

I

BAVLI SUKKAH CHAPTER ONE

FOLIOS 2A-20B

1:1 A-F

- A. A sukkah taller than twenty cubits is invalid.
- B. R. Judah declares it valid.
- C. And one that is not ten handbreadths high,
- D. one that does not have three walls,
- E. or one, the light of which is greater than the shade of which,
- F. is invalid.

We begin by comparing an intersecting rule that presents the same point and asking why the Mishnah-framers find it necessary to say the same thing twice.

- I.1 A. *We have learned in the Mishnah at another passage: The crossbeam above an alley-entry that is higher than twenty cubits [is invalid, and one therefore] should diminish it [making it lower]. R. Judah says, "It is not necessary to do so" [M. Er. 1:1A-B].*
- B. *What differentiates the case of the sukkah, in which instance the rule is formulated in the language of unfitness [without remedy], from the case of the alley-way, in which instance the framer of the Mishnah has specified the remedy [for an improper arrangement]?*
- C. *Since [the religious requirement of building] a sukkah derives [from the authority] of the Torah, the framer of the passage uses the language, "unfit," while, since the arrangement creating an artificial alley-way derives from the authority of rabbis, the framer of the passage has taught the remedy [namely, diminishing the height of the crossbar].*
- D. *If you prefer, I shall propose a different solution:*
- E. *Even in matters deriving from the authority of the Torah one may well teach the required remedy. But in the case of the sukkah, with its numerous rules, the framer of the passage has simply framed matters in terms of unfitness. In the case of the alley-way, without numerous rules and regulations, the framer of the passage taught the remedy [for an improper arrangement].*

- I.2.** A. *What is the scriptural source for the rule [that the sukkah may not be taller than twenty cubits]?*
- B. Said Rabbah, "It is because [Scripture] has stated, 'So that your coming generations may know that I made the children of Israel dwell in sukkot' (Lev. 23:43).
- C. "[If the roof is] up to twenty cubits, someone will know that he is dwelling in a sukkah. If it is higher than twenty cubits, one will not know that he is dwelling in a sukkah, *because [the roof] will be out of [the ordinary line of] sight.*"
- D. *R. Zira said, "The proof derives from here: 'And there shall be a booth [sukkah] for a shadow in the daytime from the heat' (Isa. 4: 6).*
- E. "[If the roof is] up to twenty cubits, someone will sit in the shadow of the [roof of the] sukkah. If it is higher than twenty cubits, one will not sit in the shadow of the [roof of the] sukkah [since the shadow will be cast by the walls entirely], but rather, in the shadow of the walls."
- F. Said to him Abbaye, "But if someone made his sukkah in a glen between two hills [where there is no sun], *would you maintain that in such a case it is not a valid sukkah? [Surely not!]*"
- G. *He said to him, "In that case, if one removes the two mountains there will be shade deriving from the roof of the sukkah, but here, if you remove the walls of the sukkah, there will not be any shadow cast by the sukkah at all."*
- H. *And Raba said, "The proof derives from here: 'You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days' (Lev. 23:42), is what the Torah has said. For all seven days, go out of your permanent dwelling and stay in a temporary dwelling.*
- I. "Now [if the roof is] twenty cubits high, someone will make the sukkah a merely temporary dwelling. If it is higher than that, someone will not make the sukkah a temporary dwelling but a permanent one." [Slotki, p. 2, n. 13: Such a high structure requires firm foundations and walls, and these give it the characteristic of a permanent abode.]
- J. Said to him Abbaye, "But if so, if one has made the walls of his sukkah out of iron and then made a sukkah-roofing on them, *would it be the case that this would not be a valid sukkah? [It certainly is a valid sukkah.]*"
- K. *He said to him, "This is what I was saying to you: If the roof is up to twenty cubits in height, which is the sort of house that a person makes his temporary dwelling, if he makes it his permanent dwelling, he [nevertheless] carries out his obligation. But if the roof is higher than twenty cubits, which is the sort of house a man makes a permanent dwelling, if one makes it a temporary dwelling, he has not carried out his obligation."*
- We now review the proofs of Rabbah, Zira, and Raba, and ask what is at fault that all parties do not concur on any one of the three proposed proof-texts.
- L. **[2B]** *All parties do not concur with the proof of Rabbah, for his proof-text depends upon the knowledge of the coming generations.*
- M. *All parties do not concur with the proof-text of R. Zira, for the proof-text he cites refers to the days of the Messiah.*
- N. *But R. Zira [would respond], "If so, the verse should make use of the language of a canopy: 'A canopy will serve for a shade in the daytime.'*

Why does the verse say, ‘A sukkah shall serve for a shade in the daytime’?
It serves to make two points [one concerning the proper height of a sukkah, the other concerning matters in the messianic age].”

O. *Likewise as to the proof-text adduced by Raba, all parties do not concur, on account of the question raised by Abbaye.*

I.3. A. *[With reference to the proof-texts adduced in No. 2, we turn to the dispute at M. 1:1A-B]: In accord with what authority is the following statement: R. Josiah said Raba said, “The dispute [of the Mishnah at M. 1:1A-B] treats a case in which the walls of the sukkah do not touch the sukkah-roof. But if the walls do touch the sukkah-roof, then even though the roof is higher than twenty cubits, the sukkah is valid.*

B. *In accord with whose view? It accords with Rabbah, who has said, “The reason is that the roof [if higher] will be out of sight. But since the walls touch the sukkah-roofing, the sukkah-roofing is not out of sight. [The eye will be led up the walls to the sukkah-roofing, which forms a single visual image with the walls.]”*

C. *In accord with whose view is the following statement that R. Huna made in the name of Rab: “The dispute concerns a case in which the roof is only four cubits by four cubits in area. But if it is larger than four cubits by four cubits in area, then even if the roofing is higher than twenty cubits, the sukkah is valid.”*

D. *In accord with whom? It accords with the view of R. Zira, who has said, “It is because of the need to cast a proper shadow.” Now since there is ample space in the sukkah-roofing, the shadow of the sukkah [will be suitable even though the roof is higher than twenty cubits].*

E. *In accord with which authority is the following statement that R. Hanan bar Rabbah made in the name of Rab: “The dispute concerns a case in which the sukkah can hold only someone’s head, the greater part of his body, and his table, then even if the roof is taller than twenty cubits, the sukkah will be valid”?*

F. *In accord with whom? In accord with none of them [since even if the sukkah can hold more than one’s head, etc., the stated reasons still pertain.]*

G. *Now R. Josiah surely differs from R. Huna and R. Hanan bar Rabbah, for they define a minimum measure for the extent [of the sukkah], while he does not do so.*

H. *But may we maintain that R. Huna and R. Hanan bar Rabbah differ as to what renders the sukkah valid?*

I. *The proposed theory will be as follows: one party maintains that what renders the sukkah valid is the four cubits of sukkah-roofing, and the other holds that what renders the sukkah valid is the capacity to contain the head, the greater part of the body, and the table [of a resident].*

J. *No, that theory is not valid. All parties concur that what renders a sukkah valid is the capacity to hold the head, the greater part of one’s body, and the table. But in the present case, this is the point of difference:*

K. *One party holds that at issue in the Mishnah’s dispute is a case of a sukkah that indeed holds one’s head, the greater part of one’s body, and his table. But if [a sukkah] holds more than one’s head, the greater part of one’s body, and his table, all parties concur that a sukkah with a roof above twenty cubits remains valid.*

L. *The other party [Judah, M. 1:1B] maintains the view that at issue in the Mishnah's dispute is a case of a sukkah from a size that suffices to hold one's head, the greater part of one's body, and his table, to a size of four cubits. But if the sukkah is larger than four cubits, all parties concur that the sukkah is valid.*

I.4. A. *[The specification of the cited authorities, III A, C, E, on the minimum requirements of the sukkah, now comes under discussion in its own terms.] The following objection was raised:*

B. **A Sukkah that is taller than twenty cubits is invalid.**

C. **R. Judah declares it valid [M. 1:1A-B], even up to forty or fifty cubits.**

D. **Said R. Judah, "M'SH B: The sukkah of Helene in Lud was twenty cubits tall, and sages went in and out, when visiting her, and not one of them said a thing."**

E. **They said to him, "It was because she is a woman, and a woman is not liable to keep the commandment of sitting in a sukkah."**

F. **He said to them, "Now did she not have seven sons [who are disciples of sages, and all of them were dwelling in that same sukkah!]" [T. Suk. 1:1A-E].**

G. **"And furthermore, everything she ever did was done in accord with the instruction of sages."**

H. *Now what need do I have for this additional reason: Furthermore, everything she ever did was done in accord with the instructions of sages?*

I. *This is the sense of what he said to them: "Now, if you say that the sons were minors, and minors are exempt from the religious duty of dwelling in the sukkah, since she had seven sons, it is not possible that among them was not a single one who no longer needed his mother's tending [and so would be required to dwell on his own in the sukkah]."*

J. *"And if, further, you should maintain that a minor who no longer needs his mother's tending is subject to the law only on the authority of rabbis, and that woman paid no attention to rules that rested only on the authority of the rabbis, come and note the following: 'And furthermore, everything she ever did was done in accord with the instructions of sages'."*

K. *[We now revert to the issue with which we began, namely, the comparison of the story at hand to the reasons adduced by the authorities at unit III:] Now with reference to one who said, the dispute applies to a case in which the walls of the sukkah do not touch the sukkah-roofing, would a queen dwell in a sukkah, the walls of which do not touch the sukkah-roofing?*

L. **[3A] [Indeed so! The reason is that] the space makes possible good ventilation.**

M. *But in the view of the one who has said that the dispute pertains to a small sukkah, would a queen ever dwell in a small sukkah?*

N. **Said Rabbah bar R. Ada, "At issue in the dispute is solely a case of a sukkah that is made with many small cubicles."**

- O. But would a queen take up residence in a sukkah that was subdivided into many small cubicles?
- P. Said R. Ashi, "At issue is only [a large sukkah that had] such recesses.
- Q. *"Rabbis take the view that the queen's sons were dwelling in a sukkah of absolutely valid traits, while she dwelled in the recesses on account of modesty [i.e., not showing her face among the men], and it was on that account that rabbis said nothing to her [about her dwelling in what was, in fact, an invalid part of the sukkah]."*
- R. *"And R. Judah maintains the position that her sons were dwelling along with her [in the cubbyholes of the sukkah], and even so, the rabbis did not criticize what she was doing [which proves that the small cubicles of the sukkah were valid]."*

We now proceed to a fresh topic, namely, further requirements of a valid sukkah.

- I.5.** A. Said R. Samuel bar Isaac, "The decided law is that a valid sukkah must be able to contain a person's head, the greater part of his body, and his table."
- B. *Said R. Abba to him, "In accord with which party is this rule? Does it concur with the view of the House of Shammai [at M. 2:7: **He whose head and the greater part of whose body are in the sukkah, but whose table is in the house — the House of Shammai declare invalid. And the House of Hillel declare valid**]."*
- C. *He said to him, "Then in accord with whose opinion [might one allege that this is decided]?"*
- D. *There are those who report [the matter in the following terms:]*
- E. *Said R. Abba, "And who says [that the law is as] you [have stated]?"*
- F. *He said to him, "It is in accord with the House of Shammai, and do not move from that view."*
- G. *R. Nahman bar Isaac objected [to the thesis of Abba, B]: "How [do we know that] the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel debate about a small sukkah, [so that the conclusion drawn at A, B would follow, in line with M. 2:7]? Perhaps the dispute concerns a large sukkah.*
- H. *"It would then involve the case of one who sat at the entrance of the shadowed [part of the large sukkah], with his table in his house.*
- I. *"The House of Shammai then maintain that we rule by decree [that such an arrangement is unacceptable], lest the person be drawn [into the house] after his table.*
- J. *"The House of Hillel take the view that we make no such decree.*
- K. *"From a close reading of the language of the Mishnah itself the same conclusion may be drawn, for it has been taught: **He whose head and the greater part of whose body are in the sukkah, but whose table is in the house — the House of Shammai declare invalid. And the House of Hillel declare valid [M. 2:7].***
- L. *"Now if matters were [as you say, that is, if the dispute involved a small sukkah, then the framer of the Mishnah should have used the language,] '... holds or does not hold... [one's head, the greater part of the body, etc.].'"*
- M. *Now do they really not dispute concerning the validity of a small sukkah?*

- N. *And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority:* [A sukkah that holds one's head, the greater part of his body, and his table is valid. Rabbi says, "It is valid only if it is at least four cubits by four cubits."
- O. *And it has further been taught on Tannaite authority:* Rabbi says, "Any sukkah that is not at least four cubits by four cubits is invalid."
- P. And sages say, "Even if it holds only his head, and the greater part of his body, it is valid."
- Q. *Now note that there is no reference to one's table at all!*
- R. *The cited [teachings on Tannaite authority] present inconsistencies among themselves, so would it not follow that one of them represents the view of the House of Shammai and the other the view of the House of Hillel? [At issue then is the validity of a small sukkah.]*
- S. *Said Mar Zutra, "The Mishnah-paragraph before us also [supports the same view]. Take note that a close reading sustains it: **The House of Shammai declare invalid, and the House of Hillel declare valid.***
- T. *"Now if [at issue were a large sukkah, used in an improper manner, such as was proposed above,] then it should read, 'The House of Shammai say, "The user has not carried out his obligation,; and the House of Hillel say, "The user has carried out his obligation."' [At issue would be not the character of the sukkah but the use made of it by the owner.]"*
- U. *But there is yet a problem, [since the language at hand is,] He whose head... [etc., as Nahman bar Isaac noted earlier, Gff.].*
- V. *It must follow that there is a dispute on two matters, a dispute first about a small sukkah, second, about a large sukkah. The passage then presents a lacuna, and this is its proper wording:*
- W. He whose head and the greater part of whose body were in the sukkah, but whose table was in the house —
- X. the House of Shammai say, "He has not carried out his obligation."
- Y. And the House of Hillel say, "He has carried out his obligation."
- Z. And he whose sukkah is able to contain only his head and the greater part of his body alone —
- AA. the House of Shammai declare [the sukkah] invalid.
- BB. And the House of Hillel declare it valid.

We move on to a free-standing analysis of a separate problem, which is introduced because it intersects with the analysis of the Houses' positions that has now been set forth. The specific point of intersection is at 5.N, to which the following is appended. As we shall now see, the composition can stand independent of the clause that has provoked its conclusion and the exposition of No. 5 can be fully understood without No. 6.

- I.6.** A. *Who stands behind the following teaching, which our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. A building that is not at least four cubits by four cubits [is not truly a "house," and so] is exempt from the requirement of placing a mezuzah and of building a parapet [Deu. 22: 8], does not contract uncleanness through a nega [Lev. 14:34], is not

permanently assigned to the ownership of a purchaser in line with the rules governing the transfer of real property in a walled city [Lev. 25:29]; on its account those who are in the battle line do not return from battle [if they have not used the house a requisite period of time, Deu. 20: 5]; people do not provide an erub-meal for it [symbolically to create joint ownership among the houses in a given courtyard so as to permit carrying within the entire courtyard in the theory that the whole constitutes a single property] or a shittuf-meal for it [so as symbolically to create joint ownership among the courtyards of a single alley-way, for the same purpose as above]; people do not leave an erub-meal in such a house [so as to make it the locus of the symbolic joint meal]; **[3B]** they do not make of it an extension [outpost] between two towns [regarding such a building as a house equally location in two distinct towns, with the result that the two towns are regarded as one, so that people may walk on the Sabbath from one to the other]; and brothers or partners may not partition it [since it is too small].

Now we are told the point of relevance to our prior discussion.

- C. *[Since, in all of the cited matters, Scripture speaks of a house, and Rabbi has said that a sukkah is valid only if it is four cubits by four cubits,] may one say that the cited catalogue represents the views of Rabbi and not those of the rabbis [who would regard a building of smaller size as falling into the category of a house]?*
- D. *You may say that the catalogue represents the views even of the rabbis.*
- E. *They take the view stated there only with reference to a sukkah, which may serve as a random dwelling [not as a permanent house, and hence may be smaller than the normal proportions that would define a house]. But in respect to the definition of a house, which must be able to serve as a permanent dwelling, even rabbis would concur that if a building is four cubits by four cubits, it constitutes a suitable dwelling for people, and if not, it does not constitute a suitable dwelling for people.*

The purpose for which we have introduced the free-standing rule has now been achieved, because we have elucidated the positions of both Rabbi and his opposition. What follows is a secondary analytical exegesis of the free-standing rule, now examined wholly in its own terms.

I.7. A. [Proceeding to the analysis of the passage cited above, B, we move forward:] A master has said, “It is exempt from the requirement of placing a mezuzah and building a parapet, does not contract uncleanness through a nega, is not permanently assigned to the ownership of a purchaser in line with the rules governing the transfer of real property in a walled city; on its account those who are in the battle line do not return from battle.”

- B. *What is the [scriptural] basis for that view?*
- C. *The reason is that in all of these instances, Scripture makes reference to a house. [In no case among those listed is a building of such modest size regarded as a house.]*

I.8. A. “People do not provide an erub meal for it or a shittuf-meal for it; people do not leave an erub-meal in such a house.”

- B. *What is the reason for that view?*
- C. *It will not serve as [an ordinary] dwelling.*

- D. [But if that is the operative consideration, then, while] people may not place the erub-meal there for the purpose of joining houses into a single courtyard, a shittuf-meal might well be placed there [since it joins not houses but entire courtyards that open out into a single alley-way. The consideration of whether or not it is a house does not apply.]
- E. *What is the reason [for such a position]? It is that the building at hand is no worse than a courtyard in an alley-way [and falls into that same category]. For we have learned in a teaching on Tannaite authority: The erub-meals that serve courtyards are placed in a courtyard, and the shittuf-meals serving alleyways are located in alley-ways.*
- F. *And we reflected on that teaching as follows: “Erub-meals serving courtyards are to be placed in a courtyard.” And have we not learned in the Mishnah: **He who places his erub in a gate-house, portico, or gallery — it is not a valid erub. And he who lives there [in the gate-house, portico, or gallery, and who does not share in the erub] does not prohibit [another from carrying objects in the courtyard] [M. Er. 8:4A-B].*** [Hence these are not regarded as houses in the courtyard for the purposes of the erub-meal.]
- G. *Accordingly, I must interpret the cited statement [M] as follows: Erub-meals serving courtyards must be placed in a house located in the courtyard, and shittuf-meals serving alleyways must be located in a courtyard in that alley-way.*
- H. *The matter at hand then [the house less than four cubits by four cubits] is no less [a case] than the courtyard in an alley-way [as proposed just now].*
- I.9.** A. “They do not make of it an extension between two towns:” for it is not treated even as equivalent to a watchtower. *Why not? Watchtowers [however modest] serve their purpose, but this serves no purpose.*
- I.10.** A. “And brothers or partners may not partition it:” *What is the reason? Because it is not in area four cubits by four cubits.*
- B. *But if it were of such an area, would they be able to partition it?*
- C. *And have we not learned in the Mishnah: **People may not divide up a courtyard unless there will be four cubits for one resident and four for another [after the partition] [M. B.B. 1:6].***
- D. *Rather, read the matter simply as follows: The law of partition does not apply [to such a house] as it does to a courtyard.*
- E. For R. Huna has said, “A courtyard is [wholly] divided up in accord with its entry-ways.”
- F. And R. Hisda said, “One assigns four cubits to each entry way, and they partition the remainder equally.”
- G. *The stated rules apply to a house, which one plans to keep standing. In such a case one assigns a courtyard [space to such a house]. But as to this building, which is going to be demolished, we do not assign it courtyard-space.*

We have now completed the secondary exposition of the intruded, free-standing rule, relevant in only its basic principle. We now revert to the exposition of the law of the Mishnah. Since a sukkah that is too high is invalid, one will wish to lower its height, in the model of the rule for the fictive gateway that is too high. How is this to be done? May one fill up the ground area, or must the roof of the sukkah be lowered? In theory, either mode of conforming to the law yields the same result, namely, a sukkah-ceiling that is within twenty cubits of the ground beneath.

- I.11.** A. [If a sukkah] was taller than twenty cubits and one attempted to diminish its height by placing on the ground blankets and pillows, that does not constitute a valid act of diminution [4A], *and that is so even though the owner declared the objects to be abandoned [and null, of no value whatsoever] so far as all parties are concerned.*
- B. *The reason is that his intention in the matter is null when measured against the prevailing view of all other people [who will nonetheless regard the blankets and pillows not as abandoned but as objects of value]. [Subjective intentionality bears no objective consequences.]*
- C. If he did so with straw and nullified [its value], this does indeed constitute an act of valid diminution, and all the more so if he did it with dirt and nullified [its value].
- D. As to the use of straw which the man is not planning to remove later on, and as to dirt of indeterminate condition, there is a dispute between R. Yosé and rabbis.
- E. *For we have learned in the Mishnah: **A house which one wholly filled with dirt or pebbles and which one abandoned is regarded as abandoned [M. Oh. 15:7].***
- F. *That is the case if one has abandoned the house. If one did not abandon the house, that is not the case.*
- G. *And in this regard there is a Tannaite teaching:*
- H. **R. Yosé says, “Straw which one is not destined to remove, lo, it is in the category of ordinary dirt and is regarded as abandoned and dirt which one is destined to remove, lo, it is in the category of ordinary straw and is not regarded as abandoned [T. Oh. 15:5B] [= D].**
- I.12.** A. [If a sukkah] was higher than twenty cubits, but palm leaves were hanging down within the twenty cubits, if the shade that they cast is greater than the sunlight they let through, the sukkah is valid, and if not, it is invalid.
- B. [If a sukkah] was ten handbreadths high, and palm leaves were hanging down into the space of ten handbreadths,
- C. *Abbaye considered ruling that if the shade that they cast is greater than the sunlight they let through, the sukkah is valid, and if not, it is invalid.*
- D. *[But] Raba said to him, “This really would be a disgraceful sort of dwelling, and no one would live in such a disgraceful dwelling [so the sukkah would be invalid to begin with].”*
- E. [If] it was higher than twenty cubits, but the owner built a ledge in it across the entire front of the middle [of the three] walls of the sukkah, and [the ledge] has sufficient space to constitute a valid sukkah, it is a valid sukkah.

F. [If the owner] built the ledge on the side wall, if from the edge of the ledge to the [opposite] wall of the sukkah is a space of four cubits [or more], the sukkah is invalid. If the space from the ledge to the wall is less than four cubits, it is a valid sukkah. [Slotki: It is valid because the roof above the area between the ledge and the opposite wall is regarded as a continuation of that wall which thus serves as a third wall for the ledge.]

The sequence of rules is interrupted by a secondary point of interest in an internal exegetical initiative.

G. *What inference [does the framer of this case] wish to provide for us? Is it that we invoke the principle of the “curved wall”?* [Slotki?]

H. *But we have learned on Tannaite authority:* As to a house which is lacking [the middle of its flat roof], and the owner put sukkah-roofing over that empty area, if from the wall to the sukkah-roofing is a distance of four cubits, the area is invalid [to serve as a sukkah].

I. Lo, if the distance is less than that, it is valid. [Accordingly, the principle yielded by the case at hand is not fresh, since it is readily derived from an available teaching.]

J. *[No, it was necessary to make the principle explicit in the present case.] What might you have said? In that [available] case, it is valid because [each side] is suitable to serve as a wall [Slotki: it is not higher than the permitted maximum], but here, [where the sukkah is higher than twenty cubits] so that the wall is not suitable to serve as a wall for a sukkah, I might have held that it was not a suitable arrangement.*

K. *Thus the framer of the case informs us that that is not a consideration.*

L. [If a sukkah] was taller than twenty cubits, and the owner built a ledge in the middle of the sukkah, if from the edge of the ledge to the wall is a space of four cubits in all directions, the area is invalid to serve as a sukkah. But if it is less than that space, it is valid.

M. *What principle does the framer of the case wish to tell us? Is it that we invoke the principle of the “curved wall”?* This is the same [case as the one just reviewed].

N. *[No, it was necessary to specify the matter.] What might you have imagined? We invoke the principle of the “curved wall” in the case of a [wall in a] single direction, but we do not invoke that principle in all four directions.*

O. *Thus the framer informs us that that is not the case. [We invoke the principle for all four directions.]*

P. [If a sukkah] was lower than ten handbreadths, and one made a hole in the ground of the sukkah so as to fill out the sukkah [‘s requisite space, from ground to roof] up to ten handbreadths, if from the edge of the hole to the wall there is a distance of three or more handbreadths, the sukkah is invalid. If the distance is less than this, [4B] it is valid.

