell us that these distinct aspects of intentionality do not join together], you can derive that rule from the opening clause, that is, only if he intends to eat what is ordinarily eaten, but not if he intends to eat what is not normally eaten [but burned up on the altar]. Since intentionality to eat what is normally eaten and to eat what is not normally eaten do not combine, do we have to be told about the unmiscibility of the intentionalities to eat and to burn the meat?*
- F. *What is necessary is to specify the rule governing intentionalities to eat and to burn the meat. For you might have thought that it is only in that case [when the priest will eat what is ordinarily eaten and to burn what is not ordinarily eaten] that the intentionalities do not combine, because this is not a normal intentionality, but here where the intention governing each is normal [in that the priest intends to eat what is eaten and to burn what is burned, though not in the right time or place (Freedman)], I might have supposed that they do combine, so he tells us that they do not combine.*