Q. *What differentiates the other case, in which you have maintained that the maximum distance may be four cubits, from the present case, in which the maximum acceptable difference is less than three handbreadths?*

R. *In the earlier case, in which there is a wall, a distance of as much as four cubits will suffice. Here, where the owner has to make a wall, if the distance from the*

hole to the wall is three handbreadths or less, it is acceptable, and if not, it is not acceptable.

- S. If a sukkah was higher than twenty cubits, and the owner built in the sukkah a pillar ten handbreadths in height, with sufficient space [four cubits by four cubits] to constitute a valid sukkah,
- T. *Abbaye considered invoking the principle that the partitions [formed for the sides of the pillar] are [imaginarily] projected upward [Slotki, p. 13, n. 1: As far as the ceiling, and that, since the sides are no less than ten handbreadths high and the distance between the top of the pillar and the roof is less than twenty cubits, the pillar constitutes a valid sukkah].*
- U. *Raba, however, said to him, "To invoke that principle we require partitions that can be recognized, and that condition is not met here."*
We proceed to a final point, which does not amplify the Mishnah's concerns, but, like the foregoing composition, forms a topical statement on the rules of making a sukkah.

I.13. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. If a person drove four posts into the ground and spread sukkah-roofing on them,
- C. R. Jacob declares the arrangement a valid sukkah.
- D. And sages declare it invalid.
- E. Said R. Huna, "The dispute concerns an arrangement made at the edge of a roof. R. Jacob takes the view that we invoke the principle that the walls extend upward, and rabbis maintain that we do not invoke that rule.
- F. "But if one erected such a contraption in the middle of the roof, all parties concur that the arrangement is invalid [since the sukkah has no walls]."
- G. R. Nahman said, "If one erected the arrangement in the middle of the roof, there is a dispute."
- H. *The following question troubled [the later exegetes of the passage]: Is it true that there is a dispute in the case of such an arrangement built at the middle of the roof, but if it were located on the edge of the roof, all parties would concur that it is valid [in Nahman's view of the matter]? Or perhaps whether the arrangement is in this area [the middle of the roof] or in that [the edge of the roof] [in Nahman's view] there is a dispute?*
- I. *The question stands unanswered.*
- J. *The following objection was raised concerning the initial proposition, namely: If someone drove four poles into the ground and arranged sukkah-roofing on them, R. Jacob declares [the contraption to be a] valid [sukkah]. And sages declare it invalid. Now lo, the ground is equivalent to the middle of the roof, and yet R. Jacob declares it valid. That would constitute a refutation of the theory [F] of R. Huna [on what is at issue], would it not? It indeed constitutes a refutation.*
- K. *Furthermore, there is a dispute as to such a contraption's being located at the middle of the roof, but if it is located at the edge of the roof, all parties concur that it is valid. Now may I propose that this too constitutes a refutation of R. Huna in both matters?*

- L. *[No, not at all]. R. Huna may reply to you that the dispute pertains to such a contraption in the middle of the roof, and the same rule applies to one constructed at the edge of the roof. And as to the fact that there is a dispute concerning such an arrangement in the middle of the roof, it serves to tell you just how far R. Jacob is prepared to go. For even if we deal with such an arrangement in the middle of the roof, [Jacob] even in such a case would declare it to be valid.*

I.14. A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:

- B. If someone dug four [round] poles into the ground and put sukkah-roofing on them,
- C. R. Jacob says, “[To determine whether we have valid walls,] we take a perspective such that, if one should cut the pole and plane it, what would result would be a beam with a handbreadth of space on one side and a handbreadth of space on the other. Then the poles are judged to form a rectangular corner piece [and so to constitute a double wall with each surface regarded as a wall unto itself], and if not, they are not required in that way.” [If there are two walls, one in each direction, to be imputed to the pillar, we have an adequate sukkah.]
- D. For R. Jacob says, “The measure for the assessment of a rectangular corner piece in the case of a sukkah is a handbreadth.”
- E. And sages say, “The appropriate measure is only if two [of the nearby walls] are fully articulated walls in accord with the law pertaining to them. In that case, then the third wall of the sukkah may be even so small as a handbreadth [in depth]. [So sages reject Jacob’s view that we invoke the principle that the estimate, if met, would yield two valid walls for the sukkah, one on each side of the pillar. Sages insist on two fully valid walls, and here there is none.]

We have completed the exposition of the opening clauses of the Mishnah, moving from the language to secondary consideration of the substance of the law.

II.1 A. And one [a sukkah] which is not ten handbreadths high [M. 1:1C]:

- B. *How do we know [from Scripture] that that is the rule?*
- C. *It has been stated [on Amoraic authority]:*
- D. *Rab, R. Hanina, R. Yohanan, and R. Habiba repeated —*
- E. *— n the whole of the Division of Appointed Times, in any case in which this set appears together, the name of R. Jonathan may be substituted for the name of R. Yohanan —*
- F. “The ark was nine handbreadths high, and the ark cover one more, thus, ten in all.
- G. “And it is written, ‘And there I will meet with you and I will speak with you from above the ark-cover’ (Exo. 25:22).”
- H. **[5A]** *[And it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. “R. Yosé says, ‘The Presence of God never came down, and Moses and Elijah never went upward to the height, for it is said, “The heavens are the heavens of God, and the earth he has given to the children of men” (Psa. 115:16).’” [Slotki, p. 15, n. 4: Now since the Shekhinah descended as low as the ark-cover it may be concluded that the boundary of the earth is at that level, viz., ten handbreadths

from the ground. Consequently a wall whose height is less than ten handbreadths cannot be regarded as a valid wall.]

The secondary testing of the proposition that has just now been demonstrated resorts to a dialectic argument, moving from point to point in sequence; we do not have a fully-free-standing exposition, but a testing of a sequence of allegations. That is why I treat what follows as an expansion of the proof of F-I, and not as an autonomous exposition of a proposition.

- J. But did the Presence of God never come down to the earth? *And has it not been written*, “And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai” (Exo. 19:20)?
- K. It was only to the space above ten handbreadths over the mountain.
- L. *And is it not written*, “And his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives” (Zec. 14: 4)?
- M. It will still be above ten handbreadths [from the ground].
- N. And did Moses and Elijah not go upward? *And has it not been written*, “And Moses went up to God” (Exo. 19: 3)?
- O. It was ten handbreadths below [the height].
- P. *And has it not been written*, “And Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven” (2Ki. 2:11)?
- Q. It was ten handbreadths below [the height].
- R. *And has it not been written*, “He seizes hold of the face of his throne and he spreads his cloud upon him” (Job. 26: 9)? And in this connection R. Tanhum said, “This teaches that the All-Mighty spread over him some of the splendor of his Presence and his cloud.”
- S. This was nonetheless lower than ten handbreadths [from the height].
- T. Nonetheless, it is written, “He seizes hold of the face of his throne”!
- U. *The throne was lowered down until it was ten handbreadths below the height, at which point he laid hold of it.*

II.2. A. [Reverting to the main point, 1.G, above], now there is no difficulty in showing that the ark was nine handbreadths high, for it has been written, “And they shall make an ark of acacia wood, two cubits and a half shall be the length of it, and a cubit and a half the breadth of it, and a cubit and a half the height of it (Exo. 25:10) [and a cubit is six handbreadths, so a cubit and a half will be nine].

- B. *But how do we know that* the ark-cover was a handbreadth in height?
- C. *It accords with what R. Hanina taught on Tannaite authority*, “For all of the utensils that Moses made, the Torah defined the measure of their length, breadth, and height.
- D. “In the case of the ark-cover, while the Torah specified its length and its breadth, it did not specify the dimensions of its height.
- E. “Go and derive an analogy from the dimensions of the smallest of all of the utensils.
- F. “For it has been said, ‘And you shall make it a border of a handbreadth round about’ (Exo. 25:25).

- G. “Just as that is a handbreadth in height, so in the present case, the utensil is to be a handbreadth in height.”
- H. *But should we not derive the measurement from the utensils themselves?*
- I. If you hold onto a great deal, you hold nothing, but if you hold onto a little, you will hold onto it. [Slotki, p. 16, n. 5: The lesser is included in the greater, but the greater is not included in the lesser. The selection of the lesser is therefore the safer course.]
- J. *Then let us derive the measurement from the dimensions of the plate [Exo. 28:36, still smaller than a handbreadth]!*
- K. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- L. The plate was like a gold plate, two fingerbreadths broad and stretching from ear to ear, and on it were inscribed two thin lines with a Y and H above, and “Holy” and an L below [yielding, from right to left, Holy to the Lord].”
- M. And R. Eliezer b. R. Yosé said, “I saw it in Rome, and on it was written, ‘Holy to the Lord,’ on a single line.”
- N. *[It follows that the measurement of the plate is less than a handbreadth in height. Why not derive the measurement of the ark-cover from that analogy?] We form an analogy from one utensil to another, but we do not form an analogy from an ornament for a utensil.*
- O. *And why not derive the measurement of the ark-cover from the analogy of the crown [of gold around the ark, Exo. 25:11]?*
- P. For in that connection a master has stated, “The crown was the smallest possible size.”
- Q. We establish an analogy between one utensil and another, but not between a utensil and an appurtenance to a utensil.
- R. *But the border also served as an appurtenance to a utensil.*
- S. The border was below [the top of] the table [Slotki, p. 17, n. 2: Joining its legs together and forming part of the structure].
- T. *That answer suffices for the one who maintains that the border was beneath the top of the table. But in the view of the one who maintains that the border was above it, what is there to say?* For the object at hand served only as an appurtenance to a utensil.
- U. Rather, we draw an analogy from an object to which the Torah has assigned a measure for another object to which the Torah has assigned a measure, but neither the plate or the crown should provide evidence, since in neither case did the Torah assign fixed measurements to them.
- V. *R. Huna said, “[We derive proof on the height of the ark-cover] from the verse that follows: ‘Upon the face of the ark-cover on the east’ (Lev. 16:14).*
- W. “And ‘face’ must be at least a handbreadth.”
- X. *But might I propose that [the face] would be like the face [5B] of Bar Yokhani [a very large bird]?*

- Y. [No,] if you hold onto a great deal, you hold nothing, but if you hold onto a little, you will hold onto it [as at I, above].
- Z. *But I might propose that [the face] would be like that of a siparta[-bird] which is very small.*
- AA. *Said R. Aha bar Jacob, "R. Huna [derives the lesson] from the use of the word 'face' in two passages, [applying by analogy the meaning imputed in one case to that appropriate in the other]."*
- BB. *"Here it is written, 'Upon the face of the ark cover' (Lev. 16:14).*
- CC. *"And elsewhere it is written, 'From the face of Isaac his father' (Gen. 27:30). [A human face in the latter case is meant, hence a handbreadth in size, and the same dimension then applies in the former case]."*
- DD. *But why not derive the lesson from the use of "face" with reference to the one above [God].*
- EE. *For it is written, "As one sees the face of God, and you were pleased with me" (Gen. 33:10).*
- FF. [No,] if you hold onto a great deal, you hold onto nothing, but if you hold onto a little, you will hold onto it.
- GG. *Then how about deriving the besought dimension from the case of the cherub, for it is written, "Toward the face of the ark-cover shall the faces of the cherubim be" (Exo. 25:20)?*
- HH. *Said R. Aha bar Jacob, "We have learned that the faces of cherubs are not less than a handbreadth."*
- II. *R. Huna, for his part, also derived the same lesson from here.*
- JJ. *And what is a cherub (KRWB)?*
- KK. *Said R. Abbahu, "Like a child [KRBY], for so in Babylonia they call a child a 'rabé.'"*
- LL. *Said to him Abbayye, "But [if you hold the face of a cherub was a handbreadth] how do you deal with that which is written, 'The first face was the face of the cherub, and the second face the face of a man' (Eze. 10:14)? So is the face of a cherub the same as the face of a man?"*
- MM. *One face is large, the other small.*

- II.3.** A. *And how [do you know] that the contained space [of the sukkah] not counting the covering is to be ten handbreadths? Perhaps that measurement encompasses the covering. [In that case, the sukkah from the roofing to the ground may be less than ten handbreadths, and only inclusive of the roofing from the top, must it be ten handbreadths in height.]*
- B. *The rule derives from the eternal house.*
 - C. *For it is written, "And the house which King Solomon built for the Lord was threescore cubits long, twenty cubits broad, and thirty cubits high" (1Ki. 6: 2).*
 - D. *And it is written, "The height of the one cherub was ten cubits, and so was that of the other cherub" (2Ki. 6:26).*
 - E. *And it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- F. Just as we find in the eternal house that the cherubs were a third of the height of the house, so also in the case of the tabernacle [standing on the ark, inclusive of the ark and ark cover (Slotki, p. 18, n. 15)] they were a third of its height.
- G. Now how high was the tabernacle? It was ten cubits, for it is written, "Ten cubits shall be the length of a board" (Exo. 26:16).
- H. How much is that? Sixty handbreadths. If you take a third, what do you have? Twenty handbreadths. Then take off the ten for the ark and the ark-covering, and you are left with ten [the measure of the height of the sukkah].
- I. And it is written, "And the cherubim shall spread out their wings on high, covering the ark-cover with their wings" (Exo. 25:20).
- J. The All-Merciful thus regards [the wings] above ten handbreadths "roofing" [such as serves for a sukkah]. [Q.E.D.].
- K. How do we know that their wings rose above their heads? Perhaps they were at the same level with their heads [Slotki, p. 19, n. 1: In which case, the hollow space between the wings and the ark-cover was only ten handbreadths minus the thickness of the wings].
- L. *Said R. Aha bar Jacob, "'Above' is what is written."*
- M. *And might I say that they were very high?*
- N. *Is it written, "Above and upward"?* [The sense of the language would not support the notion that they were raised up very high.]
- O. *[The proof just now given] affords no problems to the view of R. Meir, who has taken the position that all of the cubits were intermediate [normal] [with six handbreadths in a cubit, as stated above].*
- P. *But in the view of R. Judah, who has said that the cubit-measure used in the building was six handbreadths, but that used for utensils was only five handbreadths, what is there to be said?*
- Q. *How high were the ark and the ark-covering? Eight and a half, leaving eleven and a half handbreadths. [The ark was a cubit and a half, hence seven and a half handbreadths by Judah's measure, and the ark-cover one handbreadth. That will leave, between the ark-cover and the wings of the cherubim, eleven and a half handbreadths.]*
- R. *Shall I then say that [in Judah's view] the sukkah is valid only if it is eleven and a half handbreadths in height? [Surely not!]*
- S. *But R. Judah derived [the required measure, ten] on the basis of received law [transmitted orally, and not on the basis of exegesis of Scripture].*
- T. For R. Hiyya bar Ashi said Rab [said], "The [laws covering] measurements [of minimal quantities], of interpositions and partitions constitute law revealed to Moses at Sinai."
- U. *[But to the contrary] the laws governing minimal quantities derive from the Torah [its written rules, not from revelation orally transmitted], for it has been written, "A land of wheat and barley, vines, fig-trees, and pomegranates, a land of olive trees and honey" (Deu. 8: 8).*
- V. And [in regard to the cited verse] R. Hanina said, "This entire verse is stated with reference to the provision of minimum measures [for various purposes, thus:]

- W. “‘Wheat’ serves to make reference to a house afflicted with *nega*, *as we have learned in the Mishnah*:
- X. **“He who entered a house afflicted with a *nega*, with his garments slung over his shoulder and his sandals and rings in his hands — he and they are unclean forthwith. [6A] If he was dressed in his garments with his sandals on his feet and his rings on his fingers, he is unclean forthwith. But they are clean until he will remain for a time sufficient to eat a piece of bread — a piece of bread of wheat and not a piece of bread of barley, reclining and eating it with condiment [M. *Neg.* 13:9].**
- Y. “‘Barley;’ *as we have learned in the Mishnah*: **A barley-grain’s bulk of a bone [of a corpse] imparts uncleanness if someone touches or carries it, but not if someone overshadows it’ [M. *Oh.* 2:3].**
- Z. “‘Vines:’ That reference provides the measurement of a fourth-log of wine, constituted that minimum measure for which a Nazir becomes culpable [since he may not drink wine].
- AA. “‘Fig-trees:’ That reference provides the measurement of a minimum volume for which one becomes liable if he removes something on the Sabbath from one domain to another:
- BB. “‘Pomegranate:’ *As we have learned in the Mishnah*: **Any utensil [made of wood] belonging to a householder [becomes useless and therefore no longer susceptible to uncleanness] if in it there is a crack [or hole] the size of a pomegranate [so there is a hole that renders the utensil no longer a receptacle at all] [M. *Kel.* 17:1].**
- CC. “‘A land of olive-trees.’ A land all of whose minimal measures are the equivalent of the bulk of an olive.”
- DD. *Do you really mean to say that all of the minimum measures are of the size of an olive? Lo, there are [to the contrary] those others that we already have catalogued!*
- EE. *Rather, say, “...most of whose minimal measures are the equivalent of the bulk of an olive.”*
- FF. “‘Honey:’ This refers to the size of a large date. [On the Day of Atonement one who eats food the bulk of a large date becomes liable for violating the prohibition against eating, while if one eats food less than that bulk, he is not culpable].”
- GG. *[Reverting to the point at which we started, U], it follows that [the minimum measures] derive from the Torah [and not from laws revealed to Moses at Sinai and handed on orally]!*
- HH. *Do you take the position that the stated measures are actually written down in the Torah? Rather, they are laws [handed on orally], and Scripture then provided general support [for the same measurements. But from Scripture one could not derive the measurements just now catalogued].*
- II. *And the rules of interposition in fact derive from the Torah [vs. T], for it is written, “And he shall wash his body in water” (Lev. 14: 9).*
- JJ. This indicates that there should be nothing to interpose between him and the water.

- KK. *[No, there is an aspect of the rules that derives from oral transmission], for, when the orally-transmitted law serves a purpose, it is as to the interposition of one's hair, in accord with the formulation of Rabbah bar bar Hana.*
- LL. *For Rabbah bar bar Hana said, "A single knotted hair interposes [between the flesh and the water], while three do not interpose. As to the effect of two, I do not know the law."*
- MM. *The interposition of one's hair also is a matter of law deriving from the Torah [and not from an orally-transmitted law].*
- NN. *For it has been written, "And he shall wash [+ accusative particle] his body in water" (Lev. 14: 9).*
- OO. *[The use of the] accusative principle serves to indicate that at issue is what is attached to his body, that is, the hair.*
- PP. *[Reverting to the original claim, then] when there is a matter of law [orally transmitted, in connection with interposition], it is in accord with that which R. Isaac said.*
- QQ. *For R. Isaac said, [6B] "As matter of law deriving from the Torah, if most [of one's hair is covered with mud, each hair knotted singly (Slotki)], and the person pays attention to it, then the matted hair serves to interpose, but if he does not pay attention to it, then it does not interpose. And [sages] furthermore have made a decree concerning a case in which most of the hair is matted with mud but the person does not pay attention to it [indicating that in such a case, the hair interposes, even though the person pays it no mind], on account of a case in which most of the hair is matted with mud and the person does pay attention to it,*
- RR. *"as well as concerning a case in which the small part [of one's hair is matted with mud] and the person does pay attention to it [in which case, the hair interposes, though it is not the bulk of the person's hair], on account of the case in which the bulk of the hair is matted with mud and the person pays attention to it."*
- SS. *And why not let sages make a decree concerning a case in which the smaller part of one's hair is matted with mud, and the person does not pay attention to it, on account of the case in which the smaller part of one's hair is matted with mud and the person does pay attention to it?*
- TT. *Or [let the decree be made on account of the rule governing the case in which] the greater part of one's hair is matted with mud, but one pays no attention to it?*
- UU. *That very matter is subject to an [arbitrary] decree, and should we then go and impose yet another decree [applying a strict law to a matter which to begin with is subject to a decree [on our part? Such would be altogether too strict].*
- VV. *"As to the laws of partitions [T]:" they are those to which we have already made reference [concerning the height of the sukkah].*
- WW. *That view accords well with the position of R. Judah [S, who does not claim the measurements derive from Scripture], but as to the view of R. Meir, what is to be said?*
- XX. *As to the point at which a law [transmitted orally] is needed, it concerns the principles of [the legal fictions involving] extension [Slotki, p. 22, n. 7: a partition that does not reach the ground or the ceiling may in certain conditions be deemed to touch the ground or the ceiling, respectively], junction [Slotki, p.*

22, n. 8: *small interstices, of less than three handbreadths, are disregarded, and the wall is deemed to be a solid whole*], and the curved wall [Slotki, p. 22, n. 9: If a portion of the roof of a sukkah consists of materials that are legally unfit for the purpose, the sukkah may nevertheless be valid if that portion is adjacent to any of its walls and terminates within a distance of four cubits from that wall. That portion of the roof together with the wall it adjoins are regarded as one curved wall; and the space under the remainder of the roof consisting of suitable materials may be used as a proper sukkah].

III.1 A. One which does not have three walls [M. Suk. 1:1D]:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. Two [of the walls must be] in accord with the law applying to them, but the third may be even a handbreadth.
- D. And R. Simeon says, "Three must be in accord with the law applying to them, but the fourth may be even a handbreadth.
- E. *What is at issue between them?*
- F. *Rabbis take the view that the traditional text [Slotki] is authoritative [without regard to the vowels placed with the consonants] while R. Simeon holds that the traditional mode of reading the text [inclusive of reference to the vowels] is authoritative.*
- G. The rabbis take the view that the traditional text is authoritative [without regard to the vowels], and sukkot two times [read without the vowel indicating the plural] while sukkot is written only once with the consonantal vowel indicating the plural, yielding four allusions in all [one, one, two]. *You take off one needed for itself [teaching the fact that one must dwell in a sukkah], leaving three, that refer to the walls: two to be built in accord with the law applying to them, and the law transmitted orally comes along and reduces the requirement affecting the third wall, leaving it [suitable even if it is only] at a handbreadth.*
- H. R. Simeon holds that the traditional mode of reading the text is authoritative, and since the word sukkot is written three times, there are six available references in all.
- I. *You take off one verse of Scripture for itself [covering the fact that one has to make a sukkah], and you are left with four, three to be built in accord with the law governing them, and the law transmitted orally comes along and reduces the requirement affecting the third wall, leaving it at a handbreadth.*
- J. *If you want, I shall explain the cited disputed [B-D] differently, conceding that all parties concur that the traditional mode of reading the text is authoritative.*
- K. *Then in the present instance on what point do they differ?*
- L. *One authority takes the view that the fact that the sukkah must be covered with sukkah-roofing requires a proof-text, and the other authority maintains that the fact that the sukkah must be covered with sukkah-roofing does not require a proof-text.*
- M. *If you wish, I may concede that all parties concur that the traditional text is authoritative [and not the traditional mode of reading it].*
- N. *Then in the present instance on what point do they differ?*

- O. *One authority takes the view that when the law handed on orally comes along, it serves the purpose of lowering the requirements at hand, and the other authority holds that when the law transmitted orally comes along, it serves to add to what is required* [Slotki, p. 23, n. 12: Scripture teaches us the necessity of three walls and tradition adds a fourth].
- P. *If you wish, I may concede that all parties concur that the law handed on orally serves to lower the requirements at hand, and, further, that the traditional text is authoritative.*
- Q. *And in the present case, what is at issue between the contending parties?*
- R. *At issue is whether or not one imposes an exegesis upon the first occurrence of a word [in a given series in which the same word is repeated, as in the case of the several uses of the work sukkot].*
- S. *One authority takes the view that we impose a secondary exegetical meaning upon a word on the first occasion of its appearance [not as we read it above], and the other authority holds that we do not impose a secondary exegetical meaning upon a word on the first occasion of its appearance [just as we did not impose such a meaning above].*
- T. *R. Mattenah said, "The scriptural basis for the view of R. Simeon derives from the following verse: 'And there shall be a sukkah for a shadow in the day time from the heat, and for a refuge for a cover from storm and from rain' (Isa. 4: 6). [This can be provided only by four walls]."*

We revert to the exegesis of the Mishnah's rule, now asking a question of clarification on how the rule is applied.

- III.2.** A. Now as to the wall that may be only a handbreadth [of the three or of the four, as indicated just now], where does the builder set it?
- B. Said Rab, "He sets it at right angles to one of the projecting walls [Slotki]."
- C. R. Kahana and R. Assi said to Rab, **[7A]** "Let him set it in a slanting position [not at right angles]."
- D. *Rab remained silent.*
- E. *It has been stated also upon Amoraic authority:*
- F. Said Samuel in the name of Levi, "One sets it at right angles to one of the projecting walls."
- G. And so too is it taught in the house of study: One sets it at right angles to one of the projecting walls."
- H. R. Simeon, *and some say*, R. Joshua b. Levi said, "One makes the projecting wall a handbreadth measured loosely and sets it up within three handbreadths of the wall, for whatever stands within three handbreadths of the wall is held to be joined to the wall." [Slotki, p. 24, n. 5: The total width now being four handbreadths and the prescribed minimum size of a sukkah wall being seven handbreadths, the wall constitutes the greater part of a valid sukkah wall.]
- I. Said R. Judah, "A sukkah that is made like an open alley-way is suitable, and as to the wall a handbreadth in size, one may place it in any position that he wants.
- J. R. Simeon, *and some say*, R. Joshua b. Levi said, "One makes a strip of four handbreadths and a bit more and sets it up within three handbreadths of the wall,

for whatever stands within three handbreadths of the wall is held to be joined to the wall.”

- K. *Now what differentiates the former case, in which you have held that what is sufficient is a handbreadth loosely measured, from the present case, in which you have said that what is required is a strip of four handbreadths [which would be considerably larger]?*
- L. *In that other case, in which there are two walls that accord with the law governing the matter, it is sufficient to have a wall that is, in addition, merely a handful measured loosely. But here [where we have a sukkah in the shape of an alley-way [that is, open at the two ends], where there are not two clearly differentiated walls, if there is (in addition) a strip of four handbreadths, it is acceptable, and if not, it is not acceptable.*
- M. Said Raba, “Such an arrangement is acceptable only if it is in the form of a doorway.” [Slotki, p. 25, n. 2: “It is not enough to attach one board of the width of four handbreadths to one of the walls (of the sukkah in the shape of an alley), but two posts each half a handbreadth in width must be attached to each opposite wall with a cross-beam joining them.” This forms a recognizable house, not just an alley-way.”]
- N. *There are those who say that Raba said, “And [a sukkah lacking a required wall] also is valid if it is in the shape of a doorway.”*
- O. *There is yet another version that has Raba say, “It must also have the shape of a doorway.”* [Slotki, p. 25, n. 5: One of the posts on which the cross-beam lies must be a full handbreadth wide.]
- P. *R. Ashi found R. Kahana making [a sukkah using a wall the size of] a handbreadth loosely measured, and making it in the shape of a doorway.*
- Q. *He said to him, “Does not the master accord with the view of Raba, for Raba said, ‘It also is valid if it is in the shape of a doorway’?”*
- R. *He said to him, “I have taken a position in accord with a different version of what Raba said, for R. Raba said, ‘It must also have the shape of a doorway.’”*

Secondary analysis of the initial clarification goes forward. We now proceed to the exegesis of the rule on carrying out the law at hand, namely III.1.C.

- III.3.** A. “Two of the walls must be in accord with the law applying to them, but the third may be even a handbreadth.”
- B. Said Raba, “And so is the rule concerning [definition of a private domain for purposes of permitting carrying] on the Sabbath. [There must be three walls, two ordinary, one fictional. If such a sukkah is erected by the door of one’s home, on the Sabbath he may carry from the sukkah to the house.]
 - C. “[Why so?] Since the [fictional] wall is regarded as a wall for the purposes of the sukkah, it serves also as a wall for the purposes of [establishing private domain for carrying on] the Sabbath.”
 - D. *Abbaye objected [to the reasoning of C], “Do we invoke the argument [of analogy represented by the phrase beginning], ‘since’?*
 - E. *“And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘The rules covering a wall for the purpose of building a sukkah are equivalent to the walls covering [partitions to indicate a private domain for purposes of carrying on] the Sabbath [e.g., a sukkah*

attached to a door to permit carrying on the Sabbath], so long as between one reed [wall-marker] and the next is no space exceeding three handbreadths. But there is a further rule pertaining to [partitions for] the [sukkah built in connection with carrying on the] Sabbath that does not pertain to the sukkah, for [a domain constituted by a sukkah and so partitioned off for carrying on the Sabbath does not constitute a] permitted [domain] unless the standing part of the wall is greater than the breaches [in that same wall], a rule that does not apply to the sukkah [constructed solely in observance of the Festival].’

- F. *“Now is not the sense of the language, ‘a further rule for sukkah in connection with the Sabbath’ that we do not invoke [the argument of analogy beginning with the word] ‘since’?”*
- G. *[Raba replied], “No, the language indicating that ‘a further rule applies to the Sabbath’ refers to the Sabbath in general [and indicates that, overall, a valid wall is required, but not to] sukkah constructed to permit carrying on the Sabbath.”*
- H. *[Abbaye replied,] “If so, the framer of the passage should then have framed matters to indicate that the requirements governing a sukkah in general are more stringent than the requirements relating to the sukkah that is used [to permit carrying] on the Sabbath, for the sukkah in general requires [for the fictional, defective wall] a breadth of a handbreadth measured loosely, while the sukkah in regard to [carrying on] the Sabbath does not require such a measurement, but suffices with a mere side-post.*
- I. *“For you [Raba] are the one who has maintained that if one has spread sukkah-roofing over an alley-way which is marked off by a side-post, it is a valid arrangement.”*
- J. *[Raba replied], ““It was not necessary at all to make such specification [concerning the imposition of a more strict rule]. [Why not?] If we invoke the argument beginning with the word ‘since,’ with the effect of applying the role governing the less strict case [the sukkah] to the more strict case [the Sabbath], we should surely invoke the same argument to apply the rule governing the more strict case to the less strict one [with the result that the side-post which is suitable to serve for purposes of the Sabbath is acceptable also with regard to the sukkah].”*
- K. *[Reverting to the earlier] body [of discourse]: Said Raba, **[7B]**, “If one has spread sukkah-roofing over an alley-way that is marked off by a side post, it is a valid [arrangement].”*
- L. *And Raba said, “If one has placed sukkah-roofing on top of boards placed around wells, it is a valid arrangement.” [A well which by definition constitutes private domain, located in a public domain, may not be used for its water, since one would have to transport the water on the Sabbath from the private domain of the well to public domain round about. To solve this problem, four corner-pieces will be placed around the well. These indicate that the enclosed space is private domain, and the water may be taken and used within that space without violating the law against carrying from one domain to the other.]*
- M. *And it was necessary [to make explicit the law about placing sukkah-roofing over an alley-way marked off by a side-post, the*

law on sukkah-roofing on the upright boards around a well, and the law that, since a wall the size of a handbreadth is acceptable for a sukkah, it also is acceptable as a valid wall to mark off private domain for carrying on the Sabbath].

- N. *For had we heard the rule only about the alleyways, we should have assumed that the reason is that there are two perfectly valid walls [so the arrangement is acceptable], but in regard to the corner-boards around a well, in which case there are not two valid walls at all, I might have said that such an arrangement was not acceptable.*
- O. *If we had learned the rule governing the acceptability of sukkah-roofing placed over the corner-posts around a well, I might have assumed that the reason that such an arrangement is acceptable is that there are four walls, but if one spread sukkah-roofing over an alley-way, in which there are not four walls [even symbolically], I might have ruled that that would not be acceptable.*
- P. *If we had heard the rule in these two cases, I might have supposed that where we invoke for the less strict case the rule pertaining to the more strict case, that poses no problems, but I might have supposed that we do not invoke the rule governing the less strict case for judging the more strict case.*
- Q. *Accordingly, it was necessary to make explicit all three rules.*

IV.1 A. Or one, the light of which is greater than the shade of which, is invalid [M. 1:1E-F]:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. *[When] the light [of the sukkah] is more than the shadow on account of [inadequate] sukkah-roofing, [the sukkah is invalid],*
- D. *but not when the greater light is on account of the character of] the walls [which may not be opaque and so may permit light to fall into the hut].*
- E. *R. Josiah says, "Also on account of the character of the walls."*
- F. *Said R. Yemar bar Shelamayah in the name of Abbayye, "What is the scriptural reason for the view of R. Josiah? It is because it is written, 'And you shall cover the ark with the veil' (Exo. 26:33).*
- G. *"The veil constitutes a partition, and the All-Merciful has referred to it with the word used for sukkah-roofing.*
- H. *"Therefore [the partition and not only the roof constitutes an aspect of the sukkah-roofing], and we require the partition to be similar to the sukkah-roofing [and opaque]."*
- I. *And rabbis [who take the contrary view]?*
- J. *They take the word, "You shall cover" [which uses the root of the word for sukkah-roofing] to mean that at the top the veil should bend so as to appear like roofing.*

The sukkah must serve as a permanent not only temporary dwelling

We proceed to a free-standing proposition, set forth in its own terms and not related to any problems of Mishnah-exegesis. Here the Mishnah has supplied the topic but not the principle; the Talmud sets forth a number of such topical statements, having completed its systematic amplification of the Mishnah's propositions. The reason for the inclusion of No. 2 at this point is certainly the reference to the foregoing at 2.D, but the effect is to accommodate a variety of further rules for a richer exposition of the topic, which accounts for my treatment of the composite as a free-standing item. That decision is further justified at E; if the intent were mere Mishnah-commentary, the whole would have been situated in the setting of the exposition of M. 1:1B.

- IV.2.** A. *Said Abbaye, "Rabbi, R. Josiah, R. Judah, R. Simeon, Rabban Gamaliel, the House of Shammai, R. Eliezer, and 'others' all take the view that the sukkah must serve as a permanent [not only temporary] dwelling."*
- B. Rabbi: *As it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. Rabbi says, "Any sukkah which is not of the area of four cubits by four cubits is invalid." [A space of less than that is insufficient for a dwelling for a human being.]
- D. R. Josiah: *As we have just now indicated [since he requires fully filled-in walls].*
- E. R. Judah: *As we have learned in the Mishnah: A sukkah which is taller than twenty cubits is invalid. R. Judah declares it valid [M. 1:1A-B] [since it can serve as a permanent dwelling].*
- F. R. Simeon: *As it has been taught on Tannaite authority [cf. III.1.D]:*
- G. Two in accord with the law applying to them, and a third [wall] even a handbreadth. R. Simeon says, "Three walls in accord with the law applying to them, and the fourth even a handbreadth [since without three solid walls, the hut cannot be considered a permanent dwelling]."
- H. Rabban Gamaliel: *As it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- I. He who makes his sukkah on top of a wagon or on top of on the deck of a ship — Rabban Gamaliel declares it invalid, and R. 'Aqiba declares it valid. [The former holds that on moving vehicles there cannot be a permanent residence.]
- J. The House of Shammai: *As we have learned in the Mishnah: He whose head and the greater part of whose body are in the sukkah, but whose table is in the house — the House of Shammai declare the sukkah invalid, and the House of Hillel declare it valid [M. Suk. 2:7].*
- K. R. Eliezer: *As we have learned in the Mishnah: He who makes his sukkah in the shape of a cone or who learned it up against a wall — R. Eliezer declares it invalid, because it has no roof, and sages declare it valid [M. Suk. 1:11A-D].*
- L. "Others:" *As it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- M. Others say, "A sukkah make like a dovecote [round-shaped (Slotki)] is invalid, since it does not have corners."

A sukkah that is shaped like a furnace, if in its circumference is enough space so that twenty-four men can sit around it, is valid, and if not, it is invalid.

- IV.3.** A. Said R. Yohanan, “A sukkah that is shaped like a furnace [round shaped], if in its circumference is enough space so that twenty-four men can sit around it, is valid, and if not, it is invalid.”
- B. *In accord with whom does R. Yohanan rule?*
- C. *He accords with the view of Rabbi, who has said, “Any sukkah that is not four cubits by four cubits is invalid.”*
- D. *But since a man occupies the space of a cubit, and since [in rabbinical mathematics, $1 = 3$ so that] any circumference of three handbreadths has a diameter of a handbreadth, should it not be sufficient [if the sukkah in the shape of a circle] can seat only twelve [and not twenty-four]? [Why then A's measurement?]*
- E. **[8A]** *The view [that $1 = 3$] applies to a circle, but in the case of a square a greater perimeter is necessary.*
- F. *But by how much is a square greater than a circle [inscribed therein]? It is greater by a quarter.*
- G. *Then should it not be sufficient [if the sukkah in the shape of a circle] can seat only sixteen [and not twenty-four]?*
- H. *That would be the case for a circle that is inscribed in a square, but in the case of a square inscribed in a circle, more would be required on account of the projection of the corners. [Slotki, p. 29, n. 11: The circumferences of the sukkah must therefore be large enough to contain a square of four cubits.]*
- I. *But if the side of a square is a cubit, its diagonal is approximately one and two fifths cubits [Slotki]. Should not the circumference be seventeen cubits less a fifth? [Slotki, p. 29, n. 13: The diagonal of the square being equal to $(4 + 4 \times 2/5) = 5\frac{3}{5}$ ths cubits, and Pi being approximately equivalent to three, a circumference of $3\frac{3}{5}$ cubits = $16\frac{4}{5}$ cubits ought to suffice.]*
- J. *[Yohanan] did not give a precise figure.*
- K. *While we may take the view that, where the difference is minor, one does not give a precise figure, do we say so [in the present case] when the difference is considerable?*
- L. *Said Mar Qashisha, son of R. Hisda, to R. Ashi, “Do you maintain that a man occupies the space of an entire cubit? Three men can sit in the space of two cubits. How much is then [required for twenty four men]? Sixteen [would be enough]. So we require sixteen and four fifths, and [Yohanan] did not give an exact [but only an approximate] figure.*
- M. *While we may take the view that one does not give an exact figure when it yields a strict ruling, do we maintain that one does not give an exact figure when it would yield a lenient ruling?*
- N. *Said R. Assi to R. Ashi, “In point of fact a person occupies the space of a cubit. But R. Yohanan did not take account of the space occupied by persons at all.” [Slotki, p. 30, n. 2: The men are considered as sitting around the circumference of*

the sukkah they themselves forming a circumference of twenty-four cubits, equivalent to the space occupied by twenty-four men, with a diameter of eight cubits. But the inner circumference formed by the sukkah is smaller, since its diameter is eight minus two, the space occupied lengthways by the legs of two men, one sitting at each end, is six cubits.] *How many [cubits] would [the circumference of the sukkah] then require? Eighteen* [Slotki, p. 30, n. 4: Since a diameter of six cubits has a circumference of eighteen cubits], *though sixteen and four fifths cubits would be enough.*

- O. *That is the sense of the statement that he did not give a precise figure, and here it is to impose a strict ruling* [Slotki, p. 30, n. 5: instead of a circumference of $16\frac{4}{5}$, one of eighteen cubits is prescribed, while the difference in the diameter ($6 - 5\frac{3}{5} = 2/5$) is even less.]
- P. *Rabbis of Caesarea, and some say, the judges of Caesarea, say, "In the case of a circle inscribed in a square, the circumference is a quarter [less than the perimeter of the square], [8B] and in the case of a square inscribed in a circle, the circumference is a half [of the circumscribed square].* [Slotki, p. 30, n. 8: Thus if a circumference is twenty-four cubits, the figure given by R. Yohanan, the circumscribed square has a perimeter of $24 + 24/3 = 32$ cubits, while the inscribed square has a perimeter of approximately $32/2 = 16$ cubits, the measurements prescribed by Rabbi.]
- Q. *But that is not the case, for lo, we notice that they are not that much [larger].* [It is not correct to claim that the perimeter of the circumscribed square is twice the perimeter of the inscribed square and that the circumference of the circle is therefore bigger than the latter by half of its perimeter (Slotki).]
Ideally, No. 4 should follow No. 2, since its point is the same as that given earlier.

- IV.4.** A. Said R. Levi in the name of R. Meir, "Two sukkot built for a potter, one inside the other [in the inner one, the potter works, in the outer, he shows his pots] —
- B. "the inner one is not in the status of a sukkah and is liable to the requirement of having a mezuzah, while the outer one is in the status of a sukkah and is exempt from the requirement of having a mezuzah."
 - C. *And why so? Let the outer one be regarded as the gatehouse for the inner one and be liable to the requirement of having a mezuzah?*
 - D. *It is on account of the impermanence [of both sukkot]. [The inner sukkah is fragile and of insufficient standing to be assigned a gatehouse.]*

A sukkah built for gentiles, women, cattle, and or Samaritans falls into the category of a sukkah on all accounts and is valid, so long as it has sukkah-roofing in accord with the law applying to it.

- IV.5.** A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- B. A sukkah of [built by or for] gentiles, women, cattle, and or Samaritans falls into the category of a sukkah on all accounts [and is] valid, so long as it has sukkah-roofing in accord with the law applying to it.
 - C. *What is the sense of "in accord with the law applying to it"?*

- D. Said R. Hisda, "And the rule applies on condition that [the one who put on the sukkah-roofing] did so in order to create shade appropriate to a sukkah."
- E. *What is included by the language, "on all accounts"?*
- F. It is to encompass booths built for shepherds, watchmen, city guards, and keepers of orchards [given in mnemonic].
- G. *For our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. A sukkah built for shepherds, a sukkah built for guards [for crops], a sukkah built for city guards, and a sukkah built for keepers of orchards on all accounts falls into the category of a sukkah [and is] valid, so long as it has sukkah-roofing in accord with the law applying to it.
 - I. *What is the sense of "in accord with the law applying to it"?*
 - J. Said R. Hisda, "And the rule applies on condition that [the one who put on the sukkah-roofing] did so in order to create shade appropriate to a sukkah."
 - K. *What is included by the language "on all accounts"?*
 - L. It is to encompass booths built for gentiles, women, cattle, or Samaritans.
 - M. *The Tannaite authority [who encompasses the listed items under the phrase, "on all accounts"] regards as having a stronger claim to acceptability the sukkahs built for gentiles, women, cattle, or Samaritans, because they are permanent in character, and he therefore repeated the language, "on all accounts" to encompass a sukkah built for shepherds, watchmen, city guards, and keepers of orchards, none of which sorts of sukkah is of a permanent character.*
 - N. *The Tannaite authority who phrased matters in terms of a sukkah built for shepherds, watchmen, city guards, and keepers of orchards regards those sorts of sukkah as having a stronger claim of acceptability because they are built for categories that are obligated [to keep the religious requirement of dwelling in a sukkah], and he therefore repeated the language, "on all accounts" to encompass a sukkah built for gentiles, women, cattle, or Samaritans, not categories obligated [to keep the religious requirement of dwelling in a sukkah].*

The protracted Talmud serving M. 1:1A-F not only works its way through the Mishnah-paragraph but systematically expands the law applicable to that paragraph by seeking out pertinent principles in parallel or contrasting cases of law. When a unit of discourse abandons the theme or principle connected to the Mishnah-paragraph, it is to take up a secondary matter introduced by a unit of discourse that has focused on that theme or principle. I:1 begins with an analysis of the word-choice at hand. At the same time it introduces an important point, namely, the comparison between the sukkah and a contraption erected also on a temporary basis and for symbolic purposes. That is a symbolic gateway, that transforms an alley-entry into a gateway for a courtyard and so alters the status of the alley and the courtyards that open on to it and turns them into a single domain. As one domain, they are open for carrying on the Sabbath, at which time people may not

carry objects from one domain, e.g., private, to another, e.g., public. That comparison is repeatedly invoked. The treatment of M. 1:1C asks the question usually raised at the outset about the scriptural authority behind the Mishnah's rule. This leads us into a rather sizable digression on scriptural exegesis, with special interest in establishing the analogy between utensils in the Temple and dimensions pertinent to the sukkah. The underlying conception, that what the Israelite does on cultic occasions in the home responds to what is done in the cult in the Temple, is familiar. At M. 1:1D we take up the issue of the walls of the sukkah. These must be three, in rabbis' view, and four in Simeon's. Each party concedes that one of the requisite walls may be merely symbolic. The biblical source for the required number of walls forms the first object of inquiry. Subject to close study is a somewhat complicated notion. There are diverse kinds of sukkah-buildings. One, we know, is a sukkah erected to carry out the religious duty of the Festival. But a person may build a sukkah, also, to extend the enclosed and private area of his home. If he places such a sukkah by the door, the area in which it is permitted to carry objects — private domain — covers not only the space of the house but also the space of the sukkah. That sukkah, erected in connection with Sabbath-observance, is compared to the sukkah erected for purposes of keeping the Festival. The issue is appropriate here, since the matter concerns the character of the walls of the sukkah built for Sabbath-observance. The mathematics at hand derive from Slotki's notes, as indicated. I cannot point to a more thorough or satisfying sequence of Talmudic units of discourse, in which the Mishnah's statements are amplified, then the amplifications themselves worked out on their own. The whole is thorough, beautifully articulated, and cogent from the beginning until the very end.

1:1 G-N

- G. [9A] **A superannuated sukkah —**
- H. **The House of Shammai declare it invalid.**
- I. **And the House of Hillel declare it valid.**
- J. **And what exactly is a superannuated sukkah?**
- K. **Any which one made thirty days [of more] before the Festival [of Sukkot].**
- L. **But if one made it for the sake of the Festival,**
- M. **even at the beginning of the year,**
- N. **it is valid.**
- I.1 A. [A superannuated sukkah — The House of Shammai declare it invalid. And the House of Hillel declare it valid:]** *What is the scriptural basis for the position of the House of Shammai?*
- B. Scripture has said, "The festival of Sukkot, for seven days for the Lord" (Lev. 23:34).
- C. *[Since the statement thus indicates that sukkah must be "for the Lord,"] the sense is that we require the sukkah to be built solely for the sake of observance of the Festival.*
- D. And the House of Hillel?

- E. *They require that statement of Scripture [to stand behind the position of] R. Sheshet.*
- F. For R. Sheshet has said in the name of R. 'Aqiba, "How do we know that, as to the wood used for building a sukkah, it is forbidden [for use for any other purpose] all seven days of the festival?"
- G. "Scripture states, 'The festival of Sukkot, for seven days for the Lord' (Lev. 23:34). [This indicates that, for the entire period, what is devoted to observance of the festival must be used only for that purpose.]"
- H. And it has been taught on Tannaite authority:
- I. R. Judah b. Beterah says, "Just as the dedication to Heaven takes hold of the animal set aside for the festival offering [so that that animal may not be slaughtered for any other purpose but celebration of the festival], so the dedication to Heaven takes hold of whatever is used for the sukkah [with the same result]."
- J. "As it is said, 'The festival of Sukkot, for seven days for the Lord' (Lev. 23:34). The meaning is, 'Just as the animal set aside for the festival offering is to be only for the Lord, so whatever is used for the sukkah likewise is to be only for the Lord.'"
- K. *Now does not the House of Shammai also require the stated proof for the present proposition?*
- L. *That indeed is the case.*
- M. *But then what is the scriptural basis for the view of the House of Shammai?*
- N. *Another verse of Scripture states, "You shall make the festival of Sukkot for seven days" (Deu. 16:13) — a sukkah that is made for the sake of the festival is what we require.*
- O. And the House of Hillel?
- P. *They require the force of that proof-text to indicate that one may construct a sukkah on the intermediate days of the festival of Sukkot.*
- Q. And the House of Shammai?
- R. *They take the view of R. Eliezer who has said, "People may not make a sukkah [to begin with] on the intermediate days of a festival of Sukkot."*
- 1.2.** A. *But does the House of Hillel [M. 1:1G, I] not concur with the view of R. Judah stated in the name of Rab?*
- B. For R. Judah said Rab said, "If one made show-fringes out of the hanging web or woof of a woven garment, or out of sewing threads, the fringes are not valid. If he made them out of tuft [attached for that purpose to a garment], the fringes are valid. [Attaching the tuft to the garment was for the purpose of making the show-fringes, while simply drawing out an available thread and twisting it would not constitute purposefully making show-fringes.]" [How, then, can the House of Hillel accept as valid a sukkah that is not constructed for the purpose of observing the festival, in line with the principle expressed in Rab's statement?]
- C. *"Now when I [Judah] repeated this statement before Samuel, he said to me, 'Also show-fringes made from tufts are invalid.'"*
- D. *"For we require an act of weaving of the show-fringes that is done for its own sake [and in the present case, there is no such act]."*

- E. *Here too should we not require a sukkah that is made for its own sake [and not accept one constructed without the observance of the festival in mind]?*
 - F. *The case [of the fringes] is different, for Scripture has said, “You shall make twisted cords for yourself” (Deu. 22:12).*
 - G. *“For yourself” — to carry out your obligation.*
 - H. *But here too it is said, “The festival of Sukkot you shall make for yourself” (Deu. 16:13) —*
 - I. *[Thus:] “For yourself” — to carry out your obligation!*
 - J. *That verse [serves to prove a different proposition entirely, namely] to serve to exclude [the use of a sukkah] that has been stolen. [The sukkah one uses must be legally owned.]*
 - K. *But in the matter of show-fringes, surely the same usage then should serve the same purpose, namely, to exclude stolen show-fringes!*
 - L. *In that other context, a separate verse of Scripture is available, namely, “And you shall make for them” (Num. 15:38) — out of what belongs to them.*
- I:1 clarifies the source of the law, and I:2 introduces a separate

1:2

- A. **[9B] He who makes his sukkah under a tree is as if he made it in [his] house.**
 - B. **A sukkah on top of a sukkah —**
 - C. **the one on top is valid.**
 - D. **And the one on the bottom is invalid.**
 - E. **R. Judah says, “If there are no residents in the top one, the bottom one is valid.”**
- I.1** A. **[He who makes his sukkah under a tree is as if he made it in his house:]** Said Raba, “[The statement at M. **1:2A**] has been made only with regard to a tree whose branches produce more shade than light. But if the light [under the tree] is greater than the shadow, [in which case, the sukkah’s own sukkah-roofing produces the shadow in the sukkah], the sukkah is valid.
- B. *“How [do I know this to be true]? Since it is taught, **It is as if he made it in his house [M. 1:2A]**. Now what need do I have to formulate matters in this way, namely, **It is as if he made it in his house?** Let the framer of the passage state merely, ‘It is invalid’!*
 - C. *“In framing matters as he did, the author of the passage has informed us that the tree is comparable to a house. Just as a house produces more shade than light, so if a tree produces more shade than light [and thus is like a house, the sukkah built in the shade would be invalid, but, if not, it would be valid.]”*
 - D. *But even if the shade produced by a tree is greater than the light that the branches let through, what difference does it make? Lo, we have a case in which invalid sukkah-roofing [namely, the branches of the tree, which are yet attached through the trunk to the ground] is joined together with valid sukkah-roofing [namely, branches of trees that have been detached from the ground], [and such a mixture is invalid.]*

- E. Said R. Papa, “We deal with a case in which the owner has intertwined [the invalid and the valid branches. In this case, if the valid branches outnumber the invalid ones, the arrangement is valid.]”
- F. *If we deal with a case in which the owner has intertwined the valid and invalid branches, what purpose was there in making the ruling explicit? [The point is self-evident and hardly requires specification.]*
- G. *What might you have maintained? We should make a decree in prohibiting a case in which the owner intertwined valid and invalid sukkah-roofings on account of a case in which one has not done so. So the framer of the passage informs us that we make no such decree.*
- H. *But we have learned exactly that principle on Tannaite authority: **If one trained a vine, gourd, or ivy over it and then spread sukkah-roofing on one of these, it is invalid. But if the sukkah-roofing exceeded them, or if the cut the vines down, it is valid [M. 1:4A-D].** [How do we gain the same principle?] Now how can we imagine such a case? If I say that we deal with a case in which the owner did not intertwine the valid and in a valid sukkah-roof, lo, we deal with a case in which invalid sukkah-roofing is joined together with valid sukkah-roofing. So is it not a case in which one did intertwine them? And it bears the implication that we make no such decree [as we proposed]. [So why repeat the same law here?]*
- I. *[We repeat the same principle to make this point:] One might have taken the view that [the joining of the two sorts of roofings would be permitted] only after the fact, but not to begin with. Now we are told that even to begin with, it is allowed [so long as the two materials are interwoven].*

II.1 A. A sukkah on top of a sukkah [M. 1:2B]:

- B. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*
- C. “You shall dwell in Sukkot” (Lev. 23:42) — and not in a sukkah which is underneath another sukkah, nor in a sukkah that is underneath a tree, and not in a sukkah which is in a house.
- D. [On the contrary, perhaps the use of the plural, “sukkot”] bears two meanings [one of which would be to permit exactly the kind of setting rejected at C]?
- E. Said R. Nahman bar Isaac, “It is written without the mark of the plural, thus, ‘in a sukkah’ [so excluding all but the accepted mode of locating the sukkah].”

II.2. A. Said R. Jeremiah, “There are cases in which both [the upper and the lower] sukkah will be valid, cases in which both of them will be invalid, cases in which the one on the bottom will be invalid and the one on the top valid, and cases in which the one on the bottom will be invalid and the one on the top valid.

- B. *“What would be an instance in which both of them would be valid? It would be an instance in which the one on the bottom had more light than shade, but the one on the top had more shade than light [so was valid], and the one on the top [had its roofing] within twenty cubits of the ground [so forming a single sukkah out of the two].*
- C. *“What would be an instance in which both of them would be invalid? It would be a case in which both of them had sukkah-roofing that produced more shade than light, and the [sukkah-roofing of the] one on the top was stood more than twenty*

cubits above the ground. [In this case, both are, independent of one another, invalid.]

- D. *“What would be an instance in which the one on the bottom is invalid and the one on the top valid? [10A] It would be a case in which the one on the bottom produced more shade than light, and the one on the top produced more light than shade, and [the sukkah-roofing of both of them] stood within twenty cubits [of the ground].*
- E. *“And what would be a case in which the one on the top was valid and the one on the bottom invalid? It would be a case in which for both of them the shade produced by the roof was greater than the light let through, and the one [sukkah-roofing of the] one on the top was within twenty cubits of the ground.”*
- F. *These rulings are self-evident [and why was it necessary to state them]?*
- G. *It was necessary to make explicit the case in which the one on the bottom was valid and the one on the top was invalid. What might one have falsely supposed? We should make a decree [against such an arrangement] lest the invalid sukkah-roofing join together with the valid sukkah-roofing. Accordingly, we are informed that we make no such decree.*

III.1. A. And the one on the bottom is invalid:

- A. And how much space would there be between one sukkah and the other so that the lower sukkah would be invalid [as a sukkah beneath a sukkah]?
- B. Said R. Huna, “A handbreadth. [If the space between the upper sukkah-roofing and the lower sukkah-roofing is less than a handbreadth, the two sets of roofing are regarded as one. [Then we do not have a case of one sukkah beneath another sukkah at all.]”
- C. [Huna continues,] “For so we find that the handbreadth is the standard measure in connection with cases of overshadowing of corpse-uncleanness, *for we have learned in the Mishnah: A handbreadth of space by a handbreadth at the height of a handbreadth brings uncleanness [should it be left open in a partition between corpse matter in one otherwise closed room and another such room] or interposes against the passage of the same uncleanness [if such a space is closed off], but a space less than a handbreadth in height neither brings uncleanness [if open] nor interposes [if closed] [M. Oh. 3:7].* [The operative measure is a handbreadth. If the roof is higher than that distance, it is deemed a separate roof, and if it is lower, it is deemed part of the contained space].”
- D. R. Hisda and Rabbah bar R. Huna say, “Four [handbreadths], for we do not find a contained space taken into account if it is less than four handbreadths.”
- E. And Samuel said, “Ten.”
- F. *What is the reason for the view of Samuel?* The requisite measure for rendering the sukkah valid [ten handbreadths above the ground] also operates to render it invalid.
- G. Just as the requisite measure of height is ten handbreadths, so the distance that will invalidate likewise is ten handbreadths.
- H. *We have learned in the Mishnah: R. Judah says, “If there are no residents in the top one, the bottom one is valid:” What is the sense of “...no residents...”?*

If it is in concrete terms, that is, if the issue is that there really are no occupants, is this the governing criterion? [It is a random fact.] But rather is not the sense of there being no residents to mean, any [upper] sukkah which is not suitable for a dwelling [would leave the lower sukkah valid]? What would be an example of such a case? One which was not ten handbreadths in height. Would this then bear the implication that, in the view of the first [anonymous] authority [vis à vis Judah], even one which is not suitable for dwelling [would leave the lower sukkah] invalid? [This would then refute Samuel's position, above].

- I. *When R. Dimi came, he said, "In the West they say, If the lower [sukkah's roof] cannot hold the weight of the pillows and blankets of the upper one, the lower one is valid. [The upper sukkah then is not sufficiently strong. Its floor, the roof of the lower sukkah, cannot carry the weight.]"*
- J. *Does this then bear the implication that the first of the two authorities takes the view that even if the [lower sukkah] is not suitable to bear [the weight of the upper, the lower one] is invalid?*
- K. *At issue between [Judah and the first authority] is the case of a [lower] sukkah, the floor-roof of which can bear the weight of the upper sukkah only with difficulty.*

The point is that the roof of the sukkah must be exposed to the firmament and not covered, A, in large part by the boughs of the tree. D follows the same principle, now with reference to a sukkah covered by another. Judah's view is that, without residents, the upper sukkah does not constitute a dwelling, thus excluding A's consideration. I:1 then clarifies M. 1:2A. But the real interest is the notion that if invalid and valid forms of sukkah-roofing are intertwined, with a greater portion of valid, the whole is valid. That principle, not demanded by the Mishnah's rule, does clarify that rule. Unit II:1 proceeds to the scriptural basis for M. 1:2B. Unit II:2 focuses upon that same rule, making a point that the Talmud's anonymous voice itself calls self-evident. Unit III:1 clarifies a secondary question — the relationship of the two sukkah-constructions, upper and lower — but in so doing also invokes M. 1:2E.

1:3

- A. [If] one spread a sheet on top of [a sukkah] on account of the hot sun,
 - B. or underneath [the cover of boughs] on account of droppings [of the branches or leaves of the bough-cover],
 - C. or [if] he spread [a sheet] over a four-post bed [in a sukkah],
 - D. it is invalid [for dwelling or sleeping and so for fulfilling one's obligation to dwell in the sukkah].
 - E. But he spreads it over the frame of a two-poster bed.
- I.1 A.** [or underneath the cover of boughs on account of droppings of the branches or leaves of the bough-cover:] Said R. Hisda, "The stated condition pertains only to doing so on account of droppings of the branches [M. 1:3B]. But if it was to adorn [the sukkah] it is valid."
- B. *That fact is self-evident. After all, in the Mishnah we have learned, .on account of the droppings of the branches!*

- C. *What might you have said? That would be the rule even if the intent was to beautify the sukkah. The reason that the framer of the Mishnah-passage has specified, On account of the droppings of the branches, was simply that that is the ordinary way things happen.*
- D. *So we are informed [that that is not the case].*
- E. *May we propose that the following supports the thesis just now advanced:*
- F. **If one put up a proper sukkah-roofing and then decorated [the sukkah] with embroidered hangings and sheets and [in T.'s version:] [If] one hung up in it nuts, peaches, pomegranates, bunches of grapes, and wreaths of ears of corn, it is valid.**
- G. **[But] one should not eat of any of these, [10B] even on the last day of the Festival.**
- H. **But if one made a stipulation concerning them that he would eat of them on the Festival, it is permitted to do so [T. Suk. 1:7G-I].** [The passage refers to embroidered sheets and treats them as valid adornment, in line with Hisda's view.]
- I. *But perhaps [the framer of the passage assumes that the sheets are put up] along the sides [and so there is no bearing upon Hisda's claim.]*

I.2. A. *It has been taught on Amoraic authority:*

- B. Things put up to decorate the sukkah do not diminish the height of the sukkah.
- C. Said R. Ashi, "But if put up at the side, they do diminish the height of the sukkah."
- D. *Minyamin, the servant of R. Ashi, soaked his short in water and spread it out on the sukkah [to cool it off].*
- E. *Said to him R. Ashi, "Take it down, so that people will not reach the conclusion that one may make sukkah-roofing out of something that is susceptible to uncleanness."*
- F. *[The slave answered,] "But lo, people will see that it is wet [and so used for air-conditioning. Why then take it into account?]"*
- G. *[He replied,] "My instruction to you is for when it dries off."*

I.3. A. *It has been stated on Amoraic authority:*

- B. Decorations for a sukkah which are four handbreadths higher than the roof —
- C. R. Nahman said, "Such an arrangement is valid."
- D. R. Hisda and Rabbah bar R. Huna say, "It is invalid."
- E. *R. Hisda and Rabbah bar R. Huna happened by the house of the exilarch. R. Nahman [the major domo of the exilarch] put them up in a sukkah, the decorations of which were four handbreadths higher than the roof. They remained silent and said nothing to him.*
- F. *He said to them, "Have our rabbis reversed themselves from their original teaching?"*
- G. *They said to him, "We are agents for the commission of a religious obligation and so are exempt from the further religious duty of dwelling in a valid sukkah. [So it does not matter to us that your sukkah is invalid.]"*

II.1 A. **[OR IF HE SPREAD A SHEET OVER A FOUR-POST BED IN A SUKKAH, IT IS INVALID:]** Said R. Judah said Samuel, "It is permitted to sleep in a canopied bed in

a sukkah, even though the canopy forms a roof [vs. M. 1:3C], so long as it is not ten handbreadths high.”

- B. *Come and take note [of a contrary teaching]:* He who sleeps in a canopied bed in a sukkah has not carried out his obligation [to dwell in a sukkah, since the roof of the canopied bed interposes between the person and the sukkah-roofing].
- C. *[That poses no objection to the stated thesis, for] in that case, with what sort of a bed do we deal?* With one the canopy of which is ten handbreadths high [and so forms a roof unto itself].
- D. They objected: **He who sleeps under a bed in a sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation [M. 2:1A].** [Would that not contradict Samuel’s rule?]
- E. *Samuel interpreted the rule to speak of* a bed that is ten handbreadths high.
- F. *Come and take note:* **Or if he spread a sheet over a four-post bed in a sukkah — it is invalid [M. 1:3C].**
- G. *In that case, also, it is one that is ten handbreadths high.*
- H. *But lo, that is not precisely what has been taught, for it has been stated on Tannaite authority:* [The word used at M. 1:3E] speaks of a two-post bed, and [the word used at M. 1:3C] speaks of a four-post bed. If [then] one spread a sheet over a four-post bed, it is invalid. If he spread it over a two post bed, it is valid, so long as the posts are not more than ten handbreadths high over the bed. *This then bears the implication that, in the case of a four-post bed, even though the posts are not ten handbreadths high [it is invalid].*
- I. *The case of the four-post bed is to be differentiated, because the posts are firmly set in the ground.*
- J. *But there is [the parallel case of] one sukkah on top of another sukkah, in which case the posts are firmly set in the ground, and yet Samuel took the view that that trait which would validate such an arrangement serves also to invalidate it [Slotki, p. 41, n. 3: which shows that even a permanent structure cannot be valid unless it is ten handbreadths high].*
- K. *Say [in explaining how to differentiate the rulings] as follows: In that case [of one sukkah on top of another], in which case at issue is the invalidation of the sukkah, the criterion [of invalidation] is ten handbreadths. Here, where at issue is [not the status of the space in the sukkah unaffected but only] the making of a tent [by spreading a sheet over the canopy of the bed], even though the height is less than ten handbreadths, the canopy also constitutes a tent.*

- II.2.** A. Said R. Tahalipa bar Abimi said Samuel, “He who sleeps naked in a canopied bed pokes his head out of the canopy and recites the Shema. [He may not do so if he is naked. If he pokes his head out, then his body is deemed to be covered by the canopy, and the man then may say the Shema and is not regarded as naked but as clothed.]”
- B. *They objected:* “He who sleeps naked in a canopied bed may not poke his head out from under the canopy and recite the Shema.”
 - C. *In the latter case, with what sort of arrangement do we deal? With a bed more than ten handbreadths high. [Here we have a room, not a garment]. That view is quite reasonable, for since at the end of the cited passage, it is said, “Lo, to what may the case be compared? To someone who stands naked in a house, who mad*

may not poke his head out the window and recite the Shema,” the implication is [just as I have proposed. **[11A]** But as to a house, even though it is not ten handbreadths high, since it is firmly attached to the ground, it is in the status of a tent, for it is not of lesser status than the frame of a four-post bed.

- D. *Some present another version [of the foregoing, as follows:]*
- E. R. Judah said Samuel said, “It is permitted to sleep in a sukkah in a bed constructed for newly weds, even though it is ten handbreadths high, for it has no roof [but rather a sloping cover above the bed].”
- F. *This objection was raised:* He who sleeps in a sukkah in a canopied bed has not carried out his obligation [to sleep under sukkah-roofing].
- G. *In this case with what sort of a situation do we deal? With one that has a roof [and this is different from a canopy].*
- H. *Come and take note of the following:* [The word used at M. **1:3E**] speaks of a two-post bed, and [the word used at M. **1:3C**] speaks of a four-post bed. If one spread a sheet over a four-post bed, it is invalid. If he spread it over a two-post bed, it is valid, so long as the posts are not more than ten handbreadths high over the bed. *This then bears the implication that,* if the posts rise ten handbreadths over the bed, the arrangement is invalid and that is the case even though over the bed is no roof-like canopy.
- I. *The case of the two-post bed is to be differentiated, because the posts are firmly affixed to the ground.*
- J. *If the criterion is that they are firmly affixed to the ground, then why are they not in the category of the four-post bed [in which case the arrangement is not to be allowed in a sukkah]?*
- K. *When compared to a four-post bed, the posts are not deemed firmly affixed to the ground, but when compared to a bed for newly weds, they are.* [Slotki, p. 42, n. 6: They cause... invalidity where they are ten handbreadths high even if they have no roof, while a canopied bed that has no roof causes no invalidity even where it is ten handbreadths high.]

- II.3.** A. Rabbah bar R. Huna expounded: “It is permitted to sleep in a sukkah in a bed with a canopy, even though the canopy is in the form of a roof [and] even though it is higher than ten handbreadths [thus constituting an arrangement of a sukkah within a sukkah].”
- B. *In accord with whose view is this statement made? It conforms to the principle of R. Judah, who has said that a tent built at random [and not for permanent use] does not serve to nullify the validity of a permanently constructed tent. [The sukkah falls into the latter category, the bed into the former.] For we have learned in the Mishnah: **Said R. Judah, “We had the practice of sleeping under the bed before the elders, and they said nothing at all to us” [M. 2:1B].*** [This would then sustain the thesis that Judah’s principle is represented by Rabbah’s statement of the law].
 - C. *Why not state simply, “The law is in accord with R. Judah” [instead of citing the precedent that he adduces in behalf of his view]?*
 - D. *If the text had said simply, “The law is in accord with R. Judah,” I might have supposed that that is the case for a bed, which has been set up, after all, for*

people to sleep on top of it. [If they sleep underneath, that constitutes abnormal use.] But in the case of a bed with a canopy, which is set up for people to sleep within it, I might have said that that is not the rule. [In the later latter case, we really do have one sukkah constructed inside of another.] So we are informed that the operative criterion for R. Judah's view is that a tent built at random [and not for permanent use] does not serve to nullify the validity of a permanently constructed tent. And, in this regard, there is no difference between a bed and a canopied bed.

If a four-post bed, located in the sukkah, is covered over, it is not suitable as a place for sleeping in the sukkah, deemed to be like a sukkah in a house. But a two-post covered over has a sloping roof, which does not enter the category of a roof annulling the effects of the sukkah-roofing. The Talmud forms around the principal clauses of the Mishnah, and then extends its discussion to secondary matters generated by its original inquiry.

1:4

- A. [If] one trained a vine, gourd, or ivy over it and then spread sukkah-roofing on [one of these], it is invalid.
- B. But if the sukkah-roofing exceeded them,
- C. or if he cut them [the vines] down,
- D. it is valid.
- E. This is the general rule:
- F. Whatever is susceptible to uncleanness and does not grown from the ground — they do not make sukkah-roofing with it.
- G. And whatever is not susceptible to uncleanness, but does grow from the ground [and has been cut off] — they do make sukkah-roofing with it.

- I.1. A. R. Joseph was in session before R. Huna, and he said, “...or if he cut the vines down, it is valid [M. 1:4C-D]. And [in this connection, he continued], Rab said, ‘It is necessary to shake [the vines loose after cutting them down, so that the sukkah-roofing is constructed by deliberate action and so that the materials at hand are actually validated by such action. Merely cutting the vines from the ground by itself does not constitute an act of deliberate validation.]’”
- B. Said R. Huna to him, “Lo, it is Samuel who made that statement.”
- C. R. Joseph turned away and said to him, “Did I tell you that Samuel did not say it? I told you that Rab said it, and Samuel said it [too].”
- D. Said R. Huna to him, “This is what I was saying to you, that Samuel is the one who said it, and not Rab.
- E. “For Rab treats the arrangement as valid [without a deliberate act of shaking the vines].”

- I.2. A. This is comparable to the case of R. Amram, an exceptionally pious man, who hung show-fringes to the aprons of the women of his household.

- B. *He tied them on, but he did not cut off the ends of the threads.* [Slotki, p. 44, n. 4: He folded on thread four times and attached it to the garment. But subsequently cutting it he made of it the eight requisite threads.]
- C. *He came before R. Hiyya bar Ashi* [to ask whether this procedure was valid, that is, (Slotki) whether the mere cutting of the long thread constitutes the making of the fringes.] *He said to him, “This is what Rab said: ‘One simply cuts them off [as explained] and they will be valid.’ It follows, therefore, that merely cutting off [the threads and so accomplishing a deliberate act of validation] constitutes the requisite act of making them. Here too the mere act of cutting off [the vines from the ground for use of sukkah-roofing, without shaking them and so accomplishing a deliberate act of validation] likewise constitutes the requisite act of making them.*
- D. *But in fact is it the view of Samuel that merely cutting off [the threads or the vines, without a deliberate act of manufacture] constitutes the act of making them?*
- E. *And lo, Samuel taught in the name of R. Hiyya, “If one threaded a string through two corners at once, and only then cut apart the ends of the string, the show-fringes are valid.”*
- F. *Does this not mean that one tied them and only afterward cut them [as Rab would find sufficient]?*
- G. No, he cut the threads and afterward tied them.
- H. If he cut them and afterward tied them, *what purpose is there in so stating [since everyone knows that would be a valid procedure]?*
- I. *What might you have maintained?* **[11B]** *That we require someone to insert the threads in one corner at a time [Slotki] and that procedure has not been followed [so it is not valid]. So we are informed [that that consideration is not operative].*
- J. *This objection was raised: If one hung [threads of the show-fringes] and did not cut off the ends, the arrangement is invalid. Does this not mean that the arrangement remain permanently invalid [even if one did so later on], in which case it is a refutation of Rab’s view?*
- K. *[Hardly, for] Rab may say to you, “What is the meaning of ‘invalid’? The arrangement is invalid until the threads are cut.”*
- L. And Samuel would maintain that that arrangement remains permanently invalid.
- M. And so did Levi say, “It is permanently invalid,” and so did R. Mattenah say Samuel said, “It is permanently invalid.”
- N. *There are those who say: said R. Mattenah, “The case took place in connection with me, and I came before Mar Samuel and he said to me, ‘The arrangement is permanently invalid.’”*
- O. *This objection was raised: [If] one inserted [the threads of the show-fringes] and afterward cut off the ends of the threads, [the arrangement is] invalid.*
- P. *And in regard to a sukkah it furthermore has been taught on Tannaite authority: “You shall make...” (Deu. 16:13) — and not use something already made.*
- Q. On the basis of the foregoing exegesis, they have said: **If one trained a vine, gourd, or ivy over [the sukkah] and then spread sukkah-roofing on one of these, it is invalid [M. 1:4A].** *Now with what sort of case do we deal [in the foregoing exegesis]? If we say that it is a case in which the householder did not*

cut the vines off from the ground, what need is there to invoke, as the reason, the consideration of the exegesis: “‘You shall make...’ — and not use something already made”? One may just as well derive the invalidating cause from the simple fact that the vines are attached to the ground [and that by itself is the sufficient reason]. Now, it must follow, we deal with a case in which the householder has cut off the vines, and it has been taught that the arrangement nonetheless is invalid. It must then follow that we do not rule that merely cutting the [threads or the vines] constitutes the proper act of making them [without any further intervention of a deliberate act of validation], and that would constitute ample refutation of Rab’s view of the matter.

- R. *[Hardly!] Rab may say to you, “With what sort of case do we deal here? It is with a case in which he pulled the branches up [without wholly severing the bark], in which case the act of actually making [the vines into sukkah-roofing] is not to be discerned.*
- S. *Nonetheless, we have a case in which one has inserted the threads and only afterward cut off the ends, and does that not present challenge to the position of Rab? Indeed, that does present a problem to the view of Rab.*
- T. *May I propose that the present dispute [on whether merely cutting the vines, without shaking them or otherwise deliberately changing their condition, constitutes an act of validation] runs along the lines of a dispute of Tannas, which is as follows: [If, on the festival day, one] violated the law and gathered [berries of a myrtle that is attached to the lulab], [the myrtle remains] invalid,” the words of R. Simeon b. Yehosedeq. And sages declare it valid. [At issue is whether the myrtle conforms to the law that it must have more leaves than berries. On the festival itself, one may not remove berries to validate the myrtle. On the week day one may do so.] [We shall now explain the relevance of the present case to the one we have just examined.] Now in considering this matter, it was assumed that all parties concurred that the elements joined for the lulab must be tied together. The rule governing the making of the lulab, furthermore, was derived by analogy from the sukkah, in which case it is written, “You shall make...” (Deu. 16:13) — and not use something already made. Now [in line with the stated premises], is this not what is at issue? Namely, the one who declares the arrangement valid takes the view that in connection with the making of the sukkah, we hold that merely cutting off the vines constitutes an the act of making them [valid for use as sukkah-roofing]. In respect to the preparation of the lulab, we also take the view that merely collecting the myrtle [without further actions in connection with it, e.g., removing excess berries] constitutes the valid act of preparing it. The one who holds that the arrangement is invalid then takes the position that we do not rule in connection with the sukkah that the mere act of cutting off the vines constitutes an adequate act of preparing the vines to serve as sukkah-roofing. Likewise in connection with the lulab, we also do not rule that the mere act of collecting the myrtle does not constitute an act of validation.*
- U. *No, [that theory of matters does not hold]. All parties concur that, in connection with the sukkah, we do not rule that the act of cutting down the vines constitutes a sufficient act of preparing the vines to serve as sukkah-ruling. Then what is at issue here is whether, to begin with, we derive the rules governing the lulab from*

the case of the sukkah at all. The one who declares the arrangement valid takes the view that we simply do not derive the rules governing the lulab from the case of the sukkah. The one who declares the arrangement invalid takes the position that we do derive the rules governing the lulab from the case of the sukkah.

V. *If you wish, I may propose a different explanation. If we take the view that all of the parts of the lulab have to be joined. All parties furthermore concur that we do derive the rules governing the making of the lulab from those having to do with the making of the sukkah. But here at issue is the following: One party holds that it is necessary to join the parts of the lulab together. The other party holds that it is not necessary to join the parts of the lulab together. [Simeon takes the position that the lulab must be tied together. This is done before the festival. But it was not done before the festival. Taking the berries off during the festival does not do any good. The lulab already had been made and invalidly made. Sages differ and hence declare the removal of the berries to be valid, even though it was done later on. Why? The lulab itself is suitable even if its parts are not bound together prior to the festival.]*

W. *The dispute, then, follows along lines of what is under dispute in the following disagreement among Tannaite authorities, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority: **A lulab [made up of a palm branch, willow branch, and myrtle branch] whether bound up or not bound up, is valid. R. Judah says, “One which is bound up is valid, and one which is not bound up is invalid” [T. Suk. 2:10A-B].***

X. *What is the scriptural basis for the view of R. Judah?*

Y. *He derives the meaning of the word “take” [used in connection with the lulab] from the use of the word “take” used in connection with the hyssop-bundle. There it is written, “And you shall take a bundle of hyssop” (Exo. 12:22), and here it is written, “And you shall take on the first day...” (Lev. 23:40). Just as, in that other instance, it must be taken as a bundle, so here too it must be taken as a bundle.*

Z. *And rabbis do not derive the meaning of the “taking” used in the present connection from the analogy supplied by the meaning of the word “take” used in that other connection.*

AA. *In accord with what authority is the following teaching on Tannaite authority:*

BB. *The proper performance of the religious duty in regard to the lulab is to bind the species together, but if one has not done so, it is valid.*

CC. *Now this cannot be in accord with R. Judah, for if one has not bound the species together, why should the arrangement be valid? And it can hardly accord with rabbis [vis à vis Judah], for why should it be an element of the religious duty [to do so at all, if they say one need not do so]?*

DD. *Indeed, the statement accords with rabbis, since it is written “This is my God and I will glorify him” (Exo. 15: 2), which means one should be glorified before him through carrying out religious duties [in an especially felicitous manner, but if one does not do things exactly in that way, the action remains valid].*

II.1 A. This is the general rule: Whatever is susceptible to uncleanness and does not grown from the ground — they do not make sukkah-roofing with it. And whatever is not susceptible to uncleanness, but does grow from the ground [and has been cut off] — they do make sukkah-roofing with it [M. 1:4F-G]:

B. *What is the scriptural basis for this rule?*

C. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “Scripture has stated, ‘And a mist went up from the earth’ (Gen. 2: 6). Just as mist is something which is not susceptible to uncleanness and grows from the ground, so a sukkah must be made of some thing which does not receive uncleanness and grows from the ground.”

E. *[The issue is, what is the generative metaphor?] That explanation is suitable to the person who holds that the sukkah in which Israel dwelled in the wilderness was clouds of glory.*

F. *But in the view of him who holds that the sukkah was the genuine article which the Israelites actually made for themselves [and not an analogy to clouds of glory], what sort of proof may one bring?*

G. *The problem at hand accords with that which has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

H. “‘For I made the children of Israel dwell in sukkot’ (Lev. 23:43), meaning in clouds of glory,” the words of R. Eliezer.

I. R. ‘Aqiba says, “They were actually sukkot that people made for themselves.”

J. *Now [as just noted] the stated proof poses no problems to the view of R. Eliezer, but as to the position of R. ‘Aqiba, what is there to say?*

II.2. A. When R. Dimi came, [he said that] R. Yohanan said, “Scripture has stated, ‘The festal offering of Sukkot you shall prepare’ (Deu. 16:13).

B. “The sukkah thus is compared to the festal offering [brought as an animal sacrifice on the festival day].

C. “Just as the festal offering is something that does not receive uncleanness [animals fed from what grows from the ground are, in Yohanan’s view, as if they too grow from the ground] and also grows from the ground [as just now explained], so the sukkah must be made of something which does not receive uncleanness and grows from the ground.”

D. **[12A]** But what if you wish to propose a further analogy, just as the festal offering is of an animate being, so the sukkah must be made of an animate being?

II.3. A. When Rabin came, [he said that] R. Yohanan said, “Scripture has stated, ‘After you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress...’ (Deu. 16:13). Scripture speaks of what is left on the threshing floor and the dregs of the wine press. [These grow from the ground and are not susceptible to uncleanness, so too the sukkah-roofing, of which the verse at hand speaks, must conform to the same traits.]”

B. *And may I say that Scripture speaks of the threshing floor itself and the wine press itself? [Perhaps somehow the sukkah must be composed of these objects?]*

C. Said R. Zira, “Here it is written, ‘Wine press,’ and it is hardly possible to make use of a wine-press for sukkah-roofing!”

- D. *To this explanation R. Jeremiah objected, “And might I speculate that what is required is use of congealed wine which comes from Senir, like fig cakes? [Perhaps the sense of Scripture is that that is what must be used for sukkah-roofing!]”*
- E. *Said R. Zira, “We had a valid proposition in hand, but R. Jeremiah came along and threw an ax at it [and smashed it]!”*
- F. *R. Ashi said, “‘From your threshing floor’ and not the threshing floor itself, ‘from your wine press’ and not the wine press itself [is to be the source of materials used for sukkah-roofing].”*
- G. *R. Hisda said, “Proof for the desired proposition derives from here: ‘Go forth to the mountain and collect olive branches, branches of wild olive, myrtle branches, palm branches, and branches of thick trees’ (Neh. 8:15). [All of these are not susceptible to uncleanness and grow from the ground, and, in context, are specified for use as sukkah-roofing].”*
- H. *Myrtle branches fall into the category of branches of thick trees [of Lev. 23:40. Why specify the same species twice]?*
- I. *Said R. Hisda, “The wild myrtle is for the sukkah-roofing, and the branches of thick trees for the lulab.”*

The sukkah-roofing must now grow from the ground, M. 1:4F-G, which explains A, C. The consideration of uncleanness is not operative here. The Talmud’s elaborate discussion accomplishes two things. First, it raises the question of the procedure to be followed in connection with M. 1:4C. Second, it introduces the underlying principle at issue, whether the mere act of cutting down the vines also serves to render them suitable for the specific purpose of use as sukkah-roofing, or whether some distinct act of designation, thus preparation, is required. The former view is worked out in unit I:1. Unit I:2 then produces a striking analogy, in which a quite different case — making strings into show-fringes — is shown to invoke upon the same principle, namely, whether a mere act of destruction — cutting the vines, severing the string — suffices, or whether a clear-cut deed of deliberate and positive validation also is required. It is clear that the issue of show-fringes need not involve the matter of the vines for sukkah-roofing, but unit II makes a strong case that the two cases must be worked out in tandem. Units II:1-3 then present the familiar exercise of locating scriptural proof for a Mishnaic proposition; here the point of special interest is the working out of a hermeneutics resting on analogy; then the issue is, which available analogy, among many, governs?

1:5

- A. **Bundles of straw, wood, or brush —**
- B. **they do not make a sukkah-roofing with them.**
- C. **But any of them which one untied is valid[for use as sukkah-roofing].**
- D. **And all of them are valid [as is] for use for the sides [of the sukkah].**
- I.1 A.** *Said R. Jacob, “I heard from R. Yohanan two [explanations], one for the rule at hand, and the other for the rule that follows: **He who hollowed out a space in a haystack to make a sukkah therein — it is no sukkah [M. 1:8D-E].** [The*

reason for] one [of the rulings] is on account of a [precautionary] decree [on account of the possibility of a person's using a sukkah as a] store-house. [The reason for] the other [of the rulings] is on account of the exegesis, "You shall make" (Deu. 16:13) — and not make use of what is ready-made.' Now I do not know which of the two rulings [of the Mishnah at hand] is on account of the consideration of not using the sukkah as a store-house, and which one of them is on account of the exegesis, "You shall make" — and not

- B. *Said R. Jeremiah, "Let us see [how we may work matters out on the basis of a further ruling in Yohanan's name]. For R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan said, 'On what account did they rule: **Bundles of straw, wood, or brush — they do not make a sukkah-roofing with them [M. 1:5A-B]**? '[It is because] there are times that a person will come in from the field in the evening, with his bundle [of produce] on his back, and he might just push it up and leave it on top of his sukkah, so as to allow the produce to dry. Then he will reconsider the matter and determine to make use of [the bundles] for sukkah-roofing. Yet the Torah has said, "You will make" (Deu. 16:13) — and not from what is ready-made.' Now since the rule at hand is on account of a precautionary decree [lest the farmer use the sukkah] as a store-house [in the scenario just now described, it must follow that] the other ruling [about hollowing out a haystack and turning it into a sukkah] is on the count of the exegesis of 'You shall make' — and not what is ready-made."*
- C. *And R. Jacob? [What left him in doubt as to Yohanan's explanations for the two rulings, since, after all, the teaching cited by Hiyya bar Abba was available?]*
- D. *In point of fact, he had not heard the tradition [in Yohanan's name] made available by R. Hiyya bar Abba.*
- E. *Said R. Ashi, "[Can we really say that the operative consideration in the ruling about] bundles of straw, wood, or brush is only on account of the precautionary decree [against using the sukkah as a] storehouse, but there is no consideration at all of the exegesis, "You shall make for yourself" — and not from what is ready-made'? And [as to the ruling concerning] hollowing out a space in a haystack, [may we say that the operative consideration is only] on account of the exegesis, "You shall make for yourself" — and not from what is ready-made,' while the criterion based on the precautionary decree [against using the sukkah as a] store-house is not operative? [Surely each of the two rulings is susceptible to both of the available explanations!]"*
- F. *[Then how can we explain the position of] R. Yohanan, [who invokes only a single consideration for each case?]*
- G. *[Yohanan] may say to you, "In the present case, in which it is taught in the Mishnah, **They do not make a sukkah-roofing with them [M. 1:5B]**, [that prohibition applies] to begin with, [12B], in which case they do not make the sukkah-roofing on account of a precautionary decree against [using the sukkah for a] store-house. But as to the rule as the Torah would have it, it would be a valid procedure. [Rabbi's decree against it, making the law more strict than the Torah requires, is in point of fact applicable only to begin with. But if one has actually done so, then after the fact, the procedure is acceptable]. And in that other case [hollowing out a hole in a haystack for use as a sukkah], in which case*

the Mishnah is phrased, It is no sukkah [at all] then, even after the fact, on the authority of the law of the Torah, it also does not constitute a valid sukkah."

- I.2.** A. Said R. Judah said Rab, "If one made sukkah-roofing with male arrow-shaft [which are inserted into the arrow-head], it is valid [because the wood is regarded as unprepared, and a flat piece of wood not subjected to a process of manufacture is not susceptible to uncleanness].
- B. "If he did so with female ones, it is invalid [because the female shafts have a bored hole, into which the arrow-head is inserted, and so have been subjected to a process of manufacture. As is clear, a hole is bored into an end, and an arrow-head inserted into it. So there is a valid receptacle in the wood, with the result that the wood then is susceptible to uncleanness]."
- C. With male... it is valid: *That is self-evident.*
- D. *What might you have said? Let us make a precautionary decree against using the male [unbored] ones on account of the female [bored] ones.*
- E. *So we are informed that that is not the case.*
- F. With female... it is invalid: *That too is self-evident.*
- G. *What might you have said? A receptacle that is made to be filled up [e.g., with the arrow-head] is not in the category of a valid receptacle [and so the shaft would remain insusceptible, since the hole that has been made in fact will not remain unfilled].*
- H. *So we are informed that that is not the case.*

I.3. A. Said Rabbah bar bar Hana said R. Yohanan, "**If one made a sukkah-roofing of processed stalks of flax, it is invalid. If he made it of unprocessed stalks of flax, it is valid [T. Suk. 1:5].** [The latter are not susceptible to uncleanness, the former are.]

- B. "But I do not know the status of stalks of flax in an intermediate stage of preparation [Slotki].
- C. "And as to those in an intermediate stage of preparation, I also do not know [Slotki:] *whether if it has been pounded and not corded it is regarded as in an intermediate stage, but if it has been soaked and not pounded, it is regarded as being in its natural stage, or, perhaps, even if it has been soaked but not pounded, it is also regarded as being in an intermediate stage.*"

I.4. A. Said R. Judah, "As to licorice-wood and wormwood, they make sukkah-roofing with them."

- B. Abbaye said, "They make sukkah-roofing with licorice wood but not with wormwood."
- C. *What is the operative consideration?*
- D. Since **[13A]** *they stink, a person might leave them and abandon [the sukkah].*
- E. Said R. Hanan bar Raba, "People may make sukkah-roofing with a certain species of thorns and one of prickly shrubs."
- F. Abbaye said, "People may make sukkah-roofing with the species of thorns but not that of prickly shrubs. What is the reason for this distinction? Since the leaves [of the latter] fall off [and scratch people below], people will go and abandon the sukkah."

- I.5.** A. Said R. Giddal said Raba, “People may make sukkah-roofing with the forked portion of a palm tree. Even though they form a bundle, since it is formed in nature [“at the hands of Heaven”], it is not regarded as a bundle [which in line with M. 1:5A-B would be forbidden]. [Furthermore], even though a person may go back and make them into a bundle, rejoining [something that originally was joined] is not regarded as forming a bundle.”
- B. Said R. Hisda said Rabina bar Shila, “People may make a sukkah-roofing with forked reeds. Even though they form a bundle, since it is formed in nature, it is not regarded as a bundle. [Furthermore], even though a person may go back and make them into a bundle, rejoining [something that originally was joined] is not regarded as forming a bundle.”
- C. It has been taught on Tannaite authority along these same lines:
- D. People may make sukkah-roofing with reeds and forked reeds.
- E. As to reeds, that is self-evident! [Why specify what everyone knows?]
- F. The passage should be repeated as follows: People may make sukkah-roofing with [Slotki:] reeds of the forked variety.
- G. And R. Hisda said Rabina bar Shila said, “With bitter herbs of the marsh a person carries out his obligation on Passover to eat bitter herbs.”
- H. This objection was raised: **“Hyssop” — but not Greek hyssop, stibium hyssop, wild hyssop, Roman hyssop, or any kind of hyssop that has a distinctive name [M. Par. 11:7].** [This would exclude from consideration bitter herbs of the marsh, which have a distinctive name.]
- I. Said Abbaye, “In the case of anything that had a name that was changed prior to the giving of the Torah, [if] then the Torah came along and made particular mention of such a species, [such a species] assuredly falls into the category of something that has a special name. *But as to the item under discussion, the name was not changed prior to the giving of the Torah at all.*” [Slotki: “Whatever had different names prior to the Giving of the Law, and yet the Torah makes specific mention of the general name only obviously (the intention is to exclude such of the species which) have special names; but the former did not have different names before the Giving of the Law at all.]
- J. Raba said, “As to the item or under discussion, the common name is simply ‘bitter herb,’ [which would then qualify], and they are called ‘marsh herbs’ because that happens to be where they are found.”
- I.6.** A. Said R. Hisda, “Joining something to itself does not fall into the category of a bundle. Joining three distinct items together does put the whole into the category of a bundle. As to joining two distinct objects together, *there is a dispute of R. Yosé and rabbis, for we have learned in the Mishnah:*
- B. **“The religious requirement concerning the hyssop is that it have three separate stalks, and on them three buds.... R. Yosé says, ‘The religious requirement of the hyssop is that it have three stalks on which are three buds. Its remnants are two, and its stumps of any size at all’ [M. Par. 11:9A-B, I-K].** Now it is assumed [from Yosé’s perspective] that since the remnants are two, to begin with two are required. The reason that three are specified is to indicate that the religious requirement [optimally carried out] involves three.

[But a bundle is constituted by two items.] Since R. Yosé takes the view that the religious requirement [optimally carried out] involves three, it follows that in the view of rabbis, three are absolutely necessary. [Slotki, p. 53, n. 13: Thus we see that according to R. Yosé, two can constitute a bunch or joining, whereas according to the rabbis three are required.]”

- C. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: **R. Yosé says, “As to a hyssop, if in the first instance it has two stalks and its remnant one, it is unfit [T. Par. 12:1F].** It is valid only if to being with it has three and its remnants two.”*
 - D. *Then reverse the attributions. In R. Yosé’s view, three are absolutely necessary, and in rabbi’s view, three are required only for the optimal carrying out of the religious duty, [but two suffice in fact]. [Then a bundle is two.]*
 - E. *And has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: As to the hyssop, to begin with it must have two stalks, and its remnants [after use] must consist of at least one, in which case it is valid. It is invalid only if both to begin with and in its remnant it consists of only one stalk. If its remnant is only one stalk, it is invalid.*
 - F. *But can you then say that a remnant of one stalk is invalid? Lo, you have just said that a remnant of one stalk is valid! **[13B]** Rather I should state the matter as follows: [It is valid] only if to begin with it contains the number that would leave it valid even in its remnant [that is to say,] a single stalk. [Slotki, p. 54, n. 3: Thus it has been shown that the number of three stalks mentioned supra in the name of the rabbis refers only to what is expected for the most proper observance of the commandment. If the number is to be insisted upon as indispensable this last cited baraita could agree neither with R. Yosé nor with the rabbis.]*
- I.7.** A. *Maremar expounded, “As to [reeds tied into bundles which are on sale in] Sura, people may make sukkah-roofing with them, even though they are bound together. The reason is that [the reed-seller] bound them together only in order to make an accurate count [of what he is selling, and the reeds do not have to be bound together for any substantive purpose. They will certainly be unbound before they are used].”*
- B. *Said R. Abba, “As to cone-shaped bundles of bulrushes, once one has unbound the top knots, they are suitable for use as sukkah-roofing.”*
 - C. *But lo, they are bound on the bottom?*
 - D. *Said R. Pappa, “[We deal with a case in which] he has already loosened them.”*
 - E. *R. Huna son of R. Joshua [said], “Even if you say that one has not loosened them, in the case of any bundle that is not made so as to permit carrying, [what is bundled up] is not in the category of a bundle at all.”*
- I.8.** A. *Said R. Abba said Samuel, “As to those vegetables about which it is specified that [by eating them] a person may carry out his obligation [to eat bitter herbs] on Passover, all have the capacity to bring uncleanness [as a Tent, should they overshadow both something susceptible to uncleanness and a corpse]; they do not interpose against uncleanness [as a vertical partition]; they invalidate [sukkah-roofing] if they are used in a sukkah as does an open air space. [That is, just as open space in sukkah-roofing invalidates the sukkah, so do the named vegetables. It is as if they are simply not present.]”*

B. *What is the reason? Since they wither and then crumble and fall, it is as if they were not there to begin with.*

I.9. A. And R. Abba said R. Huna said, “He who cuts grapes for the vat does not render the stalks of the grapes susceptible to uncleanness. [When one cuts grapes for pressing, the stalks attached to the grapes serve no useful purpose. As something useless, they are not susceptible to uncleanness. If one had to use the stalks for some purpose, e.g., to lift the produce, then the stalks would be susceptible to uncleanness.]”

B. R. Menassia bar Gada said R. Huna said, “He who cuts [grain] for sukkah-roofing does not render the stalks of the grain susceptible to uncleanness.” [Here too, the stalks serve no purpose in relationship to the grain that is attached to them.]

C. *He who states the ruling with regard to cutting stalks all the more so would take that same position in respect to cutting grapes, for one would not want the stalks for the grapes, which[, after all,] are going to absorb the wine.*

D. *He who states the view regarding cutting grapes will maintain that the stalks of the grapes are not subject to uncleanness [since they are not wanted]. But as to cutting stalks of grain for sukkah-roofing, the stalks will be susceptible to uncleanness. [Why?] For the man surely wants to make use of the stalks for sukkah-roofing so that the grain will not be scattered. [Without the stalks he could not use the grain for the sukkah-roofing at all.]*

E. *May we say that the view of R. Menassia bar Gada [B] runs parallel to what is under dispute among Tannaite authorities, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

F. Boughs of fig-trees holding figs, vines holding grapes, stalks holding ears of corn, palm-branches holding dates — in the case of all of them, if the inedible part is more than the edible produce, it is valid [for use in sukkah-roofing], and if not, it is invalid.

G. Others say, “Only if the straw is more than both the stalk and the food [put together] [may they be used. The stalk is susceptible to uncleanness, since it is useful.]”

H. *Now is it not in the following principle that there is a dispute: One party holds that the stalks are susceptible to uncleanness [and fall into the category of the edible produce and therefore are not suitable for sukkah-roofing unless the inedible part is more than both the stalks and the edible produce], and the other party maintains that the stalks are not susceptible to uncleanness [and so do not enter the same category as the edible produce at all].*

I. *But in the view of R. Menassia bar Gada, does one have to concede that at issue is a principle subject to Tannaite dispute?*

J. *R. Menassia may reply to you that all parties concur in the principle that he who cuts stalks of grain for sukkah-roofing does not impart susceptibility to uncleanness to the stalks. Here what is at issue? It is a case in which people began to cut the grain intending the harvest for food and then changed their minds and intended the harvest to serve for sukkah-roofing instead. [In that case we*

have a dispute on the status of the stalks, such as is at issue between “others” and the anonymous ruling. Others hold that the stalk is susceptible to uncleanness as much as the produce, on the principle the change of mind makes no difference. The anonymous ruling is that, since the purpose for which the harvest has been carried out has no bearing upon the use of the stalks in connection with the attached fruit, the stalks fall into the category of useless vegetation and are not susceptible to uncleanness and so may be used for sukkah-roofing.]

- K. *If the people harvested the crop for food, what is the reason of the [anonymous] rabbis [who do not take account of the status of the stalks and do not regard them as susceptible to uncleanness]?*
- L. *If you should say that rabbis take the view that, since the farmer has changed his mind in their regard and determined to make use of them for sukkah-roofing, what he originally planned to do is null [and of no effect], [that argument cannot stand]. For is there a consideration of the nullification of one's original intention when it comes to such a matter [that is, can a mere change of mind affect the status of something as to its susceptibility to uncleanness at all]? Have we not learned in the Mishnah: **All utensils [14A] descend through the effects of human intention into the status of susceptibility to uncleanness but do not ascend from that status unless there is a concrete deed [to carry out the intention of the owner]. A concrete deed may nullify the effect of another concrete deed as well as of the owner's [mere] intention, but a mere change of mind and intention does not nullify the effect either of a concrete deed [with a contrary effect] or even another intention [not confirmed by a concrete deed] [M. Kel. 25:9].** Now should you maintain the proposition that the stated rule pertains only to utensils, which are matters of some consequence, but as to stalks of fruit, which serve only what is needful in connection with eating, the rule is that by mere intention they become susceptible to uncleanness, and by mere intention they may be made insusceptible to uncleanness, have we not learned a Mishnah-passage that bears the contrary implication? For we have learned in the Mishnah: **The stalks of all produce that is harvested in the threshing floor are insusceptible to uncleanness [since by bringing the produce to the threshing floor, the owner has indicated that he sees no use in the stalks. The previous susceptibility of the stalks thus if nullified by the act of the owner in bringing the produce as a whole to the threshing floor. His mere intention would have had no effect at all.] [M. Uqs. 1:5].** Now in the view of him who says that the meaning of “brought to the threshing floor” is simply that the farmer has unloosed the bundles, there is no problem. [Loosening the stalks indicates that the farmer does not have the intention of using the stalks. The mere intention then has the effect of nullifying the previous susceptibility to uncleanness that had affected the stalks, and no concrete action, e.g., at the threshing floor, is required.] But in the view of him who has said that the language of “bringing to the threshing floor” means just that [and is not figurative], what is there to say? [Mere intention, not accompanied by a concrete deed, is not effective.]*

- M. *In the afore-cited dispute [concerning the anonymous authority and “others”] we deal with a case in which the farmer actually brought the produce to the threshing floor.*
- N. *If that is the case, what is the reason for the opinion of “others” [who regard the stalks of the produce as susceptible to uncleanness despite the action of the farmer in bringing the produce to the threshing floor? By the farmer’s action, should the stalks not have been signified as insusceptible to uncleanness?]*
- O. *They maintain the view of R. Yosé [in the Mishnah-passage just now cited, for] we have learned [in that same Mishnah-paragraph]: **R. Yosé declares [the stalks still] susceptible to uncleanness [even though the farmer has brought the grain to the threshing floor and so indicated that he does not want the stalks any more].***
- P. *[But what makes the analogy between the case cited above and the law in M. Uqs. 1:5 so self-evident, so that the matter rule of the one case is deemed applicable to the other?] Why compare them? There [in the case of threshing at the threshing floor the reasoning of R. Yosé accords with the view of R. Simeon b. Laqish. For R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Since [if the produce has the stalks affixed,] it is more suitable to be turned over with a pitch fork [the stalks remain useful to the farmer, even at the threshing floor].” But in the case under discussion here [where one cuts ears for use in the sukkah] what use do the stalks have [that anyone should regard them as useful and so susceptible to uncleanness, as do “others”]?]*
- Q. *They remain useful [Slotki:] to seize hold of them by their haulms when he takes [the sukkah roof] to pieces. [So later on they will be useful, and hence they retain their original susceptibility to uncleanness.]*

I.10. A. *[Reverting to the] body [of the afore-cited passage:]*

- B. **All stalks of produce which one threshed in the threshing floor are insusceptible to uncleanness.**
- C. **R. Yosé declares them susceptible to uncleanness [M. Uqs. 1:5A-B].**
- D. *What is the meaning of “threshed in the threshing floor”?*
- E. *R. Yohanan said, “It means actually threshing them in the threshing floor.”*
- F. *R. Eleazar says, “It means simply unloosening the bundles [of produce, wherever].”*
- G. *Now with respect to the view of R. Eleazar, who has said that the language, “[Threshing them at the threshing floor]” is [figurative and means only] unloosened the bundles, that is why R. Yosé [nonetheless] declares the stalks to be susceptible to uncleanness [since a concrete action in connection with the stalks has not taken place]. But as to R. Yohanan, who has said that one has actually brought the produce to the threshing floor, what basis is there for R. Yosé to continue to regard the stalks as susceptible to uncleanness [seeing that the farmer has shown he does not want them any more]?]*
- H. *Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, “Since they remain suitable [for more easily] turning them over with a pitchfork [they are still wanted].”*

I.11. A. *Said R. Eleazar, “Why are the prayers of the righteous compared to a pitchfork?”*

- B. “It is to tell you that just as the pitchfork turns over the grain in the threshing floor moving it from one place to another,
- C. “so the prayers of the righteous move the mind of the Holy One blessed be he, from the measure of vindictiveness to the measure of mercy.”

Used when bound up, the bundles look not like roofing but like a storage-area. The bundles in any case may serve as sides or side-posts. Unit I:1 provides a discussion for M. 1:5A-B, a rather complex composition. The remaining compositions take up the intersection of the laws of the uncleanness of stalks and the utilization of stalks for sukkah-roofing.

1:6

- A. **“They make sukkah-roofing with boards,” the words of R. Judah.**
- B. **And R. Meir prohibits doing so.**
- C. **[If] one put on top of it a board which is four handbreadths broad, it is valid, so long as one not sleep underneath [that particular board].**
- I.1 A. **[“They make sukkah-roofing with boards,” the words of R. Judah. And R. Meir prohibits doing so:]** Said Rab, “The dispute deals with boards of four handbreadths, *for R. Meir affirms the precautionary decree [against using such boards, lest they form] a roof, while R. Judah does not affirm that precautionary decree.*
- B. “But as to boards that are not four handbreadths broad, all parties concur that use of such boards in sukkah-roofing is valid.”
- C. And Samuel said, “The dispute concerns boards that are not four handbreadths. But if they are four handbreadths, all parties concur that [a sukkah with roofing made up of such boards] is invalid.”
- D. “If they are less than four” *suggests that even if they are less than three, [there is an issue]. But in such a case they are merely reeds [and all parties concur they are valid]!*
- E. *Said R. Pappa, “This is the sense of what [Samuel] said: ‘If they are four handbreadths broad, all parties concur that [sukkah-roofing made of them] is invalid. If they are less than three [handbreadths in breadth] all parties concur that [the sukkah-roofing] is valid. Why so? Because there are merely reeds. Where there is a dispute [in Samuel’s view] it is in the case of boards that are from three to four handbreadths. One party maintains the position that, since they do not encompass a space that would serve as a distinguishable ‘place’ [or house, that is, four cubits by four cubits], we make no precautionary decree against using such boards], and the other party takes the view that since in this case we cannot invoke the legal fiction that we regard small interstices in a wall, of less than three handbreadths, as though they were filled in and part of the wall [for by definition we deal with boards larger than that size], we do make such a precautionary decree.’” [Slotki, p. 59, n. 15: Even if each plank were to be regarded as a mere air space. The cited fiction applies only to an air space of less than three handbreadths in width.]*

- F. *We have learned in the Mishnah: If one put on top of it a board which is four handbreadths broad, it is valid, so long as one not sleep underneath that particular board [M. 1:6C].*
- G. *Now with regard to the view of Samuel, who maintains that there is no dispute in the case of a board less than four handbreadths there is a dispute. If there is a space of four handbreadths in the board, all parties concur that the sukkah-roofing is invalid. Now there is no problem. That is exactly why one should not sleep under such a board. But in the view of Rab, who holds that where there are four handbreadths in the board, there is a dispute, but if the board is less than four handbreadths, [there is no dispute], for all parties concur that sukkah-roofing is valid, — in the view of R. Judah, why should someone not sleep under that board at all?*
- H. *[The reply is simple.] Do you maintain the view that the statement of the Mishnah accords with the position of all parties? The concluding clause accords only with the view of R. Meir.*
- I. *Two sheets join together [to form four handbreadths and so render sukkah-roofing invalid], [14B] while two boards do not join together [to be regarded as covering more space than can be completely opaque in the sukkah-roofing]. R. Meir says, “Also boards fall into the same category as sheets.” Now in the theory of Samuel, who has said that where there is not a space of four handbreadths, we have a dispute, but if the boards are four handbreadths, all parties concur [that the sukkah-roofing made with them is] invalid, [there is no problem]. What in the cited rule is the meaning of “join together”? It is to “join together to form the form invalidating breadth of four handbreadths.” But in the view of Rab, who has said that where there is a space of four handbreadths in the boards, there is a dispute, but if the breadth of the boards is less than four handbreadths, all parties concur [that the sukkah-roofing made with such boards is] valid, what sort of case [can we deal with in the cited passage]? If the boards are four handbreadths, why is there an issue of “joining together” at all? If they are not four handbreadths, what difference does it make? They are in the status of mere reeds [which are valid, and no issue of joining together can be evoked to begin with]!*
- J. *We deal, in point of fact, with boards that are four handbreadths. And what is the consideration as to their joining together? It is joining together to form four cubits on a given side [Slotki, p. 60, n. 7: of the sukkah, where invalid covering does not invalidate the sukkah unless it covers four cubits of space].*
- K. *Another version of the same matter:*
- L. *Now in the theory of Samuel, who has said that where there is not a space of four handbreadths, there is a dispute, but if the boards are four handbreadths, all parties concur [that sukkah-roofing made of such boards] is invalid, what is the sense of “joining together”? It means “joining together to form the four cubits [of invalid roofing that would render the sukkah-roofing unacceptable if located] at the side.” And in the view of Rab, so far as R. Meir is concerned, what would be the sense of “joining together”? It would be joining together to constitute the four cubits [that would invalidate the roofing if located] at the side. But as to the view of R. Judah, who has said that even if the boards are four handbreadths in breadth, [the sukkah-*

roofing] is valid, *what [in Rab's view] is the sense of "not joining together"? We deal with mere reeds [and the issue of joining together is not relevant to mere reeds]!*

- M. *Since the language of "joining together" is assigned to the position of R. Meir, the language of "not joining together" is assigned to R. Judah [even though, from his viewpoint, it is not an issue to begin with].*
- N. *There is a teaching on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of Rab, and there is a similar teaching in accord with the view of Samuel [as to what is at issue here].*
- O. *For it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of Rab:*
- P. If one has made a sukkah-roofing with boards of cedar, planks that are not four handbreadths in breadth, all parties concur that the sukkah-roofing is valid.
- Q. If they are four handbreadths in breadth, R. Meir declares [the roofing] invalid, and R. Judah declares it valid.
- R. **Said R. Judah, "There was the precedent that, in the time of danger, we brought boards of four handbreadths, and we made sukkah-roofing on the balcony and sat down under that roofing [to observe the requirement of sitting in a sukkah, without tipping the Romans off to what we were doing]."**
- S. **They said to him, "There is no proof from what people did in the time of danger" [cf. T. Suk. 1:7D-E].**
- T. *It was taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of Samuel:*
- U. If one made a sukkah roofing out of cedar boards that are four handbreadths, all parties concur that the sukkah is invalid.
- V. If the boards were not four handbreadths,
- W. R. Meir declares [the roofing] invalid, and R. Judah declares it valid.
- X. But R. Meir concurs that if there is a space between one board and the next of a breadth of a board, one may put laths between the boards, and the sukkah-roofing will be valid.
- Y. R. Judah concedes that if one put on the roofing a board of four handbreadths, the sukkah-roofing is valid, but people may not sleep underneath that board.
- Z. And if someone slept underneath that board, he will not have fulfilled his obligation.

II.1 A. [If one put on top of it a board which is four handbreadths broad, it is valid, so long as one not sleep underneath [that particular board:] *It has been stated on Amoraic authority:*

- B. If one turned the boards on their sides,
- C. *R. Huna said, "The roofing nonetheless is invalid.*
- D. *R. Hisda and Rabbah bar R. Huna said, "It is valid."*
- E. *R. Nahman happened to come to Sura. He came up to visit R. Hisda and Rabbah bar R. Huna. They said to him, "If the householder turned the boards on their sides, what is the law?"*
- F. *He said to them, "It is invalid, since they then fall into the category of metal spits."* [Slotki, p. 61, n. 15: Since a plank of four handbreadths is invalid, as is any metal object, in whatever position it is placed it is still invalid.]

- G. *Said R. Huna to them, “Did I not tell you to rule as I do?”*
- H. *They said to him, “Did the master give us a reason for his ruling, when he did not concur in his opinion?”*
- I. *He said to them, “And did you ask me for a reason, which I did not then give you?”*
- J. *May we adduce in support of [Nahman’s] view the following statement:*
- K. *[If the sukkah] cannot hold a person’s head and the greater part of his body and his table,*
- L. *or if a hole was made in it sufficient for a kid to hump in head first,*
- M. *or if someone put on the roof [of the sukkah] a board four handbreadths broad, even though he did not actually insert into [the sukkah-roofing] more than three handbreadths of the extent of the board,*
- N. *[the sukkah-roofing] is invalid.*
- O. *Now is this [M] not a case in which one turned the board on its side [so that only three handbreadths of the board affected the sukkah roofing? The roofing then is invalid, as Nahman has claimed].*
- P. *No, that is not support for Nahman’s position. For with what sort of case do we deal? With one in which the owner placed the broad board at the entrance of the sukkah, so that three handbreadths of the extent of the board are inside [the sukkah, within the roofing] and one handbreadth is outside.*
- Q. *In such a case we invoke the analogy of a lath that protrudes from the sukkah, and in the case of any lath that protrudes from the sukkah, the lath is adjudged as if it is fully within the category of the sukkah. [The result is that the handbreadth of the board that is outside of the sukkah is regarded as if it were inside the sukkah and the four together are not valid for use in sukkah-roofing. Nahman cannot derive support from the law at hand.]*

Boards are analogous to normal roofing material for a house, M. 1:6B. C-D form a compromise. A single board may be used, but with the stated functional restriction. Unit I:1 presents a beautifully articulated dispute between Rab and Samuel, clarifying the basic issues of the Mishnah-paragraph. Unit II:1 contributes to the clarification of the second rule of the Mishnah.

1:7

- A. **[15A] A timber-roofing which had no plastering —**
- B. **R. Judah says, “The House of Shammai say, ‘One loosens it and removes one [board] between each two.’**
- C. **“And the House of Hillel say, ‘One either loosens it or removes one [board] from between each two.’”**
- D. **R. Meir says, “One removes one from between each two, and does not loosen [the others at all].”**

- I.1 A.** *Now [if we ask for the principle behind the rulings at hand, we] assuredly [find no difficulty in accounting for the position of the House of Hillel.] Their ruling derives from the exegesis, “You shall make’ (Deu. 13:16) — and not from what is ready-made. [On that count one cannot use what is at hand as a house.]” [Since one must do a specific deed in connection with the sukkah], if one loosens the boards, he carries out a deed, [and] if he removes one board between each two, he carries out a deed. [So either procedure suffices.] But as to the House of Shammai, what is the principle behind their view? If the operative criterion is on the count of “You shall make’ (Deu. 13:16) — and not from what is ready-made,” then it should suffice if the householder does one of the two deeds. If the operative criterion is on the count of a precautionary decree [against using boards for sukkah-roofing lest they appear to form] a roof, then it should suffice if the householder simply removes one of every two boards. [Why require loosening all the boards and also removing one out of every two?]*
- B.** *Indeed, the operative criterion is the precautionary decree [to avoid the appearance of using an ordinary] roof, and this is what the House of Shammai wish to say: “Even though the householder loosens the boards, if he also removes one out of every two, it is valid, and if not, it is not valid.”*
- C.** *If that is the case, then let me cite the concluding part of the same paragraph: **R. Meir says, “One removes one from between each two [boards] and does not [have to] loosen the others at all” (M. 1:7D).** R. Meir says precisely what the House of Shammai says [in accord with the foregoing thesis on the sense of the position of the House of Shammai]! [How is this possible?]*
- D.** *This is the sense of [Meir’s] position: The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not dispute about this matter at all. [Both Houses concur that one has to remove one board from between two others.]*
- E.** *What, then, does the passage at hand propose to tell us? Is it that R. Meir invokes the precautionary decree on account of the possibility [that the sukkah-roofing will constitute] a roof, and R. Judah does not invoke the consideration of that precautionary decree? But even in that matter both parties already have stated their dispute, for we have learned: **“They make sukkah-roofing with boards,” the words of R. Judah. And R. Meir prohibits doing so [M. 1:6A-B].***
- F.** *[Distinguishing M. 1:6’s case from M. 1:7’s and so validating the proposed solution,] said R. Hiyya bar Abba said R. Yohanan, “The former of the two paragraphs deals with planed boards, and it was on account of making a precautionary decree against the use of utensils [that are susceptible to uncleanness and so invalid for sukkah-roofing] that [the Mishnah-passage] rules [as it does]. [Planed boards are not susceptible, since they are flat, and flat wooden objects are insusceptible. But they may serve a purpose and, seeing that, people in their confusion may assume that other utensils also may be used as sukkah-roofing.]”*
- G.** *But there is what R. Judah said Rab said, “If one made sukkah-roofing of male arrow-shafts, the roofing is valid. If he did so with female ones [having a receptacle] it is invalid.” And [we see] no one made a precautionary decree against using male ones on account of the possibility of using female ones. Here*

too there should be no precautionary decree against using planed boards on account of the possible use, on that account, of other such utensils [for sukkah-roofing]. Accordingly, there is no choice but to concede that, in the former of the two Mishnah-paragraphs, there is a dispute on the count of whether or not there is a precautionary decree on account of [the consideration of using an ordinary] roof [for sukkah-roofing], and in the latter of the two clauses, there is a dispute about the same matter.

- H. *[If so], why should the two authorities have disputed about the same principle in two distinct matters of law [when the dispute in principle emerges quite clearly in one or the other of the two cases in which it comes to expression]?*
- I. *The latter of the two paragraphs represents the view of R. Judah, who [as it were] says to R. Meir, “Why have you made a prohibition against the use of boards on account of a precautionary decree to take account of the possibility of their forming an [ordinary] roof? That thesis belongs to the House of Shammai, who maintain [that we] do [make such a precautionary decree.] But the House of Hillel make no such precautionary decree.” [And to this claim], R. Meir would then reply, “The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel had no such dispute.”*
- J. *That view of matters poses no problems to Rab, who has said [above M. 1:6I] that the dispute [of M. 1:6] concerns boards that are four handbreadths. In that case, R. Meir maintains that a precautionary decree does apply, and R. Judah maintains that it does not. But in the view of Samuel, who has said that the dispute deals even with boards that are not four handbreadths, while if they are four handbreadths, all parties concur that such boards are simply invalid, as to the latter of the two Mishnah-paragraphs, what can possibly be subject to dispute? [Samuel’s thesis eliminates the possibility of a dispute on the question we have alleged is at issue.]*
- K. *They dispute about nullifying the effects of a roof. [If we have a roof that has served in an ordinary way, are we able to nullify that fact and so transform it into a sukkah-roofing, and, if so, how do we do it?] One authority [Judah] takes the view that one nullifies [the former status of the roofing] in the specified manner, and the other authority [Meir] takes the view that one cannot nullify [the effects of the former status of the roof] in the specified manner.*

In this secondary development of M. 1:6, Judah now assigns his view, that boards may be used, to both Houses and explains how they make it possible even to use a roof composed of boards. The Shammaites remove every other board and loosen the remaining ones. The Hillelites do either. Now Meir takes up the position of M. 1:6C-D; boards not forming a continuous covering are valid. The Talmud is continuous with that serving at M. 1:6, yet clearly focuses upon M. 1:7.

1:8

- A. **He who makes a roof for his sukkah out of spits or with the side-pieces of a bed —**
- B. **if there is a space between them equivalent to their own breadth,**
- C. **[the sukkah] is valid.**

D. He who hollowed out a space in a haystack to make a sukkah therein — it is no sukkah.

I.1 A. [He who makes a roof for his sukkah out of spits or with the side-pieces of a bed — if there is a space between them equivalent to their own breadth, the sukkah is valid:] *May we say that the Mishnah-paragraph [at M. 1:8A-C] constitutes a refutation of the position of R. Huna, son of R. Joshua?*

B. *For it has been taught on Amoraic authority:*

C. [In the case of a fence erected on a temporary basis by a caravan so as to form a distinct domain to permit carrying on the Sabbath,] if there is a breach in the perimeter that is as long as a standing portion [of the perimeter of the fence, so that the fence consists of a standing part, a breach, a standing part, another breach, and so on, and the breaches are as long in distance as the parts of the perimeter filled in by a standing partition of some sort,]

D. R. Papa said, “[The fence] is permitted [so as to allow for carrying in the enclosed area.]” [That is to say, since we do not invoke the principle that the empty spaces are considered as if they were filled for purposes of forming a partition for the Sabbath, why do we not recognize that same fact? The empty spaces for the sukkah also should not be considered as if they were filled, with the consequence that, for the purposes of sukkah-roofing, the arrangement should be valid, there being adequate open space between one spit or side-piece and the next.]

E. And R. Huna, son of R. Joshua, said, “It is forbidden.” [Slotki, p. 65, n. 11: Now since in the circumstances mentioned a partition is invalid, in the case of the Sabbath why is the roof valid in that of Sukkah?]

F. *R. Huna, son of R. Joshua, may reply to you, “What is the sense of equivalent to their own breadth?* [It is that through the empty space, a lath the exact breadth of one of the laths in use] may easily pass through and come out [so that the required empty space between spit and spit or board and board must be somewhat broader than the mere breadth of the spit or the board itself].”

G. **[15B]** But lo, one cannot measure matters so exactly [to know, as just now proposed, whether or not the space between the boards is larger than the boards themselves].

H. Said R. Ammi, “We deal with a case in which the householder makes them larger. [That is, M. 1:8A-C speaks of a case in which the space is not exactly equivalent but somewhat larger than the breadth of the boards.]”

I. *Raba said, “Even if you say we deal with a case in which the householder did not make the spaces larger, [the arrangement would be valid]. How so? If [the boards or spits] were arranged as web, he puts the valid sukkah-roofing on as woof, or, if the boards were set as woof, he puts the valid sukkah-roofing on as the web.”* [Slotki, p. 65, n. 16: The valid covering is placed crosswise to the invalid, and, therefore, always exceeds it in volume.]

II.1 A. Or with the sidepieces of a bed [M. 1:8A]:

B. *May I say that the Mishnah-passage supports the position of R. Ammi bar Tibiomi?*

C. For R. Ammi bar Tibiomi said, “If one made sukkah-roofing with worn-out garments, the roofing is invalid.” [We cannot use boards which once served as

valid utensils, not because they are susceptible any longer to uncleanness, for they are not, since they have ceased to serve their valid function. Rather, merely because they once were susceptible, they remain invalid for use in sukkah-roofing. The same consideration is operative in Ammi's statement on worn-out garments. They once were susceptible. Since they are now mere rags and useless, they are no longer susceptible. Nonetheless, they may not be used.]

- D. *[No, we may not reach that conclusion. For matters are] in accord with what R. Hanan said Rabbi said, "[At issue at M. Kel. 18:9's reference to side-pieces of a bed is a case involving] the long board and two legs, or the short board and two legs [of a bed]. Here too we deal with the long board and two legs or the short board and two legs. [In line with Rabbi's view at M. Kel. 18:9, these constitute a valid utensil. That is why there is a problem in using them in sukkah-roofing. So Ammi may not derive support for his view of matters at all. That is, it is not that the materials at hand once constituted valid utensils. Under discussion is something that still constitutes a valid utensil.]*
- E. *In what context was the statement of R. Hanan in Rabbi's name made? It was in the following, which we learned in the Mishnah: [16A] "A bed is rendered susceptible to uncleanness only when it is bound together [fully assembled] and is rendered insusceptible only when wholly bound together," the words of R. Eliezer. And sages say, "It is rendered unclean in pieces and may be made clean in pieces" [M. Kel. 18:9C-D]. [Eliezer: The processes of contamination and purification affect the bed only when it is all in one piece. When the parts are separate from one another, there is no consideration of uncleanness.]*
- G. *What are these parts [to which reference has just now been made]?*
- H. *Said R. Hanan said Rabbi, "The long board and two legs, or the short board and two legs."*
- I. *For what would such a contraption be suitable?*
- J. *To put up against a wall for use as a seat or for tying with ropes [to form a couch].*

- II.2.** A. [Returning to the] body [of the statement above], R. Ammi bar Tibiomi said, "If one made sukkah-roofing with worn-out garments, the roofing is invalid."
- B. *What sorts of rags fall into the status of worn-out garments?*
- C. *Said Abbaye, "Rags which are not at least three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, which are not suitable for use either by poor people or by rich people."*
- D. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the view of R. Ammi bar Tibiomi:*
- E. **As to a reed-mat of rushes or straw, even though the remnants are diminished [to less than the minimum measurement at which they are susceptible to uncleanness], they may not be used for sukkah-roofing.**
- F. **As to a mat of reeds, a large one [ordinarily used as a covering] may serve for sukkah-roofing, and a small one [which may constitute a utensil] may not serve as sukkah-roofing.**

- G. **R. Eliezer says, “Even a small one is susceptible to uncleanness, so people may not use it for sukkah-roofing” [cf. T. Suk. 1:10E-G].**

III.1 A. He who hollowed out a space in a haystack [M. 1:8D]:

- B. Said R. Huna, “The stated rule applies only to a case in which there is no empty space a handbreadth in height by seven handbreadths [square], but if there is a handbreadth in height and seven handbreadths square, it is suitable to serve as a sukkah.” [If the farmer left an empty space of such a size, then the farmer has so constructed the hollow to begin with so that the top part should serve as sukkah-roofing for the empty space beneath. Then he has made a sukkah to begin with. If the space is less than the stated dimensions, by contrast, the roofing is made only as a result of the post-facto hollowing out of the space within. That is not a sukkah constructed for purposes of keeping the holiday.]
- C. *It has been taught to the same effect on Tannaite authority:*
- D. He who hollows out a space in a haystack so as to make a sukkah for himself — lo, this constitutes a valid sukkah.
- E. *Yet lo, have we not learned to repeat the passage in the following formulation: It is not a valid sukkah? [There is then a contradiction between the two passages, and would that contradiction] not yield an inference in support of the claim of R. Huna [that there are conditions in which such a hollowed out space is valid, just as there are conditions in which it is not]?*
- G. *It does indeed yield that inference.*
- H. *There are those who present the cited passage as an objection:*
- I. *We have learned: **He who hollowed out a space in a haystack to make a sukkah therein — it is no sukkah [M. 1:8D-E].***
- J. *And lo, it has been taught on Tannaite authority: It is a valid sukkah!*
- K. Said R. Huna, “There is no contradiction between the two passages. In the one case [in which it is valid], it is a space a handbreadth high by seven squared handbreadths, and in the other case [in which it is not a valid arrangement] it is where there is no empty space a handbreadth in height by seven squared handbreadths.”

A-C go over the ground of M. 1:7D. The sukkah of D-E has not been constructed with the Festival in mind (M. 1:1L-N); or it appears to be a storehouse. In any case, D-E are a misplaced, miscellaneous item. Unit I:1 brings the present passage into confrontation with its exact opposite, concerning the fence erected for creating a distinct domain. The same principle applies in both cases, namely, the fictive filling in of small gaps in a fence, roofing, or partition. If we do not fill in such a gap in one case, we ought not to think the principle applies in the other. On that basis, the issue is worked out, and, as usual, the correct solution is to propose a distinction between the one case and the other. Unit II:1 carries on the same exercise of bringing law in one topic to bear upon law in some other, and this is done by invoking the shared principle applicable to both. Unit III:1 then completes the analysis of the Mishnah-passages specifying limitations to the invalidity of the arrangement specified in the Mishnah; this further explains the underlying principle.

1:9A-G

- A. He who suspends the sides from above to below —
- B. if the [the partitions] are three [or more] handbreadths above the ground,
- C. [the sukkah] is invalid.
- D. [If he builds the sides] from the ground upward,
- E. if [they are] ten handbreadths above the ground,
- F. [the sukkah] is valid.
- G. R. Yosé says, “Just as [the required height] from below to above [when the wall is built up from the ground] is ten handbreadths, “so [the required height] from above to below [when the wall is suspended from above toward the ground] is ten handbreadths [even though the bottom is not within three handbreadths of the ground]. [The operative criterion is the height of the partitions.]”

- I.1** A. *What is at issue? One authority maintains the view that a suspended partition validates [the sukkah], and the other authority holds that a suspended partition does not validate [the sukkah, in which case it must lie within three handbreadths above the ground. If the lower side is within three handbreadths of the ground, we invoke the legal fiction that it is connected to or resting on the ground. If the distance is greater, we cannot do so.]*
- B. *We have learned there in the Mishnah:*
 - C. **A cistern which is between two courtyards —**
 - D. **they do not draw water from it on the Sabbath, unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high, whether it is above, beneath, or within its rim.**
 - E. **Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says [16B], “The House of Shammai say, ‘Below.’ And the House of Hillel say, ‘Above.’”**
 - F. **Said R. Judah, “The partition should not be expected to be more powerful than the wall which is between them” [M. Er. 8:6].** [Since the cistern is located beneath a wall dividing two courtyards, it is in the domain of neither, so people may not draw water from it. The theory of the anonymous rule is that a partition must be placed in the cistern itself, so as to distinguish the shares of the two courtyards, respectively. The partition may be above the water in the cistern, below its surface, or at the rim of the cistern, not touching the water-surface. Simeon b. Gamaliel has a Houses’ dispute on this matter. Judah rejects the entire conception. If the partition is a suitable division, so too is the wall between the two courtyards, so there is no need for a partition at all.]
 - G. **Said Rabbah bar bar Hana said R. Yohanan, “R. Judah accords with the principle of R. Yosé, who has said that a suspended partition validates [the sukkah, as a proper wall].”**
 - H. *But that is not the case at all. R. Judah does not accord with the principle of R. Yosé, and R. Yosé does not accord with the principle of R. Judah.*
 - I. *R. Judah does not accord with the principle of R. Yosé: R. Judah’s ruling pertains only to the case of creating a common domain out of courtyards, authority for which derives only from the rabbis. But in the present case, in*

which a sukkah is involved, authority for which derives from the Torah, he would not invoke the stated principle. [So there is a clear distinction between the one case and the other].

- J. *And R. Yosé does not concur with the principle of R. Judah. R. Yosé rules here as he does in the case of the sukkah, because it is a religious duty carried out by an act of commission. But in the case of the Sabbath, which is subject to a prohibition the violation of which is penalized by stoning he would not invoke that same principle, [since he sees the latter case as more stringent than the former].*
- K. *Now if you raise the objection, then as to the precedent in the case of Sepphoris [cited presently, in which a suspended partition was regarded as acceptable in the case of the Sabbath], in accord with which of the two authorities was that ruling made? For it could not conform with the principle of R. Yosé.*
- L. *Rather, it was on the instruction of R. Ishmael, the son of R. Yosé.*
- M. *What was that precedent? When R. Dimi came, he said, “One time the people [of a courtyard, not preparing the erub to unite their property] forget and did not bring the scroll of the Torah on the eve of the Sabbath [Friday]. The next day [the Sabbath itself] they spread out sheets on top of pillars and carried the scroll of the Torah, and they read in it. [The scroll of the Torah was in one of the houses of the courtyard in which the synagogue was located. The people forgot to prepare the fictive collective meal which would have made the house of the courtyard along with the courtyard into a single domain. Their solution is as described, and in that way the people created a single domain.]*
- N. *Did they really spread out the sheets? How did they bring [the sheets] on the Sabbath [to the pillars]?*
- O. *Rather, they found sheets [where they were lying] and spread them out, and brought the scroll of the Torah and read in it. [The objection thus is worked out. Since Ishmael was resident-authority in Sepphoris, the ruling accorded with his principle, not Yosé’s.]*
- I.2.** A. *Said R. Hisda said Abimi, “A matting somewhat more than four handbreadths [in length] validates a sukkah as a partition.”*
- B. *What does one do with it?*
- C. *He suspends it in the middle [of the space between the roofing and the ground, less than three handbreadths from the bottom, less than three handbreadths from the top, since whatever lies within three handbreadths is treated as if it extends the requisite distance [by fictive extension].*
- D. *That is perfectly self-evident.*
- E. *[Nonetheless, it was necessary to make it explicit, for] what might you have said? We invoke the principle of fictive extension for one side [of a partition], but we do not do so for both sides. So we are informed that that is not the case, [and we invoke the fictive extension for both sides.]*
- F. *An objection was raised [to Hisda’s statement at A] on the basis of the following teaching: A matting seven handbreadths and a bit more validates the partition in the case of a sukkah. [Hence one a bit more than four would not, since we invoke the fictive extension only for one, not for both sides.]*

- G. *When that statement was made on Tannaite authority, it was made with reference to a very tall sukkah, [that is, one taller than ten handbreadths in height. The mat then is suspended from the roof and comes within three handbreadths of the ground and so forms a wall ten handbreadths high on the principle of fictive extension.]*
- H. *What then did the statement serve to tell us?*
- I. *That one suspends walls from top to bottom, in accord with the principle of R. Yosé [at M. 1:9G].*
- I.3.** A. Said R. Ammi, “A board a bit wider than four handbreadths serves to validate as a wall in the case of a sukkah.”
- B. [The householder] places it less than three handbreadths from the [existing] wall, since whatever is less than three handbreadths from the wall is deemed, by fictive extension, to be attached to the wall [and so the wall of seven handbreadths is fictively obtained].
- C. *What does this teaching tell us [that we should not otherwise have known]?*
- D. *Lo, it informs us that the minimum extent of a short sukkah is seven handbreadths.*

M. 1:9D-F merely restate M. 1:1C, and they are inserted only to pave the way for Yosé’s argument, G. He permits the wall to be suspended, on the principle of fictive extension. Unit I introduces the mirror-ruling to the one at hand, that at M. Er. 8:6, and asks about the positions of the authorities of each Mishnah-paragraph on the ruling in the contrary passage. Nos. 2 and 3 then illustrate the law given at our Mishnah-paragraph, showing us how it applies.

1:9H - 1:10

- H.** [17A] [If] one sets the sukkah-roofing three handbreadths from the walls [of the sukkah], [the sukkah] is invalid.
- M. 1:9**
- A.** A house, [the roof of] which was damaged, and on [the gaps in the roof of which] one put sukkah-roofing —
- B.** if the distance from the wall to the sukkah-roofing is four cubits, it is invalid [as a sukkah].
- C.** And so too, [is the rule for] a courtyard which is surrounded by a peristyle.
- D.** A large sukkah, [the roofing of which] they surrounded with some sort of material with which they do not make sukkah-roofing —
- E.** if there was a space of four cubits below it,
- F.** it is invalid [as a sukkah].

M. 1:10

- I.1** A. *What need do I have for all of these rulings [M. 1:9H, 1:10A-C, D-F]?*
- B. *They all are required. For if I had in hand only the ruling concerning a house, the roof of which was damaged, I might have supposed that, since the walls of the house were made for use in the house [and designated not as partitions for a sukkah], [the rule applies there]. But as to a courtyard which is surrounded by a*

peristyle, in which case the partitions were not made for use by the peristyle, I might have said the law does not apply. So it was necessary to make the rule explicit for both cases.

- C. *Had I furthermore known only these two rulings, I might have supposed that in these cases, valid sukkah-roofing was used [so I invoke the notion that the intervening space is fictively deemed filled up]. But in the case of a large sukkah, which was surrounded by something with which people do not make sukkah-roofing, since the roofing involved is invalid, I might have said that we do not invoke [the principle of fictively filled up open space].*
- D. *So it was necessary to make all three rulings explicit.*
- Having dealt with the passage viewed whole, we now take up the exegesis of those passages of interest to our sages.

- II.1 A. [If one sets the sukkah-roofing three handbreadths from the walls of the sukkah, the sukkah is invalid:]** *said Rabbah, “I came upon the rabbis of the household of Rab [teaching in Rab’s tradition, at Sura] in session and saying, ‘An unfilled gap of airspace invalidates a sukkah if it is three handbreadths wide, [and] invalid sukkah-roofing invalidates a sukkah if it is four handbreadths.’*
- B. *“Now I said to them, ‘How do you know that an unfilled gap of airspace invalidates a sukkah at a measure of three handbreadths? It is because we have learned, **If one sets the sukkah-roofing three handbreadths from the walls of the sukkah, the sukkah is invalid [M. 1:9H].** As to invalid sukkah-roofing, however, it should invalidate only at a measure of four cubits [not handbreadths!], for we have learned: **A house, the roof of which was damaged, and on the gaps of the roof of which one put sukkah-roofing — if the distance from the wall to the sukkah-roofing is four cubits, it is invalid as a sukkah [M. 1:10A-B].**’*
- C. *“And they said to me, ‘But this represents an exception. For both Rab and Samuel have said that [with reference to M. 1:10A-B], [the reason that putting sukkah-roofing on the damaged roof] is on account of the fictive theory of the curved wall, which reaches [the exposed roof. That is to say, we imagine that the walls distant from the exposed portion of the roof are curved so as to reach the exposed portion and so form a partition for the sukkah-roofing placed at the exposed part of the roof].’*
- D. *“And I said to them, ‘What would the law be in the case of the use of invalid sukkah-roofing less than four handbreadths in area, and an unfilled gap of airspace less than three handbreadths? It most certainly would be valid. If, then, one filled the space with spits, what would be the rule? It would be invalid. [The spits are invalid because they are susceptible to uncleanness and so may not be used for sukkah-roofing. Now, filling the space with them, the man has spread more than four handbreadths of invalid roofing. But when the space was open to the air, the sukkah-roofing was valid.] Now should not an open gap of airspace, which invalidates at a measure of three handbreadths, be equivalent to invalid sukkah-roofing, which invalidates at a measure of four handbreadths? [So the air space here would invalidate the sukkah-roofing even if it is less than three handbreadths.]’*

- E. *“And they said to me, ‘If so, then in accord with your reasoning, which maintains that invalid sukkah-roofing renders the sukkah invalid only if it covers a space of four cubits, what would the law be in the case of invalid roofing less than four cubits and a gap of open airspace less than three? Would this not be a valid sukkah? Yet if one filled the gaps with spits, what would be the rule? It would be invalid. Now should not the open gap of airspace, which invalidates the sukkah at a measure of three handbreadths, be in the same category as sukkah-roofing, which, if it is invalid, invalidates the sukkah if it covers an area of four cubits? [So the same argument applies to Rabbah’s position, mutatis mutandis.]’*
- F. *“And I said to them, ‘How now! [The two cases are hardly comparable.] Now in my view — and I take the position that the requirement is [at least] four cubits [of invalid sukkah-roofing will serve to invalidate the sukkah] [17B] because there is a fixed measurement [dictated by revelation on the minimum size of a sukkah, which is four cubits] — in the present case there is not a standard measure of valid area. Here [in the case at hand] there is no standard measurement. Since the requisite sizes are not the same for the two dimensions [that is to say, invalid sukkah-covering has one measure, invalid gaps of air space in the roofing are subject to a different measure], the two dimensions [of invalid space] simply do not join together [to invalidate the entire sukkah]. But in your view — and you take the position that [the requisite measures do not derive from revealed tradition but merely from] the principle of division [that is to say, the minimum size of a distinct place is four handbreadths, and if there are four handbreadths of an invalid roofing or four handbreadths of no roofing at all, the net effect is the same, that is, the invalidation of the sukkah], — what difference does it make whether the [sukkah is subject to division into spaces invalidly covered on account of] invalid roofing or on account of a gap in the air space? [That is how I distinguish my reductio ad absurdum of your position, and your doing the same to mine.]’”*
- G. *Said Abbaye to him, “And in the view of the master [Rabbah], granted that the minimum measurements applying for each purpose are not equivalent in the case of a large sukkah, in a small sukkah are they not equivalent to one another? [Surely they are]!” [Slotki, p. 73, n. 6: A sukkah of minimum size, i.e., of seven handbreadths square, is invalid if there are either three handbreadths of invalid covering or of air space; why then should not the two combine?]*
- H. *He said to him, “In that case [of the small sukkah] the operative consideration is not that the applicable measurements are the same, but that to begin with, [if the parts of the roof are covered with invalid roofing or with no roofing at all, in either case] the minimum size of valid sukkah-roofing is not available. [The standard requisite measure is different for each category, and they cannot combine, even though they produce the same effect.]”*
- I. *And is it the case that when requisite measures for diverse dimensions are not the same, then areas that are invalid [on distinct counts] do not join together? [Slotki: Do we not then combine standards when they are unequal?] And we have learned in the Mishnah: **Cloth [of wool or flax] is subject to uncleanness if it is at least three by three handbreadths square... sacking — four by four, leather — five by five, a mat — six by six [M. Kel. 27:2].** [These dimensions*

indicate the smallest size of a given piece of material that people will find useful, hence that is susceptible to uncleanness. We shall now see that, if we have invalid cloth of less than the requisite measure and invalid sacking of less than requisite measure, the two join together to form the requisite measure of susceptible material, in accord with the minimum size applying to the second, the larger, of the two materials.] *In that connection it was taught on Tannaite authority:* Cloth joins together with sacking, sacking with leather, leather with matting. [And yet, we see, each is subject to its own minimum dimensions.]

- J. *In that case, the operative consideration is made explicit, for R. Simeon has said, "What is the reason? Since all of them are subject to the same mode of uncleanness, namely, that imparted when a person subject to uncleanness as a zab sits on any of them. [Hence, the different sorts of materials join together because the same mode of transfer of uncleanness pertains to all of them.]" For we have learned in the Mishnah: **He who cuts off from any of these items [susceptible to the uncleanness imparts as explained] a square handbreadth [the minimum size of fabric used for sitting,] the patch which is cut off is susceptible to uncleanness [from the prescribed mode of uncleanness] [M. Kel. 27:4A-B].***
- K. *For what use is a piece of material a handbreadth squared?*
- L. R. Simeon b. Laqish said in the name of R. Yannai, "It can be made into a patch for the saddle of an ass."

- II.2.** A. *In Sura, that is how they presented the preceding teaching [Rab's view that four handbreadths of invalid roofing renders a sukkah useless]. In Nehardea they taught it in another way entirely. [This is what follows. Here we see that Samuel, not Rab, is the one who says that under some conditions the requisite measure of invalid area is a more stringent area of four handbreadths, not four cubits. Both Rab and Samuel take the same view, but the authority behind that view has to be determined. Samuel's school, in Nehardea transmits the matter differently, as we shall now see.]*
- B. Said R. Judah said Samuel, "If there is invalid sukkah-roofing in the middle of the roof of a sukkah, it invalidates the sukkah if it is four handbreadths, while if it is located at the side of the roofing, it invalidates [only] if it is four cubits in breadth [a much more considerable measure may then be invalid without invalidating the sukkah]."
- C. And Rab said, "Whether it is on the side or in the middle, the requisite measure is four cubits."
- D. [We now repeat the exercise of M. 1: 6 for this new issue.] *We have learned in the Mishnah: **If one put on top of sukkah-roofing a board which is four handbreadths broad, it is valid [so long as one not sleep underneath that particular board] [M. 1:6C-D].** Now the cited passage surely poses no problems for Rab, who has said that, whether the invalid sukkah-roofing is in the middle or at the side [of the sukkah-roof], the invalidating measure is four cubits. On that account the board is valid [since the invalid portion, comprised by the board, is only four handbreadths]. But in the view of Samuel, who has said that if the invalid roofing is in the middle of the sukkah-roof, the measure defining the*

area that will invalidate the roof is four handbreadths, why should the board be valid? [Surely we have four handbreadths of invalid roofing!]

- E. *[In Samuel's behalf, we reply:] Here with what sort of case do we deal? With a board placed at the side [of the sukkah-roof, not in the middle].*
- F. *Come and take note: Two sheets join together [to form four handbreadths and so render sukkah-roofing invalid], while two boards do not join together [to be regarded as covering more space than can be completely opaque in the sukkah-roofing]. R. Meir says, "Also boards fall into the same category as sheets" [cf. M. 1:6 I L]. Now in accord with the version of matters that has Rab say, "Whether at the middle or at the side, the invalidating measure is four cubits," what would be the sense of "join together"? It would mean, "Join together to make up the four cubits [of invalidating roofing, wherever it is located]." But in accord with that version of matters that has Rab say, "If the invalidating sukkah-roofing is at the center, the minimum measure of invalid roofing [that will disqualify the sukkah is four handbreadths," what sort of case can be in mind [in the cited dispute]? If the area of invalid roofing adds up to four handbreadths, why raise the issue of joining together at all? And if the invalid area is less than four handbreadths, they add up to nothing more than reeds! [Reeds are valid, and if the boards are less than four handbreadths, they are nothing more than reeds. So what is at issue?]*
- G. *In any event we deal with a case in which the boards are four handbreadths, and what is the sense of "join together"? It means that they join together to form the requisite measure of four cubits that will invalidate the sukkah-roofing if the improper area is located at the side of the sukkah-roof.*
- H. *Come and take note of the following: If one has made a sukkah-roofing with boards of cedar which are four handbreadths broad, all parties concur that the sukkah-roofing is invalid. If they are not four handbreadths, R. Meir declares the roofing invalid, and R. Judah declares it valid. [18A] And R. Meir concedes that if, between one board and the next, there is a space of a breadth of a board, one may put laths between the boards, and the sukkah-roofing will be valid. Now in the view of him who has said that the invalidating measure of improper sukkah-roofing, whether it is located at the side or in the middle of the sukkah-roof, is four cubits, we can understand why the sukkah will be valid [since the boards are not four cubits wide]. But in the view of the one who has said that if the invalid portion of the roof in the middle is four handbreadths, then why should the arrangement here be valid?*
- I. *Said R. Huna, son of R. Joshua, "Here we deal with a sukkah which is of a measure of only eight cubits exactly. Now the householder places a board and a lath, a board and a lath, a board and a lath, on the one side, and a board and a lath, a board and a lath, a board and a lath, on the other side. In this arrangement, therefore, there are two laths in the middle." [Slotki, p. 76, n. 1: Eight cubits equal four-eight handbreadths which are duly covered by the six planks (six times four is twenty-four handbreadths), and the latter which also total six times four is twenty-four handbreadths, but the alternation of planks and laths is as follows (P is plank, L is lath): PLPLPLLPLPLP. The eight handbreadths in the middle represented by LL constitute a valid sukkah, the next being regarded as*

continuations of the walls, since on any side they are less than four cubits in extent.]”

- II.3.** A. Said Abbaye, “An open airspace in the roofing of a sukkah of three handbreadths in a large sukkah, which one has cut down, whether with reeds or spits, is validly diminished [so that the sukkah-roofing is now valid].
- B. “In the case of a small sukkah, if this is done with reeds, it constitutes a valid act of diminution of the open space, but if this was done with spits, this does not constitute a valid diminution of the open space.” [Slotki, p. 76, n. 6: Because the airspace and the spits, which together extend along three handbreadths, cannot be regarded as a valid part of the roof, and the sukkah (being of the minimum size) is thus reduced to less than the prescribed minimum.]”
- C. *This rule [that a gap of less than three handbreadths does not invalidate sukkah-roofing, A] applies when the gap is at the side, but if it is located in the middle of the sukkah-roofing, it is the rule is subject to dispute between R. Aha and Rabina.*
- D. One of them said, “We invoke the principle of fictive extension of a valid area of covering — the walls of the sukkah — to an invalid area when the invalid area is located in the middle of the roof.”
- E. The other has said, “We do not invoke the principle of the fictive extension when the open area is in the middle of the sukkah-roofing.”
- F. *What is the reason behind the view of him who has said that we do invoke the principle of the fictive extension of the walls even to the middle of the sukkah-roofing?*
- G. *It is as has been taught on Tannaite authority:*
- H. **A beam which projects from one wall and does not reach the other wall, and so too in the case of two beams, one which projects from one wall and the other which projects from the other wall but do not reach one another, if the distance between them is less than three handbreadths, one does not have to bring another beam [and place it on top of them to complete a fictive doorway], but if it is three handbreadths, one has to bring another beam and place it on top of them to complete the covering] [T. Er. 1:6].** [This supports the view that we do invoke the principle of the fictive extension of the beams if the space between them is less than three handbreadths. In the case at hand, also, we invoke that same principle.]
- I. *And the other party [who denies that, in the matter of the sukkah, we invoke the fictive extension]?*
- J. *The case of the beams is different [from the matter of the sukkah, and we impose a lenient ruling by invoking the principle of fictive extension, because, in the case of the beams, we deal with an arrangement which to begin with] derives from the authority of rabbis [and so allows for a more lenient application of the law. By the law of the Torah one could carry objects in the area to be joined by the cross-beam even without the erection of the cross-beam signifying that the area affected by it is a single domain. Rabbis imposed the requirement of creating the single domain.]*

- K. *What is the basis for the position of the one who maintains that we do not invoke the principle of fictive extension when the gap is located in the middle of the sukkah-roofing?*
- L. *As we have learned in the Mishnah: A hatchway which is in the midst of the house in the roof, open to the air, and there is in it an open space of a square handbreadth — uncleanness is in the house under the roof, not under the hatchway — that which is lying on the ground directly below the hatchway is clean. Uncleanness is directly below the hatchway — the house is clean [M. Oh. 10:1A]. If there is not a square handbreadth of open space in the hatchway — uncleanness is in the house — that which is directly under the hatchway is clean. Uncleanness is directly under the hatchway — the house is clean [unaffected by the corpse-matter] [M. Oh. 10:2A]. [M. Oh. 10:1 thus shows that the space of the hatchway is not regarded as fictively covered by the roof. If we were to invoke the principle of fictive extension of the roof, then we should have to rule that the hatchway, a handbreadth square, is fictively covered as well, and so the roof is treated as extended over the corpse-matter located underneath the hatchway, with the result that, under all circumstances, everything under the roof, including what is under the hatchway, is unclean. Why? We have a common roof over all.]*
- M. *And the other party? [How does he account for the failure to invoke the principle of fictive extension?]*
- N. *The laws of transmitting uncleanness form a distinct category [and do not follow the principles effective for the sukkah], for that is how the tradition has been learned.*

- III.1 A.** **[A house, [the roof of] which was damaged, and on [the gaps in the roof of which] one put sukkah-roofing — if the distance from the wall to the sukkah-roofing is four cubits, it is invalid [as a sukkah].** [With reference to M. 1:10A], R. Judah bar Ilai expounded, “A house, the roof of which was damaged, and on the gaps in the roof of which one put sukkah-roofing —
- B. “it is a valid arrangement.”
- C. R. Ishmael, son of R. Yosé, said before him, “Master, amplify [this ruling]. This is how father [Yosé] spelled it out: ‘If it is a space of four cubits [between the gap and the walls of the house], it will remain invalid, but if it is less than four cubits, it is valid’ [just as at M. 1:10B].”
- D. R. Judah b. Ilai expounded, “A certain kind of fish is permitted.”
- E. R. Ishmael, son of R. Yosé, said before him, “Master, amplify [this ruling]. This is how father [Yosé] amplified it out: ‘If it comes from such and such a place, it is forbidden, but if it comes from such and such a place, it is permitted.’”
- F. *That is in line with what Abbayye said, “A certain kind of fish which comes from the Bab river is permitted.”*
- G. *What is the reason? If you say that the water flows swiftly there, and in the case of an unclean fish, because it has no backbone, it cannot survive a swift current. [and if you say that the reason is that] the water is salty, and since the unclean fish has no scales, it cannot survive in salt water, lo, we see that that sort of fish*

does survive in salt water. So the operative consideration must be that there is a lot of mud in the water and unclean fish do not breed in it.

- H. *Said Rabina, "These days, when the Ethan and the Gamda rivers flow into it [so there is clear water, no mud], it is forbidden."*

IV.1 A. [And so too, [is the rule for] a courtyard which is surrounded by a peristyle:] *It has been stated on Amoraic authority:*

- B. If one put sukkah-roofing over a peristyle [covered hall in front of a house] which has door-frames, the arrangement forms a valid sukkah.
- C. If it had no door frames,
- D. Abbaye said, "It is valid."
- E. Raba said, "It is invalid."
- F. Abbaye said, "It is valid. **[18B]** *We invoke the fictive principle that the edge of the roof descends and closes off [the sides and so forms a valid partition on the sides of the peristyle]."*
- G. Raba said, "It is invalid. *We do not invoke the fictive principle that the edge of the roof descends and closes off [the sides]."*
- H. *Said Raba to Abbaye, "In accord with your position, holding that the edge of the roof of the peristyle is seen fictively to descend and close off the sides [forming a valid partition-wall for the sukkah], would you say that is the case even if the middle wall is taken away? [What is one built a sukkah with only two opposed sides? Do we invoke the principle that the roofing fictively descends to form the missing partitions? Surely not! (cf. Slotki, p. 78, n. 9)]."*
- I. *He said to him, "In that case I concede your point, because such a construction is tantamount to an alley-way which is open at both ends. [We could not regard it as a valid sukkah, even if it were covered over on the top with sukkah-roofing]."*
- J. *May we propose that Abbaye and Raba differ on the same matter as is at issue between Rab and Samuel?*
- K. *For it has been taught on Amoraic authority:*
- L. If there was a peristyle in a field [with a roof but no walls],
- M. Rab said, "[On the Sabbath] it is permitted to carry about the entire area [as a single, enclosed domain], *for we maintain the view that the end of the roof fictively descends and closes off the sides, [so completing a properly enclosed domain]."*
- N. And Samuel said, "One may on the Sabbath carry in that area only within [the ordinarily permitted space of] four cubits [which in any event one may utilize for carrying in the public domain. *We do not have a private domain in the present case, for] we do not invoke the principle that the edge of the roof fictively descends and closes off the area [so forming a private domain]."* [It would now appear as though Abbaye concurs with Rab, and Raba with Samuel.]
- O. *In regard to the position of Samuel, all parties concur [including Abbaye]. **[19A]** Where there is a dispute, it is in regard to the position of Rab.*
- P. *Abbaye accords with the principle of Rab, and [Raba will distinguish his position in regard to the peristyle used as a sukkah from the one applying to the framework located in the middle of a field.]*

- Q. *Raba will say to you, "Rab spoke of a case only in which there are partitions attached to the peristyle. But here, in which there are no partitions affixed to the peristyle, he would not [make such a ruling]. [The edge of the roof of the peristyle is fictively held to descend for the purposes of carrying on the Sabbath]."*
- R. *We have learned in the Mishnah: **And so too is the rule for a courtyard which is surrounded by a peristyle [M. 1:10C].***
- S. *Why should that be the case? May we not invoke the rule that the edge of the roof fictively descends and closes off the sides?*
- T. *Raba interpreted the matter in accord with Abbaye's view that [Slotki:] this is a case where one made the beams level. [Slotki, p. 79, n. 13: The beams of the sukkah-covering were not placed over the exedra [peristyle] roof, so that the edge of the latter was visible within the sukkah but on a level with it.]*

IV.2. A. *In Sura that is how they presented the preceding teaching [concerning the opinions of Abbaye and Raba]. In Pumbedita this is how they framed matters:*

- B. *If one put sukkah-roofing over a peristyle which has no door-frames, all parties concur that it is invalid.*
- D. *If it had door-frames,*
- E. *Abbaye said, "It is a valid arrangement."*
- F. *Raba said, "It is invalid."*
- G. *Abbaye said, "It is valid, because we invoke the principle of fictive descent [so that the roof is deemed to descend and form the requisite partitions].*
- H. *Raba said, "It is invalid, because we do not invoke the principle of fictive descent [of the roof to form the requisite partitions]."*
- I. *The decided law accords with the former of the two versions.*

IV.3. A. *R. Ashi came upon R. Kahana, who was placing sukkah-roofing on a peristyle which had no door-frames.*

- B. *He said to him, "Does not the master concur with that which Raba said, 'If it has door-frames, it is valid, if it did not have door-frames, it is invalid'?"*
- C. *He pointed out to him [Slotki:] that a door-frame was visible within though level on the outside, or visible from without, though level from within. [Slotki, p. 80, n. 7: The peristyle had a door-frame no less than a handbreadth wide which commenced at the corner of the sukkah and extended outside the sukkah, being visible only from without.]*
- D. *For it has been taught on Amoraic authority:*
- E. *If [a side-post, placed at the edge of an alley to form a fictive gateway to permit the courtyards of the entire alley-way to be regarded as a single domain for purposes of carrying on the Sabbath] was visible from outside but was level on the inside, it is regarded as a valid side post.*
- F. *And the side-post is in the same category as a door frame.*

IV.4. A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. *A lath which protrudes from a sukkah is regarded as equivalent to the sukkah [so that, if one sits under such a lath, he carries out his obligation to sit in the sukkah itself].*

- C. *What is a concrete case of a lath that protrudes from a sukkah?*
- D. Said Ulla, "We deal with reeds that protrude from the back of the sukkah."
- E. *But lo, [to form a valid sukkah], we require [not only roofing but] three partitions!*
- F. *We deal with a case in which there are such partitions.*
- G. *But we require also [a covered area that constitutes a] validly covered [roof] [so how can the mere lath suffice]?*
- H. *We deal with such a case.*
- I. *And lo, we require a case in which the shade cast by the sukkah-roofing is more than the light let through by it.*
- J. *We deal with such a case.*
- K. *If so, what in the world does the cited statement tell us [that we otherwise would not know? We have a totally valid sukkah anyhow.]*
- L. *What might you have said? Since the laths were placed for the purpose of filling up a roof for the inside of the sukkah, and were not prepared for the purpose of covering space outside of the sukkah, I might have said that such an arrangement is in any case invalid, [since it is contrary to the intent, for the laths, of the householder].*
- M. *Accordingly, we are informed that that is not the rule.*
- N. *Both Rabbah and R. Joseph say, "Here [at B] we speak of reeds that protrude in front of a sukkah [with three sides] and run along the front of one of the sukkah-walls.*
- O. *What might you have said? In such a case we do not have the requisite area of sukkah-roofing that renders a sukkah valid.*
- P. *So we are informed that we do not invoke that consideration here.*
- Q. Rabbah bar bar Hana said R. Yohanan [said], "The ruling was necessitated only to deal with a case of a sukkah, in the greater part of which the shade cast by the sukkah-roofing was more than the light let through it, and the smaller part of which was such that the light let through by the sukkah-roofing was greater than the shade cast by it.
- R. *"What might you have said? Let the sukkah be treated as invalid in that part of it in which the light was greater than the shade.*
- S. *"So we are informed that that is not the case."*
- T. *[If this is how we interpret the statement at hand, then] what can be the sense of "protruding"?*
- U. *"Protruding from the status of that which validates the sukkah [namely, the requisite trait of having more shade than light cast by the sukkah-roofing]."*
- V. *R. Oshaia said, "The ruling at hand was necessitated only to deal with a sukkah-roofing that is unfit, which covered an area of less than three handbreadths of a small sukkah [one less than seven handbreadths in all].*
- W. *"What in such a case is meant by 'protruding'?"*
- X. *"'Protruding' from the status of being a sukkah at all!"*
- Y. *R. Hoshaia objected, "Why not regard the invalid roofing as no more worthy of consideration than a gap in the sukkah-roofing. Will a gap in the sukkah roofing*

of less than three handbreadths in a small sukkah invalidate the sukkah? [Surely not! Then why make such a statement at all?]”

Z. *Said R. Abba to him, “In the former case [of invalid roofing] the improperly covered roof joins together with the properly covered roof, so people may sleep under that space [and so carry out their obligation], while in the latter case [the gap in the covering], the uncovered space joins together with covered space, but people may not sleep under that uncovered space.”*

AA. *But can there be a case in which an invalid area joins together with a valid area, and yet the invalid area itself remains invalid [such as Abba has just now posited]?*

BB. *Said R. Isaac b. Eliashab, “This is indeed the case. [19B] Mud that is sufficiently diluted to flow will prove the case. For it joins together [with valid water in an immersion pool] to form the requisite volume of forty seahs of water, yet a person who immerses in such a pool [with the requisite volume of liquid, but inadequate contents] does not gain credit for his act of immersion [and remains unclean, while the volume of the pool by itself is valid]. [That would be a perfectly parallel case].”*

M. 1:9H is independent. The sukkah-roofing must be close to the wall and not suspended in the center of the ceiling. M. 1:10A-B restate the point of M. 1:9H, but with a different measurement in the case in which there is roofing, not empty space, in the gap. At C we have a roof extending more than four cubits from the walls on the sides of the courtyard, and open space in the center. If the center is provided with sukkah-roofing up to within four cubits of the existing roof, it is valid. If, D-E, between the walls of the sukkah and the valid roofing, there are four cubits of invalid roofing, it is invalid. The sizable Talmud at hand pursues its own interests and intersects mainly for using the Mishnah-paragraph for illustrative purposes. Unit I, for its part, starts with a familiar exercise of proving that the Mishnah does not repeat itself, the only word-for-word exegesis. Unit II:1 asks an independent question, namely, the comparison between two sorts of invalid space in sukkah-roofing, one, a gap, the other, a filling of invalid materials. Each is supposedly subject to a distinct minimum measure for invalidating the sukkah-roofing. Unit II:2 provides a second version of the same dispute, and this, as we see, provides a mirror-image of the discussion at M. 1:6. It seems to me the person who has made up these protracted discussions had a rather sophisticated and comprehensive notion of how he wished to pursue the issue at hand. At unit III:1 we revert to the Mishnah-paragraph, now to M. 1:10A. We see that this passage has been constructed around its own framework — Ishmael’s sayings in his father’s name — and not around our Mishnah-passage.

1:11 A-D

- A. **He who makes his sukkah in the shape of a cone or who leaned it up against a wall —**
- B. **R. Eliezer declares it invalid,**
- C. **because it has no roof.**
- D. **And sages declare it valid.**

I.1 A. [He who makes his sukkah in the shape of a cone or who leaned it up against a wall — R. Eliezer declares it invalid, because it has no roof. And sages declare it valid:] *A Tannaite statement:*

B. **R. Eliezer concedes that if one raised [the sukkah] a handbreadth above the ground or moved it a handbreadth away from the wall [as the case may be], it is a valid sukkah.** [Now we have a roof, constituted either by the raised sukkah or by the space between the sukkah and the wall, with the open air space deemed fictively filled in, as we recall] [T. **Suk. 1:10B-D**].

C. *What is the reason behind rabbis' ruling?*

D. The inclining wall of the tent is deemed to fall into the category of a tent.

I.2. A. *Abbaye came upon R. Joseph, who was sleeping in a sukkah in a bridal bed [with curtains that sloped down from a point, not forming a roof]. He said to him, "In accord with whose opinion do you do so? [You clearly regard it as all right to sleep in a sukkah in a covered bed. Presumably this is because you do not regard the canopy as intervening and forming a roof between the bed and the sukkah-roofing.] Is this in accord with R. Eliezer [who does not regard a sloping roof as a roof at all]? Have you then abandoned the [majority] view of rabbis and acted in accord with R. Eliezer [a minority]?"*

B. *He said to him, "There is a baraita [a Tannaite teaching alternative to the version now in the Mishnah] that has matters reversed: 'R. Eliezer declares [the arrangement] valid, and sages declare it invalid.'"*

C. *He said to him, "Do you then abandon the version of matter that is presented by the Mishnah and act in accord with the alternative version that is presented in a mere baraita [of lesser reliability]?"*

D. *He said to him, "The version of the Mishnah in any case stands for the viewpoint only of an individual, for it has been taught on Tannaite authority:*

E. *"He who makes his sukkah in the shape of a cone or who leaned it up against a wall —*

F. *"R. Nathan says R. Eliezer declares it invalid, because it has no roof, and sages declare it valid."*

The Talmud's two units provide an amplification of the rule at hand (I: 1) and then a set of secondary versions of the same matter (I: 2), which, by the way, provide good examples of what is at issue.

1:11 E-J

E. **A large reed-mat,**

F. **[if] one made it for lying, it is susceptible to uncleanness, and [so] they do not make sukkah-roofing out of it.**

G. **[If one made it] for sukkah-roofing, they make sukkah-roofing out of it, and it is not susceptible to uncleanness.**

H. **R. Eliezer says, "All the same are a small one and a large one:**

I. **"[if] one made it for lying, it is susceptible to uncleanness, and they do not make sukkah-roofing out of it.**

J. **"[If one made it for] sukkah-roofing, they do make sukkah-roofing out of it, and it is not susceptible to uncleanness."**

I.1 A. *Now there is a contradiction in the body of the formulation of the law.*

B. *You have said: **If one made [the mat] for lying, it is susceptible to uncleanness and they do not make sukkah-roofing out of it** [M. 1:11F].*

C. *The operative consideration therefore is that one has made it for use for lying. Lo, if it was made without further indication of its intended use, it is assumed to be meant to serve for sukkah-roofing.*

D. *But then the framer of the passage states: **If one made it for sukkah-roofing, they make sukkah-roofing out of it, and it is not susceptible to uncleanness** [M. 1:11G].*

E. *The operative consideration therefore is that one has made it for sukkah-roofing. Lo, if it was made without further indication of its intended use, it is meant to serve for lying.*

F. *Lo, there is no internal contradiction at all. In one case, we speak of a large mat, in the other of a small mat.*

G. **R. Eliezer says, “All the same are a small one and a large one: If one made it for lying, it is susceptible to uncleanness, and they do not make sukkah-roofing out of it” [M. 1:11H-I].**

H. *The operative consideration therefore is that one has made it for use for lying. Lo, if it was made without further indication of its intended use, it is meant to serve for sukkah-roofing.*

I. *Then I point to the concluding part of his statement: **If one made it for sukkah-roofing, they do make sukkah-roofing out of it, and it is not susceptible to uncleanness** [M. 1:11J].*

J. *The operative consideration therefore is that one has made it for sukkah-roofing. Lo, if it was made without further indication of its intended use, it is meant to serve for lying.*

K. *Rather, said Raba, “In the case of a large mat, all parties concur that one made without further indication as to its intended use is meant for sukkah-roofing.*

L. *“Where there is a dispute, it concerns a small mat. The anonymous Tannaite authority, [whose opinion appears] first, takes the position that a small mat made without indication as to its intended use is for lying, and R. Eliezer takes the view that such a mat also may serve for sukkah roofing.*

M. **“[20A] This then is the sense of the passage: ‘As to a large reed-mat, if one made it for lying, it is susceptible to uncleanness and so they do not make sukkah-roofing out of it.**

N. *“The operative consideration is that one has made it for lying. Lo, one made without clear indication as to its intended use is as if one has made it for sukkah-roofing, and so people may use it for sukkah-roofing.*

O. *“R. Eliezer comes along to contribute the view [concurring with the foregoing] that all the same is the rule for the large mat and for the small one. If it was made without further indication as to its intended use, it is valid for sukkah-roofing.”*

P. *Said Abbaye to him, “If that were so, when we take note of the language at hand: **R. Eliezer says, ‘All the same are a small one and a large one’** [M. 1:11H].*

- Q. *“But within the stated theory, it should read, ‘All the same is the rule for (1) a large one and (2) a small one, [for that order of wording is dictated by the theory of Eliezer’s intended point given just now].*
- R. *“And furthermore, where there is a dispute [in the formulated Mishnah as we have it] it is in the case of a large mat that the matter is stated, and R. Eliezer adopts the more stringent ruling.*
- S. *“For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: ‘In the case of a reed mat, with a large one, people may make sukkah-roofing out of it’ [Slotki, p. 85, n. 6: From which it follows that if a large mat was made without specific purpose it is regarded as made for a covering according to the first Tannaite authority, while according to R. Eliezer it is regarded as made for lying upon].”*
- T. *Rather, said R. Pappa, “In the case of a small mat all parties concur that if it is made without indication as to its intended use, it is meant for lying.*
- U. *“Where there is a dispute, it concerns a large mat.*
- V. *“The first authority takes the position that a large mat made without further indication as to its purpose is meant for sukkah-roofing, and R. Eliezer maintains that a large mat made without further indication as to its intended roof may serve, as well, for lying.*
- W. *“And what is the sense of the phrasing, If one made it for lying? This is the sense of the passage: ‘If it is made without further specification as to the purpose of making it, it may serve also for lying, unless one prepared it for use as sukkah-roofing.’ [Slotki, p. 85, n. 9: The statement of the first Tannaite authority is thus explained as before, that the first clause refers to a large mat, as was explicitly stated, while the latter clause refers to a small mat, the meaning being that if the mat was a small one, that was made specifically for a covering it may be used as a sukkah-covering, while ordinarily it is assumed to be intended for lying upon. To this R. Eliezer objected: A large mat also is subject to the same law as a small one, that if made for no specific purpose it is deemed to have been made for lying upon, is susceptible to ritual uncleanness and may not be used as a sukkah-covering, but if it was expressly made to serve as a covering it may be used as a sukkah-covering and is not susceptible to uncleanness.]”*

I.2. A. *Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority:*

- B. **A reed made mat of wicker or of straw.**
- C. **[if it is] large, they do use it for sukkah-roofing.**
- D. **[If it is small], they do not use it for sukkah-roofing [M. 1:11E-G].**
- E. **And one made of reeds or of helaf —**
- F. **[if it is] large, they use it for sukkah-roofing.**
- G. **[If it is] woven, they do not use it for sukkah-roofing.**
- H. **R. Ishmael b. R. Yosé said in the name of his father, “Even one which is woven do they use for sukkah-roofing.”**
- I. **And so did R. Dosa rule in accord with his opinion [T. Suk. 1:10E-L].**
- J. *There we have learned in the Mishnah:*
- K. **“All rush mats are susceptible only to corpse uncleanness [and not to midras-uncleanness],” the words of R. Dosa.**

- L. **And sages say, “To midras-uncleanness” [M. Ed. 3:4A-B].** [Midras-uncleanness affects what is used for lying or sitting.]
- M. *To midras-uncleanness but not to corpse-uncleanness?*
- N. *And lo, we have learned in the Mishnah: **Whatever is susceptible to midras-uncleanness is susceptible to corpse-uncleanness** [M. Nid. 6:3].*
- O. *Then say [for C], “Also to midras-uncleanness.”*
- P. *What are rush-mats?*
- Q. Said R. Abimi bar Hammedrui, “Marzublé.”
- R. *What are marzumbélé?*
- S. Said R. Abba, “[Slotki:] Bags filled with foliage.”
- T. R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Actual rush-mats.”
- U. *And R. Simeon b. Laqish is consistent with views expressed elsewhere, for R. Simeon b. Laqish said, “Lo, I am atonement for R. Hiyya and his sons, for in the beginning, when the Torah was forgotten in Israel, Ezra came up from Babylonia and placed it on solid foundations. When it was once more forgotten, Hillel the Babylonian came up and placed it on solid foundations. When it was forgotten yet again, R. Hiyya and his sons came up and placed it again on solid foundations.*
- V. *“And so did R. Hiyya and his sons say, ‘R. Dosa and sages did not dispute concerning reed mats made in Usha, [20B] which [they concur] are susceptible to uncleanness, nor concerning those of Tiberias, [concurring] that they are not susceptible to uncleanness.*
- W. *“Concerning what sort of mats did they differ? Concerning those that come from other places.*
- X. *“One authority [who holds that they are not used for sitting and so are not susceptible to midras-uncleanness] takes the view that, since no one sits on them, they fall into the category of those of Tiberias, and the other maintains that since, from time to time, people do sit on them, they fall into the category of the mats made in Usha.”*

- I.3.** A. A master has stated, “All rush mats are susceptible to corpse-uncleanness [alone], ‘the words of R. Dosa.”
- B. *But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: “**And so did R. Dosa rule in accordance with his opinion** [T. Suk. 1:10 I]”?* [The reference is to Yosé’s view that the mats under discussion may be used for sukkah-roofing, cf. above, 2.H. It must follow that the mats are not susceptible.]
- C. *There is no contradiction at hand. In the one case, the mat has a rim, in the other it has no rim. [The latter cannot be used for sitting but only for sukkah-roofing and does not fall into the category of a utensil.]*
- D. *An objection was raised from the following teaching: “Mats made of bamboo, reed grass, sacking, and goat’s hair are susceptible [only] to corpse-uncleanness,” the words of R. Dosa.*
- E. *And sages say, “Also to midras-uncleanness [since they may be used for sitting].”*
- F. *Now with regard to him who the one who has said that [under discussion] are “bags filled with foliage,” there is no problem, for those made of bamboo and of*

reed grass serve for baling produce, while those of sacking and goat's hair may serve for [Slotki:] haversacks or baskets.

- G. *But in the view of him who has said that [under discussion] are actual mats, while there is no difficulty with reference to those of sacking and goat's hair, which they may serve for curtains or sieves, what can one do with those of bamboo or reed-grass?*
- H. *They may serve for brewing vats' [covers].*
- I. *There are those who state the foregoing as follows: Now with regard to the one who maintains that at issue [in the cited passage] are actual mats, those of bamboo and reed grass serve full well for brewing vats, and those of sacking and goat's hair serve for curtains or for sieves.*
- J. *But in the view of him who has said that under discussion are bags filled with foliage, while there is no problem with respect to those of sacking and goat's hair, which serve for haversacks and baskets, respectively, what use is there for those made of bamboo and reed grass?*
- K. *They may be used for baling fruit.*

I.4. A. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority.*

- B. Said R. Hananiah, "When I went down to the Exile, I found an old man, who said to me, 'They make sukkah-roofing with reed mats.'
- C. "When I came to R. Joshua, my father's brother, he accepted his opinion."
- D. *Said R. Hisda, "That is the case if it has no rim. "*
- E. *Said Ulla, "As to the reed mats of the people of Mahoza, were it not for their 'wall,' [rim], people could make sukkah-roofing of them. "*
- F. *It has been taught on Tannaite authority along these same lines:*
- G. People may make sukkah-roofing with reed mats, but if they have a wall [rim], people may not make sukkah-roofing with them.

Complementing M. 1:4F-G, the dispute of M. 1:11E-G vs. H-J is on Eliezer's view that one's intention for the mat, not the dimensions of the mat, is definitive of its character. E-G insist not one's plan for using the mat but one's act in making it is definitive. Unit I subjects the formulation of the Mishnah to a close reading, which allows reference to secondary considerations. Unit I:2 begins with Tosefta's complement, which is cited not only to complement the Mishnah but also to set the stage for the discussion of the matter of mats, such as at M. 1:11E. At the same time the issues of M. 1:11E-J — the consideration for what is susceptible to uncleanness — are worked out. Nos. 3 and 4 carry forward the same topical inquiry, so the entire construction is devoted to the exegesis of the Mishnah-paragraph.